instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
235k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void vga_dumb_update_retrace_info(VGACommonState *s)
{
(void) s;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 3,004
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: bool GLES2DecoderImpl::GenBuffersHelper(GLsizei n, const GLuint* client_ids) {
for (GLsizei ii = 0; ii < n; ++ii) {
if (GetBufferInfo(client_ids[ii])) {
return false;
}
}
scoped_array<GLuint> service_ids(new GLuint[n]);
glGenBuffersARB(n, service_ids.get());
for (GLsizei ii = 0; ii < n; ++ii) {
CreateBufferInfo(client_ids[ii], service_ids[ii]);
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
[email protected]
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 99,202
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType WriteMONOImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
Image *image)
{
MagickBooleanType
status;
register const PixelPacket
*p;
register ssize_t
x;
size_t
bit,
byte;
ssize_t
y;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
/*
Convert image to a bi-level image.
*/
(void) SetImageType(image,BilevelType);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
bit=0;
byte=0;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
byte>>=1;
if (image->endian == LSBEndian)
{
if (GetPixelLuma(image,p) < (QuantumRange/2.0))
byte|=0x80;
}
else
if (GetPixelLuma(image,p) >= (QuantumRange/2.0))
byte|=0x80;
bit++;
if (bit == 8)
{
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) byte);
bit=0;
byte=0;
}
p++;
}
if (bit != 0)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) (byte >> (8-bit)));
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 71,606
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: TabContents* PrintPreviewHandler::GetInitiatorTab() const {
printing::PrintPreviewTabController* tab_controller =
printing::PrintPreviewTabController::GetInstance();
if (!tab_controller)
return NULL;
return tab_controller->GetInitiatorTab(preview_tab_contents());
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 105,794
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void PDFiumEngine::OnTouchTimerCallback(int id) {
if (!touch_timers_.count(id))
return;
HandleLongPress(touch_timers_[id]);
KillTouchTimer(id);
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Use a temporary list when unloading pages
When traversing the |deferred_page_unloads_| list and handling the
unloads it's possible for new pages to get added to the list which will
invalidate the iterator.
This CL swaps the list with an empty list and does the iteration on the
list copy. New items that are unloaded while handling the defers will be
unloaded at a later point.
Bug: 780450
Change-Id: Ic7ced1c82227109784fb536ce19a4dd51b9119ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758916
Commit-Queue: dsinclair <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#515056}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 146,185
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: bool Get(int64 metahandle, syncable::IndexedBitField field) {
return GetField(metahandle, field, false);
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 105,099
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: Node* EventTargetNodeForDocument(Document* doc) {
if (!doc)
return 0;
Node* node = doc->FocusedElement();
if (!node && doc->IsPluginDocument()) {
PluginDocument* plugin_document = ToPluginDocument(doc);
node = plugin_document->PluginNode();
}
if (!node && doc->IsHTMLDocument())
node = doc->body();
if (!node)
node = doc->documentElement();
return node;
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 134,067
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void stringArrayFunctionMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::ExecutionContext, "stringArrayFunction", "TestObject", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
exceptionState.throwTypeError(ExceptionMessages::notEnoughArguments(1, info.Length()));
exceptionState.throwIfNeeded();
return;
}
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_VOID(Vector<String>, values, toNativeArray<String>(info[0], 1, info.GetIsolate()));
Vector<String> result = imp->stringArrayFunction(values, exceptionState);
if (exceptionState.throwIfNeeded())
return;
v8SetReturnValue(info, v8Array(result, info.GetIsolate()));
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 121,994
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void ext4_ext_try_to_merge(handle_t *handle,
struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_ext_path *path,
struct ext4_extent *ex) {
struct ext4_extent_header *eh;
unsigned int depth;
int merge_done = 0;
depth = ext_depth(inode);
BUG_ON(path[depth].p_hdr == NULL);
eh = path[depth].p_hdr;
if (ex > EXT_FIRST_EXTENT(eh))
merge_done = ext4_ext_try_to_merge_right(inode, path, ex - 1);
if (!merge_done)
(void) ext4_ext_try_to_merge_right(inode, path, ex);
ext4_ext_try_to_merge_up(handle, inode, path);
}
Commit Message: ext4: race-condition protection for ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio
We assumed that at the time we call ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio()
extent in question is fully inside [map.m_lblk, map->m_len] because
it was already split during submission. But this may not be true due to
a race between writeback vs fallocate.
If extent in question is larger than requested we will split it again.
Special precautions should being done if zeroout required because
[map.m_lblk, map->m_len] already contains valid data.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Monakhov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 18,587
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: SECURITY_STATUS credssp_decrypt_public_key_echo(rdpCredssp* credssp)
{
int length;
BYTE* buffer;
ULONG pfQOP;
BYTE* public_key1;
BYTE* public_key2;
int public_key_length;
SecBuffer Buffers[2];
SecBufferDesc Message;
SECURITY_STATUS status;
if (credssp->PublicKey.cbBuffer + credssp->ContextSizes.cbMaxSignature != credssp->pubKeyAuth.cbBuffer)
{
fprintf(stderr, "unexpected pubKeyAuth buffer size:%d\n", (int) credssp->pubKeyAuth.cbBuffer);
return SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN;
}
length = credssp->pubKeyAuth.cbBuffer;
buffer = (BYTE*) malloc(length);
CopyMemory(buffer, credssp->pubKeyAuth.pvBuffer, length);
public_key_length = credssp->PublicKey.cbBuffer;
Buffers[0].BufferType = SECBUFFER_TOKEN; /* Signature */
Buffers[1].BufferType = SECBUFFER_DATA; /* Encrypted TLS Public Key */
Buffers[0].cbBuffer = credssp->ContextSizes.cbMaxSignature;
Buffers[0].pvBuffer = buffer;
Buffers[1].cbBuffer = length - credssp->ContextSizes.cbMaxSignature;
Buffers[1].pvBuffer = buffer + credssp->ContextSizes.cbMaxSignature;
Message.cBuffers = 2;
Message.ulVersion = SECBUFFER_VERSION;
Message.pBuffers = (PSecBuffer) &Buffers;
status = credssp->table->DecryptMessage(&credssp->context, &Message, credssp->recv_seq_num++, &pfQOP);
if (status != SEC_E_OK)
{
fprintf(stderr, "DecryptMessage failure: 0x%08X\n", status);
return status;
}
public_key1 = (BYTE*) credssp->PublicKey.pvBuffer;
public_key2 = (BYTE*) Buffers[1].pvBuffer;
if (!credssp->server)
{
/* server echos the public key +1 */
ap_integer_decrement_le(public_key2, public_key_length);
}
if (memcmp(public_key1, public_key2, public_key_length) != 0)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Could not verify server's public key echo\n");
fprintf(stderr, "Expected (length = %d):\n", public_key_length);
winpr_HexDump(public_key1, public_key_length);
fprintf(stderr, "Actual (length = %d):\n", public_key_length);
winpr_HexDump(public_key2, public_key_length);
return SEC_E_MESSAGE_ALTERED; /* DO NOT SEND CREDENTIALS! */
}
free(buffer);
return SEC_E_OK;
}
Commit Message: nla: invalidate sec handle after creation
If sec pointer isn't invalidated after creation it is not possible
to check if the upper and lower pointers are valid.
This fixes a segfault in the server part if the client disconnects before
the authentication was finished.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 58,514
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewGuest::SetBounds(const gfx::Rect& rect) {
SetSize(rect.size());
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 115,048
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void __sched wait_for_completion(struct completion *x)
{
wait_for_common(x, MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT, TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
LKML-Reference: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 22,658
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void *__netdev_alloc_frag(unsigned int fragsz, gfp_t gfp_mask)
{
struct netdev_alloc_cache *nc;
void *data = NULL;
int order;
unsigned long flags;
local_irq_save(flags);
nc = &__get_cpu_var(netdev_alloc_cache);
if (unlikely(!nc->frag.page)) {
refill:
for (order = NETDEV_FRAG_PAGE_MAX_ORDER; ;) {
gfp_t gfp = gfp_mask;
if (order)
gfp |= __GFP_COMP | __GFP_NOWARN;
nc->frag.page = alloc_pages(gfp, order);
if (likely(nc->frag.page))
break;
if (--order < 0)
goto end;
}
nc->frag.size = PAGE_SIZE << order;
recycle:
atomic_set(&nc->frag.page->_count, NETDEV_PAGECNT_MAX_BIAS);
nc->pagecnt_bias = NETDEV_PAGECNT_MAX_BIAS;
nc->frag.offset = 0;
}
if (nc->frag.offset + fragsz > nc->frag.size) {
/* avoid unnecessary locked operations if possible */
if ((atomic_read(&nc->frag.page->_count) == nc->pagecnt_bias) ||
atomic_sub_and_test(nc->pagecnt_bias, &nc->frag.page->_count))
goto recycle;
goto refill;
}
data = page_address(nc->frag.page) + nc->frag.offset;
nc->frag.offset += fragsz;
nc->pagecnt_bias--;
end:
local_irq_restore(flags);
return data;
}
Commit Message: skbuff: skb_segment: orphan frags before copying
skb_segment copies frags around, so we need
to copy them carefully to avoid accessing
user memory after reporting completion to userspace
through a callback.
skb_segment doesn't normally happen on datapath:
TSO needs to be disabled - so disabling zero copy
in this case does not look like a big deal.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 39,850
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int mct_u232_set_modem_ctrl(struct usb_serial_port *port,
unsigned int control_state)
{
int rc;
unsigned char mcr;
unsigned char *buf;
buf = kmalloc(MCT_U232_MAX_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (buf == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
mcr = MCT_U232_MCR_NONE;
if (control_state & TIOCM_DTR)
mcr |= MCT_U232_MCR_DTR;
if (control_state & TIOCM_RTS)
mcr |= MCT_U232_MCR_RTS;
buf[0] = mcr;
rc = usb_control_msg(port->serial->dev, usb_sndctrlpipe(port->serial->dev, 0),
MCT_U232_SET_MODEM_CTRL_REQUEST,
MCT_U232_SET_REQUEST_TYPE,
0, 0, buf, MCT_U232_SET_MODEM_CTRL_SIZE,
WDR_TIMEOUT);
kfree(buf);
dev_dbg(&port->dev, "set_modem_ctrl: state=0x%x ==> mcr=0x%x\n", control_state, mcr);
if (rc < 0) {
dev_err(&port->dev, "Set MODEM CTRL 0x%x failed (error = %d)\n", mcr, rc);
return rc;
}
return 0;
} /* mct_u232_set_modem_ctrl */
Commit Message: USB: mct_u232: add sanity checking in probe
An attack using the lack of sanity checking in probe is known. This
patch checks for the existence of a second port.
CVE-2016-3136
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <[email protected]>
CC: [email protected]
[johan: add error message ]
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 54,266
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static inline void gen_stos(DisasContext *s, TCGMemOp ot)
{
gen_op_mov_v_reg(MO_32, cpu_T0, R_EAX);
gen_string_movl_A0_EDI(s);
gen_op_st_v(s, ot, cpu_T0, cpu_A0);
gen_op_movl_T0_Dshift(ot);
gen_op_add_reg_T0(s->aflag, R_EDI);
}
Commit Message: tcg/i386: Check the size of instruction being translated
This fixes the bug: 'user-to-root privesc inside VM via bad translation
caching' reported by Jann Horn here:
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1122
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <[email protected]>
CC: Peter Maydell <[email protected]>
CC: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pranith Kumar <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-94
| 0
| 66,414
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void V8TestObject::VoidMethodTestInterfaceEmptyArgMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_voidMethodTestInterfaceEmptyArg");
test_object_v8_internal::VoidMethodTestInterfaceEmptyArgMethod(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 135,490
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: virtual void RunWork() {
if (!base::TruncatePlatformFile(file_, length_))
set_error_code(base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_FAILED);
}
Commit Message: Fix a small leak in FileUtilProxy
BUG=none
TEST=green mem bots
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7669046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97451 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 97,682
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: add_printer_state_reasons(
cupsd_client_t *con, /* I - Client connection */
cupsd_printer_t *p) /* I - Printer info */
{
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG2,
"add_printer_state_reasons(%p[%d], %p[%s])",
con, con->number, p, p->name);
if (p->num_reasons == 0)
ippAddString(con->response, IPP_TAG_PRINTER, IPP_TAG_KEYWORD,
"printer-state-reasons", NULL, "none");
else
ippAddStrings(con->response, IPP_TAG_PRINTER, IPP_TAG_KEYWORD,
"printer-state-reasons", p->num_reasons, NULL,
(const char * const *)p->reasons);
}
Commit Message: DBUS notifications could crash the scheduler (Issue #5143)
- scheduler/ipp.c: Make sure requesting-user-name string is valid UTF-8.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 85,313
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: xprt_setup_rdma_bc(struct xprt_create *args)
{
struct rpc_xprt *xprt;
struct rpcrdma_xprt *new_xprt;
if (args->addrlen > sizeof(xprt->addr)) {
dprintk("RPC: %s: address too large\n", __func__);
return ERR_PTR(-EBADF);
}
xprt = xprt_alloc(args->net, sizeof(*new_xprt),
RPCRDMA_MAX_BC_REQUESTS,
RPCRDMA_MAX_BC_REQUESTS);
if (!xprt) {
dprintk("RPC: %s: couldn't allocate rpc_xprt\n",
__func__);
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
xprt->timeout = &xprt_rdma_bc_timeout;
xprt_set_bound(xprt);
xprt_set_connected(xprt);
xprt->bind_timeout = RPCRDMA_BIND_TO;
xprt->reestablish_timeout = RPCRDMA_INIT_REEST_TO;
xprt->idle_timeout = RPCRDMA_IDLE_DISC_TO;
xprt->prot = XPRT_TRANSPORT_BC_RDMA;
xprt->tsh_size = RPCRDMA_HDRLEN_MIN / sizeof(__be32);
xprt->ops = &xprt_rdma_bc_procs;
memcpy(&xprt->addr, args->dstaddr, args->addrlen);
xprt->addrlen = args->addrlen;
xprt_rdma_format_addresses(xprt, (struct sockaddr *)&xprt->addr);
xprt->resvport = 0;
xprt->max_payload = xprt_rdma_max_inline_read;
new_xprt = rpcx_to_rdmax(xprt);
new_xprt->rx_buf.rb_bc_max_requests = xprt->max_reqs;
xprt_get(xprt);
args->bc_xprt->xpt_bc_xprt = xprt;
xprt->bc_xprt = args->bc_xprt;
if (!try_module_get(THIS_MODULE))
goto out_fail;
/* Final put for backchannel xprt is in __svc_rdma_free */
xprt_get(xprt);
return xprt;
out_fail:
xprt_rdma_free_addresses(xprt);
args->bc_xprt->xpt_bc_xprt = NULL;
args->bc_xprt->xpt_bc_xps = NULL;
xprt_put(xprt);
xprt_free(xprt);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,966
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: bool AutocompleteEditModel::IsSpaceCharForAcceptingKeyword(wchar_t c) {
switch (c) {
case 0x0020: // Space
case 0x3000: // Ideographic Space
return true;
default:
return false;
}
}
Commit Message: Adds per-provider information to omnibox UMA logs.
Adds a fairly general structure to omnibox logs that can be used to pass information (that's not per-result information) from providers to the UMA logs. Right now it's only used to pass whether the asynchronous pass of a provider has finished, but it will probably be used for other things in the future.
BUG=
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10380007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137288 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 103,845
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int perf_event_read_group(struct perf_event *event,
u64 read_format, char __user *buf)
{
struct perf_event *leader = event->group_leader, *sub;
int n = 0, size = 0, ret = -EFAULT;
struct perf_event_context *ctx = leader->ctx;
u64 values[5];
u64 count, enabled, running;
mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex);
count = perf_event_read_value(leader, &enabled, &running);
values[n++] = 1 + leader->nr_siblings;
if (read_format & PERF_FORMAT_TOTAL_TIME_ENABLED)
values[n++] = enabled;
if (read_format & PERF_FORMAT_TOTAL_TIME_RUNNING)
values[n++] = running;
values[n++] = count;
if (read_format & PERF_FORMAT_ID)
values[n++] = primary_event_id(leader);
size = n * sizeof(u64);
if (copy_to_user(buf, values, size))
goto unlock;
ret = size;
list_for_each_entry(sub, &leader->sibling_list, group_entry) {
n = 0;
values[n++] = perf_event_read_value(sub, &enabled, &running);
if (read_format & PERF_FORMAT_ID)
values[n++] = primary_event_id(sub);
size = n * sizeof(u64);
if (copy_to_user(buf + ret, values, size)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto unlock;
}
ret += size;
}
unlock:
mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix event->ctx locking
There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around
changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those.
It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please
give it some thought in review.
What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of
event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 1
| 166,986
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void DateTimeFieldElement::didBlur()
{
if (m_fieldOwner)
m_fieldOwner->didBlurFromField();
}
Commit Message: INPUT_MULTIPLE_FIELDS_UI: Inconsistent value of aria-valuetext attribute
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=107897
Reviewed by Kentaro Hara.
Source/WebCore:
aria-valuetext and aria-valuenow attributes had inconsistent values in
a case of initial empty state and a case that a user clears a field.
- aria-valuetext attribute should have "blank" message in the initial
empty state.
- aria-valuenow attribute should be removed in the cleared empty state.
Also, we have a bug that aira-valuenow had a symbolic value such as "AM"
"January". It should always have a numeric value according to the
specification.
http://www.w3.org/TR/wai-aria/states_and_properties#aria-valuenow
No new tests. Updates fast/forms/*-multiple-fields/*-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html.
* html/shadow/DateTimeFieldElement.cpp:
(WebCore::DateTimeFieldElement::DateTimeFieldElement):
Set "blank" message to aria-valuetext attribute.
(WebCore::DateTimeFieldElement::updateVisibleValue):
aria-valuenow attribute should be a numeric value. Apply String::number
to the return value of valueForARIAValueNow.
Remove aria-valuenow attribute if nothing is selected.
(WebCore::DateTimeFieldElement::valueForARIAValueNow):
Added.
* html/shadow/DateTimeFieldElement.h:
(DateTimeFieldElement): Declare valueForARIAValueNow.
* html/shadow/DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement.cpp:
(WebCore::DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement::valueForARIAValueNow):
Added. Returns 1 + internal selection index.
For example, the function returns 1 for January.
* html/shadow/DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement.h:
(DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement): Declare valueForARIAValueNow.
LayoutTests:
Fix existing tests to show aria-valuenow attribute values.
* fast/forms/resources/multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js: Added.
* fast/forms/date-multiple-fields/date-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes-expected.txt:
* fast/forms/date-multiple-fields/date-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html:
Use multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js.
Add tests for initial empty-value state.
* fast/forms/month-multiple-fields/month-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes-expected.txt:
* fast/forms/month-multiple-fields/month-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html:
Use multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js.
* fast/forms/time-multiple-fields/time-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes-expected.txt:
* fast/forms/time-multiple-fields/time-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html:
Use multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@140803 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 103,230
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: add_file(cupsd_client_t *con, /* I - Connection to client */
cupsd_job_t *job, /* I - Job to add to */
mime_type_t *filetype, /* I - Type of file */
int compression) /* I - Compression */
{
mime_type_t **filetypes; /* New filetypes array... */
int *compressions; /* New compressions array... */
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG2,
"add_file(con=%p[%d], job=%d, filetype=%s/%s, "
"compression=%d)", con, con ? con->number : -1, job->id,
filetype->super, filetype->type, compression);
/*
* Add the file to the job...
*/
if (job->num_files == 0)
{
compressions = (int *)malloc(sizeof(int));
filetypes = (mime_type_t **)malloc(sizeof(mime_type_t *));
}
else
{
compressions = (int *)realloc(job->compressions,
(size_t)(job->num_files + 1) * sizeof(int));
filetypes = (mime_type_t **)realloc(job->filetypes,
(size_t)(job->num_files + 1) *
sizeof(mime_type_t *));
}
if (compressions)
job->compressions = compressions;
if (filetypes)
job->filetypes = filetypes;
if (!compressions || !filetypes)
{
cupsdSetJobState(job, IPP_JOB_ABORTED, CUPSD_JOB_PURGE,
"Job aborted because the scheduler ran out of memory.");
if (con)
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_INTERNAL_ERROR,
_("Unable to allocate memory for file types."));
return (-1);
}
job->compressions[job->num_files] = compression;
job->filetypes[job->num_files] = filetype;
job->num_files ++;
job->dirty = 1;
cupsdMarkDirty(CUPSD_DIRTY_JOBS);
return (0);
}
Commit Message: DBUS notifications could crash the scheduler (Issue #5143)
- scheduler/ipp.c: Make sure requesting-user-name string is valid UTF-8.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 85,309
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: GDataCache* GetGDataCache(Profile* profile) {
GDataSystemService* system_service =
GDataSystemServiceFactory::GetForProfile(profile);
return system_service ? system_service->cache() : NULL;
}
Commit Message: Revert 144993 - gdata: Remove invalid files in the cache directories
Broke linux_chromeos_valgrind:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20OS%20%28valgrind%29%285%29/builds/8628/steps/memory%20test%3A%20unit/logs/stdio
In theory, we shouldn't have any invalid files left in the
cache directories, but things can go wrong and invalid files
may be left if the device shuts down unexpectedly, for instance.
Besides, it's good to be defensive.
BUG=134862
TEST=added unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10693020
[email protected]
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145029 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 105,982
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void nested_free_all_saved_vmcss(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
{
struct vmcs02_list *item, *n;
list_for_each_entry_safe(item, n, &vmx->nested.vmcs02_pool, list) {
if (vmx->loaded_vmcs != &item->vmcs02)
free_loaded_vmcs(&item->vmcs02);
list_del(&item->list);
kfree(item);
}
vmx->nested.vmcs02_num = 0;
if (vmx->loaded_vmcs != &vmx->vmcs01)
free_loaded_vmcs(&vmx->vmcs01);
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 37,647
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void RenderViewHostImpl::ActivateNearestFindResult(int request_id,
float x,
float y) {
Send(new ViewMsg_ActivateNearestFindResult(GetRoutingID(), request_id, x, y));
}
Commit Message: Filter more incoming URLs in the CreateWindow path.
BUG=170532
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12036002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178728 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 117,152
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::ProcessMouseEvent(
const blink::WebMouseEvent& event,
const ui::LatencyInfo& latency) {
host_->ForwardMouseEventWithLatencyInfo(event, latency);
}
Commit Message: Allocate a FrameSinkId for RenderWidgetHostViewAura in mus+ash
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame expects its parent to have a valid
FrameSinkId. Make sure RenderWidgetHostViewAura has a FrameSinkId even
if DelegatedFrameHost is not used (in mus+ash).
BUG=706553
[email protected]
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2847253003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468179}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 132,289
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void LockContentsView::SetDisplayStyle(DisplayStyle style) {
const bool show_expanded_view =
style == DisplayStyle::kExclusivePublicAccountExpandedView;
expanded_view_->SetVisible(show_expanded_view);
main_view_->SetVisible(!show_expanded_view);
top_header_->SetVisible(!show_expanded_view);
Layout();
}
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 131,539
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: PassRefPtr<StringImpl> Document::displayStringModifiedByEncoding(PassRefPtr<StringImpl> str) const
{
if (m_decoder)
return m_decoder->encoding().displayString(str);
return str;
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 105,501
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: Browser::GetWebContentsModalDialogHost() {
return window_->GetWebContentsModalDialogHost();
}
Commit Message: Don't focus the location bar for NTP navigations in non-selected tabs.
BUG=677716
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2624373002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#443338}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 139,005
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: nvme_fc_parse_traddr(struct nvmet_fc_traddr *traddr, char *buf, size_t blen)
{
char name[2 + NVME_FC_TRADDR_HEXNAMELEN + 1];
substring_t wwn = { name, &name[sizeof(name)-1] };
int nnoffset, pnoffset;
/* validate it string one of the 2 allowed formats */
if (strnlen(buf, blen) == NVME_FC_TRADDR_MAXLENGTH &&
!strncmp(buf, "nn-0x", NVME_FC_TRADDR_OXNNLEN) &&
!strncmp(&buf[NVME_FC_TRADDR_MAX_PN_OFFSET],
"pn-0x", NVME_FC_TRADDR_OXNNLEN)) {
nnoffset = NVME_FC_TRADDR_OXNNLEN;
pnoffset = NVME_FC_TRADDR_MAX_PN_OFFSET +
NVME_FC_TRADDR_OXNNLEN;
} else if ((strnlen(buf, blen) == NVME_FC_TRADDR_MINLENGTH &&
!strncmp(buf, "nn-", NVME_FC_TRADDR_NNLEN) &&
!strncmp(&buf[NVME_FC_TRADDR_MIN_PN_OFFSET],
"pn-", NVME_FC_TRADDR_NNLEN))) {
nnoffset = NVME_FC_TRADDR_NNLEN;
pnoffset = NVME_FC_TRADDR_MIN_PN_OFFSET + NVME_FC_TRADDR_NNLEN;
} else
goto out_einval;
name[0] = '0';
name[1] = 'x';
name[2 + NVME_FC_TRADDR_HEXNAMELEN] = 0;
memcpy(&name[2], &buf[nnoffset], NVME_FC_TRADDR_HEXNAMELEN);
if (__nvme_fc_parse_u64(&wwn, &traddr->nn))
goto out_einval;
memcpy(&name[2], &buf[pnoffset], NVME_FC_TRADDR_HEXNAMELEN);
if (__nvme_fc_parse_u64(&wwn, &traddr->pn))
goto out_einval;
return 0;
out_einval:
pr_warn("%s: bad traddr string\n", __func__);
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: nvmet-fc: ensure target queue id within range.
When searching for queue id's ensure they are within the expected range.
Signed-off-by: James Smart <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 93,588
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int crypto_givcipher_default(struct crypto_alg *alg, u32 type, u32 mask)
{
struct rtattr *tb[3];
struct {
struct rtattr attr;
struct crypto_attr_type data;
} ptype;
struct {
struct rtattr attr;
struct crypto_attr_alg data;
} palg;
struct crypto_template *tmpl;
struct crypto_instance *inst;
struct crypto_alg *larval;
const char *geniv;
int err;
larval = crypto_larval_lookup(alg->cra_driver_name,
(type & ~CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK) |
CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_GIVCIPHER,
mask | CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK);
err = PTR_ERR(larval);
if (IS_ERR(larval))
goto out;
err = -EAGAIN;
if (!crypto_is_larval(larval))
goto drop_larval;
ptype.attr.rta_len = sizeof(ptype);
ptype.attr.rta_type = CRYPTOA_TYPE;
ptype.data.type = type | CRYPTO_ALG_GENIV;
/* GENIV tells the template that we're making a default geniv. */
ptype.data.mask = mask | CRYPTO_ALG_GENIV;
tb[0] = &ptype.attr;
palg.attr.rta_len = sizeof(palg);
palg.attr.rta_type = CRYPTOA_ALG;
/* Must use the exact name to locate ourselves. */
memcpy(palg.data.name, alg->cra_driver_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME);
tb[1] = &palg.attr;
tb[2] = NULL;
if ((alg->cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK) ==
CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER)
geniv = alg->cra_blkcipher.geniv;
else
geniv = alg->cra_ablkcipher.geniv;
if (!geniv)
geniv = crypto_default_geniv(alg);
tmpl = crypto_lookup_template(geniv);
err = -ENOENT;
if (!tmpl)
goto kill_larval;
inst = tmpl->alloc(tb);
err = PTR_ERR(inst);
if (IS_ERR(inst))
goto put_tmpl;
if ((err = crypto_register_instance(tmpl, inst))) {
tmpl->free(inst);
goto put_tmpl;
}
/* Redo the lookup to use the instance we just registered. */
err = -EAGAIN;
put_tmpl:
crypto_tmpl_put(tmpl);
kill_larval:
crypto_larval_kill(larval);
drop_larval:
crypto_mod_put(larval);
out:
crypto_mod_put(alg);
return err;
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 31,195
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void ndp_msg_addrto_adjust_all_routers(struct in6_addr *addr)
{
struct in6_addr any = IN6ADDR_ANY_INIT;
if (memcmp(addr, &any, sizeof(any)))
return;
addr->s6_addr32[0] = htonl(0xFF020000);
addr->s6_addr32[1] = 0;
addr->s6_addr32[2] = 0;
addr->s6_addr32[3] = htonl(0x2);
}
Commit Message: libndb: reject redirect and router advertisements from non-link-local
RFC4861 suggests that these messages should only originate from
link-local addresses in 6.1.2 (RA) and 8.1. (redirect):
Mitigates CVE-2016-3698.
Signed-off-by: Lubomir Rintel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 94,932
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::didCreateDocumentElement(blink::WebLocalFrame* frame) {
DCHECK(!frame_ || frame_ == frame);
GURL url = frame->document().url();
if (url.is_valid() && url.spec() != url::kAboutBlankURL) {
blink::WebFrame* main_frame = render_view_->webview()->mainFrame();
if (frame == main_frame) {
render_view_->Send(new ViewHostMsg_DocumentAvailableInMainFrame(
render_view_->GetRoutingID(),
main_frame->document().isPluginDocument()));
}
}
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(RenderFrameObserver, observers_,
DidCreateDocumentElement());
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(RenderViewObserver, render_view_->observers(),
DidCreateDocumentElement(frame));
}
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 123,226
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, offsetUnset)
{
char *fname, *error;
size_t fname_len;
phar_entry_info *entry;
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (PHAR_G(readonly) && !phar_obj->archive->is_data) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0, "Write operations disabled by the php.ini setting phar.readonly");
return;
}
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "s", &fname, &fname_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (zend_hash_str_exists(&phar_obj->archive->manifest, fname, (uint) fname_len)) {
if (NULL != (entry = zend_hash_str_find_ptr(&phar_obj->archive->manifest, fname, (uint) fname_len))) {
if (entry->is_deleted) {
/* entry is deleted, but has not been flushed to disk yet */
return;
}
if (phar_obj->archive->is_persistent) {
if (FAILURE == phar_copy_on_write(&(phar_obj->archive))) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "phar \"%s\" is persistent, unable to copy on write", phar_obj->archive->fname);
return;
}
/* re-populate entry after copy on write */
entry = zend_hash_str_find_ptr(&phar_obj->archive->manifest, fname, (uint) fname_len);
}
entry->is_modified = 0;
entry->is_deleted = 1;
/* we need to "flush" the stream to save the newly deleted file on disk */
phar_flush(phar_obj->archive, 0, 0, 0, &error);
if (error) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "%s", error);
efree(error);
}
RETURN_TRUE;
}
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 165,068
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoScheduleDCLayerCHROMIUM(GLuint y_texture_id,
GLuint uv_texture_id,
GLint z_order,
GLint content_x,
GLint content_y,
GLint content_width,
GLint content_height,
GLint quad_x,
GLint quad_y,
GLint quad_width,
GLint quad_height,
GLfloat transform_c1r1,
GLfloat transform_c2r1,
GLfloat transform_c1r2,
GLfloat transform_c2r2,
GLfloat transform_tx,
GLfloat transform_ty,
GLboolean is_clipped,
GLint clip_x,
GLint clip_y,
GLint clip_width,
GLint clip_height,
GLuint protected_video_type) {
if (protected_video_type >
static_cast<GLuint>(ui::ProtectedVideoType::kMaxValue)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glScheduleDCLayerCHROMIUM",
"invalid protected video type");
return;
}
GLuint texture_ids[] = {y_texture_id, uv_texture_id};
scoped_refptr<gl::GLImage> images[2];
size_t i = 0;
for (auto& texture_id : texture_ids) {
if (!texture_id) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glScheduleDCLayerCHROMIUM",
"invalid texture");
return;
}
TextureRef* ref = texture_manager()->GetTexture(texture_id);
if (!ref) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glScheduleDCLayerCHROMIUM",
"unknown texture");
return;
}
Texture::ImageState image_state;
gl::GLImage* image = ref->texture()->GetLevelImage(ref->texture()->target(),
0, &image_state);
if (!image) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glScheduleDCLayerCHROMIUM",
"unsupported texture format");
return;
}
images[i++] = scoped_refptr<gl::GLImage>(image);
}
ui::DCRendererLayerParams params;
params.y_image = std::move(images[0]);
params.uv_image = std::move(images[1]);
params.z_order = z_order;
params.content_rect =
gfx::Rect(content_x, content_y, content_width, content_height);
params.quad_rect = gfx::Rect(quad_x, quad_y, quad_width, quad_height);
params.transform =
gfx::Transform(transform_c1r1, transform_c2r1, transform_c1r2,
transform_c2r2, transform_tx, transform_ty);
params.is_clipped = is_clipped;
params.clip_rect = gfx::Rect(clip_x, clip_y, clip_width, clip_height);
params.protected_video_type =
static_cast<ui::ProtectedVideoType>(protected_video_type);
if (!surface_->ScheduleDCLayer(params)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "glScheduleDCLayerCHROMIUM",
"failed to schedule DCLayer");
}
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,371
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static CURLcode parse_connect_to_string(struct Curl_easy *data,
struct connectdata *conn,
const char *conn_to_host,
char **host_result,
int *port_result)
{
CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
const char *ptr = conn_to_host;
int host_match = FALSE;
int port_match = FALSE;
*host_result = NULL;
*port_result = -1;
if(*ptr == ':') {
/* an empty hostname always matches */
host_match = TRUE;
ptr++;
}
else {
/* check whether the URL's hostname matches */
size_t hostname_to_match_len;
char *hostname_to_match = aprintf("%s%s%s",
conn->bits.ipv6_ip ? "[" : "",
conn->host.name,
conn->bits.ipv6_ip ? "]" : "");
if(!hostname_to_match)
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
hostname_to_match_len = strlen(hostname_to_match);
host_match = strncasecompare(ptr, hostname_to_match,
hostname_to_match_len);
free(hostname_to_match);
ptr += hostname_to_match_len;
host_match = host_match && *ptr == ':';
ptr++;
}
if(host_match) {
if(*ptr == ':') {
/* an empty port always matches */
port_match = TRUE;
ptr++;
}
else {
/* check whether the URL's port matches */
char *ptr_next = strchr(ptr, ':');
if(ptr_next) {
char *endp = NULL;
long port_to_match = strtol(ptr, &endp, 10);
if((endp == ptr_next) && (port_to_match == conn->remote_port)) {
port_match = TRUE;
ptr = ptr_next + 1;
}
}
}
}
if(host_match && port_match) {
/* parse the hostname and port to connect to */
result = parse_connect_to_host_port(data, ptr, host_result, port_result);
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: Curl_close: clear data->multi_easy on free to avoid use-after-free
Regression from b46cfbc068 (7.59.0)
CVE-2018-16840
Reported-by: Brian Carpenter (Geeknik Labs)
Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2018-16840.html
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 77,804
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void Camera3Device::sProcessCaptureResult(const camera3_callback_ops *cb,
const camera3_capture_result *result) {
Camera3Device *d =
const_cast<Camera3Device*>(static_cast<const Camera3Device*>(cb));
d->processCaptureResult(result);
}
Commit Message: Camera3Device: Validate template ID
Validate template ID before creating a default request.
Bug: 26866110
Bug: 27568958
Change-Id: Ifda457024f1d5c2b1382f189c1a8d5fda852d30d
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 161,089
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: nfs3svc_release_fhandle(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p,
struct nfsd3_attrstat *resp)
{
fh_put(&resp->fh);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,297
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static bool ExecuteScrollLineDown(LocalFrame& frame,
Event*,
EditorCommandSource,
const String&) {
return frame.GetEventHandler().BubblingScroll(kScrollDownIgnoringWritingMode,
kScrollByLine);
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 128,598
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: png_get_uint_32(png_bytep buf)
{
png_uint_32 i = ((png_uint_32)(*buf) << 24) +
((png_uint_32)(*(buf + 1)) << 16) +
((png_uint_32)(*(buf + 2)) << 8) +
(png_uint_32)(*(buf + 3));
return (i);
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
[email protected]
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 172,176
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void NormalPageArena::sweepAndCompact() {
ThreadHeap& heap = getThreadState()->heap();
if (!heap.compaction()->isCompactingArena(arenaIndex()))
return;
if (!m_firstUnsweptPage) {
heap.compaction()->finishedArenaCompaction(this, 0, 0);
return;
}
NormalPage::CompactionContext context;
context.m_compactedPages = &m_firstPage;
while (m_firstUnsweptPage) {
BasePage* page = m_firstUnsweptPage;
if (page->isEmpty()) {
page->unlink(&m_firstUnsweptPage);
page->removeFromHeap();
continue;
}
DCHECK(!page->isLargeObjectPage());
NormalPage* normalPage = static_cast<NormalPage*>(page);
normalPage->unlink(&m_firstUnsweptPage);
normalPage->markAsSwept();
if (!context.m_currentPage)
context.m_currentPage = normalPage;
else
normalPage->link(&context.m_availablePages);
normalPage->sweepAndCompact(context);
}
size_t freedSize = 0;
size_t freedPageCount = 0;
DCHECK(context.m_currentPage);
size_t allocationPoint = context.m_allocationPoint;
if (!allocationPoint) {
context.m_currentPage->link(&context.m_availablePages);
} else {
NormalPage* currentPage = context.m_currentPage;
currentPage->link(&m_firstPage);
if (allocationPoint != currentPage->payloadSize()) {
freedSize = currentPage->payloadSize() - allocationPoint;
Address payload = currentPage->payload();
SET_MEMORY_INACCESSIBLE(payload + allocationPoint, freedSize);
currentPage->arenaForNormalPage()->addToFreeList(
payload + allocationPoint, freedSize);
}
}
BasePage* availablePages = context.m_availablePages;
while (availablePages) {
size_t pageSize = availablePages->size();
#if DEBUG_HEAP_COMPACTION
if (!freedPageCount)
LOG_HEAP_COMPACTION("Releasing:");
LOG_HEAP_COMPACTION(" [%p, %p]", availablePages, availablePages + pageSize);
#endif
freedSize += pageSize;
freedPageCount++;
BasePage* nextPage;
availablePages->unlink(&nextPage);
#if !(DCHECK_IS_ON() || defined(LEAK_SANITIZER) || \
defined(ADDRESS_SANITIZER) || defined(MEMORY_SANITIZER))
DCHECK(!availablePages->isLargeObjectPage());
NormalPage* unusedPage = reinterpret_cast<NormalPage*>(availablePages);
memset(unusedPage->payload(), 0, unusedPage->payloadSize());
#endif
availablePages->removeFromHeap();
availablePages = static_cast<NormalPage*>(nextPage);
}
if (freedPageCount)
LOG_HEAP_COMPACTION("\n");
heap.compaction()->finishedArenaCompaction(this, freedPageCount, freedSize);
}
Commit Message: Call HeapObjectHeader::checkHeader solely for its side-effect.
This requires changing its signature. This is a preliminary stage to making it
private.
BUG=633030
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2698673003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#460489}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 147,589
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void GLES2Implementation::GetProgramResourceiv(GLuint program,
GLenum program_interface,
GLuint index,
GLsizei prop_count,
const GLenum* props,
GLsizei bufsize,
GLsizei* length,
GLint* params) {
GPU_CLIENT_SINGLE_THREAD_CHECK();
GPU_CLIENT_LOG("[" << GetLogPrefix() << "] glGetProgramResourceiv(" << program
<< ", " << program_interface << ", " << index << ", "
<< prop_count << ", " << static_cast<const void*>(props)
<< ", " << bufsize << ", " << static_cast<void*>(length)
<< ", " << static_cast<void*>(params) << ")");
if (prop_count < 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glGetProgramResourceiv", "prop_count < 0");
return;
}
if (bufsize < 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glGetProgramResourceiv", "bufsize < 0");
return;
}
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GLES2::GetProgramResourceiv");
GLsizei param_count = 0;
bool success = share_group_->program_info_manager()->GetProgramResourceiv(
this, program, program_interface, index, prop_count, props, bufsize,
¶m_count, params);
if (length) {
*length = param_count;
}
if (success && params) {
GPU_CLIENT_LOG_CODE_BLOCK({
for (GLsizei ii = 0; ii < param_count; ++ii) {
GPU_CLIENT_LOG(" " << ii << ": " << params[ii]);
}
});
}
CheckGLError();
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,016
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void V8TestObject::StaticTestDictionaryMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_staticTestDictionaryMethod");
test_object_v8_internal::StaticTestDictionaryMethodMethod(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 135,187
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void LodePNGUnknownChunks_init(LodePNGInfo* info)
{
unsigned i;
for(i = 0; i < 3; i++) info->unknown_chunks_data[i] = 0;
for(i = 0; i < 3; i++) info->unknown_chunks_size[i] = 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 87,438
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: __xml_private_free(xml_private_t *p)
{
__xml_private_clean(p);
free(p);
}
Commit Message: Fix: acl: Do not delay evaluation of added nodes in some situations
It is not appropriate when the node has no children as it is not a
placeholder
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 43,999
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void nfs4_xdr_enc_create_session(struct rpc_rqst *req,
struct xdr_stream *xdr,
struct nfs41_create_session_args *args)
{
struct compound_hdr hdr = {
.minorversion = args->client->cl_mvops->minor_version,
};
encode_compound_hdr(xdr, req, &hdr);
encode_create_session(xdr, args, &hdr);
encode_nops(&hdr);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 23,457
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void free_session(struct nfsd4_session *ses)
{
nfsd4_del_conns(ses);
nfsd4_put_drc_mem(&ses->se_fchannel);
__free_session(ses);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,471
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int smp_execute_task(struct domain_device *dev, void *req, int req_size,
void *resp, int resp_size)
{
struct scatterlist req_sg;
struct scatterlist resp_sg;
sg_init_one(&req_sg, req, req_size);
sg_init_one(&resp_sg, resp, resp_size);
return smp_execute_task_sg(dev, &req_sg, &resp_sg);
}
Commit Message: scsi: libsas: fix memory leak in sas_smp_get_phy_events()
We've got a memory leak with the following producer:
while true;
do cat /sys/class/sas_phy/phy-1:0:12/invalid_dword_count >/dev/null;
done
The buffer req is allocated and not freed after we return. Fix it.
Fixes: 2908d778ab3e ("[SCSI] aic94xx: new driver")
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <[email protected]>
CC: John Garry <[email protected]>
CC: chenqilin <[email protected]>
CC: chenxiang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 83,976
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void PrintRenderFrameHelper::OnDestruct() {
if (ipc_nesting_level_ > 0) {
render_frame_gone_ = true;
return;
}
delete this;
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,118
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: struct ipx_interface *ipx_interfaces_head(void)
{
struct ipx_interface *rc = NULL;
if (!list_empty(&ipx_interfaces))
rc = list_entry(ipx_interfaces.next,
struct ipx_interface, node);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 40,430
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: int Instance::GetScrollbarReservedThickness() {
GetScrollbarThickness();
return scrollbar_reserved_thickness_;
}
Commit Message: Let PDFium handle event when there is not yet a visible page.
Speculative fix for 415307. CF will confirm.
The stack trace for that bug indicates an attempt to index by -1, which is consistent with no visible page.
BUG=415307
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/560133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#295421}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 120,160
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int rose_device_event(struct notifier_block *this, unsigned long event,
void *ptr)
{
struct net_device *dev = (struct net_device *)ptr;
if (!net_eq(dev_net(dev), &init_net))
return NOTIFY_DONE;
if (event != NETDEV_DOWN)
return NOTIFY_DONE;
switch (dev->type) {
case ARPHRD_ROSE:
rose_kill_by_device(dev);
break;
case ARPHRD_AX25:
rose_link_device_down(dev);
rose_rt_device_down(dev);
break;
}
return NOTIFY_DONE;
}
Commit Message: rose: Add length checks to CALL_REQUEST parsing
Define some constant offsets for CALL_REQUEST based on the description
at <http://www.techfest.com/networking/wan/x25plp.htm> and the
definition of ROSE as using 10-digit (5-byte) addresses. Use them
consistently. Validate all implicit and explicit facilities lengths.
Validate the address length byte rather than either trusting or
assuming its value.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 22,197
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: dns_run_resolution(struct dns_resolution *resolution)
{
struct dns_resolvers *resolvers = resolution->resolvers;
int query_id, i;
/* Avoid sending requests for resolutions that don't yet have an
* hostname, ie resolutions linked to servers that do not yet have an
* fqdn */
if (!resolution->hostname_dn)
return 0;
/* Check if a resolution has already been started for this server return
* directly to avoid resolution pill up. */
if (resolution->step != RSLV_STEP_NONE)
return 0;
/* Generates a new query id. We try at most 100 times to find a free
* query id */
for (i = 0; i < 100; ++i) {
query_id = dns_rnd16();
if (!eb32_lookup(&resolvers->query_ids, query_id))
break;
query_id = -1;
}
if (query_id == -1) {
send_log(NULL, LOG_NOTICE,
"could not generate a query id for %s, in resolvers %s.\n",
resolution->hostname_dn, resolvers->id);
return -1;
}
/* Update resolution parameters */
resolution->query_id = query_id;
resolution->qid.key = query_id;
resolution->step = RSLV_STEP_RUNNING;
resolution->query_type = resolution->prefered_query_type;
resolution->try = resolvers->resolve_retries;
eb32_insert(&resolvers->query_ids, &resolution->qid);
/* Send the DNS query */
resolution->try -= 1;
dns_send_query(resolution);
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 710
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void TabStripModel::UpdateTabContentsStateAt(int index,
TabStripModelObserver::TabChangeType change_type) {
DCHECK(ContainsIndex(index));
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(TabStripModelObserver, observers_,
TabChangedAt(GetTabContentsAtImpl(index), index, change_type));
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 118,246
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void Con_DrawNotify( void ) {
int x, v;
short *text;
int i;
int time;
int skip;
int currentColor;
if ( Cvar_VariableIntegerValue( "ui_limboMode" ) ) {
return;
}
currentColor = 7;
re.SetColor( g_color_table[currentColor] );
v = 0;
for ( i = con.current - NUM_CON_TIMES + 1 ; i <= con.current ; i++ )
{
if ( i < 0 ) {
continue;
}
time = con.times[i % NUM_CON_TIMES];
if ( time == 0 ) {
continue;
}
time = cls.realtime - time;
if ( time > con_notifytime->value * 1000 ) {
continue;
}
text = con.text + ( i % con.totallines ) * con.linewidth;
if (cl.snap.ps.pm_type != PM_INTERMISSION && Key_GetCatcher( ) & (KEYCATCH_UI | KEYCATCH_CGAME) ) {
continue;
}
for ( x = 0 ; x < con.linewidth ; x++ ) {
if ( ( text[x] & 0xff ) == ' ' ) {
continue;
}
if ( ColorIndexForNumber( text[x] >> 8 ) != currentColor ) {
currentColor = ColorIndexForNumber( text[x] >> 8 );
re.SetColor( g_color_table[currentColor] );
}
SCR_DrawSmallChar( cl_conXOffset->integer + con.xadjust + ( x + 1 ) * SMALLCHAR_WIDTH, v, text[x] & 0xff );
}
v += SMALLCHAR_HEIGHT;
}
re.SetColor( NULL );
if (Key_GetCatcher( ) & (KEYCATCH_UI | KEYCATCH_CGAME) ) {
return;
}
if ( Key_GetCatcher( ) & KEYCATCH_MESSAGE ) {
if ( chat_team ) {
char buf[128];
CL_TranslateString( "say_team:", buf );
SCR_DrawBigString( 8, v, buf, 1.0f, qfalse );
skip = strlen( buf ) + 2;
} else
{
char buf[128];
CL_TranslateString( "say:", buf );
SCR_DrawBigString( 8, v, buf, 1.0f, qfalse );
skip = strlen( buf ) + 1;
}
Field_BigDraw( &chatField, skip * BIGCHAR_WIDTH, v, SCREEN_WIDTH - ( skip + 1 ) * BIGCHAR_WIDTH, qtrue, qtrue );
}
}
Commit Message: All: Merge some file writing extension checks
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 95,574
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: ass_start_frame(ASS_Renderer *render_priv, ASS_Track *track,
long long now)
{
ASS_Settings *settings_priv = &render_priv->settings;
if (!render_priv->settings.frame_width
&& !render_priv->settings.frame_height)
return 1; // library not initialized
if (!render_priv->fontselect)
return 1;
if (render_priv->library != track->library)
return 1;
if (track->n_events == 0)
return 1; // nothing to do
render_priv->track = track;
render_priv->time = now;
ass_lazy_track_init(render_priv->library, render_priv->track);
ass_shaper_set_kerning(render_priv->shaper, track->Kerning);
ass_shaper_set_language(render_priv->shaper, track->Language);
ass_shaper_set_level(render_priv->shaper, render_priv->settings.shaper);
double par = render_priv->settings.par;
if (par == 0.) {
if (settings_priv->frame_width && settings_priv->frame_height &&
settings_priv->storage_width && settings_priv->storage_height) {
double dar = ((double) settings_priv->frame_width) /
settings_priv->frame_height;
double sar = ((double) settings_priv->storage_width) /
settings_priv->storage_height;
par = sar / dar;
} else
par = 1.0;
}
render_priv->font_scale_x = par;
render_priv->prev_images_root = render_priv->images_root;
render_priv->images_root = NULL;
check_cache_limits(render_priv, &render_priv->cache);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix line wrapping mode 0/3 bugs
This fixes two separate bugs:
a) Don't move a linebreak into the first symbol. This results in a empty
line at the front, which does not help to equalize line lengths at all.
b) When moving a linebreak into a symbol that already is a break, the
number of lines must be decremented. Otherwise, uninitialized memory
is possibly used for later layout operations.
Found by fuzzer test case
id:000085,sig:11,src:003377+003350,op:splice,rep:8.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 73,349
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: bool RenderFrameHostImpl::PrepareForInnerWebContentsAttach() {
DCHECK(MimeHandlerViewMode::UsesCrossProcessFrame());
if (IsCrossProcessSubframe() || !GetParent())
return false;
ResetNavigationRequests();
ResetLoadingState();
is_attaching_inner_delegate_ = true;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 153,122
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: handle_compressed( void *procctx, PKT_compressed *cd,
int (*callback)(IOBUF, void *), void *passthru )
{
compress_filter_context_t *cfx;
int rc;
if(check_compress_algo(cd->algorithm))
return G10ERR_COMPR_ALGO;
cfx = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *cfx);
cfx->release = release_context;
cfx->algo = cd->algorithm;
push_compress_filter(cd->buf,cfx,cd->algorithm);
if( callback )
rc = callback(cd->buf, passthru );
else
rc = proc_packets(procctx, cd->buf);
cd->buf = NULL;
return rc;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 11,026
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: int ssl_write_change_cipher_spec( ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret;
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write change cipher spec" ) );
ssl->out_msgtype = SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
ssl->out_msglen = 1;
ssl->out_msg[0] = 1;
ssl->state++;
if( ( ret = ssl_write_record( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_record", ret );
return( ret );
}
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write change cipher spec" ) );
return( 0 );
}
Commit Message: ssl_parse_certificate() now calls x509parse_crt_der() directly
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 29,052
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: vrrp_netlink_cmd_rcv_bufs_handler(vector_t *strvec)
{
unsigned val;
if (!strvec)
return;
val = get_netlink_rcv_bufs_size(strvec, "vrrp_netlink_cmd");
if (val)
global_data->vrrp_netlink_cmd_rcv_bufs = val;
}
Commit Message: Add command line and configuration option to set umask
Issue #1048 identified that files created by keepalived are created
with mode 0666. This commit changes the default to 0644, and also
allows the umask to be specified in the configuration or as a command
line option.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 75,877
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int __blkdev_get(struct block_device *bdev, fmode_t mode, int for_part)
{
struct gendisk *disk;
struct module *owner;
int ret;
int partno;
int perm = 0;
if (mode & FMODE_READ)
perm |= MAY_READ;
if (mode & FMODE_WRITE)
perm |= MAY_WRITE;
/*
* hooks: /n/, see "layering violations".
*/
if (!for_part) {
ret = devcgroup_inode_permission(bdev->bd_inode, perm);
if (ret != 0) {
bdput(bdev);
return ret;
}
}
restart:
ret = -ENXIO;
disk = get_gendisk(bdev->bd_dev, &partno);
if (!disk)
goto out;
owner = disk->fops->owner;
disk_block_events(disk);
mutex_lock_nested(&bdev->bd_mutex, for_part);
if (!bdev->bd_openers) {
bdev->bd_disk = disk;
bdev->bd_queue = disk->queue;
bdev->bd_contains = bdev;
if (!partno) {
struct backing_dev_info *bdi;
ret = -ENXIO;
bdev->bd_part = disk_get_part(disk, partno);
if (!bdev->bd_part)
goto out_clear;
ret = 0;
if (disk->fops->open) {
ret = disk->fops->open(bdev, mode);
if (ret == -ERESTARTSYS) {
/* Lost a race with 'disk' being
* deleted, try again.
* See md.c
*/
disk_put_part(bdev->bd_part);
bdev->bd_part = NULL;
bdev->bd_disk = NULL;
bdev->bd_queue = NULL;
mutex_unlock(&bdev->bd_mutex);
disk_unblock_events(disk);
put_disk(disk);
module_put(owner);
goto restart;
}
}
if (!ret) {
bd_set_size(bdev,(loff_t)get_capacity(disk)<<9);
bdi = blk_get_backing_dev_info(bdev);
if (bdi == NULL)
bdi = &default_backing_dev_info;
bdev_inode_switch_bdi(bdev->bd_inode, bdi);
}
/*
* If the device is invalidated, rescan partition
* if open succeeded or failed with -ENOMEDIUM.
* The latter is necessary to prevent ghost
* partitions on a removed medium.
*/
if (bdev->bd_invalidated) {
if (!ret)
rescan_partitions(disk, bdev);
else if (ret == -ENOMEDIUM)
invalidate_partitions(disk, bdev);
}
if (ret)
goto out_clear;
} else {
struct block_device *whole;
whole = bdget_disk(disk, 0);
ret = -ENOMEM;
if (!whole)
goto out_clear;
BUG_ON(for_part);
ret = __blkdev_get(whole, mode, 1);
if (ret)
goto out_clear;
bdev->bd_contains = whole;
bdev_inode_switch_bdi(bdev->bd_inode,
whole->bd_inode->i_data.backing_dev_info);
bdev->bd_part = disk_get_part(disk, partno);
if (!(disk->flags & GENHD_FL_UP) ||
!bdev->bd_part || !bdev->bd_part->nr_sects) {
ret = -ENXIO;
goto out_clear;
}
bd_set_size(bdev, (loff_t)bdev->bd_part->nr_sects << 9);
}
} else {
if (bdev->bd_contains == bdev) {
ret = 0;
if (bdev->bd_disk->fops->open)
ret = bdev->bd_disk->fops->open(bdev, mode);
/* the same as first opener case, read comment there */
if (bdev->bd_invalidated) {
if (!ret)
rescan_partitions(bdev->bd_disk, bdev);
else if (ret == -ENOMEDIUM)
invalidate_partitions(bdev->bd_disk, bdev);
}
if (ret)
goto out_unlock_bdev;
}
/* only one opener holds refs to the module and disk */
put_disk(disk);
module_put(owner);
}
bdev->bd_openers++;
if (for_part)
bdev->bd_part_count++;
mutex_unlock(&bdev->bd_mutex);
disk_unblock_events(disk);
return 0;
out_clear:
disk_put_part(bdev->bd_part);
bdev->bd_disk = NULL;
bdev->bd_part = NULL;
bdev->bd_queue = NULL;
bdev_inode_switch_bdi(bdev->bd_inode, &default_backing_dev_info);
if (bdev != bdev->bd_contains)
__blkdev_put(bdev->bd_contains, mode, 1);
bdev->bd_contains = NULL;
out_unlock_bdev:
mutex_unlock(&bdev->bd_mutex);
disk_unblock_events(disk);
put_disk(disk);
module_put(owner);
out:
bdput(bdev);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 46,229
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void CommandBufferProxyImpl::OnGpuStateError() {
CheckLock();
last_state_lock_.AssertAcquired();
DCHECK_NE(gpu::error::kNoError, last_state_.error);
DisconnectChannelInFreshCallStack();
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,463
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: pvscsi_convert_sglist(PVSCSIRequest *r)
{
uint32_t chunk_size, elmcnt = 0;
uint64_t data_length = r->req.dataLen;
PVSCSISGState sg = r->sg;
while (data_length && elmcnt < PVSCSI_MAX_SG_ELEM) {
while (!sg.resid && elmcnt++ < PVSCSI_MAX_SG_ELEM) {
pvscsi_get_next_sg_elem(&sg);
trace_pvscsi_convert_sglist(r->req.context, r->sg.dataAddr,
r->sg.resid);
}
chunk_size = MIN(data_length, sg.resid);
if (chunk_size) {
qemu_sglist_add(&r->sgl, sg.dataAddr, chunk_size);
}
sg.dataAddr += chunk_size;
data_length -= chunk_size;
sg.resid -= chunk_size;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 8,407
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: MagickExport const char *GetNextImageProperty(const Image *image)
{
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image->filename);
if (image->properties == (void *) NULL)
return((const char *) NULL);
return((const char *) GetNextKeyInSplayTree(
(SplayTreeInfo *) image->properties));
}
Commit Message: Improve checking of EXIF profile to prevent integer overflow (bug report from Ibrahim el-sayed)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 94,749
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void AXTreeSerializerTest::CreateTreeSerializer() {
if (serializer_)
return;
tree0_.reset(new AXSerializableTree(treedata0_));
tree1_.reset(new AXSerializableTree(treedata1_));
tree0_source_.reset(tree0_->CreateTreeSource());
serializer_.reset(new AXTreeSerializer<const AXNode*>(tree0_source_.get()));
AXTreeUpdate unused_update;
serializer_->SerializeChanges(tree0_->root(), &unused_update);
tree1_source_.reset(tree1_->CreateTreeSource());
serializer_->ChangeTreeSourceForTesting(tree1_source_.get());
}
Commit Message: When serializing accessibility tree, skip invalid children.
See bug for specific repro in the wild, but essentially we need to check
if the child is valid just before serializing, and not trust the list of
children of a node.
BUG=479743
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1144363004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#332748}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 127,689
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void run(const char* source_path, const char* label, uid_t uid,
gid_t gid, userid_t userid, bool multi_user, bool full_write) {
struct fuse_global global;
struct fuse fuse_default;
struct fuse fuse_read;
struct fuse fuse_write;
struct fuse_handler handler_default;
struct fuse_handler handler_read;
struct fuse_handler handler_write;
pthread_t thread_default;
pthread_t thread_read;
pthread_t thread_write;
memset(&global, 0, sizeof(global));
memset(&fuse_default, 0, sizeof(fuse_default));
memset(&fuse_read, 0, sizeof(fuse_read));
memset(&fuse_write, 0, sizeof(fuse_write));
memset(&handler_default, 0, sizeof(handler_default));
memset(&handler_read, 0, sizeof(handler_read));
memset(&handler_write, 0, sizeof(handler_write));
pthread_mutex_init(&global.lock, NULL);
global.package_to_appid = hashmapCreate(256, str_hash, str_icase_equals);
global.uid = uid;
global.gid = gid;
global.multi_user = multi_user;
global.next_generation = 0;
global.inode_ctr = 1;
memset(&global.root, 0, sizeof(global.root));
global.root.nid = FUSE_ROOT_ID; /* 1 */
global.root.refcount = 2;
global.root.namelen = strlen(source_path);
global.root.name = strdup(source_path);
global.root.userid = userid;
global.root.uid = AID_ROOT;
global.root.under_android = false;
strcpy(global.source_path, source_path);
if (multi_user) {
global.root.perm = PERM_PRE_ROOT;
snprintf(global.obb_path, sizeof(global.obb_path), "%s/obb", source_path);
} else {
global.root.perm = PERM_ROOT;
snprintf(global.obb_path, sizeof(global.obb_path), "%s/Android/obb", source_path);
}
fuse_default.global = &global;
fuse_read.global = &global;
fuse_write.global = &global;
global.fuse_default = &fuse_default;
global.fuse_read = &fuse_read;
global.fuse_write = &fuse_write;
snprintf(fuse_default.dest_path, PATH_MAX, "/mnt/runtime/default/%s", label);
snprintf(fuse_read.dest_path, PATH_MAX, "/mnt/runtime/read/%s", label);
snprintf(fuse_write.dest_path, PATH_MAX, "/mnt/runtime/write/%s", label);
handler_default.fuse = &fuse_default;
handler_read.fuse = &fuse_read;
handler_write.fuse = &fuse_write;
handler_default.token = 0;
handler_read.token = 1;
handler_write.token = 2;
umask(0);
if (multi_user) {
/* Multi-user storage is fully isolated per user, so "other"
* permissions are completely masked off. */
if (fuse_setup(&fuse_default, AID_SDCARD_RW, 0006)
|| fuse_setup(&fuse_read, AID_EVERYBODY, 0027)
|| fuse_setup(&fuse_write, AID_EVERYBODY, full_write ? 0007 : 0027)) {
ERROR("failed to fuse_setup\n");
exit(1);
}
} else {
/* Physical storage is readable by all users on device, but
* the Android directories are masked off to a single user
* deep inside attr_from_stat(). */
if (fuse_setup(&fuse_default, AID_SDCARD_RW, 0006)
|| fuse_setup(&fuse_read, AID_EVERYBODY, full_write ? 0027 : 0022)
|| fuse_setup(&fuse_write, AID_EVERYBODY, full_write ? 0007 : 0022)) {
ERROR("failed to fuse_setup\n");
exit(1);
}
}
/* Drop privs */
if (setgroups(sizeof(kGroups) / sizeof(kGroups[0]), kGroups) < 0) {
ERROR("cannot setgroups: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
if (setgid(gid) < 0) {
ERROR("cannot setgid: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
if (setuid(uid) < 0) {
ERROR("cannot setuid: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
if (multi_user) {
fs_prepare_dir(global.obb_path, 0775, uid, gid);
}
if (pthread_create(&thread_default, NULL, start_handler, &handler_default)
|| pthread_create(&thread_read, NULL, start_handler, &handler_read)
|| pthread_create(&thread_write, NULL, start_handler, &handler_write)) {
ERROR("failed to pthread_create\n");
exit(1);
}
watch_package_list(&global);
ERROR("terminated prematurely\n");
exit(1);
}
Commit Message: Fix overflow in path building
An incorrect size was causing an unsigned value
to wrap, causing it to write past the end of
the buffer.
Bug: 28085658
Change-Id: Ie9625c729cca024d514ba2880ff97209d435a165
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 160,597
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int adev_get_master_mute(struct audio_hw_device *dev, bool *muted)
{
(void)dev;
(void)muted;
return -ENOSYS;
}
Commit Message: Fix audio record pre-processing
proc_buf_out consistently initialized.
intermediate scratch buffers consistently initialized.
prevent read failure from overwriting memory.
Test: POC, CTS, camera record
Bug: 62873231
Change-Id: Ie26e12a419a5819c1c5c3a0bcf1876d6d7aca686
(cherry picked from commit 6d7b330c27efba944817e647955da48e54fd74eb)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 162,244
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static inline void rt_drop(struct rtable *rt)
{
ip_rt_put(rt);
call_rcu_bh(&rt->dst.rcu_head, dst_rcu_free);
}
Commit Message: net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 25,167
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static inline void *get_freepointer(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object)
{
return *(void **)(object + s->offset);
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <[email protected]>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: john stultz <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 24,804
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static bool cmd_device_reset(IDEState *s, uint8_t cmd)
{
ide_set_signature(s);
s->status = 0x00; /* NOTE: READY is _not_ set */
s->error = 0x01;
return false;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 6,690
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int debugMutexHeld(sqlite3_mutex *pX){
sqlite3_debug_mutex *p = (sqlite3_debug_mutex*)pX;
return p==0 || p->cnt>0;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 136,470
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void Document::hoveredNodeDetached(Node* node)
{
ASSERT(node);
if (!m_hoverNode)
return;
m_hoverNode->updateDistribution();
if (node != m_hoverNode && (!m_hoverNode->isTextNode() || node != ComposedTreeTraversal::parent(*m_hoverNode)))
return;
m_hoverNode = ComposedTreeTraversal::parent(*node);
while (m_hoverNode && !m_hoverNode->layoutObject())
m_hoverNode = ComposedTreeTraversal::parent(*m_hoverNode);
if (!page()->isCursorVisible())
return;
if (frame())
frame()->eventHandler().scheduleHoverStateUpdate();
}
Commit Message: Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,523
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> conditionalAttr1AttrGetter(v8::Local<v8::String> name, const v8::AccessorInfo& info)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.conditionalAttr1._get");
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(info.Holder());
return v8::Integer::New(imp->conditionalAttr1());
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 109,532
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void mp_shutdown(struct sb_uart_state *state)
{
struct sb_uart_info *info = state->info;
struct sb_uart_port *port = state->port;
if (info->tty)
set_bit(TTY_IO_ERROR, &info->tty->flags);
if (info->flags & UIF_INITIALIZED) {
info->flags &= ~UIF_INITIALIZED;
if (!info->tty || (info->tty->termios.c_cflag & HUPCL))
uart_clear_mctrl(port, TIOCM_DTR | TIOCM_RTS);
wake_up_interruptible(&info->delta_msr_wait);
port->ops->shutdown(port);
synchronize_irq(port->irq);
}
tasklet_kill(&info->tlet);
if (info->xmit.buf) {
free_page((unsigned long)info->xmit.buf);
info->xmit.buf = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: Staging: sb105x: info leak in mp_get_count()
The icount.reserved[] array isn't initialized so it leaks stack
information to userspace.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 29,400
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int __dev_close_many(struct list_head *head)
{
struct net_device *dev;
ASSERT_RTNL();
might_sleep();
list_for_each_entry(dev, head, close_list) {
/* Temporarily disable netpoll until the interface is down */
netpoll_poll_disable(dev);
call_netdevice_notifiers(NETDEV_GOING_DOWN, dev);
clear_bit(__LINK_STATE_START, &dev->state);
/* Synchronize to scheduled poll. We cannot touch poll list, it
* can be even on different cpu. So just clear netif_running().
*
* dev->stop() will invoke napi_disable() on all of it's
* napi_struct instances on this device.
*/
smp_mb__after_atomic(); /* Commit netif_running(). */
}
dev_deactivate_many(head);
list_for_each_entry(dev, head, close_list) {
const struct net_device_ops *ops = dev->netdev_ops;
/*
* Call the device specific close. This cannot fail.
* Only if device is UP
*
* We allow it to be called even after a DETACH hot-plug
* event.
*/
if (ops->ndo_stop)
ops->ndo_stop(dev);
dev->flags &= ~IFF_UP;
netpoll_poll_enable(dev);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 48,729
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType ReadPSDChannelRLE(Image *image,const PSDInfo *psd_info,
const ssize_t type,MagickOffsetType *sizes,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
MagickBooleanType
status;
size_t
length,
row_size;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
*compact_pixels,
*pixels;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer data is RLE compressed");
row_size=GetPSDRowSize(image);
pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(row_size,sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
length=0;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
if ((MagickOffsetType) length < sizes[y])
length=(size_t) sizes[y];
if (length > row_size + 256) // arbitrary number
{
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"InvalidLength",
image->filename);
}
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,sizeof(*pixels));
if (compact_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
}
(void) ResetMagickMemory(compact_pixels,0,length*sizeof(*compact_pixels));
status=MagickTrue;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
status=MagickFalse;
count=ReadBlob(image,(size_t) sizes[y],compact_pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) sizes[y])
break;
count=DecodePSDPixels((size_t) sizes[y],compact_pixels,
(ssize_t) (image->depth == 1 ? 123456 : image->depth),row_size,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) row_size)
break;
status=ReadPSDChannelPixels(image,psd_info->channels,y,type,pixels,
exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(compact_pixels);
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
return(status);
}
Commit Message: Fix improper cast that could cause an overflow as demonstrated in #347.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 69,049
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: update_secret_string (NMSetting *setting,
const char *key,
const char *value,
GError **error)
{
NMSettingVPNPrivate *priv = NM_SETTING_VPN_GET_PRIVATE (setting);
g_return_val_if_fail (key != NULL, FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail (value != NULL, FALSE);
if (!value || !strlen (value)) {
g_set_error (error, NM_SETTING_ERROR,
NM_SETTING_ERROR_PROPERTY_TYPE_MISMATCH,
"Secret %s was empty", key);
return FALSE;
}
g_hash_table_insert (priv->secrets, g_strdup (key), g_strdup (value));
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 2,850
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void ServiceWorkerHandler::OnErrorReported(
int64_t registration_id,
int64_t version_id,
const ServiceWorkerContextCoreObserver::ErrorInfo& info) {
frontend_->WorkerErrorReported(
ServiceWorker::ServiceWorkerErrorMessage::Create()
.SetErrorMessage(base::UTF16ToUTF8(info.error_message))
.SetRegistrationId(base::Int64ToString(registration_id))
.SetVersionId(base::Int64ToString(version_id))
.SetSourceURL(info.source_url.spec())
.SetLineNumber(info.line_number)
.SetColumnNumber(info.column_number)
.Build());
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 148,602
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: Core(const OAuthProviderInfo& info,
net::URLRequestContextGetter* request_context_getter)
: provider_info_(info),
request_context_getter_(request_context_getter),
delegate_(NULL) {
}
Commit Message: Remove UrlFetcher from remoting and use the one in net instead.
BUG=133790
TEST=Stop and restart the Me2Me host. It should still work.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10637008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143798 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 170,805
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void vmx_set_constant_host_state(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
{
u32 low32, high32;
unsigned long tmpl;
struct desc_ptr dt;
vmcs_writel(HOST_CR0, read_cr0() & ~X86_CR0_TS); /* 22.2.3 */
vmcs_writel(HOST_CR4, read_cr4()); /* 22.2.3, 22.2.5 */
vmcs_writel(HOST_CR3, read_cr3()); /* 22.2.3 FIXME: shadow tables */
vmcs_write16(HOST_CS_SELECTOR, __KERNEL_CS); /* 22.2.4 */
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
/*
* Load null selectors, so we can avoid reloading them in
* __vmx_load_host_state(), in case userspace uses the null selectors
* too (the expected case).
*/
vmcs_write16(HOST_DS_SELECTOR, 0);
vmcs_write16(HOST_ES_SELECTOR, 0);
#else
vmcs_write16(HOST_DS_SELECTOR, __KERNEL_DS); /* 22.2.4 */
vmcs_write16(HOST_ES_SELECTOR, __KERNEL_DS); /* 22.2.4 */
#endif
vmcs_write16(HOST_SS_SELECTOR, __KERNEL_DS); /* 22.2.4 */
vmcs_write16(HOST_TR_SELECTOR, GDT_ENTRY_TSS*8); /* 22.2.4 */
native_store_idt(&dt);
vmcs_writel(HOST_IDTR_BASE, dt.address); /* 22.2.4 */
vmx->host_idt_base = dt.address;
vmcs_writel(HOST_RIP, vmx_return); /* 22.2.5 */
rdmsr(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, low32, high32);
vmcs_write32(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, low32);
rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, tmpl);
vmcs_writel(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, tmpl); /* 22.2.3 */
if (vmcs_config.vmexit_ctrl & VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PAT) {
rdmsr(MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, low32, high32);
vmcs_write64(HOST_IA32_PAT, low32 | ((u64) high32 << 32));
}
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Petr Matousek <[email protected]>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 166,328
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: WebContents* WebContents::Create(const WebContents::CreateParams& params) {
return WebContentsImpl::CreateWithOpener(
params, static_cast<WebContentsImpl*>(params.opener));
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 110,569
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: int dev_addr_del_multiple(struct net_device *to_dev,
struct net_device *from_dev,
unsigned char addr_type)
{
ASSERT_RTNL();
if (from_dev->addr_len != to_dev->addr_len)
return -EINVAL;
__hw_addr_del_multiple(&to_dev->dev_addrs, &from_dev->dev_addrs,
to_dev->addr_len, addr_type);
call_netdevice_notifiers(NETDEV_CHANGEADDR, to_dev);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 32,092
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: bool WindowsOverlapping(aura::Window* window1, aura::Window* window2) {
gfx::Rect window1_bounds = GetTransformedTargetBounds(window1);
gfx::Rect window2_bounds = GetTransformedTargetBounds(window2);
return window1_bounds.Intersects(window2_bounds);
}
Commit Message: cros: Enable some tests in //ash/wm in ash_unittests --mash
For the ones that fail, disable them via filter file instead of in the
code, per our disablement policy.
Bug: 698085, 695556, 698878, 698888, 698093, 698894
Test: ash_unittests --mash
Change-Id: Ic145ab6a95508968d6884d14fac2a3ca08888d26
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/752423
Commit-Queue: James Cook <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Steven Bennetts <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513836}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 133,226
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static inline int ablkcipher_next_slow(struct ablkcipher_request *req,
struct ablkcipher_walk *walk,
unsigned int bsize,
unsigned int alignmask,
void **src_p, void **dst_p)
{
unsigned aligned_bsize = ALIGN(bsize, alignmask + 1);
struct ablkcipher_buffer *p;
void *src, *dst, *base;
unsigned int n;
n = ALIGN(sizeof(struct ablkcipher_buffer), alignmask + 1);
n += (aligned_bsize * 3 - (alignmask + 1) +
(alignmask & ~(crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment() - 1)));
p = kmalloc(n, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!p)
return ablkcipher_walk_done(req, walk, -ENOMEM);
base = p + 1;
dst = (u8 *)ALIGN((unsigned long)base, alignmask + 1);
src = dst = ablkcipher_get_spot(dst, bsize);
p->len = bsize;
p->data = dst;
scatterwalk_copychunks(src, &walk->in, bsize, 0);
ablkcipher_queue_write(walk, p);
walk->nbytes = bsize;
walk->flags |= ABLKCIPHER_WALK_SLOW;
*src_p = src;
*dst_p = dst;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 31,184
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void usb_hub_cleanup(void)
{
destroy_workqueue(hub_wq);
/*
* Hub resources are freed for us by usb_deregister. It calls
* usb_driver_purge on every device which in turn calls that
* devices disconnect function if it is using this driver.
* The hub_disconnect function takes care of releasing the
* individual hub resources. -greg
*/
usb_deregister(&hub_driver);
} /* usb_hub_cleanup() */
Commit Message: USB: fix invalid memory access in hub_activate()
Commit 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to
delayed_work") changed the hub_activate() routine to make part of it
run in a workqueue. However, the commit failed to take a reference to
the usb_hub structure or to lock the hub interface while doing so. As
a result, if a hub is plugged in and quickly unplugged before the work
routine can run, the routine will try to access memory that has been
deallocated. Or, if the hub is unplugged while the routine is
running, the memory may be deallocated while it is in active use.
This patch fixes the problem by taking a reference to the usb_hub at
the start of hub_activate() and releasing it at the end (when the work
is finished), and by locking the hub interface while the work routine
is running. It also adds a check at the start of the routine to see
if the hub has already been disconnected, in which nothing should be
done.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Alexandru Cornea <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Alexandru Cornea <[email protected]>
Fixes: 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to delayed_work")
CC: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 56,812
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void FakeCrosDisksClient::NotifyFormatCompleted(
FormatError error_code,
const std::string& device_path) {
for (auto& observer : observer_list_)
observer.OnFormatCompleted(error_code, device_path);
}
Commit Message: Add a fake DriveFS launcher client.
Using DriveFS requires building and deploying ChromeOS. Add a client for
the fake DriveFS launcher to allow the use of a real DriveFS from a
ChromeOS chroot to be used with a target_os="chromeos" build of chrome.
This connects to the fake DriveFS launcher using mojo over a unix domain
socket named by a command-line flag, using the launcher to create
DriveFS instances.
Bug: 848126
Change-Id: I22dcca154d41bda196dd7c1782bb503f6bcba5b1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1098434
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Sam McNally <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567513}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 124,107
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void WebPage::executeJavaScriptFunction(const std::vector<BlackBerry::Platform::String> &function, const std::vector<JavaScriptVariant> &args, JavaScriptVariant& returnValue)
{
if (!d->m_mainFrame) {
returnValue.setType(JavaScriptVariant::Exception);
return;
}
JSC::Bindings::RootObject* root = d->m_mainFrame->script()->bindingRootObject();
if (!root) {
returnValue.setType(JavaScriptVariant::Exception);
return;
}
JSC::ExecState* exec = root->globalObject()->globalExec();
JSGlobalContextRef ctx = toGlobalRef(exec);
JSC::JSLockHolder lock(exec);
WTF::Vector<JSValueRef> argListRef(args.size());
for (unsigned i = 0; i < args.size(); ++i)
argListRef[i] = BlackBerryJavaScriptVariantToJSValueRef(ctx, args[i]);
JSValueRef windowObjectValue = windowObject();
JSObjectRef obj = JSValueToObject(ctx, windowObjectValue, 0);
JSObjectRef thisObject = obj;
for (unsigned i = 0; i < function.size(); ++i) {
JSStringRef str = JSStringCreateWithUTF8CString(function[i].c_str());
thisObject = obj;
obj = JSValueToObject(ctx, JSObjectGetProperty(ctx, obj, str, 0), 0);
JSStringRelease(str);
if (!obj)
break;
}
JSObjectRef functionObject = obj;
JSValueRef result = 0;
if (functionObject && thisObject)
result = JSObjectCallAsFunction(ctx, functionObject, thisObject, args.size(), argListRef.data(), 0);
if (!result) {
returnValue.setType(JavaScriptVariant::Exception);
return;
}
returnValue = JSValueRefToBlackBerryJavaScriptVariant(ctx, result);
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,198
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void DumpStackTraceSignalHandler(int signal) {
base::debug::StackTrace().PrintBacktrace();
_exit(128 + signal);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 109,427
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: coolkey_find_attribute(sc_card_t *card, sc_cardctl_coolkey_attribute_t *attribute)
{
u8 object_record_type;
CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE attr_type = attribute->attribute_type;
const u8 *obj = attribute->object->data;
const u8 *attr = NULL;
size_t buf_len = attribute->object->length;
coolkey_object_header_t *object_head;
int attribute_count,i;
attribute->attribute_data_type = SC_CARDCTL_COOLKEY_ATTR_TYPE_STRING;
attribute->attribute_length = 0;
attribute->attribute_value = NULL;
if (obj == NULL) {
/* cast away const so we can cache the data value */
int r = coolkey_fill_object(card, (sc_cardctl_coolkey_object_t *)attribute->object);
if (r < 0) {
return r;
}
obj = attribute->object->data;
}
/* should be a static assert so we catch this at compile time */
assert(sizeof(coolkey_object_header_t) >= sizeof(coolkey_v0_object_header_t));
/* make sure we have enough of the object to read the record_type */
if (buf_len <= sizeof(coolkey_v0_object_header_t)) {
return SC_ERROR_CORRUPTED_DATA;
}
object_head = (coolkey_object_header_t *)obj;
object_record_type = object_head->record_type;
/* make sure it's a type we recognize */
if ((object_record_type != COOLKEY_V1_OBJECT) && (object_record_type != COOLKEY_V0_OBJECT)) {
return SC_ERROR_CORRUPTED_DATA;
}
/*
* now loop through all the attributes in the list. first find the start of the list
*/
attr = coolkey_attribute_start(obj, object_record_type, buf_len);
if (attr == NULL) {
return SC_ERROR_CORRUPTED_DATA;
}
buf_len -= (attr-obj);
/* now get the count */
attribute_count = coolkey_get_attribute_count(obj, object_record_type, buf_len);
for (i=0; i < attribute_count; i++) {
size_t record_len = coolkey_get_attribute_record_len(attr, object_record_type, buf_len);
/* make sure we have the complete record */
if (buf_len < record_len) {
return SC_ERROR_CORRUPTED_DATA;
}
/* does the attribute match the one we are looking for */
if (attr_type == coolkey_get_attribute_type(attr, object_record_type, record_len)) {
/* yup, return it */
return coolkey_get_attribute_data(attr, object_record_type, record_len, attribute);
}
/* go to the next attribute on the list */
buf_len -= record_len;
attr += record_len;
}
/* not find in attribute list, check the fixed attribute record */
if (object_record_type == COOLKEY_V1_OBJECT) {
unsigned long fixed_attributes = bebytes2ulong(object_head->fixed_attributes_values);
return coolkey_get_attribute_data_fixed(attr_type, fixed_attributes, attribute);
}
return SC_ERROR_DATA_OBJECT_NOT_FOUND;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 169,051
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: move_task_thread_func (GTask *task,
gpointer source_object,
gpointer task_data,
GCancellable *cancellable)
{
CopyMoveJob *job;
CommonJob *common;
GList *fallbacks;
SourceInfo source_info;
TransferInfo transfer_info;
char *dest_fs_id;
char *dest_fs_type;
GList *fallback_files;
job = task_data;
common = &job->common;
dest_fs_id = NULL;
dest_fs_type = NULL;
fallbacks = NULL;
nautilus_progress_info_start (job->common.progress);
verify_destination (&job->common,
job->destination,
&dest_fs_id,
-1);
if (job_aborted (common))
{
goto aborted;
}
/* This moves all files that we can do without copy + delete */
move_files_prepare (job, dest_fs_id, &dest_fs_type, &fallbacks);
if (job_aborted (common))
{
goto aborted;
}
/* The rest we need to do deep copy + delete behind on,
* so scan for size */
fallback_files = get_files_from_fallbacks (fallbacks);
scan_sources (fallback_files,
&source_info,
common,
OP_KIND_MOVE);
g_list_free (fallback_files);
if (job_aborted (common))
{
goto aborted;
}
verify_destination (&job->common,
job->destination,
NULL,
source_info.num_bytes);
if (job_aborted (common))
{
goto aborted;
}
memset (&transfer_info, 0, sizeof (transfer_info));
move_files (job,
fallbacks,
dest_fs_id, &dest_fs_type,
&source_info, &transfer_info);
aborted:
g_list_free_full (fallbacks, g_free);
g_free (dest_fs_id);
g_free (dest_fs_type);
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 61,100
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: syncable::ModelTypeSet GetTypesWithEmptyProgressMarkerToken(
syncable::ModelTypeSet types,
sync_api::UserShare* share) {
syncable::ScopedDirLookup lookup(share->dir_manager.get(),
share->name);
if (!lookup.good()) {
NOTREACHED() << "ScopedDirLookup failed for "
<< "GetTypesWithEmptyProgressMarkerToken";
return syncable::ModelTypeSet();
}
syncable::ModelTypeSet result;
for (syncable::ModelTypeSet::Iterator i = types.First();
i.Good(); i.Inc()) {
sync_pb::DataTypeProgressMarker marker;
lookup->GetDownloadProgress(i.Get(), &marker);
if (marker.token().empty())
result.Put(i.Get());
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: sync: remove Chrome OS specific logic to deal with flimflam shutdown / sync race.
No longer necessary as the ProfileSyncService now aborts sync network traffic on shutdown.
BUG=chromium-os:20841
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9358007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@120912 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 107,829
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: bool venc_dev::venc_set_color_format(OMX_COLOR_FORMATTYPE color_format)
{
struct v4l2_format fmt;
int color_space = 0;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("venc_set_color_format: color_format = %u ", color_format);
if ((int)color_format == (int)OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420SemiPlanar ||
(int)color_format == (int)QOMX_COLOR_FORMATYUV420PackedSemiPlanar32m) {
m_sVenc_cfg.inputformat = V4L2_PIX_FMT_NV12;
color_space = V4L2_COLORSPACE_BT878;
} else if ((int)color_format == (int)QOMX_COLOR_FormatYVU420SemiPlanar) {
m_sVenc_cfg.inputformat = V4L2_PIX_FMT_NV21;
color_space = V4L2_COLORSPACE_BT878;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("WARNING: Unsupported Color format [%d]", color_format);
m_sVenc_cfg.inputformat = V4L2_PIX_FMT_NV12;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Default color format YUV420SemiPlanar is set");
}
fmt.type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_OUTPUT_MPLANE;
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.pixelformat = m_sVenc_cfg.inputformat;
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.colorspace = static_cast<decltype(fmt.fmt.pix_mp.colorspace)>(color_space);
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.height = m_sVenc_cfg.input_height;
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.width = m_sVenc_cfg.input_width;
if (ioctl(m_nDriver_fd, VIDIOC_S_FMT, &fmt)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed setting color format %x", color_format);
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 159,280
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void LoadURLInContents(WebContents* target_contents,
const GURL& url,
NavigateParams* params) {
NavigationController::LoadURLParams load_url_params(url);
load_url_params.source_site_instance = params->source_site_instance;
load_url_params.referrer = params->referrer;
load_url_params.frame_name = params->frame_name;
load_url_params.frame_tree_node_id = params->frame_tree_node_id;
load_url_params.redirect_chain = params->redirect_chain;
load_url_params.transition_type = params->transition;
load_url_params.extra_headers = params->extra_headers;
load_url_params.should_replace_current_entry =
params->should_replace_current_entry;
load_url_params.is_renderer_initiated = params->is_renderer_initiated;
load_url_params.started_from_context_menu = params->started_from_context_menu;
load_url_params.has_user_gesture = params->user_gesture;
load_url_params.blob_url_loader_factory = params->blob_url_loader_factory;
if (params->frame_tree_node_id ==
content::RenderFrameHost::kNoFrameTreeNodeId) {
load_url_params.navigation_ui_data =
ChromeNavigationUIData::CreateForMainFrameNavigation(
target_contents, params->disposition);
}
if (params->uses_post) {
load_url_params.load_type = NavigationController::LOAD_TYPE_HTTP_POST;
load_url_params.post_data = params->post_data;
}
target_contents->GetController().LoadURLWithParams(load_url_params);
}
Commit Message: Mac: turn popups into new tabs while in fullscreen.
It's platform convention to show popups as new tabs while in
non-HTML5 fullscreen. (Popups cause tabs to lose HTML5 fullscreen.)
This was implemented for Cocoa in a BrowserWindow override, but
it makes sense to just stick it into Browser and remove a ton
of override code put in just to support this.
BUG=858929, 868416
TEST=as in bugs
Change-Id: I43471f242813ec1159d9c690bab73dab3e610b7d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1153455
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#578755}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 155,132
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int shmem_xattr_validate(const char *name)
{
struct { const char *prefix; size_t len; } arr[] = {
{ XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN },
{ XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX, XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN }
};
int i;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(arr); i++) {
size_t preflen = arr[i].len;
if (strncmp(name, arr[i].prefix, preflen) == 0) {
if (!name[preflen])
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
}
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
Commit Message: tmpfs: fix use-after-free of mempolicy object
The tmpfs remount logic preserves filesystem mempolicy if the mpol=M
option is not specified in the remount request. A new policy can be
specified if mpol=M is given.
Before this patch remounting an mpol bound tmpfs without specifying
mpol= mount option in the remount request would set the filesystem's
mempolicy object to a freed mempolicy object.
To reproduce the problem boot a DEBUG_PAGEALLOC kernel and run:
# mkdir /tmp/x
# mount -t tmpfs -o size=100M,mpol=interleave nodev /tmp/x
# grep /tmp/x /proc/mounts
nodev /tmp/x tmpfs rw,relatime,size=102400k,mpol=interleave:0-3 0 0
# mount -o remount,size=200M nodev /tmp/x
# grep /tmp/x /proc/mounts
nodev /tmp/x tmpfs rw,relatime,size=204800k,mpol=??? 0 0
# note ? garbage in mpol=... output above
# dd if=/dev/zero of=/tmp/x/f count=1
# panic here
Panic:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
IP: [< (null)>] (null)
[...]
Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
Call Trace:
mpol_shared_policy_init+0xa5/0x160
shmem_get_inode+0x209/0x270
shmem_mknod+0x3e/0xf0
shmem_create+0x18/0x20
vfs_create+0xb5/0x130
do_last+0x9a1/0xea0
path_openat+0xb3/0x4d0
do_filp_open+0x42/0xa0
do_sys_open+0xfe/0x1e0
compat_sys_open+0x1b/0x20
cstar_dispatch+0x7/0x1f
Non-debug kernels will not crash immediately because referencing the
dangling mpol will not cause a fault. Instead the filesystem will
reference a freed mempolicy object, which will cause unpredictable
behavior.
The problem boils down to a dropped mpol reference below if
shmem_parse_options() does not allocate a new mpol:
config = *sbinfo
shmem_parse_options(data, &config, true)
mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol)
sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol /* BUG: saves unreferenced mpol */
This patch avoids the crash by not releasing the mempolicy if
shmem_parse_options() doesn't create a new mpol.
How far back does this issue go? I see it in both 2.6.36 and 3.3. I did
not look back further.
Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 33,565
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void comps_objmrtree_copy(COMPS_ObjMRTree *ret, COMPS_ObjMRTree *rt){
COMPS_HSList * to_clone, *tmplist, *new_subnodes;
COMPS_HSListItem *it, *it2;
COMPS_ObjMRTreeData *rtdata;
COMPS_ObjList *new_data_list;
to_clone = comps_hslist_create();
comps_hslist_init(to_clone, NULL, NULL, NULL);
for (it = rt->subnodes->first; it != NULL; it = it->next) {
rtdata = comps_objmrtree_data_create(
((COMPS_ObjMRTreeData*)it->data)->key,
NULL);
new_data_list = (COMPS_ObjList*)
COMPS_OBJECT_COPY(((COMPS_ObjMRTreeData*)it->data)->data);
COMPS_OBJECT_DESTROY(&rtdata->data);
comps_hslist_destroy(&rtdata->subnodes);
rtdata->subnodes = ((COMPS_ObjMRTreeData*)it->data)->subnodes;
rtdata->data = new_data_list;
comps_hslist_append(ret->subnodes, rtdata, 0);
comps_hslist_append(to_clone, rtdata, 0);
}
while (to_clone->first) {
it2 = to_clone->first;
tmplist = ((COMPS_ObjMRTreeData*)it2->data)->subnodes;
comps_hslist_remove(to_clone, to_clone->first);
new_subnodes = comps_hslist_create();
comps_hslist_init(new_subnodes, NULL, NULL, &comps_objmrtree_data_destroy_v);
for (it = tmplist->first; it != NULL; it = it->next) {
rtdata = comps_objmrtree_data_create(
((COMPS_ObjMRTreeData*)it->data)->key,
NULL);
new_data_list = (COMPS_ObjList*)
COMPS_OBJECT_COPY(((COMPS_ObjMRTreeData*)it->data)->data);
comps_hslist_destroy(&rtdata->subnodes);
COMPS_OBJECT_DESTROY(rtdata->data);
rtdata->subnodes = ((COMPS_ObjMRTreeData*)it->data)->subnodes;
rtdata->data = new_data_list;
comps_hslist_append(new_subnodes, rtdata, 0);
comps_hslist_append(to_clone, rtdata, 0);
}
((COMPS_ObjMRTreeData*)it2->data)->subnodes = new_subnodes;
free(it2);
}
ret->len = rt->len;
comps_hslist_destroy(&to_clone);
}
Commit Message: Fix UAF in comps_objmrtree_unite function
The added field is not used at all in many places and it is probably the
left-over of some copy-paste.
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 91,763
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: unsigned getSampleRate() const {
return mStreamInfo.sample_rate;
}
Commit Message: FLACExtractor: copy protect mWriteBuffer
Bug: 30895578
Change-Id: I4cba36bbe3502678210e5925181683df9726b431
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 162,512
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void eseqiv_free(struct crypto_instance *inst)
{
skcipher_geniv_free(inst);
crypto_put_default_rng();
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 45,719
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: zsetcmykcolor(i_ctx_t * i_ctx_p)
{
os_ptr op = osp; /* required by "push" macro */
int code, i;
float values[4];
/* Gather numeric operand value(s) (also checks type) */
code = float_params(op, 4, (float *)&values);
if (code < 0)
return code;
/* Clamp numeric operand range(s) */
for (i = 0;i < 4; i++) {
if (values[i] < 0)
values[i] = 0;
else if (values[i] > 1)
values[i] = 1;
}
code = make_floats(&op[-3], (const float *)&values, 4);
if (code < 0)
return code;
/* Set up for the continuation procedure which will do the work */
/* Make sure the exec stack has enough space */
check_estack(5);
push_mark_estack(es_other, colour_cleanup);
esp++;
/* variable to hold base type (2 = CMYK) */
make_int(esp, 2);
esp++;
/* Store the 'stage' of processing (initially 0) */
make_int(esp, 0);
/* Finally, the actual continuation routine */
push_op_estack(setdevicecolor_cont);
return o_push_estack;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 3,183
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: ar6000_get_stats(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct ar6_softc *ar = (struct ar6_softc *)ar6k_priv(dev);
return &ar->arNetStats;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
CC: Karsten Keil <[email protected]>
CC: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <[email protected]>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <[email protected]>
CC: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <[email protected]>
CC: "John W. Linville" <[email protected]>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
CC: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 24,188
|
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