instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
235k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static inline void ext4_iget_extra_inode(struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_inode *raw_inode,
struct ext4_inode_info *ei)
{
__le32 *magic = (void *)raw_inode +
EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE + ei->i_extra_isize;
if (*magic == cpu_to_le32(EXT4_XATTR_MAGIC)) {
ext4_set_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_XATTR);
ext4_find_inline_data_nolock(inode);
} else
EXT4_I(inode)->i_inline_off = 0;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 56,578
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: gfx::Image CreateBitmap(SkColor color) {
SkBitmap thumbnail;
thumbnail.allocN32Pixels(4, 4);
thumbnail.eraseColor(color);
return gfx::Image::CreateFrom1xBitmap(thumbnail); // adds ref.
}
Commit Message: TopSites: Clear thumbnails from the cache when their URLs get removed
We already cleared the thumbnails from persistent storage, but they
remained in the in-memory cache, so they remained accessible (until the
next Chrome restart) even after all browsing data was cleared.
Bug: 758169
Change-Id: Id916d22358430a82e6d5043ac04fa463a32f824f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758640
Commit-Queue: Marc Treib <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#514861}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 147,109
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void mlx4_init_vlan_table(struct mlx4_dev *dev, struct mlx4_vlan_table *table)
{
int i;
mutex_init(&table->mutex);
for (i = 0; i < MLX4_MAX_VLAN_NUM; i++) {
table->entries[i] = 0;
table->refs[i] = 0;
}
table->max = 1 << dev->caps.log_num_vlans;
table->total = 0;
}
Commit Message: mlx4_en: Fix out of bounds array access
When searching for a free entry in either mlx4_register_vlan() or
mlx4_register_mac(), and there is no free entry, the loop terminates without
updating the local variable free thus causing out of array bounds access. Fix
this by adding a proper check outside the loop.
Signed-off-by: Eli Cohen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 94,175
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void ClipboardMessageFilter::OnClear(ui::ClipboardType type) {
GetClipboard()->Clear(type);
}
Commit Message: Refactor ui::Clipboard::ObjectMap sanitization in ClipboardMsgFilter.
BUG=352395
[email protected]
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/200523004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@257164 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 122,935
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void kvm_arch_hardware_unsetup(void)
{
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 20,588
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType ReadPSDChannelZip(Image *image,const size_t channels,
const ssize_t type,const PSDCompressionType compression,
const size_t compact_size,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
MagickBooleanType
status;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
count,
length,
packet_size,
row_size;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned char
*compact_pixels,
*pixels;
z_stream
stream;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer data is ZIP compressed");
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(compact_size,
sizeof(*compact_pixels));
if (compact_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
packet_size=GetPSDPacketSize(image);
row_size=image->columns*packet_size;
count=image->rows*row_size;
pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(count,sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(compact_pixels);
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
}
ResetMagickMemory(&stream,0,sizeof(stream));
stream.data_type=Z_BINARY;
(void) ReadBlob(image,compact_size,compact_pixels);
stream.next_in=(Bytef *)compact_pixels;
stream.avail_in=(uInt) compact_size;
stream.next_out=(Bytef *)pixels;
stream.avail_out=(uInt) count;
if (inflateInit(&stream) == Z_OK)
{
int
ret;
while (stream.avail_out > 0)
{
ret=inflate(&stream,Z_SYNC_FLUSH);
if ((ret != Z_OK) && (ret != Z_STREAM_END))
{
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
compact_pixels);
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
return(MagickFalse);
}
}
}
if (compression == ZipWithPrediction)
{
p=pixels;
while (count > 0)
{
length=image->columns;
while (--length)
{
if (packet_size == 2)
{
p[2]+=p[0]+((p[1]+p[3]) >> 8);
p[3]+=p[1];
}
else
*(p+1)+=*p;
p+=packet_size;
}
p+=packet_size;
count-=row_size;
}
}
status=MagickTrue;
p=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
status=ReadPSDChannelPixels(image,channels,y,type,p,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
p+=row_size;
}
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(compact_pixels);
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
return(status);
}
Commit Message: Fix improper cast that could cause an overflow as demonstrated in #347.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 69,050
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: WebNotificationManager* notificationManager()
{
return Platform::current()->notificationManager();
}
Commit Message: Notification actions may have an icon url.
This is behind a runtime flag for two reasons:
* The implementation is incomplete.
* We're still evaluating the API design.
Intent to Implement and Ship: Notification Action Icons
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/IM0HxOP7HOA/y8tu6iq1CgAJ
BUG=581336
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1644573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374649}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 119,783
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void __nfs4_read_done_cb(struct nfs_read_data *data)
{
nfs_invalidate_atime(data->inode);
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 19,801
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: int CMS_decrypt_set1_key(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
unsigned char *id, size_t idlen)
{
STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientInfo) *ris;
CMS_RecipientInfo *ri;
int i, r;
ris = CMS_get0_RecipientInfos(cms);
for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_num(ris); i++)
{
ri = sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_value(ris, i);
if (CMS_RecipientInfo_type(ri) != CMS_RECIPINFO_KEK)
continue;
/* If we have an id try matching RecipientInfo
* otherwise try them all.
*/
if (!id || (CMS_RecipientInfo_kekri_id_cmp(ri, id, idlen) == 0))
{
CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_key(ri, key, keylen);
r = CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt(cms, ri);
CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_key(ri, NULL, 0);
if (r > 0)
return 1;
if (id)
{
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_KEY,
CMS_R_DECRYPT_ERROR);
return 0;
}
ERR_clear_error();
}
}
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_KEY, CMS_R_NO_MATCHING_RECIPIENT);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Canonicalise input in CMS_verify.
If content is detached and not binary mode translate the input to
CRLF format. Before this change the input was verified verbatim
which lead to a discrepancy between sign and verify.
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 44,179
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: gfx::Rect ShelfLayoutManager::GetIdealBounds() {
gfx::Rect bounds(
gfx::Screen::GetDisplayNearestWindow(status_->GetNativeView()).bounds());
int width = 0, height = 0;
GetShelfSize(&width, &height);
switch (alignment_) {
case SHELF_ALIGNMENT_BOTTOM:
return gfx::Rect(bounds.x(), bounds.bottom() - height,
bounds.width(), height);
case SHELF_ALIGNMENT_LEFT:
return gfx::Rect(bounds.x(), bounds.y(), width, bounds.height());
case SHELF_ALIGNMENT_RIGHT:
return gfx::Rect(bounds.right() - width, bounds.y(), width,
bounds.height());
}
NOTREACHED();
return gfx::Rect();
}
Commit Message: ash: Add launcher overflow bubble.
- Host a LauncherView in bubble to display overflown items;
- Mouse wheel and two-finger scroll to scroll the LauncherView in bubble in case overflow bubble is overflown;
- Fit bubble when items are added/removed;
- Keep launcher bar on screen when the bubble is shown;
BUG=128054
TEST=Verify launcher overflown items are in a bubble instead of menu.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10659003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146460 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 106,272
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: std::vector<std::string> GetSideloadFontFiles() {
std::vector<std::string> files;
const base::CommandLine& command_line =
*base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kRegisterFontFiles)) {
base::SplitString(
command_line.GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kRegisterFontFiles),
';',
&files);
}
return files;
}
Commit Message: content: Rename webkit_test_helpers.{cc,h} to blink_test_helpers.{cc,h}
Now that webkit/ is gone, we are preparing ourselves for the merge of
third_party/WebKit into //blink.
BUG=None
BUG=content_shell && content_unittests
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1118183003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#328202}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 123,541
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: e1000e_intrmgr_fire_all_timers(E1000ECore *core)
{
int i;
uint32_t val = e1000e_intmgr_collect_delayed_causes(core);
trace_e1000e_irq_adding_delayed_causes(val, core->mac[ICR]);
core->mac[ICR] |= val;
if (core->itr.running) {
timer_del(core->itr.timer);
e1000e_intrmgr_on_throttling_timer(&core->itr);
}
for (i = 0; i < E1000E_MSIX_VEC_NUM; i++) {
if (core->eitr[i].running) {
timer_del(core->eitr[i].timer);
e1000e_intrmgr_on_msix_throttling_timer(&core->eitr[i]);
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 5,983
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: int set_hdmi_channels(struct audio_device *adev, int channel_count)
{
struct mixer_ctl *ctl;
const char *mixer_ctl_name = "";
(void)adev;
(void)channel_count;
/* TODO */
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix audio record pre-processing
proc_buf_out consistently initialized.
intermediate scratch buffers consistently initialized.
prevent read failure from overwriting memory.
Test: POC, CTS, camera record
Bug: 62873231
Change-Id: Ie26e12a419a5819c1c5c3a0bcf1876d6d7aca686
(cherry picked from commit 6d7b330c27efba944817e647955da48e54fd74eb)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 162,329
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: inline void ImageLoader::DispatchErrorEvent() {
pending_error_event_ = PostCancellableTask(
*GetElement()->GetDocument().GetTaskRunner(TaskType::kDOMManipulation),
FROM_HERE,
WTF::Bind(&ImageLoader::DispatchPendingErrorEvent, WrapPersistent(this),
WTF::Passed(IncrementLoadEventDelayCount::Create(
GetElement()->GetDocument()))));
}
Commit Message: service worker: Disable interception when OBJECT/EMBED uses ImageLoader.
Per the specification, service worker should not intercept requests for
OBJECT/EMBED elements.
R=kinuko
Bug: 771933
Change-Id: Ia6da6107dc5c68aa2c2efffde14bd2c51251fbd4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/927303
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Matt Falkenhagen <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#538027}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 147,485
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void jslTokenAsString(int token, char *str, size_t len) {
if (token>32 && token<128) {
assert(len>=4);
str[0] = '\'';
str[1] = (char)token;
str[2] = '\'';
str[3] = 0;
return;
}
switch (token) {
case LEX_EOF : strncpy(str, "EOF", len); return;
case LEX_ID : strncpy(str, "ID", len); return;
case LEX_INT : strncpy(str, "INT", len); return;
case LEX_FLOAT : strncpy(str, "FLOAT", len); return;
case LEX_STR : strncpy(str, "STRING", len); return;
case LEX_UNFINISHED_STR : strncpy(str, "UNFINISHED STRING", len); return;
case LEX_TEMPLATE_LITERAL : strncpy(str, "TEMPLATE LITERAL", len); return;
case LEX_UNFINISHED_TEMPLATE_LITERAL : strncpy(str, "UNFINISHED TEMPLATE LITERAL", len); return;
case LEX_REGEX : strncpy(str, "REGEX", len); return;
case LEX_UNFINISHED_REGEX : strncpy(str, "UNFINISHED REGEX", len); return;
case LEX_UNFINISHED_COMMENT : strncpy(str, "UNFINISHED COMMENT", len); return;
}
if (token>=_LEX_OPERATOR_START && token<_LEX_R_LIST_END) {
const char tokenNames[] =
/* LEX_EQUAL : */ "==\0"
/* LEX_TYPEEQUAL : */ "===\0"
/* LEX_NEQUAL : */ "!=\0"
/* LEX_NTYPEEQUAL : */ "!==\0"
/* LEX_LEQUAL : */ "<=\0"
/* LEX_LSHIFT : */ "<<\0"
/* LEX_LSHIFTEQUAL : */ "<<=\0"
/* LEX_GEQUAL : */ ">=\0"
/* LEX_RSHIFT : */ ">>\0"
/* LEX_RSHIFTUNSIGNED */ ">>>\0"
/* LEX_RSHIFTEQUAL : */ ">>=\0"
/* LEX_RSHIFTUNSIGNEDEQUAL */ ">>>=\0"
/* LEX_PLUSEQUAL : */ "+=\0"
/* LEX_MINUSEQUAL : */ "-=\0"
/* LEX_PLUSPLUS : */ "++\0"
/* LEX_MINUSMINUS */ "--\0"
/* LEX_MULEQUAL : */ "*=\0"
/* LEX_DIVEQUAL : */ "/=\0"
/* LEX_MODEQUAL : */ "%=\0"
/* LEX_ANDEQUAL : */ "&=\0"
/* LEX_ANDAND : */ "&&\0"
/* LEX_OREQUAL : */ "|=\0"
/* LEX_OROR : */ "||\0"
/* LEX_XOREQUAL : */ "^=\0"
/* LEX_ARROW_FUNCTION */ "=>\0"
/*LEX_R_IF : */ "if\0"
/*LEX_R_ELSE : */ "else\0"
/*LEX_R_DO : */ "do\0"
/*LEX_R_WHILE : */ "while\0"
/*LEX_R_FOR : */ "for\0"
/*LEX_R_BREAK : */ "return\0"
/*LEX_R_CONTINUE */ "continue\0"
/*LEX_R_FUNCTION */ "function\0"
/*LEX_R_RETURN */ "return\0"
/*LEX_R_VAR : */ "var\0"
/*LEX_R_LET : */ "let\0"
/*LEX_R_CONST : */ "const\0"
/*LEX_R_THIS : */ "this\0"
/*LEX_R_THROW : */ "throw\0"
/*LEX_R_TRY : */ "try\0"
/*LEX_R_CATCH : */ "catch\0"
/*LEX_R_FINALLY : */ "finally\0"
/*LEX_R_TRUE : */ "true\0"
/*LEX_R_FALSE : */ "false\0"
/*LEX_R_NULL : */ "null\0"
/*LEX_R_UNDEFINED */ "undefined\0"
/*LEX_R_NEW : */ "new\0"
/*LEX_R_IN : */ "in\0"
/*LEX_R_INSTANCEOF */ "instanceof\0"
/*LEX_R_SWITCH */ "switch\0"
/*LEX_R_CASE */ "case\0"
/*LEX_R_DEFAULT */ "default\0"
/*LEX_R_DELETE */ "delete\0"
/*LEX_R_TYPEOF : */ "typeof\0"
/*LEX_R_VOID : */ "void\0"
/*LEX_R_DEBUGGER : */ "debugger\0"
/*LEX_R_CLASS : */ "class\0"
/*LEX_R_EXTENDS : */ "extends\0"
/*LEX_R_SUPER : */ "super\0"
/*LEX_R_STATIC : */ "static\0"
;
unsigned int p = 0;
int n = token-_LEX_OPERATOR_START;
while (n>0 && p<sizeof(tokenNames)) {
while (tokenNames[p] && p<sizeof(tokenNames)) p++;
p++; // skip the zero
n--; // next token
}
assert(n==0);
strncpy(str, &tokenNames[p], len);
return;
}
assert(len>=10);
strncpy(str, "?[",len);
itostr(token, &str[2], 10);
strncat(str, "]",len);
}
Commit Message: Fix strncat/cpy bounding issues (fix #1425)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 169,212
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: Resource* ResourceFetcher::ResourceForBlockedRequest(
const FetchParameters& params,
const ResourceFactory& factory,
ResourceRequestBlockedReason blocked_reason) {
Resource* resource = factory.Create(
params.GetResourceRequest(), params.Options(), params.DecoderOptions());
resource->SetStatus(ResourceStatus::kPending);
resource->NotifyStartLoad();
resource->FinishAsError(ResourceError::CancelledDueToAccessCheckError(
params.Url(), blocked_reason));
return resource;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 138,902
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: bool WebGL2RenderingContextBase::ValidateAndUpdateBufferBindBaseTarget(
const char* function_name,
GLenum target,
GLuint index,
WebGLBuffer* buffer) {
if (!ValidateBufferBaseTarget(function_name, target))
return false;
if (buffer &&
!ValidateBufferTargetCompatibility(function_name, target, buffer))
return false;
switch (target) {
case GL_TRANSFORM_FEEDBACK_BUFFER:
if (!transform_feedback_binding_->SetBoundIndexedTransformFeedbackBuffer(
index, buffer)) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name,
"index out of range");
return false;
}
break;
case GL_UNIFORM_BUFFER:
if (index >= bound_indexed_uniform_buffers_.size()) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name,
"index out of range");
return false;
}
bound_indexed_uniform_buffers_[index] = buffer;
bound_uniform_buffer_ = buffer;
if (buffer) {
if (index > max_bound_uniform_buffer_index_)
max_bound_uniform_buffer_index_ = index;
} else if (max_bound_uniform_buffer_index_ > 0 &&
index == max_bound_uniform_buffer_index_) {
size_t i = max_bound_uniform_buffer_index_ - 1;
for (; i > 0; --i) {
if (bound_indexed_uniform_buffers_[i].Get())
break;
}
max_bound_uniform_buffer_index_ = i;
}
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
if (buffer && !buffer->GetInitialTarget())
buffer->SetInitialTarget(target);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Implement 2D texture uploading from client array with FLIP_Y or PREMULTIPLY_ALPHA.
BUG=774174
TEST=https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2555
[email protected]
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I4f4e7636314502451104730501a5048a5d7b9f3f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/808665
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522003}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 146,625
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: explicit FindAdapter(Plugin* plugin)
: pp::Find_Dev(plugin),
plugin_(plugin) {
BrowserPpp* proxy = plugin_->ppapi_proxy();
CHECK(proxy != NULL);
ppp_find_ = static_cast<const PPP_Find_Dev*>(
proxy->GetPluginInterface(PPP_FIND_DEV_INTERFACE));
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 103,340
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void Observe(NotificationType type,
const NotificationSource& source,
const NotificationDetails& details) {
if (type.value == NotificationType::APP_TERMINATING) {
notification_registrar_.RemoveAll();
StopInputMethodDaemon();
#if !defined(TOUCH_UI)
candidate_window_controller_.reset(NULL);
#endif
}
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 100,838
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: WebKit::WebSpeechInputController* RenderView::speechInputController(
WebKit::WebSpeechInputListener* listener) {
if (!speech_input_dispatcher_)
speech_input_dispatcher_ = new SpeechInputDispatcher(this, listener);
return speech_input_dispatcher_;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 99,046
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: QQmlComponent* OxideQQuickWebView::confirmDialog() const {
Q_D(const OxideQQuickWebView);
return d->confirm_dialog_;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,074
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int __hwahc_op_set_gtk(struct wusbhc *wusbhc, u32 tkid,
const void *key, size_t key_size)
{
u8 key_idx = wusb_key_index(0, WUSB_KEY_INDEX_TYPE_GTK,
WUSB_KEY_INDEX_ORIGINATOR_HOST);
return __hwahc_dev_set_key(wusbhc, 0, tkid, key, key_size, key_idx);
}
Commit Message: USB: check usb_get_extra_descriptor for proper size
When reading an extra descriptor, we need to properly check the minimum
and maximum size allowed, to prevent from invalid data being sent by a
device.
Reported-by: Hui Peng <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Mathias Payer <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hui Peng <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Payer <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 75,575
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void WebUIBidiCheckerBrowserTestRTL::RunBidiCheckerOnPage(
const std::string& page_url) {
WebUIBidiCheckerBrowserTest::RunBidiCheckerOnPage(page_url, true);
}
Commit Message: Disable WebUIBidiCheckerBrowserTestRTL.TestSettingsFramePasswords for being flaky on all platforms.
[email protected].
BUG=95425
TEST=none
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10447119
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139814 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 103,216
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: GF_Err traf_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
GF_TrackFragmentBox *p;
p = (GF_TrackFragmentBox *)a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "TrackFragmentBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, ">\n");
if (p->tfhd) gf_isom_box_dump(p->tfhd, trace);
if (p->sdtp) gf_isom_box_dump(p->sdtp, trace);
if (p->tfdt) gf_isom_box_dump(p->tfdt, trace);
if (p->sub_samples) gf_isom_box_array_dump(p->sub_samples, trace);
if (p->sampleGroupsDescription) gf_isom_box_array_dump(p->sampleGroupsDescription, trace);
if (p->sampleGroups) gf_isom_box_array_dump(p->sampleGroups, trace);
gf_isom_box_array_dump(p->TrackRuns, trace);
if (p->sai_sizes) gf_isom_box_array_dump(p->sai_sizes, trace);
if (p->sai_offsets) gf_isom_box_array_dump(p->sai_offsets, trace);
if (p->sample_encryption) gf_isom_box_dump(p->sample_encryption, trace);
gf_isom_box_dump_done("TrackFragmentBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,877
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int __hidp_send_ctrl_message(struct hidp_session *session,
unsigned char hdr, unsigned char *data,
int size)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
BT_DBG("session %p data %p size %d", session, data, size);
if (atomic_read(&session->terminate))
return -EIO;
skb = alloc_skb(size + 1, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb) {
BT_ERR("Can't allocate memory for new frame");
return -ENOMEM;
}
*skb_put(skb, 1) = hdr;
if (data && size > 0)
memcpy(skb_put(skb, size), data, size);
skb_queue_tail(&session->ctrl_transmit, skb);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: Fix incorrect strncpy() in hidp_setup_hid()
The length parameter should be sizeof(req->name) - 1 because there is no
guarantee that string provided by userspace will contain the trailing
'\0'.
Can be easily reproduced by manually setting req->name to 128 non-zero
bytes prior to ioctl(HIDPCONNADD) and checking the device name setup on
input subsystem:
$ cat /sys/devices/pnp0/00\:04/tty/ttyS0/hci0/hci0\:1/input8/name
AAAAAA[...]AAAAAAAAf0:af:f0:af:f0:af
("f0:af:f0:af:f0:af" is the device bluetooth address, taken from "phys"
field in struct hid_device due to overflow.)
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Anderson Lizardo <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 33,724
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void GpuChannel::OnCreateOffscreenCommandBuffer(
const gfx::Size& size,
const GPUCreateCommandBufferConfig& init_params,
IPC::Message* reply_message) {
int32 route_id = MSG_ROUTING_NONE;
content::GetContentClient()->SetActiveURL(init_params.active_url);
#if defined(ENABLE_GPU)
WillCreateCommandBuffer(init_params.gpu_preference);
GpuCommandBufferStub* share_group = stubs_.Lookup(init_params.share_group_id);
route_id = GenerateRouteID();
scoped_ptr<GpuCommandBufferStub> stub(new GpuCommandBufferStub(
this,
share_group,
gfx::GLSurfaceHandle(),
size,
disallowed_features_,
init_params.allowed_extensions,
init_params.attribs,
init_params.gpu_preference,
route_id,
0, watchdog_,
software_));
router_.AddRoute(route_id, stub.get());
stubs_.AddWithID(stub.release(), route_id);
TRACE_EVENT1("gpu", "GpuChannel::OnCreateOffscreenCommandBuffer",
"route_id", route_id);
#endif
GpuChannelMsg_CreateOffscreenCommandBuffer::WriteReplyParams(
reply_message,
route_id);
Send(reply_message);
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 106,867
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: int __page_symlink(struct inode *inode, const char *symname, int len, int nofs)
{
struct address_space *mapping = inode->i_mapping;
struct page *page;
void *fsdata;
int err;
char *kaddr;
unsigned int flags = AOP_FLAG_UNINTERRUPTIBLE;
if (nofs)
flags |= AOP_FLAG_NOFS;
retry:
err = pagecache_write_begin(NULL, mapping, 0, len-1,
flags, &page, &fsdata);
if (err)
goto fail;
kaddr = kmap_atomic(page, KM_USER0);
memcpy(kaddr, symname, len-1);
kunmap_atomic(kaddr, KM_USER0);
err = pagecache_write_end(NULL, mapping, 0, len-1, len-1,
page, fsdata);
if (err < 0)
goto fail;
if (err < len-1)
goto retry;
mark_inode_dirty(inode);
return 0;
fail:
return err;
}
Commit Message: fix autofs/afs/etc. magic mountpoint breakage
We end up trying to kfree() nd.last.name on open("/mnt/tmp", O_CREAT)
if /mnt/tmp is an autofs direct mount. The reason is that nd.last_type
is bogus here; we want LAST_BIND for everything of that kind and we
get LAST_NORM left over from finding parent directory.
So make sure that it *is* set properly; set to LAST_BIND before
doing ->follow_link() - for normal symlinks it will be changed
by __vfs_follow_link() and everything else needs it set that way.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 39,666
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: isdn_net_unbind_channel(isdn_net_local * lp)
{
skb_queue_purge(&lp->super_tx_queue);
if (!lp->master) { /* reset only master device */
/* Moral equivalent of dev_purge_queues():
BEWARE! This chunk of code cannot be called from hardware
interrupt handler. I hope it is true. --ANK
*/
qdisc_reset_all_tx(lp->netdev->dev);
}
lp->dialstate = 0;
dev->rx_netdev[isdn_dc2minor(lp->isdn_device, lp->isdn_channel)] = NULL;
dev->st_netdev[isdn_dc2minor(lp->isdn_device, lp->isdn_channel)] = NULL;
if (lp->isdn_device != -1 && lp->isdn_channel != -1)
isdn_free_channel(lp->isdn_device, lp->isdn_channel,
ISDN_USAGE_NET);
lp->flags &= ~ISDN_NET_CONNECTED;
lp->isdn_device = -1;
lp->isdn_channel = -1;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
CC: Karsten Keil <[email protected]>
CC: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <[email protected]>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <[email protected]>
CC: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <[email protected]>
CC: "John W. Linville" <[email protected]>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
CC: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 23,674
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static inline int connection_based(struct sock *sk)
{
return sk->sk_type == SOCK_SEQPACKET || sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM;
}
Commit Message: net: fix infinite loop in __skb_recv_datagram()
Tommi was fuzzing with trinity and reported the following problem :
commit 3f518bf745 (datagram: Add offset argument to __skb_recv_datagram)
missed that a raw socket receive queue can contain skbs with no payload.
We can loop in __skb_recv_datagram() with MSG_PEEK mode, because
wait_for_packet() is not prepared to skip these skbs.
[ 83.541011] INFO: rcu_sched detected stalls on CPUs/tasks: {}
(detected by 0, t=26002 jiffies, g=27673, c=27672, q=75)
[ 83.541011] INFO: Stall ended before state dump start
[ 108.067010] BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 22s! [trinity-child31:2847]
...
[ 108.067010] Call Trace:
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff818cc103>] __skb_recv_datagram+0x1a3/0x3b0
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff818cc33d>] skb_recv_datagram+0x2d/0x30
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff819ed43d>] rawv6_recvmsg+0xad/0x240
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff818c4b04>] sock_common_recvmsg+0x34/0x50
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff818bc8ec>] sock_recvmsg+0xbc/0xf0
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff818bf31e>] sys_recvfrom+0xde/0x150
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff81ca4329>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Reported-by: Tommi Rantala <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Tommi Rantala <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Pavel Emelyanov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 33,834
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: status_t CameraClient::connect(const sp<ICameraClient>& client) {
int callingPid = getCallingPid();
LOG1("connect E (pid %d)", callingPid);
Mutex::Autolock lock(mLock);
if (mClientPid != 0 && checkPid() != NO_ERROR) {
ALOGW("Tried to connect to a locked camera (old pid %d, new pid %d)",
mClientPid, callingPid);
return EBUSY;
}
if (mRemoteCallback != 0 &&
(client->asBinder() == mRemoteCallback->asBinder())) {
LOG1("Connect to the same client");
return NO_ERROR;
}
mPreviewCallbackFlag = CAMERA_FRAME_CALLBACK_FLAG_NOOP;
mClientPid = callingPid;
mRemoteCallback = client;
LOG1("connect X (pid %d)", callingPid);
return NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 161,767
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int packet_rcv_spkt(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
struct packet_type *pt, struct net_device *orig_dev)
{
struct sock *sk;
struct sockaddr_pkt *spkt;
/*
* When we registered the protocol we saved the socket in the data
* field for just this event.
*/
sk = pt->af_packet_priv;
/*
* Yank back the headers [hope the device set this
* right or kerboom...]
*
* Incoming packets have ll header pulled,
* push it back.
*
* For outgoing ones skb->data == skb_mac_header(skb)
* so that this procedure is noop.
*/
if (skb->pkt_type == PACKET_LOOPBACK)
goto out;
if (!net_eq(dev_net(dev), sock_net(sk)))
goto out;
skb = skb_share_check(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (skb == NULL)
goto oom;
/* drop any routing info */
skb_dst_drop(skb);
/* drop conntrack reference */
nf_reset(skb);
spkt = &PACKET_SKB_CB(skb)->sa.pkt;
skb_push(skb, skb->data - skb_mac_header(skb));
/*
* The SOCK_PACKET socket receives _all_ frames.
*/
spkt->spkt_family = dev->type;
strlcpy(spkt->spkt_device, dev->name, sizeof(spkt->spkt_device));
spkt->spkt_protocol = skb->protocol;
/*
* Charge the memory to the socket. This is done specifically
* to prevent sockets using all the memory up.
*/
if (sock_queue_rcv_skb(sk, skb) == 0)
return 0;
out:
kfree_skb(skb);
oom:
return 0;
}
Commit Message: af_packet: prevent information leak
In 2.6.27, commit 393e52e33c6c2 (packet: deliver VLAN TCI to userspace)
added a small information leak.
Add padding field and make sure its zeroed before copy to user.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
CC: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 26,567
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE5(execveat,
int, fd, const char __user *, filename,
const char __user *const __user *, argv,
const char __user *const __user *, envp,
int, flags)
{
int lookup_flags = (flags & AT_EMPTY_PATH) ? LOOKUP_EMPTY : 0;
return do_execveat(fd,
getname_flags(filename, lookup_flags, NULL),
argv, envp, flags);
}
Commit Message: fs: take i_mutex during prepare_binprm for set[ug]id executables
This prevents a race between chown() and execve(), where chowning a
setuid-user binary to root would momentarily make the binary setuid
root.
This patch was mostly written by Linus Torvalds.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 43,428
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: exsltDateCurrent (void)
{
struct tm localTm, gmTm;
time_t secs;
int local_s, gm_s;
exsltDateValPtr ret;
ret = exsltDateCreateDate(XS_DATETIME);
if (ret == NULL)
return NULL;
/* get current time */
secs = time(NULL);
#if HAVE_LOCALTIME_R
localtime_r(&secs, &localTm);
#else
localTm = *localtime(&secs);
#endif
/* get real year, not years since 1900 */
ret->value.date.year = localTm.tm_year + 1900;
ret->value.date.mon = localTm.tm_mon + 1;
ret->value.date.day = localTm.tm_mday;
ret->value.date.hour = localTm.tm_hour;
ret->value.date.min = localTm.tm_min;
/* floating point seconds */
ret->value.date.sec = (double) localTm.tm_sec;
/* determine the time zone offset from local to gm time */
#if HAVE_GMTIME_R
gmtime_r(&secs, &gmTm);
#else
gmTm = *gmtime(&secs);
#endif
ret->value.date.tz_flag = 0;
#if 0
ret->value.date.tzo = (((ret->value.date.day * 1440) +
(ret->value.date.hour * 60) +
ret->value.date.min) -
((gmTm.tm_mday * 1440) + (gmTm.tm_hour * 60) +
gmTm.tm_min));
#endif
local_s = localTm.tm_hour * SECS_PER_HOUR +
localTm.tm_min * SECS_PER_MIN +
localTm.tm_sec;
gm_s = gmTm.tm_hour * SECS_PER_HOUR +
gmTm.tm_min * SECS_PER_MIN +
gmTm.tm_sec;
if (localTm.tm_year < gmTm.tm_year) {
ret->value.date.tzo = -((SECS_PER_DAY - local_s) + gm_s)/60;
} else if (localTm.tm_year > gmTm.tm_year) {
ret->value.date.tzo = ((SECS_PER_DAY - gm_s) + local_s)/60;
} else if (localTm.tm_mon < gmTm.tm_mon) {
ret->value.date.tzo = -((SECS_PER_DAY - local_s) + gm_s)/60;
} else if (localTm.tm_mon > gmTm.tm_mon) {
ret->value.date.tzo = ((SECS_PER_DAY - gm_s) + local_s)/60;
} else if (localTm.tm_mday < gmTm.tm_mday) {
ret->value.date.tzo = -((SECS_PER_DAY - local_s) + gm_s)/60;
} else if (localTm.tm_mday > gmTm.tm_mday) {
ret->value.date.tzo = ((SECS_PER_DAY - gm_s) + local_s)/60;
} else {
ret->value.date.tzo = (local_s - gm_s)/60;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 156,592
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: int validate_camera_metadata_structure(const camera_metadata_t *metadata,
const size_t *expected_size) {
if (metadata == NULL) {
ALOGE("%s: metadata is null!", __FUNCTION__);
return ERROR;
}
{
static const struct {
const char *name;
size_t alignment;
} alignments[] = {
{
.name = "camera_metadata",
.alignment = METADATA_ALIGNMENT
},
{
.name = "camera_metadata_buffer_entry",
.alignment = ENTRY_ALIGNMENT
},
{
.name = "camera_metadata_data",
.alignment = DATA_ALIGNMENT
},
};
for (size_t i = 0; i < sizeof(alignments)/sizeof(alignments[0]); ++i) {
uintptr_t aligned_ptr = ALIGN_TO(metadata, alignments[i].alignment);
if ((uintptr_t)metadata != aligned_ptr) {
ALOGE("%s: Metadata pointer is not aligned (actual %p, "
"expected %p) to type %s",
__FUNCTION__, metadata,
(void*)aligned_ptr, alignments[i].name);
return ERROR;
}
}
}
/**
* Check that the metadata contents are correct
*/
if (expected_size != NULL && metadata->size > *expected_size) {
ALOGE("%s: Metadata size (%" PRIu32 ") should be <= expected size (%zu)",
__FUNCTION__, metadata->size, *expected_size);
return ERROR;
}
if (metadata->entry_count > metadata->entry_capacity) {
ALOGE("%s: Entry count (%" PRIu32 ") should be <= entry capacity "
"(%" PRIu32 ")",
__FUNCTION__, metadata->entry_count, metadata->entry_capacity);
return ERROR;
}
const metadata_uptrdiff_t entries_end =
metadata->entries_start + metadata->entry_capacity;
if (entries_end < metadata->entries_start || // overflow check
entries_end > metadata->data_start) {
ALOGE("%s: Entry start + capacity (%" PRIu32 ") should be <= data start "
"(%" PRIu32 ")",
__FUNCTION__,
(metadata->entries_start + metadata->entry_capacity),
metadata->data_start);
return ERROR;
}
const metadata_uptrdiff_t data_end =
metadata->data_start + metadata->data_capacity;
if (data_end < metadata->data_start || // overflow check
data_end > metadata->size) {
ALOGE("%s: Data start + capacity (%" PRIu32 ") should be <= total size "
"(%" PRIu32 ")",
__FUNCTION__,
(metadata->data_start + metadata->data_capacity),
metadata->size);
return ERROR;
}
const metadata_size_t entry_count = metadata->entry_count;
camera_metadata_buffer_entry_t *entries = get_entries(metadata);
for (size_t i = 0; i < entry_count; ++i) {
if ((uintptr_t)&entries[i] != ALIGN_TO(&entries[i], ENTRY_ALIGNMENT)) {
ALOGE("%s: Entry index %zu had bad alignment (address %p),"
" expected alignment %zu",
__FUNCTION__, i, &entries[i], ENTRY_ALIGNMENT);
return ERROR;
}
camera_metadata_buffer_entry_t entry = entries[i];
if (entry.type >= NUM_TYPES) {
ALOGE("%s: Entry index %zu had a bad type %d",
__FUNCTION__, i, entry.type);
return ERROR;
}
uint32_t tag_section = entry.tag >> 16;
int tag_type = get_camera_metadata_tag_type(entry.tag);
if (tag_type != (int)entry.type && tag_section < VENDOR_SECTION) {
ALOGE("%s: Entry index %zu had tag type %d, but the type was %d",
__FUNCTION__, i, tag_type, entry.type);
return ERROR;
}
size_t data_size;
if (validate_and_calculate_camera_metadata_entry_data_size(&data_size, entry.type,
entry.count) != OK) {
ALOGE("%s: Entry data size is invalid. type: %u count: %u", __FUNCTION__, entry.type,
entry.count);
return ERROR;
}
if (data_size != 0) {
camera_metadata_data_t *data =
(camera_metadata_data_t*) (get_data(metadata) +
entry.data.offset);
if ((uintptr_t)data != ALIGN_TO(data, DATA_ALIGNMENT)) {
ALOGE("%s: Entry index %zu had bad data alignment (address %p),"
" expected align %zu, (tag name %s, data size %zu)",
__FUNCTION__, i, data, DATA_ALIGNMENT,
get_camera_metadata_tag_name(entry.tag) ?: "unknown",
data_size);
return ERROR;
}
size_t data_entry_end = entry.data.offset + data_size;
if (data_entry_end < entry.data.offset || // overflow check
data_entry_end > metadata->data_capacity) {
ALOGE("%s: Entry index %zu data ends (%zu) beyond the capacity "
"%" PRIu32, __FUNCTION__, i, data_entry_end,
metadata->data_capacity);
return ERROR;
}
} else if (entry.count == 0) {
if (entry.data.offset != 0) {
ALOGE("%s: Entry index %zu had 0 items, but offset was non-0 "
"(%" PRIu32 "), tag name: %s", __FUNCTION__, i, entry.data.offset,
get_camera_metadata_tag_name(entry.tag) ?: "unknown");
return ERROR;
}
} // else data stored inline, so we look at value which can be anything.
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Camera metadata: Check for inconsistent data count
Resolve merge conflict for nyc-release
Also check for overflow of data/entry count on append.
Bug: 30591838
Change-Id: Ibf4c3c6e236cdb28234f3125055d95ef0a2416a2
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 1
| 173,397
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void WebPage::clearCache()
{
clearMemoryCaches();
clearAppCache(d->m_page->groupName());
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,134
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: load_font_or_hail_mary(fz_context *ctx, pdf_document *doc, pdf_obj *rdb, pdf_obj *font, int depth, fz_cookie *cookie)
{
pdf_font_desc *desc;
fz_try(ctx)
{
desc = pdf_load_font(ctx, doc, rdb, font, depth);
}
fz_catch(ctx)
{
if (fz_caught(ctx) == FZ_ERROR_TRYLATER && cookie && cookie->incomplete_ok)
{
desc = NULL;
cookie->incomplete++;
}
else
{
fz_rethrow(ctx);
}
}
if (desc == NULL)
desc = pdf_load_hail_mary_font(ctx, doc);
return desc;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 570
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: bool FrameFetchContext::AllowScriptFromSource(const KURL& url) const {
ContentSettingsClient* settings_client = GetContentSettingsClient();
Settings* settings = GetSettings();
if (settings_client && !settings_client->AllowScriptFromSource(
!settings || settings->GetScriptEnabled(), url)) {
settings_client->DidNotAllowScript();
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 138,715
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int read_into_chunked_item(conn *c) {
int total = 0;
int res;
assert(c->rcurr != c->ritem);
while (c->rlbytes > 0) {
item_chunk *ch = (item_chunk *)c->ritem;
assert(ch->used <= ch->size);
if (ch->size == ch->used) {
if (ch->next) {
c->ritem = (char *) ch->next;
} else {
/* Allocate next chunk. Binary protocol needs 2b for \r\n */
c->ritem = (char *) do_item_alloc_chunk(ch, c->rlbytes +
((c->protocol == binary_prot) ? 2 : 0));
if (!c->ritem) {
total = -2;
break;
}
continue;
}
}
int unused = ch->size - ch->used;
/* first check if we have leftovers in the conn_read buffer */
if (c->rbytes > 0) {
total = 0;
int tocopy = c->rbytes > c->rlbytes ? c->rlbytes : c->rbytes;
tocopy = tocopy > unused ? unused : tocopy;
if (c->ritem != c->rcurr) {
memmove(ch->data + ch->used, c->rcurr, tocopy);
}
total += tocopy;
c->rlbytes -= tocopy;
c->rcurr += tocopy;
c->rbytes -= tocopy;
ch->used += tocopy;
if (c->rlbytes == 0) {
break;
}
} else {
/* now try reading from the socket */
res = read(c->sfd, ch->data + ch->used,
(unused > c->rlbytes ? c->rlbytes : unused));
if (res > 0) {
pthread_mutex_lock(&c->thread->stats.mutex);
c->thread->stats.bytes_read += res;
pthread_mutex_unlock(&c->thread->stats.mutex);
ch->used += res;
total += res;
c->rlbytes -= res;
} else {
/* Reset total to the latest result so caller can handle it */
total = res;
break;
}
}
}
/* At some point I will be able to ditch the \r\n from item storage and
remove all of these kludges.
The above binprot check ensures inline space for \r\n, but if we do
exactly enough allocs there will be no additional chunk for \r\n.
*/
if (c->rlbytes == 0 && c->protocol == binary_prot && total >= 0) {
item_chunk *ch = (item_chunk *)c->ritem;
if (ch->size - ch->used < 2) {
c->ritem = (char *) do_item_alloc_chunk(ch, 2);
if (!c->ritem) {
total = -2;
}
}
}
return total;
}
Commit Message: Don't overflow item refcount on get
Counts as a miss if the refcount is too high. ASCII multigets are the only
time refcounts can be held for so long.
doing a dirty read of refcount. is aligned.
trying to avoid adding an extra refcount branch for all calls of item_get due
to performance. might be able to move it in there after logging refactoring
simplifies some of the branches.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 75,205
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: long UnserializeInt(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos, long long size,
long long& result_ref) {
if (!pReader || pos < 0 || size < 1 || size > 8)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
signed char first_byte = 0;
const long status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, (unsigned char*)&first_byte);
if (status < 0)
return status;
unsigned long long result = first_byte;
++pos;
for (long i = 1; i < size; ++i) {
unsigned char b;
const long status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &b);
if (status < 0)
return status;
result <<= 8;
result |= b;
++pos;
}
result_ref = static_cast<long long>(result);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix ParseElementHeader to support 0 payload elements
Cherry-pick'ing Change 5c83bbec9a5f6f00a349674ddad85b753d2ea219
from upstream. This fixes regression in some edge cases for mkv
playback.
BUG=26499283
Change-Id: I88de03219a3d941b6b2f251d384e29c36bdd4d9b
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 164,310
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static inline int l2cap_disconnect_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct l2cap_cmd_hdr *cmd, u8 *data)
{
struct l2cap_disconn_rsp *rsp = (struct l2cap_disconn_rsp *) data;
u16 dcid, scid;
struct sock *sk;
scid = __le16_to_cpu(rsp->scid);
dcid = __le16_to_cpu(rsp->dcid);
BT_DBG("dcid 0x%4.4x scid 0x%4.4x", dcid, scid);
sk = l2cap_get_chan_by_scid(&conn->chan_list, scid);
if (!sk)
return 0;
l2cap_chan_del(sk, 0);
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
l2cap_sock_kill(sk);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: Add configuration support for ERTM and Streaming mode
Add support to config_req and config_rsp to configure ERTM and Streaming
mode. If the remote device specifies ERTM or Streaming mode, then the
same mode is proposed. Otherwise ERTM or Basic mode is used. And in case
of a state 2 device, the remote device should propose the same mode. If
not, then the channel gets disconnected.
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 58,939
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void EnableDatatype(syncable::ModelType model_type) {
enabled_datatypes_.Put(model_type);
mock_server_->ExpectGetUpdatesRequestTypes(enabled_datatypes_);
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 105,092
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: do_ip_vs_set_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, unsigned int len)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
int ret;
unsigned char arg[MAX_ARG_LEN];
struct ip_vs_service_user *usvc_compat;
struct ip_vs_service_user_kern usvc;
struct ip_vs_service *svc;
struct ip_vs_dest_user *udest_compat;
struct ip_vs_dest_user_kern udest;
struct netns_ipvs *ipvs = net_ipvs(net);
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (cmd < IP_VS_BASE_CTL || cmd > IP_VS_SO_SET_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
if (len < 0 || len > MAX_ARG_LEN)
return -EINVAL;
if (len != set_arglen[SET_CMDID(cmd)]) {
pr_err("set_ctl: len %u != %u\n",
len, set_arglen[SET_CMDID(cmd)]);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (copy_from_user(arg, user, len) != 0)
return -EFAULT;
/* increase the module use count */
ip_vs_use_count_inc();
/* Handle daemons since they have another lock */
if (cmd == IP_VS_SO_SET_STARTDAEMON ||
cmd == IP_VS_SO_SET_STOPDAEMON) {
struct ip_vs_daemon_user *dm = (struct ip_vs_daemon_user *)arg;
if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&ipvs->sync_mutex)) {
ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
goto out_dec;
}
if (cmd == IP_VS_SO_SET_STARTDAEMON)
ret = start_sync_thread(net, dm->state, dm->mcast_ifn,
dm->syncid);
else
ret = stop_sync_thread(net, dm->state);
mutex_unlock(&ipvs->sync_mutex);
goto out_dec;
}
if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&__ip_vs_mutex)) {
ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
goto out_dec;
}
if (cmd == IP_VS_SO_SET_FLUSH) {
/* Flush the virtual service */
ret = ip_vs_flush(net);
goto out_unlock;
} else if (cmd == IP_VS_SO_SET_TIMEOUT) {
/* Set timeout values for (tcp tcpfin udp) */
ret = ip_vs_set_timeout(net, (struct ip_vs_timeout_user *)arg);
goto out_unlock;
}
usvc_compat = (struct ip_vs_service_user *)arg;
udest_compat = (struct ip_vs_dest_user *)(usvc_compat + 1);
/* We only use the new structs internally, so copy userspace compat
* structs to extended internal versions */
ip_vs_copy_usvc_compat(&usvc, usvc_compat);
ip_vs_copy_udest_compat(&udest, udest_compat);
if (cmd == IP_VS_SO_SET_ZERO) {
/* if no service address is set, zero counters in all */
if (!usvc.fwmark && !usvc.addr.ip && !usvc.port) {
ret = ip_vs_zero_all(net);
goto out_unlock;
}
}
/* Check for valid protocol: TCP or UDP or SCTP, even for fwmark!=0 */
if (usvc.protocol != IPPROTO_TCP && usvc.protocol != IPPROTO_UDP &&
usvc.protocol != IPPROTO_SCTP) {
pr_err("set_ctl: invalid protocol: %d %pI4:%d %s\n",
usvc.protocol, &usvc.addr.ip,
ntohs(usvc.port), usvc.sched_name);
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out_unlock;
}
/* Lookup the exact service by <protocol, addr, port> or fwmark */
if (usvc.fwmark == 0)
svc = __ip_vs_service_find(net, usvc.af, usvc.protocol,
&usvc.addr, usvc.port);
else
svc = __ip_vs_svc_fwm_find(net, usvc.af, usvc.fwmark);
if (cmd != IP_VS_SO_SET_ADD
&& (svc == NULL || svc->protocol != usvc.protocol)) {
ret = -ESRCH;
goto out_unlock;
}
switch (cmd) {
case IP_VS_SO_SET_ADD:
if (svc != NULL)
ret = -EEXIST;
else
ret = ip_vs_add_service(net, &usvc, &svc);
break;
case IP_VS_SO_SET_EDIT:
ret = ip_vs_edit_service(svc, &usvc);
break;
case IP_VS_SO_SET_DEL:
ret = ip_vs_del_service(svc);
if (!ret)
goto out_unlock;
break;
case IP_VS_SO_SET_ZERO:
ret = ip_vs_zero_service(svc);
break;
case IP_VS_SO_SET_ADDDEST:
ret = ip_vs_add_dest(svc, &udest);
break;
case IP_VS_SO_SET_EDITDEST:
ret = ip_vs_edit_dest(svc, &udest);
break;
case IP_VS_SO_SET_DELDEST:
ret = ip_vs_del_dest(svc, &udest);
break;
default:
ret = -EINVAL;
}
out_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&__ip_vs_mutex);
out_dec:
/* decrease the module use count */
ip_vs_use_count_dec();
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ipvs: fix info leak in getsockopt(IP_VS_SO_GET_TIMEOUT)
If at least one of CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_TCP or CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_UDP is
not set, __ip_vs_get_timeouts() does not fully initialize the structure
that gets copied to userland and that for leaks up to 12 bytes of kernel
stack. Add an explicit memset(0) before passing the structure to
__ip_vs_get_timeouts() to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Cc: Wensong Zhang <[email protected]>
Cc: Simon Horman <[email protected]>
Cc: Julian Anastasov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 34,183
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void V8TestObject::CallWithExecutionContextAndScriptStateAndIsolateAnyAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_callWithExecutionContextAndScriptStateAndIsolateAnyAttribute_Getter");
test_object_v8_internal::CallWithExecutionContextAndScriptStateAndIsolateAnyAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 134,575
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: SMB2_sess_sendreceive(struct SMB2_sess_data *sess_data)
{
int rc;
struct smb2_sess_setup_req *req = sess_data->iov[0].iov_base;
struct kvec rsp_iov = { NULL, 0 };
/* Testing shows that buffer offset must be at location of Buffer[0] */
req->SecurityBufferOffset =
cpu_to_le16(sizeof(struct smb2_sess_setup_req) -
1 /* pad */ - 4 /* rfc1001 len */);
req->SecurityBufferLength = cpu_to_le16(sess_data->iov[1].iov_len);
inc_rfc1001_len(req, sess_data->iov[1].iov_len - 1 /* pad */);
/* BB add code to build os and lm fields */
rc = SendReceive2(sess_data->xid, sess_data->ses,
sess_data->iov, 2,
&sess_data->buf0_type,
CIFS_LOG_ERROR | CIFS_NEG_OP, &rsp_iov);
cifs_small_buf_release(sess_data->iov[0].iov_base);
memcpy(&sess_data->iov[0], &rsp_iov, sizeof(struct kvec));
return rc;
}
Commit Message: CIFS: Enable encryption during session setup phase
In order to allow encryption on SMB connection we need to exchange
a session key and generate encryption and decryption keys.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 84,923
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void CLASS canon_compressed_load_raw()
{
ushort *pixel, *prow, *huff[2];
int nblocks, lowbits, i, c, row, r, col, save, val;
unsigned irow, icol;
int block, diffbuf[64], leaf, len, diff, carry=0, pnum=0, base[2];
crw_init_tables (tiff_compress, huff);
pixel = (ushort *) calloc (raw_width*8, sizeof *pixel);
merror (pixel, "canon_compressed_load_raw()");
lowbits = canon_has_lowbits();
if (!lowbits) maximum = 0x3ff;
fseek (ifp, 540 + lowbits*raw_height*raw_width/4, SEEK_SET);
zero_after_ff = 1;
getbits(-1);
for (row=0; row < raw_height; row+=8) {
nblocks = MIN (8, raw_height-row) * raw_width >> 6;
for (block=0; block < nblocks; block++) {
memset (diffbuf, 0, sizeof diffbuf);
for (i=0; i < 64; i++ ) {
leaf = gethuff(huff[i > 0]);
if (leaf == 0 && i) break;
if (leaf == 0xff) continue;
i += leaf >> 4;
len = leaf & 15;
if (len == 0) continue;
diff = getbits(len);
if ((diff & (1 << (len-1))) == 0)
diff -= (1 << len) - 1;
if (i < 64) diffbuf[i] = diff;
}
diffbuf[0] += carry;
carry = diffbuf[0];
for (i=0; i < 64; i++ ) {
if (pnum++ % raw_width == 0)
base[0] = base[1] = 512;
if ((pixel[(block << 6) + i] = base[i & 1] += diffbuf[i]) >> 10)
derror();
}
}
if (lowbits) {
save = ftell(ifp);
fseek (ifp, 26 + row*raw_width/4, SEEK_SET);
for (prow=pixel, i=0; i < raw_width*2; i++) {
c = fgetc(ifp);
for (r=0; r < 8; r+=2, prow++) {
val = (*prow << 2) + ((c >> r) & 3);
if (raw_width == 2672 && val < 512) val += 2;
*prow = val;
}
}
fseek (ifp, save, SEEK_SET);
}
for (r=0; r < 8; r++) {
irow = row - top_margin + r;
if (irow >= height) continue;
for (col=0; col < raw_width; col++) {
icol = col - left_margin;
c = FC(irow,icol);
if (icol < width)
BAYER(irow,icol) = pixel[r*raw_width+col];
else if (col > 1 && (unsigned) (col-left_margin+2) >
(unsigned) (width+3))
cblack[c] += (cblack[4+c]++,pixel[r*raw_width+col]);
}
}
}
free (pixel);
FORC(2) free (huff[c]);
FORC4 if (cblack[4+c]) cblack[c] /= cblack[4+c];
}
Commit Message: Avoid overflow in ljpeg_start().
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 43,246
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void NotifyFail(const std::string& message) {
FinishTesting();
FAIL() << logs_ << message;
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Don't allow built-in extensions code to be overridden
BUG=546677
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417513003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356654}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 133,036
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void Document::inheritHtmlAndBodyElementStyles(StyleRecalcChange change)
{
ASSERT(inStyleRecalc());
ASSERT(documentElement());
bool didRecalcDocumentElement = false;
RefPtr<ComputedStyle> documentElementStyle = documentElement()->mutableComputedStyle();
if (change == Force)
documentElement()->clearAnimationStyleChange();
if (!documentElementStyle || documentElement()->needsStyleRecalc() || change == Force) {
documentElementStyle = ensureStyleResolver().styleForElement(documentElement());
didRecalcDocumentElement = true;
}
WritingMode rootWritingMode = documentElementStyle->writingMode();
TextDirection rootDirection = documentElementStyle->direction();
HTMLElement* body = this->body();
RefPtr<ComputedStyle> bodyStyle;
if (body) {
bodyStyle = body->mutableComputedStyle();
if (didRecalcDocumentElement)
body->clearAnimationStyleChange();
if (!bodyStyle || body->needsStyleRecalc() || didRecalcDocumentElement)
bodyStyle = ensureStyleResolver().styleForElement(body, documentElementStyle.get());
rootWritingMode = bodyStyle->writingMode();
rootDirection = bodyStyle->direction();
}
RefPtr<ComputedStyle> overflowStyle;
if (Element* element = viewportDefiningElement(documentElementStyle.get())) {
if (element == body) {
overflowStyle = bodyStyle;
} else {
ASSERT(element == documentElement());
overflowStyle = documentElementStyle;
}
}
if (styleEngine().usesRemUnits() && (documentElement()->needsAttach() || documentElement()->ensureComputedStyle()->fontSize() != documentElementStyle->fontSize())) {
ensureStyleResolver().invalidateMatchedPropertiesCache();
documentElement()->setNeedsStyleRecalc(SubtreeStyleChange, StyleChangeReasonForTracing::create(StyleChangeReason::FontSizeChange));
}
EOverflow overflowX = OAUTO;
EOverflow overflowY = OAUTO;
float columnGap = 0;
if (overflowStyle) {
overflowX = overflowStyle->overflowX();
overflowY = overflowStyle->overflowY();
if (overflowX == OVISIBLE)
overflowX = OAUTO;
if (overflowY == OVISIBLE)
overflowY = OAUTO;
columnGap = overflowStyle->columnGap();
}
WebScrollBlocksOn scrollBlocksOn = documentElementStyle->scrollBlocksOn();
RefPtr<ComputedStyle> documentStyle = layoutView()->mutableStyle();
if (documentStyle->writingMode() != rootWritingMode
|| documentStyle->direction() != rootDirection
|| documentStyle->overflowX() != overflowX
|| documentStyle->overflowY() != overflowY
|| documentStyle->columnGap() != columnGap
|| documentStyle->scrollBlocksOn() != scrollBlocksOn) {
RefPtr<ComputedStyle> newStyle = ComputedStyle::clone(*documentStyle);
newStyle->setWritingMode(rootWritingMode);
newStyle->setDirection(rootDirection);
newStyle->setColumnGap(columnGap);
newStyle->setOverflowX(overflowX);
newStyle->setOverflowY(overflowY);
newStyle->setScrollBlocksOn(scrollBlocksOn);
layoutView()->setStyle(newStyle);
setupFontBuilder(*newStyle);
}
if (body) {
if (const ComputedStyle* style = body->computedStyle()) {
if (style->direction() != rootDirection || style->writingMode() != rootWritingMode)
body->setNeedsStyleRecalc(SubtreeStyleChange, StyleChangeReasonForTracing::create(StyleChangeReason::WritingModeChange));
}
}
if (const ComputedStyle* style = documentElement()->computedStyle()) {
if (style->direction() != rootDirection || style->writingMode() != rootWritingMode)
documentElement()->setNeedsStyleRecalc(SubtreeStyleChange, StyleChangeReasonForTracing::create(StyleChangeReason::WritingModeChange));
}
}
Commit Message: Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,525
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: conv_encoding(OnigEncoding from, OnigEncoding to, const UChar* s, const UChar* end,
UChar** conv, UChar** conv_end)
{
int len = (int )(end - s);
if (to == ONIG_ENCODING_UTF16_BE) {
if (from == ONIG_ENCODING_ASCII || from == ONIG_ENCODING_ISO_8859_1) {
*conv = (UChar* )xmalloc(len * 2);
CHECK_NULL_RETURN_MEMERR(*conv);
*conv_end = *conv + (len * 2);
conv_ext0be(s, end, *conv);
return 0;
}
else if (from == ONIG_ENCODING_UTF16_LE) {
swap16:
*conv = (UChar* )xmalloc(len);
CHECK_NULL_RETURN_MEMERR(*conv);
*conv_end = *conv + len;
conv_swap2bytes(s, end, *conv);
return 0;
}
}
else if (to == ONIG_ENCODING_UTF16_LE) {
if (from == ONIG_ENCODING_ASCII || from == ONIG_ENCODING_ISO_8859_1) {
*conv = (UChar* )xmalloc(len * 2);
CHECK_NULL_RETURN_MEMERR(*conv);
*conv_end = *conv + (len * 2);
conv_ext0le(s, end, *conv);
return 0;
}
else if (from == ONIG_ENCODING_UTF16_BE) {
goto swap16;
}
}
if (to == ONIG_ENCODING_UTF32_BE) {
if (from == ONIG_ENCODING_ASCII || from == ONIG_ENCODING_ISO_8859_1) {
*conv = (UChar* )xmalloc(len * 4);
CHECK_NULL_RETURN_MEMERR(*conv);
*conv_end = *conv + (len * 4);
conv_ext0be32(s, end, *conv);
return 0;
}
else if (from == ONIG_ENCODING_UTF32_LE) {
swap32:
*conv = (UChar* )xmalloc(len);
CHECK_NULL_RETURN_MEMERR(*conv);
*conv_end = *conv + len;
conv_swap4bytes(s, end, *conv);
return 0;
}
}
else if (to == ONIG_ENCODING_UTF32_LE) {
if (from == ONIG_ENCODING_ASCII || from == ONIG_ENCODING_ISO_8859_1) {
*conv = (UChar* )xmalloc(len * 4);
CHECK_NULL_RETURN_MEMERR(*conv);
*conv_end = *conv + (len * 4);
conv_ext0le32(s, end, *conv);
return 0;
}
else if (from == ONIG_ENCODING_UTF32_BE) {
goto swap32;
}
}
return ONIGERR_NOT_SUPPORTED_ENCODING_COMBINATION;
}
Commit Message: Fix CVE-2019-13224: don't allow different encodings for onig_new_deluxe()
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 89,246
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: status_t Parcel::setData(const uint8_t* buffer, size_t len)
{
status_t err = restartWrite(len);
if (err == NO_ERROR) {
memcpy(const_cast<uint8_t*>(data()), buffer, len);
mDataSize = len;
mFdsKnown = false;
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: Disregard alleged binder entities beyond parcel bounds
When appending one parcel's contents to another, ignore binder
objects within the source Parcel that appear to lie beyond the
formal bounds of that Parcel's data buffer.
Bug 17312693
Change-Id: If592a260f3fcd9a56fc160e7feb2c8b44c73f514
(cherry picked from commit 27182be9f20f4f5b48316666429f09b9ecc1f22e)
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 157,323
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: bool ExtensionService::SyncBundle::HasExtensionId(const std::string& id) const {
return synced_extensions.find(id) != synced_extensions.end();
}
Commit Message: Limit extent of webstore app to just chrome.google.com/webstore.
BUG=93497
TEST=Try installing extensions and apps from the webstore, starting both being
initially logged in, and not.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7719003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 98,594
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: get_input_token(unsigned char **buff_in, unsigned int buff_length)
{
gss_buffer_t input_token;
unsigned int len;
if (g_get_tag_and_length(buff_in, OCTET_STRING, buff_length, &len) < 0)
return (NULL);
input_token = (gss_buffer_t)malloc(sizeof (gss_buffer_desc));
if (input_token == NULL)
return (NULL);
input_token->length = len;
if (input_token->length > 0) {
input_token->value = gssalloc_malloc(input_token->length);
if (input_token->value == NULL) {
free(input_token);
return (NULL);
}
memcpy(input_token->value, *buff_in, input_token->length);
} else {
input_token->value = NULL;
}
*buff_in += input_token->length;
return (input_token);
}
Commit Message: Fix null deref in SPNEGO acceptor [CVE-2014-4344]
When processing a continuation token, acc_ctx_cont was dereferencing
the initial byte of the token without checking the length. This could
result in a null dereference.
CVE-2014-4344:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and newer, an unauthenticated or partially
authenticated remote attacker can cause a NULL dereference and
application crash during a SPNEGO negotiation by sending an empty
token as the second or later context token from initiator to acceptor.
The attacker must provide at least one valid context token in the
security context negotiation before sending the empty token. This can
be done by an unauthenticated attacker by forcing SPNEGO to
renegotiate the underlying mechanism, or by using IAKERB to wrap an
unauthenticated AS-REQ as the first token.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[[email protected]: CVE summary, CVSSv2 vector]
(cherry picked from commit 524688ce87a15fc75f87efc8c039ba4c7d5c197b)
ticket: 7970
version_fixed: 1.12.2
status: resolved
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 36,704
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: EventListenerProperties LayerTreeHostImpl::GetEventListenerProperties(
EventListenerClass event_class) const {
return active_tree_->event_listener_properties(event_class);
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
[email protected], [email protected]
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 137,273
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int flv_write_trailer(AVFormatContext *s)
{
int64_t file_size;
AVIOContext *pb = s->pb;
FLVContext *flv = s->priv_data;
int build_keyframes_idx = flv->flags & FLV_ADD_KEYFRAME_INDEX;
int i, res;
int64_t cur_pos = avio_tell(s->pb);
if (build_keyframes_idx) {
FLVFileposition *newflv_posinfo, *p;
avio_seek(pb, flv->videosize_offset, SEEK_SET);
put_amf_double(pb, flv->videosize);
avio_seek(pb, flv->audiosize_offset, SEEK_SET);
put_amf_double(pb, flv->audiosize);
avio_seek(pb, flv->lasttimestamp_offset, SEEK_SET);
put_amf_double(pb, flv->lasttimestamp);
avio_seek(pb, flv->lastkeyframetimestamp_offset, SEEK_SET);
put_amf_double(pb, flv->lastkeyframetimestamp);
avio_seek(pb, flv->lastkeyframelocation_offset, SEEK_SET);
put_amf_double(pb, flv->lastkeyframelocation + flv->keyframe_index_size);
avio_seek(pb, cur_pos, SEEK_SET);
res = shift_data(s);
if (res < 0) {
goto end;
}
avio_seek(pb, flv->keyframes_info_offset, SEEK_SET);
put_amf_string(pb, "filepositions");
put_amf_dword_array(pb, flv->filepositions_count);
for (newflv_posinfo = flv->head_filepositions; newflv_posinfo; newflv_posinfo = newflv_posinfo->next) {
put_amf_double(pb, newflv_posinfo->keyframe_position + flv->keyframe_index_size);
}
put_amf_string(pb, "times");
put_amf_dword_array(pb, flv->filepositions_count);
for (newflv_posinfo = flv->head_filepositions; newflv_posinfo; newflv_posinfo = newflv_posinfo->next) {
put_amf_double(pb, newflv_posinfo->keyframe_timestamp);
}
newflv_posinfo = flv->head_filepositions;
while (newflv_posinfo) {
p = newflv_posinfo->next;
if (p) {
newflv_posinfo->next = p->next;
av_free(p);
p = NULL;
} else {
av_free(newflv_posinfo);
newflv_posinfo = NULL;
}
}
put_amf_string(pb, "");
avio_w8(pb, AMF_END_OF_OBJECT);
avio_seek(pb, cur_pos + flv->keyframe_index_size, SEEK_SET);
}
end:
if (flv->flags & FLV_NO_SEQUENCE_END) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "FLV no sequence end mode open\n");
} else {
/* Add EOS tag */
for (i = 0; i < s->nb_streams; i++) {
AVCodecParameters *par = s->streams[i]->codecpar;
FLVStreamContext *sc = s->streams[i]->priv_data;
if (par->codec_type == AVMEDIA_TYPE_VIDEO &&
(par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_H264 || par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_MPEG4))
put_avc_eos_tag(pb, sc->last_ts);
}
}
file_size = avio_tell(pb);
if (build_keyframes_idx) {
flv->datasize = file_size - flv->datastart_offset;
avio_seek(pb, flv->datasize_offset, SEEK_SET);
put_amf_double(pb, flv->datasize);
}
if (!(flv->flags & FLV_NO_METADATA)) {
if (!(flv->flags & FLV_NO_DURATION_FILESIZE)) {
/* update information */
if (avio_seek(pb, flv->duration_offset, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Failed to update header with correct duration.\n");
} else {
put_amf_double(pb, flv->duration / (double)1000);
}
if (avio_seek(pb, flv->filesize_offset, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Failed to update header with correct filesize.\n");
} else {
put_amf_double(pb, file_size);
}
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/flvenc: Check audio packet size
Fixes: Assertion failure
Fixes: assert_flvenc.c:941_1.swf
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 79,035
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static Attr* findAttrNodeInList(AttrNodeList* attrNodeList, const QualifiedName& name)
{
for (unsigned i = 0; i < attrNodeList->size(); ++i) {
if (attrNodeList->at(i)->qualifiedName() == name)
return attrNodeList->at(i).get();
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 112,263
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: e1000e_write_lgcy_rx_descr(E1000ECore *core, uint8_t *desc,
struct NetRxPkt *pkt,
const E1000E_RSSInfo *rss_info,
uint16_t length)
{
uint32_t status_flags, rss, mrq;
uint16_t ip_id;
struct e1000_rx_desc *d = (struct e1000_rx_desc *) desc;
assert(!rss_info->enabled);
d->length = cpu_to_le16(length);
d->csum = 0;
e1000e_build_rx_metadata(core, pkt, pkt != NULL,
rss_info,
&rss, &mrq,
&status_flags, &ip_id,
&d->special);
d->errors = (uint8_t) (le32_to_cpu(status_flags) >> 24);
d->status = (uint8_t) le32_to_cpu(status_flags);
d->special = 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 6,100
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void DelegatedFrameHost::OnLostResources() {
EvictDelegatedFrame();
idle_frame_subscriber_textures_.clear();
yuv_readback_pipeline_.reset();
}
Commit Message: mac: Make RWHVMac::ClearCompositorFrame clear locks
Ensure that the BrowserCompositorMac not hold on to a compositor lock
when requested to clear its compositor frame. This lock may be held
indefinitely (if the renderer hangs) and so the frame will never be
cleared.
Bug: 739621
Change-Id: I15d0e82bdf632f3379a48e959f198afb8a4ac218
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/608239
Commit-Queue: ccameron chromium <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#493563}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 150,968
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: comics_document_get_n_pages (EvDocument *document)
{
ComicsDocument *comics_document = COMICS_DOCUMENT (document);
if (comics_document->page_names == NULL)
return 0;
return comics_document->page_names->len;
}
Commit Message: comics: Remove support for tar and tar-like commands
When handling tar files, or using a command with tar-compatible syntax,
to open comic-book archives, both the archive name (the name of the
comics file) and the filename (the name of a page within the archive)
are quoted to not be interpreted by the shell.
But the filename is completely with the attacker's control and can start
with "--" which leads to tar interpreting it as a command line flag.
This can be exploited by creating a CBT file (a tar archive with the
.cbt suffix) with an embedded file named something like this:
"--checkpoint-action=exec=bash -c 'touch ~/hacked;'.jpg"
CBT files are infinitely rare (CBZ is usually used for DRM-free
commercial releases, CBR for those from more dubious provenance), so
removing support is the easiest way to avoid the bug triggering. All
this code was rewritten in the development release for GNOME 3.26 to not
shell out to any command, closing off this particular attack vector.
This also removes the ability to use libarchive's bsdtar-compatible
binary for CBZ (ZIP), CB7 (7zip), and CBR (RAR) formats. The first two
are already supported by unzip and 7zip respectively. libarchive's RAR
support is limited, so unrar is a requirement anyway.
Discovered by Felix Wilhelm from the Google Security Team.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=784630
CWE ID:
| 0
| 59,076
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::ReleaseSurface() {
if (!context_.get())
return;
if (WasContextLost()) {
DLOG(ERROR) << " GLES2DecoderImpl: Trying to release lost context.";
return;
}
context_->ReleaseCurrent(surface_.get());
surface_ = nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,640
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: is_write_comp_null (gnutls_session_t session)
{
record_parameters_st *record_params;
_gnutls_epoch_get (session, EPOCH_WRITE_CURRENT, &record_params);
if (record_params->compression_algorithm == GNUTLS_COMP_NULL)
return 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 11,313
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void PDFiumEngine::GetPasswordAndLoad() {
getting_password_ = true;
DCHECK(!doc_ && FPDF_GetLastError() == FPDF_ERR_PASSWORD);
client_->GetDocumentPassword(password_factory_.NewCallbackWithOutput(
&PDFiumEngine::OnGetPasswordComplete));
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 140,347
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: xfs_da3_node_lookup_int(
struct xfs_da_state *state,
int *result)
{
struct xfs_da_state_blk *blk;
struct xfs_da_blkinfo *curr;
struct xfs_da_intnode *node;
struct xfs_da_node_entry *btree;
struct xfs_da3_icnode_hdr nodehdr;
struct xfs_da_args *args;
xfs_dablk_t blkno;
xfs_dahash_t hashval;
xfs_dahash_t btreehashval;
int probe;
int span;
int max;
int error;
int retval;
struct xfs_inode *dp = state->args->dp;
args = state->args;
/*
* Descend thru the B-tree searching each level for the right
* node to use, until the right hashval is found.
*/
blkno = (args->whichfork == XFS_DATA_FORK)? state->mp->m_dirleafblk : 0;
for (blk = &state->path.blk[0], state->path.active = 1;
state->path.active <= XFS_DA_NODE_MAXDEPTH;
blk++, state->path.active++) {
/*
* Read the next node down in the tree.
*/
blk->blkno = blkno;
error = xfs_da3_node_read(args->trans, args->dp, blkno,
-1, &blk->bp, args->whichfork);
if (error) {
blk->blkno = 0;
state->path.active--;
return(error);
}
curr = blk->bp->b_addr;
blk->magic = be16_to_cpu(curr->magic);
if (blk->magic == XFS_ATTR_LEAF_MAGIC ||
blk->magic == XFS_ATTR3_LEAF_MAGIC) {
blk->magic = XFS_ATTR_LEAF_MAGIC;
blk->hashval = xfs_attr_leaf_lasthash(blk->bp, NULL);
break;
}
if (blk->magic == XFS_DIR2_LEAFN_MAGIC ||
blk->magic == XFS_DIR3_LEAFN_MAGIC) {
blk->magic = XFS_DIR2_LEAFN_MAGIC;
blk->hashval = xfs_dir2_leafn_lasthash(args->dp,
blk->bp, NULL);
break;
}
blk->magic = XFS_DA_NODE_MAGIC;
/*
* Search an intermediate node for a match.
*/
node = blk->bp->b_addr;
dp->d_ops->node_hdr_from_disk(&nodehdr, node);
btree = dp->d_ops->node_tree_p(node);
max = nodehdr.count;
blk->hashval = be32_to_cpu(btree[max - 1].hashval);
/*
* Binary search. (note: small blocks will skip loop)
*/
probe = span = max / 2;
hashval = args->hashval;
while (span > 4) {
span /= 2;
btreehashval = be32_to_cpu(btree[probe].hashval);
if (btreehashval < hashval)
probe += span;
else if (btreehashval > hashval)
probe -= span;
else
break;
}
ASSERT((probe >= 0) && (probe < max));
ASSERT((span <= 4) ||
(be32_to_cpu(btree[probe].hashval) == hashval));
/*
* Since we may have duplicate hashval's, find the first
* matching hashval in the node.
*/
while (probe > 0 &&
be32_to_cpu(btree[probe].hashval) >= hashval) {
probe--;
}
while (probe < max &&
be32_to_cpu(btree[probe].hashval) < hashval) {
probe++;
}
/*
* Pick the right block to descend on.
*/
if (probe == max) {
blk->index = max - 1;
blkno = be32_to_cpu(btree[max - 1].before);
} else {
blk->index = probe;
blkno = be32_to_cpu(btree[probe].before);
}
}
/*
* A leaf block that ends in the hashval that we are interested in
* (final hashval == search hashval) means that the next block may
* contain more entries with the same hashval, shift upward to the
* next leaf and keep searching.
*/
for (;;) {
if (blk->magic == XFS_DIR2_LEAFN_MAGIC) {
retval = xfs_dir2_leafn_lookup_int(blk->bp, args,
&blk->index, state);
} else if (blk->magic == XFS_ATTR_LEAF_MAGIC) {
retval = xfs_attr3_leaf_lookup_int(blk->bp, args);
blk->index = args->index;
args->blkno = blk->blkno;
} else {
ASSERT(0);
return XFS_ERROR(EFSCORRUPTED);
}
if (((retval == ENOENT) || (retval == ENOATTR)) &&
(blk->hashval == args->hashval)) {
error = xfs_da3_path_shift(state, &state->path, 1, 1,
&retval);
if (error)
return(error);
if (retval == 0) {
continue;
} else if (blk->magic == XFS_ATTR_LEAF_MAGIC) {
/* path_shift() gives ENOENT */
retval = XFS_ERROR(ENOATTR);
}
}
break;
}
*result = retval;
return(0);
}
Commit Message: xfs: fix directory hash ordering bug
Commit f5ea1100 ("xfs: add CRCs to dir2/da node blocks") introduced
in 3.10 incorrectly converted the btree hash index array pointer in
xfs_da3_fixhashpath(). It resulted in the the current hash always
being compared against the first entry in the btree rather than the
current block index into the btree block's hash entry array. As a
result, it was comparing the wrong hashes, and so could misorder the
entries in the btree.
For most cases, this doesn't cause any problems as it requires hash
collisions to expose the ordering problem. However, when there are
hash collisions within a directory there is a very good probability
that the entries will be ordered incorrectly and that actually
matters when duplicate hashes are placed into or removed from the
btree block hash entry array.
This bug results in an on-disk directory corruption and that results
in directory verifier functions throwing corruption warnings into
the logs. While no data or directory entries are lost, access to
them may be compromised, and attempts to remove entries from a
directory that has suffered from this corruption may result in a
filesystem shutdown. xfs_repair will fix the directory hash
ordering without data loss occuring.
[dchinner: wrote useful a commit message]
cc: <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mark Tinguely <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ben Myers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 35,937
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: poppler_page_transition_new (void)
{
return (PopplerPageTransition *) g_new0 (PopplerPageTransition, 1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 811
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: ImageResourceFactory(const FetchParameters& fetch_params)
: NonTextResourceFactory(Resource::kImage),
fetch_params_(&fetch_params) {}
Commit Message: Check CORS using PassesAccessControlCheck() with supplied SecurityOrigin
Partial revert of https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535694.
Bug: 799477
Change-Id: I878bb9bcb83afaafe8601293db9aa644fc5929b3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/898427
Commit-Queue: Hiroshige Hayashizaki <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kouhei Ueno <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Takeshi Yoshino <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#535176}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 149,659
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void ResetObserver() {
suppressed_ = false;
notified_ = false;
}
Commit Message: Move smart deploy to tristate.
BUG=
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1149383006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333058}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 123,301
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void PageHandler::NotifyScreencastVisibility(bool visible) {
if (visible)
capture_retry_count_ = kCaptureRetryLimit;
frontend_->ScreencastVisibilityChanged(visible);
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow Page.setDownloadBehavior for extensions
Bug: 866426
Change-Id: I71b672978e1a8ec779ede49da16b21198567d3a4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1270007
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598004}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 143,617
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void rq_attach_root(struct rq *rq, struct root_domain *rd)
{
struct root_domain *old_rd = NULL;
unsigned long flags;
raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&rq->lock, flags);
if (rq->rd) {
old_rd = rq->rd;
if (cpumask_test_cpu(rq->cpu, old_rd->online))
set_rq_offline(rq);
cpumask_clear_cpu(rq->cpu, old_rd->span);
/*
* If we dont want to free the old_rd yet then
* set old_rd to NULL to skip the freeing later
* in this function:
*/
if (!atomic_dec_and_test(&old_rd->refcount))
old_rd = NULL;
}
atomic_inc(&rd->refcount);
rq->rd = rd;
cpumask_set_cpu(rq->cpu, rd->span);
if (cpumask_test_cpu(rq->cpu, cpu_active_mask))
set_rq_online(rq);
raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rq->lock, flags);
if (old_rd)
call_rcu_sched(&old_rd->rcu, free_rootdomain);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <[email protected]>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 55,583
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void MetalayerMode::OnDisable() {
CommonPaletteTool::OnDisable();
Shell::Get()->highlighter_controller()->SetEnabled(false);
activated_via_button_ = false;
}
Commit Message: Disable metalayer tool when assistant is not available
BUG=b:68664196
TEST=unit tests and manually check on device
Change-Id: If4c997a048ffc7ec3afa3e9ab2199f8c2b140c7a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/828265
Reviewed-by: Vladislav Kaznacheev <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jenny Zhang <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Xiaohui Chen <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#524881}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 154,009
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: gfx::Point CalculateDragPoint(const WindowResizer& resizer,
int delta_x,
int delta_y) const {
gfx::Point location = resizer.GetInitialLocation();
location.set_x(location.x() + delta_x);
location.set_y(location.y() + delta_y);
return location;
}
Commit Message: cros: Enable some tests in //ash/wm in ash_unittests --mash
For the ones that fail, disable them via filter file instead of in the
code, per our disablement policy.
Bug: 698085, 695556, 698878, 698888, 698093, 698894
Test: ash_unittests --mash
Change-Id: Ic145ab6a95508968d6884d14fac2a3ca08888d26
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/752423
Commit-Queue: James Cook <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Steven Bennetts <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513836}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 133,256
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: aura::WindowTreeHost* DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::AsWindowTreeHost() {
return this;
}
Commit Message: Fix PIP window being blank after minimize/show
DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::SetVisible only made the call into
OnNativeWidgetVisibilityChanged when transitioning from shown
to minimized and not vice versa. This is because this change
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1437263
considered IsVisible to be true when minimized, which made
IsVisible always true in this case. This caused layers to be hidden
but never shown again.
This is a reland of:
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1580103
Bug: 949199
Change-Id: I2151cd09e537d8ce8781897f43a3b8e9cec75996
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1584617
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: enne <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654280}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 140,504
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static BOOLEAN btm_serv_trusted(tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC *p_dev_rec, tBTM_SEC_SERV_REC *p_serv_rec)
{
if(BTM_SEC_IS_SERVICE_TRUSTED(p_dev_rec->trusted_mask, p_serv_rec->service_id))
{
return(TRUE);
}
return(FALSE);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Remove Porsche car-kit pairing workaround
Bug: 26551752
Change-Id: I14c5e3fcda0849874c8a94e48aeb7d09585617e1
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 161,465
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int dccp_kmemdup_sysctl_table(struct net *net, struct nf_proto_net *pn,
struct dccp_net *dn)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
if (pn->ctl_table)
return 0;
pn->ctl_table = kmemdup(dccp_sysctl_table,
sizeof(dccp_sysctl_table),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!pn->ctl_table)
return -ENOMEM;
pn->ctl_table[0].data = &dn->dccp_timeout[CT_DCCP_REQUEST];
pn->ctl_table[1].data = &dn->dccp_timeout[CT_DCCP_RESPOND];
pn->ctl_table[2].data = &dn->dccp_timeout[CT_DCCP_PARTOPEN];
pn->ctl_table[3].data = &dn->dccp_timeout[CT_DCCP_OPEN];
pn->ctl_table[4].data = &dn->dccp_timeout[CT_DCCP_CLOSEREQ];
pn->ctl_table[5].data = &dn->dccp_timeout[CT_DCCP_CLOSING];
pn->ctl_table[6].data = &dn->dccp_timeout[CT_DCCP_TIMEWAIT];
pn->ctl_table[7].data = &dn->dccp_loose;
/* Don't export sysctls to unprivileged users */
if (net->user_ns != &init_user_ns)
pn->ctl_table[0].procname = NULL;
#endif
return 0;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_conntrack_dccp: fix skb_header_pointer API usages
Some occurences in the netfilter tree use skb_header_pointer() in
the following way ...
struct dccp_hdr _dh, *dh;
...
skb_header_pointer(skb, dataoff, sizeof(_dh), &dh);
... where dh itself is a pointer that is being passed as the copy
buffer. Instead, we need to use &_dh as the forth argument so that
we're copying the data into an actual buffer that sits on the stack.
Currently, we probably could overwrite memory on the stack (e.g.
with a possibly mal-formed DCCP packet), but unintentionally, as
we only want the buffer to be placed into _dh variable.
Fixes: 2bc780499aa3 ("[NETFILTER]: nf_conntrack: add DCCP protocol support")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 39,112
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static bool ExecuteMoveWordBackward(LocalFrame& frame,
Event*,
EditorCommandSource,
const String&) {
frame.Selection().Modify(SelectionModifyAlteration::kMove,
SelectionModifyDirection::kBackward,
TextGranularity::kWord, SetSelectionBy::kUser);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 128,584
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static encodePtr find_encoder_by_type_name(sdlPtr sdl, const char *type)
{
if (sdl && sdl->encoders) {
HashPosition pos;
encodePtr *enc;
for (zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset_ex(sdl->encoders, &pos);
zend_hash_get_current_data_ex(sdl->encoders, (void **) &enc, &pos) == SUCCESS;
zend_hash_move_forward_ex(sdl->encoders, &pos)) {
if (strcmp((*enc)->details.type_str, type) == 0) {
return *enc;
}
}
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 14,850
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: evdns_base_set_option(struct evdns_base *base,
const char *option, const char *val)
{
int res;
EVDNS_LOCK(base);
res = evdns_base_set_option_impl(base, option, val, DNS_OPTIONS_ALL);
EVDNS_UNLOCK(base);
return res;
}
Commit Message: evdns: fix searching empty hostnames
From #332:
Here follows a bug report by **Guido Vranken** via the _Tor bug bounty program_. Please credit Guido accordingly.
## Bug report
The DNS code of Libevent contains this rather obvious OOB read:
```c
static char *
search_make_new(const struct search_state *const state, int n, const char *const base_name) {
const size_t base_len = strlen(base_name);
const char need_to_append_dot = base_name[base_len - 1] == '.' ? 0 : 1;
```
If the length of ```base_name``` is 0, then line 3125 reads 1 byte before the buffer. This will trigger a crash on ASAN-protected builds.
To reproduce:
Build libevent with ASAN:
```
$ CFLAGS='-fomit-frame-pointer -fsanitize=address' ./configure && make -j4
```
Put the attached ```resolv.conf``` and ```poc.c``` in the source directory and then do:
```
$ gcc -fsanitize=address -fomit-frame-pointer poc.c .libs/libevent.a
$ ./a.out
=================================================================
==22201== ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60060000efdf at pc 0x4429da bp 0x7ffe1ed47300 sp 0x7ffe1ed472f8
READ of size 1 at 0x60060000efdf thread T0
```
P.S. we can add a check earlier, but since this is very uncommon, I didn't add it.
Fixes: #332
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 70,598
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: ui::MenuModel* AuthenticatorPaaskSheetModel::GetOtherTransportsMenuModel() {
return other_transports_menu_model_.get();
}
Commit Message: chrome/browser/ui/webauthn: long domains may cause a line break.
As requested by UX in [1], allow long host names to split a title into
two lines. This allows us to show more of the name before eliding,
although sufficiently long names will still trigger elision.
Screenshot at
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1_V6t2CeZDAVazy3Px-OET2LnB__aEW1r.
[1] https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1TtxkPUchyVZulqgdMcfui-68B0W-DWaFFVJEffGIbLA/edit#slide=id.g5913c4105f_1_12
Change-Id: I70f6541e0db3e9942239304de43b487a7561ca34
Bug: 870892
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1601812
Auto-Submit: Adam Langley <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Nina Satragno <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nina Satragno <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#658114}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 142,869
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void PDFiumEngine::Form_UploadTo(FPDF_FORMFILLINFO* param,
FPDF_FILEHANDLER* file_handle,
int file_flag,
FPDF_WIDESTRING to) {
std::string to_str =
base::UTF16ToUTF8(reinterpret_cast<const base::char16*>(to));
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 140,315
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void srpt_close_session(struct se_session *se_sess)
{
DECLARE_COMPLETION_ONSTACK(release_done);
struct srpt_rdma_ch *ch;
struct srpt_device *sdev;
unsigned long res;
ch = se_sess->fabric_sess_ptr;
WARN_ON(ch->sess != se_sess);
pr_debug("ch %p state %d\n", ch, srpt_get_ch_state(ch));
sdev = ch->sport->sdev;
spin_lock_irq(&sdev->spinlock);
BUG_ON(ch->release_done);
ch->release_done = &release_done;
__srpt_close_ch(ch);
spin_unlock_irq(&sdev->spinlock);
res = wait_for_completion_timeout(&release_done, 60 * HZ);
WARN_ON(res == 0);
}
Commit Message: IB/srpt: Simplify srpt_handle_tsk_mgmt()
Let the target core check task existence instead of the SRP target
driver. Additionally, let the target core check the validity of the
task management request instead of the ib_srpt driver.
This patch fixes the following kernel crash:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000001
IP: [<ffffffffa0565f37>] srpt_handle_new_iu+0x6d7/0x790 [ib_srpt]
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Call Trace:
[<ffffffffa05660ce>] srpt_process_completion+0xde/0x570 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffffa056669f>] srpt_compl_thread+0x13f/0x160 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffff8109726f>] kthread+0xcf/0xe0
[<ffffffff81613cfc>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
Fixes: 3e4f574857ee ("ib_srpt: Convert TMR path to target_submit_tmr")
Tested-by: Alex Estrin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Cc: Nicholas Bellinger <[email protected]>
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 50,636
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: base::FilePath GetSetupExeFromRegistry(InstallationLevel level,
const wchar_t* app_guid) {
string16 uninstall;
if (GetClientStateValue(level, app_guid, kUninstallStringField, &uninstall)) {
base::FilePath setup_exe_path(uninstall);
if (file_util::PathExists(setup_exe_path))
return setup_exe_path;
}
return base::FilePath();
}
Commit Message: Upgrade old app host to new app launcher on startup
This patch is a continuation of https://codereview.chromium.org/16805002/.
BUG=248825
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17022015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@209604 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 113,666
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: pair_count(char *s, char delim)
{
int ndelim = 0;
while ((s = strchr(s, delim)) != NULL)
{
ndelim++;
s++;
}
return (ndelim % 2) ? ((ndelim + 1) / 2) : -1;
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 38,943
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: Page* Document::page() const
{
return m_frame ? m_frame->page() : 0;
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
[email protected], abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 102,796
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, int err)
{
struct thread_info *thread = current_thread_info();
int ret;
oops_enter();
raw_spin_lock_irq(&die_lock);
console_verbose();
bust_spinlocks(1);
ret = __die(str, err, thread, regs);
if (regs && kexec_should_crash(thread->task))
crash_kexec(regs);
bust_spinlocks(0);
add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&die_lock);
oops_exit();
if (in_interrupt())
panic("Fatal exception in interrupt");
if (panic_on_oops)
panic("Fatal exception");
if (ret != NOTIFY_STOP)
do_exit(SIGSEGV);
}
Commit Message: arm64: don't kill the kernel on a bad esr from el0
Rather than completely killing the kernel if we receive an esr value we
can't deal with in the el0 handlers, send the process a SIGILL and log
the esr value in the hope that we can debug it. If we receive a bad esr
from el1, we'll die() as before.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
CWE ID:
| 0
| 29,884
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::TraceWrappers(
ScriptWrappableVisitor* visitor) const {
visitor->TraceWrappers(context_group_);
visitor->TraceWrappers(bound_array_buffer_);
visitor->TraceWrappers(renderbuffer_binding_);
visitor->TraceWrappers(framebuffer_binding_);
visitor->TraceWrappers(current_program_);
visitor->TraceWrappers(bound_vertex_array_object_);
for (auto& unit : texture_units_) {
visitor->TraceWrappers(unit.texture2d_binding_);
visitor->TraceWrappers(unit.texture_cube_map_binding_);
visitor->TraceWrappers(unit.texture3d_binding_);
visitor->TraceWrappers(unit.texture2d_array_binding_);
}
for (auto tracker : extensions_) {
visitor->TraceWrappers(tracker);
}
CanvasRenderingContext::TraceWrappers(visitor);
}
Commit Message: fix incorrect TexImage3D params w/ UNPACK_IMAGE_HEIGHT
Bug: 804123
Test: http://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2646
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ifbce9b93f0b35817881e1e34930cbac22a1e8b98
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1053573
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Kai Ninomiya <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#558962}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 153,924
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: unsigned int rose_new_lci(struct rose_neigh *neigh)
{
int lci;
if (neigh->dce_mode) {
for (lci = 1; lci <= sysctl_rose_maximum_vcs; lci++)
if (rose_find_socket(lci, neigh) == NULL && rose_route_free_lci(lci, neigh) == NULL)
return lci;
} else {
for (lci = sysctl_rose_maximum_vcs; lci > 0; lci--)
if (rose_find_socket(lci, neigh) == NULL && rose_route_free_lci(lci, neigh) == NULL)
return lci;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: rose: Add length checks to CALL_REQUEST parsing
Define some constant offsets for CALL_REQUEST based on the description
at <http://www.techfest.com/networking/wan/x25plp.htm> and the
definition of ROSE as using 10-digit (5-byte) addresses. Use them
consistently. Validate all implicit and explicit facilities lengths.
Validate the address length byte rather than either trusting or
assuming its value.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 22,211
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void ipgre_tunnel_uninit(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct net *net = dev_net(dev);
struct ipgre_net *ign = net_generic(net, ipgre_net_id);
ipgre_tunnel_unlink(ign, netdev_priv(dev));
dev_put(dev);
}
Commit Message: gre: fix netns vs proto registration ordering
GRE protocol receive hook can be called right after protocol addition is done.
If netns stuff is not yet initialized, we're going to oops in
net_generic().
This is remotely oopsable if ip_gre is compiled as module and packet
comes at unfortunate moment of module loading.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 27,507
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: iasecc_process_fci(struct sc_card *card, struct sc_file *file,
const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen)
{
struct sc_context *ctx = card->ctx;
size_t taglen;
int rv, ii, offs;
const unsigned char *acls = NULL, *tag = NULL;
unsigned char mask;
unsigned char ops_DF[7] = {
SC_AC_OP_DELETE, 0xFF, SC_AC_OP_ACTIVATE, SC_AC_OP_DEACTIVATE, 0xFF, SC_AC_OP_CREATE, 0xFF
};
unsigned char ops_EF[7] = {
SC_AC_OP_DELETE, 0xFF, SC_AC_OP_ACTIVATE, SC_AC_OP_DEACTIVATE, 0xFF, SC_AC_OP_UPDATE, SC_AC_OP_READ
};
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(ctx);
tag = sc_asn1_find_tag(ctx, buf, buflen, 0x6F, &taglen);
sc_log(ctx, "processing FCI: 0x6F tag %p", tag);
if (tag != NULL) {
sc_log(ctx, " FCP length %"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u", taglen);
buf = tag;
buflen = taglen;
}
tag = sc_asn1_find_tag(ctx, buf, buflen, 0x62, &taglen);
sc_log(ctx, "processing FCI: 0x62 tag %p", tag);
if (tag != NULL) {
sc_log(ctx, " FCP length %"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u", taglen);
buf = tag;
buflen = taglen;
}
rv = iso_ops->process_fci(card, file, buf, buflen);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "ISO parse FCI failed");
/*
Gemalto: 6F 19 80 02 02 ED 82 01 01 83 02 B0 01 88 00 8C 07 7B 17 17 17 17 17 00 8A 01 05 90 00
Sagem: 6F 17 62 15 80 02 00 7D 82 01 01 8C 02 01 00 83 02 2F 00 88 01 F0 8A 01 05 90 00
Oberthur: 62 1B 80 02 05 DC 82 01 01 83 02 B0 01 88 00 A1 09 8C 07 7B 17 FF 17 17 17 00 8A 01 05 90 00
*/
sc_log(ctx, "iasecc_process_fci() type %i; let's parse file ACLs", file->type);
tag = sc_asn1_find_tag(ctx, buf, buflen, IASECC_DOCP_TAG_ACLS, &taglen);
if (tag)
acls = sc_asn1_find_tag(ctx, tag, taglen, IASECC_DOCP_TAG_ACLS_CONTACT, &taglen);
else
acls = sc_asn1_find_tag(ctx, buf, buflen, IASECC_DOCP_TAG_ACLS_CONTACT, &taglen);
if (!acls) {
sc_log(ctx,
"ACLs not found in data(%"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u) %s",
buflen, sc_dump_hex(buf, buflen));
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, SC_ERROR_OBJECT_NOT_FOUND, "ACLs tag missing");
}
sc_log(ctx, "ACLs(%"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u) '%s'", taglen,
sc_dump_hex(acls, taglen));
mask = 0x40, offs = 1;
for (ii = 0; ii < 7; ii++, mask /= 2) {
unsigned char op = file->type == SC_FILE_TYPE_DF ? ops_DF[ii] : ops_EF[ii];
if (!(mask & acls[0]))
continue;
sc_log(ctx, "ACLs mask 0x%X, offs %i, op 0x%X, acls[offs] 0x%X", mask, offs, op, acls[offs]);
if (op == 0xFF) {
;
}
else if (acls[offs] == 0) {
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, op, SC_AC_NONE, 0);
}
else if (acls[offs] == 0xFF) {
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, op, SC_AC_NEVER, 0);
}
else if ((acls[offs] & IASECC_SCB_METHOD_MASK) == IASECC_SCB_METHOD_USER_AUTH) {
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, op, SC_AC_SEN, acls[offs] & IASECC_SCB_METHOD_MASK_REF);
}
else if (acls[offs] & IASECC_SCB_METHOD_MASK) {
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, op, SC_AC_SCB, acls[offs]);
}
else {
sc_log(ctx, "Warning: non supported SCB method: %X", acls[offs]);
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, op, SC_AC_NEVER, 0);
}
offs++;
}
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, 0);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 78,506
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int __udp_queue_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int rc;
if (inet_sk(sk)->inet_daddr) {
sock_rps_save_rxhash(sk, skb);
sk_mark_napi_id(sk, skb);
}
rc = sock_queue_rcv_skb(sk, skb);
if (rc < 0) {
int is_udplite = IS_UDPLITE(sk);
/* Note that an ENOMEM error is charged twice */
if (rc == -ENOMEM)
UDP_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), UDP_MIB_RCVBUFERRORS,
is_udplite);
UDP_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), UDP_MIB_INERRORS, is_udplite);
kfree_skb(skb);
trace_udp_fail_queue_rcv_skb(rc, sk);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: inet: prevent leakage of uninitialized memory to user in recv syscalls
Only update *addr_len when we actually fill in sockaddr, otherwise we
can return uninitialized memory from the stack to the caller in the
recvfrom, recvmmsg and recvmsg syscalls. Drop the the (addr_len == NULL)
checks because we only get called with a valid addr_len pointer either
from sock_common_recvmsg or inet_recvmsg.
If a blocking read waits on a socket which is concurrently shut down we
now return zero and set msg_msgnamelen to 0.
Reported-by: mpb <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 40,167
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: struct posix_acl *btrfs_get_acl(struct inode *inode, int type)
{
int size;
const char *name;
char *value = NULL;
struct posix_acl *acl;
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS;
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
break;
default:
BUG();
}
size = __btrfs_getxattr(inode, name, "", 0);
if (size > 0) {
value = kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!value)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
size = __btrfs_getxattr(inode, name, value, size);
}
if (size > 0) {
acl = posix_acl_from_xattr(&init_user_ns, value, size);
} else if (size == -ERANGE || size == -ENODATA || size == 0) {
acl = NULL;
} else {
acl = ERR_PTR(-EIO);
}
kfree(value);
return acl;
}
Commit Message: posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-285
| 0
| 50,314
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::ReleaseNotInUseBackTextures() {
for (auto& saved_back_texture : saved_back_textures_) {
if (!saved_back_texture.in_use)
saved_back_texture.back_texture->Destroy();
}
base::EraseIf(saved_back_textures_,
[](const SavedBackTexture& saved_back_texture) {
return !saved_back_texture.in_use;
});
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,639
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: iperf_set_test_reverse(struct iperf_test *ipt, int reverse)
{
ipt->reverse = reverse;
if (ipt->reverse)
ipt->sender = ! ipt->sender;
check_sender_has_retransmits(ipt);
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 53,430
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void IndexedDBDispatcher::ResetCursorPrefetchCaches(int32 exception_cursor_id) {
typedef std::map<int32, RendererWebIDBCursorImpl*>::iterator Iterator;
for (Iterator i = cursors_.begin(); i != cursors_.end(); ++i) {
if (i->first == exception_cursor_id)
continue;
i->second->ResetPrefetchCache();
}
}
Commit Message: Add DCHECK to ensure IndexedDBDispatcher doesn't get re-created.
This could happen if there are IDB objects that survive the call to
didStopWorkerRunLoop.
BUG=121734
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9999035
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@131679 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 108,718
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static IMFSample* CreateInputSample(const uint8* stream, int size,
int min_size, int alignment) {
CHECK(stream);
CHECK_GT(size, 0);
base::win::ScopedComPtr<IMFSample> sample;
sample.Attach(CreateEmptySampleWithBuffer(std::max(min_size, size),
alignment));
RETURN_ON_FAILURE(sample, "Failed to create empty sample", NULL);
base::win::ScopedComPtr<IMFMediaBuffer> buffer;
HRESULT hr = sample->GetBufferByIndex(0, buffer.Receive());
RETURN_ON_HR_FAILURE(hr, "Failed to get buffer from sample", NULL);
DWORD max_length = 0;
DWORD current_length = 0;
uint8* destination = NULL;
hr = buffer->Lock(&destination, &max_length, ¤t_length);
RETURN_ON_HR_FAILURE(hr, "Failed to lock buffer", NULL);
CHECK_EQ(current_length, 0u);
CHECK_GE(static_cast<int>(max_length), size);
memcpy(destination, stream, size);
hr = buffer->Unlock();
RETURN_ON_HR_FAILURE(hr, "Failed to unlock buffer", NULL);
hr = buffer->SetCurrentLength(size);
RETURN_ON_HR_FAILURE(hr, "Failed to set buffer length", NULL);
return sample.Detach();
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 106,925
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::FailedNavigation(
int64_t navigation_id,
const CommonNavigationParams& common_params,
const RequestNavigationParams& request_params,
bool has_stale_copy_in_cache,
int error_code,
const base::Optional<std::string>& error_page_content) {
TRACE_EVENT2("navigation", "RenderFrameHostImpl::FailedNavigation",
"frame_tree_node", frame_tree_node_->frame_tree_node_id(),
"error", error_code);
UpdatePermissionsForNavigation(common_params, request_params);
ResetWaitingState();
url::Origin origin = url::Origin();
std::unique_ptr<URLLoaderFactoryBundleInfo> subresource_loader_factories;
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(network::features::kNetworkService)) {
network::mojom::URLLoaderFactoryPtrInfo default_factory_info;
bool bypass_redirect_checks = CreateNetworkServiceDefaultFactoryAndObserve(
origin, mojo::MakeRequest(&default_factory_info));
subresource_loader_factories = std::make_unique<URLLoaderFactoryBundleInfo>(
std::move(default_factory_info),
URLLoaderFactoryBundleInfo::SchemeMap(),
URLLoaderFactoryBundleInfo::OriginMap(), bypass_redirect_checks);
}
auto find_request = navigation_requests_.find(navigation_id);
NavigationRequest* request = find_request != navigation_requests_.end()
? find_request->second.get()
: nullptr;
if (IsPerNavigationMojoInterfaceEnabled() && request &&
request->GetCommitNavigationClient()) {
request->GetCommitNavigationClient()->CommitFailedNavigation(
common_params, request_params, has_stale_copy_in_cache, error_code,
error_page_content, std::move(subresource_loader_factories),
base::BindOnce(&RenderFrameHostImpl::OnCrossDocumentCommitProcessed,
base::Unretained(this), navigation_id));
} else {
GetNavigationControl()->CommitFailedNavigation(
common_params, request_params, has_stale_copy_in_cache, error_code,
error_page_content, std::move(subresource_loader_factories),
base::BindOnce(&RenderFrameHostImpl::OnCrossDocumentCommitProcessed,
base::Unretained(this), navigation_id));
}
is_loading_ = true;
DCHECK(request && request->navigation_handle() &&
request->navigation_handle()->GetNetErrorCode() != net::OK);
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 153,101
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: do_add_counters(struct net *net, const void __user *user,
unsigned int len, int compat)
{
unsigned int i;
struct xt_counters_info tmp;
struct xt_counters *paddc;
unsigned int num_counters;
const char *name;
int size;
void *ptmp;
struct xt_table *t;
const struct xt_table_info *private;
int ret = 0;
struct ipt_entry *iter;
unsigned int addend;
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
struct compat_xt_counters_info compat_tmp;
if (compat) {
ptmp = &compat_tmp;
size = sizeof(struct compat_xt_counters_info);
} else
#endif
{
ptmp = &tmp;
size = sizeof(struct xt_counters_info);
}
if (copy_from_user(ptmp, user, size) != 0)
return -EFAULT;
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
if (compat) {
num_counters = compat_tmp.num_counters;
name = compat_tmp.name;
} else
#endif
{
num_counters = tmp.num_counters;
name = tmp.name;
}
if (len != size + num_counters * sizeof(struct xt_counters))
return -EINVAL;
paddc = vmalloc(len - size);
if (!paddc)
return -ENOMEM;
if (copy_from_user(paddc, user + size, len - size) != 0) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto free;
}
t = xt_find_table_lock(net, AF_INET, name);
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(t)) {
ret = t ? PTR_ERR(t) : -ENOENT;
goto free;
}
local_bh_disable();
private = t->private;
if (private->number != num_counters) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto unlock_up_free;
}
i = 0;
addend = xt_write_recseq_begin();
xt_entry_foreach(iter, private->entries, private->size) {
struct xt_counters *tmp;
tmp = xt_get_this_cpu_counter(&iter->counters);
ADD_COUNTER(*tmp, paddc[i].bcnt, paddc[i].pcnt);
++i;
}
xt_write_recseq_end(addend);
unlock_up_free:
local_bh_enable();
xt_table_unlock(t);
module_put(t->me);
free:
vfree(paddc);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: make sure e->next_offset covers remaining blob size
Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 52,291
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void AudioRendererHost::OnCreated(media::AudioOutputController* controller) {
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::IO,
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(
&AudioRendererHost::DoCompleteCreation,
this,
make_scoped_refptr(controller)));
}
Commit Message: Improve validation when creating audio streams.
BUG=166795
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11647012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173981 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 118,569
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static bool is_help(char *w)
{
if (strcmp(w, "-h") == 0 ||
strcmp(w, "--help") == 0 ||
strcmp(w, "-help") == 0 ||
strcmp(w, "help") == 0)
return true;
return false;
}
Commit Message: Implement privilege check when moving tasks
When writing pids to a tasks file in lxcfs, lxcfs was checking
for privilege over the tasks file but not over the pid being
moved. Since the cgm_movepid request is done as root on the host,
not with the requestor's credentials, we must copy the check which
cgmanager was doing to ensure that the requesting task is allowed
to change the victim task's cgroup membership.
This is CVE-2015-1344
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/lxcfs/+bug/1512854
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 44,404
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int __init ptrace_break_init(void)
{
register_undef_hook(&arm_break_hook);
register_undef_hook(&thumb_break_hook);
register_undef_hook(&thumb2_break_hook);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 25,319
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: int tomoyo_write_mount(char *data, struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
const bool is_delete)
{
struct tomoyo_mount_acl e = { .head.type = TOMOYO_TYPE_MOUNT_ACL };
int error = is_delete ? -ENOENT : -ENOMEM;
char *w[4];
if (!tomoyo_tokenize(data, w, sizeof(w)) || !w[3][0])
return -EINVAL;
if (!tomoyo_parse_name_union(w[0], &e.dev_name) ||
!tomoyo_parse_name_union(w[1], &e.dir_name) ||
!tomoyo_parse_name_union(w[2], &e.fs_type) ||
!tomoyo_parse_number_union(w[3], &e.flags))
goto out;
error = tomoyo_update_domain(&e.head, sizeof(e), is_delete, domain,
tomoyo_same_mount_acl, NULL);
out:
tomoyo_put_name_union(&e.dev_name);
tomoyo_put_name_union(&e.dir_name);
tomoyo_put_name_union(&e.fs_type);
tomoyo_put_number_union(&e.flags);
return error;
}
Commit Message: TOMOYO: Fix oops in tomoyo_mount_acl().
In tomoyo_mount_acl() since 2.6.36, kern_path() was called without checking
dev_name != NULL. As a result, an unprivileged user can trigger oops by issuing
mount(NULL, "/", "ext3", 0, NULL) request.
Fix this by checking dev_name != NULL before calling kern_path(dev_name).
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 26,651
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void btif_config_remove_unpaired(config_t *conf) {
assert(conf != NULL);
const config_section_node_t *snode = config_section_begin(conf);
while (snode != config_section_end(conf)) {
const char *section = config_section_name(snode);
if (string_is_bdaddr(section)) {
if (!config_has_key(conf, section, "LinkKey") &&
!config_has_key(conf, section, "LE_KEY_PENC") &&
!config_has_key(conf, section, "LE_KEY_PID") &&
!config_has_key(conf, section, "LE_KEY_PCSRK") &&
!config_has_key(conf, section, "LE_KEY_LENC") &&
!config_has_key(conf, section, "LE_KEY_LCSRK")) {
snode = config_section_next(snode);
config_remove_section(conf, section);
continue;
}
}
snode = config_section_next(snode);
}
}
Commit Message: Add guest mode functionality (2/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: I8f23d28ef0aa3a8df13d469c73005c8e1b894d19
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 159,662
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int llcp_sock_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *_addr,
int len, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct nfc_llcp_sock *llcp_sock = nfc_llcp_sock(sk);
struct sockaddr_nfc_llcp *addr = (struct sockaddr_nfc_llcp *)_addr;
struct nfc_dev *dev;
struct nfc_llcp_local *local;
int ret = 0;
pr_debug("sock %p sk %p flags 0x%x\n", sock, sk, flags);
if (!addr || len < sizeof(struct sockaddr_nfc) ||
addr->sa_family != AF_NFC)
return -EINVAL;
if (addr->service_name_len == 0 && addr->dsap == 0)
return -EINVAL;
pr_debug("addr dev_idx=%u target_idx=%u protocol=%u\n", addr->dev_idx,
addr->target_idx, addr->nfc_protocol);
lock_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_state == LLCP_CONNECTED) {
ret = -EISCONN;
goto error;
}
dev = nfc_get_device(addr->dev_idx);
if (dev == NULL) {
ret = -ENODEV;
goto error;
}
local = nfc_llcp_find_local(dev);
if (local == NULL) {
ret = -ENODEV;
goto put_dev;
}
device_lock(&dev->dev);
if (dev->dep_link_up == false) {
ret = -ENOLINK;
device_unlock(&dev->dev);
goto put_dev;
}
device_unlock(&dev->dev);
if (local->rf_mode == NFC_RF_INITIATOR &&
addr->target_idx != local->target_idx) {
ret = -ENOLINK;
goto put_dev;
}
llcp_sock->dev = dev;
llcp_sock->local = nfc_llcp_local_get(local);
llcp_sock->remote_miu = llcp_sock->local->remote_miu;
llcp_sock->ssap = nfc_llcp_get_local_ssap(local);
if (llcp_sock->ssap == LLCP_SAP_MAX) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto put_dev;
}
llcp_sock->reserved_ssap = llcp_sock->ssap;
if (addr->service_name_len == 0)
llcp_sock->dsap = addr->dsap;
else
llcp_sock->dsap = LLCP_SAP_SDP;
llcp_sock->nfc_protocol = addr->nfc_protocol;
llcp_sock->service_name_len = min_t(unsigned int,
addr->service_name_len,
NFC_LLCP_MAX_SERVICE_NAME);
llcp_sock->service_name = kmemdup(addr->service_name,
llcp_sock->service_name_len,
GFP_KERNEL);
nfc_llcp_sock_link(&local->connecting_sockets, sk);
ret = nfc_llcp_send_connect(llcp_sock);
if (ret)
goto sock_unlink;
sk->sk_state = LLCP_CONNECTING;
ret = sock_wait_state(sk, LLCP_CONNECTED,
sock_sndtimeo(sk, flags & O_NONBLOCK));
if (ret && ret != -EINPROGRESS)
goto sock_unlink;
release_sock(sk);
return ret;
sock_unlink:
nfc_llcp_put_ssap(local, llcp_sock->ssap);
nfc_llcp_sock_unlink(&local->connecting_sockets, sk);
put_dev:
nfc_put_device(dev);
error:
release_sock(sk);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 40,580
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: status_t BufferQueueConsumer::acquireBuffer(BufferItem* outBuffer,
nsecs_t expectedPresent) {
ATRACE_CALL();
Mutex::Autolock lock(mCore->mMutex);
int numAcquiredBuffers = 0;
for (int s = 0; s < BufferQueueDefs::NUM_BUFFER_SLOTS; ++s) {
if (mSlots[s].mBufferState == BufferSlot::ACQUIRED) {
++numAcquiredBuffers;
}
}
if (numAcquiredBuffers >= mCore->mMaxAcquiredBufferCount + 1) {
BQ_LOGE("acquireBuffer: max acquired buffer count reached: %d (max %d)",
numAcquiredBuffers, mCore->mMaxAcquiredBufferCount);
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
if (mCore->mQueue.empty()) {
return NO_BUFFER_AVAILABLE;
}
BufferQueueCore::Fifo::iterator front(mCore->mQueue.begin());
if (expectedPresent != 0) {
const int MAX_REASONABLE_NSEC = 1000000000ULL; // 1 second
while (mCore->mQueue.size() > 1 && !mCore->mQueue[0].mIsAutoTimestamp) {
const BufferItem& bufferItem(mCore->mQueue[1]);
nsecs_t desiredPresent = bufferItem.mTimestamp;
if (desiredPresent < expectedPresent - MAX_REASONABLE_NSEC ||
desiredPresent > expectedPresent) {
BQ_LOGV("acquireBuffer: nodrop desire=%" PRId64 " expect=%"
PRId64 " (%" PRId64 ") now=%" PRId64,
desiredPresent, expectedPresent,
desiredPresent - expectedPresent,
systemTime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC));
break;
}
BQ_LOGV("acquireBuffer: drop desire=%" PRId64 " expect=%" PRId64
" size=%zu",
desiredPresent, expectedPresent, mCore->mQueue.size());
if (mCore->stillTracking(front)) {
mSlots[front->mSlot].mBufferState = BufferSlot::FREE;
}
mCore->mQueue.erase(front);
front = mCore->mQueue.begin();
}
nsecs_t desiredPresent = front->mTimestamp;
if (desiredPresent > expectedPresent &&
desiredPresent < expectedPresent + MAX_REASONABLE_NSEC) {
BQ_LOGV("acquireBuffer: defer desire=%" PRId64 " expect=%" PRId64
" (%" PRId64 ") now=%" PRId64,
desiredPresent, expectedPresent,
desiredPresent - expectedPresent,
systemTime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC));
return PRESENT_LATER;
}
BQ_LOGV("acquireBuffer: accept desire=%" PRId64 " expect=%" PRId64 " "
"(%" PRId64 ") now=%" PRId64, desiredPresent, expectedPresent,
desiredPresent - expectedPresent,
systemTime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC));
}
int slot = front->mSlot;
*outBuffer = *front;
ATRACE_BUFFER_INDEX(slot);
BQ_LOGV("acquireBuffer: acquiring { slot=%d/%" PRIu64 " buffer=%p }",
slot, front->mFrameNumber, front->mGraphicBuffer->handle);
if (mCore->stillTracking(front)) {
mSlots[slot].mAcquireCalled = true;
mSlots[slot].mNeedsCleanupOnRelease = false;
mSlots[slot].mBufferState = BufferSlot::ACQUIRED;
mSlots[slot].mFence = Fence::NO_FENCE;
}
if (outBuffer->mAcquireCalled) {
outBuffer->mGraphicBuffer = NULL;
}
mCore->mQueue.erase(front);
mCore->mDequeueCondition.broadcast();
ATRACE_INT(mCore->mConsumerName.string(), mCore->mQueue.size());
return NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Add SN logging
Bug 27046057
Change-Id: Iede7c92e59e60795df1ec7768ebafd6b090f1c27
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 161,323
|
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