instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
235k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static UINT32 rdp_get_sec_bytes(rdpRdp* rdp)
{
UINT32 sec_bytes;
if (rdp->sec_flags & SEC_ENCRYPT)
{
sec_bytes = 12;
if (rdp->settings->EncryptionMethods == ENCRYPTION_METHOD_FIPS)
sec_bytes += 4;
}
else if (rdp->sec_flags != 0)
{
sec_bytes = 4;
}
else
{
sec_bytes = 0;
}
return sec_bytes;
}
Commit Message: security: add a NULL pointer check to fix a server crash.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 58,626
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: _XcursorReadFileHeader (XcursorFile *file)
{
XcursorFileHeader head, *fileHeader;
XcursorUInt skip;
unsigned int n;
if (!file)
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.magic))
return NULL;
if (head.magic != XCURSOR_MAGIC)
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.header))
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.version))
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.ntoc))
return NULL;
skip = head.header - XCURSOR_FILE_HEADER_LEN;
if (skip)
if ((*file->seek) (file, skip, SEEK_CUR) == EOF)
return NULL;
fileHeader = _XcursorFileHeaderCreate (head.ntoc);
if (!fileHeader)
return NULL;
fileHeader->magic = head.magic;
fileHeader->header = head.header;
fileHeader->version = head.version;
fileHeader->ntoc = head.ntoc;
for (n = 0; n < fileHeader->ntoc; n++)
{
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &fileHeader->tocs[n].type))
break;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &fileHeader->tocs[n].subtype))
break;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &fileHeader->tocs[n].position))
break;
}
if (n != fileHeader->ntoc)
{
_XcursorFileHeaderDestroy (fileHeader);
return NULL;
}
return fileHeader;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 1,395
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: int bdrv_open_backing_file(BlockDriverState *bs, QDict *options, Error **errp)
{
char backing_filename[PATH_MAX];
int back_flags, ret;
BlockDriver *back_drv = NULL;
Error *local_err = NULL;
if (bs->backing_hd != NULL) {
QDECREF(options);
return 0;
}
/* NULL means an empty set of options */
if (options == NULL) {
options = qdict_new();
}
bs->open_flags &= ~BDRV_O_NO_BACKING;
if (qdict_haskey(options, "file.filename")) {
backing_filename[0] = '\0';
} else if (bs->backing_file[0] == '\0' && qdict_size(options) == 0) {
QDECREF(options);
return 0;
} else {
bdrv_get_full_backing_filename(bs, backing_filename,
sizeof(backing_filename));
}
if (bs->backing_format[0] != '\0') {
back_drv = bdrv_find_format(bs->backing_format);
}
/* backing files always opened read-only */
back_flags = bs->open_flags & ~(BDRV_O_RDWR | BDRV_O_SNAPSHOT |
BDRV_O_COPY_ON_READ);
assert(bs->backing_hd == NULL);
ret = bdrv_open(&bs->backing_hd,
*backing_filename ? backing_filename : NULL, NULL, options,
back_flags, back_drv, &local_err);
if (ret < 0) {
bs->backing_hd = NULL;
bs->open_flags |= BDRV_O_NO_BACKING;
error_setg(errp, "Could not open backing file: %s",
error_get_pretty(local_err));
error_free(local_err);
return ret;
}
if (bs->backing_hd->file) {
pstrcpy(bs->backing_file, sizeof(bs->backing_file),
bs->backing_hd->file->filename);
}
/* Recalculate the BlockLimits with the backing file */
bdrv_refresh_limits(bs);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 16,880
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void vmcs_write64(unsigned long field, u64 value)
{
vmcs_writel(field, value);
#ifndef CONFIG_X86_64
asm volatile ("");
vmcs_writel(field+1, value >> 32);
#endif
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Petr Matousek <[email protected]>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 37,215
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void RenderViewImpl::UpdatePreferredSize() {
if (!send_preferred_size_changes_ || !webview())
return;
if (!needs_preferred_size_update_)
return;
needs_preferred_size_update_ = false;
blink::WebSize tmp_size = webview()->ContentsPreferredMinimumSize();
blink::WebRect tmp_rect(0, 0, tmp_size.width, tmp_size.height);
WidgetClient()->ConvertViewportToWindow(&tmp_rect);
gfx::Size size(tmp_rect.width, tmp_rect.height);
if (size == preferred_size_)
return;
preferred_size_ = size;
Send(new ViewHostMsg_DidContentsPreferredSizeChange(GetRoutingID(),
preferred_size_));
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 145,191
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int ftrace_check_record(struct dyn_ftrace *rec, int enable, int update)
{
unsigned long flag = 0UL;
/*
* If we are updating calls:
*
* If the record has a ref count, then we need to enable it
* because someone is using it.
*
* Otherwise we make sure its disabled.
*
* If we are disabling calls, then disable all records that
* are enabled.
*/
if (enable && (rec->flags & ~FTRACE_FL_MASK))
flag = FTRACE_FL_ENABLED;
/*
* If enabling and the REGS flag does not match the REGS_EN, then
* do not ignore this record. Set flags to fail the compare against
* ENABLED.
*/
if (flag &&
(!(rec->flags & FTRACE_FL_REGS) != !(rec->flags & FTRACE_FL_REGS_EN)))
flag |= FTRACE_FL_REGS;
/* If the state of this record hasn't changed, then do nothing */
if ((rec->flags & FTRACE_FL_ENABLED) == flag)
return FTRACE_UPDATE_IGNORE;
if (flag) {
/* Save off if rec is being enabled (for return value) */
flag ^= rec->flags & FTRACE_FL_ENABLED;
if (update) {
rec->flags |= FTRACE_FL_ENABLED;
if (flag & FTRACE_FL_REGS) {
if (rec->flags & FTRACE_FL_REGS)
rec->flags |= FTRACE_FL_REGS_EN;
else
rec->flags &= ~FTRACE_FL_REGS_EN;
}
}
/*
* If this record is being updated from a nop, then
* return UPDATE_MAKE_CALL.
* Otherwise, if the EN flag is set, then return
* UPDATE_MODIFY_CALL_REGS to tell the caller to convert
* from the non-save regs, to a save regs function.
* Otherwise,
* return UPDATE_MODIFY_CALL to tell the caller to convert
* from the save regs, to a non-save regs function.
*/
if (flag & FTRACE_FL_ENABLED)
return FTRACE_UPDATE_MAKE_CALL;
else if (rec->flags & FTRACE_FL_REGS_EN)
return FTRACE_UPDATE_MODIFY_CALL_REGS;
else
return FTRACE_UPDATE_MODIFY_CALL;
}
if (update) {
/* If there's no more users, clear all flags */
if (!(rec->flags & ~FTRACE_FL_MASK))
rec->flags = 0;
else
/* Just disable the record (keep REGS state) */
rec->flags &= ~FTRACE_FL_ENABLED;
}
return FTRACE_UPDATE_MAKE_NOP;
}
Commit Message: tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 30,139
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: bool smbXcli_conn_is_connected(struct smbXcli_conn *conn)
{
if (conn == NULL) {
return false;
}
if (conn->sock_fd == -1) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 2,459
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: int udp4_ufo_send_check(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
const struct iphdr *iph;
struct udphdr *uh;
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(*uh)))
return -EINVAL;
iph = ip_hdr(skb);
uh = udp_hdr(skb);
uh->check = ~csum_tcpudp_magic(iph->saddr, iph->daddr, skb->len,
IPPROTO_UDP, 0);
skb->csum_start = skb_transport_header(skb) - skb->head;
skb->csum_offset = offsetof(struct udphdr, check);
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_PARTIAL;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 19,077
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void bnep_net_set_mc_list(struct net_device *dev)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_BT_BNEP_MC_FILTER
struct bnep_session *s = netdev_priv(dev);
struct sock *sk = s->sock->sk;
struct bnep_set_filter_req *r;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int size;
BT_DBG("%s mc_count %d", dev->name, netdev_mc_count(dev));
size = sizeof(*r) + (BNEP_MAX_MULTICAST_FILTERS + 1) * ETH_ALEN * 2;
skb = alloc_skb(size, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb) {
BT_ERR("%s Multicast list allocation failed", dev->name);
return;
}
r = (void *) skb->data;
__skb_put(skb, sizeof(*r));
r->type = BNEP_CONTROL;
r->ctrl = BNEP_FILTER_MULTI_ADDR_SET;
if (dev->flags & (IFF_PROMISC | IFF_ALLMULTI)) {
u8 start[ETH_ALEN] = { 0x01 };
/* Request all addresses */
memcpy(__skb_put(skb, ETH_ALEN), start, ETH_ALEN);
memcpy(__skb_put(skb, ETH_ALEN), dev->broadcast, ETH_ALEN);
r->len = htons(ETH_ALEN * 2);
} else {
struct netdev_hw_addr *ha;
int i, len = skb->len;
if (dev->flags & IFF_BROADCAST) {
memcpy(__skb_put(skb, ETH_ALEN), dev->broadcast, ETH_ALEN);
memcpy(__skb_put(skb, ETH_ALEN), dev->broadcast, ETH_ALEN);
}
/* FIXME: We should group addresses here. */
i = 0;
netdev_for_each_mc_addr(ha, dev) {
if (i == BNEP_MAX_MULTICAST_FILTERS)
break;
memcpy(__skb_put(skb, ETH_ALEN), ha->addr, ETH_ALEN);
memcpy(__skb_put(skb, ETH_ALEN), ha->addr, ETH_ALEN);
i++;
}
r->len = htons(skb->len - len);
}
skb_queue_tail(&sk->sk_write_queue, skb);
wake_up_interruptible(sk_sleep(sk));
#endif
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
CC: Karsten Keil <[email protected]>
CC: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <[email protected]>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <[email protected]>
CC: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <[email protected]>
CC: "John W. Linville" <[email protected]>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
CC: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 24,298
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: pp::Var Plugin::GetInstanceObject() {
PLUGIN_PRINTF(("Plugin::GetInstanceObject (this=%p)\n",
static_cast<void*>(this)));
ScriptablePlugin* handle =
static_cast<ScriptablePlugin*>(scriptable_plugin()->AddRef());
pp::Var* handle_var = handle->var();
PLUGIN_PRINTF(("Plugin::GetInstanceObject (handle=%p, handle_var=%p)\n",
static_cast<void*>(handle), static_cast<void*>(handle_var)));
return *handle_var; // make a copy
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 103,343
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void readTiff8bit (const unsigned char *src,
gdImagePtr im,
uint16 photometric,
int startx,
int starty,
int width,
int height,
char has_alpha,
int extra,
int align)
{
int red, green, blue, alpha;
int x, y;
(void)extra;
(void)align;
switch (photometric) {
case PHOTOMETRIC_PALETTE:
/* Palette has no alpha (see TIFF specs for more details */
for (y = starty; y < starty + height; y++) {
for (x = startx; x < startx + width; x++) {
gdImageSetPixel(im, x, y,*(src++));
}
}
break;
case PHOTOMETRIC_RGB:
if (has_alpha) {
gdImageAlphaBlending(im, 0);
gdImageSaveAlpha(im, 1);
for (y = starty; y < starty + height; y++) {
for (x = startx; x < startx + width; x++) {
red = *src++;
green = *src++;
blue = *src++;
alpha = *src++;
red = MIN (red, alpha);
blue = MIN (blue, alpha);
green = MIN (green, alpha);
if (alpha) {
gdImageSetPixel(im, x, y, gdTrueColorAlpha(red * 255 / alpha, green * 255 / alpha, blue * 255 /alpha, gdAlphaMax - (alpha >> 1)));
} else {
gdImageSetPixel(im, x, y, gdTrueColorAlpha(red, green, blue, gdAlphaMax - (alpha >> 1)));
}
}
}
} else {
for (y = 0; y < height; y++) {
for (x = 0; x < width; x++) {
register unsigned char r = *src++;
register unsigned char g = *src++;
register unsigned char b = *src++;
gdImageSetPixel(im, x, y, gdTrueColor(r, g, b));
}
}
}
break;
case PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE:
if (has_alpha) {
/* We don't process the extra yet */
} else {
for (y = starty; y < starty + height; y++) {
for (x = startx; x < startx + width; x++) {
gdImageSetPixel(im, x, y, ~(*src++));
}
}
}
break;
case PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK:
if (has_alpha) {
/* We don't process the extra yet */
} else {
for (y = starty; y < height; y++) {
for (x = 0; x < width; x++) {
gdImageSetPixel(im, x, y, *src++);
}
}
}
break;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix invalid read in gdImageCreateFromTiffPtr()
tiff_invalid_read.tiff is corrupt, and causes an invalid read in
gdImageCreateFromTiffPtr(), but not in gdImageCreateFromTiff(). The culprit
is dynamicGetbuf(), which doesn't check for out-of-bound reads. In this case,
dynamicGetbuf() is called with a negative dp->pos, but also positive buffer
overflows have to be handled, in which case 0 has to be returned (cf. commit
75e29a9).
Fixing dynamicGetbuf() exhibits that the corrupt TIFF would still create
the image, because the return value of TIFFReadRGBAImage() is not checked.
We do that, and let createFromTiffRgba() fail if TIFFReadRGBAImage() fails.
This issue had been reported by Ibrahim El-Sayed to [email protected].
CVE-2016-6911
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 73,731
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void nfs_write_prepare(struct rpc_task *task, void *calldata)
{
struct nfs_write_data *data = calldata;
int err;
err = NFS_PROTO(data->header->inode)->write_rpc_prepare(task, data);
if (err)
rpc_exit(task, err);
}
Commit Message: nfs: always make sure page is up-to-date before extending a write to cover the entire page
We should always make sure the cached page is up-to-date when we're
determining whether we can extend a write to cover the full page -- even
if we've received a write delegation from the server.
Commit c7559663 added logic to skip this check if we have a write
delegation, which can lead to data corruption such as the following
scenario if client B receives a write delegation from the NFS server:
Client A:
# echo 123456789 > /mnt/file
Client B:
# echo abcdefghi >> /mnt/file
# cat /mnt/file
0�D0�abcdefghi
Just because we hold a write delegation doesn't mean that we've read in
the entire page contents.
Cc: <[email protected]> # v3.11+
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 39,207
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: dynamic_interfaces_handler(vector_t *strvec)
{
char *str;
global_data->dynamic_interfaces = true;
if (vector_size(strvec) >= 2) {
str = strvec_slot(strvec, 1);
if (!strcmp(str, "allow_if_changes"))
global_data->allow_if_changes = true;
else
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "Unknown dynamic_interfaces option '%s'",str);
}
}
Commit Message: Add command line and configuration option to set umask
Issue #1048 identified that files created by keepalived are created
with mode 0666. This commit changes the default to 0644, and also
allows the umask to be specified in the configuration or as a command
line option.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 75,817
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void OfflinePageModelImpl::GetPagesByRequestOrigin(
const std::string& request_origin,
const MultipleOfflinePageItemCallback& callback) {
OfflinePageModelQueryBuilder builder;
builder.SetRequestOrigin(OfflinePageModelQuery::Requirement::INCLUDE_MATCHING,
request_origin);
RunWhenLoaded(
base::Bind(&OfflinePageModelImpl::GetPagesMatchingQueryWhenLoadDone,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
base::Passed(builder.Build(GetPolicyController())), callback));
}
Commit Message: Add the method to check if offline archive is in internal dir
Bug: 758690
Change-Id: I8bb4283fc40a87fa7a87df2c7e513e2e16903290
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/828049
Reviewed-by: Filip Gorski <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Jian Li <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#524232}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 155,888
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int memcg_oom_wake_function(wait_queue_t *wait,
unsigned mode, int sync, void *arg)
{
struct mem_cgroup *wake_memcg = (struct mem_cgroup *)arg,
*oom_wait_memcg;
struct oom_wait_info *oom_wait_info;
oom_wait_info = container_of(wait, struct oom_wait_info, wait);
oom_wait_memcg = oom_wait_info->mem;
/*
* Both of oom_wait_info->mem and wake_mem are stable under us.
* Then we can use css_is_ancestor without taking care of RCU.
*/
if (!mem_cgroup_same_or_subtree(oom_wait_memcg, wake_memcg)
&& !mem_cgroup_same_or_subtree(wake_memcg, oom_wait_memcg))
return 0;
return autoremove_wake_function(wait, mode, sync, arg);
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[[email protected]: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Jones <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Salter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 21,163
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: bool LocalFrameClientImpl::HasWebView() const {
return web_frame_->ViewImpl();
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 145,288
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: __blk_mq_alloc_request(struct blk_mq_alloc_data *data, int rw)
{
struct request *rq;
unsigned int tag;
tag = blk_mq_get_tag(data);
if (tag != BLK_MQ_TAG_FAIL) {
rq = data->hctx->tags->rqs[tag];
if (blk_mq_tag_busy(data->hctx)) {
rq->cmd_flags = REQ_MQ_INFLIGHT;
atomic_inc(&data->hctx->nr_active);
}
rq->tag = tag;
blk_mq_rq_ctx_init(data->q, data->ctx, rq, rw);
return rq;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: blk-mq: fix race between timeout and freeing request
Inside timeout handler, blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is called
to retrieve the request from one tag. This way is obviously
wrong because the request can be freed any time and some
fiedds of the request can't be trusted, then kernel oops
might be triggered[1].
Currently wrt. blk_mq_tag_to_rq(), the only special case is
that the flush request can share same tag with the request
cloned from, and the two requests can't be active at the same
time, so this patch fixes the above issue by updating tags->rqs[tag]
with the active request(either flush rq or the request cloned
from) of the tag.
Also blk_mq_tag_to_rq() gets much simplified with this patch.
Given blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is mainly for drivers and the caller must
make sure the request can't be freed, so in bt_for_each() this
helper is replaced with tags->rqs[tag].
[1] kernel oops log
[ 439.696220] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.697162] IP: [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.700653] PGD 7ef765067 PUD 7ef764067 PMD 0 ^M
[ 439.700653] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC ^M
[ 439.700653] Dumping ftrace buffer:^M
[ 439.700653] (ftrace buffer empty)^M
[ 439.700653] Modules linked in: nbd ipv6 kvm_intel kvm serio_raw^M
[ 439.700653] CPU: 6 PID: 2779 Comm: stress-ng-sigfd Not tainted 4.2.0-rc5-next-20150805+ #265^M
[ 439.730500] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011^M
[ 439.730500] task: ffff880605308000 ti: ffff88060530c000 task.ti: ffff88060530c000^M
[ 439.730500] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d89ba>] [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.730500] RSP: 0018:ffff880819203da0 EFLAGS: 00010283^M
[ 439.730500] RAX: ffff880811b0e000 RBX: ffff8800bb465f00 RCX: 0000000000000002^M
[ 439.730500] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000202 RDI: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] RBP: ffff880819203db0 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000202^M
[ 439.730500] R13: ffff880814104800 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffff880811a2ea00^M
[ 439.730500] FS: 00007f165b3f5740(0000) GS:ffff880819200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b^M
[ 439.730500] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 00000007ef766000 CR4: 00000000000006e0^M
[ 439.730500] Stack:^M
[ 439.730500] 0000000000000008 ffff8808114eed90 ffff880819203e00 ffffffff812dc104^M
[ 439.755663] ffff880819203e40 ffffffff812d9f5e 0000020000000000 ffff8808114eed80^M
[ 439.755663] Call Trace:^M
[ 439.755663] <IRQ> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc104>] bt_for_each+0x6e/0xc8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc1b3>] blk_mq_tag_busy_iter+0x55/0x5e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d8911>] blk_mq_rq_timer+0x5d/0xd4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3e10>] call_timer_fn+0xf7/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3d1e>] ? call_timer_fn+0x5/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a46d6>] run_timer_softirq+0x1ce/0x1f8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c367>] __do_softirq+0x181/0x3a4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c76e>] irq_exit+0x40/0x94^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81031482>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x33/0x3e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff815559a4>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x84/0x90^M
[ 439.755663] <EOI> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81554350>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x32/0x4a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a98b>] finish_task_switch+0xe0/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a94d>] ? finish_task_switch+0xa2/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81550066>] __schedule+0x469/0x6cd^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8155039b>] schedule+0x82/0x9a^M
[ 439.789267] [<ffffffff8119b28b>] signalfd_read+0x186/0x49a^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8106d86a>] ? wake_up_q+0x47/0x47^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811618c2>] __vfs_read+0x28/0x9f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8117a289>] ? __fget_light+0x4d/0x74^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811620a7>] vfs_read+0x7a/0xc6^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8116292b>] SyS_read+0x49/0x7f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff81554c17>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f^M
[ 439.790911] Code: 48 89 e5 e8 a9 b8 e7 ff 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 89
f2 48 89 e5 41 54 41 89 f4 53 48 8b 47 60 48 8b 1c d0 48 8b 7b 30 48 8b
53 38 <48> 8b 87 58 01 00 00 48 85 c0 75 09 48 8b 97 88 0c 00 00 eb 10
^M
[ 439.790911] RIP [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.790911] RSP <ffff880819203da0>^M
[ 439.790911] CR2: 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.790911] ---[ end trace d40af58949325661 ]---^M
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 86,666
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static bool isLegacySupportedJavaScriptLanguage(const String& language)
{
typedef HashSet<String, CaseFoldingHash> LanguageSet;
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(LanguageSet, languages, ());
if (languages.isEmpty()) {
languages.add("javascript");
languages.add("javascript1.0");
languages.add("javascript1.1");
languages.add("javascript1.2");
languages.add("javascript1.3");
languages.add("javascript1.4");
languages.add("javascript1.5");
languages.add("javascript1.6");
languages.add("javascript1.7");
languages.add("livescript");
languages.add("ecmascript");
languages.add("jscript");
}
return languages.contains(language);
}
Commit Message: Apply 'x-content-type-options' check to dynamically inserted script.
BUG=348581
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/185593011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@168570 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 115,361
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void release_tree_content(struct tree_content *t)
{
struct avail_tree_content *f = (struct avail_tree_content*)t;
unsigned int hc = hc_entries(f->entry_capacity);
f->next_avail = avail_tree_table[hc];
avail_tree_table[hc] = f;
}
Commit Message: prefer memcpy to strcpy
When we already know the length of a string (e.g., because
we just malloc'd to fit it), it's nicer to use memcpy than
strcpy, as it makes it more obvious that we are not going to
overflow the buffer (because the size we pass matches the
size in the allocation).
This also eliminates calls to strcpy, which make auditing
the code base harder.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 55,131
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void snd_usbmidi_resume(struct list_head *p)
{
struct snd_usb_midi *umidi;
umidi = list_entry(p, struct snd_usb_midi, list);
mutex_lock(&umidi->mutex);
snd_usbmidi_input_start(p);
mutex_unlock(&umidi->mutex);
}
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: avoid freeing umidi object twice
The 'umidi' object will be free'd on the error path by snd_usbmidi_free()
when tearing down the rawmidi interface. So we shouldn't try to free it
in snd_usbmidi_create() after having registered the rawmidi interface.
Found by KASAN.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Clemens Ladisch <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 54,805
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: bool TestBrowserWindow::IsToolbarVisible() const {
return false;
}
Commit Message: Mac: turn popups into new tabs while in fullscreen.
It's platform convention to show popups as new tabs while in
non-HTML5 fullscreen. (Popups cause tabs to lose HTML5 fullscreen.)
This was implemented for Cocoa in a BrowserWindow override, but
it makes sense to just stick it into Browser and remove a ton
of override code put in just to support this.
BUG=858929, 868416
TEST=as in bugs
Change-Id: I43471f242813ec1159d9c690bab73dab3e610b7d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1153455
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#578755}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 155,331
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: ssh_packet_close(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
int r;
u_int mode;
if (!state->initialized)
return;
state->initialized = 0;
if (state->connection_in == state->connection_out) {
shutdown(state->connection_out, SHUT_RDWR);
close(state->connection_out);
} else {
close(state->connection_in);
close(state->connection_out);
}
sshbuf_free(state->input);
sshbuf_free(state->output);
sshbuf_free(state->outgoing_packet);
sshbuf_free(state->incoming_packet);
for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++)
kex_free_newkeys(state->newkeys[mode]);
if (state->compression_buffer) {
sshbuf_free(state->compression_buffer);
if (state->compression_out_started) {
z_streamp stream = &state->compression_out_stream;
debug("compress outgoing: "
"raw data %llu, compressed %llu, factor %.2f",
(unsigned long long)stream->total_in,
(unsigned long long)stream->total_out,
stream->total_in == 0 ? 0.0 :
(double) stream->total_out / stream->total_in);
if (state->compression_out_failures == 0)
deflateEnd(stream);
}
if (state->compression_in_started) {
z_streamp stream = &state->compression_out_stream;
debug("compress incoming: "
"raw data %llu, compressed %llu, factor %.2f",
(unsigned long long)stream->total_out,
(unsigned long long)stream->total_in,
stream->total_out == 0 ? 0.0 :
(double) stream->total_in / stream->total_out);
if (state->compression_in_failures == 0)
inflateEnd(stream);
}
}
if ((r = cipher_cleanup(&state->send_context)) != 0)
error("%s: cipher_cleanup failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if ((r = cipher_cleanup(&state->receive_context)) != 0)
error("%s: cipher_cleanup failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (ssh->remote_ipaddr) {
free(ssh->remote_ipaddr);
ssh->remote_ipaddr = NULL;
}
free(ssh->state);
ssh->state = NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 12,950
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: int arm_dma_set_mask(struct device *dev, u64 dma_mask)
{
if (!dev->dma_mask || !dma_supported(dev, dma_mask))
return -EIO;
*dev->dma_mask = dma_mask;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ARM: dma-mapping: don't allow DMA mappings to be marked executable
DMA mapping permissions were being derived from pgprot_kernel directly
without using PAGE_KERNEL. This causes them to be marked with executable
permission, which is not what we want. Fix this.
Signed-off-by: Russell King <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 58,294
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void AutomationInternalCustomBindings::SendNodesRemovedEvent(
ui::AXTree* tree,
const std::vector<int>& ids) {
auto iter = axtree_to_tree_cache_map_.find(tree);
if (iter == axtree_to_tree_cache_map_.end())
return;
int tree_id = iter->second->tree_id;
v8::Isolate* isolate = GetIsolate();
v8::HandleScope handle_scope(isolate);
v8::Context::Scope context_scope(context()->v8_context());
v8::Local<v8::Array> args(v8::Array::New(GetIsolate(), 2U));
args->Set(0U, v8::Integer::New(GetIsolate(), tree_id));
v8::Local<v8::Array> nodes(v8::Array::New(GetIsolate(), ids.size()));
args->Set(1U, nodes);
for (size_t i = 0; i < ids.size(); ++i)
nodes->Set(i, v8::Integer::New(GetIsolate(), ids[i]));
context()->DispatchEvent("automationInternal.onNodesRemoved", args);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add more bindings access checks
BUG=598165
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1854983002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385282}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 156,380
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: bool Editor::tryDHTMLCut() {
if (frame().selection().isInPasswordField())
return false;
return !dispatchCPPEvent(EventTypeNames::cut, DataTransferWritable);
}
Commit Message: Make TypingCommand::insertText() to take SelectionInDOMTree instead of VisibleSelection
This patch makes |TypingCommand::insertText()| to take |SelectionInDOMTree|
instead of |VisibleSelection| to reduce usage of |VisibleSelection| for
improving code health.
BUG=657237
TEST=n/a
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2733183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#455368}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 129,188
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: FTC_SNode_Free( FTC_SNode snode,
FTC_Cache cache )
{
ftc_snode_free( FTC_NODE( snode ), cache );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 7,008
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: size_t LayerTreeHost::MaxPartialTextureUpdates() const {
size_t max_partial_texture_updates = 0;
if (proxy_->GetRendererCapabilities().allow_partial_texture_updates &&
!settings_.impl_side_painting) {
max_partial_texture_updates =
std::min(settings_.max_partial_texture_updates,
proxy_->MaxPartialTextureUpdates());
}
return max_partial_texture_updates;
}
Commit Message: Removed pinch viewport scroll offset distribution
The associated change in Blink makes the pinch viewport a proper
ScrollableArea meaning the normal path for synchronizing layer scroll
offsets is used.
This is a 2 sided patch, the other CL:
https://codereview.chromium.org/199253002/
BUG=349941
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/210543002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260105 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 111,983
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::prepareForAdaptivePlayback(
OMX_U32 portIndex, OMX_BOOL enable, OMX_U32 maxFrameWidth,
OMX_U32 maxFrameHeight) {
Mutex::Autolock autolock(mLock);
CLOG_CONFIG(prepareForAdaptivePlayback, "%s:%u en=%d max=%ux%u",
portString(portIndex), portIndex, enable, maxFrameWidth, maxFrameHeight);
OMX_INDEXTYPE index;
OMX_STRING name = const_cast<OMX_STRING>(
"OMX.google.android.index.prepareForAdaptivePlayback");
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_GetExtensionIndex(mHandle, name, &index);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR_IF(enable, getExtensionIndex, err, "%s", name);
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
PrepareForAdaptivePlaybackParams params;
InitOMXParams(¶ms);
params.nPortIndex = portIndex;
params.bEnable = enable;
params.nMaxFrameWidth = maxFrameWidth;
params.nMaxFrameHeight = maxFrameHeight;
err = OMX_SetParameter(mHandle, index, ¶ms);
CLOG_IF_ERROR(setParameter, err, "%s(%#x): %s:%u en=%d max=%ux%u", name, index,
portString(portIndex), portIndex, enable, maxFrameWidth, maxFrameHeight);
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: IOMX: work against metadata buffer spoofing
- Prohibit direct set/getParam/Settings for extensions meant for
OMXNodeInstance alone. This disallows enabling metadata mode
without the knowledge of OMXNodeInstance.
- Use a backup buffer for metadata mode buffers and do not directly
share with clients.
- Disallow setting up metadata mode/tunneling/input surface
after first sendCommand.
- Disallow store-meta for input cross process.
- Disallow emptyBuffer for surface input (via IOMX).
- Fix checking for input surface.
Bug: 29422020
Change-Id: I801c77b80e703903f62e42d76fd2e76a34e4bc8e
(cherry picked from commit 7c3c2fa3e233c656fc8c2fc2a6634b3ecf8a23e8)
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 1
| 174,136
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void APIENTRY PassthroughGLDebugMessageCallback(GLenum source,
GLenum type,
GLuint id,
GLenum severity,
GLsizei length,
const GLchar* message,
const GLvoid* user_param) {
DCHECK(user_param != nullptr);
GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl* command_decoder =
static_cast<GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl*>(const_cast<void*>(user_param));
command_decoder->OnDebugMessage(source, type, id, severity, length, message);
LogGLDebugMessage(source, type, id, severity, length, message,
command_decoder->GetLogger());
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,792
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int scsi_disk_emulate_inquiry(SCSIRequest *req, uint8_t *outbuf)
{
SCSIDiskState *s = DO_UPCAST(SCSIDiskState, qdev, req->dev);
int buflen = 0;
if (req->cmd.buf[1] & 0x2) {
/* Command support data - optional, not implemented */
BADF("optional INQUIRY command support request not implemented\n");
return -1;
}
if (req->cmd.buf[1] & 0x1) {
/* Vital product data */
uint8_t page_code = req->cmd.buf[2];
if (req->cmd.xfer < 4) {
BADF("Error: Inquiry (EVPD[%02X]) buffer size %zd is "
"less than 4\n", page_code, req->cmd.xfer);
return -1;
}
if (s->qdev.type == TYPE_ROM) {
outbuf[buflen++] = 5;
} else {
outbuf[buflen++] = 0;
}
outbuf[buflen++] = page_code ; // this page
outbuf[buflen++] = 0x00;
switch (page_code) {
case 0x00: /* Supported page codes, mandatory */
{
int pages;
DPRINTF("Inquiry EVPD[Supported pages] "
"buffer size %zd\n", req->cmd.xfer);
pages = buflen++;
outbuf[buflen++] = 0x00; // list of supported pages (this page)
if (s->serial)
outbuf[buflen++] = 0x80; // unit serial number
outbuf[buflen++] = 0x83; // device identification
if (s->qdev.type == TYPE_DISK) {
outbuf[buflen++] = 0xb0; // block limits
outbuf[buflen++] = 0xb2; // thin provisioning
}
outbuf[pages] = buflen - pages - 1; // number of pages
break;
}
case 0x80: /* Device serial number, optional */
{
int l;
if (!s->serial) {
DPRINTF("Inquiry (EVPD[Serial number] not supported\n");
return -1;
}
l = strlen(s->serial);
if (l > req->cmd.xfer)
l = req->cmd.xfer;
if (l > 20)
l = 20;
DPRINTF("Inquiry EVPD[Serial number] "
"buffer size %zd\n", req->cmd.xfer);
outbuf[buflen++] = l;
memcpy(outbuf+buflen, s->serial, l);
buflen += l;
break;
}
case 0x83: /* Device identification page, mandatory */
{
int max_len = 255 - 8;
int id_len = strlen(bdrv_get_device_name(s->bs));
if (id_len > max_len)
id_len = max_len;
DPRINTF("Inquiry EVPD[Device identification] "
"buffer size %zd\n", req->cmd.xfer);
outbuf[buflen++] = 4 + id_len;
outbuf[buflen++] = 0x2; // ASCII
outbuf[buflen++] = 0; // not officially assigned
outbuf[buflen++] = 0; // reserved
outbuf[buflen++] = id_len; // length of data following
memcpy(outbuf+buflen, bdrv_get_device_name(s->bs), id_len);
buflen += id_len;
break;
}
case 0xb0: /* block limits */
{
unsigned int unmap_sectors =
s->qdev.conf.discard_granularity / s->qdev.blocksize;
unsigned int min_io_size =
s->qdev.conf.min_io_size / s->qdev.blocksize;
unsigned int opt_io_size =
s->qdev.conf.opt_io_size / s->qdev.blocksize;
if (s->qdev.type == TYPE_ROM) {
DPRINTF("Inquiry (EVPD[%02X] not supported for CDROM\n",
page_code);
return -1;
}
/* required VPD size with unmap support */
outbuf[3] = buflen = 0x3c;
memset(outbuf + 4, 0, buflen - 4);
/* optimal transfer length granularity */
outbuf[6] = (min_io_size >> 8) & 0xff;
outbuf[7] = min_io_size & 0xff;
/* optimal transfer length */
outbuf[12] = (opt_io_size >> 24) & 0xff;
outbuf[13] = (opt_io_size >> 16) & 0xff;
outbuf[14] = (opt_io_size >> 8) & 0xff;
outbuf[15] = opt_io_size & 0xff;
/* optimal unmap granularity */
outbuf[28] = (unmap_sectors >> 24) & 0xff;
outbuf[29] = (unmap_sectors >> 16) & 0xff;
outbuf[30] = (unmap_sectors >> 8) & 0xff;
outbuf[31] = unmap_sectors & 0xff;
break;
}
case 0xb2: /* thin provisioning */
{
outbuf[3] = buflen = 8;
outbuf[4] = 0;
outbuf[5] = 0x40; /* write same with unmap supported */
outbuf[6] = 0;
outbuf[7] = 0;
break;
}
default:
BADF("Error: unsupported Inquiry (EVPD[%02X]) "
"buffer size %zd\n", page_code, req->cmd.xfer);
return -1;
}
/* done with EVPD */
return buflen;
}
/* Standard INQUIRY data */
if (req->cmd.buf[2] != 0) {
BADF("Error: Inquiry (STANDARD) page or code "
"is non-zero [%02X]\n", req->cmd.buf[2]);
return -1;
}
/* PAGE CODE == 0 */
if (req->cmd.xfer < 5) {
BADF("Error: Inquiry (STANDARD) buffer size %zd "
"is less than 5\n", req->cmd.xfer);
return -1;
}
buflen = req->cmd.xfer;
if (buflen > SCSI_MAX_INQUIRY_LEN)
buflen = SCSI_MAX_INQUIRY_LEN;
memset(outbuf, 0, buflen);
outbuf[0] = s->qdev.type & 0x1f;
if (s->qdev.type == TYPE_ROM) {
outbuf[1] = 0x80;
memcpy(&outbuf[16], "QEMU CD-ROM ", 16);
} else {
outbuf[1] = s->removable ? 0x80 : 0;
memcpy(&outbuf[16], "QEMU HARDDISK ", 16);
}
memcpy(&outbuf[8], "QEMU ", 8);
memset(&outbuf[32], 0, 4);
memcpy(&outbuf[32], s->version, MIN(4, strlen(s->version)));
/*
* We claim conformance to SPC-3, which is required for guests
* to ask for modern features like READ CAPACITY(16) or the
* block characteristics VPD page by default. Not all of SPC-3
* is actually implemented, but we're good enough.
*/
outbuf[2] = 5;
outbuf[3] = 2; /* Format 2 */
if (buflen > 36) {
outbuf[4] = buflen - 5; /* Additional Length = (Len - 1) - 4 */
} else {
/* If the allocation length of CDB is too small,
the additional length is not adjusted */
outbuf[4] = 36 - 5;
}
/* Sync data transfer and TCQ. */
outbuf[7] = 0x10 | (req->bus->tcq ? 0x02 : 0);
return buflen;
}
Commit Message: scsi-disk: lazily allocate bounce buffer
It will not be needed for reads and writes if the HBA provides a sglist.
In addition, this lets scsi-disk refuse commands with an excessive
allocation length, as well as limit memory on usual well-behaved guests.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 41,254
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void snd_seq_device_info(struct snd_info_entry *entry,
struct snd_info_buffer *buffer)
{
bus_for_each_dev(&snd_seq_bus_type, NULL, buffer, print_dev_info);
}
Commit Message: ALSA: seq: Cancel pending autoload work at unbinding device
ALSA sequencer core has a mechanism to load the enumerated devices
automatically, and it's performed in an off-load work. This seems
causing some race when a sequencer is removed while the pending
autoload work is running. As syzkaller spotted, it may lead to some
use-after-free:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_rawmidi_dev_seq_free+0x69/0x70
sound/core/rawmidi.c:1617
Write of size 8 at addr ffff88006c611d90 by task kworker/2:1/567
CPU: 2 PID: 567 Comm: kworker/2:1 Not tainted 4.13.0+ #29
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Workqueue: events autoload_drivers
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16 [inline]
dump_stack+0x192/0x22c lib/dump_stack.c:52
print_address_description+0x78/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline]
kasan_report+0x230/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_store8_noabort+0x1c/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:435
snd_rawmidi_dev_seq_free+0x69/0x70 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1617
snd_seq_dev_release+0x4f/0x70 sound/core/seq_device.c:192
device_release+0x13f/0x210 drivers/base/core.c:814
kobject_cleanup lib/kobject.c:648 [inline]
kobject_release lib/kobject.c:677 [inline]
kref_put include/linux/kref.h:70 [inline]
kobject_put+0x145/0x240 lib/kobject.c:694
put_device+0x25/0x30 drivers/base/core.c:1799
klist_devices_put+0x36/0x40 drivers/base/bus.c:827
klist_next+0x264/0x4a0 lib/klist.c:403
next_device drivers/base/bus.c:270 [inline]
bus_for_each_dev+0x17e/0x210 drivers/base/bus.c:312
autoload_drivers+0x3b/0x50 sound/core/seq_device.c:117
process_one_work+0x9fb/0x1570 kernel/workqueue.c:2097
worker_thread+0x1e4/0x1350 kernel/workqueue.c:2231
kthread+0x324/0x3f0 kernel/kthread.c:231
ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:425
The fix is simply to assure canceling the autoload work at removing
the device.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 59,952
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void gs_lib_ctx_set_cms_context( const gs_memory_t *mem, void *cms_context )
{
if (mem == NULL)
return;
mem->gs_lib_ctx->cms_context = cms_context;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 14,018
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void server_disconnect(SERVER_REC *server)
{
int chans;
g_return_if_fail(IS_SERVER(server));
if (server->disconnected)
return;
if (server->connect_tag != -1) {
/* still connecting to server.. */
if (server->connect_pid != -1)
net_disconnect_nonblock(server->connect_pid);
server_connect_failed(server, NULL);
return;
}
servers = g_slist_remove(servers, server);
server->disconnected = TRUE;
signal_emit("server disconnected", 1, server);
/* close all channels */
chans = server_remove_channels(server);
if (server->handle != NULL) {
if (!chans || server->connection_lost)
net_sendbuffer_destroy(server->handle, TRUE);
else {
/* we were on some channels, try to let the server
disconnect so that our quit message is guaranteed
to get displayed */
net_disconnect_later(net_sendbuffer_handle(server->handle));
net_sendbuffer_destroy(server->handle, FALSE);
}
server->handle = NULL;
}
if (server->readtag > 0) {
g_source_remove(server->readtag);
server->readtag = -1;
}
server_unref(server);
}
Commit Message: Check if an SSL certificate matches the hostname of the server we are connecting to
git-svn-id: http://svn.irssi.org/repos/irssi/trunk@5104 dbcabf3a-b0e7-0310-adc4-f8d773084564
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 18,207
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void *yam_seq_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *pos)
{
++*pos;
return (*pos < NR_PORTS) ? yam_devs[*pos] : NULL;
}
Commit Message: hamradio/yam: fix info leak in ioctl
The yam_ioctl() code fails to initialise the cmd field
of the struct yamdrv_ioctl_cfg. Add an explicit memset(0)
before filling the structure to avoid the 4-byte info leak.
Signed-off-by: Salva Peiró <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 39,474
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void MemoryInstrumentation::RequestGlobalDumpForPid(
base::ProcessId pid,
RequestGlobalDumpCallback callback) {
const auto& coordinator = GetCoordinatorBindingForCurrentThread();
coordinator->RequestGlobalMemoryDumpForPid(pid, callback);
}
Commit Message: memory-infra: split up memory-infra coordinator service into two
This allows for heap profiler to use its own service with correct
capabilities and all other instances to use the existing coordinator
service.
Bug: 792028
Change-Id: I84e4ec71f5f1d00991c0516b1424ce7334bcd3cd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/836896
Commit-Queue: Lalit Maganti <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: oysteine <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Albert J. Wong <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529059}
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 150,111
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int output_byte(char byte)
{
int status = wait_til_ready();
if (status < 0)
return -1;
if (is_ready_state(status)) {
fd_outb(byte, FD_DATA);
output_log[output_log_pos].data = byte;
output_log[output_log_pos].status = status;
output_log[output_log_pos].jiffies = jiffies;
output_log_pos = (output_log_pos + 1) % OLOGSIZE;
return 0;
}
FDCS->reset = 1;
if (initialized) {
DPRINT("Unable to send byte %x to FDC. Fdc=%x Status=%x\n",
byte, fdc, status);
show_floppy();
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: floppy: don't write kernel-only members to FDRAWCMD ioctl output
Do not leak kernel-only floppy_raw_cmd structure members to userspace.
This includes the linked-list pointer and the pointer to the allocated
DMA space.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 39,402
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: update_info_linux_dmmp_component (Device *device)
{
gboolean is_dmmp_component;
is_dmmp_component = FALSE;
if (device->priv->holders_objpath->len == 1)
{
Device *holder;
holder = daemon_local_find_by_object_path (device->priv->daemon, device->priv->holders_objpath->pdata[0]);
if (holder != NULL && holder->priv->device_is_linux_dmmp)
{
is_dmmp_component = TRUE;
device_set_linux_dmmp_component_holder (device, holder->priv->object_path);
}
}
device_set_device_is_linux_dmmp_component (device, is_dmmp_component);
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 11,841
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: Response InspectorPageAgent::setAutoAttachToCreatedPages(bool auto_attach) {
state_->setBoolean(PageAgentState::kAutoAttachToCreatedPages, auto_attach);
return Response::OK();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 138,602
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: SpdyWriteQueue::SpdyWriteQueue() : removing_writes_(false) {}
Commit Message: These can post callbacks which re-enter into SpdyWriteQueue.
BUG=369539
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/265933007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268730 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 121,327
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: zend_bool php_openssl_pkey_init_and_assign_rsa(EVP_PKEY *pkey, RSA *rsa, zval *data)
{
BIGNUM *n, *e, *d, *p, *q, *dmp1, *dmq1, *iqmp;
OPENSSL_PKEY_SET_BN(data, n);
OPENSSL_PKEY_SET_BN(data, e);
OPENSSL_PKEY_SET_BN(data, d);
if (!n || !d || !RSA_set0_key(rsa, n, e, d)) {
return 0;
}
OPENSSL_PKEY_SET_BN(data, p);
OPENSSL_PKEY_SET_BN(data, q);
if ((p || q) && !RSA_set0_factors(rsa, p, q)) {
return 0;
}
OPENSSL_PKEY_SET_BN(data, dmp1);
OPENSSL_PKEY_SET_BN(data, dmq1);
OPENSSL_PKEY_SET_BN(data, iqmp);
if ((dmp1 || dmq1 || iqmp) && !RSA_set0_crt_params(rsa, dmp1, dmq1, iqmp)) {
return 0;
}
if (!EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa)) {
php_openssl_store_errors();
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-754
| 0
| 4,638
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: ofproto_set_rstp(struct ofproto *ofproto,
const struct ofproto_rstp_settings *s)
{
if (!ofproto->ofproto_class->set_rstp) {
return EOPNOTSUPP;
}
ofproto->ofproto_class->set_rstp(ofproto, s);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 77,392
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static noinline int record_one_backref(u64 inum, u64 offset, u64 root_id,
void *ctx)
{
struct btrfs_file_extent_item *extent;
struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info;
struct old_sa_defrag_extent *old = ctx;
struct new_sa_defrag_extent *new = old->new;
struct btrfs_path *path = new->path;
struct btrfs_key key;
struct btrfs_root *root;
struct sa_defrag_extent_backref *backref;
struct extent_buffer *leaf;
struct inode *inode = new->inode;
int slot;
int ret;
u64 extent_offset;
u64 num_bytes;
if (BTRFS_I(inode)->root->root_key.objectid == root_id &&
inum == btrfs_ino(inode))
return 0;
key.objectid = root_id;
key.type = BTRFS_ROOT_ITEM_KEY;
key.offset = (u64)-1;
fs_info = BTRFS_I(inode)->root->fs_info;
root = btrfs_read_fs_root_no_name(fs_info, &key);
if (IS_ERR(root)) {
if (PTR_ERR(root) == -ENOENT)
return 0;
WARN_ON(1);
pr_debug("inum=%llu, offset=%llu, root_id=%llu\n",
inum, offset, root_id);
return PTR_ERR(root);
}
key.objectid = inum;
key.type = BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_KEY;
if (offset > (u64)-1 << 32)
key.offset = 0;
else
key.offset = offset;
ret = btrfs_search_slot(NULL, root, &key, path, 0, 0);
if (WARN_ON(ret < 0))
return ret;
ret = 0;
while (1) {
cond_resched();
leaf = path->nodes[0];
slot = path->slots[0];
if (slot >= btrfs_header_nritems(leaf)) {
ret = btrfs_next_leaf(root, path);
if (ret < 0) {
goto out;
} else if (ret > 0) {
ret = 0;
goto out;
}
continue;
}
path->slots[0]++;
btrfs_item_key_to_cpu(leaf, &key, slot);
if (key.objectid > inum)
goto out;
if (key.objectid < inum || key.type != BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_KEY)
continue;
extent = btrfs_item_ptr(leaf, slot,
struct btrfs_file_extent_item);
if (btrfs_file_extent_disk_bytenr(leaf, extent) != old->bytenr)
continue;
/*
* 'offset' refers to the exact key.offset,
* NOT the 'offset' field in btrfs_extent_data_ref, ie.
* (key.offset - extent_offset).
*/
if (key.offset != offset)
continue;
extent_offset = btrfs_file_extent_offset(leaf, extent);
num_bytes = btrfs_file_extent_num_bytes(leaf, extent);
if (extent_offset >= old->extent_offset + old->offset +
old->len || extent_offset + num_bytes <=
old->extent_offset + old->offset)
continue;
break;
}
backref = kmalloc(sizeof(*backref), GFP_NOFS);
if (!backref) {
ret = -ENOENT;
goto out;
}
backref->root_id = root_id;
backref->inum = inum;
backref->file_pos = offset;
backref->num_bytes = num_bytes;
backref->extent_offset = extent_offset;
backref->generation = btrfs_file_extent_generation(leaf, extent);
backref->old = old;
backref_insert(&new->root, backref);
old->count++;
out:
btrfs_release_path(path);
WARN_ON(ret);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix truncation of compressed and inlined extents
When truncating a file to a smaller size which consists of an inline
extent that is compressed, we did not discard (or made unusable) the
data between the new file size and the old file size, wasting metadata
space and allowing for the truncated data to be leaked and the data
corruption/loss mentioned below.
We were also not correctly decrementing the number of bytes used by the
inode, we were setting it to zero, giving a wrong report for callers of
the stat(2) syscall. The fsck tool also reported an error about a mismatch
between the nbytes of the file versus the real space used by the file.
Now because we weren't discarding the truncated region of the file, it
was possible for a caller of the clone ioctl to actually read the data
that was truncated, allowing for a security breach without requiring root
access to the system, using only standard filesystem operations. The
scenario is the following:
1) User A creates a file which consists of an inline and compressed
extent with a size of 2000 bytes - the file is not accessible to
any other users (no read, write or execution permission for anyone
else);
2) The user truncates the file to a size of 1000 bytes;
3) User A makes the file world readable;
4) User B creates a file consisting of an inline extent of 2000 bytes;
5) User B issues a clone operation from user A's file into its own
file (using a length argument of 0, clone the whole range);
6) User B now gets to see the 1000 bytes that user A truncated from
its file before it made its file world readbale. User B also lost
the bytes in the range [1000, 2000[ bytes from its own file, but
that might be ok if his/her intention was reading stale data from
user A that was never supposed to be public.
Note that this contrasts with the case where we truncate a file from 2000
bytes to 1000 bytes and then truncate it back from 1000 to 2000 bytes. In
this case reading any byte from the range [1000, 2000[ will return a value
of 0x00, instead of the original data.
This problem exists since the clone ioctl was added and happens both with
and without my recent data loss and file corruption fixes for the clone
ioctl (patch "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents").
So fix this by truncating the compressed inline extents as we do for the
non-compressed case, which involves decompressing, if the data isn't already
in the page cache, compressing the truncated version of the extent, writing
the compressed content into the inline extent and then truncate it.
The following test case for fstests reproduces the problem. In order for
the test to pass both this fix and my previous fix for the clone ioctl
that forbids cloning a smaller inline extent into a larger one,
which is titled "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents", are needed. Without that other fix the test fails in a
different way that does not leak the truncated data, instead part of
destination file gets replaced with zeroes (because the destination file
has a larger inline extent than the source).
seq=`basename $0`
seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq
echo "QA output created by $seq"
tmp=/tmp/$$
status=1 # failure is the default!
trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15
_cleanup()
{
rm -f $tmp.*
}
# get standard environment, filters and checks
. ./common/rc
. ./common/filter
# real QA test starts here
_need_to_be_root
_supported_fs btrfs
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch
_require_cloner
rm -f $seqres.full
_scratch_mkfs >>$seqres.full 2>&1
_scratch_mount "-o compress"
# Create our test files. File foo is going to be the source of a clone operation
# and consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of 512 bytes,
# while file bar consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of
# 256 bytes. For our test's purpose, it's important that file bar has an inline
# extent with a size smaller than foo's inline extent.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xa1 0 128" \
-c "pwrite -S 0x2a 128 384" \
$SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 0 256" $SCRATCH_MNT/bar | _filter_xfs_io
# Now durably persist all metadata and data. We do this to make sure that we get
# on disk an inline extent with a size of 512 bytes for file foo.
sync
# Now truncate our file foo to a smaller size. Because it consists of a
# compressed and inline extent, btrfs did not shrink the inline extent to the
# new size (if the extent was not compressed, btrfs would shrink it to 128
# bytes), it only updates the inode's i_size to 128 bytes.
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "truncate 128" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
# Now clone foo's inline extent into bar.
# This clone operation should fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP because the source
# file consists only of an inline extent and the file's size is smaller than
# the inline extent of the destination (128 bytes < 256 bytes). However the
# clone ioctl was not prepared to deal with a file that has a size smaller
# than the size of its inline extent (something that happens only for compressed
# inline extents), resulting in copying the full inline extent from the source
# file into the destination file.
#
# Note that btrfs' clone operation for inline extents consists of removing the
# inline extent from the destination inode and copy the inline extent from the
# source inode into the destination inode, meaning that if the destination
# inode's inline extent is larger (N bytes) than the source inode's inline
# extent (M bytes), some bytes (N - M bytes) will be lost from the destination
# file. Btrfs could copy the source inline extent's data into the destination's
# inline extent so that we would not lose any data, but that's currently not
# done due to the complexity that would be needed to deal with such cases
# (specially when one or both extents are compressed), returning EOPNOTSUPP, as
# it's normally not a very common case to clone very small files (only case
# where we get inline extents) and copying inline extents does not save any
# space (unlike for normal, non-inlined extents).
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Now because the above clone operation used to succeed, and due to foo's inline
# extent not being shinked by the truncate operation, our file bar got the whole
# inline extent copied from foo, making us lose the last 128 bytes from bar
# which got replaced by the bytes in range [128, 256[ from foo before foo was
# truncated - in other words, data loss from bar and being able to read old and
# stale data from foo that should not be possible to read anymore through normal
# filesystem operations. Contrast with the case where we truncate a file from a
# size N to a smaller size M, truncate it back to size N and then read the range
# [M, N[, we should always get the value 0x00 for all the bytes in that range.
# We expected the clone operation to fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP and therefore
# not modify our file's bar data/metadata. So its content should be 256 bytes
# long with all bytes having the value 0xbb.
#
# Without the btrfs bug fix, the clone operation succeeded and resulted in
# leaking truncated data from foo, the bytes that belonged to its range
# [128, 256[, and losing data from bar in that same range. So reading the
# file gave us the following content:
#
# 0000000 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1
# *
# 0000200 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a
# *
# 0000400
echo "File bar's content after the clone operation:"
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Also because the foo's inline extent was not shrunk by the truncate
# operation, btrfs' fsck, which is run by the fstests framework everytime a
# test completes, failed reporting the following error:
#
# root 5 inode 257 errors 400, nbytes wrong
status=0
exit
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 41,723
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void HTMLInputElement::setMaxLength(int maxLength, ExceptionCode& ec)
{
if (maxLength < 0)
ec = INDEX_SIZE_ERR;
else
setAttribute(maxlengthAttr, String::number(maxLength));
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 112,994
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: gss_process_context_token (minor_status,
context_handle,
token_buffer)
OM_uint32 * minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle;
gss_buffer_t token_buffer;
{
OM_uint32 status;
gss_union_ctx_id_t ctx;
gss_mechanism mech;
if (minor_status == NULL)
return (GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE);
*minor_status = 0;
if (context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
return (GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ | GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
if (token_buffer == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
return (GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ);
if (GSS_EMPTY_BUFFER(token_buffer))
return (GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ);
/*
* select the approprate underlying mechanism routine and
* call it.
*/
ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t) context_handle;
mech = gssint_get_mechanism (ctx->mech_type);
if (mech) {
if (mech->gss_process_context_token) {
status = mech->gss_process_context_token(
minor_status,
ctx->internal_ctx_id,
token_buffer);
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
map_error(minor_status, mech);
} else
status = GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
return(status);
}
return (GSS_S_BAD_MECH);
}
Commit Message: Preserve GSS context on init/accept failure
After gss_init_sec_context() or gss_accept_sec_context() has created a
context, don't delete the mechglue context on failures from subsequent
calls, even if the mechanism deletes the mech-specific context (which
is allowed by RFC 2744 but not preferred). Check for union contexts
with no mechanism context in each GSS function which accepts a
gss_ctx_id_t.
CVE-2017-11462:
RFC 2744 permits a GSS-API implementation to delete an existing
security context on a second or subsequent call to
gss_init_sec_context() or gss_accept_sec_context() if the call results
in an error. This API behavior has been found to be dangerous,
leading to the possibility of memory errors in some callers. For
safety, GSS-API implementations should instead preserve existing
security contexts on error until the caller deletes them.
All versions of MIT krb5 prior to this change may delete acceptor
contexts on error. Versions 1.13.4 through 1.13.7, 1.14.1 through
1.14.5, and 1.15 through 1.15.1 may also delete initiator contexts on
error.
ticket: 8598 (new)
target_version: 1.15-next
target_version: 1.14-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 1
| 168,019
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: ExternalPopupMenuDisplayNoneTest() {}
Commit Message: Fix crashes in RenderFrameImpl::OnSelectPopupMenuItem(s)
ExternalPopupMenu::DidSelectItem(s) can delete the RenderFrameImpl.
We need to reset external_popup_menu_ before calling it.
Bug: 912211
Change-Id: Ia9a628e144464a2ebb14ab77d3a693fd5cead6fc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1381325
Commit-Queue: Kent Tamura <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#618026}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 152,829
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void mct_u232_break_ctl(struct tty_struct *tty, int break_state)
{
struct usb_serial_port *port = tty->driver_data;
struct mct_u232_private *priv = usb_get_serial_port_data(port);
unsigned char lcr;
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->lock, flags);
lcr = priv->last_lcr;
if (break_state)
lcr |= MCT_U232_SET_BREAK;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->lock, flags);
mct_u232_set_line_ctrl(port, lcr);
} /* mct_u232_break_ctl */
Commit Message: USB: mct_u232: add sanity checking in probe
An attack using the lack of sanity checking in probe is known. This
patch checks for the existence of a second port.
CVE-2016-3136
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <[email protected]>
CC: [email protected]
[johan: add error message ]
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 54,254
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void UserCloudPolicyManagerChromeOS::GetChromePolicy(PolicyMap* policy_map) {
CloudPolicyManager::GetChromePolicy(policy_map);
if (store()->has_policy() &&
!policy_map->Get(key::kChromeOsMultiProfileUserBehavior)) {
policy_map->Set(key::kChromeOsMultiProfileUserBehavior,
POLICY_LEVEL_MANDATORY,
POLICY_SCOPE_USER,
new base::StringValue("primary-only"),
NULL);
}
}
Commit Message: Make the policy fetch for first time login blocking
The CL makes policy fetching for first time login blocking for all users, except the ones that are known to be non-enterprise users.
BUG=334584
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/330843002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@282925 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 110,387
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void ChromeContentBrowserClient::BrowserURLHandlerCreated(
BrowserURLHandler* handler) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < extra_parts_.size(); ++i)
extra_parts_[i]->BrowserURLHandlerCreated(handler);
handler->SetFixupHandler(&FixupBrowserAboutURL);
handler->AddHandlerPair(&WillHandleBrowserAboutURL,
BrowserURLHandler::null_handler());
handler->AddHandlerPair(&HandleNewTabPageLocationOverride,
BrowserURLHandler::null_handler());
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
handler->AddHandlerPair(&chrome::android::HandleAndroidNativePageURL,
BrowserURLHandler::null_handler());
#else
handler->AddHandlerPair(&search::HandleNewTabURLRewrite,
&search::HandleNewTabURLReverseRewrite);
#endif
handler->AddHandlerPair(&ChromeContentBrowserClient::HandleWebUI,
&ChromeContentBrowserClient::HandleWebUIReverse);
handler->AddHandlerPair(&HandlePreviewsLitePageURLRewrite,
&HandlePreviewsLitePageURLRewriteReverse);
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 142,601
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: virtual ~TabAnimation() {}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 118,192
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_module_get_algo_key_size)
{
MCRYPT_GET_MODE_DIR_ARGS(algorithms_dir);
RETURN_LONG(mcrypt_module_get_algo_key_size(module, dir));
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 1
| 167,100
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: raptor_rss_emit_connection(raptor_parser* rdf_parser,
raptor_term *subject_identifier,
raptor_uri* predicate_uri, int predicate_ordinal,
raptor_term *object_identifier)
{
raptor_rss_parser* rss_parser = (raptor_rss_parser*)rdf_parser->context;
raptor_uri *puri = NULL;
raptor_term *predicate_term = NULL;
if(!subject_identifier) {
raptor_parser_error(rdf_parser, "Connection subject has no identifier");
return 1;
}
rss_parser->statement.subject = subject_identifier;
if(!predicate_uri) {
/* new URI object */
puri = raptor_new_uri_from_rdf_ordinal(rdf_parser->world, predicate_ordinal);
predicate_uri = puri;
}
predicate_term = raptor_new_term_from_uri(rdf_parser->world,
predicate_uri);
rss_parser->statement.predicate = predicate_term;
rss_parser->statement.object = object_identifier;
/* Generate the statement */
(*rdf_parser->statement_handler)(rdf_parser->user_data,
&rss_parser->statement);
raptor_free_term(predicate_term);
if(puri)
raptor_free_uri(puri);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2012-0037
Enforce entity loading policy in raptor_libxml_resolveEntity
and raptor_libxml_getEntity by checking for file URIs and network URIs.
Add RAPTOR_OPTION_LOAD_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES / loadExternalEntities for
turning on loading of XML external entity loading, disabled by default.
This affects all the parsers that use SAX2: rdfxml, rss-tag-soup (and
aliases) and rdfa.
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 22,035
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int kvm_read_hva_atomic(void *data, void __user *hva, int len)
{
return __copy_from_user_inatomic(data, hva, len);
}
Commit Message: KVM: perform an invalid memslot step for gpa base change
PPC must flush all translations before the new memory slot
is visible.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 29,094
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: crm_element_value_const(const xmlNode * data, const char *name)
{
return crm_element_value((xmlNode *) data, name);
}
Commit Message: Fix: acl: Do not delay evaluation of added nodes in some situations
It is not appropriate when the node has no children as it is not a
placeholder
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 44,018
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void ClientDiscardableSharedMemoryManager::MemoryUsageChanged(
size_t new_bytes_total,
size_t new_bytes_free) const {
static crash_reporter::CrashKeyString<24> discardable_memory_allocated(
"discardable-memory-allocated");
discardable_memory_allocated.Set(base::NumberToString(new_bytes_total));
static crash_reporter::CrashKeyString<24> discardable_memory_free(
"discardable-memory-free");
discardable_memory_free.Set(base::NumberToString(new_bytes_free));
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,033
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: int TabStripGtk::GetAvailableWidthForTabs(TabGtk* last_tab) const {
if (!base::i18n::IsRTL())
return last_tab->x() - bounds_.x() + last_tab->width();
else
return bounds_.width() - last_tab->x();
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 118,084
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<Element> Document::createElementNS(const AtomicString& namespaceURI, const AtomicString& qualifiedName, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
QualifiedName qName(createQualifiedName(namespaceURI, qualifiedName, exceptionState));
if (qName == QualifiedName::null())
return nullptr;
return createElement(qName, false);
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 124,318
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void ReverbConvolverStage::processInBackground(ReverbConvolver* convolver, size_t framesToProcess)
{
ReverbInputBuffer* inputBuffer = convolver->inputBuffer();
float* source = inputBuffer->directReadFrom(&m_inputReadIndex, framesToProcess);
process(source, framesToProcess);
}
Commit Message: Don't read past the end of the impulseResponse array
BUG=281480
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23689004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157007 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 111,696
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void TabStripGtk::ResizeLayoutTabs() {
weak_factory_.InvalidateWeakPtrs();
layout_factory_.InvalidateWeakPtrs();
RemoveMessageLoopObserver();
available_width_for_tabs_ = -1;
int mini_tab_count = GetMiniTabCount();
if (mini_tab_count == GetTabCount()) {
return;
}
TabGtk* first_tab = GetTabAt(mini_tab_count);
double unselected, selected;
GetDesiredTabWidths(GetTabCount(), mini_tab_count, &unselected, &selected);
int w = Round(first_tab->IsActive() ? selected : unselected);
if (abs(first_tab->width() - w) > 1)
StartResizeLayoutAnimation();
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 118,150
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: BackingStore* RenderWidgetHostViewAura::AllocBackingStore(
const gfx::Size& size) {
return new BackingStoreAura(host_, size);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,799
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static bool EnabledInRichlyEditableText(LocalFrame& frame,
Event*,
EditorCommandSource source) {
frame.GetDocument()->UpdateStyleAndLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
if (source == kCommandFromMenuOrKeyBinding &&
!frame.Selection().SelectionHasFocus())
return false;
return !frame.Selection()
.ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTreeDeprecated()
.IsNone() &&
frame.Selection()
.ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTreeDeprecated()
.IsContentRichlyEditable() &&
frame.Selection()
.ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTreeDeprecated()
.RootEditableElement();
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 128,487
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void mcryptd_flusher(struct work_struct *__work)
{
struct mcryptd_alg_cstate *alg_cpu_state;
struct mcryptd_alg_state *alg_state;
struct mcryptd_flush_list *flist;
int cpu;
cpu = smp_processor_id();
alg_cpu_state = container_of(to_delayed_work(__work),
struct mcryptd_alg_cstate, flush);
alg_state = alg_cpu_state->alg_state;
if (alg_cpu_state->cpu != cpu)
pr_debug("mcryptd error: work on cpu %d, should be cpu %d\n",
cpu, alg_cpu_state->cpu);
if (alg_cpu_state->flusher_engaged) {
flist = per_cpu_ptr(mcryptd_flist, cpu);
mutex_lock(&flist->lock);
list_del(&alg_cpu_state->flush_list);
alg_cpu_state->flusher_engaged = false;
mutex_unlock(&flist->lock);
alg_state->flusher(alg_cpu_state);
}
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 45,824
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::willSubmitForm(blink::WebLocalFrame* frame,
const blink::WebFormElement& form) {
DCHECK(!frame_ || frame_ == frame);
DocumentState* document_state =
DocumentState::FromDataSource(frame->provisionalDataSource());
NavigationStateImpl* navigation_state =
static_cast<NavigationStateImpl*>(document_state->navigation_state());
InternalDocumentStateData* internal_data =
InternalDocumentStateData::FromDocumentState(document_state);
if (ui::PageTransitionCoreTypeIs(navigation_state->GetTransitionType(),
ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK)) {
navigation_state->set_transition_type(ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_FORM_SUBMIT);
}
WebSearchableFormData web_searchable_form_data(form);
internal_data->set_searchable_form_url(web_searchable_form_data.url());
internal_data->set_searchable_form_encoding(
web_searchable_form_data.encoding().utf8());
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(RenderFrameObserver, observers_, WillSubmitForm(form));
}
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 123,276
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void GDataFileSystem::UpdateFileByEntryOnUIThread(
const FileOperationCallback& callback,
GDataEntry* entry) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
if (!entry || !entry->AsGDataFile()) {
base::MessageLoopProxy::current()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(callback,
GDATA_FILE_ERROR_NOT_FOUND));
return;
}
GDataFile* file = entry->AsGDataFile();
cache_->GetFileOnUIThread(
file->resource_id(),
file->file_md5(),
base::Bind(&GDataFileSystem::OnGetFileCompleteForUpdateFile,
ui_weak_ptr_,
callback));
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 117,062
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int cryptd_blkcipher_encrypt_enqueue(struct ablkcipher_request *req)
{
return cryptd_blkcipher_enqueue(req, cryptd_blkcipher_encrypt);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 45,642
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void sco_recv_frame(struct sco_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct sock *sk;
sco_conn_lock(conn);
sk = conn->sk;
sco_conn_unlock(conn);
if (!sk)
goto drop;
BT_DBG("sk %p len %d", sk, skb->len);
if (sk->sk_state != BT_CONNECTED)
goto drop;
if (!sock_queue_rcv_skb(sk, skb))
return;
drop:
kfree_skb(skb);
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Validate socket address length in sco_sock_bind().
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 57,355
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::UpdateSubresourceLoaderFactories() {
DCHECK(base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(network::features::kNetworkService));
if (!has_committed_any_navigation_)
return;
DCHECK(!IsOutOfProcessNetworkService() ||
network_service_connection_error_handler_holder_.is_bound());
network::mojom::URLLoaderFactoryPtrInfo default_factory_info;
bool bypass_redirect_checks = false;
if (recreate_default_url_loader_factory_after_network_service_crash_) {
bypass_redirect_checks = CreateNetworkServiceDefaultFactoryAndObserve(
last_committed_origin_, mojo::MakeRequest(&default_factory_info));
}
std::unique_ptr<URLLoaderFactoryBundleInfo> subresource_loader_factories =
std::make_unique<URLLoaderFactoryBundleInfo>(
std::move(default_factory_info),
URLLoaderFactoryBundleInfo::SchemeMap(),
CreateInitiatorSpecificURLLoaderFactories(
initiators_requiring_separate_url_loader_factory_),
bypass_redirect_checks);
GetNavigationControl()->UpdateSubresourceLoaderFactories(
std::move(subresource_loader_factories));
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 153,132
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int tt_s2_4600_frontend_attach(struct dvb_usb_adapter *adap)
{
struct dvb_usb_device *d = adap->dev;
struct dw2102_state *state = d->priv;
u8 obuf[3] = { 0xe, 0x80, 0 };
u8 ibuf[] = { 0 };
struct i2c_adapter *i2c_adapter;
struct i2c_client *client;
struct i2c_board_info board_info;
struct m88ds3103_platform_data m88ds3103_pdata = {};
struct ts2020_config ts2020_config = {};
if (dvb_usb_generic_rw(d, obuf, 3, ibuf, 1, 0) < 0)
err("command 0x0e transfer failed.");
obuf[0] = 0xe;
obuf[1] = 0x02;
obuf[2] = 1;
if (dvb_usb_generic_rw(d, obuf, 3, ibuf, 1, 0) < 0)
err("command 0x0e transfer failed.");
msleep(300);
obuf[0] = 0xe;
obuf[1] = 0x83;
obuf[2] = 0;
if (dvb_usb_generic_rw(d, obuf, 3, ibuf, 1, 0) < 0)
err("command 0x0e transfer failed.");
obuf[0] = 0xe;
obuf[1] = 0x83;
obuf[2] = 1;
if (dvb_usb_generic_rw(d, obuf, 3, ibuf, 1, 0) < 0)
err("command 0x0e transfer failed.");
obuf[0] = 0x51;
if (dvb_usb_generic_rw(d, obuf, 1, ibuf, 1, 0) < 0)
err("command 0x51 transfer failed.");
/* attach demod */
m88ds3103_pdata.clk = 27000000;
m88ds3103_pdata.i2c_wr_max = 33;
m88ds3103_pdata.ts_mode = M88DS3103_TS_CI;
m88ds3103_pdata.ts_clk = 16000;
m88ds3103_pdata.ts_clk_pol = 0;
m88ds3103_pdata.spec_inv = 0;
m88ds3103_pdata.agc = 0x99;
m88ds3103_pdata.agc_inv = 0;
m88ds3103_pdata.clk_out = M88DS3103_CLOCK_OUT_ENABLED;
m88ds3103_pdata.envelope_mode = 0;
m88ds3103_pdata.lnb_hv_pol = 1;
m88ds3103_pdata.lnb_en_pol = 0;
memset(&board_info, 0, sizeof(board_info));
strlcpy(board_info.type, "m88ds3103", I2C_NAME_SIZE);
board_info.addr = 0x68;
board_info.platform_data = &m88ds3103_pdata;
request_module("m88ds3103");
client = i2c_new_device(&d->i2c_adap, &board_info);
if (client == NULL || client->dev.driver == NULL)
return -ENODEV;
if (!try_module_get(client->dev.driver->owner)) {
i2c_unregister_device(client);
return -ENODEV;
}
adap->fe_adap[0].fe = m88ds3103_pdata.get_dvb_frontend(client);
i2c_adapter = m88ds3103_pdata.get_i2c_adapter(client);
state->i2c_client_demod = client;
/* attach tuner */
ts2020_config.fe = adap->fe_adap[0].fe;
memset(&board_info, 0, sizeof(board_info));
strlcpy(board_info.type, "ts2022", I2C_NAME_SIZE);
board_info.addr = 0x60;
board_info.platform_data = &ts2020_config;
request_module("ts2020");
client = i2c_new_device(i2c_adapter, &board_info);
if (client == NULL || client->dev.driver == NULL) {
dvb_frontend_detach(adap->fe_adap[0].fe);
return -ENODEV;
}
if (!try_module_get(client->dev.driver->owner)) {
i2c_unregister_device(client);
dvb_frontend_detach(adap->fe_adap[0].fe);
return -ENODEV;
}
/* delegate signal strength measurement to tuner */
adap->fe_adap[0].fe->ops.read_signal_strength =
adap->fe_adap[0].fe->ops.tuner_ops.get_rf_strength;
state->i2c_client_tuner = client;
/* hook fe: need to resync the slave fifo when signal locks */
state->fe_read_status = adap->fe_adap[0].fe->ops.read_status;
adap->fe_adap[0].fe->ops.read_status = tt_s2_4600_read_status;
state->last_lock = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [media] dw2102: don't do DMA on stack
On Kernel 4.9, WARNINGs about doing DMA on stack are hit at
the dw2102 driver: one in su3000_power_ctrl() and the other in tt_s2_4600_frontend_attach().
Both were due to the use of buffers on the stack as parameters to
dvb_usb_generic_rw() and the resulting attempt to do DMA with them.
The device was non-functional as a result.
So, switch this driver over to use a buffer within the device state
structure, as has been done with other DVB-USB drivers.
Tested with TechnoTrend TT-connect S2-4600.
[[email protected]: fixed a warning at su3000_i2c_transfer() that
state var were dereferenced before check 'd']
Signed-off-by: Jonathan McDowell <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 168,229
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: LayerTreeHostTestElasticOverscroll()
: scroll_elasticity_helper_(nullptr), num_draws_(0) {}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
[email protected], [email protected]
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 137,434
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static UINT dvcman_load_addin(drdynvcPlugin* drdynvc,
IWTSVirtualChannelManager* pChannelMgr,
ADDIN_ARGV* args,
rdpSettings* settings)
{
DVCMAN_ENTRY_POINTS entryPoints;
PDVC_PLUGIN_ENTRY pDVCPluginEntry = NULL;
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_INFO, "Loading Dynamic Virtual Channel %s", args->argv[0]);
pDVCPluginEntry = (PDVC_PLUGIN_ENTRY) freerdp_load_channel_addin_entry(
args->argv[0],
NULL, NULL, FREERDP_ADDIN_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC);
if (pDVCPluginEntry)
{
entryPoints.iface.RegisterPlugin = dvcman_register_plugin;
entryPoints.iface.GetPlugin = dvcman_get_plugin;
entryPoints.iface.GetPluginData = dvcman_get_plugin_data;
entryPoints.iface.GetRdpSettings = dvcman_get_rdp_settings;
entryPoints.dvcman = (DVCMAN*) pChannelMgr;
entryPoints.args = args;
entryPoints.settings = settings;
return pDVCPluginEntry((IDRDYNVC_ENTRY_POINTS*) &entryPoints);
}
return ERROR_INVALID_FUNCTION;
}
Commit Message: Fix for #4866: Added additional length checks
CWE ID:
| 0
| 74,984
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: BordersTest() : EncoderTest(GET_PARAM(0)) {}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 164,367
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: spnego_gss_pseudo_random(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t context,
int prf_key,
const gss_buffer_t prf_in,
ssize_t desired_output_len,
gss_buffer_t prf_out)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
ret = gss_pseudo_random(minor_status,
context,
prf_key,
prf_in,
desired_output_len,
prf_out);
return (ret);
}
Commit Message: Fix null deref in SPNEGO acceptor [CVE-2014-4344]
When processing a continuation token, acc_ctx_cont was dereferencing
the initial byte of the token without checking the length. This could
result in a null dereference.
CVE-2014-4344:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and newer, an unauthenticated or partially
authenticated remote attacker can cause a NULL dereference and
application crash during a SPNEGO negotiation by sending an empty
token as the second or later context token from initiator to acceptor.
The attacker must provide at least one valid context token in the
security context negotiation before sending the empty token. This can
be done by an unauthenticated attacker by forcing SPNEGO to
renegotiate the underlying mechanism, or by using IAKERB to wrap an
unauthenticated AS-REQ as the first token.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[[email protected]: CVE summary, CVSSv2 vector]
(cherry picked from commit 524688ce87a15fc75f87efc8c039ba4c7d5c197b)
ticket: 7970
version_fixed: 1.12.2
status: resolved
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 36,768
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void RenderViewImpl::PluginFocusChanged(bool focused, int plugin_id) {
IPC::Message* msg = new ViewHostMsg_PluginFocusChanged(routing_id(),
focused, plugin_id);
Send(msg);
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 108,398
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int ext4_show_options(struct seq_file *seq, struct vfsmount *vfs)
{
int def_errors;
unsigned long def_mount_opts;
struct super_block *sb = vfs->mnt_sb;
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
struct ext4_super_block *es = sbi->s_es;
def_mount_opts = le32_to_cpu(es->s_default_mount_opts);
def_errors = le16_to_cpu(es->s_errors);
if (sbi->s_sb_block != 1)
seq_printf(seq, ",sb=%llu", sbi->s_sb_block);
if (test_opt(sb, MINIX_DF))
seq_puts(seq, ",minixdf");
if (test_opt(sb, GRPID) && !(def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_BSDGROUPS))
seq_puts(seq, ",grpid");
if (!test_opt(sb, GRPID) && (def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_BSDGROUPS))
seq_puts(seq, ",nogrpid");
if (sbi->s_resuid != EXT4_DEF_RESUID ||
le16_to_cpu(es->s_def_resuid) != EXT4_DEF_RESUID) {
seq_printf(seq, ",resuid=%u", sbi->s_resuid);
}
if (sbi->s_resgid != EXT4_DEF_RESGID ||
le16_to_cpu(es->s_def_resgid) != EXT4_DEF_RESGID) {
seq_printf(seq, ",resgid=%u", sbi->s_resgid);
}
if (test_opt(sb, ERRORS_RO)) {
if (def_errors == EXT4_ERRORS_PANIC ||
def_errors == EXT4_ERRORS_CONTINUE) {
seq_puts(seq, ",errors=remount-ro");
}
}
if (test_opt(sb, ERRORS_CONT) && def_errors != EXT4_ERRORS_CONTINUE)
seq_puts(seq, ",errors=continue");
if (test_opt(sb, ERRORS_PANIC) && def_errors != EXT4_ERRORS_PANIC)
seq_puts(seq, ",errors=panic");
if (test_opt(sb, NO_UID32) && !(def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_UID16))
seq_puts(seq, ",nouid32");
if (test_opt(sb, DEBUG) && !(def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_DEBUG))
seq_puts(seq, ",debug");
#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_XATTR
if (test_opt(sb, XATTR_USER))
seq_puts(seq, ",user_xattr");
if (!test_opt(sb, XATTR_USER))
seq_puts(seq, ",nouser_xattr");
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_POSIX_ACL
if (test_opt(sb, POSIX_ACL) && !(def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_ACL))
seq_puts(seq, ",acl");
if (!test_opt(sb, POSIX_ACL) && (def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_ACL))
seq_puts(seq, ",noacl");
#endif
if (sbi->s_commit_interval != JBD2_DEFAULT_MAX_COMMIT_AGE*HZ) {
seq_printf(seq, ",commit=%u",
(unsigned) (sbi->s_commit_interval / HZ));
}
if (sbi->s_min_batch_time != EXT4_DEF_MIN_BATCH_TIME) {
seq_printf(seq, ",min_batch_time=%u",
(unsigned) sbi->s_min_batch_time);
}
if (sbi->s_max_batch_time != EXT4_DEF_MAX_BATCH_TIME) {
seq_printf(seq, ",max_batch_time=%u",
(unsigned) sbi->s_max_batch_time);
}
/*
* We're changing the default of barrier mount option, so
* let's always display its mount state so it's clear what its
* status is.
*/
seq_puts(seq, ",barrier=");
seq_puts(seq, test_opt(sb, BARRIER) ? "1" : "0");
if (test_opt(sb, JOURNAL_ASYNC_COMMIT))
seq_puts(seq, ",journal_async_commit");
else if (test_opt(sb, JOURNAL_CHECKSUM))
seq_puts(seq, ",journal_checksum");
if (test_opt(sb, I_VERSION))
seq_puts(seq, ",i_version");
if (!test_opt(sb, DELALLOC) &&
!(def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_NODELALLOC))
seq_puts(seq, ",nodelalloc");
if (!test_opt(sb, MBLK_IO_SUBMIT))
seq_puts(seq, ",nomblk_io_submit");
if (sbi->s_stripe)
seq_printf(seq, ",stripe=%lu", sbi->s_stripe);
/*
* journal mode get enabled in different ways
* So just print the value even if we didn't specify it
*/
if (test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS) == EXT4_MOUNT_JOURNAL_DATA)
seq_puts(seq, ",data=journal");
else if (test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS) == EXT4_MOUNT_ORDERED_DATA)
seq_puts(seq, ",data=ordered");
else if (test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS) == EXT4_MOUNT_WRITEBACK_DATA)
seq_puts(seq, ",data=writeback");
if (sbi->s_inode_readahead_blks != EXT4_DEF_INODE_READAHEAD_BLKS)
seq_printf(seq, ",inode_readahead_blks=%u",
sbi->s_inode_readahead_blks);
if (test_opt(sb, DATA_ERR_ABORT))
seq_puts(seq, ",data_err=abort");
if (test_opt(sb, NO_AUTO_DA_ALLOC))
seq_puts(seq, ",noauto_da_alloc");
if (test_opt(sb, DISCARD) && !(def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_DISCARD))
seq_puts(seq, ",discard");
if (test_opt(sb, NOLOAD))
seq_puts(seq, ",norecovery");
if (test_opt(sb, DIOREAD_NOLOCK))
seq_puts(seq, ",dioread_nolock");
if (test_opt(sb, BLOCK_VALIDITY) &&
!(def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_BLOCK_VALIDITY))
seq_puts(seq, ",block_validity");
if (!test_opt(sb, INIT_INODE_TABLE))
seq_puts(seq, ",noinit_itable");
else if (sbi->s_li_wait_mult != EXT4_DEF_LI_WAIT_MULT)
seq_printf(seq, ",init_itable=%u",
(unsigned) sbi->s_li_wait_mult);
ext4_show_quota_options(seq, sb);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix undefined behavior in ext4_fill_flex_info()
Commit 503358ae01b70ce6909d19dd01287093f6b6271c ("ext4: avoid divide by
zero when trying to mount a corrupted file system") fixes CVE-2009-4307
by performing a sanity check on s_log_groups_per_flex, since it can be
set to a bogus value by an attacker.
sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex = sbi->s_es->s_log_groups_per_flex;
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex < 2) { ... }
This patch fixes two potential issues in the previous commit.
1) The sanity check might only work on architectures like PowerPC.
On x86, 5 bits are used for the shifting amount. That means, given a
large s_log_groups_per_flex value like 36, groups_per_flex = 1 << 36
is essentially 1 << 4 = 16, rather than 0. This will bypass the check,
leaving s_log_groups_per_flex and groups_per_flex inconsistent.
2) The sanity check relies on undefined behavior, i.e., oversized shift.
A standard-confirming C compiler could rewrite the check in unexpected
ways. Consider the following equivalent form, assuming groups_per_flex
is unsigned for simplicity.
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex == 0 || groups_per_flex == 1) {
We compile the code snippet using Clang 3.0 and GCC 4.6. Clang will
completely optimize away the check groups_per_flex == 0, leaving the
patched code as vulnerable as the original. GCC keeps the check, but
there is no guarantee that future versions will do the same.
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 20,526
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void __fuse_get_request(struct fuse_req *req)
{
atomic_inc(&req->count);
}
Commit Message: fuse: check size of FUSE_NOTIFY_INVAL_ENTRY message
FUSE_NOTIFY_INVAL_ENTRY didn't check the length of the write so the
message processing could overrun and result in a "kernel BUG at
fs/fuse/dev.c:629!"
Reported-by: Han-Wen Nienhuys <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]>
CC: [email protected]
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 24,582
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void WebPagePrivate::zoomBlock()
{
if (!m_mainFrame)
return;
IntPoint anchor(roundUntransformedPoint(m_finalBlockPoint));
bool willUseTextReflow = false;
#if ENABLE(VIEWPORT_REFLOW)
willUseTextReflow = m_webPage->settings()->textReflowMode() != WebSettings::TextReflowDisabled;
toggleTextReflowIfEnabledForBlockZoomOnly(m_shouldReflowBlock);
setNeedsLayout();
#endif
TransformationMatrix zoom;
zoom.scale(m_blockZoomFinalScale);
*m_transformationMatrix = zoom;
m_backingStore->d->suspendBackingStoreUpdates();
m_backingStore->d->suspendScreenUpdates();
updateViewportSize();
FrameView* mainFrameView = m_mainFrame->view();
bool constrainsScrollingToContentEdge = true;
if (mainFrameView) {
constrainsScrollingToContentEdge = mainFrameView->constrainsScrollingToContentEdge();
mainFrameView->setConstrainsScrollingToContentEdge(m_shouldConstrainScrollingToContentEdge);
}
#if ENABLE(VIEWPORT_REFLOW)
requestLayoutIfNeeded();
if (willUseTextReflow && m_shouldReflowBlock) {
IntRect reflowedRect = rectForNode(m_currentBlockZoomAdjustedNode.get());
reflowedRect = adjustRectOffsetForFrameOffset(reflowedRect, m_currentBlockZoomAdjustedNode.get());
reflowedRect.move(roundTransformedPoint(m_finalBlockPointReflowOffset).x(), roundTransformedPoint(m_finalBlockPointReflowOffset).y());
RenderObject* renderer = m_currentBlockZoomAdjustedNode->renderer();
IntPoint topLeftPoint(reflowedRect.location());
if (renderer && renderer->isText()) {
ETextAlign textAlign = renderer->style()->textAlign();
IntPoint textAnchor;
switch (textAlign) {
case CENTER:
case WEBKIT_CENTER:
textAnchor = IntPoint(reflowedRect.x() + (reflowedRect.width() - actualVisibleSize().width()) / 2, topLeftPoint.y());
break;
case LEFT:
case WEBKIT_LEFT:
textAnchor = topLeftPoint;
break;
case RIGHT:
case WEBKIT_RIGHT:
textAnchor = IntPoint(reflowedRect.x() + reflowedRect.width() - actualVisibleSize().width(), topLeftPoint.y());
break;
case TAAUTO:
case JUSTIFY:
default:
if (renderer->style()->isLeftToRightDirection())
textAnchor = topLeftPoint;
else
textAnchor = IntPoint(reflowedRect.x() + reflowedRect.width() - actualVisibleSize().width(), topLeftPoint.y());
break;
}
setScrollPosition(textAnchor);
} else {
renderer->style()->isLeftToRightDirection()
? setScrollPosition(topLeftPoint)
: setScrollPosition(IntPoint(reflowedRect.x() + reflowedRect.width() - actualVisibleSize().width(), topLeftPoint.y()));
}
} else if (willUseTextReflow) {
IntRect finalRect = rectForNode(m_currentBlockZoomAdjustedNode.get());
finalRect = adjustRectOffsetForFrameOffset(finalRect, m_currentBlockZoomAdjustedNode.get());
setScrollPosition(IntPoint(0, finalRect.y() + m_finalBlockPointReflowOffset.y()));
resetBlockZoom();
}
#endif
if (!willUseTextReflow) {
setScrollPosition(anchor);
if (!m_shouldReflowBlock)
resetBlockZoom();
}
notifyTransformChanged();
m_client->scaleChanged();
if (mainFrameView)
mainFrameView->setConstrainsScrollingToContentEdge(constrainsScrollingToContentEdge);
m_backingStore->d->resumeBackingStoreUpdates();
m_backingStore->d->resumeScreenUpdates(BackingStore::RenderAndBlit);
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,483
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::HoldReferenceToDrawingBuffer(DrawingBuffer*) {
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 142,266
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static inline int ext4_ext_space_root_idx(struct inode *inode, int check)
{
int size;
size = sizeof(EXT4_I(inode)->i_data);
size -= sizeof(struct ext4_extent_header);
size /= sizeof(struct ext4_extent_idx);
if (!check) {
#ifdef AGGRESSIVE_TEST
if (size > 4)
size = 4;
#endif
}
return size;
}
Commit Message: ext4: reimplement convert and split_unwritten
Reimplement ext4_ext_convert_to_initialized() and
ext4_split_unwritten_extents() using ext4_split_extent()
Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Yang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Allison Henderson <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 34,768
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: int fb_prepare_logo(struct fb_info *info, int rotate)
{
int depth = fb_get_color_depth(&info->var, &info->fix);
unsigned int yres;
memset(&fb_logo, 0, sizeof(struct logo_data));
if (info->flags & FBINFO_MISC_TILEBLITTING ||
info->flags & FBINFO_MODULE)
return 0;
if (info->fix.visual == FB_VISUAL_DIRECTCOLOR) {
depth = info->var.blue.length;
if (info->var.red.length < depth)
depth = info->var.red.length;
if (info->var.green.length < depth)
depth = info->var.green.length;
}
if (info->fix.visual == FB_VISUAL_STATIC_PSEUDOCOLOR && depth > 4) {
/* assume console colormap */
depth = 4;
}
/* Return if no suitable logo was found */
fb_logo.logo = fb_find_logo(depth);
if (!fb_logo.logo) {
return 0;
}
if (rotate == FB_ROTATE_UR || rotate == FB_ROTATE_UD)
yres = info->var.yres;
else
yres = info->var.xres;
if (fb_logo.logo->height > yres) {
fb_logo.logo = NULL;
return 0;
}
/* What depth we asked for might be different from what we get */
if (fb_logo.logo->type == LINUX_LOGO_CLUT224)
fb_logo.depth = 8;
else if (fb_logo.logo->type == LINUX_LOGO_VGA16)
fb_logo.depth = 4;
else
fb_logo.depth = 1;
if (fb_logo.depth > 4 && depth > 4) {
switch (info->fix.visual) {
case FB_VISUAL_TRUECOLOR:
fb_logo.needs_truepalette = 1;
break;
case FB_VISUAL_DIRECTCOLOR:
fb_logo.needs_directpalette = 1;
fb_logo.needs_cmapreset = 1;
break;
case FB_VISUAL_PSEUDOCOLOR:
fb_logo.needs_cmapreset = 1;
break;
}
}
return fb_prepare_extra_logos(info, fb_logo.logo->height, yres);
}
Commit Message: vm: convert fb_mmap to vm_iomap_memory() helper
This is my example conversion of a few existing mmap users. The
fb_mmap() case is a good example because it is a bit more complicated
than some: fb_mmap() mmaps one of two different memory areas depending
on the page offset of the mmap (but happily there is never any mixing of
the two, so the helper function still works).
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 31,141
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void MockNetworkLayer::SetClock(base::Clock* clock) {
DCHECK(!clock_);
clock_ = clock;
}
Commit Message: Replace fixed string uses of AddHeaderFromString
Uses of AddHeaderFromString() with a static string may as well be
replaced with SetHeader(). Do so.
BUG=None
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2236933005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#418161}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 119,347
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: evutil_found_ifaddr(const struct sockaddr *sa)
{
const char ZEROES[] = "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00";
if (sa->sa_family == AF_INET) {
const struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa;
ev_uint32_t addr = ntohl(sin->sin_addr.s_addr);
if (addr == 0 ||
EVUTIL_V4ADDR_IS_LOCALHOST(addr) ||
EVUTIL_V4ADDR_IS_CLASSD(addr)) {
/* Not actually a usable external address. */
} else {
event_debug(("Detected an IPv4 interface"));
had_ipv4_address = 1;
}
} else if (sa->sa_family == AF_INET6) {
const struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa;
const unsigned char *addr =
(unsigned char*)sin6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
if (!memcmp(addr, ZEROES, 8) ||
((addr[0] & 0xfe) == 0xfc) ||
(addr[0] == 0xfe && (addr[1] & 0xc0) == 0x80) ||
(addr[0] == 0xfe && (addr[1] & 0xc0) == 0xc0) ||
(addr[0] == 0xff)) {
/* This is a reserved, ipv4compat, ipv4map, loopback,
* link-local, multicast, or unspecified address. */
} else {
event_debug(("Detected an IPv6 interface"));
had_ipv6_address = 1;
}
}
}
Commit Message: evutil_parse_sockaddr_port(): fix buffer overflow
@asn-the-goblin-slayer:
"Length between '[' and ']' is cast to signed 32 bit integer on line 1815. Is
the length is more than 2<<31 (INT_MAX), len will hold a negative value.
Consequently, it will pass the check at line 1816. Segfault happens at line
1819.
Generate a resolv.conf with generate-resolv.conf, then compile and run
poc.c. See entry-functions.txt for functions in tor that might be
vulnerable.
Please credit 'Guido Vranken' for this discovery through the Tor bug bounty
program."
Reproducer for gdb (https://gist.github.com/azat/be2b0d5e9417ba0dfe2c):
start
p (1ULL<<31)+1ULL
# $1 = 2147483649
p malloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr))
# $2 = (void *) 0x646010
p malloc(sizeof(int))
# $3 = (void *) 0x646030
p malloc($1)
# $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
p memset($4, 1, $1)
# $5 = 1990369296
p (char *)$4
# $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
set $6[0]='['
set $6[$1]=']'
p evutil_parse_sockaddr_port($4, $2, $3)
# $7 = -1
Before:
$ gdb bin/http-connect < gdb
(gdb) $1 = 2147483649
(gdb) (gdb) $2 = (void *) 0x646010
(gdb) (gdb) $3 = (void *) 0x646030
(gdb) (gdb) $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
(gdb) (gdb) $5 = 1990369296
(gdb) (gdb) $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
(gdb) (gdb) (gdb) (gdb)
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
__memcpy_sse2_unaligned () at memcpy-sse2-unaligned.S:36
After:
$ gdb bin/http-connect < gdb
(gdb) $1 = 2147483649
(gdb) (gdb) $2 = (void *) 0x646010
(gdb) (gdb) $3 = (void *) 0x646030
(gdb) (gdb) $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
(gdb) (gdb) $5 = 1990369296
(gdb) (gdb) $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
(gdb) (gdb) (gdb) (gdb) $7 = -1
(gdb) (gdb) quit
Fixes: #318
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 70,725
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void dynamicPutchar(struct gdIOCtx *ctx, int a)
{
unsigned char b;
dpIOCtxPtr dctx;
b = a;
dctx = (dpIOCtxPtr) ctx;
appendDynamic(dctx->dp, &b, 1);
}
Commit Message: Avoid potentially dangerous signed to unsigned conversion
We make sure to never pass a negative `rlen` as size to memcpy(). See
also <https://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=73280>.
Patch provided by Emmanuel Law.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 73,248
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: MagickExport Image *CloneImage(const Image *image,const size_t columns,
const size_t rows,const MagickBooleanType detach,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*clone_image;
double
scale;
size_t
length;
/*
Clone the image.
*/
assert(image != (const Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),CorruptImageError,
"NegativeOrZeroImageSize","`%s'",image->filename);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
clone_image=(Image *) AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(*clone_image));
if (clone_image == (Image *) NULL)
ThrowImageException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) ResetMagickMemory(clone_image,0,sizeof(*clone_image));
clone_image->signature=MagickCoreSignature;
clone_image->storage_class=image->storage_class;
clone_image->number_channels=image->number_channels;
clone_image->number_meta_channels=image->number_meta_channels;
clone_image->metacontent_extent=image->metacontent_extent;
clone_image->colorspace=image->colorspace;
clone_image->read_mask=image->read_mask;
clone_image->write_mask=image->write_mask;
clone_image->alpha_trait=image->alpha_trait;
clone_image->columns=image->columns;
clone_image->rows=image->rows;
clone_image->dither=image->dither;
if (image->colormap != (PixelInfo *) NULL)
{
/*
Allocate and copy the image colormap.
*/
clone_image->colors=image->colors;
length=(size_t) image->colors;
clone_image->colormap=(PixelInfo *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,
sizeof(*clone_image->colormap));
if (clone_image->colormap == (PixelInfo *) NULL)
ThrowImageException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) CopyMagickMemory(clone_image->colormap,image->colormap,length*
sizeof(*clone_image->colormap));
}
clone_image->image_info=CloneImageInfo(image->image_info);
(void) CloneImageProfiles(clone_image,image);
(void) CloneImageProperties(clone_image,image);
(void) CloneImageArtifacts(clone_image,image);
GetTimerInfo(&clone_image->timer);
if (image->ascii85 != (void *) NULL)
Ascii85Initialize(clone_image);
clone_image->magick_columns=image->magick_columns;
clone_image->magick_rows=image->magick_rows;
clone_image->type=image->type;
clone_image->channel_mask=image->channel_mask;
clone_image->channel_map=ClonePixelChannelMap(image->channel_map);
(void) CopyMagickString(clone_image->magick_filename,image->magick_filename,
MagickPathExtent);
(void) CopyMagickString(clone_image->magick,image->magick,MagickPathExtent);
(void) CopyMagickString(clone_image->filename,image->filename,
MagickPathExtent);
clone_image->progress_monitor=image->progress_monitor;
clone_image->client_data=image->client_data;
clone_image->reference_count=1;
clone_image->next=image->next;
clone_image->previous=image->previous;
clone_image->list=NewImageList();
if (detach == MagickFalse)
clone_image->blob=ReferenceBlob(image->blob);
else
{
clone_image->next=NewImageList();
clone_image->previous=NewImageList();
clone_image->blob=CloneBlobInfo((BlobInfo *) NULL);
}
clone_image->ping=image->ping;
clone_image->debug=IsEventLogging();
clone_image->semaphore=AcquireSemaphoreInfo();
if ((columns == 0) || (rows == 0))
{
if (image->montage != (char *) NULL)
(void) CloneString(&clone_image->montage,image->montage);
if (image->directory != (char *) NULL)
(void) CloneString(&clone_image->directory,image->directory);
clone_image->cache=ReferencePixelCache(image->cache);
return(clone_image);
}
scale=1.0;
if (image->columns != 0)
scale=(double) columns/(double) image->columns;
clone_image->page.width=(size_t) floor(scale*image->page.width+0.5);
clone_image->page.x=(ssize_t) ceil(scale*image->page.x-0.5);
clone_image->tile_offset.x=(ssize_t) ceil(scale*image->tile_offset.x-0.5);
scale=1.0;
if (image->rows != 0)
scale=(double) rows/(double) image->rows;
clone_image->page.height=(size_t) floor(scale*image->page.height+0.5);
clone_image->page.y=(ssize_t) ceil(scale*image->page.y-0.5);
clone_image->tile_offset.y=(ssize_t) ceil(scale*image->tile_offset.y-0.5);
clone_image->columns=columns;
clone_image->rows=rows;
clone_image->cache=ClonePixelCache(image->cache);
return(clone_image);
}
Commit Message: Set pixel cache to undefined if any resource limit is exceeded
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 169,960
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: circle_draw( FT_F26Dot6 center_x,
FT_F26Dot6 center_y,
FT_F26Dot6 radius,
FTDemo_Handle* handle,
FTDemo_Display* display,
grColor color )
{
FT_Outline outline;
ft_outline_new_circle( &outline, radius, handle );
FT_Outline_Translate( &outline, center_x & 63, center_y & 63 );
ft_outline_draw( &outline, 1., (center_x >> 6), (center_y >> 6), handle, display, color );
FT_Outline_Done( handle->library, &outline );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,008
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: xmlNormalizeURIPath(char *path) {
char *cur, *out;
if (path == NULL)
return(-1);
/* Skip all initial "/" chars. We want to get to the beginning of the
* first non-empty segment.
*/
cur = path;
while (cur[0] == '/')
++cur;
if (cur[0] == '\0')
return(0);
/* Keep everything we've seen so far. */
out = cur;
/*
* Analyze each segment in sequence for cases (c) and (d).
*/
while (cur[0] != '\0') {
/*
* c) All occurrences of "./", where "." is a complete path segment,
* are removed from the buffer string.
*/
if ((cur[0] == '.') && (cur[1] == '/')) {
cur += 2;
/* '//' normalization should be done at this point too */
while (cur[0] == '/')
cur++;
continue;
}
/*
* d) If the buffer string ends with "." as a complete path segment,
* that "." is removed.
*/
if ((cur[0] == '.') && (cur[1] == '\0'))
break;
/* Otherwise keep the segment. */
while (cur[0] != '/') {
if (cur[0] == '\0')
goto done_cd;
(out++)[0] = (cur++)[0];
}
/* nomalize // */
while ((cur[0] == '/') && (cur[1] == '/'))
cur++;
(out++)[0] = (cur++)[0];
}
done_cd:
out[0] = '\0';
/* Reset to the beginning of the first segment for the next sequence. */
cur = path;
while (cur[0] == '/')
++cur;
if (cur[0] == '\0')
return(0);
/*
* Analyze each segment in sequence for cases (e) and (f).
*
* e) All occurrences of "<segment>/../", where <segment> is a
* complete path segment not equal to "..", are removed from the
* buffer string. Removal of these path segments is performed
* iteratively, removing the leftmost matching pattern on each
* iteration, until no matching pattern remains.
*
* f) If the buffer string ends with "<segment>/..", where <segment>
* is a complete path segment not equal to "..", that
* "<segment>/.." is removed.
*
* To satisfy the "iterative" clause in (e), we need to collapse the
* string every time we find something that needs to be removed. Thus,
* we don't need to keep two pointers into the string: we only need a
* "current position" pointer.
*/
while (1) {
char *segp, *tmp;
/* At the beginning of each iteration of this loop, "cur" points to
* the first character of the segment we want to examine.
*/
/* Find the end of the current segment. */
segp = cur;
while ((segp[0] != '/') && (segp[0] != '\0'))
++segp;
/* If this is the last segment, we're done (we need at least two
* segments to meet the criteria for the (e) and (f) cases).
*/
if (segp[0] == '\0')
break;
/* If the first segment is "..", or if the next segment _isn't_ "..",
* keep this segment and try the next one.
*/
++segp;
if (((cur[0] == '.') && (cur[1] == '.') && (segp == cur+3))
|| ((segp[0] != '.') || (segp[1] != '.')
|| ((segp[2] != '/') && (segp[2] != '\0')))) {
cur = segp;
continue;
}
/* If we get here, remove this segment and the next one and back up
* to the previous segment (if there is one), to implement the
* "iteratively" clause. It's pretty much impossible to back up
* while maintaining two pointers into the buffer, so just compact
* the whole buffer now.
*/
/* If this is the end of the buffer, we're done. */
if (segp[2] == '\0') {
cur[0] = '\0';
break;
}
/* Valgrind complained, strcpy(cur, segp + 3); */
/* string will overlap, do not use strcpy */
tmp = cur;
segp += 3;
while ((*tmp++ = *segp++) != 0)
;
/* If there are no previous segments, then keep going from here. */
segp = cur;
while ((segp > path) && ((--segp)[0] == '/'))
;
if (segp == path)
continue;
/* "segp" is pointing to the end of a previous segment; find it's
* start. We need to back up to the previous segment and start
* over with that to handle things like "foo/bar/../..". If we
* don't do this, then on the first pass we'll remove the "bar/..",
* but be pointing at the second ".." so we won't realize we can also
* remove the "foo/..".
*/
cur = segp;
while ((cur > path) && (cur[-1] != '/'))
--cur;
}
out[0] = '\0';
/*
* g) If the resulting buffer string still begins with one or more
* complete path segments of "..", then the reference is
* considered to be in error. Implementations may handle this
* error by retaining these components in the resolved path (i.e.,
* treating them as part of the final URI), by removing them from
* the resolved path (i.e., discarding relative levels above the
* root), or by avoiding traversal of the reference.
*
* We discard them from the final path.
*/
if (path[0] == '/') {
cur = path;
while ((cur[0] == '/') && (cur[1] == '.') && (cur[2] == '.')
&& ((cur[3] == '/') || (cur[3] == '\0')))
cur += 3;
if (cur != path) {
out = path;
while (cur[0] != '\0')
(out++)[0] = (cur++)[0];
out[0] = 0;
}
}
return(0);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Use correct limit for port values
no upstream report yet, add it here when we have it
issue found & patch by nmehta@
Bug: 36555370
Change-Id: Ibf1efea554b95f514e23e939363d608021de4614
(cherry picked from commit b62884fb49fe92081e414966d9b5fe58250ae53c)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 163,342
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void RenderingHelper::CreateTexture(int window_id, GLuint* texture_id,
base::WaitableEvent* done) {
if (MessageLoop::current() != message_loop_) {
message_loop_->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&RenderingHelper::CreateTexture, base::Unretained(this),
window_id, texture_id, done));
return;
}
CHECK(eglMakeCurrent(egl_display_, egl_surfaces_[window_id],
egl_surfaces_[window_id], egl_context_))
<< eglGetError();
glGenTextures(1, texture_id);
glBindTexture(GL_TEXTURE_2D, *texture_id);
glTexImage2D(GL_TEXTURE_2D, 0, GL_RGBA, width_, height_, 0, GL_RGBA,
GL_UNSIGNED_BYTE, NULL);
glTexParameteri(GL_TEXTURE_2D, GL_TEXTURE_MIN_FILTER, GL_LINEAR);
glTexParameteri(GL_TEXTURE_2D, GL_TEXTURE_MAG_FILTER, GL_LINEAR);
glTexParameteri(GL_TEXTURE_2D, GL_TEXTURE_WRAP_S, GL_CLAMP_TO_EDGE);
glTexParameteri(GL_TEXTURE_2D, GL_TEXTURE_WRAP_T, GL_CLAMP_TO_EDGE);
CHECK_EQ(static_cast<int>(glGetError()), GL_NO_ERROR);
CHECK(texture_id_to_surface_index_.insert(
std::make_pair(*texture_id, window_id)).second);
done->Signal();
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 106,962
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static unsigned int bt_unused_tags(struct blk_mq_bitmap_tags *bt)
{
unsigned int i, used;
for (i = 0, used = 0; i < bt->map_nr; i++) {
struct blk_align_bitmap *bm = &bt->map[i];
used += bitmap_weight(&bm->word, bm->depth);
}
return bt->depth - used;
}
Commit Message: blk-mq: fix race between timeout and freeing request
Inside timeout handler, blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is called
to retrieve the request from one tag. This way is obviously
wrong because the request can be freed any time and some
fiedds of the request can't be trusted, then kernel oops
might be triggered[1].
Currently wrt. blk_mq_tag_to_rq(), the only special case is
that the flush request can share same tag with the request
cloned from, and the two requests can't be active at the same
time, so this patch fixes the above issue by updating tags->rqs[tag]
with the active request(either flush rq or the request cloned
from) of the tag.
Also blk_mq_tag_to_rq() gets much simplified with this patch.
Given blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is mainly for drivers and the caller must
make sure the request can't be freed, so in bt_for_each() this
helper is replaced with tags->rqs[tag].
[1] kernel oops log
[ 439.696220] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.697162] IP: [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.700653] PGD 7ef765067 PUD 7ef764067 PMD 0 ^M
[ 439.700653] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC ^M
[ 439.700653] Dumping ftrace buffer:^M
[ 439.700653] (ftrace buffer empty)^M
[ 439.700653] Modules linked in: nbd ipv6 kvm_intel kvm serio_raw^M
[ 439.700653] CPU: 6 PID: 2779 Comm: stress-ng-sigfd Not tainted 4.2.0-rc5-next-20150805+ #265^M
[ 439.730500] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011^M
[ 439.730500] task: ffff880605308000 ti: ffff88060530c000 task.ti: ffff88060530c000^M
[ 439.730500] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d89ba>] [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.730500] RSP: 0018:ffff880819203da0 EFLAGS: 00010283^M
[ 439.730500] RAX: ffff880811b0e000 RBX: ffff8800bb465f00 RCX: 0000000000000002^M
[ 439.730500] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000202 RDI: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] RBP: ffff880819203db0 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000202^M
[ 439.730500] R13: ffff880814104800 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffff880811a2ea00^M
[ 439.730500] FS: 00007f165b3f5740(0000) GS:ffff880819200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b^M
[ 439.730500] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 00000007ef766000 CR4: 00000000000006e0^M
[ 439.730500] Stack:^M
[ 439.730500] 0000000000000008 ffff8808114eed90 ffff880819203e00 ffffffff812dc104^M
[ 439.755663] ffff880819203e40 ffffffff812d9f5e 0000020000000000 ffff8808114eed80^M
[ 439.755663] Call Trace:^M
[ 439.755663] <IRQ> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc104>] bt_for_each+0x6e/0xc8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc1b3>] blk_mq_tag_busy_iter+0x55/0x5e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d8911>] blk_mq_rq_timer+0x5d/0xd4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3e10>] call_timer_fn+0xf7/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3d1e>] ? call_timer_fn+0x5/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a46d6>] run_timer_softirq+0x1ce/0x1f8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c367>] __do_softirq+0x181/0x3a4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c76e>] irq_exit+0x40/0x94^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81031482>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x33/0x3e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff815559a4>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x84/0x90^M
[ 439.755663] <EOI> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81554350>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x32/0x4a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a98b>] finish_task_switch+0xe0/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a94d>] ? finish_task_switch+0xa2/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81550066>] __schedule+0x469/0x6cd^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8155039b>] schedule+0x82/0x9a^M
[ 439.789267] [<ffffffff8119b28b>] signalfd_read+0x186/0x49a^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8106d86a>] ? wake_up_q+0x47/0x47^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811618c2>] __vfs_read+0x28/0x9f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8117a289>] ? __fget_light+0x4d/0x74^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811620a7>] vfs_read+0x7a/0xc6^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8116292b>] SyS_read+0x49/0x7f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff81554c17>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f^M
[ 439.790911] Code: 48 89 e5 e8 a9 b8 e7 ff 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 89
f2 48 89 e5 41 54 41 89 f4 53 48 8b 47 60 48 8b 1c d0 48 8b 7b 30 48 8b
53 38 <48> 8b 87 58 01 00 00 48 85 c0 75 09 48 8b 97 88 0c 00 00 eb 10
^M
[ 439.790911] RIP [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.790911] RSP <ffff880819203da0>^M
[ 439.790911] CR2: 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.790911] ---[ end trace d40af58949325661 ]---^M
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 86,661
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void StyleResolver::addTreeBoundaryCrossingRules(const Vector<MinimalRuleData>& rules, ContainerNode* scope)
{
for (unsigned i = 0; i < rules.size(); ++i) {
const MinimalRuleData& info = rules[i];
m_treeBoundaryCrossingRules.addRule(info.m_rule, info.m_selectorIndex, scope, info.m_flags);
}
}
Commit Message: Remove the Simple Default Stylesheet, it's just a foot-gun.
We've been bitten by the Simple Default Stylesheet being out
of sync with the real html.css twice this week.
The Simple Default Stylesheet was invented years ago for Mac:
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/36135
It nicely handles the case where you just want to create
a single WebView and parse some simple HTML either without
styling said HTML, or only to display a small string, etc.
Note that this optimization/complexity *only* helps for the
very first document, since the default stylesheets are
all static (process-global) variables. Since any real page
on the internet uses a tag not covered by the simple default
stylesheet, not real load benefits from this optimization.
Only uses of WebView which were just rendering small bits
of text might have benefited from this. about:blank would
also have used this sheet.
This was a common application for some uses of WebView back
in those days. These days, even with WebView on Android,
there are likely much larger overheads than parsing the
html.css stylesheet, so making it required seems like the
right tradeoff of code-simplicity for this case.
BUG=319556
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73723005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162153 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 118,944
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: int Effect_getDescriptor(effect_handle_t self,
effect_descriptor_t *pDescriptor)
{
EffectContext * pContext = (EffectContext *) self;
const effect_descriptor_t *desc;
if (pContext == NULL || pDescriptor == NULL) {
ALOGV("Effect_getDescriptor() invalid param");
return -EINVAL;
}
switch(pContext->EffectType) {
case LVM_BASS_BOOST:
desc = &android::gBassBoostDescriptor;
break;
case LVM_VIRTUALIZER:
desc = &android::gVirtualizerDescriptor;
break;
case LVM_EQUALIZER:
desc = &android::gEqualizerDescriptor;
break;
case LVM_VOLUME:
desc = &android::gVolumeDescriptor;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
*pDescriptor = *desc;
return 0;
} /* end Effect_getDescriptor */
Commit Message: audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 157,387
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void BubbleManager::CloseBubblesOwnedBy(const content::RenderFrameHost* frame) {
CloseAllMatchingBubbles(nullptr, frame, BUBBLE_CLOSE_FRAME_DESTROYED);
}
Commit Message: Ensure device choosers are closed on navigation
The requestDevice() IPCs can race with navigation. This change ensures
that choosers are closed on navigation and adds browser tests to
exercise this for Web Bluetooth and WebUSB.
Bug: 723503
Change-Id: I66760161220e17bd2be9309cca228d161fe76e9c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1099961
Commit-Queue: Reilly Grant <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michael Wasserman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Yasskin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#569900}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 155,101
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void xhci_mfwrap_update(XHCIState *xhci)
{
const uint32_t bits = USBCMD_RS | USBCMD_EWE;
uint32_t mfindex, left;
int64_t now;
if ((xhci->usbcmd & bits) == bits) {
now = qemu_clock_get_ns(QEMU_CLOCK_VIRTUAL);
mfindex = ((now - xhci->mfindex_start) / 125000) & 0x3fff;
left = 0x4000 - mfindex;
timer_mod(xhci->mfwrap_timer, now + left * 125000);
} else {
timer_del(xhci->mfwrap_timer);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 5,731
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: int blk_rq_append_bio(struct request *rq, struct bio *bio)
{
if (!rq->bio) {
blk_rq_bio_prep(rq->q, rq, bio);
} else {
if (!ll_back_merge_fn(rq->q, rq, bio))
return -EINVAL;
rq->biotail->bi_next = bio;
rq->biotail = bio;
rq->__data_len += bio->bi_iter.bi_size;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Don't feed anything but regular iovec's to blk_rq_map_user_iov
In theory we could map other things, but there's a reason that function
is called "user_iov". Using anything else (like splice can do) just
confuses it.
Reported-and-tested-by: Johannes Thumshirn <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 48,155
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: WebKitHitTestResult* webkit_web_view_get_hit_test_result(WebKitWebView* webView, GdkEventButton* event)
{
g_return_val_if_fail(WEBKIT_IS_WEB_VIEW(webView), NULL);
g_return_val_if_fail(event, NULL);
PlatformMouseEvent mouseEvent = PlatformMouseEvent(event);
Frame* frame = core(webView)->focusController()->focusedOrMainFrame();
HitTestRequest request(HitTestRequest::Active);
IntPoint documentPoint = documentPointForWindowPoint(frame, mouseEvent.pos());
MouseEventWithHitTestResults mev = frame->document()->prepareMouseEvent(request, documentPoint, mouseEvent);
return kit(mev.hitTestResult());
}
Commit Message: 2011-06-02 Joone Hur <[email protected]>
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
[GTK] Only load dictionaries if spell check is enabled
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32879
We don't need to call enchant if enable-spell-checking is false.
* webkit/webkitwebview.cpp:
(webkit_web_view_update_settings): Skip loading dictionaries when enable-spell-checking is false.
(webkit_web_view_settings_notify): Ditto.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@87925 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 100,560
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void dump_instr(const char *lvl, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned long addr = instruction_pointer(regs);
mm_segment_t fs;
char str[sizeof("00000000 ") * 5 + 2 + 1], *p = str;
int i;
/*
* We need to switch to kernel mode so that we can use __get_user
* to safely read from kernel space. Note that we now dump the
* code first, just in case the backtrace kills us.
*/
fs = get_fs();
set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
for (i = -4; i < 1; i++) {
unsigned int val, bad;
bad = __get_user(val, &((u32 *)addr)[i]);
if (!bad)
p += sprintf(p, i == 0 ? "(%08x) " : "%08x ", val);
else {
p += sprintf(p, "bad PC value");
break;
}
}
printk("%sCode: %s\n", lvl, str);
set_fs(fs);
}
Commit Message: arm64: don't kill the kernel on a bad esr from el0
Rather than completely killing the kernel if we receive an esr value we
can't deal with in the el0 handlers, send the process a SIGILL and log
the esr value in the hope that we can debug it. If we receive a bad esr
from el1, we'll die() as before.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
CWE ID:
| 0
| 29,888
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: AXObject::AXRange AXLayoutObject::selection() const {
AXRange textSelection = textControlSelection();
if (textSelection.isValid())
return textSelection;
if (!getLayoutObject() || !getLayoutObject()->frame())
return AXRange();
VisibleSelection selection =
getLayoutObject()
->frame()
->selection()
.computeVisibleSelectionInDOMTreeDeprecated();
if (selection.isNone())
return AXRange();
VisiblePosition visibleStart = selection.visibleStart();
Position start = visibleStart.toParentAnchoredPosition();
TextAffinity startAffinity = visibleStart.affinity();
VisiblePosition visibleEnd = selection.visibleEnd();
Position end = visibleEnd.toParentAnchoredPosition();
TextAffinity endAffinity = visibleEnd.affinity();
Node* anchorNode = start.anchorNode();
ASSERT(anchorNode);
AXLayoutObject* anchorObject = nullptr;
while (anchorNode) {
anchorObject = getUnignoredObjectFromNode(*anchorNode);
if (anchorObject)
break;
if (anchorNode->nextSibling())
anchorNode = anchorNode->nextSibling();
else
anchorNode = anchorNode->parentNode();
}
Node* focusNode = end.anchorNode();
ASSERT(focusNode);
AXLayoutObject* focusObject = nullptr;
while (focusNode) {
focusObject = getUnignoredObjectFromNode(*focusNode);
if (focusObject)
break;
if (focusNode->previousSibling())
focusNode = focusNode->previousSibling();
else
focusNode = focusNode->parentNode();
}
if (!anchorObject || !focusObject)
return AXRange();
int anchorOffset = anchorObject->indexForVisiblePosition(visibleStart);
ASSERT(anchorOffset >= 0);
int focusOffset = focusObject->indexForVisiblePosition(visibleEnd);
ASSERT(focusOffset >= 0);
return AXRange(anchorObject, anchorOffset, startAffinity, focusObject,
focusOffset, endAffinity);
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,081
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static ssize_t ib_ucm_notify(struct ib_ucm_file *file,
const char __user *inbuf,
int in_len, int out_len)
{
struct ib_ucm_notify cmd;
struct ib_ucm_context *ctx;
int result;
if (copy_from_user(&cmd, inbuf, sizeof(cmd)))
return -EFAULT;
ctx = ib_ucm_ctx_get(file, cmd.id);
if (IS_ERR(ctx))
return PTR_ERR(ctx);
result = ib_cm_notify(ctx->cm_id, (enum ib_event_type) cmd.event);
ib_ucm_ctx_put(ctx);
return result;
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 52,801
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: HandleGlobalVar(CompatInfo *info, VarDef *stmt)
{
const char *elem, *field;
ExprDef *ndx;
bool ret;
if (!ExprResolveLhs(info->ctx, stmt->name, &elem, &field, &ndx))
ret = false;
else if (elem && istreq(elem, "interpret"))
ret = SetInterpField(info, &info->default_interp, field, ndx,
stmt->value);
else if (elem && istreq(elem, "indicator"))
ret = SetLedMapField(info, &info->default_led, field, ndx,
stmt->value);
else
ret = SetActionField(info->ctx, info->actions, &info->mods,
elem, field, ndx, stmt->value);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: xkbcomp: Don't crash on no-op modmask expressions
If we have an expression of the form 'l1' in an interp section, we
unconditionally try to dereference its args, even if it has none.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Stone <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 78,926
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void BluetoothRemoteGATTService::GetCharacteristicsCallback(
const String& serviceInstanceId,
mojom::blink::WebBluetoothGATTQueryQuantity quantity,
ScriptPromiseResolver* resolver,
mojom::blink::WebBluetoothResult result,
Optional<Vector<mojom::blink::WebBluetoothRemoteGATTCharacteristicPtr>>
characteristics) {
if (!resolver->getExecutionContext() ||
resolver->getExecutionContext()->isContextDestroyed())
return;
if (!device()->gatt()->RemoveFromActiveAlgorithms(resolver)) {
resolver->reject(
DOMException::create(NetworkError, kGATTServerDisconnected));
return;
}
if (result == mojom::blink::WebBluetoothResult::SUCCESS) {
DCHECK(characteristics);
if (quantity == mojom::blink::WebBluetoothGATTQueryQuantity::SINGLE) {
DCHECK_EQ(1u, characteristics->size());
resolver->resolve(device()->getOrCreateRemoteGATTCharacteristic(
resolver->getExecutionContext(),
std::move(characteristics.value()[0]), this));
return;
}
HeapVector<Member<BluetoothRemoteGATTCharacteristic>> gattCharacteristics;
gattCharacteristics.reserveInitialCapacity(characteristics->size());
for (auto& characteristic : characteristics.value()) {
gattCharacteristics.push_back(
device()->getOrCreateRemoteGATTCharacteristic(
resolver->getExecutionContext(), std::move(characteristic),
this));
}
resolver->resolve(gattCharacteristics);
} else {
resolver->reject(BluetoothError::take(resolver, result));
}
}
Commit Message: Allow serialization of empty bluetooth uuids.
This change allows the passing WTF::Optional<String> types as
bluetooth.mojom.UUID optional parameter without needing to ensure the passed
object isn't empty.
BUG=None
R=juncai, dcheng
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2646613003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#445809}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 129,062
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static WebElement HitTestUrlElement(WebView* view, int x, int y) {
WebPoint hit_point(x, y);
WebHitTestResult hit_test_result = view->HitTestResultAt(hit_point);
return hit_test_result.UrlElement();
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 148,060
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static uint32_t *nfs_read_post_op_attr(uint32_t *p, struct inode *inode)
{
/*
* union post_op_attr switch (bool attributes_follow) {
* case TRUE:
* fattr3 attributes;
* case FALSE:
* void;
* };
*/
if (ntoh32(net_read_uint32(p++))) {
nfs_fattr3_to_stat(p, inode);
p += 21;
}
return p;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 1,348
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void jpc_dec_cp_destroy(jpc_dec_cp_t *cp)
{
if (cp->ccps) {
jas_free(cp->ccps);
}
if (cp->pchglist) {
jpc_pchglist_destroy(cp->pchglist);
}
jas_free(cp);
}
Commit Message: Fixed an integral type promotion problem by adding a JAS_CAST.
Modified the jpc_tsfb_synthesize function so that it will be a noop for
an empty sequence (in order to avoid dereferencing a null pointer).
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 70,407
|
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