instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
235k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: bool GLES2Implementation::GetSamplerParameterfvHelper(GLuint /* sampler */,
GLenum /* pname */,
GLfloat* /* params */) {
return false;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,027
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void SetHttpWarningEnabled() {
scoped_feature_list_.InitAndEnableFeature(
security_state::kHttpFormWarningFeature);
}
Commit Message: Fixing names of password_manager kEnableManualFallbacksFilling feature.
Fixing names of password_manager kEnableManualFallbacksFilling feature
as per the naming convention.
Bug: 785953
Change-Id: I4a4baa1649fe9f02c3783a5e4c40bc75e717cc03
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/900566
Reviewed-by: Vaclav Brozek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: NIKHIL SAHNI <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#534923}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 124,623
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void jas_stream_destroy(jas_stream_t *stream)
{
/* If the memory for the buffer was allocated with malloc, free
this memory. */
if ((stream->bufmode_ & JAS_STREAM_FREEBUF) && stream->bufbase_) {
JAS_DBGLOG(100, ("jas_stream_destroy freeing buffer %p\n",
stream->bufbase_));
jas_free(stream->bufbase_);
stream->bufbase_ = 0;
}
jas_free(stream);
}
Commit Message: Made some changes to the I/O stream library for memory streams.
There were a number of potential problems due to the possibility
of integer overflow.
Changed some integral types to the larger types size_t or ssize_t.
For example, the function mem_resize now takes the buffer size parameter
as a size_t.
Added a new function jas_stream_memopen2, which takes a
buffer size specified as a size_t instead of an int.
This can be used in jas_image_cmpt_create to avoid potential
overflow problems.
Added a new function jas_deprecated to warn about reliance on
deprecated library behavior.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 73,122
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void HTMLInputElement::EnsurePrimaryContent() {
input_type_view_->EnsurePrimaryContent();
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 126,023
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: ForceTermination(struct upnphttp * h, const char * action, const char * ns)
{
UNUSED(action);
UNUSED(ns);
SoapError(h, 606, "Action not authorized");
}
Commit Message: GetOutboundPinholeTimeout: check args
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 89,855
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: acpi_status acpi_os_delete_semaphore(acpi_handle handle)
{
struct semaphore *sem = (struct semaphore *)handle;
if (!sem)
return AE_BAD_PARAMETER;
ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT((ACPI_DB_MUTEX, "Deleting semaphore[%p].\n", handle));
BUG_ON(!list_empty(&sem->wait_list));
kfree(sem);
sem = NULL;
return AE_OK;
}
Commit Message: acpi: Disable ACPI table override if securelevel is set
From the kernel documentation (initrd_table_override.txt):
If the ACPI_INITRD_TABLE_OVERRIDE compile option is true, it is possible
to override nearly any ACPI table provided by the BIOS with an
instrumented, modified one.
When securelevel is set, the kernel should disallow any unauthenticated
changes to kernel space. ACPI tables contain code invoked by the kernel, so
do not allow ACPI tables to be overridden if securelevel is set.
Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 53,838
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int mnt_alloc_group_id(struct mount *mnt)
{
int res;
if (!ida_pre_get(&mnt_group_ida, GFP_KERNEL))
return -ENOMEM;
res = ida_get_new_above(&mnt_group_ida,
mnt_group_start,
&mnt->mnt_group_id);
if (!res)
mnt_group_start = mnt->mnt_group_id + 1;
return res;
}
Commit Message: vfs: Carefully propogate mounts across user namespaces
As a matter of policy MNT_READONLY should not be changable if the
original mounter had more privileges than creator of the mount
namespace.
Add the flag CL_UNPRIVILEGED to note when we are copying a mount from
a mount namespace that requires more privileges to a mount namespace
that requires fewer privileges.
When the CL_UNPRIVILEGED flag is set cause clone_mnt to set MNT_NO_REMOUNT
if any of the mnt flags that should never be changed are set.
This protects both mount propagation and the initial creation of a less
privileged mount namespace.
Cc: [email protected]
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 32,378
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int ux500_cryp_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
{
struct resource *res = NULL;
struct resource *res_irq = NULL;
struct cryp_device_data *device_data;
dev_dbg(&pdev->dev, "[%s]", __func__);
device_data = platform_get_drvdata(pdev);
if (!device_data) {
dev_err(&pdev->dev, "[%s]: platform_get_drvdata() failed!",
__func__);
return -ENOMEM;
}
/* Try to decrease the number of available devices. */
if (down_trylock(&driver_data.device_allocation))
return -EBUSY;
/* Check that the device is free */
spin_lock(&device_data->ctx_lock);
/* current_ctx allocates a device, NULL = unallocated */
if (device_data->current_ctx) {
/* The device is busy */
spin_unlock(&device_data->ctx_lock);
/* Return the device to the pool. */
up(&driver_data.device_allocation);
return -EBUSY;
}
spin_unlock(&device_data->ctx_lock);
/* Remove the device from the list */
if (klist_node_attached(&device_data->list_node))
klist_remove(&device_data->list_node);
/* If this was the last device, remove the services */
if (list_empty(&driver_data.device_list.k_list))
cryp_algs_unregister_all();
res_irq = platform_get_resource(pdev, IORESOURCE_IRQ, 0);
if (!res_irq)
dev_err(&pdev->dev, "[%s]: IORESOURCE_IRQ, unavailable",
__func__);
else {
disable_irq(res_irq->start);
free_irq(res_irq->start, device_data);
}
if (cryp_disable_power(&pdev->dev, device_data, false))
dev_err(&pdev->dev, "[%s]: cryp_disable_power() failed",
__func__);
clk_unprepare(device_data->clk);
clk_put(device_data->clk);
regulator_put(device_data->pwr_regulator);
iounmap(device_data->base);
res = platform_get_resource(pdev, IORESOURCE_MEM, 0);
if (res)
release_mem_region(res->start, resource_size(res));
kfree(device_data);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 47,514
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: int dm_deleting_md(struct mapped_device *md)
{
return test_bit(DMF_DELETING, &md->flags);
}
Commit Message: dm: fix race between dm_get_from_kobject() and __dm_destroy()
The following BUG_ON was hit when testing repeat creation and removal of
DM devices:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm.c:2919!
CPU: 7 PID: 750 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.1.44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81649e8b>] dm_get_from_kobject+0x34/0x3a
[<ffffffff81650ef1>] dm_attr_show+0x2b/0x5e
[<ffffffff817b46d1>] ? mutex_lock+0x26/0x44
[<ffffffff811df7f5>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x83/0xcf
[<ffffffff811de257>] kernfs_seq_show+0x23/0x25
[<ffffffff81199118>] seq_read+0x16f/0x325
[<ffffffff811de994>] kernfs_fop_read+0x3a/0x13f
[<ffffffff8117b625>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x9d
[<ffffffff8130eb59>] ? security_file_permission+0x3c/0x44
[<ffffffff8117bdb8>] ? rw_verify_area+0x83/0xd9
[<ffffffff8117be9d>] vfs_read+0x8f/0xcf
[<ffffffff81193e34>] ? __fdget_pos+0x12/0x41
[<ffffffff8117c686>] SyS_read+0x4b/0x76
[<ffffffff817b606e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 85,880
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: GF_Err tfdt_Read(GF_Box *s,GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_TFBaseMediaDecodeTimeBox *ptr = (GF_TFBaseMediaDecodeTimeBox *)s;
if (ptr->version==1) {
ptr->baseMediaDecodeTime = gf_bs_read_u64(bs);
ISOM_DECREASE_SIZE(ptr, 8);
} else {
ptr->baseMediaDecodeTime = (u32) gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ISOM_DECREASE_SIZE(ptr, 4);
}
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,512
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: dissect_dch_control_frame(proto_tree *tree, packet_info *pinfo, tvbuff_t *tvb,
int offset, struct fp_info *p_fp_info)
{
/* Control frame type */
guint8 control_frame_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_fp_dch_control_frame_type, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset++;
col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO,
val_to_str_const(control_frame_type,
dch_control_frame_type_vals, "Unknown"));
switch (control_frame_type) {
case DCH_TIMING_ADJUSTMENT:
/*offset =*/ dissect_dch_timing_adjustment(tree, pinfo, tvb, offset);
break;
case DCH_RX_TIMING_DEVIATION:
/*offset =*/ dissect_dch_rx_timing_deviation(pinfo, tree, tvb, offset, p_fp_info);
break;
case DCH_DL_SYNCHRONISATION:
/*offset =*/ dissect_dch_dl_synchronisation(tree, pinfo, tvb, offset);
break;
case DCH_UL_SYNCHRONISATION:
/*offset =*/ dissect_dch_ul_synchronisation(tree, pinfo, tvb, offset);
break;
case DCH_OUTER_LOOP_POWER_CONTROL:
/*offset =*/ dissect_dch_outer_loop_power_control(tree, pinfo, tvb, offset);
break;
case DCH_DL_NODE_SYNCHRONISATION:
/*offset =*/ dissect_dch_dl_node_synchronisation(tree, pinfo, tvb, offset);
break;
case DCH_UL_NODE_SYNCHRONISATION:
/*offset =*/ dissect_dch_ul_node_synchronisation(tree, pinfo, tvb, offset);
break;
case DCH_RADIO_INTERFACE_PARAMETER_UPDATE:
/*offset =*/ dissect_dch_radio_interface_parameter_update(tree, pinfo, tvb, offset);
break;
case DCH_TIMING_ADVANCE:
/*offset =*/ dissect_dch_timing_advance(tree, pinfo, tvb, offset, p_fp_info);
break;
case DCH_TNL_CONGESTION_INDICATION:
/*offset =*/ dissect_dch_tnl_congestion_indication(tree, pinfo, tvb, offset);
break;
}
/* Spare Extension */
/* dissect_spare_extension_and_crc(tvb, pinfo, tree, 0, offset);
*/
}
Commit Message: UMTS_FP: fix handling reserved C/T value
The spec puts the reserved value at 0xf but our internal table has 'unknown' at
0; since all the other values seem to be offset-by-one, just take the modulus
0xf to avoid running off the end of the table.
Bug: 12191
Change-Id: I83c8fb66797bbdee52a2246fb1eea6e37cbc7eb0
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15722
Reviewed-by: Evan Huus <[email protected]>
Petri-Dish: Evan Huus <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 51,853
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int tg3_phy_probe(struct tg3 *tp)
{
u32 hw_phy_id_1, hw_phy_id_2;
u32 hw_phy_id, hw_phy_id_masked;
int err;
/* flow control autonegotiation is default behavior */
tg3_flag_set(tp, PAUSE_AUTONEG);
tp->link_config.flowctrl = FLOW_CTRL_TX | FLOW_CTRL_RX;
if (tg3_flag(tp, ENABLE_APE)) {
switch (tp->pci_fn) {
case 0:
tp->phy_ape_lock = TG3_APE_LOCK_PHY0;
break;
case 1:
tp->phy_ape_lock = TG3_APE_LOCK_PHY1;
break;
case 2:
tp->phy_ape_lock = TG3_APE_LOCK_PHY2;
break;
case 3:
tp->phy_ape_lock = TG3_APE_LOCK_PHY3;
break;
}
}
if (tg3_flag(tp, USE_PHYLIB))
return tg3_phy_init(tp);
/* Reading the PHY ID register can conflict with ASF
* firmware access to the PHY hardware.
*/
err = 0;
if (tg3_flag(tp, ENABLE_ASF) || tg3_flag(tp, ENABLE_APE)) {
hw_phy_id = hw_phy_id_masked = TG3_PHY_ID_INVALID;
} else {
/* Now read the physical PHY_ID from the chip and verify
* that it is sane. If it doesn't look good, we fall back
* to either the hard-coded table based PHY_ID and failing
* that the value found in the eeprom area.
*/
err |= tg3_readphy(tp, MII_PHYSID1, &hw_phy_id_1);
err |= tg3_readphy(tp, MII_PHYSID2, &hw_phy_id_2);
hw_phy_id = (hw_phy_id_1 & 0xffff) << 10;
hw_phy_id |= (hw_phy_id_2 & 0xfc00) << 16;
hw_phy_id |= (hw_phy_id_2 & 0x03ff) << 0;
hw_phy_id_masked = hw_phy_id & TG3_PHY_ID_MASK;
}
if (!err && TG3_KNOWN_PHY_ID(hw_phy_id_masked)) {
tp->phy_id = hw_phy_id;
if (hw_phy_id_masked == TG3_PHY_ID_BCM8002)
tp->phy_flags |= TG3_PHYFLG_PHY_SERDES;
else
tp->phy_flags &= ~TG3_PHYFLG_PHY_SERDES;
} else {
if (tp->phy_id != TG3_PHY_ID_INVALID) {
/* Do nothing, phy ID already set up in
* tg3_get_eeprom_hw_cfg().
*/
} else {
struct subsys_tbl_ent *p;
/* No eeprom signature? Try the hardcoded
* subsys device table.
*/
p = tg3_lookup_by_subsys(tp);
if (p) {
tp->phy_id = p->phy_id;
} else if (!tg3_flag(tp, IS_SSB_CORE)) {
/* For now we saw the IDs 0xbc050cd0,
* 0xbc050f80 and 0xbc050c30 on devices
* connected to an BCM4785 and there are
* probably more. Just assume that the phy is
* supported when it is connected to a SSB core
* for now.
*/
return -ENODEV;
}
if (!tp->phy_id ||
tp->phy_id == TG3_PHY_ID_BCM8002)
tp->phy_flags |= TG3_PHYFLG_PHY_SERDES;
}
}
if (!(tp->phy_flags & TG3_PHYFLG_ANY_SERDES) &&
(tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5719 ||
tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5720 ||
tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5762 ||
(tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5717 &&
tg3_chip_rev_id(tp) != CHIPREV_ID_5717_A0) ||
(tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_57765 &&
tg3_chip_rev_id(tp) != CHIPREV_ID_57765_A0)))
tp->phy_flags |= TG3_PHYFLG_EEE_CAP;
tg3_phy_init_link_config(tp);
if (!(tp->phy_flags & TG3_PHYFLG_ANY_SERDES) &&
!tg3_flag(tp, ENABLE_APE) &&
!tg3_flag(tp, ENABLE_ASF)) {
u32 bmsr, dummy;
tg3_readphy(tp, MII_BMSR, &bmsr);
if (!tg3_readphy(tp, MII_BMSR, &bmsr) &&
(bmsr & BMSR_LSTATUS))
goto skip_phy_reset;
err = tg3_phy_reset(tp);
if (err)
return err;
tg3_phy_set_wirespeed(tp);
if (!tg3_phy_copper_an_config_ok(tp, &dummy)) {
tg3_phy_autoneg_cfg(tp, tp->link_config.advertising,
tp->link_config.flowctrl);
tg3_writephy(tp, MII_BMCR,
BMCR_ANENABLE | BMCR_ANRESTART);
}
}
skip_phy_reset:
if ((tp->phy_id & TG3_PHY_ID_MASK) == TG3_PHY_ID_BCM5401) {
err = tg3_init_5401phy_dsp(tp);
if (err)
return err;
err = tg3_init_5401phy_dsp(tp);
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Matt Carlson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 32,662
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: BGD_DECLARE(int) gdImageBoundsSafe (gdImagePtr im, int x, int y)
{
return gdImageBoundsSafeMacro (im, x, y);
}
Commit Message: Fix #340: System frozen
gdImageCreate() doesn't check for oversized images and as such is prone
to DoS vulnerabilities. We fix that by applying the same overflow check
that is already in place for gdImageCreateTrueColor().
CVE-2016-9317
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 73,035
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: xsltGetPlainNamespace(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt, xmlNodePtr cur,
xmlNsPtr ns, xmlNodePtr out)
{
return(xsltGetNamespace(ctxt, cur, ns, out));
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 156,752
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: virtual ~Trans16x16DCT() {}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 164,408
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int mv_read_seek(AVFormatContext *avctx, int stream_index,
int64_t timestamp, int flags)
{
MvContext *mv = avctx->priv_data;
AVStream *st = avctx->streams[stream_index];
int frame, i;
if ((flags & AVSEEK_FLAG_FRAME) || (flags & AVSEEK_FLAG_BYTE))
return AVERROR(ENOSYS);
if (!(avctx->pb->seekable & AVIO_SEEKABLE_NORMAL))
return AVERROR(EIO);
frame = av_index_search_timestamp(st, timestamp, flags);
if (frame < 0)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
for (i = 0; i < avctx->nb_streams; i++)
mv->frame[i] = frame;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/mvdec: Fix DoS due to lack of eof check
Fixes: loop.mv
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-834
| 0
| 61,830
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void FileSystemManagerImpl::DidCreateSnapshot(
CreateSnapshotFileCallback callback,
const storage::FileSystemURL& url,
base::File::Error result,
const base::File::Info& info,
const base::FilePath& platform_path,
scoped_refptr<storage::ShareableFileReference> /* unused */) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
if (result != base::File::FILE_OK) {
std::move(callback).Run(base::File::Info(), base::FilePath(), result,
nullptr);
return;
}
scoped_refptr<storage::ShareableFileReference> file_ref =
storage::ShareableFileReference::Get(platform_path);
if (!security_policy_->CanReadFile(process_id_, platform_path)) {
security_policy_->GrantReadFile(process_id_, platform_path);
if (!file_ref.get()) {
file_ref = storage::ShareableFileReference::GetOrCreate(
platform_path,
storage::ShareableFileReference::DONT_DELETE_ON_FINAL_RELEASE,
context_->default_file_task_runner());
}
file_ref->AddFinalReleaseCallback(
base::BindOnce(&RevokeFilePermission, process_id_));
}
if (file_ref.get()) {
int request_id = in_transit_snapshot_files_.Add(file_ref);
blink::mojom::ReceivedSnapshotListenerPtr listener_ptr;
snapshot_listeners_.AddBinding(
std::make_unique<ReceivedSnapshotListenerImpl>(request_id, this),
mojo::MakeRequest<blink::mojom::ReceivedSnapshotListener>(
&listener_ptr));
std::move(callback).Run(info, platform_path, result,
std::move(listener_ptr));
return;
}
std::move(callback).Run(info, platform_path, result, nullptr);
}
Commit Message: Disable FileSystemManager::CreateWriter if WritableFiles isn't enabled.
Bug: 922677
Change-Id: Ib16137cbabb2ec07f1ffc0484722f1d9cc533404
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1416570
Commit-Queue: Marijn Kruisselbrink <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#623552}
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 153,029
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_cpuid *cpuid,
struct kvm_cpuid_entry __user *entries)
{
int r, i;
struct kvm_cpuid_entry *cpuid_entries;
r = -E2BIG;
if (cpuid->nent > KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES)
goto out;
r = -ENOMEM;
cpuid_entries = vmalloc(sizeof(struct kvm_cpuid_entry) * cpuid->nent);
if (!cpuid_entries)
goto out;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(cpuid_entries, entries,
cpuid->nent * sizeof(struct kvm_cpuid_entry)))
goto out_free;
for (i = 0; i < cpuid->nent; i++) {
vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries[i].function = cpuid_entries[i].function;
vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries[i].eax = cpuid_entries[i].eax;
vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries[i].ebx = cpuid_entries[i].ebx;
vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries[i].ecx = cpuid_entries[i].ecx;
vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries[i].edx = cpuid_entries[i].edx;
vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries[i].index = 0;
vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries[i].flags = 0;
vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries[i].padding[0] = 0;
vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries[i].padding[1] = 0;
vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries[i].padding[2] = 0;
}
vcpu->arch.cpuid_nent = cpuid->nent;
cpuid_fix_nx_cap(vcpu);
r = 0;
kvm_apic_set_version(vcpu);
kvm_x86_ops->cpuid_update(vcpu);
update_cpuid(vcpu);
out_free:
vfree(cpuid_entries);
out:
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to user-space
This patch prevents that emulation failures which result
from emulating an instruction for an L2-Guest results in
being reported to userspace.
Without this patch a malicious L2-Guest would be able to
kill the L1 by triggering a race-condition between an vmexit
and the instruction emulator.
With this patch the L2 will most likely only kill itself in
this situation.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 41,396
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: FT_Set_Charmap( FT_Face face,
FT_CharMap charmap )
{
FT_CharMap* cur;
FT_CharMap* limit;
if ( !face )
return FT_Err_Invalid_Face_Handle;
cur = face->charmaps;
if ( !cur )
return FT_Err_Invalid_CharMap_Handle;
if ( FT_Get_CMap_Format( charmap ) == 14 )
return FT_Err_Invalid_Argument;
limit = cur + face->num_charmaps;
for ( ; cur < limit; cur++ )
{
if ( cur[0] == charmap )
{
face->charmap = cur[0];
return 0;
}
}
return FT_Err_Invalid_Argument;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,268
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: bool AuthenticatorInsertAndActivateUsbSheetModel::IsActivityIndicatorVisible()
const {
return true;
}
Commit Message: chrome/browser/ui/webauthn: long domains may cause a line break.
As requested by UX in [1], allow long host names to split a title into
two lines. This allows us to show more of the name before eliding,
although sufficiently long names will still trigger elision.
Screenshot at
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1_V6t2CeZDAVazy3Px-OET2LnB__aEW1r.
[1] https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1TtxkPUchyVZulqgdMcfui-68B0W-DWaFFVJEffGIbLA/edit#slide=id.g5913c4105f_1_12
Change-Id: I70f6541e0db3e9942239304de43b487a7561ca34
Bug: 870892
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1601812
Auto-Submit: Adam Langley <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Nina Satragno <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nina Satragno <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#658114}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 142,959
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void Element::setRegionOversetState(RegionOversetState state)
{
ensureElementRareData()->setRegionOversetState(state);
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 112,393
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: xmlIsNameStartChar(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int c) {
if ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_OLD10) == 0) {
/*
* Use the new checks of production [4] [4a] amd [5] of the
* Update 5 of XML-1.0
*/
if ((c != ' ') && (c != '>') && (c != '/') && /* accelerators */
(((c >= 'a') && (c <= 'z')) ||
((c >= 'A') && (c <= 'Z')) ||
(c == '_') || (c == ':') ||
((c >= 0xC0) && (c <= 0xD6)) ||
((c >= 0xD8) && (c <= 0xF6)) ||
((c >= 0xF8) && (c <= 0x2FF)) ||
((c >= 0x370) && (c <= 0x37D)) ||
((c >= 0x37F) && (c <= 0x1FFF)) ||
((c >= 0x200C) && (c <= 0x200D)) ||
((c >= 0x2070) && (c <= 0x218F)) ||
((c >= 0x2C00) && (c <= 0x2FEF)) ||
((c >= 0x3001) && (c <= 0xD7FF)) ||
((c >= 0xF900) && (c <= 0xFDCF)) ||
((c >= 0xFDF0) && (c <= 0xFFFD)) ||
((c >= 0x10000) && (c <= 0xEFFFF))))
return(1);
} else {
if (IS_LETTER(c) || (c == '_') || (c == ':'))
return(1);
}
return(0);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
CWE ID: CWE-611
| 0
| 163,423
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: bool VideoTrack::VetEntry(const BlockEntry* pBlockEntry) const
{
return Track::VetEntry(pBlockEntry) && pBlockEntry->GetBlock()->IsKey();
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 174,452
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void CrosLibrary::TestApi::ResetUseStubImpl() {
library_->use_stub_impl_ = false;
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 101,870
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::RenderProcessGoneFromRenderManager(
RenderViewHost* render_view_host) {
DCHECK(crashed_status_ != base::TERMINATION_STATUS_STILL_RUNNING);
RenderViewTerminated(render_view_host, crashed_status_, crashed_error_code_);
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 110,753
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int netsnmp_session_set_contextEngineID(struct snmp_session *s, char * contextEngineID TSRMLS_DC)
{
size_t ebuf_len = 32, eout_len = 0;
u_char *ebuf = (u_char *) emalloc(ebuf_len);
if (ebuf == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "malloc failure setting contextEngineID");
return (-1);
}
if (!snmp_hex_to_binary(&ebuf, &ebuf_len, &eout_len, 1, contextEngineID)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Bad engine ID value '%s'", contextEngineID);
efree(ebuf);
return (-1);
}
if (s->contextEngineID) {
efree(s->contextEngineID);
}
s->contextEngineID = ebuf;
s->contextEngineIDLen = eout_len;
return (0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 9,547
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static inline void dx_set_count(struct dx_entry *entries, unsigned value)
{
((struct dx_countlimit *) entries)->count = cpu_to_le16(value);
}
Commit Message: ext4: avoid hang when mounting non-journal filesystems with orphan list
When trying to mount a file system which does not contain a journal,
but which does have a orphan list containing an inode which needs to
be truncated, the mount call with hang forever in
ext4_orphan_cleanup() because ext4_orphan_del() will return
immediately without removing the inode from the orphan list, leading
to an uninterruptible loop in kernel code which will busy out one of
the CPU's on the system.
This can be trivially reproduced by trying to mount the file system
found in tests/f_orphan_extents_inode/image.gz from the e2fsprogs
source tree. If a malicious user were to put this on a USB stick, and
mount it on a Linux desktop which has automatic mounts enabled, this
could be considered a potential denial of service attack. (Not a big
deal in practice, but professional paranoids worry about such things,
and have even been known to allocate CVE numbers for such problems.)
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Zheng Liu <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 32,254
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: int UDPSocketWin::SetDiffServCodePoint(DiffServCodePoint dscp) {
return ERR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
}
Commit Message: Map posix error codes in bind better, and fix one windows mapping.
r=wtc
BUG=330233
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/101193008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@242224 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 113,459
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void DevToolsClient::DidClearWindowObject() {
if (!compatibility_script_.empty())
render_frame()->ExecuteJavaScript(base::UTF8ToUTF16(compatibility_script_));
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Move sanitize url to devtools_ui.cc.
Compatibility script is not reliable enough.
BUG=653134
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2403633002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#425814}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 140,231
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void remove_free_list(struct cache *cache, struct cache_entry *entry)
{
if(entry->free_prev == NULL || entry->free_next == NULL)
/* not in free list */
return;
else if(entry->free_prev == entry && entry->free_next == entry) {
/* only this entry in the free list */
cache->free_list = NULL;
} else {
/* more than one entry in the free list */
entry->free_next->free_prev = entry->free_prev;
entry->free_prev->free_next = entry->free_next;
if(cache->free_list == entry)
cache->free_list = entry->free_next;
}
entry->free_prev = entry->free_next = NULL;
}
Commit Message: unsquashfs-4: Add more sanity checks + fix CVE-2015-4645/6
Add more filesystem table sanity checks to Unsquashfs-4 and
also properly fix CVE-2015-4645 and CVE-2015-4646.
The CVEs were raised due to Unsquashfs having variable
oveflow and stack overflow in a number of vulnerable
functions.
The suggested patch only "fixed" one such function and fixed
it badly, and so it was buggy and introduced extra bugs!
The suggested patch was not only buggy, but, it used the
essentially wrong approach too. It was "fixing" the
symptom but not the cause. The symptom is wrong values
causing overflow, the cause is filesystem corruption.
This corruption should be detected and the filesystem
rejected *before* trying to allocate memory.
This patch applies the following fixes:
1. The filesystem super-block tables are checked, and the values
must match across the filesystem.
This will trap corrupted filesystems created by Mksquashfs.
2. The maximum (theorectical) size the filesystem tables could grow
to, were analysed, and some variables were increased from int to
long long.
This analysis has been added as comments.
3. Stack allocation was removed, and a shared buffer (which is
checked and increased as necessary) is used to read the
table indexes.
Signed-off-by: Phillip Lougher <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 74,301
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: create_krb5_trustedCertifiers(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
krb5_external_principal_identifier *** ids)
{
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
STACK_OF(X509) *sk = id_cryptoctx->trustedCAs;
*ids = NULL;
if (id_cryptoctx->trustedCAs == NULL)
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
retval = create_identifiers_from_stack(sk, ids);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: PKINIT null pointer deref [CVE-2013-1415]
Don't dereference a null pointer when cleaning up.
The KDC plugin for PKINIT can dereference a null pointer when a
malformed packet causes processing to terminate early, leading to
a crash of the KDC process. An attacker would need to have a valid
PKINIT certificate or have observed a successful PKINIT authentication,
or an unauthenticated attacker could execute the attack if anonymous
PKINIT is enabled.
CVSSv2 vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:P/RL:O/RC:C
This is a minimal commit for pullup; style fixes in a followup.
[[email protected]: reformat and edit commit message]
(cherry picked from commit c773d3c775e9b2d88bcdff5f8a8ba88d7ec4e8ed)
ticket: 7570
version_fixed: 1.11.1
status: resolved
CWE ID:
| 0
| 33,617
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int AppLayerProtoDetectTest19(void)
{
int result = 0;
Flow *f = NULL;
uint8_t http_buf1[] = "MPUT one\r\n";
uint32_t http_buf1_len = sizeof(http_buf1) - 1;
TcpSession ssn;
Packet *p = NULL;
Signature *s = NULL;
ThreadVars tv;
DetectEngineThreadCtx *det_ctx = NULL;
DetectEngineCtx *de_ctx = NULL;
AppLayerParserThreadCtx *alp_tctx = AppLayerParserThreadCtxAlloc();
memset(&tv, 0, sizeof(ThreadVars));
memset(&ssn, 0, sizeof(TcpSession));
p = UTHBuildPacketSrcDstPorts(http_buf1, http_buf1_len, IPPROTO_TCP, 12345, 88);
f = UTHBuildFlow(AF_INET, "1.1.1.1", "2.2.2.2", 1024, 80);
if (f == NULL)
goto end;
f->protoctx = &ssn;
f->proto = IPPROTO_TCP;
p->flow = f;
p->flowflags |= FLOW_PKT_TOSERVER;
p->flowflags |= FLOW_PKT_ESTABLISHED;
p->flags |= PKT_HAS_FLOW|PKT_STREAM_EST;
f->alproto = ALPROTO_FTP;
StreamTcpInitConfig(TRUE);
de_ctx = DetectEngineCtxInit();
if (de_ctx == NULL) {
goto end;
}
de_ctx->flags |= DE_QUIET;
s = de_ctx->sig_list = SigInit(de_ctx, "alert http any !80 -> any any "
"(msg:\"http over non standar port\"; "
"sid:1;)");
if (s == NULL) {
goto end;
}
SigGroupBuild(de_ctx);
DetectEngineThreadCtxInit(&tv, (void *)de_ctx, (void *)&det_ctx);
FLOWLOCK_WRLOCK(f);
int r = AppLayerParserParse(NULL, alp_tctx, f, ALPROTO_FTP,
STREAM_TOSERVER, http_buf1, http_buf1_len);
if (r != 0) {
printf("toserver chunk 1 returned %" PRId32 ", expected 0: ", r);
FLOWLOCK_UNLOCK(f);
goto end;
}
FLOWLOCK_UNLOCK(f);
/* do detect */
SigMatchSignatures(&tv, de_ctx, det_ctx, p);
if (PacketAlertCheck(p, 1)) {
printf("sig 1 alerted, but it should not (it's ftp): ");
goto end;
}
result = 1;
end:
if (alp_tctx != NULL)
AppLayerParserThreadCtxFree(alp_tctx);
if (det_ctx != NULL)
DetectEngineThreadCtxDeinit(&tv, det_ctx);
if (de_ctx != NULL)
SigGroupCleanup(de_ctx);
if (de_ctx != NULL)
DetectEngineCtxFree(de_ctx);
StreamTcpFreeConfig(TRUE);
UTHFreePackets(&p, 1);
UTHFreeFlow(f);
return result;
}
Commit Message: proto/detect: workaround dns misdetected as dcerpc
The DCERPC UDP detection would misfire on DNS with transaction
ID 0x0400. This would happen as the protocol detection engine
gives preference to pattern based detection over probing parsers for
performance reasons.
This hack/workaround fixes this specific case by still running the
probing parser if DCERPC has been detected on UDP. The probing
parser result will take precedence.
Bug #2736.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 96,529
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void __fanout_unlink(struct sock *sk, struct packet_sock *po)
{
struct packet_fanout *f = po->fanout;
int i;
spin_lock(&f->lock);
for (i = 0; i < f->num_members; i++) {
if (f->arr[i] == sk)
break;
}
BUG_ON(i >= f->num_members);
f->arr[i] = f->arr[f->num_members - 1];
f->num_members--;
if (f->num_members == 0)
__dev_remove_pack(&f->prot_hook);
spin_unlock(&f->lock);
}
Commit Message: packet: in packet_do_bind, test fanout with bind_lock held
Once a socket has po->fanout set, it remains a member of the group
until it is destroyed. The prot_hook must be constant and identical
across sockets in the group.
If fanout_add races with packet_do_bind between the test of po->fanout
and taking the lock, the bind call may make type or dev inconsistent
with that of the fanout group.
Hold po->bind_lock when testing po->fanout to avoid this race.
I had to introduce artificial delay (local_bh_enable) to actually
observe the race.
Fixes: dc99f600698d ("packet: Add fanout support.")
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 60,408
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_base)
{
CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL key;
#ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_base: Setting up stop handlers\n");
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG
ossl_malloc_setup_failures();
#endif
if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&key, ossl_init_thread_destructor))
return 0;
if ((init_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
OPENSSL_cpuid_setup();
destructor_key.value = key;
base_inited = 1;
return 1;
err:
#ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_base not ok!\n");
#endif
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(init_lock);
init_lock = NULL;
CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&key);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-330
| 0
| 11,990
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoUniform1ui(GLint location,
GLuint x) {
api()->glUniform1uiFn(location, x);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 142,141
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void NaClProcessHost::OnNaClGdbAttached() {
wait_for_nacl_gdb_ = false;
nacl_gdb_watcher_.StopWatchingFileDescriptor();
nacl_gdb_watcher_delegate_.reset();
OnProcessLaunched();
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 103,271
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void Editor::applyStyleToSelection(StylePropertySet* style,
InputEvent::InputType inputType) {
if (!style || style->isEmpty() || !canEditRichly())
return;
applyStyle(style, inputType);
}
Commit Message: Make TypingCommand::insertText() to take SelectionInDOMTree instead of VisibleSelection
This patch makes |TypingCommand::insertText()| to take |SelectionInDOMTree|
instead of |VisibleSelection| to reduce usage of |VisibleSelection| for
improving code health.
BUG=657237
TEST=n/a
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2733183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#455368}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 129,106
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: bool IsVoiceInteractionEnabled() {
return IsVoiceInteractionLocalesSupported() &&
IsVoiceInteractionFlagsEnabled();
}
Commit Message: Add a fake DriveFS launcher client.
Using DriveFS requires building and deploying ChromeOS. Add a client for
the fake DriveFS launcher to allow the use of a real DriveFS from a
ChromeOS chroot to be used with a target_os="chromeos" build of chrome.
This connects to the fake DriveFS launcher using mojo over a unix domain
socket named by a command-line flag, using the launcher to create
DriveFS instances.
Bug: 848126
Change-Id: I22dcca154d41bda196dd7c1782bb503f6bcba5b1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1098434
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Sam McNally <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567513}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 124,070
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int http_close(URLContext *h)
{
int ret = 0;
HTTPContext *s = h->priv_data;
#if CONFIG_ZLIB
inflateEnd(&s->inflate_stream);
av_freep(&s->inflate_buffer);
#endif /* CONFIG_ZLIB */
if (!s->end_chunked_post)
/* Close the write direction by sending the end of chunked encoding. */
ret = http_shutdown(h, h->flags);
if (s->hd)
ffurl_closep(&s->hd);
av_dict_free(&s->chained_options);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: http: make length/offset-related variables unsigned.
Fixes #5992, reported and found by Paul Cher <[email protected]>.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 70,854
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void WebBluetoothServiceImpl::SetClientConnectionErrorHandler(
base::OnceClosure closure) {
binding_.set_connection_error_handler(std::move(closure));
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <[email protected]>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 138,155
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void vmx_set_constant_host_state(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
{
u32 low32, high32;
unsigned long tmpl;
struct desc_ptr dt;
unsigned long cr0, cr4;
cr0 = read_cr0();
WARN_ON(cr0 & X86_CR0_TS);
vmcs_writel(HOST_CR0, cr0); /* 22.2.3 */
vmcs_writel(HOST_CR3, read_cr3()); /* 22.2.3 FIXME: shadow tables */
/* Save the most likely value for this task's CR4 in the VMCS. */
cr4 = cr4_read_shadow();
vmcs_writel(HOST_CR4, cr4); /* 22.2.3, 22.2.5 */
vmx->host_state.vmcs_host_cr4 = cr4;
vmcs_write16(HOST_CS_SELECTOR, __KERNEL_CS); /* 22.2.4 */
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
/*
* Load null selectors, so we can avoid reloading them in
* __vmx_load_host_state(), in case userspace uses the null selectors
* too (the expected case).
*/
vmcs_write16(HOST_DS_SELECTOR, 0);
vmcs_write16(HOST_ES_SELECTOR, 0);
#else
vmcs_write16(HOST_DS_SELECTOR, __KERNEL_DS); /* 22.2.4 */
vmcs_write16(HOST_ES_SELECTOR, __KERNEL_DS); /* 22.2.4 */
#endif
vmcs_write16(HOST_SS_SELECTOR, __KERNEL_DS); /* 22.2.4 */
vmcs_write16(HOST_TR_SELECTOR, GDT_ENTRY_TSS*8); /* 22.2.4 */
native_store_idt(&dt);
vmcs_writel(HOST_IDTR_BASE, dt.address); /* 22.2.4 */
vmx->host_idt_base = dt.address;
vmcs_writel(HOST_RIP, vmx_return); /* 22.2.5 */
rdmsr(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, low32, high32);
vmcs_write32(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, low32);
rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, tmpl);
vmcs_writel(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, tmpl); /* 22.2.3 */
if (vmcs_config.vmexit_ctrl & VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PAT) {
rdmsr(MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, low32, high32);
vmcs_write64(HOST_IA32_PAT, low32 | ((u64) high32 << 32));
}
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-388
| 0
| 48,136
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: DeliverEventsToWindow(DeviceIntPtr pDev, WindowPtr pWin, xEvent
*pEvents, int count, Mask filter, GrabPtr grab)
{
int deliveries = 0, nondeliveries = 0;
ClientPtr client = NullClient;
Mask deliveryMask = 0; /* If a grab occurs due to a button press, then
this mask is the mask of the grab. */
int type = pEvents->u.u.type;
/* Deliver to window owner */
if ((filter == CantBeFiltered) || core_get_type(pEvents) != 0) {
enum EventDeliveryState rc;
rc = DeliverToWindowOwner(pDev, pWin, pEvents, count, filter, grab);
switch (rc) {
case EVENT_SKIP:
return 0;
case EVENT_REJECTED:
nondeliveries--;
break;
case EVENT_DELIVERED:
/* We delivered to the owner, with our event mask */
deliveries++;
client = wClient(pWin);
deliveryMask = pWin->eventMask;
break;
case EVENT_NOT_DELIVERED:
break;
}
}
/* CantBeFiltered means only window owner gets the event */
if (filter != CantBeFiltered) {
enum EventDeliveryState rc;
rc = DeliverEventToWindowMask(pDev, pWin, pEvents, count, filter,
grab, &client, &deliveryMask);
switch (rc) {
case EVENT_SKIP:
return 0;
case EVENT_REJECTED:
nondeliveries--;
break;
case EVENT_DELIVERED:
deliveries++;
break;
case EVENT_NOT_DELIVERED:
break;
}
}
if (deliveries) {
/*
* Note that since core events are delivered first, an implicit grab may
* be activated on a core grab, stopping the XI events.
*/
if (!grab &&
ActivateImplicitGrab(pDev, client, pWin, pEvents, deliveryMask))
/* grab activated */ ;
else if (type == MotionNotify)
pDev->valuator->motionHintWindow = pWin;
else if (type == DeviceMotionNotify || type == DeviceButtonPress)
CheckDeviceGrabAndHintWindow(pWin, type,
(deviceKeyButtonPointer *) pEvents,
grab, client, deliveryMask);
return deliveries;
}
return nondeliveries;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 4,815
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: base::string16 BrowserView::GetAccessibleTabLabel(bool include_app_name,
int index) const {
if (index == -1)
return base::string16();
base::string16 window_title =
browser_->GetWindowTitleForTab(include_app_name, index);
return chrome::AssembleTabAccessibilityLabel(
window_title, tabstrip_->IsTabCrashed(index),
tabstrip_->TabHasNetworkError(index), tabstrip_->GetTabAlertState(index));
}
Commit Message: Mac: turn popups into new tabs while in fullscreen.
It's platform convention to show popups as new tabs while in
non-HTML5 fullscreen. (Popups cause tabs to lose HTML5 fullscreen.)
This was implemented for Cocoa in a BrowserWindow override, but
it makes sense to just stick it into Browser and remove a ton
of override code put in just to support this.
BUG=858929, 868416
TEST=as in bugs
Change-Id: I43471f242813ec1159d9c690bab73dab3e610b7d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1153455
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#578755}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 155,167
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(time_nanosleep)
{
long tv_sec, tv_nsec;
struct timespec php_req, php_rem;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "ll", &tv_sec, &tv_nsec) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (tv_sec < 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "The seconds value must be greater than 0");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (tv_nsec < 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "The nanoseconds value must be greater than 0");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
php_req.tv_sec = (time_t) tv_sec;
php_req.tv_nsec = tv_nsec;
if (!nanosleep(&php_req, &php_rem)) {
RETURN_TRUE;
} else if (errno == EINTR) {
array_init(return_value);
add_assoc_long_ex(return_value, "seconds", sizeof("seconds"), php_rem.tv_sec);
add_assoc_long_ex(return_value, "nanoseconds", sizeof("nanoseconds"), php_rem.tv_nsec);
return;
} else if (errno == EINVAL) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "nanoseconds was not in the range 0 to 999 999 999 or seconds was negative");
}
RETURN_FALSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 4,260
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int global_template_search(const char *key, void *data, void *privdata)
{
template_iter_t *iter = privdata;
default_template_t *def_t = data;
if (def_t->flags == iter->level)
iter->res = key;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: chanserv/flags: make Anope FLAGS compatibility an option
Previously, ChanServ FLAGS behavior could be modified by registering or
dropping the keyword nicks "LIST", "CLEAR", and "MODIFY".
Now, a configuration option is available that when turned on (default),
disables registration of these keyword nicks and enables this
compatibility feature. When turned off, registration of these keyword
nicks is possible, and compatibility to Anope's FLAGS command is
disabled.
Fixes atheme/atheme#397
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 58,400
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: int __init udp_offload_init(void)
{
return inet6_add_offload(&udpv6_offload, IPPROTO_UDP);
}
Commit Message: ipv6: fix headroom calculation in udp6_ufo_fragment
Commit 1e2bd517c108816220f262d7954b697af03b5f9c ("udp6: Fix udp
fragmentation for tunnel traffic.") changed the calculation if
there is enough space to include a fragment header in the skb from a
skb->mac_header dervived one to skb_headroom. Because we already peeled
off the skb to transport_header this is wrong. Change this back to check
if we have enough room before the mac_header.
This fixes a panic Saran Neti reported. He used the tbf scheduler which
skb_gso_segments the skb. The offsets get negative and we panic in memcpy
because the skb was erroneously not expanded at the head.
Reported-by: Saran Neti <[email protected]>
Cc: Pravin B Shelar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 29,366
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: ZEND_API int zend_declare_class_constant_stringl(zend_class_entry *ce, const char *name, size_t name_length, const char *value, size_t value_length TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
zval *constant;
if (ce->type & ZEND_INTERNAL_CLASS) {
ALLOC_PERMANENT_ZVAL(constant);
ZVAL_STRINGL(constant, zend_strndup(value, value_length), value_length, 0);
} else {
ALLOC_ZVAL(constant);
ZVAL_STRINGL(constant, value, value_length, 1);
}
INIT_PZVAL(constant);
return zend_declare_class_constant(ce, name, name_length, constant TSRMLS_CC);
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 13,779
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: vrrp_nopreempt_handler(__attribute__((unused)) vector_t *strvec)
{
vrrp_t *vrrp = LIST_TAIL_DATA(vrrp_data->vrrp);
vrrp->nopreempt = 1;
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 76,019
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int shutdown_none(struct lxc_handler *handler, struct lxc_netdev *netdev)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 44,652
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: const KURL Document::SiteForCookies() const {
if (IsHTMLImport())
return ImportsController()->Master()->SiteForCookies();
if (!GetFrame())
return SecurityOrigin::UrlWithUniqueSecurityOrigin();
Frame& top = GetFrame()->Tree().Top();
KURL top_document_url;
if (top.IsLocalFrame()) {
top_document_url = ToLocalFrame(top).GetDocument()->Url();
} else {
SecurityOrigin* origin = top.GetSecurityContext()->GetSecurityOrigin();
if (origin)
top_document_url = KURL(NullURL(), origin->ToString());
else
top_document_url = SecurityOrigin::UrlWithUniqueSecurityOrigin();
}
if (SchemeRegistry::ShouldTreatURLSchemeAsFirstPartyWhenTopLevel(
top_document_url.Protocol()))
return top_document_url;
const OriginAccessEntry& access_entry =
top.IsLocalFrame()
? ToLocalFrame(top).GetDocument()->AccessEntryFromURL()
: OriginAccessEntry(top_document_url.Protocol(),
top_document_url.Host(),
OriginAccessEntry::kAllowRegisterableDomains);
const Frame* current_frame = GetFrame();
while (current_frame) {
while (current_frame->IsLocalFrame() &&
ToLocalFrame(current_frame)->GetDocument()->IsSrcdocDocument())
current_frame = current_frame->Tree().Parent();
DCHECK(current_frame);
if (access_entry.MatchesDomain(
*current_frame->GetSecurityContext()->GetSecurityOrigin()) ==
OriginAccessEntry::kDoesNotMatchOrigin)
return SecurityOrigin::UrlWithUniqueSecurityOrigin();
current_frame = current_frame->Tree().Parent();
}
return top_document_url;
}
Commit Message: Fixed bug where PlzNavigate CSP in a iframe did not get the inherited CSP
When inheriting the CSP from a parent document to a local-scheme CSP,
it does not always get propagated to the PlzNavigate CSP. This means
that PlzNavigate CSP checks (like `frame-src`) would be ran against
a blank policy instead of the proper inherited policy.
Bug: 778658
Change-Id: I61bb0d432e1cea52f199e855624cb7b3078f56a9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/765969
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#518245}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 146,777
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: bool extractPages (const char *srcFileName, const char *destFileName) {
char pathName[1024];
GooString *gfileName = new GooString (srcFileName);
PDFDoc *doc = new PDFDoc (gfileName, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (!doc->isOk()) {
error(errSyntaxError, -1, "Could not extract page(s) from damaged file ('{0:s}')", srcFileName);
return false;
}
if (firstPage == 0 && lastPage == 0) {
firstPage = 1;
lastPage = doc->getNumPages();
}
if (lastPage == 0)
lastPage = doc->getNumPages();
if (firstPage == 0)
firstPage = 1;
if (firstPage != lastPage && strstr(destFileName, "%d") == NULL) {
error(errSyntaxError, -1, "'{0:s}' must contain '%%d' if more than one page should be extracted", destFileName);
return false;
}
for (int pageNo = firstPage; pageNo <= lastPage; pageNo++) {
sprintf (pathName, destFileName, pageNo);
GooString *gpageName = new GooString (pathName);
int errCode = doc->savePageAs(gpageName, pageNo);
if ( errCode != errNone) {
delete gpageName;
delete gfileName;
return false;
}
delete gpageName;
}
delete gfileName;
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 164,654
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: float LayerTreeHostImpl::CurrentBrowserControlsShownRatio() const {
return active_tree_->CurrentBrowserControlsShownRatio();
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
[email protected], [email protected]
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 137,246
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: parserep(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const struct sunrpc_msg *rp, register u_int length)
{
register const uint32_t *dp;
u_int len;
enum sunrpc_accept_stat astat;
/*
* Portability note:
* Here we find the address of the ar_verf credentials.
* Originally, this calculation was
* dp = (uint32_t *)&rp->rm_reply.rp_acpt.ar_verf
* On the wire, the rp_acpt field starts immediately after
* the (32 bit) rp_stat field. However, rp_acpt (which is a
* "struct accepted_reply") contains a "struct opaque_auth",
* whose internal representation contains a pointer, so on a
* 64-bit machine the compiler inserts 32 bits of padding
* before rp->rm_reply.rp_acpt.ar_verf. So, we cannot use
* the internal representation to parse the on-the-wire
* representation. Instead, we skip past the rp_stat field,
* which is an "enum" and so occupies one 32-bit word.
*/
dp = ((const uint32_t *)&rp->rm_reply) + 1;
ND_TCHECK(dp[1]);
len = EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[1]);
if (len >= length)
return (NULL);
/*
* skip past the ar_verf credentials.
*/
dp += (len + (2*sizeof(uint32_t) + 3)) / sizeof(uint32_t);
/*
* now we can check the ar_stat field
*/
ND_TCHECK(dp[0]);
astat = (enum sunrpc_accept_stat) EXTRACT_32BITS(dp);
if (astat != SUNRPC_SUCCESS) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", tok2str(sunrpc_str, "ar_stat %d", astat)));
nfserr = 1; /* suppress trunc string */
return (NULL);
}
/* successful return */
ND_TCHECK2(*dp, sizeof(astat));
return ((const uint32_t *) (sizeof(astat) + ((const char *)dp)));
trunc:
return (0);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13005/NFS: Add two bounds checks before fetching data
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 62,461
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: FT_Stream_ReleaseFrame( FT_Stream stream,
FT_Byte** pbytes )
{
if ( stream && stream->read )
{
FT_Memory memory = stream->memory;
#ifdef FT_DEBUG_MEMORY
ft_mem_free( memory, *pbytes );
*pbytes = NULL;
#else
FT_FREE( *pbytes );
#endif
}
*pbytes = 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 9,713
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void SVGElement::InvalidateRelativeLengthClients(
SubtreeLayoutScope* layout_scope) {
if (!isConnected())
return;
#if DCHECK_IS_ON()
DCHECK(!in_relative_length_clients_invalidation_);
base::AutoReset<bool> in_relative_length_clients_invalidation_change(
&in_relative_length_clients_invalidation_, true);
#endif
if (LayoutObject* layout_object = this->GetLayoutObject()) {
if (HasRelativeLengths() && layout_object->IsSVGResourceContainer()) {
ToLayoutSVGResourceContainer(layout_object)
->InvalidateCacheAndMarkForLayout(
layout_invalidation_reason::kSizeChanged, layout_scope);
} else if (SelfHasRelativeLengths()) {
layout_object->SetNeedsLayoutAndFullPaintInvalidation(
layout_invalidation_reason::kUnknown, kMarkContainerChain,
layout_scope);
}
}
for (SVGElement* element : elements_with_relative_lengths_) {
if (element != this)
element->InvalidateRelativeLengthClients(layout_scope);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix SVG crash for v0 distribution into foreignObject.
We require a parent element to be an SVG element for non-svg-root
elements in order to create a LayoutObject for them. However, we checked
the light tree parent element, not the flat tree one which is the parent
for the layout tree construction. Note that this is just an issue in
Shadow DOM v0 since v1 does not allow shadow roots on SVG elements.
Bug: 915469
Change-Id: Id81843abad08814fae747b5bc81c09666583f130
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1382494
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Rune Lillesveen <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#617487}
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 152,771
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: FakeDownloadItem* DownloadPathReservationTrackerTest::CreateDownloadItem(
int32 id) {
FakeDownloadItem* item = new ::testing::StrictMock<FakeDownloadItem>;
DownloadId download_id(reinterpret_cast<void*>(this), id);
EXPECT_CALL(*item, GetGlobalId())
.WillRepeatedly(Return(download_id));
EXPECT_CALL(*item, GetTargetFilePath())
.WillRepeatedly(ReturnRefOfCopy(base::FilePath()));
return item;
}
Commit Message: Fix OS_MACOS typos. Should be OS_MACOSX.
BUG=163208
TEST=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12829005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@189130 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 118,743
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void empty(void)
{
}
Commit Message: floppy: don't write kernel-only members to FDRAWCMD ioctl output
Do not leak kernel-only floppy_raw_cmd structure members to userspace.
This includes the linked-list pointer and the pointer to the allocated
DMA space.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 39,344
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: OmniboxState::~OmniboxState() {
}
Commit Message: omnibox: experiment with restoring placeholder when caret shows
Shows the "Search Google or type a URL" omnibox placeholder even when
the caret (text edit cursor) is showing / when focused. views::Textfield
works this way, as does <input placeholder="">. Omnibox and the NTP's
"fakebox" are exceptions in this regard and this experiment makes this
more consistent.
[email protected]
BUG=955585
Change-Id: I23c299c0973f2feb43f7a2be3bd3425a80b06c2d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1582315
Commit-Queue: Dan Beam <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Li <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654279}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 142,489
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: ec_pow2 (gcry_mpi_t w, const gcry_mpi_t b, mpi_ec_t ctx)
{
/* Using mpi_mul is slightly faster (at least on amd64). */
/* mpi_powm (w, b, mpi_const (MPI_C_TWO), ctx->p); */
ec_mulm (w, b, b, ctx);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 13,067
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int nft_deltable(struct nft_ctx *ctx)
{
int err;
err = nft_trans_table_add(ctx, NFT_MSG_DELTABLE);
if (err < 0)
return err;
list_del_rcu(&ctx->table->list);
return err;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_tables: fix flush ruleset chain dependencies
Jumping between chains doesn't mix well with flush ruleset. Rules
from a different chain and set elements may still refer to us.
[ 353.373791] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 353.373845] kernel BUG at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1159!
[ 353.373896] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 353.373942] Modules linked in: intel_powerclamp uas iwldvm iwlwifi
[ 353.374017] CPU: 0 PID: 6445 Comm: 31c3.nft Not tainted 3.18.0 #98
[ 353.374069] Hardware name: LENOVO 5129CTO/5129CTO, BIOS 6QET47WW (1.17 ) 07/14/2010
[...]
[ 353.375018] Call Trace:
[ 353.375046] [<ffffffff81964c31>] ? nf_tables_commit+0x381/0x540
[ 353.375101] [<ffffffff81949118>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x3d8/0x4b0
[ 353.375150] [<ffffffff81943fc5>] netlink_unicast+0x105/0x1a0
[ 353.375200] [<ffffffff8194438e>] netlink_sendmsg+0x32e/0x790
[ 353.375253] [<ffffffff818f398e>] sock_sendmsg+0x8e/0xc0
[ 353.375300] [<ffffffff818f36b9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel.part.20+0x19/0x70
[ 353.375357] [<ffffffff818f44f9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel+0x19/0x30
[ 353.375410] [<ffffffff819016d2>] ? verify_iovec+0x42/0xd0
[ 353.375459] [<ffffffff818f3e10>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x3f0/0x400
[ 353.375510] [<ffffffff810615fa>] ? native_sched_clock+0x2a/0x90
[ 353.375563] [<ffffffff81176697>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x17/0x20
[ 353.375616] [<ffffffff8110dc78>] ? account_user_time+0x88/0xa0
[ 353.375667] [<ffffffff818f4bbd>] __sys_sendmsg+0x3d/0x80
[ 353.375719] [<ffffffff81b184f4>] ? int_check_syscall_exit_work+0x34/0x3d
[ 353.375776] [<ffffffff818f4c0d>] SyS_sendmsg+0xd/0x20
[ 353.375823] [<ffffffff81b1826d>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Release objects in this order: rules -> sets -> chains -> tables, to
make sure no references to chains are held anymore.
Reported-by: Asbjoern Sloth Toennesen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 58,019
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void sched_domains_numa_masks_clear(int cpu)
{
int i, j;
for (i = 0; i < sched_domains_numa_levels; i++) {
for (j = 0; j < nr_node_ids; j++)
cpumask_clear_cpu(cpu, sched_domains_numa_masks[i][j]);
}
}
Commit Message: sched: Fix information leak in sys_sched_getattr()
We're copying the on-stack structure to userspace, but forgot to give
the right number of bytes to copy. This allows the calling process to
obtain up to PAGE_SIZE bytes from the stack (and possibly adjacent
kernel memory).
This fix copies only as much as we actually have on the stack
(attr->size defaults to the size of the struct) and leaves the rest of
the userspace-provided buffer untouched.
Found using kmemcheck + trinity.
Fixes: d50dde5a10f30 ("sched: Add new scheduler syscalls to support an extended scheduling parameters ABI")
Cc: Dario Faggioli <[email protected]>
Cc: Juri Lelli <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 58,189
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: nfs4_proc_layoutget(struct nfs4_layoutget *lgp, gfp_t gfp_flags)
{
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(lgp->args.inode);
size_t max_pages = max_response_pages(server);
struct rpc_task *task;
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_LAYOUTGET],
.rpc_argp = &lgp->args,
.rpc_resp = &lgp->res,
};
struct rpc_task_setup task_setup_data = {
.rpc_client = server->client,
.rpc_message = &msg,
.callback_ops = &nfs4_layoutget_call_ops,
.callback_data = lgp,
.flags = RPC_TASK_ASYNC,
};
struct pnfs_layout_segment *lseg = NULL;
int status = 0;
dprintk("--> %s\n", __func__);
lgp->args.layout.pages = nfs4_alloc_pages(max_pages, gfp_flags);
if (!lgp->args.layout.pages) {
nfs4_layoutget_release(lgp);
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
lgp->args.layout.pglen = max_pages * PAGE_SIZE;
lgp->res.layoutp = &lgp->args.layout;
lgp->res.seq_res.sr_slot = NULL;
nfs41_init_sequence(&lgp->args.seq_args, &lgp->res.seq_res, 0);
task = rpc_run_task(&task_setup_data);
if (IS_ERR(task))
return ERR_CAST(task);
status = nfs4_wait_for_completion_rpc_task(task);
if (status == 0)
status = task->tk_status;
if (status == 0)
lseg = pnfs_layout_process(lgp);
rpc_put_task(task);
dprintk("<-- %s status=%d\n", __func__, status);
if (status)
return ERR_PTR(status);
return lseg;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Check for buffer length in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
Commit 1f1ea6c "NFSv4: Fix buffer overflow checking in
__nfs4_get_acl_uncached" accidently dropped the checking for too small
result buffer length.
If someone uses getxattr on "system.nfs4_acl" on an NFSv4 mount
supporting ACLs, the ACL has not been cached and the buffer suplied is
too short, we still copy the complete ACL, resulting in kernel and user
space memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Sven Wegener <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 29,198
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: __be32 *nfs3svc_decode_fh(__be32 *p, struct svc_fh *fhp)
{
return decode_fh(p, fhp);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,269
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void ehci_wakeup(USBPort *port)
{
EHCIState *s = port->opaque;
uint32_t *portsc = &s->portsc[port->index];
if (*portsc & PORTSC_POWNER) {
USBPort *companion = s->companion_ports[port->index];
if (companion->ops->wakeup) {
companion->ops->wakeup(companion);
}
return;
}
if (*portsc & PORTSC_SUSPEND) {
trace_usb_ehci_port_wakeup(port->index);
*portsc |= PORTSC_FPRES;
ehci_raise_irq(s, USBSTS_PCD);
}
qemu_bh_schedule(s->async_bh);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 5,839
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void _ewk_frame_smart_set(Evas_Smart_Class* api)
{
evas_object_smart_clipped_smart_set(api);
api->add = _ewk_frame_smart_add;
api->del = _ewk_frame_smart_del;
api->resize = _ewk_frame_smart_resize;
}
Commit Message: [EFL] fast/frames/frame-crash-with-page-cache.html is crashing
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85879
Patch by Mikhail Pozdnyakov <[email protected]> on 2012-05-17
Reviewed by Noam Rosenthal.
Source/WebKit/efl:
_ewk_frame_smart_del() is considering now that the frame can be present in cache.
loader()->detachFromParent() is only applied for the main frame.
loader()->cancelAndClear() is not used anymore.
* ewk/ewk_frame.cpp:
(_ewk_frame_smart_del):
LayoutTests:
* platform/efl/test_expectations.txt: Removed fast/frames/frame-crash-with-page-cache.html.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117409 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 107,628
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int bcm_char_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
struct bcm_mini_adapter *Adapter = NULL;
struct bcm_tarang_data *pTarang = NULL;
Adapter = GET_BCM_ADAPTER(gblpnetdev);
pTarang = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bcm_tarang_data), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!pTarang)
return -ENOMEM;
pTarang->Adapter = Adapter;
pTarang->RxCntrlMsgBitMask = 0xFFFFFFFF & ~(1 << 0xB);
down(&Adapter->RxAppControlQueuelock);
pTarang->next = Adapter->pTarangs;
Adapter->pTarangs = pTarang;
up(&Adapter->RxAppControlQueuelock);
/* Store the Adapter structure */
filp->private_data = pTarang;
/* Start Queuing the control response Packets */
atomic_inc(&Adapter->ApplicationRunning);
nonseekable_open(inode, filp);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Staging: bcm: info leak in ioctl
The DevInfo.u32Reserved[] array isn't initialized so it leaks kernel
information to user space.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 29,460
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void gdImageFilledRectangle (gdImagePtr im, int x1, int y1, int x2, int y2, int color)
{
int x, y;
if (x1 == x2 && y1 == y2) {
gdImageSetPixel(im, x1, y1, color);
return;
}
if (x1 > x2) {
x = x1;
x1 = x2;
x2 = x;
}
if (y1 > y2) {
y = y1;
y1 = y2;
y2 = y;
}
if (x1 < 0) {
x1 = 0;
}
if (x2 >= gdImageSX(im)) {
x2 = gdImageSX(im) - 1;
}
if (y1 < 0) {
y1 = 0;
}
if (y2 >= gdImageSY(im)) {
y2 = gdImageSY(im) - 1;
}
for (y = y1; (y <= y2); y++) {
for (x = x1; (x <= x2); x++) {
gdImageSetPixel (im, x, y, color);
}
}
}
Commit Message: iFixed bug #72446 - Integer Overflow in gdImagePaletteToTrueColor() resulting in heap overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 51,439
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static inline MagickSizeType GetPSDSize(const PSDInfo *psd_info,Image *image)
{
if (psd_info->version == 1)
return((MagickSizeType) ReadBlobLong(image));
return((MagickSizeType) ReadBlobLongLong(image));
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/714
CWE ID: CWE-834
| 0
| 61,506
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: evdns_resolv_conf_parse(int flags, const char *const filename) {
if (!current_base)
current_base = evdns_base_new(NULL, 0);
return evdns_base_resolv_conf_parse(current_base, flags, filename);
}
Commit Message: evdns: fix searching empty hostnames
From #332:
Here follows a bug report by **Guido Vranken** via the _Tor bug bounty program_. Please credit Guido accordingly.
## Bug report
The DNS code of Libevent contains this rather obvious OOB read:
```c
static char *
search_make_new(const struct search_state *const state, int n, const char *const base_name) {
const size_t base_len = strlen(base_name);
const char need_to_append_dot = base_name[base_len - 1] == '.' ? 0 : 1;
```
If the length of ```base_name``` is 0, then line 3125 reads 1 byte before the buffer. This will trigger a crash on ASAN-protected builds.
To reproduce:
Build libevent with ASAN:
```
$ CFLAGS='-fomit-frame-pointer -fsanitize=address' ./configure && make -j4
```
Put the attached ```resolv.conf``` and ```poc.c``` in the source directory and then do:
```
$ gcc -fsanitize=address -fomit-frame-pointer poc.c .libs/libevent.a
$ ./a.out
=================================================================
==22201== ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60060000efdf at pc 0x4429da bp 0x7ffe1ed47300 sp 0x7ffe1ed472f8
READ of size 1 at 0x60060000efdf thread T0
```
P.S. we can add a check earlier, but since this is very uncommon, I didn't add it.
Fixes: #332
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 70,630
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void CSoundFile::RetrigNote(CHANNELINDEX nChn, int param, int offset)
{
ModChannel &chn = m_PlayState.Chn[nChn];
int retrigSpeed = param & 0x0F;
int16 retrigCount = chn.nRetrigCount;
bool doRetrig = false;
if(m_playBehaviour[kITRetrigger])
{
if(m_PlayState.m_nTickCount == 0 && chn.rowCommand.note)
{
chn.nRetrigCount = param & 0xf;
} else if(!chn.nRetrigCount || !--chn.nRetrigCount)
{
chn.nRetrigCount = param & 0xf;
doRetrig = true;
}
} else if(m_playBehaviour[kFT2Retrigger] && (param & 0x100))
{
if(m_SongFlags[SONG_FIRSTTICK])
{
if(chn.rowCommand.instr > 0 && chn.rowCommand.IsNoteOrEmpty()) retrigCount = 1;
if(chn.rowCommand.volcmd == VOLCMD_VOLUME && chn.rowCommand.vol != 0)
{
chn.nRetrigCount = retrigCount;
return;
}
}
if(retrigCount >= retrigSpeed)
{
if(!m_SongFlags[SONG_FIRSTTICK] || !chn.rowCommand.IsNote())
{
doRetrig = true;
retrigCount = 0;
}
}
} else
{
if (GetType() & (MOD_TYPE_S3M|MOD_TYPE_IT|MOD_TYPE_MPT))
{
if (!retrigSpeed) retrigSpeed = 1;
if ((retrigCount) && (!(retrigCount % retrigSpeed))) doRetrig = true;
retrigCount++;
} else if(GetType() == MOD_TYPE_MTM)
{
doRetrig = m_PlayState.m_nTickCount == static_cast<uint32>(param & 0x0F) && retrigSpeed != 0;
} else
{
int realspeed = retrigSpeed;
if ((param & 0x100) && (chn.rowCommand.volcmd == VOLCMD_VOLUME) && (chn.rowCommand.param & 0xF0)) realspeed++;
if(!m_SongFlags[SONG_FIRSTTICK] || (param & 0x100))
{
if (!realspeed) realspeed = 1;
if ((!(param & 0x100)) && (m_PlayState.m_nMusicSpeed) && (!(m_PlayState.m_nTickCount % realspeed))) doRetrig = true;
retrigCount++;
} else if (GetType() & (MOD_TYPE_XM|MOD_TYPE_MT2)) retrigCount = 0;
if (retrigCount >= realspeed)
{
if ((m_PlayState.m_nTickCount) || ((param & 0x100) && (!chn.rowCommand.note))) doRetrig = true;
}
if(m_playBehaviour[kFT2Retrigger] && param == 0)
{
doRetrig = (m_PlayState.m_nTickCount == 0);
}
}
}
if(chn.nLength == 0 && m_playBehaviour[kITShortSampleRetrig] && !chn.HasMIDIOutput())
{
return;
}
if(doRetrig)
{
uint32 dv = (param >> 4) & 0x0F;
int vol = chn.nVolume;
if (dv)
{
if(!m_playBehaviour[kFT2Retrigger] || !(chn.rowCommand.volcmd == VOLCMD_VOLUME))
{
if (retrigTable1[dv])
vol = (vol * retrigTable1[dv]) >> 4;
else
vol += ((int)retrigTable2[dv]) << 2;
}
Limit(vol, 0, 256);
chn.dwFlags.set(CHN_FASTVOLRAMP);
}
uint32 note = chn.nNewNote;
int32 oldPeriod = chn.nPeriod;
if (note >= NOTE_MIN && note <= NOTE_MAX && chn.nLength)
CheckNNA(nChn, 0, note, true);
bool resetEnv = false;
if(GetType() & (MOD_TYPE_XM | MOD_TYPE_MT2))
{
if((chn.rowCommand.instr) && (param < 0x100))
{
InstrumentChange(&chn, chn.rowCommand.instr, false, false);
resetEnv = true;
}
if (param < 0x100) resetEnv = true;
}
bool fading = chn.dwFlags[CHN_NOTEFADE];
NoteChange(&chn, note, m_playBehaviour[kITRetrigger], resetEnv);
if(fading && GetType() == MOD_TYPE_XM)
chn.dwFlags.set(CHN_NOTEFADE);
chn.nVolume = vol;
if(m_nInstruments)
{
chn.rowCommand.note = static_cast<ModCommand::NOTE>(note); // No retrig without note...
#ifndef NO_PLUGINS
ProcessMidiOut(nChn); //Send retrig to Midi
#endif // NO_PLUGINS
}
if ((GetType() & (MOD_TYPE_IT|MOD_TYPE_MPT)) && (!chn.rowCommand.note) && (oldPeriod)) chn.nPeriod = oldPeriod;
if (!(GetType() & (MOD_TYPE_S3M|MOD_TYPE_IT|MOD_TYPE_MPT))) retrigCount = 0;
if(m_playBehaviour[kITRetrigger]) chn.position.Set(0);
offset--;
if(offset >= 0 && offset <= static_cast<int>(CountOf(chn.pModSample->cues)) && chn.pModSample != nullptr)
{
if(offset == 0) offset = chn.oldOffset;
else offset = chn.oldOffset = chn.pModSample->cues[offset - 1];
SampleOffset(chn, offset);
}
}
if(m_playBehaviour[kFT2Retrigger] && (param & 0x100)) retrigCount++;
if(!m_playBehaviour[kITRetrigger])
chn.nRetrigCount = retrigCount;
}
Commit Message: [Fix] Possible out-of-bounds read when computing length of some IT files with pattern loops (OpenMPT: formats that are converted to IT, libopenmpt: IT/ITP/MO3), caught with afl-fuzz.
git-svn-id: https://source.openmpt.org/svn/openmpt/trunk/OpenMPT@10027 56274372-70c3-4bfc-bfc3-4c3a0b034d27
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 83,333
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::BeginNavigation(
const CommonNavigationParams& common_params,
mojom::BeginNavigationParamsPtr begin_params,
blink::mojom::BlobURLTokenPtr blob_url_token) {
if (!is_active())
return;
TRACE_EVENT2("navigation", "RenderFrameHostImpl::BeginNavigation",
"frame_tree_node", frame_tree_node_->frame_tree_node_id(), "url",
common_params.url.possibly_invalid_spec());
CommonNavigationParams validated_params = common_params;
GetProcess()->FilterURL(false, &validated_params.url);
if (!validated_params.base_url_for_data_url.is_empty()) {
bad_message::ReceivedBadMessage(
GetProcess(), bad_message::RFH_BASE_URL_FOR_DATA_URL_SPECIFIED);
return;
}
GetProcess()->FilterURL(true, &begin_params->searchable_form_url);
if (!ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance()->CanReadRequestBody(
GetSiteInstance(), validated_params.post_data)) {
bad_message::ReceivedBadMessage(GetProcess(),
bad_message::RFH_ILLEGAL_UPLOAD_PARAMS);
return;
}
if (validated_params.url.SchemeIs(kChromeErrorScheme)) {
mojo::ReportBadMessage("Renderer cannot request error page URLs directly");
return;
}
if (blob_url_token && !validated_params.url.SchemeIsBlob()) {
mojo::ReportBadMessage("Blob URL Token, but not a blob: URL");
return;
}
scoped_refptr<network::SharedURLLoaderFactory> blob_url_loader_factory;
if (blob_url_token) {
blob_url_loader_factory =
ChromeBlobStorageContext::URLLoaderFactoryForToken(
GetSiteInstance()->GetBrowserContext(), std::move(blob_url_token));
}
if (waiting_for_init_) {
pending_navigate_ = std::make_unique<PendingNavigation>(
validated_params, std::move(begin_params),
std::move(blob_url_loader_factory));
return;
}
frame_tree_node()->navigator()->OnBeginNavigation(
frame_tree_node(), validated_params, std::move(begin_params),
std::move(blob_url_loader_factory));
}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 155,971
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: int nlmsg_total_size(int payload)
{
return NLMSG_ALIGN(nlmsg_msg_size(payload));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 12,934
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: hook_modifier (struct t_weechat_plugin *plugin, const char *modifier,
t_hook_callback_modifier *callback, void *callback_data)
{
struct t_hook *new_hook;
struct t_hook_modifier *new_hook_modifier;
int priority;
const char *ptr_modifier;
if (!modifier || !modifier[0] || !callback)
return NULL;
new_hook = malloc (sizeof (*new_hook));
if (!new_hook)
return NULL;
new_hook_modifier = malloc (sizeof (*new_hook_modifier));
if (!new_hook_modifier)
{
free (new_hook);
return NULL;
}
hook_get_priority_and_name (modifier, &priority, &ptr_modifier);
hook_init_data (new_hook, plugin, HOOK_TYPE_MODIFIER, priority,
callback_data);
new_hook->hook_data = new_hook_modifier;
new_hook_modifier->callback = callback;
new_hook_modifier->modifier = strdup ((ptr_modifier) ? ptr_modifier : modifier);
hook_add_to_list (new_hook);
return new_hook;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 7,311
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: R_API int r_flag_relocate(RFlag *f, ut64 off, ut64 off_mask, ut64 to) {
ut64 neg_mask = ~(off_mask);
RFlagItem *item;
RListIter *iter;
int n = 0;
r_list_foreach (f->flags, iter, item) {
ut64 fn = item->offset & neg_mask;
ut64 on = off & neg_mask;
if (fn == on) {
ut64 fm = item->offset & off_mask;
ut64 om = to & off_mask;
item->offset = (to&neg_mask) + fm + om;
n++;
}
}
return n;
}
Commit Message: Fix crash in wasm disassembler
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 60,485
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: explicit ParseQualifiedNameResult(QualifiedNameStatus status)
: status(status) {}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 129,813
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: __nvmet_fc_fod_op_abort(struct nvmet_fc_fcp_iod *fod, bool abort)
{
struct nvmefc_tgt_fcp_req *fcpreq = fod->fcpreq;
struct nvmet_fc_tgtport *tgtport = fod->tgtport;
/* if in the middle of an io and we need to tear down */
if (abort) {
if (fcpreq->op == NVMET_FCOP_WRITEDATA) {
nvmet_req_complete(&fod->req, NVME_SC_INTERNAL);
return true;
}
nvmet_fc_abort_op(tgtport, fod);
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: nvmet-fc: ensure target queue id within range.
When searching for queue id's ensure they are within the expected range.
Signed-off-by: James Smart <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 93,578
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void jswrap_graphics_setFontAlign(JsVar *parent, int x, int y, int r) {
JsGraphics gfx; if (!graphicsGetFromVar(&gfx, parent)) return;
if (x<-1) x=-1;
if (x>1) x=1;
if (y<-1) y=-1;
if (y>1) y=1;
if (r<0) r=0;
if (r>3) r=3;
gfx.data.fontAlignX = x;
gfx.data.fontAlignY = y;
gfx.data.fontRotate = r;
graphicsSetVar(&gfx);
}
Commit Message: Add height check for Graphics.createArrayBuffer(...vertical_byte:true) (fix #1421)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 82,582
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: callout_name_table_clear(CalloutNameTable* t)
{
if (IS_NOT_NULL(t)) {
onig_st_foreach(t, i_free_callout_name_entry, 0);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fix #147: Stack Exhaustion Problem caused by some parsing functions in regcomp.c making recursive calls to themselves.
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 87,848
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: smp_fetch_fhdr_cnt(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private)
{
struct hdr_idx *idx;
struct hdr_ctx ctx;
const struct http_msg *msg;
int cnt;
const char *name = NULL;
int len = 0;
if (args && args->type == ARGT_STR) {
name = args->data.str.str;
len = args->data.str.len;
}
CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST();
idx = &smp->strm->txn->hdr_idx;
msg = ((smp->opt & SMP_OPT_DIR) == SMP_OPT_DIR_REQ) ? &smp->strm->txn->req : &smp->strm->txn->rsp;
ctx.idx = 0;
cnt = 0;
while (http_find_full_header2(name, len, msg->chn->buf->p, idx, &ctx))
cnt++;
smp->data.type = SMP_T_SINT;
smp->data.u.sint = cnt;
smp->flags = SMP_F_VOL_HDR;
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 6,905
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: util_fatal(const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list ap;
va_start(ap, fmt);
fprintf(stderr, "error: ");
vfprintf(stderr, fmt, ap);
fprintf(stderr, "\nAborting.\n");
va_end(ap);
sc_notify_close();
exit(1);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 78,896
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: zone_get_layer(int zone_index)
{
struct map_zone* zone;
zone = vector_get(s_map->zones, zone_index);
return zone->layer;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c (#268)
* Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c
There's a buffer overflow bug in the function layer_resize. It allocates
a buffer `tilemap` with size `x_size * y_size * sizeof(struct map_tile)`.
But it didn't check for integer overflow, so if x_size and y_size are
very large, it's possible that the buffer size is smaller than needed,
causing a buffer overflow later.
PoC: `SetLayerSize(0, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF);`
* move malloc to a separate line
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 75,134
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: mailimf_resent_date_parse(const char * message, size_t length,
size_t * indx, struct mailimf_orig_date ** result)
{
struct mailimf_orig_date * orig_date;
struct mailimf_date_time * date_time;
size_t cur_token;
int r;
int res;
cur_token = * indx;
r = mailimf_token_case_insensitive_parse(message, length,
&cur_token, "Resent-Date");
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
res = r;
goto err;
}
r = mailimf_colon_parse(message, length, &cur_token);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
res = r;
goto err;
}
r = mailimf_date_time_parse(message, length, &cur_token, &date_time);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
res = r;
goto err;
}
r = mailimf_unstrict_crlf_parse(message, length, &cur_token);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
res = r;
goto free_date_time;
}
orig_date = mailimf_orig_date_new(date_time);
if (orig_date == NULL) {
res = MAILIMF_ERROR_MEMORY;
goto free_date_time;
}
* result = orig_date;
* indx = cur_token;
return MAILIMF_NO_ERROR;
free_date_time:
mailimf_date_time_free(date_time);
err:
return res;
}
Commit Message: Fixed crash #274
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 66,229
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: __GLXcontext *__glXLookupContextByTag(__GLXclientState *cl, GLXContextTag tag)
{
int num = cl->numCurrentContexts;
if (tag < 1 || tag > num) {
return 0;
} else {
return cl->currentContexts[tag-1];
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 14,184
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int sched_group_set_rt_runtime(struct task_group *tg, long rt_runtime_us)
{
u64 rt_runtime, rt_period;
rt_period = ktime_to_ns(tg->rt_bandwidth.rt_period);
rt_runtime = (u64)rt_runtime_us * NSEC_PER_USEC;
if (rt_runtime_us < 0)
rt_runtime = RUNTIME_INF;
return tg_set_rt_bandwidth(tg, rt_period, rt_runtime);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <[email protected]>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 55,612
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void perf_event_free_filter(struct perf_event *event)
{
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 26,082
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
{
if (
/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
/*
* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
* during re-negotiation:
*/
&& ((s->session->peer == NULL) ||
!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
/*
* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
* section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
* RFC 2246):
*/
&& (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
/*
* ... except when the application insists on
* verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
* this for SSL 3)
*/
|| (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
/* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
/*
* With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
* are omitted
*/
&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 12,738
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int xhci_submit(XHCIState *xhci, XHCITransfer *xfer, XHCIEPContext *epctx)
{
uint64_t mfindex;
DPRINTF("xhci_submit(slotid=%d,epid=%d)\n", xfer->slotid, xfer->epid);
xfer->in_xfer = epctx->type>>2;
switch(epctx->type) {
case ET_INTR_OUT:
case ET_INTR_IN:
xfer->pkts = 0;
xfer->iso_xfer = false;
xfer->timed_xfer = true;
mfindex = xhci_mfindex_get(xhci);
xhci_calc_intr_kick(xhci, xfer, epctx, mfindex);
xhci_check_intr_iso_kick(xhci, xfer, epctx, mfindex);
if (xfer->running_retry) {
return -1;
}
break;
case ET_BULK_OUT:
case ET_BULK_IN:
xfer->pkts = 0;
xfer->iso_xfer = false;
xfer->timed_xfer = false;
break;
case ET_ISO_OUT:
case ET_ISO_IN:
xfer->pkts = 1;
xfer->iso_xfer = true;
xfer->timed_xfer = true;
mfindex = xhci_mfindex_get(xhci);
xhci_calc_iso_kick(xhci, xfer, epctx, mfindex);
xhci_check_intr_iso_kick(xhci, xfer, epctx, mfindex);
if (xfer->running_retry) {
return -1;
}
break;
default:
trace_usb_xhci_unimplemented("endpoint type", epctx->type);
return -1;
}
if (xhci_setup_packet(xfer) < 0) {
return -1;
}
usb_handle_packet(xfer->packet.ep->dev, &xfer->packet);
xhci_complete_packet(xfer);
if (!xfer->running_async && !xfer->running_retry) {
xhci_kick_ep(xhci, xfer->slotid, xfer->epid, xfer->streamid);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 8,347
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void vmx_set_rvi(int vector)
{
u16 status;
u8 old;
status = vmcs_read16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS);
old = (u8)status & 0xff;
if ((u8)vector != old) {
status &= ~0xff;
status |= (u8)vector;
vmcs_write16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS, status);
}
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Petr Matousek <[email protected]>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 37,305
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void FeatureInfo::EnableOESTextureHalfFloatLinear() {
if (!oes_texture_half_float_linear_available_)
return;
AddExtensionString("GL_OES_texture_half_float_linear");
feature_flags_.enable_texture_half_float_linear = true;
feature_flags_.gpu_memory_buffer_formats.Add(gfx::BufferFormat::RGBA_F16);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,169
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: blink::WebLocalFrame* FrameReference::GetFrame() {
if (view_ == nullptr || frame_ == nullptr)
return nullptr;
for (blink::WebFrame* frame = view_->MainFrame(); frame != nullptr;
frame = frame->TraverseNext()) {
if (frame == frame_)
return frame_;
}
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,094
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void LayoutBlockFlow::layoutBlock(bool relayoutChildren)
{
ASSERT(needsLayout());
ASSERT(isInlineBlockOrInlineTable() || !isInline());
m_hasOnlySelfCollapsingChildren = false;
if (!relayoutChildren && simplifiedLayout())
return;
LayoutAnalyzer::BlockScope analyzer(*this);
SubtreeLayoutScope layoutScope(*this);
bool done = false;
LayoutUnit pageLogicalHeight = 0;
while (!done)
done = layoutBlockFlow(relayoutChildren, pageLogicalHeight, layoutScope);
LayoutView* layoutView = view();
if (layoutView->layoutState()->pageLogicalHeight())
setPageLogicalOffset(layoutView->layoutState()->pageLogicalOffset(*this, logicalTop()));
updateLayerTransformAfterLayout();
updateScrollInfoAfterLayout();
if (m_paintInvalidationLogicalTop != m_paintInvalidationLogicalBottom) {
bool hasVisibleContent = style()->visibility() == VISIBLE;
if (!hasVisibleContent) {
PaintLayer* layer = enclosingLayer();
layer->updateDescendantDependentFlags();
hasVisibleContent = layer->hasVisibleContent();
}
if (hasVisibleContent)
setShouldInvalidateOverflowForPaint();
}
if (isHTMLDialogElement(node()) && isOutOfFlowPositioned())
positionDialog();
clearNeedsLayout();
}
Commit Message: Consistently check if a block can handle pagination strut propagation.
https://codereview.chromium.org/1360753002 got it right for inline child
layout, but did nothing for block child layout.
BUG=329421
[email protected],[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1387553002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#352429}
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 123,003
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: WebContentsImpl::WebContentsImpl(BrowserContext* browser_context)
: delegate_(NULL),
controller_(this, browser_context),
render_view_host_delegate_view_(NULL),
created_with_opener_(false),
frame_tree_(new NavigatorImpl(&controller_, this),
this,
this,
this,
this),
node_(this),
is_load_to_different_document_(false),
crashed_status_(base::TERMINATION_STATUS_STILL_RUNNING),
crashed_error_code_(0),
waiting_for_response_(false),
load_state_(net::LOAD_STATE_IDLE, base::string16()),
upload_size_(0),
upload_position_(0),
is_resume_pending_(false),
interstitial_page_(nullptr),
has_accessed_initial_document_(false),
theme_color_(SK_ColorTRANSPARENT),
last_sent_theme_color_(SK_ColorTRANSPARENT),
did_first_visually_non_empty_paint_(false),
capturer_count_(0),
should_normally_be_visible_(true),
should_normally_be_occluded_(false),
did_first_set_visible_(false),
is_being_destroyed_(false),
is_notifying_observers_(false),
notify_disconnection_(false),
dialog_manager_(NULL),
is_showing_before_unload_dialog_(false),
last_active_time_(base::TimeTicks::Now()),
closed_by_user_gesture_(false),
minimum_zoom_percent_(static_cast<int>(kMinimumZoomFactor * 100)),
maximum_zoom_percent_(static_cast<int>(kMaximumZoomFactor * 100)),
zoom_scroll_remainder_(0),
fullscreen_widget_process_id_(ChildProcessHost::kInvalidUniqueID),
fullscreen_widget_routing_id_(MSG_ROUTING_NONE),
fullscreen_widget_had_focus_at_shutdown_(false),
is_subframe_(false),
force_disable_overscroll_content_(false),
last_dialog_suppressed_(false),
geolocation_context_(new device::GeolocationContext()),
accessibility_mode_(
BrowserAccessibilityStateImpl::GetInstance()->accessibility_mode()),
audio_stream_monitor_(this),
bluetooth_connected_device_count_(0),
virtual_keyboard_requested_(false),
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
page_scale_factor_is_one_(true),
#endif // !defined(OS_ANDROID)
mouse_lock_widget_(nullptr),
is_overlay_content_(false),
showing_context_menu_(false),
loading_weak_factory_(this),
weak_factory_(this) {
frame_tree_.SetFrameRemoveListener(
base::Bind(&WebContentsImpl::OnFrameRemoved,
base::Unretained(this)));
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
media_web_contents_observer_.reset(new MediaWebContentsObserverAndroid(this));
#else
media_web_contents_observer_.reset(new MediaWebContentsObserver(this));
#endif
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PLUGINS)
pepper_playback_observer_.reset(new PepperPlaybackObserver(this));
#endif
loader_io_thread_notifier_.reset(new LoaderIOThreadNotifier(this));
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
host_zoom_map_observer_.reset(new HostZoomMapObserver(this));
#endif // !defined(OS_ANDROID)
}
Commit Message: If a page shows a popup, end fullscreen.
This was implemented in Blink r159834, but it is susceptible
to a popup/fullscreen race. This CL reverts that implementation
and re-implements it in WebContents.
BUG=752003
TEST=WebContentsImplBrowserTest.PopupsFromJavaScriptEndFullscreen
Change-Id: Ia345cdeda273693c3231ad8f486bebfc3d83927f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/606987
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498171}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 150,913
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: mailimf_optional_field_parse(const char * message, size_t length,
size_t * indx,
struct mailimf_optional_field ** result)
{
char * name;
char * value;
struct mailimf_optional_field * optional_field;
size_t cur_token;
int r;
int res;
cur_token = * indx;
r = mailimf_field_name_parse(message, length, &cur_token, &name);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
res = r;
goto err;
}
r = mailimf_colon_parse(message, length, &cur_token);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
res = r;
goto free_name;
}
r = mailimf_unstructured_parse(message, length, &cur_token, &value);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
res = r;
goto free_name;
}
r = mailimf_unstrict_crlf_parse(message, length, &cur_token);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
res = r;
goto free_value;
}
optional_field = mailimf_optional_field_new(name, value);
if (optional_field == NULL) {
res = MAILIMF_ERROR_MEMORY;
goto free_value;
}
* result = optional_field;
* indx = cur_token;
return MAILIMF_NO_ERROR;
free_value:
mailimf_unstructured_free(value);
free_name:
mailimf_field_name_free(name);
err:
return res;
}
Commit Message: Fixed crash #274
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 66,215
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void SocketStream::Delegate::OnSSLCertificateError(
SocketStream* socket,
const SSLInfo& ssl_info,
bool fatal) {
socket->CancelWithSSLError(ssl_info);
}
Commit Message: Revert a workaround commit for a Use-After-Free crash.
Revert a workaround commit r20158 for a Use-After-Free issue (http://crbug.com/244746) because a cleaner CL r207218 is landed.
URLRequestContext does not inherit SupportsWeakPtr now.
R=mmenke
BUG=244746
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16870008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@207811 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 112,707
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void InspectorPageAgent::DomContentLoadedEventFired(LocalFrame* frame) {
double timestamp = MonotonicallyIncreasingTime();
if (frame == inspected_frames_->Root())
GetFrontend()->domContentEventFired(timestamp);
GetFrontend()->lifecycleEvent(IdentifiersFactory::FrameId(frame),
"DOMContentLoaded", timestamp);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 138,559
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: int main(int argc, char** argv)
{
/* Kernel starts us with all fd's closed.
* But it's dangerous:
* fprintf(stderr) can dump messages into random fds, etc.
* Ensure that if any of fd 0,1,2 is closed, we open it to /dev/null.
*/
int fd = xopen("/dev/null", O_RDWR);
while (fd < 2)
fd = xdup(fd);
if (fd > 2)
close(fd);
if (argc < 8)
{
/* percent specifier: %s %c %p %u %g %t %e %h */
/* argv: [0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]*/
error_msg_and_die("Usage: %s SIGNO CORE_SIZE_LIMIT PID UID GID TIME BINARY_NAME [HOSTNAME]", argv[0]);
}
/* Not needed on 2.6.30.
* At least 2.6.18 has a bug where
* argv[1] = "SIGNO CORE_SIZE_LIMIT PID ..."
* argv[2] = "CORE_SIZE_LIMIT PID ..."
* and so on. Fixing it:
*/
if (strchr(argv[1], ' '))
{
int i;
for (i = 1; argv[i]; i++)
{
strchrnul(argv[i], ' ')[0] = '\0';
}
}
logmode = LOGMODE_JOURNAL;
/* Parse abrt.conf */
load_abrt_conf();
/* ... and plugins/CCpp.conf */
bool setting_MakeCompatCore;
bool setting_SaveBinaryImage;
{
map_string_t *settings = new_map_string();
load_abrt_plugin_conf_file("CCpp.conf", settings);
const char *value;
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "MakeCompatCore");
setting_MakeCompatCore = value && string_to_bool(value);
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "SaveBinaryImage");
setting_SaveBinaryImage = value && string_to_bool(value);
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "VerboseLog");
if (value)
g_verbose = xatoi_positive(value);
free_map_string(settings);
}
errno = 0;
const char* signal_str = argv[1];
int signal_no = xatoi_positive(signal_str);
off_t ulimit_c = strtoull(argv[2], NULL, 10);
if (ulimit_c < 0) /* unlimited? */
{
/* set to max possible >0 value */
ulimit_c = ~((off_t)1 << (sizeof(off_t)*8-1));
}
const char *pid_str = argv[3];
pid_t pid = xatoi_positive(argv[3]);
uid_t uid = xatoi_positive(argv[4]);
if (errno || pid <= 0)
{
perror_msg_and_die("PID '%s' or limit '%s' is bogus", argv[3], argv[2]);
}
{
char *s = xmalloc_fopen_fgetline_fclose(VAR_RUN"/abrt/saved_core_pattern");
/* If we have a saved pattern and it's not a "|PROG ARGS" thing... */
if (s && s[0] != '|')
core_basename = s;
else
free(s);
}
struct utsname uts;
if (!argv[8]) /* no HOSTNAME? */
{
uname(&uts);
argv[8] = uts.nodename;
}
char path[PATH_MAX];
int src_fd_binary = -1;
char *executable = get_executable(pid, setting_SaveBinaryImage ? &src_fd_binary : NULL);
if (executable && strstr(executable, "/abrt-hook-ccpp"))
{
error_msg_and_die("PID %lu is '%s', not dumping it to avoid recursion",
(long)pid, executable);
}
user_pwd = get_cwd(pid); /* may be NULL on error */
log_notice("user_pwd:'%s'", user_pwd);
sprintf(path, "/proc/%lu/status", (long)pid);
proc_pid_status = xmalloc_xopen_read_close(path, /*maxsz:*/ NULL);
uid_t fsuid = uid;
uid_t tmp_fsuid = get_fsuid();
int suid_policy = dump_suid_policy();
if (tmp_fsuid != uid)
{
/* use root for suided apps unless it's explicitly set to UNSAFE */
fsuid = 0;
if (suid_policy == DUMP_SUID_UNSAFE)
{
fsuid = tmp_fsuid;
}
}
/* Open a fd to compat coredump, if requested and is possible */
if (setting_MakeCompatCore && ulimit_c != 0)
/* note: checks "user_pwd == NULL" inside; updates core_basename */
user_core_fd = open_user_core(uid, fsuid, pid, &argv[1]);
if (executable == NULL)
{
/* readlink on /proc/$PID/exe failed, don't create abrt dump dir */
error_msg("Can't read /proc/%lu/exe link", (long)pid);
goto create_user_core;
}
const char *signame = NULL;
switch (signal_no)
{
case SIGILL : signame = "ILL" ; break;
case SIGFPE : signame = "FPE" ; break;
case SIGSEGV: signame = "SEGV"; break;
case SIGBUS : signame = "BUS" ; break; //Bus error (bad memory access)
case SIGABRT: signame = "ABRT"; break; //usually when abort() was called
case SIGTRAP: signame = "TRAP"; break; //Trace/breakpoint trap
default: goto create_user_core; // not a signal we care about
}
if (!daemon_is_ok())
{
/* not an error, exit with exit code 0 */
log("abrtd is not running. If it crashed, "
"/proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern contains a stale value, "
"consider resetting it to 'core'"
);
goto create_user_core;
}
if (g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize > 0)
{
/* If free space is less than 1/4 of MaxCrashReportsSize... */
if (low_free_space(g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize, g_settings_dump_location))
goto create_user_core;
}
/* Check /var/tmp/abrt/last-ccpp marker, do not dump repeated crashes
* if they happen too often. Else, write new marker value.
*/
snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/last-ccpp", g_settings_dump_location);
if (check_recent_crash_file(path, executable))
{
/* It is a repeating crash */
goto create_user_core;
}
const char *last_slash = strrchr(executable, '/');
if (last_slash && strncmp(++last_slash, "abrt", 4) == 0)
{
/* If abrtd/abrt-foo crashes, we don't want to create a _directory_,
* since that can make new copy of abrtd to process it,
* and maybe crash again...
* Unlike dirs, mere files are ignored by abrtd.
*/
snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/%s-coredump", g_settings_dump_location, last_slash);
int abrt_core_fd = xopen3(path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0600);
off_t core_size = copyfd_eof(STDIN_FILENO, abrt_core_fd, COPYFD_SPARSE);
if (core_size < 0 || fsync(abrt_core_fd) != 0)
{
unlink(path);
/* copyfd_eof logs the error including errno string,
* but it does not log file name */
error_msg_and_die("Error saving '%s'", path);
}
log("Saved core dump of pid %lu (%s) to %s (%llu bytes)", (long)pid, executable, path, (long long)core_size);
return 0;
}
unsigned path_len = snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/ccpp-%s-%lu.new",
g_settings_dump_location, iso_date_string(NULL), (long)pid);
if (path_len >= (sizeof(path) - sizeof("/"FILENAME_COREDUMP)))
{
goto create_user_core;
}
/* use fsuid instead of uid, so we don't expose any sensitive
* information of suided app in /var/tmp/abrt
*/
dd = dd_create(path, fsuid, DEFAULT_DUMP_DIR_MODE);
if (dd)
{
char *rootdir = get_rootdir(pid);
dd_create_basic_files(dd, fsuid, NULL);
char source_filename[sizeof("/proc/%lu/somewhat_long_name") + sizeof(long)*3];
int source_base_ofs = sprintf(source_filename, "/proc/%lu/smaps", (long)pid);
source_base_ofs -= strlen("smaps");
char *dest_filename = concat_path_file(dd->dd_dirname, "also_somewhat_longish_name");
char *dest_base = strrchr(dest_filename, '/') + 1;
strcpy(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "maps");
strcpy(dest_base, FILENAME_MAPS);
copy_file_ext(source_filename, dest_filename, 0640, dd->dd_uid, dd->dd_gid, O_RDONLY, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_EXCL);
strcpy(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "limits");
strcpy(dest_base, FILENAME_LIMITS);
copy_file_ext(source_filename, dest_filename, 0640, dd->dd_uid, dd->dd_gid, O_RDONLY, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_EXCL);
strcpy(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "cgroup");
strcpy(dest_base, FILENAME_CGROUP);
copy_file_ext(source_filename, dest_filename, 0640, dd->dd_uid, dd->dd_gid, O_RDONLY, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_EXCL);
strcpy(dest_base, FILENAME_OPEN_FDS);
dump_fd_info(dest_filename, source_filename, source_base_ofs, dd->dd_uid, dd->dd_gid);
free(dest_filename);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_ANALYZER, "CCpp");
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_TYPE, "CCpp");
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_EXECUTABLE, executable);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_PID, pid_str);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_PROC_PID_STATUS, proc_pid_status);
if (user_pwd)
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_PWD, user_pwd);
if (rootdir)
{
if (strcmp(rootdir, "/") != 0)
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_ROOTDIR, rootdir);
}
char *reason = xasprintf("%s killed by SIG%s",
last_slash, signame ? signame : signal_str);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_REASON, reason);
free(reason);
char *cmdline = get_cmdline(pid);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_CMDLINE, cmdline ? : "");
free(cmdline);
char *environ = get_environ(pid);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_ENVIRON, environ ? : "");
free(environ);
char *fips_enabled = xmalloc_fopen_fgetline_fclose("/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled");
if (fips_enabled)
{
if (strcmp(fips_enabled, "0") != 0)
dd_save_text(dd, "fips_enabled", fips_enabled);
free(fips_enabled);
}
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_ABRT_VERSION, VERSION);
if (src_fd_binary > 0)
{
strcpy(path + path_len, "/"FILENAME_BINARY);
int dst_fd = create_or_die(path);
off_t sz = copyfd_eof(src_fd_binary, dst_fd, COPYFD_SPARSE);
if (fsync(dst_fd) != 0 || close(dst_fd) != 0 || sz < 0)
{
dd_delete(dd);
error_msg_and_die("Error saving '%s'", path);
}
close(src_fd_binary);
}
strcpy(path + path_len, "/"FILENAME_COREDUMP);
int abrt_core_fd = create_or_die(path);
/* We write both coredumps at once.
* We can't write user coredump first, since it might be truncated
* and thus can't be copied and used as abrt coredump;
* and if we write abrt coredump first and then copy it as user one,
* then we have a race when process exits but coredump does not exist yet:
* $ echo -e '#include<signal.h>\nmain(){raise(SIGSEGV);}' | gcc -o test -x c -
* $ rm -f core*; ulimit -c unlimited; ./test; ls -l core*
* 21631 Segmentation fault (core dumped) ./test
* ls: cannot access core*: No such file or directory <=== BAD
*/
off_t core_size = copyfd_sparse(STDIN_FILENO, abrt_core_fd, user_core_fd, ulimit_c);
if (fsync(abrt_core_fd) != 0 || close(abrt_core_fd) != 0 || core_size < 0)
{
unlink(path);
dd_delete(dd);
if (user_core_fd >= 0)
{
xchdir(user_pwd);
unlink(core_basename);
}
/* copyfd_sparse logs the error including errno string,
* but it does not log file name */
error_msg_and_die("Error writing '%s'", path);
}
if (user_core_fd >= 0
/* error writing user coredump? */
&& (fsync(user_core_fd) != 0 || close(user_core_fd) != 0
/* user coredump is too big? */
|| (ulimit_c == 0 /* paranoia */ || core_size > ulimit_c)
)
) {
/* nuke it (silently) */
xchdir(user_pwd);
unlink(core_basename);
}
/* Because of #1211835 and #1126850 */
#if 0
/* Save JVM crash log if it exists. (JVM's coredump per se
* is nearly useless for JVM developers)
*/
{
char *java_log = xasprintf("/tmp/jvm-%lu/hs_error.log", (long)pid);
int src_fd = open(java_log, O_RDONLY);
free(java_log);
/* If we couldn't open the error log in /tmp directory we can try to
* read the log from the current directory. It may produce AVC, it
* may produce some error log but all these are expected.
*/
if (src_fd < 0)
{
java_log = xasprintf("%s/hs_err_pid%lu.log", user_pwd, (long)pid);
src_fd = open(java_log, O_RDONLY);
free(java_log);
}
if (src_fd >= 0)
{
strcpy(path + path_len, "/hs_err.log");
int dst_fd = create_or_die(path);
off_t sz = copyfd_eof(src_fd, dst_fd, COPYFD_SPARSE);
if (close(dst_fd) != 0 || sz < 0)
{
dd_delete(dd);
error_msg_and_die("Error saving '%s'", path);
}
close(src_fd);
}
}
#endif
/* We close dumpdir before we start catering for crash storm case.
* Otherwise, delete_dump_dir's from other concurrent
* CCpp's won't be able to delete our dump (their delete_dump_dir
* will wait for us), and we won't be able to delete their dumps.
* Classic deadlock.
*/
dd_close(dd);
path[path_len] = '\0'; /* path now contains only directory name */
char *newpath = xstrndup(path, path_len - (sizeof(".new")-1));
if (rename(path, newpath) == 0)
strcpy(path, newpath);
free(newpath);
log("Saved core dump of pid %lu (%s) to %s (%llu bytes)", (long)pid, executable, path, (long long)core_size);
notify_new_path(path);
/* rhbz#539551: "abrt going crazy when crashing process is respawned" */
if (g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize > 0)
{
/* x1.25 and round up to 64m: go a bit up, so that usual in-daemon trimming
* kicks in first, and we don't "fight" with it:
*/
unsigned maxsize = g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize + g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize / 4;
maxsize |= 63;
trim_problem_dirs(g_settings_dump_location, maxsize * (double)(1024*1024), path);
}
free(rootdir);
return 0;
}
/* We didn't create abrt dump, but may need to create compat coredump */
create_user_core:
if (user_core_fd >= 0)
{
off_t core_size = copyfd_size(STDIN_FILENO, user_core_fd, ulimit_c, COPYFD_SPARSE);
if (fsync(user_core_fd) != 0 || close(user_core_fd) != 0 || core_size < 0)
{
/* perror first, otherwise unlink may trash errno */
perror_msg("Error writing '%s'", full_core_basename);
xchdir(user_pwd);
unlink(core_basename);
return 1;
}
if (ulimit_c == 0 || core_size > ulimit_c)
{
xchdir(user_pwd);
unlink(core_basename);
return 1;
}
log("Saved core dump of pid %lu to %s (%llu bytes)", (long)pid, full_core_basename, (long long)core_size);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ccpp: open file for dump_fd_info with O_EXCL
To avoid possible races.
Related: #1211835
Signed-off-by: Jakub Filak <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 96,298
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void ACodec::BaseState::onInputBufferFilled(const sp<AMessage> &msg) {
IOMX::buffer_id bufferID;
CHECK(msg->findInt32("buffer-id", (int32_t*)&bufferID));
sp<ABuffer> buffer;
int32_t err = OK;
bool eos = false;
PortMode mode = getPortMode(kPortIndexInput);
if (!msg->findBuffer("buffer", &buffer)) {
/* these are unfilled buffers returned by client */
CHECK(msg->findInt32("err", &err));
if (err == OK) {
/* buffers with no errors are returned on MediaCodec.flush */
mode = KEEP_BUFFERS;
} else {
ALOGV("[%s] saw error %d instead of an input buffer",
mCodec->mComponentName.c_str(), err);
eos = true;
}
buffer.clear();
}
int32_t tmp;
if (buffer != NULL && buffer->meta()->findInt32("eos", &tmp) && tmp) {
eos = true;
err = ERROR_END_OF_STREAM;
}
BufferInfo *info = mCodec->findBufferByID(kPortIndexInput, bufferID);
BufferInfo::Status status = BufferInfo::getSafeStatus(info);
if (status != BufferInfo::OWNED_BY_UPSTREAM) {
ALOGE("Wrong ownership in IBF: %s(%d) buffer #%u", _asString(status), status, bufferID);
mCodec->dumpBuffers(kPortIndexInput);
mCodec->signalError(OMX_ErrorUndefined, FAILED_TRANSACTION);
return;
}
info->mStatus = BufferInfo::OWNED_BY_US;
switch (mode) {
case KEEP_BUFFERS:
{
if (eos) {
if (!mCodec->mPortEOS[kPortIndexInput]) {
mCodec->mPortEOS[kPortIndexInput] = true;
mCodec->mInputEOSResult = err;
}
}
break;
}
case RESUBMIT_BUFFERS:
{
if (buffer != NULL && !mCodec->mPortEOS[kPortIndexInput]) {
if (buffer->size() == 0 && !eos) {
postFillThisBuffer(info);
break;
}
int64_t timeUs;
CHECK(buffer->meta()->findInt64("timeUs", &timeUs));
OMX_U32 flags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_ENDOFFRAME;
int32_t isCSD;
if (buffer->meta()->findInt32("csd", &isCSD) && isCSD != 0) {
flags |= OMX_BUFFERFLAG_CODECCONFIG;
}
if (eos) {
flags |= OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
}
if (buffer != info->mData) {
ALOGV("[%s] Needs to copy input data for buffer %u. (%p != %p)",
mCodec->mComponentName.c_str(),
bufferID,
buffer.get(), info->mData.get());
if (buffer->size() > info->mData->capacity()) {
ALOGE("data size (%zu) is greated than buffer capacity (%zu)",
buffer->size(), // this is the data received
info->mData->capacity()); // this is out buffer size
mCodec->signalError(OMX_ErrorUndefined, FAILED_TRANSACTION);
return;
}
memcpy(info->mData->data(), buffer->data(), buffer->size());
}
if (flags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_CODECCONFIG) {
ALOGV("[%s] calling emptyBuffer %u w/ codec specific data",
mCodec->mComponentName.c_str(), bufferID);
} else if (flags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
ALOGV("[%s] calling emptyBuffer %u w/ EOS",
mCodec->mComponentName.c_str(), bufferID);
} else {
#if TRACK_BUFFER_TIMING
ALOGI("[%s] calling emptyBuffer %u w/ time %lld us",
mCodec->mComponentName.c_str(), bufferID, (long long)timeUs);
#else
ALOGV("[%s] calling emptyBuffer %u w/ time %lld us",
mCodec->mComponentName.c_str(), bufferID, (long long)timeUs);
#endif
}
#if TRACK_BUFFER_TIMING
ACodec::BufferStats stats;
stats.mEmptyBufferTimeUs = ALooper::GetNowUs();
stats.mFillBufferDoneTimeUs = -1ll;
mCodec->mBufferStats.add(timeUs, stats);
#endif
if (mCodec->storingMetadataInDecodedBuffers()) {
PortMode outputMode = getPortMode(kPortIndexOutput);
ALOGV("MetadataBuffersToSubmit=%u portMode=%s",
mCodec->mMetadataBuffersToSubmit,
(outputMode == FREE_BUFFERS ? "FREE" :
outputMode == KEEP_BUFFERS ? "KEEP" : "RESUBMIT"));
if (outputMode == RESUBMIT_BUFFERS) {
mCodec->submitOutputMetadataBuffer();
}
}
info->checkReadFence("onInputBufferFilled");
status_t err2 = mCodec->mOMX->emptyBuffer(
mCodec->mNode,
bufferID,
0,
buffer->size(),
flags,
timeUs,
info->mFenceFd);
info->mFenceFd = -1;
if (err2 != OK) {
mCodec->signalError(OMX_ErrorUndefined, makeNoSideEffectStatus(err2));
return;
}
info->mStatus = BufferInfo::OWNED_BY_COMPONENT;
if (!eos && err == OK) {
getMoreInputDataIfPossible();
} else {
ALOGV("[%s] Signalled EOS (%d) on the input port",
mCodec->mComponentName.c_str(), err);
mCodec->mPortEOS[kPortIndexInput] = true;
mCodec->mInputEOSResult = err;
}
} else if (!mCodec->mPortEOS[kPortIndexInput]) {
if (err != OK && err != ERROR_END_OF_STREAM) {
ALOGV("[%s] Signalling EOS on the input port due to error %d",
mCodec->mComponentName.c_str(), err);
} else {
ALOGV("[%s] Signalling EOS on the input port",
mCodec->mComponentName.c_str());
}
ALOGV("[%s] calling emptyBuffer %u signalling EOS",
mCodec->mComponentName.c_str(), bufferID);
info->checkReadFence("onInputBufferFilled");
status_t err2 = mCodec->mOMX->emptyBuffer(
mCodec->mNode,
bufferID,
0,
0,
OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS,
0,
info->mFenceFd);
info->mFenceFd = -1;
if (err2 != OK) {
mCodec->signalError(OMX_ErrorUndefined, makeNoSideEffectStatus(err2));
return;
}
info->mStatus = BufferInfo::OWNED_BY_COMPONENT;
mCodec->mPortEOS[kPortIndexInput] = true;
mCodec->mInputEOSResult = err;
}
break;
}
case FREE_BUFFERS:
break;
default:
ALOGE("invalid port mode: %d", mode);
break;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix initialization of AAC presentation struct
Otherwise the new size checks trip on this.
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I1f8f01097e3a88ff041b69279a6121be842f1766
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 164,081
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: bool RenderBox::avoidsFloats() const
{
return isReplaced() || hasOverflowClip() || isHR() || isLegend() || isWritingModeRoot() || isDeprecatedFlexItem();
}
Commit Message: Source/WebCore: Fix for bug 64046 - Wrong image height in absolutely positioned div in
relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <[email protected]> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
Test: fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
LayoutTests: Test to cover absolutely positioned child with percentage height
in relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <[email protected]> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@91533 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 101,534
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static struct sk_buff **sit_ip6ip6_gro_receive(struct sk_buff **head,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
/* Common GRO receive for SIT and IP6IP6 */
if (NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->encap_mark) {
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush = 1;
return NULL;
}
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->encap_mark = 1;
return ipv6_gro_receive(head, skb);
}
Commit Message: ipv6: Prevent overrun when parsing v6 header options
The KASAN warning repoted below was discovered with a syzkaller
program. The reproducer is basically:
int s = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_RAW, NEXTHDR_HOP);
send(s, &one_byte_of_data, 1, MSG_MORE);
send(s, &more_than_mtu_bytes_data, 2000, 0);
The socket() call sets the nexthdr field of the v6 header to
NEXTHDR_HOP, the first send call primes the payload with a non zero
byte of data, and the second send call triggers the fragmentation path.
The fragmentation code tries to parse the header options in order
to figure out where to insert the fragment option. Since nexthdr points
to an invalid option, the calculation of the size of the network header
can made to be much larger than the linear section of the skb and data
is read outside of it.
This fix makes ip6_find_1stfrag return an error if it detects
running out-of-bounds.
[ 42.361487] ==================================================================
[ 42.364412] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730
[ 42.365471] Read of size 840 at addr ffff88000969e798 by task ip6_fragment-oo/3789
[ 42.366469]
[ 42.366696] CPU: 1 PID: 3789 Comm: ip6_fragment-oo Not tainted 4.11.0+ #41
[ 42.367628] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.1-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 42.368824] Call Trace:
[ 42.369183] dump_stack+0xb3/0x10b
[ 42.369664] print_address_description+0x73/0x290
[ 42.370325] kasan_report+0x252/0x370
[ 42.370839] ? ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730
[ 42.371396] check_memory_region+0x13c/0x1a0
[ 42.371978] memcpy+0x23/0x50
[ 42.372395] ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730
[ 42.372920] ? nf_ct_expect_unregister_notifier+0x110/0x110
[ 42.373681] ? ip6_copy_metadata+0x7f0/0x7f0
[ 42.374263] ? ip6_forward+0x2e30/0x2e30
[ 42.374803] ip6_finish_output+0x584/0x990
[ 42.375350] ip6_output+0x1b7/0x690
[ 42.375836] ? ip6_finish_output+0x990/0x990
[ 42.376411] ? ip6_fragment+0x3730/0x3730
[ 42.376968] ip6_local_out+0x95/0x160
[ 42.377471] ip6_send_skb+0xa1/0x330
[ 42.377969] ip6_push_pending_frames+0xb3/0xe0
[ 42.378589] rawv6_sendmsg+0x2051/0x2db0
[ 42.379129] ? rawv6_bind+0x8b0/0x8b0
[ 42.379633] ? _copy_from_user+0x84/0xe0
[ 42.380193] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290
[ 42.380878] ? ___sys_sendmsg+0x162/0x930
[ 42.381427] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa3/0x120
[ 42.382074] ? sock_has_perm+0x1f6/0x290
[ 42.382614] ? ___sys_sendmsg+0x167/0x930
[ 42.383173] ? lock_downgrade+0x660/0x660
[ 42.383727] inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500
[ 42.384226] ? inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500
[ 42.384748] ? inet_recvmsg+0x540/0x540
[ 42.385263] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110
[ 42.385758] SYSC_sendto+0x217/0x380
[ 42.386249] ? SYSC_connect+0x310/0x310
[ 42.386783] ? __might_fault+0x110/0x1d0
[ 42.387324] ? lock_downgrade+0x660/0x660
[ 42.387880] ? __fget_light+0xa1/0x1f0
[ 42.388403] ? __fdget+0x18/0x20
[ 42.388851] ? sock_common_setsockopt+0x95/0xd0
[ 42.389472] ? SyS_setsockopt+0x17f/0x260
[ 42.390021] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x5/0xbe
[ 42.390650] SyS_sendto+0x40/0x50
[ 42.391103] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
[ 42.391731] RIP: 0033:0x7fbbb711e383
[ 42.392217] RSP: 002b:00007ffff4d34f28 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
[ 42.393235] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fbbb711e383
[ 42.394195] RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: 00007ffff4d34f60 RDI: 0000000000000003
[ 42.395145] RBP: 0000000000000046 R08: 00007ffff4d34f40 R09: 0000000000000018
[ 42.396056] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400aad
[ 42.396598] R13: 0000000000000066 R14: 00007ffff4d34ee0 R15: 00007fbbb717af00
[ 42.397257]
[ 42.397411] Allocated by task 3789:
[ 42.397702] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
[ 42.398005] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[ 42.398267] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
[ 42.398548] kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20
[ 42.398848] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xcb/0x380
[ 42.399224] __kmalloc_reserve.isra.32+0x41/0xe0
[ 42.399654] __alloc_skb+0xf8/0x580
[ 42.400003] sock_wmalloc+0xab/0xf0
[ 42.400346] __ip6_append_data.isra.41+0x2472/0x33d0
[ 42.400813] ip6_append_data+0x1a8/0x2f0
[ 42.401122] rawv6_sendmsg+0x11ee/0x2db0
[ 42.401505] inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500
[ 42.401860] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110
[ 42.402209] ___sys_sendmsg+0x7cb/0x930
[ 42.402582] __sys_sendmsg+0xd9/0x190
[ 42.402941] SyS_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50
[ 42.403273] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
[ 42.403718]
[ 42.403871] Freed by task 1794:
[ 42.404146] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
[ 42.404515] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[ 42.404827] kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0
[ 42.405167] kfree+0xe8/0x2b0
[ 42.405462] skb_free_head+0x74/0xb0
[ 42.405806] skb_release_data+0x30e/0x3a0
[ 42.406198] skb_release_all+0x4a/0x60
[ 42.406563] consume_skb+0x113/0x2e0
[ 42.406910] skb_free_datagram+0x1a/0xe0
[ 42.407288] netlink_recvmsg+0x60d/0xe40
[ 42.407667] sock_recvmsg+0xd7/0x110
[ 42.408022] ___sys_recvmsg+0x25c/0x580
[ 42.408395] __sys_recvmsg+0xd6/0x190
[ 42.408753] SyS_recvmsg+0x2d/0x50
[ 42.409086] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
[ 42.409513]
[ 42.409665] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88000969e780
[ 42.409665] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512
[ 42.410846] The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of
[ 42.410846] 512-byte region [ffff88000969e780, ffff88000969e980)
[ 42.411941] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 42.412405] page:ffffea000025a780 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping: (null) index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
[ 42.413298] flags: 0x100000000008100(slab|head)
[ 42.413729] raw: 0100000000008100 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001800c000c
[ 42.414387] raw: ffffea00002a9500 0000000900000007 ffff88000c401280 0000000000000000
[ 42.415074] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 42.415604]
[ 42.415757] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 42.416222] ffff88000969e880: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 42.416904] ffff88000969e900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 42.417591] >ffff88000969e980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 42.418273] ^
[ 42.418588] ffff88000969ea00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 42.419273] ffff88000969ea80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 42.419882] ==================================================================
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Craig Gallek <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 65,179
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: check_auth (const struct url *u, char *user, char *passwd, struct response *resp,
struct request *req, bool *ntlm_seen_ref, bool *retry,
bool *basic_auth_finished_ref, bool *auth_finished_ref)
{
uerr_t auth_err = RETROK;
bool basic_auth_finished = *basic_auth_finished_ref;
bool auth_finished = *auth_finished_ref;
bool ntlm_seen = *ntlm_seen_ref;
*retry = false;
if (!auth_finished && (user && passwd))
{
/* IIS sends multiple copies of WWW-Authenticate, one with
the value "negotiate", and other(s) with data. Loop over
all the occurrences and pick the one we recognize. */
int wapos;
char *buf;
const char *www_authenticate = NULL;
const char *wabeg, *waend;
const char *digest = NULL, *basic = NULL, *ntlm = NULL;
for (wapos = 0; !ntlm
&& (wapos = resp_header_locate (resp, "WWW-Authenticate", wapos,
&wabeg, &waend)) != -1;
++wapos)
{
param_token name, value;
BOUNDED_TO_ALLOCA (wabeg, waend, buf);
www_authenticate = buf;
for (;!ntlm;)
{
/* extract the auth-scheme */
while (c_isspace (*www_authenticate)) www_authenticate++;
name.e = name.b = www_authenticate;
while (*name.e && !c_isspace (*name.e)) name.e++;
if (name.b == name.e)
break;
DEBUGP (("Auth scheme found '%.*s'\n", (int) (name.e - name.b), name.b));
if (known_authentication_scheme_p (name.b, name.e))
{
if (BEGINS_WITH (name.b, "NTLM"))
{
ntlm = name.b;
break; /* this is the most secure challenge, stop here */
}
else if (!digest && BEGINS_WITH (name.b, "Digest"))
digest = name.b;
else if (!basic && BEGINS_WITH (name.b, "Basic"))
basic = name.b;
}
/* now advance over the auth-params */
www_authenticate = name.e;
DEBUGP (("Auth param list '%s'\n", www_authenticate));
while (extract_param (&www_authenticate, &name, &value, ',', NULL) && name.b && value.b)
{
DEBUGP (("Auth param %.*s=%.*s\n",
(int) (name.e - name.b), name.b, (int) (value.e - value.b), value.b));
}
}
}
if (!basic && !digest && !ntlm)
{
/* If the authentication header is missing or
unrecognized, there's no sense in retrying. */
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Unknown authentication scheme.\n"));
}
else if (!basic_auth_finished
|| !basic)
{
char *pth = url_full_path (u);
const char *value;
uerr_t *auth_stat;
auth_stat = xmalloc (sizeof (uerr_t));
*auth_stat = RETROK;
if (ntlm)
www_authenticate = ntlm;
else if (digest)
www_authenticate = digest;
else
www_authenticate = basic;
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Authentication selected: %s\n"), www_authenticate);
value = create_authorization_line (www_authenticate,
user, passwd,
request_method (req),
pth,
&auth_finished,
auth_stat);
auth_err = *auth_stat;
if (auth_err == RETROK)
{
request_set_header (req, "Authorization", value, rel_value);
if (BEGINS_WITH (www_authenticate, "NTLM"))
ntlm_seen = true;
else if (!u->user && BEGINS_WITH (www_authenticate, "Basic"))
{
/* Need to register this host as using basic auth,
* so we automatically send creds next time. */
register_basic_auth_host (u->host);
}
xfree (pth);
xfree (auth_stat);
*retry = true;
goto cleanup;
}
else
{
/* Creating the Authorization header went wrong */
}
}
else
{
/* We already did Basic auth, and it failed. Gotta
* give up. */
}
}
cleanup:
*ntlm_seen_ref = ntlm_seen;
*basic_auth_finished_ref = basic_auth_finished;
*auth_finished_ref = auth_finished;
return auth_err;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 15,470
|
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.