instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
235k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: bool Editor::CanDelete() const {
FrameSelection& selection = GetFrame().Selection();
return selection.ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTreeDeprecated().IsRange() &&
selection.ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTree().RootEditableElement();
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 124,657
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void __init ping_init(void)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < PING_HTABLE_SIZE; i++)
INIT_HLIST_NULLS_HEAD(&ping_table.hash[i], i);
rwlock_init(&ping_table.lock);
}
Commit Message: ping: prevent NULL pointer dereference on write to msg_name
A plain read() on a socket does set msg->msg_name to NULL. So check for
NULL pointer first.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 28,372
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType DecodeImage(Image *image,const ssize_t opacity,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
int
c;
LZWInfo
*lzw_info;
size_t
pass;
ssize_t
index,
offset,
y;
unsigned char
data_size;
/*
Allocate decoder tables.
*/
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
data_size=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (data_size > MaximumLZWBits)
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage",image->filename);
lzw_info=AcquireLZWInfo(image,data_size);
if (lzw_info == (LZWInfo *) NULL)
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
pass=0;
offset=0;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register ssize_t
x;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,offset,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; )
{
c=ReadBlobLZWByte(lzw_info);
if (c < 0)
break;
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(ssize_t) c,exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,(Quantum) index,q);
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,image->colormap+index,q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,index == opacity ? TransparentAlpha : OpaqueAlpha,q);
x++;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (x < (ssize_t) image->columns)
break;
if (image->interlace == NoInterlace)
offset++;
else
{
switch (pass)
{
case 0:
default:
{
offset+=8;
break;
}
case 1:
{
offset+=8;
break;
}
case 2:
{
offset+=4;
break;
}
case 3:
{
offset+=2;
break;
}
}
if ((pass == 0) && (offset >= (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
pass++;
offset=4;
}
if ((pass == 1) && (offset >= (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
pass++;
offset=2;
}
if ((pass == 2) && (offset >= (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
pass++;
offset=1;
}
}
}
lzw_info=RelinquishLZWInfo(lzw_info);
if (y < (ssize_t) image->rows)
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage",image->filename);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/592
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 60,563
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::GetTexParameterImpl(
GLenum target, GLenum pname, GLfloat* fparams, GLint* iparams,
const char* function_name) {
TextureRef* texture_ref = texture_manager()->GetTextureInfoForTarget(
&state_, target);
if (!texture_ref) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION, function_name, "unknown texture for target");
return;
}
Texture* texture = texture_ref->texture();
switch (pname) {
case GL_TEXTURE_MAX_ANISOTROPY_EXT:
if (workarounds().init_texture_max_anisotropy) {
texture->InitTextureMaxAnisotropyIfNeeded(target);
}
break;
case GL_TEXTURE_IMMUTABLE_LEVELS:
if (gl_version_info().IsLowerThanGL(4, 2)) {
GLint levels = texture->GetImmutableLevels();
if (fparams) {
fparams[0] = static_cast<GLfloat>(levels);
} else {
iparams[0] = levels;
}
return;
}
break;
case GL_TEXTURE_BASE_LEVEL:
if (fparams) {
fparams[0] = static_cast<GLfloat>(texture->unclamped_base_level());
} else {
iparams[0] = texture->unclamped_base_level();
}
return;
case GL_TEXTURE_MAX_LEVEL:
if (fparams) {
fparams[0] = static_cast<GLfloat>(texture->unclamped_max_level());
} else {
iparams[0] = texture->unclamped_max_level();
}
return;
case GL_TEXTURE_SWIZZLE_R:
if (fparams) {
fparams[0] = static_cast<GLfloat>(texture->swizzle_r());
} else {
iparams[0] = texture->swizzle_r();
}
return;
case GL_TEXTURE_SWIZZLE_G:
if (fparams) {
fparams[0] = static_cast<GLfloat>(texture->swizzle_g());
} else {
iparams[0] = texture->swizzle_g();
}
return;
case GL_TEXTURE_SWIZZLE_B:
if (fparams) {
fparams[0] = static_cast<GLfloat>(texture->swizzle_b());
} else {
iparams[0] = texture->swizzle_b();
}
return;
case GL_TEXTURE_SWIZZLE_A:
if (fparams) {
fparams[0] = static_cast<GLfloat>(texture->swizzle_a());
} else {
iparams[0] = texture->swizzle_a();
}
return;
default:
break;
}
if (fparams) {
api()->glGetTexParameterfvFn(target, pname, fparams);
} else {
api()->glGetTexParameterivFn(target, pname, iparams);
}
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,493
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void FrameFetchContext::DispatchNetworkQuiet() {
if (WebServiceWorkerNetworkProvider* service_worker_network_provider =
MasterDocumentLoader()->GetServiceWorkerNetworkProvider()) {
service_worker_network_provider->DispatchNetworkQuiet();
}
}
Commit Message: Do not forward resource timing to parent frame after back-forward navigation
LocalFrame has |should_send_resource_timing_info_to_parent_| flag not to
send timing info to parent except for the first navigation. This flag is
cleared when the first timing is sent to parent, however this does not happen
if iframe's first navigation was by back-forward navigation. For such
iframes, we shouldn't send timings to parent at all.
Bug: 876822
Change-Id: I128b51a82ef278c439548afc8283ae63abdef5c5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1186215
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#585736}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 145,802
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void check_thread_timers(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct list_head *firing)
{
struct list_head *timers = tsk->cpu_timers;
struct task_cputime *tsk_expires = &tsk->cputime_expires;
u64 expires;
unsigned long soft;
if (dl_task(tsk))
check_dl_overrun(tsk);
/*
* If cputime_expires is zero, then there are no active
* per thread CPU timers.
*/
if (task_cputime_zero(&tsk->cputime_expires))
return;
expires = check_timers_list(timers, firing, prof_ticks(tsk));
tsk_expires->prof_exp = expires;
expires = check_timers_list(++timers, firing, virt_ticks(tsk));
tsk_expires->virt_exp = expires;
tsk_expires->sched_exp = check_timers_list(++timers, firing,
tsk->se.sum_exec_runtime);
/*
* Check for the special case thread timers.
*/
soft = task_rlimit(tsk, RLIMIT_RTTIME);
if (soft != RLIM_INFINITY) {
unsigned long hard = task_rlimit_max(tsk, RLIMIT_RTTIME);
if (hard != RLIM_INFINITY &&
tsk->rt.timeout > DIV_ROUND_UP(hard, USEC_PER_SEC/HZ)) {
/*
* At the hard limit, we just die.
* No need to calculate anything else now.
*/
if (print_fatal_signals) {
pr_info("CPU Watchdog Timeout (hard): %s[%d]\n",
tsk->comm, task_pid_nr(tsk));
}
__group_send_sig_info(SIGKILL, SEND_SIG_PRIV, tsk);
return;
}
if (tsk->rt.timeout > DIV_ROUND_UP(soft, USEC_PER_SEC/HZ)) {
/*
* At the soft limit, send a SIGXCPU every second.
*/
if (soft < hard) {
soft += USEC_PER_SEC;
tsk->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_RTTIME].rlim_cur =
soft;
}
if (print_fatal_signals) {
pr_info("RT Watchdog Timeout (soft): %s[%d]\n",
tsk->comm, task_pid_nr(tsk));
}
__group_send_sig_info(SIGXCPU, SEND_SIG_PRIV, tsk);
}
}
if (task_cputime_zero(tsk_expires))
tick_dep_clear_task(tsk, TICK_DEP_BIT_POSIX_TIMER);
}
Commit Message: posix-timers: Sanitize overrun handling
The posix timer overrun handling is broken because the forwarding functions
can return a huge number of overruns which does not fit in an int. As a
consequence timer_getoverrun(2) and siginfo::si_overrun can turn into
random number generators.
The k_clock::timer_forward() callbacks return a 64 bit value now. Make
k_itimer::ti_overrun[_last] 64bit as well, so the kernel internal
accounting is correct. 3Remove the temporary (int) casts.
Add a helper function which clamps the overrun value returned to user space
via timer_getoverrun(2) or siginfo::si_overrun limited to a positive value
between 0 and INT_MAX. INT_MAX is an indicator for user space that the
overrun value has been clamped.
Reported-by: Team OWL337 <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Acked-by: John Stultz <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <[email protected]>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 81,097
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void free_rootdomain(struct rcu_head *rcu)
{
struct root_domain *rd = container_of(rcu, struct root_domain, rcu);
cpupri_cleanup(&rd->cpupri);
free_cpumask_var(rd->rto_mask);
free_cpumask_var(rd->online);
free_cpumask_var(rd->span);
kfree(rd);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 26,283
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, canWrite)
{
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETURN_BOOL(!PHAR_G(readonly));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 4,361
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: bool canCollapseMarginAfterWithLastChild() const { return m_canCollapseMarginAfterWithLastChild; }
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 116,333
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: bool InspectorNetworkAgent::FetchResourceContent(Document* document,
const KURL& url,
String* content,
bool* base64_encoded) {
DCHECK(document);
DCHECK(IsMainThread());
Resource* cached_resource = document->Fetcher()->CachedResource(url);
if (!cached_resource) {
cached_resource = GetMemoryCache()->ResourceForURL(
url, document->Fetcher()->GetCacheIdentifier());
}
if (cached_resource && InspectorPageAgent::CachedResourceContent(
cached_resource, content, base64_encoded))
return true;
for (auto& resource : resources_data_->Resources()) {
if (resource->RequestedURL() == url) {
*content = resource->Content();
*base64_encoded = resource->Base64Encoded();
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 138,502
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int csnmp_read_host(user_data_t *ud) {
host_definition_t *host;
int status;
int success;
int i;
host = ud->data;
if (host->interval == 0)
host->interval = plugin_get_interval();
if (host->sess_handle == NULL)
csnmp_host_open_session(host);
if (host->sess_handle == NULL)
return (-1);
success = 0;
for (i = 0; i < host->data_list_len; i++) {
data_definition_t *data = host->data_list[i];
if (data->is_table)
status = csnmp_read_table(host, data);
else
status = csnmp_read_value(host, data);
if (status == 0)
success++;
}
if (success == 0)
return (-1);
return (0);
} /* int csnmp_read_host */
Commit Message: snmp plugin: Fix double free of request PDU
snmp_sess_synch_response() always frees request PDU, in both case of request
error and success. If error condition occurs inside of `while (status == 0)`
loop, double free of `req` happens.
Issue: #2291
Signed-off-by: Florian Forster <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 59,681
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: int kvmppc_emulate_mmio(struct kvm_run *run, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
enum emulation_result er;
int r;
er = kvmppc_emulate_loadstore(vcpu);
switch (er) {
case EMULATE_DONE:
/* Future optimization: only reload non-volatiles if they were
* actually modified. */
r = RESUME_GUEST_NV;
break;
case EMULATE_AGAIN:
r = RESUME_GUEST;
break;
case EMULATE_DO_MMIO:
run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_MMIO;
/* We must reload nonvolatiles because "update" load/store
* instructions modify register state. */
/* Future optimization: only reload non-volatiles if they were
* actually modified. */
r = RESUME_HOST_NV;
break;
case EMULATE_FAIL:
{
u32 last_inst;
kvmppc_get_last_inst(vcpu, INST_GENERIC, &last_inst);
/* XXX Deliver Program interrupt to guest. */
pr_emerg("%s: emulation failed (%08x)\n", __func__, last_inst);
r = RESUME_HOST;
break;
}
default:
WARN_ON(1);
r = RESUME_GUEST;
}
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: PPC: Fix oops when checking KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM
The following program causes a kernel oops:
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <linux/kvm.h>
main()
{
int fd = open("/dev/kvm", O_RDWR);
ioctl(fd, KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION, KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM);
}
This happens because when using the global KVM fd with
KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION, kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension() gets
called with a NULL kvm argument, which gets dereferenced
in is_kvmppc_hv_enabled(). Spotted while reading the code.
Let's use the hv_enabled fallback variable, like everywhere
else in this function.
Fixes: 23528bb21ee2 ("KVM: PPC: Introduce KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM")
Cc: [email protected] # v4.7+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Gibson <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 60,542
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void sctp_shutdown(struct sock *sk, int how)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
struct sctp_endpoint *ep;
if (!sctp_style(sk, TCP))
return;
ep = sctp_sk(sk)->ep;
if (how & SEND_SHUTDOWN && !list_empty(&ep->asocs)) {
struct sctp_association *asoc;
sk->sk_state = SCTP_SS_CLOSING;
asoc = list_entry(ep->asocs.next,
struct sctp_association, asocs);
sctp_primitive_SHUTDOWN(net, asoc, NULL);
}
}
Commit Message: sctp: do not peel off an assoc from one netns to another one
Now when peeling off an association to the sock in another netns, all
transports in this assoc are not to be rehashed and keep use the old
key in hashtable.
As a transport uses sk->net as the hash key to insert into hashtable,
it would miss removing these transports from hashtable due to the new
netns when closing the sock and all transports are being freeed, then
later an use-after-free issue could be caused when looking up an asoc
and dereferencing those transports.
This is a very old issue since very beginning, ChunYu found it with
syzkaller fuzz testing with this series:
socket$inet6_sctp()
bind$inet6()
sendto$inet6()
unshare(0x40000000)
getsockopt$inet_sctp6_SCTP_GET_ASSOC_ID_LIST()
getsockopt$inet_sctp6_SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF()
This patch is to block this call when peeling one assoc off from one
netns to another one, so that the netns of all transport would not
go out-sync with the key in hashtable.
Note that this patch didn't fix it by rehashing transports, as it's
difficult to handle the situation when the tuple is already in use
in the new netns. Besides, no one would like to peel off one assoc
to another netns, considering ipaddrs, ifaces, etc. are usually
different.
Reported-by: ChunYu Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 60,699
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void svm_set_virtual_x2apic_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool set)
{
return;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 37,905
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: gfx::Size Launcher::DelegateView::GetPreferredSize() {
return child_count() > 0 ? child_at(0)->GetPreferredSize() : gfx::Size();
}
Commit Message: ash: Add launcher overflow bubble.
- Host a LauncherView in bubble to display overflown items;
- Mouse wheel and two-finger scroll to scroll the LauncherView in bubble in case overflow bubble is overflown;
- Fit bubble when items are added/removed;
- Keep launcher bar on screen when the bubble is shown;
BUG=128054
TEST=Verify launcher overflown items are in a bubble instead of menu.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10659003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146460 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 106,205
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void LauncherView::GetOverflowItems(std::vector<LauncherItem>* items) {
int index = 0;
while (index < view_model_->view_size() &&
view_model_->view_at(index)->visible()) {
index++;
}
while (index < view_model_->view_size()) {
const LauncherItem& item = model_->items()[index];
if (item.type == TYPE_TABBED ||
item.type == TYPE_APP_PANEL ||
item.type == TYPE_APP_SHORTCUT)
items->push_back(item);
index++;
}
}
Commit Message: ash: Add launcher overflow bubble.
- Host a LauncherView in bubble to display overflown items;
- Mouse wheel and two-finger scroll to scroll the LauncherView in bubble in case overflow bubble is overflown;
- Fit bubble when items are added/removed;
- Keep launcher bar on screen when the bubble is shown;
BUG=128054
TEST=Verify launcher overflown items are in a bubble instead of menu.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10659003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146460 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 106,237
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void ReceivedAckImpl(bool prevent_defaulted) {
scoped_ptr<ui::TouchEvent> event(queue_.front());
dispatcher_->ProcessedTouchEvent(event.get(), window_,
prevent_defaulted ? ui::ER_HANDLED : ui::ER_UNHANDLED);
queue_.pop();
}
Commit Message: Pass ui::LatencyInfo correct with unified gesture detector on Aura.
BUG=379812
TEST=GestureRecognizerTest.LatencyPassedFromTouchEvent
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/309823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@274602 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 112,080
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int asf_read_metadata(AVFormatContext *s, const char *title, uint16_t len,
unsigned char *ch, uint16_t buflen)
{
AVIOContext *pb = s->pb;
avio_get_str16le(pb, len, ch, buflen);
if (ch[0]) {
if (av_dict_set(&s->metadata, title, ch, 0) < 0)
av_log(s, AV_LOG_WARNING, "av_dict_set failed.\n");
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/asfdec_o: Check size_bmp more fully
Fixes: integer overflow and out of array access
Fixes: asfo-crash-46080c4341572a7137a162331af77f6ded45cbd7
Found-by: Paul Ch <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 74,873
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: _compare_path_table(const void *v1, const void *v2)
{
const struct isoent *p1, *p2;
const char *s1, *s2;
int cmp, l;
p1 = *((const struct isoent **)(uintptr_t)v1);
p2 = *((const struct isoent **)(uintptr_t)v2);
/* Compare parent directory number */
cmp = p1->parent->dir_number - p2->parent->dir_number;
if (cmp != 0)
return (cmp);
/* Compare indetifier */
s1 = p1->identifier;
s2 = p2->identifier;
l = p1->ext_off;
if (l > p2->ext_off)
l = p2->ext_off;
cmp = strncmp(s1, s2, l);
if (cmp != 0)
return (cmp);
if (p1->ext_off < p2->ext_off) {
s2 += l;
l = p2->ext_off - p1->ext_off;
while (l--)
if (0x20 != *s2++)
return (0x20
- *(const unsigned char *)(s2 - 1));
} else if (p1->ext_off > p2->ext_off) {
s1 += l;
l = p1->ext_off - p2->ext_off;
while (l--)
if (0x20 != *s1++)
return (*(const unsigned char *)(s1 - 1)
- 0x20);
}
return (0);
}
Commit Message: Issue 711: Be more careful about verifying filename lengths when writing ISO9660 archives
* Don't cast size_t to int, since this can lead to overflow
on machines where sizeof(int) < sizeof(size_t)
* Check a + b > limit by writing it as
a > limit || b > limit || a + b > limit
to avoid problems when a + b wraps around.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 50,780
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static struct sk_buff *xfrm_policy_netlink(struct sk_buff *in_skb,
struct xfrm_policy *xp,
int dir, u32 seq)
{
struct xfrm_dump_info info;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int err;
skb = nlmsg_new(NLMSG_DEFAULT_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!skb)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
info.in_skb = in_skb;
info.out_skb = skb;
info.nlmsg_seq = seq;
info.nlmsg_flags = 0;
err = dump_one_policy(xp, dir, 0, &info);
if (err) {
kfree_skb(skb);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
return skb;
}
Commit Message: xfrm_user: fix info leak in copy_to_user_auth()
copy_to_user_auth() fails to initialize the remainder of alg_name and
therefore discloses up to 54 bytes of heap memory via netlink to
userland.
Use strncpy() instead of strcpy() to fill the trailing bytes of alg_name
with null bytes.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 34,248
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: FlateStream::FlateStream(Stream *strA, int predictor, int columns,
int colors, int bits):
FilterStream(strA) {
if (predictor != 1) {
pred = new StreamPredictor(this, predictor, columns, colors, bits);
if (!pred->isOk()) {
delete pred;
pred = NULL;
}
} else {
pred = NULL;
}
litCodeTab.codes = NULL;
distCodeTab.codes = NULL;
memset(buf, 0, flateWindow);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 3,905
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void Document::UpdateStyleInvalidationIfNeeded() {
DCHECK(IsActive());
ScriptForbiddenScope forbid_script;
if (!ChildNeedsStyleInvalidation() && !NeedsStyleInvalidation())
return;
TRACE_EVENT0("blink", "Document::updateStyleInvalidationIfNeeded");
GetStyleEngine().GetStyleInvalidator().Invalidate(*this);
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 134,190
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: internal_ipc_get_reply(crm_ipc_t * client, int request_id, int ms_timeout)
{
time_t timeout = time(NULL) + 1 + (ms_timeout / 1000);
int rc = 0;
crm_ipc_init();
/* get the reply */
crm_trace("client %s waiting on reply to msg id %d", client->name, request_id);
do {
rc = qb_ipcc_recv(client->ipc, client->buffer, client->buf_size, 1000);
if (rc > 0) {
struct crm_ipc_response_header *hdr = NULL;
int rc = crm_ipc_decompress(client);
if (rc != pcmk_ok) {
return rc;
}
hdr = (struct crm_ipc_response_header *)(void*)client->buffer;
if (hdr->qb.id == request_id) {
/* Got it */
break;
} else if (hdr->qb.id < request_id) {
xmlNode *bad = string2xml(crm_ipc_buffer(client));
crm_err("Discarding old reply %d (need %d)", hdr->qb.id, request_id);
crm_log_xml_notice(bad, "OldIpcReply");
} else {
xmlNode *bad = string2xml(crm_ipc_buffer(client));
crm_err("Discarding newer reply %d (need %d)", hdr->qb.id, request_id);
crm_log_xml_notice(bad, "ImpossibleReply");
CRM_ASSERT(hdr->qb.id <= request_id);
}
} else if (crm_ipc_connected(client) == FALSE) {
crm_err("Server disconnected client %s while waiting for msg id %d", client->name,
request_id);
break;
}
} while (time(NULL) < timeout);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: High: libcrmcommon: fix CVE-2016-7035 (improper IPC guarding)
It was discovered that at some not so uncommon circumstances, some
pacemaker daemons could be talked to, via libqb-facilitated IPC, by
unprivileged clients due to flawed authorization decision. Depending
on the capabilities of affected daemons, this might equip unauthorized
user with local privilege escalation or up to cluster-wide remote
execution of possibly arbitrary commands when such user happens to
reside at standard or remote/guest cluster node, respectively.
The original vulnerability was introduced in an attempt to allow
unprivileged IPC clients to clean up the file system materialized
leftovers in case the server (otherwise responsible for the lifecycle
of these files) crashes. While the intended part of such behavior is
now effectively voided (along with the unintended one), a best-effort
fix to address this corner case systemically at libqb is coming along
(https://github.com/ClusterLabs/libqb/pull/231).
Affected versions: 1.1.10-rc1 (2013-04-17) - 1.1.15 (2016-06-21)
Impact: Important
CVSSv3 ranking: 8.8 : AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Credits for independent findings, in chronological order:
Jan "poki" Pokorný, of Red Hat
Alain Moulle, of ATOS/BULL
CWE ID: CWE-285
| 0
| 86,595
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void locationWithPerWorldBindingsAttributeSetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::locationWithPerWorldBindingsAttributeSetter(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,382
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void CL_CDDialog( void ) {
cls.cddialog = qtrue; // start it next frame
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 95,640
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int rmd128_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
{
struct rmd128_ctx *rctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
rctx->byte_count = 0;
rctx->state[0] = RMD_H0;
rctx->state[1] = RMD_H1;
rctx->state[2] = RMD_H2;
rctx->state[3] = RMD_H3;
memset(rctx->buffer, 0, sizeof(rctx->buffer));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 47,303
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: resp_parse(netdissect_options *ndo, register const u_char *bp, int length)
{
u_char op;
int ret_len;
LCHECK2(length, 1);
ND_TCHECK(*bp);
op = *bp;
/* bp now points to the op, so these routines must skip it */
switch(op) {
case RESP_SIMPLE_STRING: ret_len = resp_print_simple_string(ndo, bp, length); break;
case RESP_INTEGER: ret_len = resp_print_integer(ndo, bp, length); break;
case RESP_ERROR: ret_len = resp_print_error(ndo, bp, length); break;
case RESP_BULK_STRING: ret_len = resp_print_bulk_string(ndo, bp, length); break;
case RESP_ARRAY: ret_len = resp_print_bulk_array(ndo, bp, length); break;
default: ret_len = resp_print_inline(ndo, bp, length); break;
}
/*
* This gives up with a "truncated" indicator for all errors,
* including invalid packet errors; that's what we want, as
* we have to give up on further parsing in that case.
*/
TEST_RET_LEN(ret_len);
trunc:
return (-1);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12989/RESP: Make sure resp_get_length() advances the pointer for invalid lengths.
Make sure that it always sends *endp before returning and that, for
invalid lengths where we don't like a character in the length string,
what it sets *endp to is past the character in question, so we don't
run the risk of infinitely looping (or doing something else random) if a
character in the length is invalid.
This fixes an infinite loop discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 62,513
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: Ins_FLIPRGOFF( INS_ARG )
{
FT_UShort I, K, L;
K = (FT_UShort)args[1];
L = (FT_UShort)args[0];
if ( BOUNDS( K, CUR.pts.n_points ) ||
BOUNDS( L, CUR.pts.n_points ) )
{
if ( CUR.pedantic_hinting )
CUR.error = TT_Err_Invalid_Reference;
return;
}
for ( I = L; I <= K; I++ )
CUR.pts.tags[I] &= ~FT_CURVE_TAG_ON;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,105
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: map_person_by_name(const char* name)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < s_num_persons; ++i) {
if (strcmp(name, s_persons[i]->name) == 0)
return s_persons[i];
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c (#268)
* Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c
There's a buffer overflow bug in the function layer_resize. It allocates
a buffer `tilemap` with size `x_size * y_size * sizeof(struct map_tile)`.
But it didn't check for integer overflow, so if x_size and y_size are
very large, it's possible that the buffer size is smaller than needed,
causing a buffer overflow later.
PoC: `SetLayerSize(0, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF);`
* move malloc to a separate line
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 75,057
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int snd_usb_mbox2_boot_quirk(struct usb_device *dev)
{
struct usb_host_config *config = dev->actconfig;
int err;
u8 bootresponse[0x12];
int fwsize;
int count;
fwsize = le16_to_cpu(get_cfg_desc(config)->wTotalLength);
if (fwsize != MBOX2_FIRMWARE_SIZE) {
dev_err(&dev->dev, "Invalid firmware size=%d.\n", fwsize);
return -ENODEV;
}
dev_dbg(&dev->dev, "Sending Digidesign Mbox 2 boot sequence...\n");
count = 0;
bootresponse[0] = MBOX2_BOOT_LOADING;
while ((bootresponse[0] == MBOX2_BOOT_LOADING) && (count < 10)) {
msleep(500); /* 0.5 second delay */
snd_usb_ctl_msg(dev, usb_rcvctrlpipe(dev, 0),
/* Control magic - load onboard firmware */
0x85, 0xc0, 0x0001, 0x0000, &bootresponse, 0x0012);
if (bootresponse[0] == MBOX2_BOOT_READY)
break;
dev_dbg(&dev->dev, "device not ready, resending boot sequence...\n");
count++;
}
if (bootresponse[0] != MBOX2_BOOT_READY) {
dev_err(&dev->dev, "Unknown bootresponse=%d, or timed out, ignoring device.\n", bootresponse[0]);
return -ENODEV;
}
dev_dbg(&dev->dev, "device initialised!\n");
err = usb_get_descriptor(dev, USB_DT_DEVICE, 0,
&dev->descriptor, sizeof(dev->descriptor));
config = dev->actconfig;
if (err < 0)
dev_dbg(&dev->dev, "error usb_get_descriptor: %d\n", err);
err = usb_reset_configuration(dev);
if (err < 0)
dev_dbg(&dev->dev, "error usb_reset_configuration: %d\n", err);
dev_dbg(&dev->dev, "mbox2_boot: new boot length = %d\n",
le16_to_cpu(get_cfg_desc(config)->wTotalLength));
mbox2_setup_48_24_magic(dev);
dev_info(&dev->dev, "Digidesign Mbox 2: 24bit 48kHz");
return 0; /* Successful boot */
}
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: Fix NULL dereference in create_fixed_stream_quirk()
create_fixed_stream_quirk() may cause a NULL-pointer dereference by
accessing the non-existing endpoint when a USB device with a malformed
USB descriptor is used.
This patch avoids it simply by adding a sanity check of bNumEndpoints
before the accesses.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=971125
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 55,270
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: float Parcel::readFloat() const
{
return readAligned<float>();
}
Commit Message: Disregard alleged binder entities beyond parcel bounds
When appending one parcel's contents to another, ignore binder
objects within the source Parcel that appear to lie beyond the
formal bounds of that Parcel's data buffer.
Bug 17312693
Change-Id: If592a260f3fcd9a56fc160e7feb2c8b44c73f514
(cherry picked from commit 27182be9f20f4f5b48316666429f09b9ecc1f22e)
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 157,298
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::RenderViewCreated(RenderViewHost* render_view_host) {
if (!static_cast<RenderViewHostImpl*>(render_view_host)->is_active())
return;
if (delegate_)
view_->SetOverscrollControllerEnabled(CanOverscrollContent());
NotificationService::current()->Notify(
NOTIFICATION_WEB_CONTENTS_RENDER_VIEW_HOST_CREATED,
Source<WebContents>(this),
Details<RenderViewHost>(render_view_host));
view_->RenderViewCreated(render_view_host);
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.RenderViewCreated(render_view_host);
RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::WebContentsCreated(this);
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 135,852
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void opj_tcd_code_block_enc_deallocate (opj_tcd_precinct_t * p_precinct)
{
OPJ_UINT32 cblkno , l_nb_code_blocks;
opj_tcd_cblk_enc_t * l_code_block = p_precinct->cblks.enc;
if (l_code_block) {
l_nb_code_blocks = p_precinct->block_size / sizeof(opj_tcd_cblk_enc_t);
for (cblkno = 0; cblkno < l_nb_code_blocks; ++cblkno) {
if (l_code_block->data) {
opj_free(l_code_block->data - 1);
l_code_block->data = 00;
}
if (l_code_block->layers) {
opj_free(l_code_block->layers );
l_code_block->layers = 00;
}
if (l_code_block->passes) {
opj_free(l_code_block->passes );
l_code_block->passes = 00;
}
++l_code_block;
}
opj_free(p_precinct->cblks.enc);
p_precinct->cblks.enc = 00;
}
}
Commit Message: [trunk] fixed a buffer overflow in opj_tcd_init_decode_tile
Update issue 431
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 97,084
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void cleanup_bmc_work(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct bmc_device *bmc = container_of(work, struct bmc_device,
remove_work);
int id = bmc->pdev.id; /* Unregister overwrites id */
platform_device_unregister(&bmc->pdev);
ida_simple_remove(&ipmi_bmc_ida, id);
}
Commit Message: ipmi: fix use-after-free of user->release_barrier.rda
When we do the following test, we got oops in ipmi_msghandler driver
while((1))
do
service ipmievd restart & service ipmievd restart
done
---------------------------------------------------------------
[ 294.230186] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000803fea6ea008
[ 294.230188] Mem abort info:
[ 294.230190] ESR = 0x96000004
[ 294.230191] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 294.230193] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 294.230194] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 294.230195] Data abort info:
[ 294.230196] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
[ 294.230197] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 294.230199] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000a1c1b75a
[ 294.230201] [0000803fea6ea008] pgd=0000000000000000
[ 294.230204] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
[ 294.235211] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce sha2_ce ses sha256_arm64 sha1_ce hibmc_drm hisi_sas_v2_hw enclosure sg hisi_sas_main sbsa_gwdt ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe ipmi_si mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler hns_enet_drv hns_mdio
[ 294.277745] CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.0.0-rc2+ #113
[ 294.285511] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 294.292835] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 294.297695] pc : __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.301940] lr : acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.307853] sp : ffff00001001bc80
[ 294.311208] x29: ffff00001001bc80 x28: ffff0000117e5000
[ 294.316594] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: dead000000000100
[ 294.321980] x25: dead000000000200 x24: ffff803f6bd06800
[ 294.327366] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000
[ 294.332752] x21: ffff00001001bd04 x20: ffff80df33d19018
[ 294.338137] x19: ffff80df33d19018 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 294.343523] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 294.348908] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000002
[ 294.354293] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 294.359679] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000100000
[ 294.365065] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000004
[ 294.370451] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff80df34558678
[ 294.375836] x5 : 000000000000000c x4 : 0000000000000000
[ 294.381221] x3 : 0000000000000001 x2 : 0000803fea6ea000
[ 294.386607] x1 : 0000803fea6ea008 x0 : 0000000000000001
[ 294.391994] Process swapper/3 (pid: 0, stack limit = 0x0000000083087293)
[ 294.398791] Call trace:
[ 294.401266] __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.405154] acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.410716] deliver_response+0x80/0xf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.416189] deliver_local_response+0x28/0x68 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.422193] handle_one_recv_msg+0x158/0xcf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.432050] handle_new_recv_msgs+0xc0/0x210 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.441984] smi_recv_tasklet+0x8c/0x158 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.451618] tasklet_action_common.isra.5+0x88/0x138
[ 294.460661] tasklet_action+0x2c/0x38
[ 294.468191] __do_softirq+0x120/0x2f8
[ 294.475561] irq_exit+0x134/0x140
[ 294.482445] __handle_domain_irq+0x6c/0xc0
[ 294.489954] gic_handle_irq+0xb8/0x178
[ 294.497037] el1_irq+0xb0/0x140
[ 294.503381] arch_cpu_idle+0x34/0x1a8
[ 294.510096] do_idle+0x1d4/0x290
[ 294.516322] cpu_startup_entry+0x28/0x30
[ 294.523230] secondary_start_kernel+0x184/0x1d0
[ 294.530657] Code: d538d082 d2800023 8b010c81 8b020021 (c85f7c25)
[ 294.539746] ---[ end trace 8a7a880dee570b29 ]---
[ 294.547341] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
[ 294.556837] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 294.563996] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 294.570515] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 294.577638] Memory Limit: none
[ 294.587178] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 294.594314] Bye!
Because the user->release_barrier.rda is freed in ipmi_destroy_user(), but
the refcount is not zero, when acquire_ipmi_user() uses user->release_barrier.rda
in __srcu_read_lock(), it causes oops.
Fix this by calling cleanup_srcu_struct() when the refcount is zero.
Fixes: e86ee2d44b44 ("ipmi: Rework locking and shutdown for hot remove")
Cc: [email protected] # 4.18
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 91,219
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static long sched_group_rt_runtime(struct task_group *tg)
{
u64 rt_runtime_us;
if (tg->rt_bandwidth.rt_runtime == RUNTIME_INF)
return -1;
rt_runtime_us = tg->rt_bandwidth.rt_runtime;
do_div(rt_runtime_us, NSEC_PER_USEC);
return rt_runtime_us;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <[email protected]>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 55,610
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: ChromeContentBrowserClient::DetermineCommittedPreviewsForURL(
const GURL& url,
data_reduction_proxy::DataReductionProxyData* drp_data,
previews::PreviewsUserData* previews_user_data,
const previews::PreviewsDecider* previews_decider,
content::PreviewsState initial_state) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::UI);
if (!previews::HasEnabledPreviews(initial_state))
return content::PREVIEWS_OFF;
content::PreviewsState previews_state =
data_reduction_proxy::ContentLoFiDecider::
DetermineCommittedServerPreviewsState(drp_data, initial_state);
return previews::DetermineCommittedClientPreviewsState(
previews_user_data, url, previews_state, previews_decider);
}
Commit Message: [GuestView] - Introduce MimeHandlerViewAttachHelper
This CL is for the most part a mechanical change which extracts almost
all the frame-based MimeHandlerView code out of
ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter. This change both removes the current
clutter form EGVMF as well as fixesa race introduced when the
frame-based logic was added to EGVMF. The reason for the race was that
EGVMF is destroyed on IO thread but all the access to it (for
frame-based MHV) are from UI.
[email protected],[email protected]
Bug: 659750, 896679, 911161, 918861
Change-Id: I6474b870e4d56daa68be03637bb633665d9f9dda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1401451
Commit-Queue: Ehsan Karamad <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: James MacLean <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ehsan Karamad <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621155}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 152,373
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static inline void skcipher_map_src(struct skcipher_walk *walk)
{
walk->src.virt.addr = skcipher_map(&walk->in);
}
Commit Message: crypto: skcipher - Add missing API setkey checks
The API setkey checks for key sizes and alignment went AWOL during the
skcipher conversion. This patch restores them.
Cc: <[email protected]>
Fixes: 4e6c3df4d729 ("crypto: skcipher - Add low-level skcipher...")
Reported-by: Baozeng <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 64,795
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: GLES2Decoder::GLES2Decoder()
: debug_(false) {
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
[email protected]
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 99,200
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int ptrace_signal(int signr, siginfo_t *info,
struct pt_regs *regs, void *cookie)
{
if (!task_ptrace(current))
return signr;
ptrace_signal_deliver(regs, cookie);
/* Let the debugger run. */
ptrace_stop(signr, 0, info);
/* We're back. Did the debugger cancel the sig? */
signr = current->exit_code;
if (signr == 0)
return signr;
current->exit_code = 0;
/* Update the siginfo structure if the signal has
changed. If the debugger wanted something
specific in the siginfo structure then it should
have updated *info via PTRACE_SETSIGINFO. */
if (signr != info->si_signo) {
info->si_signo = signr;
info->si_errno = 0;
info->si_code = SI_USER;
info->si_pid = task_pid_vnr(current->parent);
info->si_uid = task_uid(current->parent);
}
/* If the (new) signal is now blocked, requeue it. */
if (sigismember(¤t->blocked, signr)) {
specific_send_sig_info(signr, info, current);
signr = 0;
}
return signr;
}
Commit Message: Prevent rt_sigqueueinfo and rt_tgsigqueueinfo from spoofing the signal code
Userland should be able to trust the pid and uid of the sender of a
signal if the si_code is SI_TKILL.
Unfortunately, the kernel has historically allowed sigqueueinfo() to
send any si_code at all (as long as it was negative - to distinguish it
from kernel-generated signals like SIGILL etc), so it could spoof a
SI_TKILL with incorrect siginfo values.
Happily, it looks like glibc has always set si_code to the appropriate
SI_QUEUE, so there are probably no actual user code that ever uses
anything but the appropriate SI_QUEUE flag.
So just tighten the check for si_code (we used to allow any negative
value), and add a (one-time) warning in case there are binaries out
there that might depend on using other si_code values.
Signed-off-by: Julien Tinnes <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 35,185
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: createImageSection(uint32 sectsize, unsigned char **sect_buff_ptr)
{
unsigned char *sect_buff = NULL;
unsigned char *new_buff = NULL;
static uint32 prev_sectsize = 0;
sect_buff = *sect_buff_ptr;
if (!sect_buff)
{
sect_buff = (unsigned char *)_TIFFmalloc(sectsize);
*sect_buff_ptr = sect_buff;
_TIFFmemset(sect_buff, 0, sectsize);
}
else
{
if (prev_sectsize < sectsize)
{
new_buff = _TIFFrealloc(sect_buff, sectsize);
if (!new_buff)
{
free (sect_buff);
sect_buff = (unsigned char *)_TIFFmalloc(sectsize);
}
else
sect_buff = new_buff;
_TIFFmemset(sect_buff, 0, sectsize);
}
}
if (!sect_buff)
{
TIFFError("createImageSection", "Unable to allocate/reallocate section buffer");
return (-1);
}
prev_sectsize = sectsize;
*sect_buff_ptr = sect_buff;
return (0);
} /* end createImageSection */
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix out-of-bound read of up to 3 bytes in
readContigTilesIntoBuffer(). Reported as MSVR 35092 by Axel Souchet
& Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 48,237
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void HTMLElement::addHTMLLengthToStyle(StylePropertySet* style, CSSPropertyID propertyID, const String& value)
{
StringImpl* v = value.impl();
if (v) {
unsigned int l = 0;
while (l < v->length() && (*v)[l] <= ' ')
l++;
for (; l < v->length(); l++) {
UChar cc = (*v)[l];
if (cc > '9')
break;
if (cc < '0') {
if (cc == '%' || cc == '*')
l++;
if (cc != '.')
break;
}
}
if (l != v->length()) {
addPropertyToAttributeStyle(style, propertyID, v->substring(0, l));
return;
}
}
addPropertyToAttributeStyle(style, propertyID, value);
}
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 100,351
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static off_t raw_command(char* buf,
size_t bufsz,
uint8_t cmd,
const void* key,
size_t keylen,
const void* dta,
size_t dtalen) {
/* all of the storage commands use the same command layout */
protocol_binary_request_no_extras *request = (void*)buf;
assert(bufsz > sizeof(*request) + keylen + dtalen);
memset(request, 0, sizeof(*request));
request->message.header.request.magic = PROTOCOL_BINARY_REQ;
request->message.header.request.opcode = cmd;
request->message.header.request.keylen = htons(keylen);
request->message.header.request.bodylen = htonl(keylen + dtalen);
request->message.header.request.opaque = 0xdeadbeef;
off_t key_offset = sizeof(protocol_binary_request_no_extras);
if (key != NULL) {
memcpy(buf + key_offset, key, keylen);
}
if (dta != NULL) {
memcpy(buf + key_offset + keylen, dta, dtalen);
}
return sizeof(*request) + keylen + dtalen;
}
Commit Message: Issue 102: Piping null to the server will crash it
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 94,233
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: explicit BrowserCompositorOutputSurface(
WebGraphicsContext3DCommandBufferImpl* context,
int surface_id,
BrowserCompositorOutputSurfaceProxy* output_surface_proxy)
: context3D_(context),
surface_id_(surface_id),
client_(NULL),
output_surface_proxy_(output_surface_proxy) {
DetachFromThread();
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,470
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void* ipc_alloc(int size)
{
void* out;
if(size > PAGE_SIZE)
out = vmalloc(size);
else
out = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
return out;
}
Commit Message: ipc,sem: fine grained locking for semtimedop
Introduce finer grained locking for semtimedop, to handle the common case
of a program wanting to manipulate one semaphore from an array with
multiple semaphores.
If the call is a semop manipulating just one semaphore in an array with
multiple semaphores, only take the lock for that semaphore itself.
If the call needs to manipulate multiple semaphores, or another caller is
in a transaction that manipulates multiple semaphores, the sem_array lock
is taken, as well as all the locks for the individual semaphores.
On a 24 CPU system, performance numbers with the semop-multi
test with N threads and N semaphores, look like this:
vanilla Davidlohr's Davidlohr's + Davidlohr's +
threads patches rwlock patches v3 patches
10 610652 726325 1783589 2142206
20 341570 365699 1520453 1977878
30 288102 307037 1498167 2037995
40 290714 305955 1612665 2256484
50 288620 312890 1733453 2650292
60 289987 306043 1649360 2388008
70 291298 306347 1723167 2717486
80 290948 305662 1729545 2763582
90 290996 306680 1736021 2757524
100 292243 306700 1773700 3059159
[[email protected]: do not call sem_lock when bogus sma]
[[email protected]: make refcounter atomic]
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
Cc: Chegu Vinod <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Low <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michel Lespinasse <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Hurley <[email protected]>
Cc: Stanislav Kinsbursky <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Emmanuel Benisty <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 1
| 165,982
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: long long VideoTrack::GetHeight() const { return m_height; }
Commit Message: Fix ParseElementHeader to support 0 payload elements
Cherry-pick'ing Change 5c83bbec9a5f6f00a349674ddad85b753d2ea219
from upstream. This fixes regression in some edge cases for mkv
playback.
BUG=26499283
Change-Id: I88de03219a3d941b6b2f251d384e29c36bdd4d9b
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 164,229
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static sctp_ierror_t sctp_process_unk_param(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
union sctp_params param,
struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
struct sctp_chunk **errp)
{
int retval = SCTP_IERROR_NO_ERROR;
switch (param.p->type & SCTP_PARAM_ACTION_MASK) {
case SCTP_PARAM_ACTION_DISCARD:
retval = SCTP_IERROR_ERROR;
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_ACTION_SKIP:
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_ACTION_DISCARD_ERR:
retval = SCTP_IERROR_ERROR;
/* Fall through */
case SCTP_PARAM_ACTION_SKIP_ERR:
/* Make an ERROR chunk, preparing enough room for
* returning multiple unknown parameters.
*/
if (NULL == *errp)
*errp = sctp_make_op_error_fixed(asoc, chunk);
if (*errp) {
if (!sctp_init_cause_fixed(*errp, SCTP_ERROR_UNKNOWN_PARAM,
WORD_ROUND(ntohs(param.p->length))))
sctp_addto_chunk_fixed(*errp,
WORD_ROUND(ntohs(param.p->length)),
param.v);
} else {
/* If there is no memory for generating the ERROR
* report as specified, an ABORT will be triggered
* to the peer and the association won't be
* established.
*/
retval = SCTP_IERROR_NOMEM;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
return retval;
}
Commit Message: net: sctp: fix NULL pointer dereference in af->from_addr_param on malformed packet
An SCTP server doing ASCONF will panic on malformed INIT ping-of-death
in the form of:
------------ INIT[PARAM: SET_PRIMARY_IP] ------------>
While the INIT chunk parameter verification dissects through many things
in order to detect malformed input, it misses to actually check parameters
inside of parameters. E.g. RFC5061, section 4.2.4 proposes a 'set primary
IP address' parameter in ASCONF, which has as a subparameter an address
parameter.
So an attacker may send a parameter type other than SCTP_PARAM_IPV4_ADDRESS
or SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS, param_type2af() will subsequently return 0
and thus sctp_get_af_specific() returns NULL, too, which we then happily
dereference unconditionally through af->from_addr_param().
The trace for the log:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000078
IP: [<ffffffffa01e9c62>] sctp_process_init+0x492/0x990 [sctp]
PGD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[...]
Pid: 0, comm: swapper Not tainted 2.6.32-504.el6.x86_64 #1 Bochs Bochs
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa01e9c62>] [<ffffffffa01e9c62>] sctp_process_init+0x492/0x990 [sctp]
[...]
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffffa01f2add>] ? sctp_bind_addr_copy+0x5d/0xe0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e1fcb>] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x21b/0x340 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e5c09>] ? sctp_endpoint_lookup_assoc+0xc9/0xf0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e61f6>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x116/0x230 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter]
[<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[...]
A minimal way to address this is to check for NULL as we do on all
other such occasions where we know sctp_get_af_specific() could
possibly return with NULL.
Fixes: d6de3097592b ("[SCTP]: Add the handling of "Set Primary IP Address" parameter to INIT")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 35,891
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: std::unique_ptr<SharedBitmap> ClientSharedBitmapManager::GetSharedBitmapFromId(
const gfx::Size&,
const SharedBitmapId&) {
NOTREACHED();
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,188
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int kvm_mmu_notifier_clear_flush_young(struct mmu_notifier *mn,
struct mm_struct *mm,
unsigned long address)
{
struct kvm *kvm = mmu_notifier_to_kvm(mn);
int young, idx;
idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
spin_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
young = kvm_age_hva(kvm, address);
spin_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, idx);
if (young)
kvm_flush_remote_tlbs(kvm);
return young;
}
Commit Message: KVM: unmap pages from the iommu when slots are removed
commit 32f6daad4651a748a58a3ab6da0611862175722f upstream.
We've been adding new mappings, but not destroying old mappings.
This can lead to a page leak as pages are pinned using
get_user_pages, but only unpinned with put_page if they still
exist in the memslots list on vm shutdown. A memslot that is
destroyed while an iommu domain is enabled for the guest will
therefore result in an elevated page reference count that is
never cleared.
Additionally, without this fix, the iommu is only programmed
with the first translation for a gpa. This can result in
peer-to-peer errors if a mapping is destroyed and replaced by a
new mapping at the same gpa as the iommu will still be pointing
to the original, pinned memory address.
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 20,369
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::SetHistoryLengthAndPrune(
const SiteInstance* site_instance,
int history_length,
int32 minimum_page_id) {
if (render_manager_.pending_render_view_host()) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
RenderViewHostImpl* rvh = GetRenderViewHostImpl();
if (!rvh) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
if (site_instance && rvh->GetSiteInstance() != site_instance) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
Send(new ViewMsg_SetHistoryLengthAndPrune(GetRoutingID(),
history_length,
minimum_page_id));
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 110,781
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::OnDidStopLoading() {
TRACE_EVENT1("navigation", "RenderFrameHostImpl::OnDidStopLoading",
"frame_tree_node", frame_tree_node_->frame_tree_node_id());
if (!is_loading_)
return;
was_discarded_ = false;
is_loading_ = false;
navigation_request_.reset();
if (is_active())
frame_tree_node_->DidStopLoading();
}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 155,988
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void __init ion_reserve(struct ion_platform_data *data)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < data->nr; i++) {
if (data->heaps[i].size == 0)
continue;
if (data->heaps[i].base == 0) {
phys_addr_t paddr;
paddr = memblock_alloc_base(data->heaps[i].size,
data->heaps[i].align,
MEMBLOCK_ALLOC_ANYWHERE);
if (!paddr) {
pr_err("%s: error allocating memblock for heap %d\n",
__func__, i);
continue;
}
data->heaps[i].base = paddr;
} else {
int ret = memblock_reserve(data->heaps[i].base,
data->heaps[i].size);
if (ret)
pr_err("memblock reserve of %zx@%lx failed\n",
data->heaps[i].size,
data->heaps[i].base);
}
pr_info("%s: %s reserved base %lx size %zu\n", __func__,
data->heaps[i].name,
data->heaps[i].base,
data->heaps[i].size);
}
}
Commit Message: staging/android/ion : fix a race condition in the ion driver
There is a use-after-free problem in the ion driver.
This is caused by a race condition in the ion_ioctl()
function.
A handle has ref count of 1 and two tasks on different
cpus calls ION_IOC_FREE simultaneously.
cpu 0 cpu 1
-------------------------------------------------------
ion_handle_get_by_id()
(ref == 2)
ion_handle_get_by_id()
(ref == 3)
ion_free()
(ref == 2)
ion_handle_put()
(ref == 1)
ion_free()
(ref == 0 so ion_handle_destroy() is
called
and the handle is freed.)
ion_handle_put() is called and it
decreases the slub's next free pointer
The problem is detected as an unaligned access in the
spin lock functions since it uses load exclusive
instruction. In some cases it corrupts the slub's
free pointer which causes a mis-aligned access to the
next free pointer.(kmalloc returns a pointer like
ffffc0745b4580aa). And it causes lots of other
hard-to-debug problems.
This symptom is caused since the first member in the
ion_handle structure is the reference count and the
ion driver decrements the reference after it has been
freed.
To fix this problem client->lock mutex is extended
to protect all the codes that uses the handle.
Signed-off-by: Eun Taik Lee <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Laura Abbott <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 48,567
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(Array, count)
{
long count;
spl_array_object *intern = (spl_array_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
spl_array_object_count_elements_helper(intern, &count TSRMLS_CC);
RETURN_LONG(count);
} /* }}} */
static void spl_array_method(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, char *fname, int fname_len, int use_arg) /* {{{ */
Commit Message: Fix bug #73029 - Missing type check when unserializing SplArray
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 49,859
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: struct sock *ax25_make_new(struct sock *osk, struct ax25_dev *ax25_dev)
{
struct sock *sk;
ax25_cb *ax25, *oax25;
sk = sk_alloc(sock_net(osk), PF_AX25, GFP_ATOMIC, osk->sk_prot, 0);
if (sk == NULL)
return NULL;
if ((ax25 = ax25_create_cb()) == NULL) {
sk_free(sk);
return NULL;
}
switch (osk->sk_type) {
case SOCK_DGRAM:
break;
case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
break;
default:
sk_free(sk);
ax25_cb_put(ax25);
return NULL;
}
sock_init_data(NULL, sk);
sk->sk_type = osk->sk_type;
sk->sk_priority = osk->sk_priority;
sk->sk_protocol = osk->sk_protocol;
sk->sk_rcvbuf = osk->sk_rcvbuf;
sk->sk_sndbuf = osk->sk_sndbuf;
sk->sk_state = TCP_ESTABLISHED;
sock_copy_flags(sk, osk);
oax25 = sk_to_ax25(osk);
ax25->modulus = oax25->modulus;
ax25->backoff = oax25->backoff;
ax25->pidincl = oax25->pidincl;
ax25->iamdigi = oax25->iamdigi;
ax25->rtt = oax25->rtt;
ax25->t1 = oax25->t1;
ax25->t2 = oax25->t2;
ax25->t3 = oax25->t3;
ax25->n2 = oax25->n2;
ax25->idle = oax25->idle;
ax25->paclen = oax25->paclen;
ax25->window = oax25->window;
ax25->ax25_dev = ax25_dev;
ax25->source_addr = oax25->source_addr;
if (oax25->digipeat != NULL) {
ax25->digipeat = kmemdup(oax25->digipeat, sizeof(ax25_digi),
GFP_ATOMIC);
if (ax25->digipeat == NULL) {
sk_free(sk);
ax25_cb_put(ax25);
return NULL;
}
}
ax25_sk(sk)->cb = ax25;
sk->sk_destruct = ax25_free_sock;
ax25->sk = sk;
return sk;
}
Commit Message: net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 41,459
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void raisesExceptionVoidMethodOptionalTestCallbackInterfaceArgMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::raisesExceptionVoidMethodOptionalTestCallbackInterfaceArgMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,554
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: pgp_update_pubkey_blob(sc_card_t *card, u8* modulus, size_t modulus_len,
u8* exponent, size_t exponent_len, u8 key_id)
{
struct pgp_priv_data *priv = DRVDATA(card);
pgp_blob_t *pk_blob;
unsigned int blob_id;
sc_pkcs15_pubkey_t pubkey;
u8 *data = NULL;
size_t len;
int r;
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx);
if (key_id == SC_OPENPGP_KEY_SIGN)
blob_id = DO_SIGN_SYM;
else if (key_id == SC_OPENPGP_KEY_ENCR)
blob_id = DO_ENCR_SYM;
else if (key_id == SC_OPENPGP_KEY_AUTH)
blob_id = DO_AUTH_SYM;
else {
sc_log(card->ctx, "Unknown key id %X.", key_id);
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS);
}
sc_log(card->ctx, "Get the blob %X.", blob_id);
r = pgp_get_blob(card, priv->mf, blob_id, &pk_blob);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "Cannot get the blob.");
/* encode pubkey */
memset(&pubkey, 0, sizeof(pubkey));
pubkey.algorithm = SC_ALGORITHM_RSA;
pubkey.u.rsa.modulus.data = modulus;
pubkey.u.rsa.modulus.len = modulus_len >> 3; /* 1/8 */
pubkey.u.rsa.exponent.data = exponent;
pubkey.u.rsa.exponent.len = exponent_len >> 3;
r = sc_pkcs15_encode_pubkey(card->ctx, &pubkey, &data, &len);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "Cannot encode pubkey.");
sc_log(card->ctx, "Update blob content.");
r = pgp_set_blob(pk_blob, data, len);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "Cannot update blob content.");
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, r);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 78,616
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static bool check_client_passwd(PgSocket *client, const char *passwd)
{
char md5[MD5_PASSWD_LEN + 1];
const char *correct;
PgUser *user = client->auth_user;
/* disallow empty passwords */
if (!*passwd || !*user->passwd)
return false;
switch (cf_auth_type) {
case AUTH_PLAIN:
return strcmp(user->passwd, passwd) == 0;
case AUTH_CRYPT:
correct = crypt(user->passwd, (char *)client->tmp_login_salt);
return correct && strcmp(correct, passwd) == 0;
case AUTH_MD5:
if (strlen(passwd) != MD5_PASSWD_LEN)
return false;
if (!isMD5(user->passwd))
pg_md5_encrypt(user->passwd, user->name, strlen(user->name), user->passwd);
pg_md5_encrypt(user->passwd + 3, (char *)client->tmp_login_salt, 4, md5);
return strcmp(md5, passwd) == 0;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Check if auth_user is set.
Fixes a crash if password packet appears before startup packet (#42).
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 74,313
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static ssize_t tun_get_user(struct tun_struct *tun, void *msg_control,
const struct iovec *iv, size_t total_len,
size_t count, int noblock)
{
struct tun_pi pi = { 0, cpu_to_be16(ETH_P_IP) };
struct sk_buff *skb;
size_t len = total_len, align = NET_SKB_PAD;
struct virtio_net_hdr gso = { 0 };
int offset = 0;
int copylen;
bool zerocopy = false;
int err;
if (!(tun->flags & TUN_NO_PI)) {
if ((len -= sizeof(pi)) > total_len)
return -EINVAL;
if (memcpy_fromiovecend((void *)&pi, iv, 0, sizeof(pi)))
return -EFAULT;
offset += sizeof(pi);
}
if (tun->flags & TUN_VNET_HDR) {
if ((len -= tun->vnet_hdr_sz) > total_len)
return -EINVAL;
if (memcpy_fromiovecend((void *)&gso, iv, offset, sizeof(gso)))
return -EFAULT;
if ((gso.flags & VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM) &&
gso.csum_start + gso.csum_offset + 2 > gso.hdr_len)
gso.hdr_len = gso.csum_start + gso.csum_offset + 2;
if (gso.hdr_len > len)
return -EINVAL;
offset += tun->vnet_hdr_sz;
}
if ((tun->flags & TUN_TYPE_MASK) == TUN_TAP_DEV) {
align += NET_IP_ALIGN;
if (unlikely(len < ETH_HLEN ||
(gso.hdr_len && gso.hdr_len < ETH_HLEN)))
return -EINVAL;
}
if (msg_control)
zerocopy = true;
if (zerocopy) {
/* Userspace may produce vectors with count greater than
* MAX_SKB_FRAGS, so we need to linearize parts of the skb
* to let the rest of data to be fit in the frags.
*/
if (count > MAX_SKB_FRAGS) {
copylen = iov_length(iv, count - MAX_SKB_FRAGS);
if (copylen < offset)
copylen = 0;
else
copylen -= offset;
} else
copylen = 0;
/* There are 256 bytes to be copied in skb, so there is enough
* room for skb expand head in case it is used.
* The rest of the buffer is mapped from userspace.
*/
if (copylen < gso.hdr_len)
copylen = gso.hdr_len;
if (!copylen)
copylen = GOODCOPY_LEN;
} else
copylen = len;
skb = tun_alloc_skb(tun, align, copylen, gso.hdr_len, noblock);
if (IS_ERR(skb)) {
if (PTR_ERR(skb) != -EAGAIN)
tun->dev->stats.rx_dropped++;
return PTR_ERR(skb);
}
if (zerocopy)
err = zerocopy_sg_from_iovec(skb, iv, offset, count);
else
err = skb_copy_datagram_from_iovec(skb, 0, iv, offset, len);
if (err) {
tun->dev->stats.rx_dropped++;
kfree_skb(skb);
return -EFAULT;
}
if (gso.flags & VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM) {
if (!skb_partial_csum_set(skb, gso.csum_start,
gso.csum_offset)) {
tun->dev->stats.rx_frame_errors++;
kfree_skb(skb);
return -EINVAL;
}
}
switch (tun->flags & TUN_TYPE_MASK) {
case TUN_TUN_DEV:
if (tun->flags & TUN_NO_PI) {
switch (skb->data[0] & 0xf0) {
case 0x40:
pi.proto = htons(ETH_P_IP);
break;
case 0x60:
pi.proto = htons(ETH_P_IPV6);
break;
default:
tun->dev->stats.rx_dropped++;
kfree_skb(skb);
return -EINVAL;
}
}
skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
skb->protocol = pi.proto;
skb->dev = tun->dev;
break;
case TUN_TAP_DEV:
skb->protocol = eth_type_trans(skb, tun->dev);
break;
}
if (gso.gso_type != VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE) {
pr_debug("GSO!\n");
switch (gso.gso_type & ~VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_ECN) {
case VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4:
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type = SKB_GSO_TCPV4;
break;
case VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV6:
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type = SKB_GSO_TCPV6;
break;
case VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP:
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type = SKB_GSO_UDP;
break;
default:
tun->dev->stats.rx_frame_errors++;
kfree_skb(skb);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (gso.gso_type & VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_ECN)
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type |= SKB_GSO_TCP_ECN;
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size = gso.gso_size;
if (skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size == 0) {
tun->dev->stats.rx_frame_errors++;
kfree_skb(skb);
return -EINVAL;
}
/* Header must be checked, and gso_segs computed. */
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type |= SKB_GSO_DODGY;
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_segs = 0;
}
/* copy skb_ubuf_info for callback when skb has no error */
if (zerocopy) {
skb_shinfo(skb)->destructor_arg = msg_control;
skb_shinfo(skb)->tx_flags |= SKBTX_DEV_ZEROCOPY;
}
netif_rx_ni(skb);
tun->dev->stats.rx_packets++;
tun->dev->stats.rx_bytes += len;
return total_len;
}
Commit Message: net/tun: fix ioctl() based info leaks
The tun module leaks up to 36 bytes of memory by not fully initializing
a structure located on the stack that gets copied to user memory by the
TUNGETIFF and SIOCGIFHWADDR ioctl()s.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 34,098
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
{
unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
int rv;
pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
if (!pkey)
return 0;
/* If not EC nothing to do */
if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
{
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
return 1;
}
rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
if (!rv)
return 0;
/* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
* supported curves extension.
*/
rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
if (!rv)
return 0;
/* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
* SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
*/
if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
{
int check_md;
size_t i;
CERT *c = s->cert;
if (curve_id[0])
return 0;
/* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
else
return 0; /* Should never happen */
for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
break;
if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
return 0;
if (set_ee_md == 2)
{
if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
else
c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
}
}
return rv;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 10,811
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int vmci_transport_send_conn_request(struct sock *sk, size_t size)
{
return vmci_transport_send_control_pkt(sk,
VMCI_TRANSPORT_PACKET_TYPE_REQUEST,
size, 0, NULL,
VSOCK_PROTO_INVALID,
VMCI_INVALID_HANDLE);
}
Commit Message: VSOCK: vmci - fix possible info leak in vmci_transport_dgram_dequeue()
In case we received no data on the call to skb_recv_datagram(), i.e.
skb->data is NULL, vmci_transport_dgram_dequeue() will return with 0
without updating msg_namelen leading to net/socket.c leaking the local,
uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable to userland -- 128 bytes of
kernel stack memory.
Fix this by moving the already existing msg_namelen assignment a few
lines above.
Cc: Andy King <[email protected]>
Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]>
Cc: George Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 30,417
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int mem_cgroup_count_precharge_pte_range(pmd_t *pmd,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
struct mm_walk *walk)
{
struct vm_area_struct *vma = walk->private;
pte_t *pte;
spinlock_t *ptl;
split_huge_page_pmd(walk->mm, pmd);
pte = pte_offset_map_lock(vma->vm_mm, pmd, addr, &ptl);
for (; addr != end; pte++, addr += PAGE_SIZE)
if (is_target_pte_for_mc(vma, addr, *pte, NULL))
mc.precharge++; /* increment precharge temporarily */
pte_unmap_unlock(pte - 1, ptl);
cond_resched();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[[email protected]: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Jones <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Salter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 1
| 165,631
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: get_string (Buffer *buffer, Header *header, guint32 *offset, guint32 end_offset)
{
guint8 len;
char *str;
*offset = align_by_4 (*offset);
if (*offset + 4 >= end_offset)
return FALSE;
len = read_uint32 (header, &buffer->data[*offset]);
*offset += 4;
if ((*offset) + len + 1 > end_offset)
return FALSE;
if (buffer->data[(*offset) + len] != 0)
return FALSE;
str = (char *) &buffer->data[(*offset)];
*offset += len + 1;
return str;
}
Commit Message: Fix vulnerability in dbus proxy
During the authentication all client data is directly forwarded
to the dbus daemon as is, until we detect the BEGIN command after
which we start filtering the binary dbus protocol.
Unfortunately the detection of the BEGIN command in the proxy
did not exactly match the detection in the dbus daemon. A BEGIN
followed by a space or tab was considered ok in the daemon but
not by the proxy. This could be exploited to send arbitrary
dbus messages to the host, which can be used to break out of
the sandbox.
This was noticed by Gabriel Campana of The Google Security Team.
This fix makes the detection of the authentication phase end
match the dbus code. In addition we duplicate the authentication
line validation from dbus, which includes ensuring all data is
ASCII, and limiting the size of a line to 16k. In fact, we add
some extra stringent checks, disallowing ASCII control chars and
requiring that auth lines start with a capital letter.
CWE ID: CWE-436
| 0
| 84,403
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int kvm_create_vm_debugfs(struct kvm *kvm, int fd)
{
char dir_name[ITOA_MAX_LEN * 2];
struct kvm_stat_data *stat_data;
struct kvm_stats_debugfs_item *p;
if (!debugfs_initialized())
return 0;
snprintf(dir_name, sizeof(dir_name), "%d-%d", task_pid_nr(current), fd);
kvm->debugfs_dentry = debugfs_create_dir(dir_name,
kvm_debugfs_dir);
if (!kvm->debugfs_dentry)
return -ENOMEM;
kvm->debugfs_stat_data = kcalloc(kvm_debugfs_num_entries,
sizeof(*kvm->debugfs_stat_data),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!kvm->debugfs_stat_data)
return -ENOMEM;
for (p = debugfs_entries; p->name; p++) {
stat_data = kzalloc(sizeof(*stat_data), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!stat_data)
return -ENOMEM;
stat_data->kvm = kvm;
stat_data->offset = p->offset;
kvm->debugfs_stat_data[p - debugfs_entries] = stat_data;
if (!debugfs_create_file(p->name, 0444,
kvm->debugfs_dentry,
stat_data,
stat_fops_per_vm[p->kind]))
return -ENOMEM;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: use after free in kvm_ioctl_create_device()
We should move the ops->destroy(dev) after the list_del(&dev->vm_node)
so that we don't use "dev" after freeing it.
Fixes: a28ebea2adc4 ("KVM: Protect device ops->create and list_add with kvm->lock")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 71,198
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static bool set_one_prio_perm(struct task_struct *p)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *pcred = __task_cred(p);
if (pcred->user->user_ns == cred->user->user_ns &&
(pcred->uid == cred->euid ||
pcred->euid == cred->euid))
return true;
if (ns_capable(pcred->user->user_ns, CAP_SYS_NICE))
return true;
return false;
}
Commit Message: mm: fix prctl_set_vma_anon_name
prctl_set_vma_anon_name could attempt to set the name across
two vmas at the same time due to a typo, which might corrupt
the vma list. Fix it to use tmp instead of end to limit
the name setting to a single vma at a time.
Change-Id: Ie32d8ddb0fd547efbeedd6528acdab5ca5b308b4
Reported-by: Jed Davis <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Colin Cross <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 162,067
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: INST_HANDLER (swap) { // SWAP Rd
int d = ((buf[1] & 0x1) << 4) | ((buf[0] >> 4) & 0xf);
ESIL_A ("4,r%d,>>,0x0f,&,", d); // (Rd >> 4) & 0xf
ESIL_A ("4,r%d,<<,0xf0,&,", d); // (Rd >> 4) & 0xf
ESIL_A ("|,", d); // S[0] | S[1]
ESIL_A ("r%d,=,", d); // Rd = result
}
Commit Message: Fix #9943 - Invalid free on RAnal.avr
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 82,765
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int srpt_create_ch_ib(struct srpt_rdma_ch *ch)
{
struct ib_qp_init_attr *qp_init;
struct srpt_port *sport = ch->sport;
struct srpt_device *sdev = sport->sdev;
u32 srp_sq_size = sport->port_attrib.srp_sq_size;
int ret;
WARN_ON(ch->rq_size < 1);
ret = -ENOMEM;
qp_init = kzalloc(sizeof *qp_init, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!qp_init)
goto out;
retry:
ch->cq = ib_alloc_cq(sdev->device, ch, ch->rq_size + srp_sq_size,
0 /* XXX: spread CQs */, IB_POLL_WORKQUEUE);
if (IS_ERR(ch->cq)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(ch->cq);
pr_err("failed to create CQ cqe= %d ret= %d\n",
ch->rq_size + srp_sq_size, ret);
goto out;
}
qp_init->qp_context = (void *)ch;
qp_init->event_handler
= (void(*)(struct ib_event *, void*))srpt_qp_event;
qp_init->send_cq = ch->cq;
qp_init->recv_cq = ch->cq;
qp_init->srq = sdev->srq;
qp_init->sq_sig_type = IB_SIGNAL_REQ_WR;
qp_init->qp_type = IB_QPT_RC;
qp_init->cap.max_send_wr = srp_sq_size;
qp_init->cap.max_send_sge = SRPT_DEF_SG_PER_WQE;
ch->qp = ib_create_qp(sdev->pd, qp_init);
if (IS_ERR(ch->qp)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(ch->qp);
if (ret == -ENOMEM) {
srp_sq_size /= 2;
if (srp_sq_size >= MIN_SRPT_SQ_SIZE) {
ib_destroy_cq(ch->cq);
goto retry;
}
}
pr_err("failed to create_qp ret= %d\n", ret);
goto err_destroy_cq;
}
atomic_set(&ch->sq_wr_avail, qp_init->cap.max_send_wr);
pr_debug("%s: max_cqe= %d max_sge= %d sq_size = %d cm_id= %p\n",
__func__, ch->cq->cqe, qp_init->cap.max_send_sge,
qp_init->cap.max_send_wr, ch->cm_id);
ret = srpt_init_ch_qp(ch, ch->qp);
if (ret)
goto err_destroy_qp;
out:
kfree(qp_init);
return ret;
err_destroy_qp:
ib_destroy_qp(ch->qp);
err_destroy_cq:
ib_free_cq(ch->cq);
goto out;
}
Commit Message: IB/srpt: Simplify srpt_handle_tsk_mgmt()
Let the target core check task existence instead of the SRP target
driver. Additionally, let the target core check the validity of the
task management request instead of the ib_srpt driver.
This patch fixes the following kernel crash:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000001
IP: [<ffffffffa0565f37>] srpt_handle_new_iu+0x6d7/0x790 [ib_srpt]
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Call Trace:
[<ffffffffa05660ce>] srpt_process_completion+0xde/0x570 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffffa056669f>] srpt_compl_thread+0x13f/0x160 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffff8109726f>] kthread+0xcf/0xe0
[<ffffffff81613cfc>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
Fixes: 3e4f574857ee ("ib_srpt: Convert TMR path to target_submit_tmr")
Tested-by: Alex Estrin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Cc: Nicholas Bellinger <[email protected]>
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 50,645
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int nfs41_test_stateid(struct nfs_server *server, nfs4_stateid *stateid)
{
struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
int err;
do {
err = _nfs41_test_stateid(server, stateid);
if (err != -NFS4ERR_DELAY)
break;
nfs4_handle_exception(server, err, &exception);
} while (exception.retry);
return err;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Check for buffer length in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
Commit 1f1ea6c "NFSv4: Fix buffer overflow checking in
__nfs4_get_acl_uncached" accidently dropped the checking for too small
result buffer length.
If someone uses getxattr on "system.nfs4_acl" on an NFSv4 mount
supporting ACLs, the ACL has not been cached and the buffer suplied is
too short, we still copy the complete ACL, resulting in kernel and user
space memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Sven Wegener <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 29,137
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void mp_update_termios(struct sb_uart_state *state)
{
struct tty_struct *tty = state->info->tty;
struct sb_uart_port *port = state->port;
if (!(tty->flags & (1 << TTY_IO_ERROR))) {
mp_change_speed(state, NULL);
if (tty->termios.c_cflag & CBAUD)
uart_set_mctrl(port, TIOCM_DTR | TIOCM_RTS);
}
}
Commit Message: Staging: sb105x: info leak in mp_get_count()
The icount.reserved[] array isn't initialized so it leaks stack
information to userspace.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 29,413
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static CURLcode smtp_state_command_resp(struct connectdata *conn, int smtpcode,
smtpstate instate)
{
CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
struct SMTP *smtp = data->req.protop;
char *line = data->state.buffer;
size_t len = strlen(line);
(void)instate; /* no use for this yet */
if((smtp->rcpt && smtpcode/100 != 2 && smtpcode != 553 && smtpcode != 1) ||
(!smtp->rcpt && smtpcode/100 != 2 && smtpcode != 1)) {
failf(data, "Command failed: %d", smtpcode);
result = CURLE_RECV_ERROR;
}
else {
/* Temporarily add the LF character back and send as body to the client */
if(!data->set.opt_no_body) {
line[len] = '\n';
result = Curl_client_write(conn, CLIENTWRITE_BODY, line, len + 1);
line[len] = '\0';
}
if(smtpcode != 1) {
if(smtp->rcpt) {
smtp->rcpt = smtp->rcpt->next;
if(smtp->rcpt) {
/* Send the next command */
result = smtp_perform_command(conn);
}
else
/* End of DO phase */
state(conn, SMTP_STOP);
}
else
/* End of DO phase */
state(conn, SMTP_STOP);
}
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: smtp: use the upload buffer size for scratch buffer malloc
... not the read buffer size, as that can be set smaller and thus cause
a buffer overflow! CVE-2018-0500
Reported-by: Peter Wu
Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_2018-70a2.html
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 85,065
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static pfn_t kvm_pin_pages(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
gfn_t gfn, unsigned long size)
{
gfn_t end_gfn;
pfn_t pfn;
pfn = gfn_to_pfn_memslot(kvm, slot, gfn);
end_gfn = gfn + (size >> PAGE_SHIFT);
gfn += 1;
if (is_error_pfn(pfn))
return pfn;
while (gfn < end_gfn)
gfn_to_pfn_memslot(kvm, slot, gfn++);
return pfn;
}
Commit Message: KVM: unmap pages from the iommu when slots are removed
commit 32f6daad4651a748a58a3ab6da0611862175722f upstream.
We've been adding new mappings, but not destroying old mappings.
This can lead to a page leak as pages are pinned using
get_user_pages, but only unpinned with put_page if they still
exist in the memslots list on vm shutdown. A memslot that is
destroyed while an iommu domain is enabled for the guest will
therefore result in an elevated page reference count that is
never cleared.
Additionally, without this fix, the iommu is only programmed
with the first translation for a gpa. This can result in
peer-to-peer errors if a mapping is destroyed and replaced by a
new mapping at the same gpa as the iommu will still be pointing
to the original, pinned memory address.
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 20,295
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void TypedUrlModelAssociator::UpdateURLRowFromTypedUrlSpecifics(
const sync_pb::TypedUrlSpecifics& typed_url, history::URLRow* new_url) {
DCHECK_GT(typed_url.visits_size(), 0);
DCHECK_EQ(typed_url.visit_transitions_size(), typed_url.visits_size());
new_url->set_title(UTF8ToUTF16(typed_url.title()));
new_url->set_hidden(typed_url.hidden());
new_url->set_last_visit(base::Time::FromInternalValue(
typed_url.visits(typed_url.visits_size() - 1)));
}
Commit Message: Now ignores obsolete sync nodes without visit transitions.
Also removed assertion that was erroneously triggered by obsolete sync nodes.
BUG=none
TEST=run chrome against a database that contains obsolete typed url sync nodes.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7129069
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88846 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 100,816
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: smb_ofile_netinfo_fini(smb_netfileinfo_t *fi)
{
if (fi == NULL)
return;
if (fi->fi_path)
smb_mem_free(fi->fi_path);
if (fi->fi_username)
kmem_free(fi->fi_username, fi->fi_namelen);
bzero(fi, sizeof (smb_netfileinfo_t));
}
Commit Message: 7483 SMB flush on pipe triggers NULL pointer dereference in module smbsrv
Reviewed by: Gordon Ross <[email protected]>
Reviewed by: Matt Barden <[email protected]>
Reviewed by: Evan Layton <[email protected]>
Reviewed by: Dan McDonald <[email protected]>
Approved by: Gordon Ross <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 73,764
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: bool GLES2Decoder::GetServiceTextureId(uint32 client_texture_id,
uint32* service_texture_id) {
return false;
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
[email protected]
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 99,229
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void tq_thaw(struct thread_q *tq)
{
tq_freezethaw(tq, false);
}
Commit Message: stratum: parse_notify(): Don't die on malformed bbversion/prev_hash/nbit/ntime.
Might have introduced a memory leak, don't have time to check. :(
Should the other hex2bin()'s be checked?
Thanks to Mick Ayzenberg <mick.dejavusecurity.com> for finding this.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 36,646
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static __be64 sig_mkey_mask(void)
{
u64 result;
result = MLX5_MKEY_MASK_LEN |
MLX5_MKEY_MASK_PAGE_SIZE |
MLX5_MKEY_MASK_START_ADDR |
MLX5_MKEY_MASK_EN_SIGERR |
MLX5_MKEY_MASK_EN_RINVAL |
MLX5_MKEY_MASK_KEY |
MLX5_MKEY_MASK_LR |
MLX5_MKEY_MASK_LW |
MLX5_MKEY_MASK_RR |
MLX5_MKEY_MASK_RW |
MLX5_MKEY_MASK_SMALL_FENCE |
MLX5_MKEY_MASK_FREE |
MLX5_MKEY_MASK_BSF_EN;
return cpu_to_be64(result);
}
Commit Message: IB/mlx5: Fix leaking stack memory to userspace
mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp was never initialized and only the first 4 bytes
were written.
Fixes: 41d902cb7c32 ("RDMA/mlx5: Fix definition of mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp")
Cc: <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 92,203
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(imageaffinematrixget)
{
double affine[6];
long type;
zval *options = NULL;
zval **tmp;
int res = GD_FALSE, i;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "l|z", &type, &options) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
switch((gdAffineStandardMatrix)type) {
case GD_AFFINE_TRANSLATE:
case GD_AFFINE_SCALE: {
double x, y;
if (!options || Z_TYPE_P(options) != IS_ARRAY) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Array expected as options");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (zend_hash_find(HASH_OF(options), "x", sizeof("x"), (void **)&tmp) != FAILURE) {
if (Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) != IS_DOUBLE) {
zval dval;
dval = **tmp;
zval_copy_ctor(&dval);
convert_to_double(&dval);
x = Z_DVAL(dval);
} else {
x = Z_DVAL_PP(tmp);
}
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Missing x position");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (zend_hash_find(HASH_OF(options), "y", sizeof("y"), (void **)&tmp) != FAILURE) {
if (Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) != IS_DOUBLE) {
zval dval;
dval = **tmp;
zval_copy_ctor(&dval);
convert_to_double(&dval);
y = Z_DVAL(dval);
} else {
y = Z_DVAL_PP(tmp);
}
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Missing y position");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (type == GD_AFFINE_TRANSLATE) {
res = gdAffineTranslate(affine, x, y);
} else {
res = gdAffineScale(affine, x, y);
}
break;
}
case GD_AFFINE_ROTATE:
case GD_AFFINE_SHEAR_HORIZONTAL:
case GD_AFFINE_SHEAR_VERTICAL: {
double angle;
if (!options) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Number is expected as option");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if(Z_TYPE_P(options) != IS_DOUBLE) {
zval dval;
dval = *options;
zval_copy_ctor(&dval);
convert_to_double(&dval);
angle = Z_DVAL(dval);
} else {
angle = Z_DVAL_P(options);
}
if (type == GD_AFFINE_SHEAR_HORIZONTAL) {
res = gdAffineShearHorizontal(affine, angle);
} else if (type == GD_AFFINE_SHEAR_VERTICAL) {
res = gdAffineShearVertical(affine, angle);
} else {
res = gdAffineRotate(affine, angle);
}
break;
}
default:
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Invalid type for element %li", type);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (res == GD_FALSE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
} else {
array_init(return_value);
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
add_index_double(return_value, i, affine[i]);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug#72697 - select_colors write out-of-bounds
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 1
| 166,954
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: xfs_end_io(
struct work_struct *work)
{
struct xfs_ioend *ioend =
container_of(work, struct xfs_ioend, io_work);
struct xfs_inode *ip = XFS_I(ioend->io_inode);
int error = ioend->io_bio->bi_error;
/*
* Set an error if the mount has shut down and proceed with end I/O
* processing so it can perform whatever cleanups are necessary.
*/
if (XFS_FORCED_SHUTDOWN(ip->i_mount))
error = -EIO;
/*
* For a CoW extent, we need to move the mapping from the CoW fork
* to the data fork. If instead an error happened, just dump the
* new blocks.
*/
if (ioend->io_type == XFS_IO_COW) {
if (error)
goto done;
if (ioend->io_bio->bi_error) {
error = xfs_reflink_cancel_cow_range(ip,
ioend->io_offset, ioend->io_size);
goto done;
}
error = xfs_reflink_end_cow(ip, ioend->io_offset,
ioend->io_size);
if (error)
goto done;
}
/*
* For unwritten extents we need to issue transactions to convert a
* range to normal written extens after the data I/O has finished.
* Detecting and handling completion IO errors is done individually
* for each case as different cleanup operations need to be performed
* on error.
*/
if (ioend->io_type == XFS_IO_UNWRITTEN) {
if (error)
goto done;
error = xfs_iomap_write_unwritten(ip, ioend->io_offset,
ioend->io_size);
} else if (ioend->io_append_trans) {
error = xfs_setfilesize_ioend(ioend, error);
} else {
ASSERT(!xfs_ioend_is_append(ioend) ||
ioend->io_type == XFS_IO_COW);
}
done:
xfs_destroy_ioend(ioend, error);
}
Commit Message: xfs: don't BUG() on mixed direct and mapped I/O
We've had reports of generic/095 causing XFS to BUG() in
__xfs_get_blocks() due to the existence of delalloc blocks on a
direct I/O read. generic/095 issues a mix of various types of I/O,
including direct and memory mapped I/O to a single file. This is
clearly not supported behavior and is known to lead to such
problems. E.g., the lack of exclusion between the direct I/O and
write fault paths means that a write fault can allocate delalloc
blocks in a region of a file that was previously a hole after the
direct read has attempted to flush/inval the file range, but before
it actually reads the block mapping. In turn, the direct read
discovers a delalloc extent and cannot proceed.
While the appropriate solution here is to not mix direct and memory
mapped I/O to the same regions of the same file, the current
BUG_ON() behavior is probably overkill as it can crash the entire
system. Instead, localize the failure to the I/O in question by
returning an error for a direct I/O that cannot be handled safely
due to delalloc blocks. Be careful to allow the case of a direct
write to post-eof delalloc blocks. This can occur due to speculative
preallocation and is safe as post-eof blocks are not accompanied by
dirty pages in pagecache (conversely, preallocation within eof must
have been zeroed, and thus dirtied, before the inode size could have
been increased beyond said blocks).
Finally, provide an additional warning if a direct I/O write occurs
while the file is memory mapped. This may not catch all problematic
scenarios, but provides a hint that some known-to-be-problematic I/O
methods are in use.
Signed-off-by: Brian Foster <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 93,946
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: gs_currentdevice(const gs_gstate * pgs)
{
return pgs->device;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78
| 0
| 2,782
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int iwgif_read_extension(struct iwgifrcontext *rctx)
{
int retval=0;
iw_byte ext_type;
if(!iwgif_read(rctx,rctx->rbuf,1)) goto done;
ext_type=rctx->rbuf[0];
switch(ext_type) {
case 0xf9:
if(rctx->page == rctx->pages_seen+1) {
if(!iwgif_read_graphic_control_ext(rctx)) goto done;
}
else {
if(!iwgif_skip_subblocks(rctx)) goto done;
}
break;
default:
if(!iwgif_skip_subblocks(rctx)) goto done;
}
retval=1;
done:
return retval;
}
Commit Message: Fixed a GIF decoding bug (divide by zero)
Fixes issue #15
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 66,795
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: const Extension* CreateExtension(const std::string& name,
bool has_background_process) {
std::unique_ptr<TestExtensionDir> dir(new TestExtensionDir());
DictionaryBuilder manifest;
manifest.Set("name", name)
.Set("version", "1")
.Set("manifest_version", 2)
.Set("content_security_policy",
"script-src 'self' 'unsafe-eval'; object-src 'self'")
.Set("sandbox",
DictionaryBuilder()
.Set("pages", ListBuilder().Append("sandboxed.html").Build())
.Build())
.Set("web_accessible_resources",
ListBuilder().Append("*.html").Build());
if (has_background_process) {
manifest.Set("background",
DictionaryBuilder().Set("page", "bg.html").Build());
dir->WriteFile(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("bg.html"),
"<iframe id='bgframe' src='empty.html'></iframe>");
}
dir->WriteFile(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("blank_iframe.html"),
"<iframe id='frame0' src='about:blank'></iframe>");
dir->WriteFile(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("srcdoc_iframe.html"),
"<iframe id='frame0' srcdoc='Hello world'></iframe>");
dir->WriteFile(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("two_iframes.html"),
"<iframe id='frame1' src='empty.html'></iframe>"
"<iframe id='frame2' src='empty.html'></iframe>");
dir->WriteFile(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("sandboxed.html"), "Some sandboxed page");
dir->WriteFile(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("empty.html"), "");
dir->WriteManifest(manifest.ToJSON());
const Extension* extension = LoadExtension(dir->UnpackedPath());
EXPECT_TRUE(extension);
temp_dirs_.push_back(std::move(dir));
return extension;
}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 155,959
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: make_capture_history_tree(OnigCaptureTreeNode* node, OnigStackType** kp,
OnigStackType* stk_top, UChar* str, regex_t* reg)
{
int n, r;
OnigCaptureTreeNode* child;
OnigStackType* k = *kp;
while (k < stk_top) {
if (k->type == STK_MEM_START) {
n = k->u.mem.num;
if (n <= ONIG_MAX_CAPTURE_HISTORY_GROUP &&
BIT_STATUS_AT(reg->capture_history, n) != 0) {
child = history_node_new();
CHECK_NULL_RETURN_MEMERR(child);
child->group = n;
child->beg = (int )(k->u.mem.pstr - str);
r = history_tree_add_child(node, child);
if (r != 0) return r;
*kp = (k + 1);
r = make_capture_history_tree(child, kp, stk_top, str, reg);
if (r != 0) return r;
k = *kp;
child->end = (int )(k->u.mem.pstr - str);
}
}
else if (k->type == STK_MEM_END) {
if (k->u.mem.num == node->group) {
node->end = (int )(k->u.mem.pstr - str);
*kp = k;
return 0;
}
}
k++;
}
return 1; /* 1: root node ending. */
}
Commit Message: fix #59 : access to invalid address by reg->dmax value
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 64,659
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void remove_server(gpointer s) {
SERVER *server;
server=(SERVER*)s;
g_free(server->exportname);
if(server->authname)
g_free(server->authname);
if(server->listenaddr)
g_free(server->listenaddr);
if(server->prerun)
g_free(server->prerun);
if(server->postrun)
g_free(server->postrun);
g_free(server);
}
Commit Message: Fix buffer size checking
Yes, this means we've re-introduced CVE-2005-3534. Sigh.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 18,446
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::OnBoundsChanged(const gfx::Rect& old_bounds,
const gfx::Rect& new_bounds) {
base::AutoReset<bool> in_bounds_changed(&in_bounds_changed_, true);
SetSize(new_bounds.size());
if (GetInputMethod())
GetInputMethod()->OnCaretBoundsChanged(this);
}
Commit Message: Allocate a FrameSinkId for RenderWidgetHostViewAura in mus+ash
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame expects its parent to have a valid
FrameSinkId. Make sure RenderWidgetHostViewAura has a FrameSinkId even
if DelegatedFrameHost is not used (in mus+ash).
BUG=706553
[email protected]
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2847253003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468179}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 132,263
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void RTCPeerConnectionHandler::CreateOffer(
const blink::WebRTCSessionDescriptionRequest& request,
const blink::WebMediaConstraints& options) {
DCHECK(task_runner_->RunsTasksInCurrentSequence());
TRACE_EVENT0("webrtc", "RTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer");
scoped_refptr<CreateSessionDescriptionRequest> description_request(
new rtc::RefCountedObject<CreateSessionDescriptionRequest>(
task_runner_, request, weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
peer_connection_tracker_,
PeerConnectionTracker::ACTION_CREATE_OFFER));
webrtc::PeerConnectionInterface::RTCOfferAnswerOptions webrtc_options;
ConvertConstraintsToWebrtcOfferOptions(options, &webrtc_options);
native_peer_connection_->CreateOffer(description_request.get(),
webrtc_options);
if (peer_connection_tracker_)
peer_connection_tracker_->TrackCreateOffer(this, options);
}
Commit Message: Check weak pointers in RTCPeerConnectionHandler::WebRtcSetDescriptionObserverImpl
Bug: 912074
Change-Id: I8ba86751f5d5bf12db51520f985ef0d3dae63ed8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1411916
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#622945}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 152,931
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void TabStripModel::AddTabContents(TabContents* contents,
int index,
content::PageTransition transition,
int add_types) {
bool inherit_group = (add_types & ADD_INHERIT_GROUP) == ADD_INHERIT_GROUP;
if (transition == content::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK &&
(add_types & ADD_FORCE_INDEX) == 0) {
index = order_controller_->DetermineInsertionIndex(
contents, transition, add_types & ADD_ACTIVE);
inherit_group = true;
} else {
if (index < 0 || index > count())
index = order_controller_->DetermineInsertionIndexForAppending();
}
if (transition == content::PAGE_TRANSITION_TYPED && index == count()) {
inherit_group = true;
}
InsertTabContentsAt(
index, contents, add_types | (inherit_group ? ADD_INHERIT_GROUP : 0));
index = GetIndexOfTabContents(contents);
if (inherit_group && transition == content::PAGE_TRANSITION_TYPED)
contents_data_[index]->reset_group_on_select = true;
if (WebContents* old_contents = GetActiveWebContents()) {
if ((add_types & ADD_ACTIVE) == 0) {
contents->web_contents()->GetView()->
SizeContents(old_contents->GetView()->GetContainerSize());
contents->web_contents()->WasHidden();
}
}
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 118,197
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: HIDDetectionView* OobeUI::GetHIDDetectionView() {
return hid_detection_view_;
}
Commit Message: One polymer_config.js to rule them all.
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
BUG=425626
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1224783005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#337882}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 123,670
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void RenderViewImpl::ApplyNewSizeForWidget(const gfx::Size& old_size,
const gfx::Size& new_size) {
if (webview()) {
if (new_size != old_size)
webview()->HidePopups();
if (send_preferred_size_changes_ &&
webview()->MainFrame()->IsWebLocalFrame()) {
webview()->MainFrame()->ToWebLocalFrame()->SetCanHaveScrollbars(
ShouldDisplayScrollbars(new_size.width(), new_size.height()));
}
}
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 145,085
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE4(socketpair, int, family, int, type, int, protocol,
int __user *, usockvec)
{
struct socket *sock1, *sock2;
int fd1, fd2, err;
struct file *newfile1, *newfile2;
int flags;
flags = type & ~SOCK_TYPE_MASK;
if (flags & ~(SOCK_CLOEXEC | SOCK_NONBLOCK))
return -EINVAL;
type &= SOCK_TYPE_MASK;
if (SOCK_NONBLOCK != O_NONBLOCK && (flags & SOCK_NONBLOCK))
flags = (flags & ~SOCK_NONBLOCK) | O_NONBLOCK;
/*
* Obtain the first socket and check if the underlying protocol
* supports the socketpair call.
*/
err = sock_create(family, type, protocol, &sock1);
if (err < 0)
goto out;
err = sock_create(family, type, protocol, &sock2);
if (err < 0)
goto out_release_1;
err = sock1->ops->socketpair(sock1, sock2);
if (err < 0)
goto out_release_both;
fd1 = sock_alloc_file(sock1, &newfile1, flags);
if (unlikely(fd1 < 0)) {
err = fd1;
goto out_release_both;
}
fd2 = sock_alloc_file(sock2, &newfile2, flags);
if (unlikely(fd2 < 0)) {
err = fd2;
fput(newfile1);
put_unused_fd(fd1);
sock_release(sock2);
goto out;
}
audit_fd_pair(fd1, fd2);
fd_install(fd1, newfile1);
fd_install(fd2, newfile2);
/* fd1 and fd2 may be already another descriptors.
* Not kernel problem.
*/
err = put_user(fd1, &usockvec[0]);
if (!err)
err = put_user(fd2, &usockvec[1]);
if (!err)
return 0;
sys_close(fd2);
sys_close(fd1);
return err;
out_release_both:
sock_release(sock2);
out_release_1:
sock_release(sock1);
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: Fix order of arguments to compat_put_time[spec|val]
Commit 644595f89620 ("compat: Handle COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME in
net/socket.c") introduced a bug where the helper functions to take
either a 64-bit or compat time[spec|val] got the arguments in the wrong
order, passing the kernel stack pointer off as a user pointer (and vice
versa).
Because of the user address range check, that in turn then causes an
EFAULT due to the user pointer range checking failing for the kernel
address. Incorrectly resuling in a failed system call for 32-bit
processes with a 64-bit kernel.
On odder architectures like HP-PA (with separate user/kernel address
spaces), it can be used read kernel memory.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 18,619
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void CameraService::onDeviceStatusChanged(int cameraId,
int newStatus)
{
ALOGI("%s: Status changed for cameraId=%d, newStatus=%d", __FUNCTION__,
cameraId, newStatus);
if (cameraId < 0 || cameraId >= MAX_CAMERAS) {
ALOGE("%s: Bad camera ID %d", __FUNCTION__, cameraId);
return;
}
if ((int)getStatus(cameraId) == newStatus) {
ALOGE("%s: State transition to the same status 0x%x not allowed",
__FUNCTION__, (uint32_t)newStatus);
return;
}
/* don't do this in updateStatus
since it is also called from connect and we could get into a deadlock */
if (newStatus == CAMERA_DEVICE_STATUS_NOT_PRESENT) {
Vector<sp<BasicClient> > clientsToDisconnect;
{
Mutex::Autolock al(mServiceLock);
/* Find all clients that we need to disconnect */
sp<BasicClient> client = mClient[cameraId].promote();
if (client.get() != NULL) {
clientsToDisconnect.push_back(client);
}
int i = cameraId;
for (size_t j = 0; j < mProClientList[i].size(); ++j) {
sp<ProClient> cl = mProClientList[i][j].promote();
if (cl != NULL) {
clientsToDisconnect.push_back(cl);
}
}
}
/* now disconnect them. don't hold the lock
or we can get into a deadlock */
for (size_t i = 0; i < clientsToDisconnect.size(); ++i) {
sp<BasicClient> client = clientsToDisconnect[i];
client->disconnect();
/**
* The remote app will no longer be able to call methods on the
* client since the client PID will be reset to 0
*/
}
ALOGV("%s: After unplug, disconnected %d clients",
__FUNCTION__, clientsToDisconnect.size());
}
updateStatus(
static_cast<ICameraServiceListener::Status>(newStatus), cameraId);
}
Commit Message: Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 161,691
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int sctp_v4_addr_valid(union sctp_addr *addr,
struct sctp_sock *sp,
const struct sk_buff *skb)
{
/* IPv4 addresses not allowed */
if (sp && ipv6_only_sock(sctp_opt2sk(sp)))
return 0;
/* Is this a non-unicast address or a unusable SCTP address? */
if (IS_IPV4_UNUSABLE_ADDRESS(addr->v4.sin_addr.s_addr))
return 0;
/* Is this a broadcast address? */
if (skb && skb_rtable(skb)->rt_flags & RTCF_BROADCAST)
return 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: sctp: fix race on protocol/netns initialization
Consider sctp module is unloaded and is being requested because an user
is creating a sctp socket.
During initialization, sctp will add the new protocol type and then
initialize pernet subsys:
status = sctp_v4_protosw_init();
if (status)
goto err_protosw_init;
status = sctp_v6_protosw_init();
if (status)
goto err_v6_protosw_init;
status = register_pernet_subsys(&sctp_net_ops);
The problem is that after those calls to sctp_v{4,6}_protosw_init(), it
is possible for userspace to create SCTP sockets like if the module is
already fully loaded. If that happens, one of the possible effects is
that we will have readers for net->sctp.local_addr_list list earlier
than expected and sctp_net_init() does not take precautions while
dealing with that list, leading to a potential panic but not limited to
that, as sctp_sock_init() will copy a bunch of blank/partially
initialized values from net->sctp.
The race happens like this:
CPU 0 | CPU 1
socket() |
__sock_create | socket()
inet_create | __sock_create
list_for_each_entry_rcu( |
answer, &inetsw[sock->type], |
list) { | inet_create
/* no hits */ |
if (unlikely(err)) { |
... |
request_module() |
/* socket creation is blocked |
* the module is fully loaded |
*/ |
sctp_init |
sctp_v4_protosw_init |
inet_register_protosw |
list_add_rcu(&p->list, |
last_perm); |
| list_for_each_entry_rcu(
| answer, &inetsw[sock->type],
sctp_v6_protosw_init | list) {
| /* hit, so assumes protocol
| * is already loaded
| */
| /* socket creation continues
| * before netns is initialized
| */
register_pernet_subsys |
Simply inverting the initialization order between
register_pernet_subsys() and sctp_v4_protosw_init() is not possible
because register_pernet_subsys() will create a control sctp socket, so
the protocol must be already visible by then. Deferring the socket
creation to a work-queue is not good specially because we loose the
ability to handle its errors.
So, as suggested by Vlad, the fix is to split netns initialization in
two moments: defaults and control socket, so that the defaults are
already loaded by when we register the protocol, while control socket
initialization is kept at the same moment it is today.
Fixes: 4db67e808640 ("sctp: Make the address lists per network namespace")
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 42,928
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: error_returned(char *errstr, ...)
{
va_list args;
va_start(args, errstr);
{
TSK_ERROR_INFO *errInfo = tsk_error_get_info();
char *loc_errstr2 = errInfo->errstr2;
if (errInfo->t_errno == 0)
errInfo->t_errno = TSK_ERR_AUX_GENERIC;
if (errstr != NULL) {
size_t sl = strlen(loc_errstr2);
vsnprintf(loc_errstr2 + sl, TSK_ERROR_STRING_MAX_LENGTH - sl,
errstr, args);
}
}
va_end(args);
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #1374 from JordyZomer/develop
Fix CVE-2018-19497.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 75,666
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: int tipc_socket_init(void)
{
int res;
res = proto_register(&tipc_proto, 1);
if (res) {
pr_err("Failed to register TIPC protocol type\n");
goto out;
}
res = sock_register(&tipc_family_ops);
if (res) {
pr_err("Failed to register TIPC socket type\n");
proto_unregister(&tipc_proto);
goto out;
}
out:
return res;
}
Commit Message: tipc: check nl sock before parsing nested attributes
Make sure the socket for which the user is listing publication exists
before parsing the socket netlink attributes.
Prior to this patch a call without any socket caused a NULL pointer
dereference in tipc_nl_publ_dump().
Tested-and-reported-by: Baozeng Ding <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Richard Alpe <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 52,514
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: ProcXvQueryBestSize(ClientPtr client)
{
unsigned int actual_width, actual_height;
XvPortPtr pPort;
xvQueryBestSizeReply rep;
REQUEST(xvQueryBestSizeReq);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xvQueryBestSizeReq);
VALIDATE_XV_PORT(stuff->port, pPort, DixReadAccess);
(*pPort->pAdaptor->ddQueryBestSize) (pPort, stuff->motion,
stuff->vid_w, stuff->vid_h,
stuff->drw_w, stuff->drw_h,
&actual_width, &actual_height);
rep = (xvQueryBestSizeReply) {
.type = X_Reply,
.sequenceNumber = client->sequence,
.length = 0,
.actual_width = actual_width,
.actual_height = actual_height
};
_WriteQueryBestSizeReply(client, &rep);
return Success;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,468
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: MojoResult Core::GetSerializedMessageContents(
MojoMessageHandle message_handle,
void** buffer,
uint32_t* num_bytes,
MojoHandle* handles,
uint32_t* num_handles,
MojoGetSerializedMessageContentsFlags flags) {
if (!message_handle || (num_handles && *num_handles && !handles))
return MOJO_RESULT_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
auto* message = reinterpret_cast<ports::UserMessageEvent*>(message_handle)
->GetMessage<UserMessageImpl>();
if (!message->IsSerialized() || !message->IsTransmittable())
return MOJO_RESULT_FAILED_PRECONDITION;
if (num_bytes) {
base::CheckedNumeric<uint32_t> payload_size = message->user_payload_size();
*num_bytes = payload_size.ValueOrDie();
}
if (message->user_payload_size() > 0) {
if (!num_bytes || !buffer)
return MOJO_RESULT_RESOURCE_EXHAUSTED;
*buffer = message->user_payload();
} else if (buffer) {
*buffer = nullptr;
}
uint32_t max_num_handles = 0;
if (num_handles) {
max_num_handles = *num_handles;
*num_handles = static_cast<uint32_t>(message->num_handles());
}
if (message->num_handles() > max_num_handles ||
message->num_handles() > kMaxHandlesPerMessage) {
return MOJO_RESULT_RESOURCE_EXHAUSTED;
}
RequestContext request_context;
return message->ExtractSerializedHandles(
UserMessageImpl::ExtractBadHandlePolicy::kAbort, handles);
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,599
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
unsigned char *limit, int *al)
{
int extdatalen = 0;
unsigned char *orig = buf;
unsigned char *ret = buf;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
int next_proto_neg_seen;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
#endif
ret += 2;
if (ret >= limit)
return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
int el;
if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return NULL;
}
/*-
* check for enough space.
* 4 bytes for the reneg type and extension length
* + reneg data length
*/
if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + el, limit))
return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
s2n(el, ret);
if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return NULL;
}
ret += el;
}
/* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
goto done;
if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
&& s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
/*-
* check for enough space.
* 4 bytes for the server name type and extension length
*/
if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
s2n(0, ret);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (using_ecc) {
const unsigned char *plist;
size_t plistlen;
/*
* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
*/
tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
if (plistlen > 255) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return NULL;
}
/*-
* check for enough space.
* 4 bytes for the ec points format type and extension length
* 1 byte for the points format list length
* + length of points format list
*/
if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5 + plistlen, limit))
return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
*(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
ret += plistlen;
}
/*
* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
* extension
*/
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
/*-
* check for enough space.
* 4 bytes for the Ticket type and extension length
*/
if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
s2n(0, ret);
} else {
/*
* if we don't add the above TLSEXT, we can't add a session ticket
* later
*/
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
}
if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
/*-
* check for enough space.
* 4 bytes for the Status request type and extension length
*/
if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
s2n(0, ret);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
int el;
/* Returns 0 on success!! */
if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return NULL;
}
/*-
* check for enough space.
* 4 bytes for the SRTP profiles type and extension length
* + length of the SRTP profiles list
*/
if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + el, limit))
return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
s2n(el, ret);
if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return NULL;
}
ret += el;
}
#endif
if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
|| (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
&& (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
};
/* check for enough space. */
if (CHECKLEN(ret, sizeof(cryptopro_ext), limit))
return NULL;
memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext));
ret += sizeof(cryptopro_ext);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
/* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)) {
/*-
* check for enough space.
* 4 bytes for the Heartbeat type and extension length
* 1 byte for the mode
*/
if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5, limit))
return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
s2n(1, ret);
/*-
* Set mode:
* 1: peer may send requests
* 2: peer not allowed to send requests
*/
if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
*(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
else
*(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
const unsigned char *npa;
unsigned int npalen;
int r;
r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
s->
ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
/*-
* check for enough space.
* 4 bytes for the NPN type and extension length
* + length of protocols list
*/
if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + npalen, limit))
return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
s2n(npalen, ret);
memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
ret += npalen;
s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
}
}
#endif
if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
return NULL;
if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
/*
* Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
* for other cases too.
*/
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
|| s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
|| s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
|| s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
else {
/*-
* check for enough space.
* 4 bytes for the ETM type and extension length
*/
if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
s2n(0, ret);
}
}
if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
/*-
* check for enough space.
* 4 bytes for the EMS type and extension length
*/
if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
s2n(0, ret);
}
if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
size_t len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
/*-
* check for enough space.
* 4 bytes for the ALPN type and extension length
* 2 bytes for ALPN data length
* 1 byte for selected protocol length
* + length of the selected protocol
*/
if (CHECKLEN(ret, 7 + len, limit))
return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
s2n(3 + len, ret);
s2n(1 + len, ret);
*ret++ = len;
memcpy(ret, selected, len);
ret += len;
}
done:
if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
return orig;
s2n(extdatalen, orig);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Don't change the state of the ETM flags until CCS processing
Changing the ciphersuite during a renegotiation can result in a crash
leading to a DoS attack. ETM has not been implemented in 1.1.0 for DTLS
so this is TLS only.
The problem is caused by changing the flag indicating whether to use ETM
or not immediately on negotiation of ETM, rather than at CCS. Therefore,
during a renegotiation, if the ETM state is changing (usually due to a
change of ciphersuite), then an error/crash will occur.
Due to the fact that there are separate CCS messages for read and write
we actually now need two flags to determine whether to use ETM or not.
CVE-2017-3733
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 168,427
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void isa_register_soundhw(const char *name, const char *descr,
int (*init_isa)(ISABus *bus))
{
assert(soundhw_count < ARRAY_SIZE(soundhw) - 1);
soundhw[soundhw_count].name = name;
soundhw[soundhw_count].descr = descr;
soundhw[soundhw_count].isa = 1;
soundhw[soundhw_count].init.init_isa = init_isa;
soundhw_count++;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 7,845
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void InputHandler::setPopupListIndexes(int size, const bool* selecteds)
{
if (!isActiveSelectPopup())
return clearCurrentFocusElement();
if (size < 0)
return;
HTMLSelectElement* selectElement = static_cast<HTMLSelectElement*>(m_currentFocusElement.get());
const WTF::Vector<HTMLElement*>& items = selectElement->listItems();
if (items.size() != static_cast<unsigned int>(size))
return;
HTMLOptionElement* option;
for (int i = 0; i < size; i++) {
if (items[i]->hasTagName(HTMLNames::optionTag)) {
option = static_cast<HTMLOptionElement*>(items[i]);
option->setSelectedState(selecteds[i]);
}
}
selectElement->dispatchFormControlChangeEvent();
selectElement->renderer()->repaint();
clearCurrentFocusElement();
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,570
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static bt_status_t connect_int(RawAddress* bd_addr, uint16_t uuid) {
btif_av_connect_req_t connect_req;
connect_req.target_bda = bd_addr;
connect_req.uuid = uuid;
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("%s", __func__);
btif_sm_dispatch(btif_av_cb.sm_handle, BTIF_AV_CONNECT_REQ_EVT,
(char*)&connect_req);
return BT_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE AVRC: Copy browse.p_browse_data in btif_av_event_deep_copy
p_msg_src->browse.p_browse_data is not copied, but used after the
original pointer is freed
Bug: 109699112
Test: manual
Change-Id: I1d014eb9a8911da6913173a9b11218bf1c89e16e
(cherry picked from commit 1d9a58768e6573899c7e80c2b3f52e22f2d8f58b)
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 163,244
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void do_disable(char UNUSED *p)
{
bdt_disable();
}
Commit Message: Add guest mode functionality (2/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: I8f23d28ef0aa3a8df13d469c73005c8e1b894d19
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 159,721
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: cpio_rename(const char *name)
{
static char buff[1024];
FILE *t;
char *p, *ret;
#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__CYGWIN__)
FILE *to;
t = fopen("CONIN$", "r");
if (t == NULL)
return (name);
to = fopen("CONOUT$", "w");
if (to == NULL) {
fclose(t);
return (name);
}
fprintf(to, "%s (Enter/./(new name))? ", name);
fclose(to);
#else
t = fopen("/dev/tty", "r+");
if (t == NULL)
return (name);
fprintf(t, "%s (Enter/./(new name))? ", name);
fflush(t);
#endif
p = fgets(buff, sizeof(buff), t);
fclose(t);
if (p == NULL)
/* End-of-file is a blank line. */
return (NULL);
while (*p == ' ' || *p == '\t')
++p;
if (*p == '\n' || *p == '\0')
/* Empty line. */
return (NULL);
if (*p == '.' && p[1] == '\n')
/* Single period preserves original name. */
return (name);
ret = p;
/* Trim the final newline. */
while (*p != '\0' && *p != '\n')
++p;
/* Overwrite the final \n with a null character. */
*p = '\0';
return (ret);
}
Commit Message: Add ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS option
This fixes a directory traversal in the cpio tool.
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 43,865
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void DrawBoundingRectangles(Image *image,const DrawInfo *draw_info,
const PolygonInfo *polygon_info)
{
double
mid;
DrawInfo
*clone_info;
PointInfo
end,
resolution,
start;
PrimitiveInfo
primitive_info[6];
register ssize_t
i;
SegmentInfo
bounds;
ssize_t
coordinates;
clone_info=CloneDrawInfo((ImageInfo *) NULL,draw_info);
(void) QueryColorDatabase("#0000",&clone_info->fill,&image->exception);
resolution.x=DefaultResolution;
resolution.y=DefaultResolution;
if (clone_info->density != (char *) NULL)
{
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
MagickStatusType
flags;
flags=ParseGeometry(clone_info->density,&geometry_info);
resolution.x=geometry_info.rho;
resolution.y=geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == MagickFalse)
resolution.y=resolution.x;
}
mid=(resolution.x/72.0)*ExpandAffine(&clone_info->affine)*
clone_info->stroke_width/2.0;
bounds.x1=0.0;
bounds.y1=0.0;
bounds.x2=0.0;
bounds.y2=0.0;
if (polygon_info != (PolygonInfo *) NULL)
{
bounds=polygon_info->edges[0].bounds;
for (i=1; i < (ssize_t) polygon_info->number_edges; i++)
{
if (polygon_info->edges[i].bounds.x1 < (double) bounds.x1)
bounds.x1=polygon_info->edges[i].bounds.x1;
if (polygon_info->edges[i].bounds.y1 < (double) bounds.y1)
bounds.y1=polygon_info->edges[i].bounds.y1;
if (polygon_info->edges[i].bounds.x2 > (double) bounds.x2)
bounds.x2=polygon_info->edges[i].bounds.x2;
if (polygon_info->edges[i].bounds.y2 > (double) bounds.y2)
bounds.y2=polygon_info->edges[i].bounds.y2;
}
bounds.x1-=mid;
bounds.x1=bounds.x1 < 0.0 ? 0.0 : bounds.x1 >= (double)
image->columns ? (double) image->columns-1 : bounds.x1;
bounds.y1-=mid;
bounds.y1=bounds.y1 < 0.0 ? 0.0 : bounds.y1 >= (double)
image->rows ? (double) image->rows-1 : bounds.y1;
bounds.x2+=mid;
bounds.x2=bounds.x2 < 0.0 ? 0.0 : bounds.x2 >= (double)
image->columns ? (double) image->columns-1 : bounds.x2;
bounds.y2+=mid;
bounds.y2=bounds.y2 < 0.0 ? 0.0 : bounds.y2 >= (double)
image->rows ? (double) image->rows-1 : bounds.y2;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) polygon_info->number_edges; i++)
{
if (polygon_info->edges[i].direction != 0)
(void) QueryColorDatabase("red",&clone_info->stroke,
&image->exception);
else
(void) QueryColorDatabase("green",&clone_info->stroke,
&image->exception);
start.x=(double) (polygon_info->edges[i].bounds.x1-mid);
start.y=(double) (polygon_info->edges[i].bounds.y1-mid);
end.x=(double) (polygon_info->edges[i].bounds.x2+mid);
end.y=(double) (polygon_info->edges[i].bounds.y2+mid);
primitive_info[0].primitive=RectanglePrimitive;
TraceRectangle(primitive_info,start,end);
primitive_info[0].method=ReplaceMethod;
coordinates=(ssize_t) primitive_info[0].coordinates;
primitive_info[coordinates].primitive=UndefinedPrimitive;
(void) DrawPrimitive(image,clone_info,primitive_info);
}
}
(void) QueryColorDatabase("blue",&clone_info->stroke,&image->exception);
start.x=(double) (bounds.x1-mid);
start.y=(double) (bounds.y1-mid);
end.x=(double) (bounds.x2+mid);
end.y=(double) (bounds.y2+mid);
primitive_info[0].primitive=RectanglePrimitive;
TraceRectangle(primitive_info,start,end);
primitive_info[0].method=ReplaceMethod;
coordinates=(ssize_t) primitive_info[0].coordinates;
primitive_info[coordinates].primitive=UndefinedPrimitive;
(void) DrawPrimitive(image,clone_info,primitive_info);
clone_info=DestroyDrawInfo(clone_info);
}
Commit Message: Prevent buffer overflow (bug report from Max Thrane)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 71,994
|
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