instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
235k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: int usbnet_read_cmd_nopm(struct usbnet *dev, u8 cmd, u8 reqtype,
u16 value, u16 index, void *data, u16 size)
{
return __usbnet_read_cmd(dev, cmd, reqtype, value, index,
data, size);
}
Commit Message: usbnet: cleanup after bind() in probe()
In case bind() works, but a later error forces bailing
in probe() in error cases work and a timer may be scheduled.
They must be killed. This fixes an error case related to
the double free reported in
http://www.spinics.net/lists/netdev/msg367669.html
and needs to go on top of Linus' fix to cdc-ncm.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 94,910
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void HTMLKeygenElement::parseAttribute(const QualifiedName& name, const AtomicString& value)
{
if (name == disabledAttr)
shadowSelect()->setAttribute(name, value);
HTMLFormControlElement::parseAttribute(name, value);
}
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 114,037
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: ImportArrayTIFF_Rational ( const TIFF_Manager::TagInfo & tagInfo, const bool nativeEndian,
SXMPMeta * xmp, const char * xmpNS, const char * xmpProp )
{
try { // Don't let errors with one stop the others.
XMP_Uns32 * binPtr = (XMP_Uns32*)tagInfo.dataPtr;
xmp->DeleteProperty ( xmpNS, xmpProp ); // ! Don't keep appending, create a new array.
for ( size_t i = 0; i < tagInfo.count; ++i, binPtr += 2 ) {
XMP_Uns32 binNum = GetUns32AsIs ( &binPtr[0] );
XMP_Uns32 binDenom = GetUns32AsIs ( &binPtr[1] );
if ( ! nativeEndian ) {
binNum = Flip4 ( binNum );
binDenom = Flip4 ( binDenom );
}
char strValue[40];
snprintf ( strValue, sizeof(strValue), "%lu/%lu", (unsigned long)binNum, (unsigned long)binDenom ); // AUDIT: Using sizeof(strValue) is safe.
xmp->AppendArrayItem ( xmpNS, xmpProp, kXMP_PropArrayIsOrdered, strValue );
}
} catch ( ... ) {
}
} // ImportArrayTIFF_Rational
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 15,962
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void _WM_do_meta_portprefix(struct _mdi *mdi, struct _event_data *data) {
/* placeholder function so we can record tempo in the event stream
* for conversion function _WM_Event2Midi */
#ifdef DEBUG_MIDI
uint8_t ch = data->channel;
MIDI_EVENT_DEBUG(__FUNCTION__, ch, data->data.value);
#else
UNUSED(data);
#endif
UNUSED(mdi);
return;
}
Commit Message: Add a new size parameter to _WM_SetupMidiEvent() so that it knows
where to stop reading, and adjust its users properly. Fixes bug #175
(CVE-2017-11661, CVE-2017-11662, CVE-2017-11663, CVE-2017-11664.)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 63,248
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: bool TabStripModel::IsNewTabAtEndOfTabStrip(
TabContentsWrapper* contents) const {
return LowerCaseEqualsASCII(contents->tab_contents()->GetURL().spec(),
chrome::kChromeUINewTabURL) &&
contents == GetContentsAt(count() - 1) &&
contents->controller().entry_count() == 1;
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 98,106
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: int ext4_convert_unwritten_extents(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,
loff_t offset, ssize_t len)
{
unsigned int max_blocks;
int ret = 0;
int ret2 = 0;
struct ext4_map_blocks map;
unsigned int credits, blkbits = inode->i_blkbits;
map.m_lblk = offset >> blkbits;
/*
* We can't just convert len to max_blocks because
* If blocksize = 4096 offset = 3072 and len = 2048
*/
max_blocks = ((EXT4_BLOCK_ALIGN(len + offset, blkbits) >> blkbits) -
map.m_lblk);
/*
* This is somewhat ugly but the idea is clear: When transaction is
* reserved, everything goes into it. Otherwise we rather start several
* smaller transactions for conversion of each extent separately.
*/
if (handle) {
handle = ext4_journal_start_reserved(handle,
EXT4_HT_EXT_CONVERT);
if (IS_ERR(handle))
return PTR_ERR(handle);
credits = 0;
} else {
/*
* credits to insert 1 extent into extent tree
*/
credits = ext4_chunk_trans_blocks(inode, max_blocks);
}
while (ret >= 0 && ret < max_blocks) {
map.m_lblk += ret;
map.m_len = (max_blocks -= ret);
if (credits) {
handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, EXT4_HT_MAP_BLOCKS,
credits);
if (IS_ERR(handle)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(handle);
break;
}
}
ret = ext4_map_blocks(handle, inode, &map,
EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_IO_CONVERT_EXT);
if (ret <= 0)
ext4_warning(inode->i_sb,
"inode #%lu: block %u: len %u: "
"ext4_ext_map_blocks returned %d",
inode->i_ino, map.m_lblk,
map.m_len, ret);
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
if (credits)
ret2 = ext4_journal_stop(handle);
if (ret <= 0 || ret2)
break;
}
if (!credits)
ret2 = ext4_journal_stop(handle);
return ret > 0 ? ret2 : ret;
}
Commit Message: ext4: allocate entire range in zero range
Currently there is a bug in zero range code which causes zero range
calls to only allocate block aligned portion of the range, while
ignoring the rest in some cases.
In some cases, namely if the end of the range is past i_size, we do
attempt to preallocate the last nonaligned block. However this might
cause kernel to BUG() in some carefully designed zero range requests
on setups where page size > block size.
Fix this problem by first preallocating the entire range, including
the nonaligned edges and converting the written extents to unwritten
in the next step. This approach will also give us the advantage of
having the range to be as linearly contiguous as possible.
Signed-off-by: Lukas Czerner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 0
| 44,861
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void ip_cmsg_recv_opts(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
if (IPCB(skb)->opt.optlen == 0)
return;
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IP, IP_RECVOPTS, IPCB(skb)->opt.optlen,
ip_hdr(skb) + 1);
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 18,926
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: TargetHandler::Throttle::~Throttle() {
CleanupPointers();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 148,682
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: GF_Box *btrt_New()
{
GF_BitRateBox *tmp = (GF_BitRateBox *) gf_malloc(sizeof(GF_BitRateBox));
if (tmp == NULL) return NULL;
memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(GF_BitRateBox));
tmp->type = GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_BTRT;
return (GF_Box *)tmp;
}
Commit Message: fix some exploitable overflows (#994, #997)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 83,993
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: bool AudioMixerAlsa::SetElementVolume(snd_mixer_elem_t* element,
double new_volume_db,
double rounding_bias) {
DCHECK(MessageLoop::current() == thread_->message_loop());
alsa_long_t volume_low = 0;
alsa_long_t volume_high = 0;
int alsa_result = snd_mixer_selem_get_playback_volume_range(
element, &volume_low, &volume_high);
if (alsa_result != 0) {
LOG(WARNING) << "snd_mixer_selem_get_playback_volume_range() failed: "
<< snd_strerror(alsa_result);
return false;
}
alsa_long_t volume_range = volume_high - volume_low;
if (volume_range <= 0)
return false;
alsa_long_t db_low_int = 0;
alsa_long_t db_high_int = 0;
alsa_result =
snd_mixer_selem_get_playback_dB_range(element, &db_low_int, &db_high_int);
if (alsa_result != 0) {
LOG(WARNING) << "snd_mixer_selem_get_playback_dB_range() failed: "
<< snd_strerror(alsa_result);
return false;
}
double db_low = static_cast<double>(db_low_int) / 100.0;
double db_high = static_cast<double>(db_high_int) / 100.0;
double db_step = static_cast<double>(db_high - db_low) / volume_range;
if (db_step <= 0.0)
return false;
if (new_volume_db < db_low)
new_volume_db = db_low;
alsa_long_t value = static_cast<alsa_long_t>(
rounding_bias + (new_volume_db - db_low) / db_step) + volume_low;
alsa_result = snd_mixer_selem_set_playback_volume_all(element, value);
if (alsa_result != 0) {
LOG(WARNING) << "snd_mixer_selem_set_playback_volume_all() failed: "
<< snd_strerror(alsa_result);
return false;
}
VLOG(1) << "Set volume " << snd_mixer_selem_get_name(element)
<< " to " << new_volume_db << " ==> "
<< (value - volume_low) * db_step + db_low << " dB";
return true;
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 109,270
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void BubbleHeaderView::AddPasswordReuseButtons() {
change_password_button_ = views::MdTextButton::CreateSecondaryUiBlueButton(
button_listener_,
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_PAGE_INFO_CHANGE_PASSWORD_BUTTON));
change_password_button_->set_id(
PageInfoBubbleView::VIEW_ID_PAGE_INFO_BUTTON_CHANGE_PASSWORD);
whitelist_password_reuse_button_ =
views::MdTextButton::CreateSecondaryUiButton(
button_listener_, l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_PAGE_INFO_WHITELIST_PASSWORD_REUSE_BUTTON));
whitelist_password_reuse_button_->set_id(
PageInfoBubbleView::VIEW_ID_PAGE_INFO_BUTTON_WHITELIST_PASSWORD_REUSE);
int kSpacingBetweenButtons = 8;
bool can_fit_in_one_line =
(password_reuse_button_container_->width() - kSpacingBetweenButtons) >=
(change_password_button_->CalculatePreferredSize().width() +
whitelist_password_reuse_button_->CalculatePreferredSize().width());
views::BoxLayout* layout =
new views::BoxLayout(can_fit_in_one_line ? views::BoxLayout::kHorizontal
: views::BoxLayout::kVertical,
gfx::Insets(), kSpacingBetweenButtons);
layout->set_main_axis_alignment(views::BoxLayout::MAIN_AXIS_ALIGNMENT_START);
password_reuse_button_container_->SetLayoutManager(layout);
#if defined(OS_WIN) || defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
password_reuse_button_container_->AddChildView(change_password_button_);
password_reuse_button_container_->AddChildView(
whitelist_password_reuse_button_);
#else
password_reuse_button_container_->AddChildView(
whitelist_password_reuse_button_);
password_reuse_button_container_->AddChildView(change_password_button_);
#endif
password_reuse_button_container_->SetBorder(
views::CreateEmptyBorder(8, 0, 0, 0));
InvalidateLayout();
}
Commit Message: Desktop Page Info/Harmony: Show close button for internal pages.
The Harmony version of Page Info for internal Chrome pages (chrome://,
chrome-extension:// and view-source:// pages) show a close button. Update the
code to match this.
This patch also adds TestBrowserDialog tests for the latter two cases described
above (internal extension and view source pages).
See screenshot -
https://drive.google.com/file/d/18RZnMiHCu-rCX9N6DLUpu4mkFWguh1xm/view?usp=sharing
Bug: 535074
Change-Id: I55e5f1aa682fd4ec85f7b65ac88f5a4f5906fe53
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/759624
Commit-Queue: Patti <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Trent Apted <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#516624}
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 133,980
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: ref_param_read_float_array(gs_param_list * plist, gs_param_name pkey,
gs_param_float_array * pvalue)
{
iparam_list *const iplist = (iparam_list *) plist;
iparam_loc loc;
ref aref, elt;
int code = ref_param_read_array(iplist, pkey, &loc);
float *pfv;
uint size;
long i;
if (code != 0)
return code;
size = r_size(loc.pvalue);
pfv = (float *)gs_alloc_byte_array(plist->memory, size, sizeof(float),
"ref_param_read_float_array");
if (pfv == 0)
return_error(gs_error_VMerror);
aref = *loc.pvalue;
loc.pvalue = &elt;
for (i = 0; code >= 0 && i < size; i++) {
array_get(plist->memory, &aref, i, &elt);
code = float_param(&elt, pfv + i);
}
if (code < 0) {
gs_free_object(plist->memory, pfv, "ref_read_float_array_param");
return (*loc.presult = code);
}
pvalue->data = pfv;
pvalue->size = size;
pvalue->persistent = true;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 3,274
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: xmlPopInput(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
if ((ctxt == NULL) || (ctxt->inputNr <= 1)) return(0);
if (xmlParserDebugEntities)
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"Popping input %d\n", ctxt->inputNr);
if ((ctxt->inputNr > 1) && (ctxt->inSubset == 0) &&
(ctxt->instate != XML_PARSER_EOF))
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"Unfinished entity outside the DTD");
xmlFreeInputStream(inputPop(ctxt));
if (*ctxt->input->cur == 0)
xmlParserInputGrow(ctxt->input, INPUT_CHUNK);
return(CUR);
}
Commit Message: Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579.
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 59,530
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: int ip_queue_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
if (!(inet_sk(sk)->cmsg_flags & IP_CMSG_PKTINFO))
skb_dst_drop(skb);
return sock_queue_rcv_skb(sk, skb);
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 18,936
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: MagickExport void ImageToCustomStream(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
const MagickInfo
*magick_info;
ImageInfo
*clone_info;
MagickBooleanType
blob_support,
status;
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(image_info->custom_stream != (CustomStreamInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->custom_stream->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(image_info->custom_stream->writer != (CustomStreamHandler) NULL);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
clone_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
clone_info->adjoin=MagickFalse;
(void) SetImageInfo(clone_info,1,exception);
if (*clone_info->magick != '\0')
(void) CopyMagickString(image->magick,clone_info->magick,MagickPathExtent);
magick_info=GetMagickInfo(image->magick,exception);
if (magick_info == (const MagickInfo *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
MissingDelegateError,"NoEncodeDelegateForThisImageFormat","`%s'",
image->magick);
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
return;
}
(void) CopyMagickString(clone_info->magick,image->magick,MagickPathExtent);
blob_support=GetMagickBlobSupport(magick_info);
if ((blob_support != MagickFalse) &&
(GetMagickEncoderSeekableStream(magick_info) != MagickFalse))
{
if ((clone_info->custom_stream->seeker == (CustomStreamSeeker) NULL) ||
(clone_info->custom_stream->teller == (CustomStreamTeller) NULL))
blob_support=MagickFalse;
}
if (blob_support != MagickFalse)
{
/*
Native blob support for this image format.
*/
(void) CloseBlob(image);
*image->filename='\0';
(void) WriteImage(clone_info,image,exception);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
}
else
{
char
unique[MagickPathExtent];
int
file;
unsigned char
*blob;
/*
Write file to disk in blob image format.
*/
clone_info->custom_stream=(CustomStreamInfo *) NULL;
blob=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MagickMaxBufferExtent,
sizeof(*blob));
if (blob == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,BlobError,"UnableToWriteBlob",
image_info->filename);
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
return;
}
file=AcquireUniqueFileResource(unique);
if (file == -1)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,BlobError,"UnableToWriteBlob",
image_info->filename);
blob=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(blob);
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
return;
}
clone_info->file=fdopen(file,"wb+");
if (clone_info->file != (FILE *) NULL)
{
ssize_t
count;
(void) FormatLocaleString(image->filename,MagickPathExtent,
"%s:%s",image->magick,unique);
status=WriteImage(clone_info,image,exception);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
if (status != MagickFalse)
{
(void) fseek(clone_info->file,0,SEEK_SET);
count=(ssize_t) MagickMaxBufferExtent;
while (count == (ssize_t) MagickMaxBufferExtent)
{
count=(ssize_t) fread(blob,sizeof(*blob),MagickMaxBufferExtent,
clone_info->file);
(void) image_info->custom_stream->writer(blob,(size_t) count,
image_info->custom_stream->data);
}
}
(void) fclose(clone_info->file);
}
blob=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(blob);
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(unique);
}
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick6/issues/43
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 96,642
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: AccessType GetExtensionAccess(const Extension* extension,
const GURL& url,
int tab_id) {
bool allowed_script = IsAllowedScript(extension, url, tab_id);
bool allowed_capture =
extension->permissions_data()->CanCaptureVisiblePage(tab_id, nullptr);
if (allowed_script && allowed_capture)
return ALLOWED_SCRIPT_AND_CAPTURE;
if (allowed_script)
return ALLOWED_SCRIPT_ONLY;
if (allowed_capture)
return ALLOWED_CAPTURE_ONLY;
return DISALLOWED;
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Restrict tabs.captureVisibleTab()
Modify the permissions for tabs.captureVisibleTab(). Instead of just
checking for <all_urls> and assuming its safe, do the following:
- If the page is a "normal" web page (e.g., http/https), allow the
capture if the extension has activeTab granted or <all_urls>.
- If the page is a file page (file:///), allow the capture if the
extension has file access *and* either of the <all_urls> or
activeTab permissions.
- If the page is a chrome:// page, allow the capture only if the
extension has activeTab granted.
Bug: 810220
Change-Id: I1e2f71281e2f331d641ba0e435df10d66d721304
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/981195
Commit-Queue: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Karan Bhatia <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#548891}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 173,232
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int ext4_ext_rm_idx(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_ext_path *path, int depth)
{
int err;
ext4_fsblk_t leaf;
/* free index block */
depth--;
path = path + depth;
leaf = ext4_idx_pblock(path->p_idx);
if (unlikely(path->p_hdr->eh_entries == 0)) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "path->p_hdr->eh_entries == 0");
return -EIO;
}
err = ext4_ext_get_access(handle, inode, path);
if (err)
return err;
if (path->p_idx != EXT_LAST_INDEX(path->p_hdr)) {
int len = EXT_LAST_INDEX(path->p_hdr) - path->p_idx;
len *= sizeof(struct ext4_extent_idx);
memmove(path->p_idx, path->p_idx + 1, len);
}
le16_add_cpu(&path->p_hdr->eh_entries, -1);
err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path);
if (err)
return err;
ext_debug("index is empty, remove it, free block %llu\n", leaf);
trace_ext4_ext_rm_idx(inode, leaf);
ext4_free_blocks(handle, inode, NULL, leaf, 1,
EXT4_FREE_BLOCKS_METADATA | EXT4_FREE_BLOCKS_FORGET);
while (--depth >= 0) {
if (path->p_idx != EXT_FIRST_INDEX(path->p_hdr))
break;
path--;
err = ext4_ext_get_access(handle, inode, path);
if (err)
break;
path->p_idx->ei_block = (path+1)->p_idx->ei_block;
err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path);
if (err)
break;
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: ext4: allocate entire range in zero range
Currently there is a bug in zero range code which causes zero range
calls to only allocate block aligned portion of the range, while
ignoring the rest in some cases.
In some cases, namely if the end of the range is past i_size, we do
attempt to preallocate the last nonaligned block. However this might
cause kernel to BUG() in some carefully designed zero range requests
on setups where page size > block size.
Fix this problem by first preallocating the entire range, including
the nonaligned edges and converting the written extents to unwritten
in the next step. This approach will also give us the advantage of
having the range to be as linearly contiguous as possible.
Signed-off-by: Lukas Czerner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 0
| 44,877
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: Response PageHandler::SetWebLifecycleState(const std::string& state) {
WebContentsImpl* web_contents = GetWebContents();
if (!web_contents)
return Response::Error("Not attached to a page");
if (state == Page::SetWebLifecycleState::StateEnum::Frozen) {
web_contents->WasHidden();
web_contents->SetPageFrozen(true);
return Response::OK();
}
if (state == Page::SetWebLifecycleState::StateEnum::Active) {
web_contents->SetPageFrozen(false);
return Response::OK();
}
return Response::Error("Unidentified lifecycle state");
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow Page.setDownloadBehavior for extensions
Bug: 866426
Change-Id: I71b672978e1a8ec779ede49da16b21198567d3a4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1270007
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598004}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 143,630
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void vmxnet_tx_pkt_update_ip_checksums(struct VmxnetTxPkt *pkt)
{
uint16_t csum;
uint32_t ph_raw_csum;
assert(pkt);
uint8_t gso_type = pkt->virt_hdr.gso_type & ~VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_ECN;
struct ip_header *ip_hdr;
if (VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4 != gso_type &&
VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP != gso_type) {
return;
}
ip_hdr = pkt->vec[VMXNET_TX_PKT_L3HDR_FRAG].iov_base;
if (pkt->payload_len + pkt->vec[VMXNET_TX_PKT_L3HDR_FRAG].iov_len >
ETH_MAX_IP_DGRAM_LEN) {
return;
}
ip_hdr->ip_len = cpu_to_be16(pkt->payload_len +
pkt->vec[VMXNET_TX_PKT_L3HDR_FRAG].iov_len);
/* Calculate IP header checksum */
ip_hdr->ip_sum = 0;
csum = net_raw_checksum((uint8_t *)ip_hdr,
pkt->vec[VMXNET_TX_PKT_L3HDR_FRAG].iov_len);
ip_hdr->ip_sum = cpu_to_be16(csum);
/* Calculate IP pseudo header checksum */
ph_raw_csum = eth_calc_pseudo_hdr_csum(ip_hdr, pkt->payload_len);
csum = cpu_to_be16(~net_checksum_finish(ph_raw_csum));
iov_from_buf(&pkt->vec[VMXNET_TX_PKT_PL_START_FRAG], pkt->payload_frags,
pkt->virt_hdr.csum_offset, &csum, sizeof(csum));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 9,135
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> supplementalNodeAttrGetter(v8::Local<v8::String> name, const v8::AccessorInfo& info)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestInterface.supplementalNode._get");
TestInterface* imp = V8TestInterface::toNative(info.Holder());
return toV8(TestSupplemental::supplementalNode(imp), info.GetIsolate());
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 109,494
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void ext4_ext_truncate(struct inode *inode)
{
struct address_space *mapping = inode->i_mapping;
struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
ext4_lblk_t last_block;
handle_t *handle;
int err = 0;
/*
* finish any pending end_io work so we won't run the risk of
* converting any truncated blocks to initialized later
*/
ext4_flush_completed_IO(inode);
/*
* probably first extent we're gonna free will be last in block
*/
err = ext4_writepage_trans_blocks(inode);
handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, err);
if (IS_ERR(handle))
return;
if (inode->i_size & (sb->s_blocksize - 1))
ext4_block_truncate_page(handle, mapping, inode->i_size);
if (ext4_orphan_add(handle, inode))
goto out_stop;
down_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
ext4_ext_invalidate_cache(inode);
ext4_discard_preallocations(inode);
/*
* TODO: optimization is possible here.
* Probably we need not scan at all,
* because page truncation is enough.
*/
/* we have to know where to truncate from in crash case */
EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize = inode->i_size;
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
last_block = (inode->i_size + sb->s_blocksize - 1)
>> EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(sb);
err = ext4_ext_remove_space(inode, last_block);
/* In a multi-transaction truncate, we only make the final
* transaction synchronous.
*/
if (IS_SYNC(inode))
ext4_handle_sync(handle);
out_stop:
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
/*
* If this was a simple ftruncate() and the file will remain alive,
* then we need to clear up the orphan record which we created above.
* However, if this was a real unlink then we were called by
* ext4_delete_inode(), and we allow that function to clean up the
* orphan info for us.
*/
if (inode->i_nlink)
ext4_orphan_del(handle, inode);
inode->i_mtime = inode->i_ctime = ext4_current_time(inode);
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
}
Commit Message: ext4: reimplement convert and split_unwritten
Reimplement ext4_ext_convert_to_initialized() and
ext4_split_unwritten_extents() using ext4_split_extent()
Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Yang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Allison Henderson <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 34,770
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void InitializeWithCORS(const char* url,
bool expected,
UrlData::CORSMode cors_mode,
size_t file_size = kFileSize) {
GURL gurl(url);
data_source_.reset(new MockMultibufferDataSource(
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get(),
url_index_->GetByUrl(gurl, cors_mode), &host_));
data_source_->SetPreload(preload_);
response_generator_.reset(new TestResponseGenerator(gurl, file_size));
EXPECT_CALL(*this, OnInitialize(expected));
data_source_->Initialize(base::Bind(
&MultibufferDataSourceTest::OnInitialize, base::Unretained(this)));
base::RunLoop().RunUntilIdle();
EXPECT_EQ(data_source_->downloading(), false);
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 144,259
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void *Type_Measurement_Read(struct _cms_typehandler_struct* self, cmsIOHANDLER* io, cmsUInt32Number* nItems, cmsUInt32Number SizeOfTag)
{
cmsICCMeasurementConditions mc;
memset(&mc, 0, sizeof(mc));
if (!_cmsReadUInt32Number(io, &mc.Observer)) return NULL;
if (!_cmsReadXYZNumber(io, &mc.Backing)) return NULL;
if (!_cmsReadUInt32Number(io, &mc.Geometry)) return NULL;
if (!_cmsRead15Fixed16Number(io, &mc.Flare)) return NULL;
if (!_cmsReadUInt32Number(io, &mc.IlluminantType)) return NULL;
*nItems = 1;
return _cmsDupMem(self ->ContextID, &mc, sizeof(cmsICCMeasurementConditions));
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(SizeOfTag);
}
Commit Message: Added an extra check to MLU bounds
Thanks to Ibrahim el-sayed for spotting the bug
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 71,026
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableExperimentalProductivityFeatures(bool enable) {
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SetExperimentalProductivityFeaturesEnabled(enable);
}
Commit Message: Remove RequireCSSExtensionForFile runtime enabled flag.
The feature has long since been stable (since M64) and doesn't seem
to be a need for this flag.
BUG=788936
Change-Id: I666390b869289c328acb4a2daa5bf4154e1702c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324143
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607329}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 154,611
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_video::use_EGL_image(OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_INOUT OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE** bufferHdr,
OMX_IN OMX_U32 port,
OMX_IN OMX_PTR appData,
OMX_IN void* eglImage)
{
(void)hComp, (void)bufferHdr, (void)port, (void)appData, (void)eglImage;
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: use_EGL_image: Not Implemented");
return OMX_ErrorNotImplemented;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 159,205
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int ass_image_compare(ASS_Image *i1, ASS_Image *i2)
{
if (i1->w != i2->w)
return 2;
if (i1->h != i2->h)
return 2;
if (i1->stride != i2->stride)
return 2;
if (i1->color != i2->color)
return 2;
if (i1->bitmap != i2->bitmap)
return 2;
if (i1->dst_x != i2->dst_x)
return 1;
if (i1->dst_y != i2->dst_y)
return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix line wrapping mode 0/3 bugs
This fixes two separate bugs:
a) Don't move a linebreak into the first symbol. This results in a empty
line at the front, which does not help to equalize line lengths at all.
b) When moving a linebreak into a symbol that already is a break, the
number of lines must be decremented. Otherwise, uninitialized memory
is possibly used for later layout operations.
Found by fuzzer test case
id:000085,sig:11,src:003377+003350,op:splice,rep:8.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 73,344
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: parse_rock_ridge_inode_internal(struct iso_directory_record *de,
struct inode *inode, int flags)
{
int symlink_len = 0;
int cnt, sig;
unsigned int reloc_block;
struct inode *reloc;
struct rock_ridge *rr;
int rootflag;
struct rock_state rs;
int ret = 0;
if (!ISOFS_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_rock)
return 0;
init_rock_state(&rs, inode);
setup_rock_ridge(de, inode, &rs);
if (flags & RR_REGARD_XA) {
rs.chr += 14;
rs.len -= 14;
if (rs.len < 0)
rs.len = 0;
}
repeat:
while (rs.len > 2) { /* There may be one byte for padding somewhere */
rr = (struct rock_ridge *)rs.chr;
/*
* Ignore rock ridge info if rr->len is out of range, but
* don't return -EIO because that would make the file
* invisible.
*/
if (rr->len < 3)
goto out; /* Something got screwed up here */
sig = isonum_721(rs.chr);
if (rock_check_overflow(&rs, sig))
goto eio;
rs.chr += rr->len;
rs.len -= rr->len;
/*
* As above, just ignore the rock ridge info if rr->len
* is bogus.
*/
if (rs.len < 0)
goto out; /* Something got screwed up here */
switch (sig) {
#ifndef CONFIG_ZISOFS /* No flag for SF or ZF */
case SIG('R', 'R'):
if ((rr->u.RR.flags[0] &
(RR_PX | RR_TF | RR_SL | RR_CL)) == 0)
goto out;
break;
#endif
case SIG('S', 'P'):
if (check_sp(rr, inode))
goto out;
break;
case SIG('C', 'E'):
rs.cont_extent = isonum_733(rr->u.CE.extent);
rs.cont_offset = isonum_733(rr->u.CE.offset);
rs.cont_size = isonum_733(rr->u.CE.size);
break;
case SIG('E', 'R'):
ISOFS_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_rock = 1;
printk(KERN_DEBUG "ISO 9660 Extensions: ");
{
int p;
for (p = 0; p < rr->u.ER.len_id; p++)
printk("%c", rr->u.ER.data[p]);
}
printk("\n");
break;
case SIG('P', 'X'):
inode->i_mode = isonum_733(rr->u.PX.mode);
set_nlink(inode, isonum_733(rr->u.PX.n_links));
i_uid_write(inode, isonum_733(rr->u.PX.uid));
i_gid_write(inode, isonum_733(rr->u.PX.gid));
break;
case SIG('P', 'N'):
{
int high, low;
high = isonum_733(rr->u.PN.dev_high);
low = isonum_733(rr->u.PN.dev_low);
/*
* The Rock Ridge standard specifies that if
* sizeof(dev_t) <= 4, then the high field is
* unused, and the device number is completely
* stored in the low field. Some writers may
* ignore this subtlety,
* and as a result we test to see if the entire
* device number is
* stored in the low field, and use that.
*/
if ((low & ~0xff) && high == 0) {
inode->i_rdev =
MKDEV(low >> 8, low & 0xff);
} else {
inode->i_rdev =
MKDEV(high, low);
}
}
break;
case SIG('T', 'F'):
/*
* Some RRIP writers incorrectly place ctime in the
* TF_CREATE field. Try to handle this correctly for
* either case.
*/
/* Rock ridge never appears on a High Sierra disk */
cnt = 0;
if (rr->u.TF.flags & TF_CREATE) {
inode->i_ctime.tv_sec =
iso_date(rr->u.TF.times[cnt++].time,
0);
inode->i_ctime.tv_nsec = 0;
}
if (rr->u.TF.flags & TF_MODIFY) {
inode->i_mtime.tv_sec =
iso_date(rr->u.TF.times[cnt++].time,
0);
inode->i_mtime.tv_nsec = 0;
}
if (rr->u.TF.flags & TF_ACCESS) {
inode->i_atime.tv_sec =
iso_date(rr->u.TF.times[cnt++].time,
0);
inode->i_atime.tv_nsec = 0;
}
if (rr->u.TF.flags & TF_ATTRIBUTES) {
inode->i_ctime.tv_sec =
iso_date(rr->u.TF.times[cnt++].time,
0);
inode->i_ctime.tv_nsec = 0;
}
break;
case SIG('S', 'L'):
{
int slen;
struct SL_component *slp;
struct SL_component *oldslp;
slen = rr->len - 5;
slp = &rr->u.SL.link;
inode->i_size = symlink_len;
while (slen > 1) {
rootflag = 0;
switch (slp->flags & ~1) {
case 0:
inode->i_size +=
slp->len;
break;
case 2:
inode->i_size += 1;
break;
case 4:
inode->i_size += 2;
break;
case 8:
rootflag = 1;
inode->i_size += 1;
break;
default:
printk("Symlink component flag "
"not implemented\n");
}
slen -= slp->len + 2;
oldslp = slp;
slp = (struct SL_component *)
(((char *)slp) + slp->len + 2);
if (slen < 2) {
if (((rr->u.SL.
flags & 1) != 0)
&&
((oldslp->
flags & 1) == 0))
inode->i_size +=
1;
break;
}
/*
* If this component record isn't
* continued, then append a '/'.
*/
if (!rootflag
&& (oldslp->flags & 1) == 0)
inode->i_size += 1;
}
}
symlink_len = inode->i_size;
break;
case SIG('R', 'E'):
printk(KERN_WARNING "Attempt to read inode for "
"relocated directory\n");
goto out;
case SIG('C', 'L'):
if (flags & RR_RELOC_DE) {
printk(KERN_ERR
"ISOFS: Recursive directory relocation "
"is not supported\n");
goto eio;
}
reloc_block = isonum_733(rr->u.CL.location);
if (reloc_block == ISOFS_I(inode)->i_iget5_block &&
ISOFS_I(inode)->i_iget5_offset == 0) {
printk(KERN_ERR
"ISOFS: Directory relocation points to "
"itself\n");
goto eio;
}
ISOFS_I(inode)->i_first_extent = reloc_block;
reloc = isofs_iget_reloc(inode->i_sb, reloc_block, 0);
if (IS_ERR(reloc)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(reloc);
goto out;
}
inode->i_mode = reloc->i_mode;
set_nlink(inode, reloc->i_nlink);
inode->i_uid = reloc->i_uid;
inode->i_gid = reloc->i_gid;
inode->i_rdev = reloc->i_rdev;
inode->i_size = reloc->i_size;
inode->i_blocks = reloc->i_blocks;
inode->i_atime = reloc->i_atime;
inode->i_ctime = reloc->i_ctime;
inode->i_mtime = reloc->i_mtime;
iput(reloc);
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_ZISOFS
case SIG('Z', 'F'): {
int algo;
if (ISOFS_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_nocompress)
break;
algo = isonum_721(rr->u.ZF.algorithm);
if (algo == SIG('p', 'z')) {
int block_shift =
isonum_711(&rr->u.ZF.parms[1]);
if (block_shift > 17) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "isofs: "
"Can't handle ZF block "
"size of 2^%d\n",
block_shift);
} else {
/*
* Note: we don't change
* i_blocks here
*/
ISOFS_I(inode)->i_file_format =
isofs_file_compressed;
/*
* Parameters to compression
* algorithm (header size,
* block size)
*/
ISOFS_I(inode)->i_format_parm[0] =
isonum_711(&rr->u.ZF.parms[0]);
ISOFS_I(inode)->i_format_parm[1] =
isonum_711(&rr->u.ZF.parms[1]);
inode->i_size =
isonum_733(rr->u.ZF.
real_size);
}
} else {
printk(KERN_WARNING
"isofs: Unknown ZF compression "
"algorithm: %c%c\n",
rr->u.ZF.algorithm[0],
rr->u.ZF.algorithm[1]);
}
break;
}
#endif
default:
break;
}
}
ret = rock_continue(&rs);
if (ret == 0)
goto repeat;
if (ret == 1)
ret = 0;
out:
kfree(rs.buffer);
return ret;
eio:
ret = -EIO;
goto out;
}
Commit Message: isofs: Fix unchecked printing of ER records
We didn't check length of rock ridge ER records before printing them.
Thus corrupted isofs image can cause us to access and print some memory
behind the buffer with obvious consequences.
Reported-and-tested-by: Carl Henrik Lunde <[email protected]>
CC: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 166,782
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void RenderBox::setScrollTop(int newTop)
{
if (hasOverflowClip())
layer()->scrollToYOffset(newTop, RenderLayer::ScrollOffsetClamped);
}
Commit Message: Source/WebCore: Fix for bug 64046 - Wrong image height in absolutely positioned div in
relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <[email protected]> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
Test: fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
LayoutTests: Test to cover absolutely positioned child with percentage height
in relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <[email protected]> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@91533 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 101,646
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void CL_InitServerInfo( serverInfo_t *server, netadr_t *address ) {
server->adr = *address;
server->clients = 0;
server->hostName[0] = '\0';
server->mapName[0] = '\0';
server->maxClients = 0;
server->maxPing = 0;
server->minPing = 0;
server->ping = -1;
server->game[0] = '\0';
server->gameType = 0;
server->netType = 0;
server->allowAnonymous = 0;
server->friendlyFire = 0; // NERVE - SMF
server->maxlives = 0; // NERVE - SMF
server->tourney = 0; // NERVE - SMF
server->punkbuster = 0; // DHM - Nerve
server->gameName[0] = '\0'; // Arnout
server->antilag = 0;
server->g_humanplayers = 0;
server->g_needpass = 0;
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 95,684
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void dm_unlock_md_type(struct mapped_device *md)
{
mutex_unlock(&md->type_lock);
}
Commit Message: dm: fix race between dm_get_from_kobject() and __dm_destroy()
The following BUG_ON was hit when testing repeat creation and removal of
DM devices:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm.c:2919!
CPU: 7 PID: 750 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.1.44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81649e8b>] dm_get_from_kobject+0x34/0x3a
[<ffffffff81650ef1>] dm_attr_show+0x2b/0x5e
[<ffffffff817b46d1>] ? mutex_lock+0x26/0x44
[<ffffffff811df7f5>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x83/0xcf
[<ffffffff811de257>] kernfs_seq_show+0x23/0x25
[<ffffffff81199118>] seq_read+0x16f/0x325
[<ffffffff811de994>] kernfs_fop_read+0x3a/0x13f
[<ffffffff8117b625>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x9d
[<ffffffff8130eb59>] ? security_file_permission+0x3c/0x44
[<ffffffff8117bdb8>] ? rw_verify_area+0x83/0xd9
[<ffffffff8117be9d>] vfs_read+0x8f/0xcf
[<ffffffff81193e34>] ? __fdget_pos+0x12/0x41
[<ffffffff8117c686>] SyS_read+0x4b/0x76
[<ffffffff817b606e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 85,942
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: cupsdCloseClient(cupsd_client_t *con) /* I - Client to close */
{
int partial; /* Do partial close for SSL? */
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG, "Closing connection.");
/*
* Flush pending writes before closing...
*/
httpFlushWrite(con->http);
partial = 0;
if (con->pipe_pid != 0)
{
/*
* Stop any CGI process...
*/
cupsdEndProcess(con->pipe_pid, 1);
con->pipe_pid = 0;
}
if (con->file >= 0)
{
cupsdRemoveSelect(con->file);
close(con->file);
con->file = -1;
}
/*
* Close the socket and clear the file from the input set for select()...
*/
if (httpGetFd(con->http) >= 0)
{
cupsArrayRemove(ActiveClients, con);
cupsdSetBusyState();
#ifdef HAVE_SSL
/*
* Shutdown encryption as needed...
*/
if (httpIsEncrypted(con->http))
partial = 1;
#endif /* HAVE_SSL */
if (partial)
{
/*
* Only do a partial close so that the encrypted client gets everything.
*/
httpShutdown(con->http);
cupsdAddSelect(httpGetFd(con->http), (cupsd_selfunc_t)cupsdReadClient,
NULL, con);
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG, "Waiting for socket close.");
}
else
{
/*
* Shut the socket down fully...
*/
cupsdRemoveSelect(httpGetFd(con->http));
httpClose(con->http);
con->http = NULL;
}
}
if (!partial)
{
/*
* Free memory...
*/
cupsdRemoveSelect(httpGetFd(con->http));
httpClose(con->http);
if (con->filename)
{
unlink(con->filename);
cupsdClearString(&con->filename);
}
cupsdClearString(&con->command);
cupsdClearString(&con->options);
cupsdClearString(&con->query_string);
if (con->request)
{
ippDelete(con->request);
con->request = NULL;
}
if (con->response)
{
ippDelete(con->response);
con->response = NULL;
}
if (con->language)
{
cupsLangFree(con->language);
con->language = NULL;
}
#ifdef HAVE_AUTHORIZATION_H
if (con->authref)
{
AuthorizationFree(con->authref, kAuthorizationFlagDefaults);
con->authref = NULL;
}
#endif /* HAVE_AUTHORIZATION_H */
/*
* Re-enable new client connections if we are going back under the
* limit...
*/
if (cupsArrayCount(Clients) == MaxClients)
cupsdResumeListening();
/*
* Compact the list of clients as necessary...
*/
cupsArrayRemove(Clients, con);
free(con);
}
return (partial);
}
Commit Message: Don't treat "localhost.localdomain" as an allowed replacement for localhost, since it isn't.
CWE ID: CWE-290
| 0
| 86,099
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int build_ike_version()
{
return ((IKEv2_MAJOR_VERSION + (DBGP(IMPAIR_MAJOR_VERSION_BUMP) ? 1 : 0))
<< ISA_MAJ_SHIFT) | (IKEv2_MINOR_VERSION +
(DBGP(IMPAIR_MINOR_VERSION_BUMP) ? 1 : 0));
}
Commit Message: SECURITY: Properly handle IKEv2 I1 notification packet without KE payload
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 40,114
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: bool X86_insn_reg_intel2(unsigned int id, x86_reg *reg1, enum cs_ac_type *access1, x86_reg *reg2, enum cs_ac_type *access2)
{
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; i < ARR_SIZE(insn_regs_intel2); i++) {
if (insn_regs_intel2[i].insn == id) {
*reg1 = insn_regs_intel2[i].reg1;
*reg2 = insn_regs_intel2[i].reg2;
if (access1)
*access1 = insn_regs_intel2[i].access1;
if (access2)
*access2 = insn_regs_intel2[i].access2;
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: x86: fast path checking for X86_insn_reg_intel()
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 94,024
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: zcvr(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
{
os_ptr op = osp;
switch (r_type(op)) {
case t_integer:
make_real(op, (float)op->value.intval);
case t_real:
return 0;
default:
return_op_typecheck(op);
case t_string:
{
ref str, token;
int code;
ref_assign(&str, op);
code = gs_scan_string_token(i_ctx_p, &str, &token);
if (code > 0) /* anything other than a plain token */
code = gs_note_error(gs_error_syntaxerror);
if (code < 0)
return code;
switch (r_type(&token)) {
case t_integer:
make_real(op, (float)token.value.intval);
return 0;
case t_real:
*op = token;
return 0;
default:
return_error(gs_error_typecheck);
}
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 3,199
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void V8TestObject::UnrestrictedDoubleAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_unrestrictedDoubleAttribute_Getter");
test_object_v8_internal::UnrestrictedDoubleAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 135,275
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: virtual void TearDown() { libvpx_test::ClearSystemState(); }
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 164,403
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void PaintArtifactCompositor::PendingLayer::Upcast(
const PropertyTreeState& new_state) {
DCHECK(!requires_own_layer);
FloatClipRect float_clip_rect(bounds);
GeometryMapper::LocalToAncestorVisualRect(property_tree_state, new_state,
float_clip_rect);
bounds = float_clip_rect.Rect();
property_tree_state = new_state;
rect_known_to_be_opaque = FloatRect();
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <[email protected]>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> [email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 125,540
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void init_cs_entry(cs_entry * cs)
{
cs->data = NULL;
cs->name = NULL;
cs->len = 0;
cs->cslen = 0;
cs->used = false;
cs->valid = false;
}
Commit Message: writet1 protection against buffer overflow
git-svn-id: svn://tug.org/texlive/trunk/Build/source@48697 c570f23f-e606-0410-a88d-b1316a301751
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 76,686
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: TouchEmulator* RenderWidgetHostImpl::GetExistingTouchEmulator() {
if (!delegate_ || !delegate_->GetInputEventRouter() ||
!delegate_->GetInputEventRouter()->has_touch_emulator()) {
return nullptr;
}
return delegate_->GetInputEventRouter()->GetTouchEmulator();
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 145,465
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void cfs_bandwidth_usage_inc(void) {}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <[email protected]>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 92,481
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: CanvasRenderingContextFactory* OffscreenCanvas::GetRenderingContextFactory(
int type) {
DCHECK_LE(type, CanvasRenderingContext::kMaxValue);
return RenderingContextFactories()[type].get();
}
Commit Message: Clean up CanvasResourceDispatcher on finalizer
We may have pending mojo messages after GC, so we want to drop the
dispatcher as soon as possible.
Bug: 929757,913964
Change-Id: I5789bcbb55aada4a74c67a28758f07686f8911c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489175
Reviewed-by: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <[email protected]>
Auto-Submit: Fernando Serboncini <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#635833}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 152,145
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: is_good_case_fold_items_for_search(OnigEncoding enc, int slen,
int n, OnigCaseFoldCodeItem items[])
{
int i, len;
UChar buf[ONIGENC_MBC_CASE_FOLD_MAXLEN];
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
OnigCaseFoldCodeItem* item = items + i;
if (item->code_len != 1) return 0;
if (item->byte_len != slen) return 0;
len = ONIGENC_CODE_TO_MBC(enc, item->code[0], buf);
if (len != slen) return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fix CVE-2019-13225: problem in converting if-then-else pattern to bytecode.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 89,174
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: ProcCopyColormapAndFree(ClientPtr client)
{
Colormap mid;
ColormapPtr pSrcMap;
REQUEST(xCopyColormapAndFreeReq);
int rc;
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xCopyColormapAndFreeReq);
mid = stuff->mid;
LEGAL_NEW_RESOURCE(mid, client);
rc = dixLookupResourceByType((void **) &pSrcMap, stuff->srcCmap,
RT_COLORMAP, client,
DixReadAccess | DixRemoveAccess);
if (rc == Success)
return CopyColormapAndFree(mid, pSrcMap, client->index);
client->errorValue = stuff->srcCmap;
return rc;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 14,960
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void WebMediaPlayerImpl::MaybeSetContainerName() {
if (chunk_demuxer_ || using_media_player_renderer_)
return;
if (!demuxer_)
return;
if (highest_ready_state_ >= WebMediaPlayer::kReadyStateHaveMetadata)
return;
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_FFMPEG)
media_metrics_provider_->SetContainerName(
static_cast<FFmpegDemuxer*>(demuxer_.get())->container());
#endif
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 144,428
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: OmniboxViewWin::ScopedSuspendUndo::~ScopedSuspendUndo() {
if (text_object_model_)
text_object_model_->Undo(tomResume, NULL);
}
Commit Message: Change omnibox behavior when stripping javascript schema to navigate after stripping the schema on drag drop.
BUG=109245
TEST=N/A
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9116016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116692 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 107,546
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: struct sk_buff *napi_get_frags(struct napi_struct *napi)
{
struct sk_buff *skb = napi->skb;
if (!skb) {
skb = napi_alloc_skb(napi, GRO_MAX_HEAD);
if (skb) {
napi->skb = skb;
skb_mark_napi_id(skb, napi);
}
}
return skb;
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 48,834
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void CL_Shutdown( char *finalmsg, qboolean disconnect, qboolean quit ) {
static qboolean recursive = qfalse;
if(!(com_cl_running && com_cl_running->integer))
return;
Com_Printf( "----- Client Shutdown (%s) -----\n", finalmsg );
if ( recursive ) {
Com_Printf( "WARNING: Recursive shutdown\n" );
return;
}
recursive = qtrue;
noGameRestart = quit;
if(disconnect)
CL_Disconnect(qtrue);
CL_ClearMemory(qtrue);
CL_Snd_Shutdown();
Cmd_RemoveCommand( "cmd" );
Cmd_RemoveCommand( "configstrings" );
Cmd_RemoveCommand ("clientinfo");
Cmd_RemoveCommand( "snd_restart" );
Cmd_RemoveCommand( "vid_restart" );
Cmd_RemoveCommand( "disconnect" );
Cmd_RemoveCommand( "record" );
Cmd_RemoveCommand( "demo" );
Cmd_RemoveCommand( "cinematic" );
Cmd_RemoveCommand( "stoprecord" );
Cmd_RemoveCommand( "connect" );
Cmd_RemoveCommand ("reconnect");
Cmd_RemoveCommand( "localservers" );
Cmd_RemoveCommand( "globalservers" );
Cmd_RemoveCommand( "rcon" );
Cmd_RemoveCommand( "ping" );
Cmd_RemoveCommand( "serverstatus" );
Cmd_RemoveCommand( "showip" );
Cmd_RemoveCommand ("fs_openedList");
Cmd_RemoveCommand ("fs_referencedList");
Cmd_RemoveCommand( "model" );
Cmd_RemoveCommand ("video");
Cmd_RemoveCommand ("stopvideo");
Cmd_RemoveCommand( "cache_startgather" );
Cmd_RemoveCommand( "cache_usedfile" );
Cmd_RemoveCommand( "cache_setindex" );
Cmd_RemoveCommand( "cache_mapchange" );
Cmd_RemoveCommand( "cache_endgather" );
Cmd_RemoveCommand( "updatehunkusage" );
CL_ShutdownInput();
Con_Shutdown();
Cvar_Set( "cl_running", "0" );
recursive = qfalse;
memset( &cls, 0, sizeof( cls ) );
Key_SetCatcher( 0 );
Com_Printf( "-----------------------\n" );
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 95,892
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: struct file *alloc_file(struct path *path, fmode_t mode,
const struct file_operations *fop)
{
struct file *file;
file = get_empty_filp();
if (IS_ERR(file))
return file;
file->f_path = *path;
file->f_inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
file->f_mapping = path->dentry->d_inode->i_mapping;
file->f_mode = mode;
file->f_op = fop;
/*
* These mounts don't really matter in practice
* for r/o bind mounts. They aren't userspace-
* visible. We do this for consistency, and so
* that we can do debugging checks at __fput()
*/
if ((mode & FMODE_WRITE) && !special_file(path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode)) {
file_take_write(file);
WARN_ON(mnt_clone_write(path->mnt));
}
if ((mode & (FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE)) == FMODE_READ)
i_readcount_inc(path->dentry->d_inode);
return file;
}
Commit Message: get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 0
| 46,121
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void CLASS dcraw_message(int code, const char *format, ...) {
if (verbose || code!=DCRAW_VERBOSE) {
va_list ap;
va_start(ap, format);
vfprintf(stderr, format, ap);
va_end(ap);
}
}
Commit Message: Avoid overflow in ljpeg_start().
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 43,254
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType IsBoundsCleared(const Image *image1,
const Image *image2,RectangleInfo *bounds,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
register const PixelPacket
*p,
*q;
register ssize_t
x;
ssize_t
y;
if (bounds->x < 0)
return(MagickFalse);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) bounds->height; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image1,bounds->x,bounds->y+y,bounds->width,1,
exception);
q=GetVirtualPixels(image2,bounds->x,bounds->y+y,bounds->width,1,
exception);
if ((p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL) || (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL))
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) bounds->width; x++)
{
if ((GetPixelOpacity(p) <= (Quantum) (QuantumRange/2)) &&
(GetPixelOpacity(q) > (Quantum) (QuantumRange/2)))
break;
p++;
q++;
}
if (x < (ssize_t) bounds->width)
break;
}
return(y < (ssize_t) bounds->height ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1629
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 88,861
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: icmp6_nodeinfo_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_int icmp6len, const u_char *bp, const u_char *ep)
{
const struct icmp6_nodeinfo *ni6;
const struct icmp6_hdr *dp;
const u_char *cp;
size_t siz, i;
int needcomma;
if (ep < bp)
return;
dp = (const struct icmp6_hdr *)bp;
ni6 = (const struct icmp6_nodeinfo *)bp;
siz = ep - bp;
switch (ni6->ni_type) {
case ICMP6_NI_QUERY:
if (siz == sizeof(*dp) + 4) {
/* KAME who-are-you */
ND_PRINT((ndo," who-are-you request"));
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo," node information query"));
ND_TCHECK2(*dp, sizeof(*ni6));
ni6 = (const struct icmp6_nodeinfo *)dp;
ND_PRINT((ndo," (")); /*)*/
switch (EXTRACT_16BITS(&ni6->ni_qtype)) {
case NI_QTYPE_NOOP:
ND_PRINT((ndo,"noop"));
break;
case NI_QTYPE_SUPTYPES:
ND_PRINT((ndo,"supported qtypes"));
i = EXTRACT_16BITS(&ni6->ni_flags);
if (i)
ND_PRINT((ndo," [%s]", (i & 0x01) ? "C" : ""));
break;
case NI_QTYPE_FQDN:
ND_PRINT((ndo,"DNS name"));
break;
case NI_QTYPE_NODEADDR:
ND_PRINT((ndo,"node addresses"));
i = ni6->ni_flags;
if (!i)
break;
/* NI_NODEADDR_FLAG_TRUNCATE undefined for query */
ND_PRINT((ndo," [%s%s%s%s%s%s]",
(i & NI_NODEADDR_FLAG_ANYCAST) ? "a" : "",
(i & NI_NODEADDR_FLAG_GLOBAL) ? "G" : "",
(i & NI_NODEADDR_FLAG_SITELOCAL) ? "S" : "",
(i & NI_NODEADDR_FLAG_LINKLOCAL) ? "L" : "",
(i & NI_NODEADDR_FLAG_COMPAT) ? "C" : "",
(i & NI_NODEADDR_FLAG_ALL) ? "A" : ""));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo,"unknown"));
break;
}
if (ni6->ni_qtype == NI_QTYPE_NOOP ||
ni6->ni_qtype == NI_QTYPE_SUPTYPES) {
if (siz != sizeof(*ni6))
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,", invalid len"));
/*(*/
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
break;
}
/* XXX backward compat, icmp-name-lookup-03 */
if (siz == sizeof(*ni6)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,", 03 draft"));
/*(*/
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
break;
}
switch (ni6->ni_code) {
case ICMP6_NI_SUBJ_IPV6:
if (!ND_TTEST2(*dp,
sizeof(*ni6) + sizeof(struct in6_addr)))
break;
if (siz != sizeof(*ni6) + sizeof(struct in6_addr)) {
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,", invalid subject len"));
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,", subject=%s",
ip6addr_string(ndo, ni6 + 1)));
break;
case ICMP6_NI_SUBJ_FQDN:
ND_PRINT((ndo,", subject=DNS name"));
cp = (const u_char *)(ni6 + 1);
if (cp[0] == ep - cp - 1) {
/* icmp-name-lookup-03, pascal string */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,", 03 draft"));
cp++;
ND_PRINT((ndo,", \""));
while (cp < ep) {
safeputchar(ndo, *cp);
cp++;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,"\""));
} else
dnsname_print(ndo, cp, ep);
break;
case ICMP6_NI_SUBJ_IPV4:
if (!ND_TTEST2(*dp, sizeof(*ni6) + sizeof(struct in_addr)))
break;
if (siz != sizeof(*ni6) + sizeof(struct in_addr)) {
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,", invalid subject len"));
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,", subject=%s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, ni6 + 1)));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo,", unknown subject"));
break;
}
/*(*/
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
break;
case ICMP6_NI_REPLY:
if (icmp6len > siz) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,"[|icmp6: node information reply]"));
break;
}
needcomma = 0;
ND_TCHECK2(*dp, sizeof(*ni6));
ni6 = (const struct icmp6_nodeinfo *)dp;
ND_PRINT((ndo," node information reply"));
ND_PRINT((ndo," (")); /*)*/
switch (ni6->ni_code) {
case ICMP6_NI_SUCCESS:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,"success"));
needcomma++;
}
break;
case ICMP6_NI_REFUSED:
ND_PRINT((ndo,"refused"));
needcomma++;
if (siz != sizeof(*ni6))
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,", invalid length"));
break;
case ICMP6_NI_UNKNOWN:
ND_PRINT((ndo,"unknown"));
needcomma++;
if (siz != sizeof(*ni6))
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,", invalid length"));
break;
}
if (ni6->ni_code != ICMP6_NI_SUCCESS) {
/*(*/
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
break;
}
switch (EXTRACT_16BITS(&ni6->ni_qtype)) {
case NI_QTYPE_NOOP:
if (needcomma)
ND_PRINT((ndo,", "));
ND_PRINT((ndo,"noop"));
if (siz != sizeof(*ni6))
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,", invalid length"));
break;
case NI_QTYPE_SUPTYPES:
if (needcomma)
ND_PRINT((ndo,", "));
ND_PRINT((ndo,"supported qtypes"));
i = EXTRACT_16BITS(&ni6->ni_flags);
if (i)
ND_PRINT((ndo," [%s]", (i & 0x01) ? "C" : ""));
break;
case NI_QTYPE_FQDN:
if (needcomma)
ND_PRINT((ndo,", "));
ND_PRINT((ndo,"DNS name"));
cp = (const u_char *)(ni6 + 1) + 4;
ND_TCHECK(cp[0]);
if (cp[0] == ep - cp - 1) {
/* icmp-name-lookup-03, pascal string */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,", 03 draft"));
cp++;
ND_PRINT((ndo,", \""));
while (cp < ep) {
safeputchar(ndo, *cp);
cp++;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,"\""));
} else
dnsname_print(ndo, cp, ep);
if ((EXTRACT_16BITS(&ni6->ni_flags) & 0x01) != 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo," [TTL=%u]", EXTRACT_32BITS(ni6 + 1)));
break;
case NI_QTYPE_NODEADDR:
if (needcomma)
ND_PRINT((ndo,", "));
ND_PRINT((ndo,"node addresses"));
i = sizeof(*ni6);
while (i < siz) {
if (i + sizeof(struct in6_addr) + sizeof(int32_t) > siz)
break;
ND_PRINT((ndo," %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, bp + i)));
i += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
ND_PRINT((ndo,"(%d)", (int32_t)EXTRACT_32BITS(bp + i)));
i += sizeof(int32_t);
}
i = ni6->ni_flags;
if (!i)
break;
ND_PRINT((ndo," [%s%s%s%s%s%s%s]",
(i & NI_NODEADDR_FLAG_ANYCAST) ? "a" : "",
(i & NI_NODEADDR_FLAG_GLOBAL) ? "G" : "",
(i & NI_NODEADDR_FLAG_SITELOCAL) ? "S" : "",
(i & NI_NODEADDR_FLAG_LINKLOCAL) ? "L" : "",
(i & NI_NODEADDR_FLAG_COMPAT) ? "C" : "",
(i & NI_NODEADDR_FLAG_ALL) ? "A" : "",
(i & NI_NODEADDR_FLAG_TRUNCATE) ? "T" : ""));
break;
default:
if (needcomma)
ND_PRINT((ndo,", "));
ND_PRINT((ndo,"unknown"));
break;
}
/*(*/
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
break;
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|icmp6]"));
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14882/ICMP6 RPL: Add a missing bounds check
Moreover:
Add and use *_tstr[] strings.
Update four tests outputs accordingly.
Fix a space.
Wang Junjie of 360 ESG Codesafe Team had independently identified this
vulnerability in 2018 by means of fuzzing and provided the packet capture
file for the test.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 169,822
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: WebsiteSettings::SiteIdentityStatus GetSiteIdentityStatusByCTInfo(
const content::SignedCertificateTimestampIDStatusList& scts,
bool is_ev) {
if (CertificateTransparencyStatusMatch(scts, net::ct::SCT_STATUS_INVALID))
return WebsiteSettings::SITE_IDENTITY_STATUS_ERROR;
return is_ev ? WebsiteSettings::SITE_IDENTITY_STATUS_EV_CERT
: WebsiteSettings::SITE_IDENTITY_STATUS_CERT;
}
Commit Message: Fix UAF in Origin Info Bubble and permission settings UI.
In addition to fixing the UAF, will this also fix the problem of the bubble
showing over the previous tab (if the bubble is open when the tab it was opened
for closes).
BUG=490492
TBR=tedchoc
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1317443002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#346023}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 125,245
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static PHP_FUNCTION(session_unset)
{
if (PS(session_status) == php_session_none) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
IF_SESSION_VARS() {
HashTable *ht_sess_var;
SEPARATE_ZVAL_IF_NOT_REF(&PS(http_session_vars));
ht_sess_var = Z_ARRVAL_P(PS(http_session_vars));
/* Clean $_SESSION. */
zend_hash_clean(ht_sess_var);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 9,592
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface(ExecState* exec)
{
JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor*>(exec->callee());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 2)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
const String& hello(ustringToString(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined).isEmpty() ? UString() : MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined).toString(exec)->value(exec)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
RefPtr<SerializedScriptValue> data(SerializedScriptValue::create(exec, MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 1, DefaultIsUndefined)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
Array* transferList(toArray(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 2, DefaultIsUndefined)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
RefPtr<TestSerializedScriptValueInterface> object = TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::create(hello, data, transferList);
return JSValue::encode(asObject(toJS(exec, castedThis->globalObject(), object.get())));
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 170,611
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void inc_refcounts(BlockDriverState *bs,
BdrvCheckResult *res,
uint16_t *refcount_table,
int refcount_table_size,
int64_t offset, int64_t size)
{
BDRVQcowState *s = bs->opaque;
int64_t start, last, cluster_offset;
int k;
if (size <= 0)
return;
start = start_of_cluster(s, offset);
last = start_of_cluster(s, offset + size - 1);
for(cluster_offset = start; cluster_offset <= last;
cluster_offset += s->cluster_size) {
k = cluster_offset >> s->cluster_bits;
if (k < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: invalid cluster offset=0x%" PRIx64 "\n",
cluster_offset);
res->corruptions++;
} else if (k >= refcount_table_size) {
fprintf(stderr, "Warning: cluster offset=0x%" PRIx64 " is after "
"the end of the image file, can't properly check refcounts.\n",
cluster_offset);
res->check_errors++;
} else {
if (++refcount_table[k] == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: overflow cluster offset=0x%" PRIx64
"\n", cluster_offset);
res->corruptions++;
}
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 16,804
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static jas_iccattrval_t *jas_iccattrval_create0()
{
jas_iccattrval_t *attrval;
if (!(attrval = jas_malloc(sizeof(jas_iccattrval_t))))
return 0;
memset(attrval, 0, sizeof(jas_iccattrval_t));
attrval->refcnt = 0;
attrval->ops = 0;
attrval->type = 0;
return attrval;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 72,686
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int llc_ui_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, unsigned int optlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct llc_sock *llc = llc_sk(sk);
unsigned int opt;
int rc = -EINVAL;
lock_sock(sk);
if (unlikely(level != SOL_LLC || optlen != sizeof(int)))
goto out;
rc = get_user(opt, (int __user *)optval);
if (rc)
goto out;
rc = -EINVAL;
switch (optname) {
case LLC_OPT_RETRY:
if (opt > LLC_OPT_MAX_RETRY)
goto out;
llc->n2 = opt;
break;
case LLC_OPT_SIZE:
if (opt > LLC_OPT_MAX_SIZE)
goto out;
llc->n1 = opt;
break;
case LLC_OPT_ACK_TMR_EXP:
if (opt > LLC_OPT_MAX_ACK_TMR_EXP)
goto out;
llc->ack_timer.expire = opt * HZ;
break;
case LLC_OPT_P_TMR_EXP:
if (opt > LLC_OPT_MAX_P_TMR_EXP)
goto out;
llc->pf_cycle_timer.expire = opt * HZ;
break;
case LLC_OPT_REJ_TMR_EXP:
if (opt > LLC_OPT_MAX_REJ_TMR_EXP)
goto out;
llc->rej_sent_timer.expire = opt * HZ;
break;
case LLC_OPT_BUSY_TMR_EXP:
if (opt > LLC_OPT_MAX_BUSY_TMR_EXP)
goto out;
llc->busy_state_timer.expire = opt * HZ;
break;
case LLC_OPT_TX_WIN:
if (opt > LLC_OPT_MAX_WIN)
goto out;
llc->k = opt;
break;
case LLC_OPT_RX_WIN:
if (opt > LLC_OPT_MAX_WIN)
goto out;
llc->rw = opt;
break;
case LLC_OPT_PKTINFO:
if (opt)
llc->cmsg_flags |= LLC_CMSG_PKTINFO;
else
llc->cmsg_flags &= ~LLC_CMSG_PKTINFO;
break;
default:
rc = -ENOPROTOOPT;
goto out;
}
rc = 0;
out:
release_sock(sk);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: llc: Fix missing msg_namelen update in llc_ui_recvmsg()
For stream sockets the code misses to update the msg_namelen member
to 0 and therefore makes net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized
sockaddr_storage variable to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack
memory. The msg_namelen update is also missing for datagram sockets
in case the socket is shutting down during receive.
Fix both issues by setting msg_namelen to 0 early. It will be
updated later if we're going to fill the msg_name member.
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 30,550
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: ext4_ext_new_meta_block(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_ext_path *path,
struct ext4_extent *ex, int *err)
{
ext4_fsblk_t goal, newblock;
goal = ext4_ext_find_goal(inode, path, le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block));
newblock = ext4_new_meta_blocks(handle, inode, goal, NULL, err);
return newblock;
}
Commit Message: ext4: reimplement convert and split_unwritten
Reimplement ext4_ext_convert_to_initialized() and
ext4_split_unwritten_extents() using ext4_split_extent()
Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Yang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Allison Henderson <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 34,755
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void function_trace_probe_call(unsigned long ip, unsigned long parent_ip,
struct ftrace_ops *op, struct pt_regs *pt_regs)
{
struct ftrace_func_probe *entry;
struct hlist_head *hhd;
unsigned long key;
key = hash_long(ip, FTRACE_HASH_BITS);
hhd = &ftrace_func_hash[key];
if (hlist_empty(hhd))
return;
/*
* Disable preemption for these calls to prevent a RCU grace
* period. This syncs the hash iteration and freeing of items
* on the hash. rcu_read_lock is too dangerous here.
*/
preempt_disable_notrace();
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, hhd, node) {
if (entry->ip == ip)
entry->ops->func(ip, parent_ip, &entry->data);
}
preempt_enable_notrace();
}
Commit Message: tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 30,248
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int adjust_insn_aux_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 prog_len,
u32 off, u32 cnt)
{
struct bpf_insn_aux_data *new_data, *old_data = env->insn_aux_data;
int i;
if (cnt == 1)
return 0;
new_data = vzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * prog_len);
if (!new_data)
return -ENOMEM;
memcpy(new_data, old_data, sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * off);
memcpy(new_data + off + cnt - 1, old_data + off,
sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * (prog_len - off - cnt + 1));
for (i = off; i < off + cnt - 1; i++)
new_data[i].seen = true;
env->insn_aux_data = new_data;
vfree(old_data);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix missing error return in check_stack_boundary()
Prevent indirect stack accesses at non-constant addresses, which would
permit reading and corrupting spilled pointers.
Fixes: f1174f77b50c ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 59,178
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: EvalJsResult GetOriginFromRenderer(FrameTreeNode* ftn) {
return EvalJs(ftn, "self.origin;");
}
Commit Message: Add a check for disallowing remote frame navigations to local resources.
Previously, RemoteFrame navigations did not perform any renderer-side
checks and relied solely on the browser-side logic to block disallowed
navigations via mechanisms like FilterURL. This means that blocked
remote frame navigations were silently navigated to about:blank
without any console error message.
This CL adds a CanDisplay check to the remote navigation path to match
an equivalent check done for local frame navigations. This way, the
renderer can consistently block disallowed navigations in both cases
and output an error message.
Bug: 894399
Change-Id: I172f68f77c1676f6ca0172d2a6c78f7edc0e3b7a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1282390
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601022}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 143,848
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void isdn_net_writebuf_skb(isdn_net_local *lp, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int ret;
int len = skb->len; /* save len */
/* before obtaining the lock the caller should have checked that
the lp isn't busy */
if (isdn_net_lp_busy(lp)) {
printk("isdn BUG at %s:%d!\n", __FILE__, __LINE__);
goto error;
}
if (!(lp->flags & ISDN_NET_CONNECTED)) {
printk("isdn BUG at %s:%d!\n", __FILE__, __LINE__);
goto error;
}
ret = isdn_writebuf_skb_stub(lp->isdn_device, lp->isdn_channel, 1, skb);
if (ret != len) {
/* we should never get here */
printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: HL driver queue full\n", lp->netdev->dev->name);
goto error;
}
lp->transcount += len;
isdn_net_inc_frame_cnt(lp);
return;
error:
dev_kfree_skb(skb);
lp->stats.tx_errors++;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
CC: Karsten Keil <[email protected]>
CC: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <[email protected]>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <[email protected]>
CC: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <[email protected]>
CC: "John W. Linville" <[email protected]>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
CC: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 23,677
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void RenderViewImpl::OnWasHidden() {
RenderWidget::OnWasHidden();
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
media_player_manager_->ReleaseMediaResources();
#endif
if (webview()) {
webview()->settings()->setMinimumTimerInterval(
webkit_glue::kBackgroundTabTimerInterval);
webview()->setVisibilityState(visibilityState(), false);
}
pepper_helper_->PageVisibilityChanged(false);
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
std::set<WebPluginDelegateProxy*>::iterator plugin_it;
for (plugin_it = plugin_delegates_.begin();
plugin_it != plugin_delegates_.end(); ++plugin_it) {
(*plugin_it)->SetContainerVisibility(false);
}
#endif // OS_MACOSX
}
Commit Message: Let the browser handle external navigations from DevTools.
BUG=180555
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12531004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@186793 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 115,573
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: dissect_tb_data(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
int offset, struct fp_info *p_fp_info,
dissector_handle_t *data_handle, void *data)
{
int chan, num_tbs = 0;
int bit_offset = 0;
int crci_bit_offset = (offset+1)<<3; /* Current offset + Quality estimate of 1 byte at the end*/
guint data_bits = 0;
guint8 crci_bit = 0;
proto_item *tree_ti = NULL;
proto_tree *data_tree = NULL;
gboolean dissected = FALSE;
if (tree) {
/* Add data subtree */
tree_ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_fp_data, tvb, offset, -1, ENC_NA);
proto_item_set_text(tree_ti, "TB data for %u chans", p_fp_info->num_chans);
data_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(tree_ti, ett_fp_data);
}
/* Calculate offset to CRCI bits */
if (p_fp_info->is_uplink) {
for (chan=0; chan < p_fp_info->num_chans; chan++) {
int n;
for (n=0; n < p_fp_info->chan_num_tbs[chan]; n++) {
/* Advance bit offset */
crci_bit_offset += p_fp_info->chan_tf_size[chan];
/* Pad out to next byte */
if (crci_bit_offset % 8) {
crci_bit_offset += (8 - (crci_bit_offset % 8));
}
}
}
}
/* Now for the TB data */
for (chan=0; chan < p_fp_info->num_chans; chan++) {
int n;
p_fp_info->cur_chan = chan; /*Set current channel?*/
/* Clearly show channels with no TBs */
if (p_fp_info->chan_num_tbs[chan] == 0) {
proto_item *no_tb_ti = proto_tree_add_uint(data_tree, hf_fp_chan_zero_tbs, tvb,
offset+(bit_offset/8),
0, chan+1);
proto_item_append_text(no_tb_ti, " (of size %d)",
p_fp_info->chan_tf_size[chan]);
PROTO_ITEM_SET_GENERATED(no_tb_ti);
}
/* Show TBs from non-empty channels */
pinfo->fd->subnum = chan; /* set subframe number to current TB */
for (n=0; n < p_fp_info->chan_num_tbs[chan]; n++) {
proto_item *ti;
p_fp_info->cur_tb = chan; /*Set current transport block?*/
if (data_tree) {
ti = proto_tree_add_item(data_tree, hf_fp_tb, tvb,
offset + (bit_offset/8),
((bit_offset % 8) + p_fp_info->chan_tf_size[chan] + 7) / 8,
ENC_NA);
proto_item_set_text(ti, "TB (chan %u, tb %u, %u bits)",
chan+1, n+1, p_fp_info->chan_tf_size[chan]);
}
if (preferences_call_mac_dissectors /*&& !rlc_is_ciphered(pinfo)*/ && data_handle &&
(p_fp_info->chan_tf_size[chan] > 0)) {
tvbuff_t *next_tvb;
proto_item *item;
/* If this is DL we should not care about crci bits (since they don't exists)*/
if (p_fp_info->is_uplink) {
if ( p_fp_info->channel == CHANNEL_RACH_FDD) { /*In RACH we don't have any QE field, hence go back 8 bits.*/
crci_bit = tvb_get_bits8(tvb, crci_bit_offset+n-8, 1);
item = proto_tree_add_item(data_tree, hf_fp_crci[n%8], tvb, (crci_bit_offset+n-8)/8, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
PROTO_ITEM_SET_GENERATED(item);
} else {
crci_bit = tvb_get_bits8(tvb, crci_bit_offset+n, 1);
item = proto_tree_add_item(data_tree, hf_fp_crci[n%8], tvb, (crci_bit_offset+n)/8, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
PROTO_ITEM_SET_GENERATED(item);
}
}
if (crci_bit == 0 || !p_fp_info->is_uplink) {
next_tvb = tvb_new_subset(tvb, offset + bit_offset/8,
((bit_offset % 8) + p_fp_info->chan_tf_size[chan] + 7) / 8, -1);
/****************/
/* TODO: maybe this decision can be based only on info available in fp_info */
call_dissector_with_data(*data_handle, next_tvb, pinfo, top_level_tree, data);
dissected = TRUE;
} else {
proto_tree_add_expert(tree, pinfo, &ei_fp_crci_no_subdissector, tvb, offset + bit_offset/8,
((bit_offset % 8) + p_fp_info->chan_tf_size[chan] + 7) / 8);
}
}
num_tbs++;
/* Advance bit offset */
bit_offset += p_fp_info->chan_tf_size[chan];
data_bits += p_fp_info->chan_tf_size[chan];
/* Pad out to next byte */
if (bit_offset % 8) {
bit_offset += (8 - (bit_offset % 8));
}
}
}
if (dissected == FALSE) {
col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "(%u bits in %u tbs)",
data_bits, num_tbs);
}
/* Data tree should cover entire length */
if (data_tree) {
proto_item_set_len(tree_ti, bit_offset/8);
proto_item_append_text(tree_ti, " (%u bits in %u tbs)", data_bits, num_tbs);
}
/* Move offset past TBs (we know it's already padded out to next byte) */
offset += (bit_offset / 8);
return offset;
}
Commit Message: UMTS_FP: fix handling reserved C/T value
The spec puts the reserved value at 0xf but our internal table has 'unknown' at
0; since all the other values seem to be offset-by-one, just take the modulus
0xf to avoid running off the end of the table.
Bug: 12191
Change-Id: I83c8fb66797bbdee52a2246fb1eea6e37cbc7eb0
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15722
Reviewed-by: Evan Huus <[email protected]>
Petri-Dish: Evan Huus <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 51,882
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void blk_start_plug(struct blk_plug *plug)
{
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
/*
* If this is a nested plug, don't actually assign it.
*/
if (tsk->plug)
return;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&plug->list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&plug->mq_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&plug->cb_list);
/*
* Store ordering should not be needed here, since a potential
* preempt will imply a full memory barrier
*/
tsk->plug = plug;
}
Commit Message: block: blk_init_allocated_queue() set q->fq as NULL in the fail case
We find the memory use-after-free issue in __blk_drain_queue()
on the kernel 4.14. After read the latest kernel 4.18-rc6 we
think it has the same problem.
Memory is allocated for q->fq in the blk_init_allocated_queue().
If the elevator init function called with error return, it will
run into the fail case to free the q->fq.
Then the __blk_drain_queue() uses the same memory after the free
of the q->fq, it will lead to the unpredictable event.
The patch is to set q->fq as NULL in the fail case of
blk_init_allocated_queue().
Fixes: commit 7c94e1c157a2 ("block: introduce blk_flush_queue to drive flush machinery")
Cc: <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: xiao jin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 92,032
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: xsltEvalAttrValueTemplate(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt, xmlNodePtr inst,
const xmlChar *name, const xmlChar *ns)
{
xmlChar *ret;
xmlChar *expr;
if ((ctxt == NULL) || (inst == NULL) || (name == NULL))
return(NULL);
expr = xsltGetNsProp(inst, name, ns);
if (expr == NULL)
return(NULL);
/*
* TODO: though now {} is detected ahead, it would still be good to
* optimize both functions to keep the splitted value if the
* attribute content and the XPath precompiled expressions around
*/
ret = xsltAttrTemplateValueProcessNode(ctxt, expr, inst);
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_TEMPLATES
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_TEMPLATES,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltEvalAttrValueTemplate: %s returns %s\n", expr, ret));
#endif
if (expr != NULL)
xmlFree(expr);
return(ret);
}
Commit Message: Fix dictionary string usage.
BUG=144799
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10919019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@154331 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 105,909
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: gfx::Rect GetGridBounds() {
if (window_selector())
return window_selector()->grid_list_[0]->bounds_;
return gfx::Rect();
}
Commit Message: cros: Enable some tests in //ash/wm in ash_unittests --mash
For the ones that fail, disable them via filter file instead of in the
code, per our disablement policy.
Bug: 698085, 695556, 698878, 698888, 698093, 698894
Test: ash_unittests --mash
Change-Id: Ic145ab6a95508968d6884d14fac2a3ca08888d26
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/752423
Commit-Queue: James Cook <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Steven Bennetts <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513836}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 133,206
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE1(times, struct tms __user *, tbuf)
{
if (tbuf) {
struct tms tmp;
do_sys_times(&tmp);
if (copy_to_user(tbuf, &tmp, sizeof(struct tms)))
return -EFAULT;
}
force_successful_syscall_return();
return (long) jiffies_64_to_clock_t(get_jiffies_64());
}
Commit Message: kernel/sys.c: fix stack memory content leak via UNAME26
Calling uname() with the UNAME26 personality set allows a leak of kernel
stack contents. This fixes it by defensively calculating the length of
copy_to_user() call, making the len argument unsigned, and initializing
the stack buffer to zero (now technically unneeded, but hey, overkill).
CVE-2012-0957
Reported-by: PaX Team <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
Cc: PaX Team <[email protected]>
Cc: Brad Spengler <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-16
| 0
| 21,516
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: v8::Handle<v8::Value> V8DOMWindow::addEventListenerMethodCustom(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
String eventType = toWebCoreString(args[0]);
bool useCapture = args[2]->BooleanValue();
DOMWindow* imp = V8DOMWindow::toNative(args.Holder());
if (!BindingSecurity::shouldAllowAccessToFrame(imp->frame()))
return v8::Undefined();
Document* doc = imp->document();
if (!doc)
return v8::Undefined();
if (!imp->frame())
return v8::Undefined();
RefPtr<EventListener> listener = V8EventListenerList::getEventListener(args[1], false, ListenerFindOrCreate);
if (listener) {
imp->addEventListener(eventType, listener, useCapture);
createHiddenDependency(args.Holder(), args[1], eventListenerCacheIndex, args.GetIsolate());
}
return v8::Undefined();
}
Commit Message: Named access checks on DOMWindow miss navigator
The design of the named access check is very fragile. Instead of doing the
access check at the same time as the access, we need to check access in a
separate operation using different parameters. Worse, we need to implement a
part of the access check as a blacklist of dangerous properties.
This CL expands the blacklist slightly by adding in the real named properties
from the DOMWindow instance to the current list (which included the real named
properties of the shadow object).
In the longer term, we should investigate whether we can change the V8 API to
let us do the access check in the same callback as the property access itself.
BUG=237022
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15346002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150616 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 113,585
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void kvm_purge_vmm_mapping(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
ia64_ptr_entry(0x3, vcpu->arch.vmm_tr_slot);
ia64_ptr_entry(0x3, vcpu->arch.vm_tr_slot);
#if defined(CONFIG_IA64_SGI_SN2) || defined(CONFIG_IA64_GENERIC)
if (kvm->arch.is_sn2)
ia64_ptr_entry(0x3, vcpu->arch.sn_rtc_tr_slot);
#endif
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 20,630
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: bool ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::IsDownloadReadyForCompletion(
DownloadItem* item,
const base::Closure& internal_complete_callback) {
#if defined(ENABLE_SAFE_BROWSING)
SafeBrowsingState* state = static_cast<SafeBrowsingState*>(
item->GetExternalData(&safe_browsing_id));
if (!state) {
DownloadProtectionService* service = GetDownloadProtectionService();
if (service) {
VLOG(2) << __FUNCTION__ << "() Start SB download check for download = "
<< item->DebugString(false);
state = new SafeBrowsingState();
state->set_callback(internal_complete_callback);
item->SetExternalData(&safe_browsing_id, state);
service->CheckClientDownload(
DownloadProtectionService::DownloadInfo::FromDownloadItem(*item),
base::Bind(
&ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::CheckClientDownloadDone,
this,
item->GetId()));
return false;
}
} else if (!state->is_complete()) {
state->set_callback(internal_complete_callback);
return false;
}
#endif
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
if (!gdata::GDataDownloadObserver::IsReadyToComplete(
item, internal_complete_callback))
return false;
#endif
return true;
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 106,010
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::ProcessKeyboardEventAck(int type, bool processed) {
if (key_queue_.empty()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Got a KeyEvent back from the renderer but we "
<< "don't seem to have sent it to the renderer!";
} else if (key_queue_.front().type != type) {
LOG(ERROR) << "We seem to have a different key type sent from "
<< "the renderer. (" << key_queue_.front().type << " vs. "
<< type << "). Ignoring event.";
key_queue_.clear();
suppress_next_char_events_ = false;
} else {
NativeWebKeyboardEvent front_item = key_queue_.front();
key_queue_.pop_front();
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
if (!is_hidden_ && view_->PostProcessEventForPluginIme(front_item))
return;
#endif
if (delegate_ && !processed && !is_hidden_ && !front_item.skip_in_browser) {
delegate_->HandleKeyboardEvent(front_item);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,682
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: int blkg_print_stat_bytes_recursive(struct seq_file *sf, void *v)
{
blkcg_print_blkgs(sf, css_to_blkcg(seq_css(sf)),
blkg_prfill_rwstat_field_recursive,
(void *)seq_cft(sf)->private,
offsetof(struct blkcg_gq, stat_bytes), true);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: blkcg: fix double free of new_blkg in blkcg_init_queue
If blkg_create fails, new_blkg passed as an argument will
be freed by blkg_create, so there is no need to free it again.
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 84,144
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: v8::Persistent<v8::FunctionTemplate> V8TestEventConstructor::GetTemplate()
{
V8BindingPerIsolateData* data = V8BindingPerIsolateData::current();
V8BindingPerIsolateData::TemplateMap::iterator result = data->templateMap().find(&info);
if (result != data->templateMap().end())
return result->second;
v8::HandleScope handleScope;
v8::Persistent<v8::FunctionTemplate> templ =
ConfigureV8TestEventConstructorTemplate(GetRawTemplate());
data->templateMap().add(&info, templ);
return templ;
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 109,474
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: define_function(fsum_2)
{
double a = float_argument(1);
double b = float_argument(2);
return_float(a + b);
}
Commit Message: Fix heap overflow (reported by Jurriaan Bremer)
When setting a new array item with yr_object_array_set_item() the array size is doubled if the index for the new item is larger than the already allocated ones. No further checks were made to ensure that the index fits into the array after doubling its capacity. If the array capacity was for example 64, and a new object is assigned to an index larger than 128 the overflow occurs. As yr_object_array_set_item() is usually invoked with indexes that increase monotonically by one, this bug never triggered before. But the new "dotnet" module has the potential to allow the exploitation of this bug by scanning a specially crafted .NET binary.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 63,452
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void GraphicsContext::clip(const Path& path)
{
#ifdef __WXMAC__
if (paintingDisabled())
return;
wxGraphicsContext* gc = m_data->context->GetGraphicsContext();
CGContextRef context = (CGContextRef)gc->GetNativeContext();
if (!context)
return;
CGPathRef nativePath = (CGPathRef)path.platformPath()->GetNativePath();
if (path.isEmpty())
CGContextClipToRect(context, CGRectZero);
else if (nativePath) {
CGContextBeginPath(context);
CGContextAddPath(context, nativePath);
CGContextClip(context);
}
#else
notImplemented();
#endif
}
Commit Message: Reviewed by Kevin Ollivier.
[wx] Fix strokeArc and fillRoundedRect drawing, and add clipPath support.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=60847
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@86502 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 170,421
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int samldb_generate_sAMAccountName(struct ldb_context *ldb,
struct ldb_message *msg)
{
char *name;
/* Format: $000000-000000000000 */
name = talloc_asprintf(msg, "$%.6X-%.6X%.6X",
(unsigned int)generate_random(),
(unsigned int)generate_random(),
(unsigned int)generate_random());
if (name == NULL) {
return ldb_oom(ldb);
}
return ldb_msg_add_steal_string(msg, "sAMAccountName", name);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 13
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int netlink_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
int alen, int flags)
{
int err = 0;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct netlink_sock *nlk = nlk_sk(sk);
struct sockaddr_nl *nladdr = (struct sockaddr_nl *)addr;
if (alen < sizeof(addr->sa_family))
return -EINVAL;
if (addr->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC) {
sk->sk_state = NETLINK_UNCONNECTED;
nlk->dst_portid = 0;
nlk->dst_group = 0;
return 0;
}
if (addr->sa_family != AF_NETLINK)
return -EINVAL;
if ((nladdr->nl_groups || nladdr->nl_pid) &&
!netlink_allowed(sock, NL_CFG_F_NONROOT_SEND))
return -EPERM;
/* No need for barriers here as we return to user-space without
* using any of the bound attributes.
*/
if (!nlk->bound)
err = netlink_autobind(sock);
if (err == 0) {
sk->sk_state = NETLINK_CONNECTED;
nlk->dst_portid = nladdr->nl_pid;
nlk->dst_group = ffs(nladdr->nl_groups);
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: netlink: Fix dump skb leak/double free
When we free cb->skb after a dump, we do it after releasing the
lock. This means that a new dump could have started in the time
being and we'll end up freeing their skb instead of ours.
This patch saves the skb and module before we unlock so we free
the right memory.
Fixes: 16b304f3404f ("netlink: Eliminate kmalloc in netlink dump operation.")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 47,744
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: bool GraphicsJNI::SetPixels(JNIEnv* env, jintArray srcColors, int srcOffset, int srcStride,
int x, int y, int width, int height, const SkBitmap& dstBitmap) {
SkAutoLockPixels alp(dstBitmap);
void* dst = dstBitmap.getPixels();
FromColorProc proc = ChooseFromColorProc(dstBitmap);
if (NULL == dst || NULL == proc) {
return false;
}
const jint* array = env->GetIntArrayElements(srcColors, NULL);
const SkColor* src = (const SkColor*)array + srcOffset;
dst = dstBitmap.getAddr(x, y);
for (int y = 0; y < height; y++) {
proc(dst, src, width, x, y);
src += srcStride;
dst = (char*)dst + dstBitmap.rowBytes();
}
dstBitmap.notifyPixelsChanged();
env->ReleaseIntArrayElements(srcColors, const_cast<jint*>(array),
JNI_ABORT);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Make Bitmap_createFromParcel check the color count. DO NOT MERGE
When reading from the parcel, if the number of colors is invalid, early
exit.
Add two more checks: setInfo must return true, and Parcel::readInplace
must return non-NULL. The former ensures that the previously read values
(width, height, etc) were valid, and the latter checks that the Parcel
had enough data even if the number of colors was reasonable.
Also use an auto-deleter to handle deletion of the SkBitmap.
Cherry pick from change-Id: Icbd562d6d1f131a723724883fd31822d337cf5a6
BUG=19666945
Change-Id: Iab0d218c41ae0c39606e333e44cda078eef32291
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 157,657
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: vips_foreign_load_gif_buffer_open( VipsForeignLoadGif *gif )
{
VipsForeignLoadGifBuffer *buffer = (VipsForeignLoadGifBuffer *) gif;
vips_foreign_load_gif_close( gif );
buffer->p = buffer->buf->data;
buffer->bytes_to_go = buffer->buf->length;
gif->read_func = vips_giflib_buffer_read;;
return( VIPS_FOREIGN_LOAD_GIF_CLASS(
vips_foreign_load_gif_file_parent_class )->open( gif ) );
}
Commit Message: fetch map after DGifGetImageDesc()
Earlier refactoring broke GIF map fetch.
CWE ID:
| 0
| 87,340
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void ext2_clear_super_error(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct buffer_head *sbh = EXT2_SB(sb)->s_sbh;
if (buffer_write_io_error(sbh)) {
/*
* Oh, dear. A previous attempt to write the
* superblock failed. This could happen because the
* USB device was yanked out. Or it could happen to
* be a transient write error and maybe the block will
* be remapped. Nothing we can do but to retry the
* write and hope for the best.
*/
ext2_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"previous I/O error to superblock detected\n");
clear_buffer_write_io_error(sbh);
set_buffer_uptodate(sbh);
}
}
Commit Message: ext2: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. We convert filesystem from
a global cache to per-fs one. Similarly to ext4 the tricky part is that
xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed before we
get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether the entry is
still valid after getting the buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 94,953
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void vfio_pci_disable(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev)
{
struct pci_dev *pdev = vdev->pdev;
struct vfio_pci_dummy_resource *dummy_res, *tmp;
int i, bar;
/* Stop the device from further DMA */
pci_clear_master(pdev);
vfio_pci_set_irqs_ioctl(vdev, VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_NONE |
VFIO_IRQ_SET_ACTION_TRIGGER,
vdev->irq_type, 0, 0, NULL);
vdev->virq_disabled = false;
for (i = 0; i < vdev->num_regions; i++)
vdev->region[i].ops->release(vdev, &vdev->region[i]);
vdev->num_regions = 0;
kfree(vdev->region);
vdev->region = NULL; /* don't krealloc a freed pointer */
vfio_config_free(vdev);
for (bar = PCI_STD_RESOURCES; bar <= PCI_STD_RESOURCE_END; bar++) {
if (!vdev->barmap[bar])
continue;
pci_iounmap(pdev, vdev->barmap[bar]);
pci_release_selected_regions(pdev, 1 << bar);
vdev->barmap[bar] = NULL;
}
list_for_each_entry_safe(dummy_res, tmp,
&vdev->dummy_resources_list, res_next) {
list_del(&dummy_res->res_next);
release_resource(&dummy_res->resource);
kfree(dummy_res);
}
vdev->needs_reset = true;
/*
* If we have saved state, restore it. If we can reset the device,
* even better. Resetting with current state seems better than
* nothing, but saving and restoring current state without reset
* is just busy work.
*/
if (pci_load_and_free_saved_state(pdev, &vdev->pci_saved_state)) {
pr_info("%s: Couldn't reload %s saved state\n",
__func__, dev_name(&pdev->dev));
if (!vdev->reset_works)
goto out;
pci_save_state(pdev);
}
/*
* Disable INTx and MSI, presumably to avoid spurious interrupts
* during reset. Stolen from pci_reset_function()
*/
pci_write_config_word(pdev, PCI_COMMAND, PCI_COMMAND_INTX_DISABLE);
/*
* Try to reset the device. The success of this is dependent on
* being able to lock the device, which is not always possible.
*/
if (vdev->reset_works && !pci_try_reset_function(pdev))
vdev->needs_reset = false;
pci_restore_state(pdev);
out:
pci_disable_device(pdev);
vfio_pci_try_bus_reset(vdev);
if (!disable_idle_d3)
pci_set_power_state(pdev, PCI_D3hot);
}
Commit Message: vfio/pci: Fix integer overflows, bitmask check
The VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS ioctl did not sufficiently sanitize
user-supplied integers, potentially allowing memory corruption. This
patch adds appropriate integer overflow checks, checks the range bounds
for VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_NONE, and also verifies that only single element
in the VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_TYPE_MASK bitmask is set.
VFIO_IRQ_SET_ACTION_TYPE_MASK is already correctly checked later in
vfio_pci_set_irqs_ioctl().
Furthermore, a kzalloc is changed to a kcalloc because the use of a
kzalloc with an integer multiplication allowed an integer overflow
condition to be reached without this patch. kcalloc checks for overflow
and should prevent a similar occurrence.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Tsyrklevich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 48,583
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void rewrite_nalus_list(GF_List *nalus, GF_BitStream *bs, Bool rewrite_start_codes, u32 nal_unit_size_field)
{
u32 i, count = gf_list_count(nalus);
for (i=0; i<count; i++) {
GF_AVCConfigSlot *sl = (GF_AVCConfigSlot*)gf_list_get(nalus, i);
if (rewrite_start_codes) gf_bs_write_u32(bs, 1);
else gf_bs_write_int(bs, sl->size, 8*nal_unit_size_field);
gf_bs_write_data(bs, sl->data, sl->size);
}
}
Commit Message: fix some exploitable overflows (#994, #997)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 84,051
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: bool SendKeyEvent(const std::string type,
int key_value,
int key_code,
std::string key_name,
int modifiers,
aura::WindowTreeHost* host) {
ui::EventType event_type = ui::ET_UNKNOWN;
if (type == kKeyDown)
event_type = ui::ET_KEY_PRESSED;
else if (type == kKeyUp)
event_type = ui::ET_KEY_RELEASED;
if (event_type == ui::ET_UNKNOWN)
return false;
ui::KeyboardCode code = static_cast<ui::KeyboardCode>(key_code);
if (code == ui::VKEY_UNKNOWN) {
if (event_type == ui::ET_KEY_RELEASED) {
ui::InputMethod* input_method = host->window()->GetProperty(
aura::client::kRootWindowInputMethodKey);
if (!input_method)
return false;
ui::TextInputClient* tic = input_method->GetTextInputClient();
SendProcessKeyEvent(ui::ET_KEY_PRESSED, host);
tic->InsertChar(static_cast<uint16>(key_value), ui::EF_NONE);
SendProcessKeyEvent(ui::ET_KEY_RELEASED, host);
}
} else {
if (event_type == ui::ET_KEY_RELEASED) {
static int keys_seen = 0;
if (code == ui::VKEY_BACK) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_CUSTOM_COUNTS(
"VirtualKeyboard.KeystrokesBetweenBackspaces",
keys_seen, 1, 1000, 50);
keys_seen = 0;
} else {
++keys_seen;
}
}
ui::DomCode dom_code = ui::DomCode::NONE;
if (!key_name.empty())
dom_code = ui::KeycodeConverter::CodeStringToDomCode(key_name.c_str());
if (dom_code == ui::DomCode::NONE)
dom_code = ui::UsLayoutKeyboardCodeToDomCode(code);
CHECK(dom_code != ui::DomCode::NONE);
ui::KeyEvent event(
event_type,
code,
dom_code,
modifiers);
ui::EventDispatchDetails details =
host->event_processor()->OnEventFromSource(&event);
CHECK(!details.dispatcher_destroyed);
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Move smart deploy to tristate.
BUG=
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1149383006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333058}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 123,341
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: int TS_MSG_IMPRINT_print_bio(BIO *bio, TS_MSG_IMPRINT *a)
{
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *msg;
TS_X509_ALGOR_print_bio(bio, a->hash_algo);
BIO_printf(bio, "Message data:\n");
msg = a->hashed_msg;
BIO_dump_indent(bio, (const char *)ASN1_STRING_data(msg),
ASN1_STRING_length(msg), 4);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fix OOB read in TS_OBJ_print_bio().
TS_OBJ_print_bio() misuses OBJ_txt2obj: it should print the result
as a null terminated buffer. The length value returned is the total
length the complete text reprsentation would need not the amount of
data written.
CVE-2016-2180
Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this bug.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 55,277
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void __rtnl_link_unregister(struct rtnl_link_ops *ops)
{
struct net *net;
for_each_net(net) {
__rtnl_kill_links(net, ops);
}
list_del(&ops->list);
}
Commit Message: rtnl: fix info leak on RTM_GETLINK request for VF devices
Initialize the mac address buffer with 0 as the driver specific function
will probably not fill the whole buffer. In fact, all in-kernel drivers
fill only ETH_ALEN of the MAX_ADDR_LEN bytes, i.e. 6 of the 32 possible
bytes. Therefore we currently leak 26 bytes of stack memory to userland
via the netlink interface.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 31,001
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: bool UrlIsInPrerenderManager(const std::string& html_file) {
GURL dest_url = test_server()->GetURL(html_file);
return (prerender_manager()->FindEntry(dest_url) != NULL);
}
Commit Message: Update PrerenderBrowserTests to work with new
PrerenderContents.
Also update PrerenderContents to pass plugin
and HTML5 prerender tests.
BUG=81229
TEST=PrerenderBrowserTests (Once the new code is enabled)
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6905169
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83841 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 99,966
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void cma_release_port(struct rdma_id_private *id_priv)
{
struct rdma_bind_list *bind_list = id_priv->bind_list;
if (!bind_list)
return;
mutex_lock(&lock);
hlist_del(&id_priv->node);
if (hlist_empty(&bind_list->owners)) {
idr_remove(bind_list->ps, bind_list->port);
kfree(bind_list);
}
mutex_unlock(&lock);
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 38,509
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void AutocompleteInput::RemoveForcedQueryStringIfNecessary(Type type,
string16* text) {
if (type == FORCED_QUERY && !text->empty() && (*text)[0] == L'?')
text->erase(0, 1);
}
Commit Message: Adds per-provider information to omnibox UMA logs.
Adds a fairly general structure to omnibox logs that can be used to pass information (that's not per-result information) from providers to the UMA logs. Right now it's only used to pass whether the asynchronous pass of a provider has finished, but it will probably be used for other things in the future.
BUG=
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10380007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137288 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 103,798
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: crm_ipcs_send(crm_client_t * c, uint32_t request, xmlNode * message,
enum crm_ipc_flags flags)
{
struct iovec *iov = NULL;
ssize_t rc = 0;
if(c == NULL) {
return -EDESTADDRREQ;
}
crm_ipc_init();
rc = crm_ipc_prepare(request, message, &iov, ipc_buffer_max);
if (rc > 0) {
rc = crm_ipcs_sendv(c, iov, flags | crm_ipc_server_free);
} else {
free(iov);
crm_notice("Message to %p[%d] failed: %s (%d)",
c->ipcs, c->pid, pcmk_strerror(rc), rc);
}
return rc;
}
Commit Message: High: libcrmcommon: fix CVE-2016-7035 (improper IPC guarding)
It was discovered that at some not so uncommon circumstances, some
pacemaker daemons could be talked to, via libqb-facilitated IPC, by
unprivileged clients due to flawed authorization decision. Depending
on the capabilities of affected daemons, this might equip unauthorized
user with local privilege escalation or up to cluster-wide remote
execution of possibly arbitrary commands when such user happens to
reside at standard or remote/guest cluster node, respectively.
The original vulnerability was introduced in an attempt to allow
unprivileged IPC clients to clean up the file system materialized
leftovers in case the server (otherwise responsible for the lifecycle
of these files) crashes. While the intended part of such behavior is
now effectively voided (along with the unintended one), a best-effort
fix to address this corner case systemically at libqb is coming along
(https://github.com/ClusterLabs/libqb/pull/231).
Affected versions: 1.1.10-rc1 (2013-04-17) - 1.1.15 (2016-06-21)
Impact: Important
CVSSv3 ranking: 8.8 : AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Credits for independent findings, in chronological order:
Jan "poki" Pokorný, of Red Hat
Alain Moulle, of ATOS/BULL
CWE ID: CWE-285
| 0
| 86,591
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int do_shrink(struct inode *inode, u64 oldsize, u64 newsize)
{
struct gfs2_inode *ip = GFS2_I(inode);
int error;
error = trunc_start(inode, oldsize, newsize);
if (error < 0)
return error;
if (gfs2_is_stuffed(ip))
return 0;
error = trunc_dealloc(ip, newsize);
if (error == 0)
error = trunc_end(ip);
return error;
}
Commit Message: GFS2: rewrite fallocate code to write blocks directly
GFS2's fallocate code currently goes through the page cache. Since it's only
writing to the end of the file or to holes in it, it doesn't need to, and it
was causing issues on low memory environments. This patch pulls in some of
Steve's block allocation work, and uses it to simply allocate the blocks for
the file, and zero them out at allocation time. It provides a slight
performance increase, and it dramatically simplifies the code.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Marzinski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steven Whitehouse <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 34,662
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int hci_uart_set_proto(struct hci_uart *hu, int id)
{
const struct hci_uart_proto *p;
int err;
p = hci_uart_get_proto(id);
if (!p)
return -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
hu->proto = p;
set_bit(HCI_UART_PROTO_READY, &hu->flags);
err = hci_uart_register_dev(hu);
if (err) {
clear_bit(HCI_UART_PROTO_READY, &hu->flags);
return err;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: hci_ldisc: Postpone HCI_UART_PROTO_READY bit set in hci_uart_set_proto()
task A: task B:
hci_uart_set_proto flush_to_ldisc
- p->open(hu) -> h5_open //alloc h5 - receive_buf
- set_bit HCI_UART_PROTO_READY - tty_port_default_receive_buf
- hci_uart_register_dev - tty_ldisc_receive_buf
- hci_uart_tty_receive
- test_bit HCI_UART_PROTO_READY
- h5_recv
- clear_bit HCI_UART_PROTO_READY while() {
- p->open(hu) -> h5_close //free h5
- h5_rx_3wire_hdr
- h5_reset() //use-after-free
}
It could use ioctl to set hci uart proto, but there is
a use-after-free issue when hci_uart_register_dev() fail in
hci_uart_set_proto(), see stack above, fix this by setting
HCI_UART_PROTO_READY bit only when hci_uart_register_dev()
return success.
Reported-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Cline <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 1
| 169,528
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void __free_slab(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page)
{
int order = compound_order(page);
int pages = 1 << order;
if (unlikely(SlabDebug(page))) {
void *p;
slab_pad_check(s, page);
for_each_object(p, s, page_address(page),
page->objects)
check_object(s, page, p, 0);
ClearSlabDebug(page);
}
mod_zone_page_state(page_zone(page),
(s->flags & SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT) ?
NR_SLAB_RECLAIMABLE : NR_SLAB_UNRECLAIMABLE,
-pages);
__ClearPageSlab(page);
reset_page_mapcount(page);
__free_pages(page, order);
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <[email protected]>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: john stultz <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 24,742
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void tcp_check_urg(struct sock *sk, const struct tcphdr *th)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
u32 ptr = ntohs(th->urg_ptr);
if (ptr && !sysctl_tcp_stdurg)
ptr--;
ptr += ntohl(th->seq);
/* Ignore urgent data that we've already seen and read. */
if (after(tp->copied_seq, ptr))
return;
/* Do not replay urg ptr.
*
* NOTE: interesting situation not covered by specs.
* Misbehaving sender may send urg ptr, pointing to segment,
* which we already have in ofo queue. We are not able to fetch
* such data and will stay in TCP_URG_NOTYET until will be eaten
* by recvmsg(). Seems, we are not obliged to handle such wicked
* situations. But it is worth to think about possibility of some
* DoSes using some hypothetical application level deadlock.
*/
if (before(ptr, tp->rcv_nxt))
return;
/* Do we already have a newer (or duplicate) urgent pointer? */
if (tp->urg_data && !after(ptr, tp->urg_seq))
return;
/* Tell the world about our new urgent pointer. */
sk_send_sigurg(sk);
/* We may be adding urgent data when the last byte read was
* urgent. To do this requires some care. We cannot just ignore
* tp->copied_seq since we would read the last urgent byte again
* as data, nor can we alter copied_seq until this data arrives
* or we break the semantics of SIOCATMARK (and thus sockatmark())
*
* NOTE. Double Dutch. Rendering to plain English: author of comment
* above did something sort of send("A", MSG_OOB); send("B", MSG_OOB);
* and expect that both A and B disappear from stream. This is _wrong_.
* Though this happens in BSD with high probability, this is occasional.
* Any application relying on this is buggy. Note also, that fix "works"
* only in this artificial test. Insert some normal data between A and B and we will
* decline of BSD again. Verdict: it is better to remove to trap
* buggy users.
*/
if (tp->urg_seq == tp->copied_seq && tp->urg_data &&
!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_URGINLINE) && tp->copied_seq != tp->rcv_nxt) {
struct sk_buff *skb = skb_peek(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
tp->copied_seq++;
if (skb && !before(tp->copied_seq, TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq)) {
__skb_unlink(skb, &sk->sk_receive_queue);
__kfree_skb(skb);
}
}
tp->urg_data = TCP_URG_NOTYET;
tp->urg_seq = ptr;
/* Disable header prediction. */
tp->pred_flags = 0;
}
Commit Message: tcp: drop SYN+FIN messages
Denys Fedoryshchenko reported that SYN+FIN attacks were bringing his
linux machines to their limits.
Dont call conn_request() if the TCP flags includes SYN flag
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 41,121
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void nohz_balance_enter_idle(int cpu)
{
struct rq *rq = cpu_rq(cpu);
SCHED_WARN_ON(cpu != smp_processor_id());
/* If this CPU is going down, then nothing needs to be done: */
if (!cpu_active(cpu))
return;
/* Spare idle load balancing on CPUs that don't want to be disturbed: */
if (!housekeeping_cpu(cpu, HK_FLAG_SCHED))
return;
/*
* Can be set safely without rq->lock held
* If a clear happens, it will have evaluated last additions because
* rq->lock is held during the check and the clear
*/
rq->has_blocked_load = 1;
/*
* The tick is still stopped but load could have been added in the
* meantime. We set the nohz.has_blocked flag to trig a check of the
* *_avg. The CPU is already part of nohz.idle_cpus_mask so the clear
* of nohz.has_blocked can only happen after checking the new load
*/
if (rq->nohz_tick_stopped)
goto out;
/* If we're a completely isolated CPU, we don't play: */
if (on_null_domain(rq))
return;
rq->nohz_tick_stopped = 1;
cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, nohz.idle_cpus_mask);
atomic_inc(&nohz.nr_cpus);
/*
* Ensures that if nohz_idle_balance() fails to observe our
* @idle_cpus_mask store, it must observe the @has_blocked
* store.
*/
smp_mb__after_atomic();
set_cpu_sd_state_idle(cpu);
out:
/*
* Each time a cpu enter idle, we assume that it has blocked load and
* enable the periodic update of the load of idle cpus
*/
WRITE_ONCE(nohz.has_blocked, 1);
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <[email protected]>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 92,611
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: String GetTypeExtension(Document* document,
const StringOrDictionary& string_or_options,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
if (string_or_options.IsNull())
return g_empty_string;
if (string_or_options.IsString()) {
UseCounter::Count(document,
WebFeature::kDocumentCreateElement2ndArgStringHandling);
return string_or_options.GetAsString();
}
if (string_or_options.IsDictionary()) {
Dictionary dict = string_or_options.GetAsDictionary();
ElementCreationOptions impl;
V8ElementCreationOptions::ToImpl(dict.GetIsolate(), dict.V8Value(), impl,
exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return g_empty_string;
if (impl.hasIs())
return impl.is();
}
return g_empty_string;
}
Commit Message: Fixed bug where PlzNavigate CSP in a iframe did not get the inherited CSP
When inheriting the CSP from a parent document to a local-scheme CSP,
it does not always get propagated to the PlzNavigate CSP. This means
that PlzNavigate CSP checks (like `frame-src`) would be ran against
a blank policy instead of the proper inherited policy.
Bug: 778658
Change-Id: I61bb0d432e1cea52f199e855624cb7b3078f56a9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/765969
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#518245}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 146,757
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: asmlinkage long sys_oabi_lstat64(const char __user * filename,
struct oldabi_stat64 __user * statbuf)
{
struct kstat stat;
int error = vfs_lstat(filename, &stat);
if (!error)
error = cp_oldabi_stat64(&stat, statbuf);
return error;
}
Commit Message: ARM: 6891/1: prevent heap corruption in OABI semtimedop
When CONFIG_OABI_COMPAT is set, the wrapper for semtimedop does not
bound the nsops argument. A sufficiently large value will cause an
integer overflow in allocation size, followed by copying too much data
into the allocated buffer. Fix this by restricting nsops to SEMOPM.
Untested.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 27,520
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void perf_event_task_tick(void)
{
struct list_head *head = this_cpu_ptr(&active_ctx_list);
struct perf_event_context *ctx, *tmp;
int throttled;
WARN_ON(!irqs_disabled());
__this_cpu_inc(perf_throttled_seq);
throttled = __this_cpu_xchg(perf_throttled_count, 0);
list_for_each_entry_safe(ctx, tmp, head, active_ctx_list)
perf_adjust_freq_unthr_context(ctx, throttled);
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix race in swevent hash
There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array
while it can still have events on. This will result in a
use-after-free which is BAD.
Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing
around and no use-after-free takes place.
When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration
anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage
will occur.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Vince Weaver <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 56,108
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: lha_replace_path_separator(struct lha *lha, struct archive_entry *entry)
{
const wchar_t *wp;
size_t i;
if ((wp = archive_entry_pathname_w(entry)) != NULL) {
archive_wstrcpy(&(lha->ws), wp);
for (i = 0; i < archive_strlen(&(lha->ws)); i++) {
if (lha->ws.s[i] == L'\\')
lha->ws.s[i] = L'/';
}
archive_entry_copy_pathname_w(entry, lha->ws.s);
}
if ((wp = archive_entry_symlink_w(entry)) != NULL) {
archive_wstrcpy(&(lha->ws), wp);
for (i = 0; i < archive_strlen(&(lha->ws)); i++) {
if (lha->ws.s[i] == L'\\')
lha->ws.s[i] = L'/';
}
archive_entry_copy_symlink_w(entry, lha->ws.s);
}
}
Commit Message: Fail with negative lha->compsize in lha_read_file_header_1()
Fixes a heap buffer overflow reported in Secunia SA74169
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 68,636
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s,
const unsigned char *key, uint16_t type, uint32_t handle)
{
unsigned char enonce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
unsigned char ononce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
int ret;
ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE)
return ret;
INIT_BUF(tb);
store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND);
store32(tb, TPM_OSAP_SIZE);
store32(tb, TPM_ORD_OSAP);
store16(tb, type);
store32(tb, handle);
storebytes(tb, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
s->handle = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET);
memcpy(s->enonce, &(tb->data[TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t)]),
TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
memcpy(enonce, &(tb->data[TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t) +
TPM_NONCE_SIZE]), TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
return TSS_rawhmac(s->secret, key, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, TPM_NONCE_SIZE,
enonce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 0, 0);
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix handling of stored error in a negatively instantiated user key
If a user key gets negatively instantiated, an error code is cached in the
payload area. A negatively instantiated key may be then be positively
instantiated by updating it with valid data. However, the ->update key
type method must be aware that the error code may be there.
The following may be used to trigger the bug in the user key type:
keyctl request2 user user "" @u
keyctl add user user "a" @u
which manifests itself as:
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffff8a
IP: [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046
PGD 7cc30067 PUD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 PID: 2644 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.3.0+ #49
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
task: ffff88003ddea700 ti: ffff88003dd88000 task.ti: ffff88003dd88000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810a376f>] [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280
[<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046
RSP: 0018:ffff88003dd8bdb0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 00000000ffffff82 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: ffffffff81e3fe40 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000ffffff82
RBP: ffff88003dd8bde0 R08: ffff88007d2d2da0 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff88003e8073c0 R12: 00000000ffffff82
R13: ffff88003dd8be68 R14: ffff88007d027600 R15: ffff88003ddea700
FS: 0000000000b92880(0063) GS:ffff88007fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 00000000ffffff8a CR3: 000000007cc5f000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
Stack:
ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff81160a8a 0000000000000000 00000000ffffff82
ffff88003dd8be68 ffff88007d027600 ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff810a39e5
ffff88003dd8be20 ffffffff812a31ab ffff88007d027600 ffff88007d027620
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff810a39e5>] kfree_call_rcu+0x15/0x20 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3136
[<ffffffff812a31ab>] user_update+0x8b/0xb0 security/keys/user_defined.c:129
[< inline >] __key_update security/keys/key.c:730
[<ffffffff8129e5c1>] key_create_or_update+0x291/0x440 security/keys/key.c:908
[< inline >] SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:125
[<ffffffff8129fc21>] SyS_add_key+0x101/0x1e0 security/keys/keyctl.c:60
[<ffffffff8185f617>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6a arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
Note the error code (-ENOKEY) in EDX.
A similar bug can be tripped by:
keyctl request2 trusted user "" @u
keyctl add trusted user "a" @u
This should also affect encrypted keys - but that has to be correctly
parameterised or it will fail with EINVAL before getting to the bit that
will crashes.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 57,409
|
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