sarahwei/cyber_MITRE_tactic_CTI_dataset_v16

text stringlengths 23 517	label stringclasses 31 values
YAHOYAH checks for antimalware solution processes on the system.	['TA0007:Discovery']
YAHOYAH checks for the system’s Windows OS version and hostname.	['TA0007:Discovery']
YAHOYAH uses HTTP for C2.	['TA0011:Command and Control']
ZIPLINE can add itself to the exclusion list for the Ivanti Connect Secure Integrity Checker Tool if the `--exclude` parameter is passed by the `tar` process.	['TA0005:Defense Evasion']
ZIPLINE can find and append specific files on Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs based upon received commands.	['TA0007:Discovery']
ZIPLINE can download files to be saved on the compromised system.	['TA0011:Command and Control']
ZIPLINE can communicate with C2 using a custom binary protocol.	['TA0011:Command and Control']
ZIPLINE can identify running processes and their names.	['TA0007:Discovery']
ZIPLINE can create a proxy server on compromised hosts.	['TA0011:Command and Control']
ZIPLINE can use AES-128-CBC to encrypt data for both upload and download.	['TA0011:Command and Control']
ZIPLINE can identify a specific string in intercepted network traffic, `SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_0.3xx.`, to trigger its command functionality.	['TA0011:Command and Control', 'TA0005:Defense Evasion', 'TA0003:Persistence']
ZIPLINE can use `/bin/sh` to create a reverse shell and execute commands.	['TA0002:Execution']
The ZLib backdoor compresses communications using the standard Zlib compression library.	['TA0009:Collection']
ZLib has sent data and files from a compromised host to its C2 servers.	['TA0010:Exfiltration']
ZLib has the ability to enumerate files and drives.	['TA0007:Discovery']
ZLib has the ability to download files.	['TA0011:Command and Control']
ZLib mimics the resource version information of legitimate Realtek Semiconductor, Nvidia, or Synaptics modules.	['TA0005:Defense Evasion']
ZLib has the ability to obtain screenshots of the compromised system.	['TA0009:Collection']
ZLib has the ability to enumerate system information.	['TA0007:Discovery']
ZLib has the ability to discover and manipulate Windows services.	['TA0007:Discovery']
ZLib communicates over HTTP for C2.	['TA0011:Command and Control']
ZLib has the ability to execute shell commands.	['TA0002:Execution']
ZLib creates Registry keys to allow itself to run as various services.	['TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']
Zebrocy has used a method similar to RC4 as well as AES for encryption and hexadecimal for encoding data before exfiltration.	['TA0009:Collection']
Zebrocy uses SSL and AES ECB for encrypting C2 communications.	['TA0011:Command and Control']
Zebrocy scans the system and automatically collects files with the following extensions: .doc, .docx, ,.xls, .xlsx, .pdf, .pptx, .rar, .zip, .jpg, .jpeg, .bmp, .tiff, .kum, .tlg, .sbx, .cr, .hse, .hsf, and .lhz.	['TA0009:Collection']
Zebrocy installs an application-defined Windows hook to get notified when a network drive has been attached, so it can then use the hook to call its RecordToFile file stealing method.	['TA0009:Collection', 'TA0006:Credential Access']
Zebrocy has the capability to upload dumper tools that extract credentials from web browsers and store them in database files.	['TA0006:Credential Access']
Zebrocy decodes its secondary payload and writes it to the victim’s machine. Zebrocy also uses AES and XOR to decrypt strings and payloads.	['TA0005:Defense Evasion']
Zebrocy has exfiltrated data to the designated C2 server using HTTP POST requests.	['TA0010:Exfiltration']
Zebrocy has a command to delete files and directories.	['TA0005:Defense Evasion']
Zebrocy searches for files that are 60mb and less and contain the following extensions: .doc, .docx, .xls, .xlsx, .ppt, .pptx, .exe, .zip, and .rar. Zebrocy also runs the <code>echo %APPDATA%</code> command to list the contents of the directory. Zebrocy can obtain the current execution path as well as perform drive enumeration.	['TA0007:Discovery']
Zebrocy obtains additional code to execute on the victim's machine, including the downloading of a secondary payload.	['TA0011:Command and Control']
Zebrocy stores all collected information in a single file before exfiltration.	['TA0009:Collection']
Zebrocy performs persistence with a logon script via adding to the Registry key <code>HKCU\Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript</code>.	['TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']
Zebrocy uses SMTP and POP3 for C2.	['TA0011:Command and Control']
Zebrocy identifies network drives when they are added to victim systems.	['TA0007:Discovery']
Zebrocy enumerates information about connected storage devices.	['TA0007:Discovery']
Zebrocy uses the <code>tasklist</code> and <code>wmic process get Capture, ExecutablePath</code> commands to gather the processes running on the system.	['TA0007:Discovery']
Zebrocy executes the <code>reg query</code> command to obtain information in the Registry.	['TA0007:Discovery']
Zebrocy creates an entry in a Registry Run key for the malware to execute on startup.	['TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']
Zebrocy has a command to create a scheduled task for persistence.	['TA0002:Execution', 'TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']
A variant of Zebrocy captures screenshots of the victim’s machine in JPEG and BMP format.	['TA0009:Collection']
Zebrocy's Delphi variant was packed with UPX.	['TA0005:Defense Evasion']
Zebrocy has used URL/Percent Encoding on data exfiltrated via HTTP POST requests.	['TA0011:Command and Control']
Zebrocy collects the OS version, computer name and serial number for the storage volume C:\. Zebrocy also runs the <code>systeminfo</code> command to gather system information.	['TA0007:Discovery']
Zebrocy runs the <code>ipconfig /all</code> command.	['TA0007:Discovery']
Zebrocy uses <code>netstat -aon</code> to gather network connection information.	['TA0007:Discovery']
Zebrocy gets the username from the system.	['TA0007:Discovery']
Zebrocy gathers the current time zone and date information from the system.	['TA0007:Discovery']
Zebrocy uses HTTP for C2.	['TA0011:Command and Control']
Zebrocy uses cmd.exe to execute commands on the system.	['TA0002:Execution']
One variant of Zebrocy uses WMI queries to gather information.	['TA0002:Execution']
ZeroCleare can deploy a vulnerable, signed driver on a compromised host to bypass operating system safeguards.	['TA0005:Defense Evasion']
ZeroCleare can receive command line arguments from an operator to corrupt the file system using the RawDisk driver.	['TA0002:Execution']
ZeroCleare can corrupt the file system and wipe the system drive on targeted hosts.	['TA0040:Impact']
ZeroCleare has used a vulnerable signed VBoxDrv driver to bypass Microsoft Driver Signature Enforcement protections and subsequently load the unsigned RawDisk driver.	['TA0004:Privilege Escalation']
ZeroCleare has the ability to uninstall the RawDisk driver and delete the `rwdsk` file on disk.	['TA0005:Defense Evasion']
ZeroCleare can call the `GetSystemDirectoryW` API to locate the system directory.	['TA0002:Execution']
ZeroCleare can use a malicious PowerShell script to bypass Windows controls.	['TA0002:Execution']
ZeroCleare can use the `IOCTL_DISK_GET_DRIVE_GEOMETRY_EX`, `IOCTL_DISK_GET_DRIVE_GEOMETRY`, and `IOCTL_DISK_GET_LENGTH_INFO` system calls to compute disk size.	['TA0007:Discovery']
ZeroT has obfuscated DLLs and functions using dummy API calls inserted between real instructions.	['TA0005:Defense Evasion']
Many ZeroT samples can perform UAC bypass by using eventvwr.exe to execute a malicious file.	['TA0005:Defense Evasion', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']
ZeroT has used DLL side-loading to load malicious payloads.	['TA0005:Defense Evasion', 'TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']
ZeroT shellcode decrypts and decompresses its RC4-encrypted payload.	['TA0005:Defense Evasion']
ZeroT has encrypted its payload with RC4.	['TA0005:Defense Evasion']
ZeroT can download additional payloads onto the victim.	['TA0011:Command and Control']
Some ZeroT DLL files have been packed with UPX.	['TA0005:Defense Evasion']
ZeroT has retrieved stage 2 payloads as Bitmap images that use Least Significant Bit steganography.	['TA0011:Command and Control']
ZeroT has used RC4 to encrypt C2 traffic.	['TA0011:Command and Control']
ZeroT gathers the victim's computer name, Windows version, and system language, and then sends it to its C2 server.	['TA0007:Discovery']
ZeroT gathers the victim's IP address and domain information, and then sends it to its C2 server.	['TA0007:Discovery']
ZeroT has used HTTP for C2.	['TA0011:Command and Control']
ZeroT can add a new service to ensure PlugX persists on the system when delivered as another payload onto the system.	['TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']
Some variants of the Zeroaccess Trojan have been known to store data in Extended Attributes.	['TA0005:Defense Evasion']
Zeroaccess is a kernel-mode rootkit.	['TA0005:Defense Evasion']
Zeus Panda can hook GetClipboardData function to watch for clipboard pastes to collect.	['TA0009:Collection']
Zeus Panda obfuscates the macro commands in its initial payload.	['TA0005:Defense Evasion']
Zeus Panda can launch remote scripts on the victim’s machine.	['TA0002:Execution']
Zeus Panda hooks processes by leveraging its own IAT hooked functions.	['TA0009:Collection', 'TA0006:Credential Access']
Zeus Panda decrypts strings in the code during the execution process.	['TA0005:Defense Evasion']
Zeus Panda encrypts strings with XOR. Zeus Panda also encrypts all configuration and settings in AES and RC4.	['TA0005:Defense Evasion']
Zeus Panda has a command to delete a file. It also can uninstall scripts and delete files to cover its track.	['TA0005:Defense Evasion']
Zeus Panda searches for specific directories on the victim’s machine.	['TA0007:Discovery']
Zeus Panda can download additional malware plug-in modules and execute them on the victim’s machine.	['TA0011:Command and Control']
Zeus Panda can perform keylogging on the victim’s machine by hooking the functions TranslateMessage and WM_KEYDOWN.	['TA0009:Collection', 'TA0006:Credential Access']
Zeus Panda modifies several Registry keys under <code>HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\ PhishingFilter\</code> to disable phishing filters.	['TA0005:Defense Evasion']
Zeus Panda checks processes on the system and if they meet the necessary requirements, it injects into that process.	['TA0005:Defense Evasion', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']
Zeus Panda uses PowerShell to download and execute the payload.	['TA0002:Execution']
Zeus Panda checks for running processes on the victim’s machine.	['TA0007:Discovery']
Zeus Panda checks for the existence of a Registry key and if it contains certain values.	['TA0007:Discovery']
Zeus Panda adds persistence by creating Registry Run keys.	['TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']
Zeus Panda can take screenshots of the victim’s machine.	['TA0009:Collection']
Zeus Panda checks to see if anti-virus, anti-spyware, or firewall products are installed in the victim’s environment.	['TA0007:Discovery']
Zeus Panda collects the OS version, system architecture, computer name, product ID, install date, and information on the keyboard mapping to determine the language used on the system.	['TA0007:Discovery']
Zeus Panda queries the system's keyboard mapping to determine the language used on the system. It will terminate execution if it detects LANG_RUSSIAN, LANG_BELARUSIAN, LANG_KAZAK, or LANG_UKRAINIAN.	['TA0007:Discovery']
Zeus Panda collects the current system time and sends it back to the C2 server.	['TA0007:Discovery']
Zeus Panda uses HTTP for C2 communications.	['TA0011:Command and Control']
Zeus Panda can launch an interface where it can execute several commands on the victim’s PC.	['TA0002:Execution']
Zox has the ability to upload files from a targeted system.	['TA0009:Collection']

YAHOYAH checks for antimalware solution processes on the system.

['TA0007:Discovery']

YAHOYAH checks for the system’s Windows OS version and hostname.

['TA0007:Discovery']

YAHOYAH uses HTTP for C2.

['TA0011:Command and Control']

ZIPLINE can add itself to the exclusion list for the Ivanti Connect Secure Integrity Checker Tool if the `--exclude` parameter is passed by the `tar` process.

['TA0005:Defense Evasion']

ZIPLINE can find and append specific files on Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs based upon received commands.

['TA0007:Discovery']

ZIPLINE can download files to be saved on the compromised system.

['TA0011:Command and Control']

ZIPLINE can communicate with C2 using a custom binary protocol.

['TA0011:Command and Control']

ZIPLINE can identify running processes and their names.

['TA0007:Discovery']

ZIPLINE can create a proxy server on compromised hosts.

['TA0011:Command and Control']

ZIPLINE can use AES-128-CBC to encrypt data for both upload and download.

['TA0011:Command and Control']

ZIPLINE can identify a specific string in intercepted network traffic, `SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_0.3xx.`, to trigger its command functionality.

['TA0011:Command and Control', 'TA0005:Defense Evasion', 'TA0003:Persistence']

ZIPLINE can use `/bin/sh` to create a reverse shell and execute commands.

['TA0002:Execution']

The ZLib backdoor compresses communications using the standard Zlib compression library.

['TA0009:Collection']

ZLib has sent data and files from a compromised host to its C2 servers.

['TA0010:Exfiltration']

ZLib has the ability to enumerate files and drives.

['TA0007:Discovery']

ZLib has the ability to download files.

['TA0011:Command and Control']

ZLib mimics the resource version information of legitimate Realtek Semiconductor, Nvidia, or Synaptics modules.

['TA0005:Defense Evasion']

ZLib has the ability to obtain screenshots of the compromised system.

['TA0009:Collection']

ZLib has the ability to enumerate system information.

['TA0007:Discovery']

ZLib has the ability to discover and manipulate Windows services.

['TA0007:Discovery']

ZLib communicates over HTTP for C2.

['TA0011:Command and Control']

ZLib has the ability to execute shell commands.

['TA0002:Execution']

ZLib creates Registry keys to allow itself to run as various services.

['TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']

Zebrocy has used a method similar to RC4 as well as AES for encryption and hexadecimal for encoding data before exfiltration.

['TA0009:Collection']

Zebrocy uses SSL and AES ECB for encrypting C2 communications.

['TA0011:Command and Control']

Zebrocy scans the system and automatically collects files with the following extensions: .doc, .docx, ,.xls, .xlsx, .pdf, .pptx, .rar, .zip, .jpg, .jpeg, .bmp, .tiff, .kum, .tlg, .sbx, .cr, .hse, .hsf, and .lhz.

['TA0009:Collection']

Zebrocy installs an application-defined Windows hook to get notified when a network drive has been attached, so it can then use the hook to call its RecordToFile file stealing method.

['TA0009:Collection', 'TA0006:Credential Access']

Zebrocy has the capability to upload dumper tools that extract credentials from web browsers and store them in database files.

['TA0006:Credential Access']

Zebrocy decodes its secondary payload and writes it to the victim’s machine. Zebrocy also uses AES and XOR to decrypt strings and payloads.

['TA0005:Defense Evasion']

Zebrocy has exfiltrated data to the designated C2 server using HTTP POST requests.

['TA0010:Exfiltration']

Zebrocy has a command to delete files and directories.

['TA0005:Defense Evasion']

Zebrocy searches for files that are 60mb and less and contain the following extensions: .doc, .docx, .xls, .xlsx, .ppt, .pptx, .exe, .zip, and .rar. Zebrocy also runs the <code>echo %APPDATA%</code> command to list the contents of the directory. Zebrocy can obtain the current execution path as well as perform drive enumeration.

['TA0007:Discovery']

Zebrocy obtains additional code to execute on the victim's machine, including the downloading of a secondary payload.

['TA0011:Command and Control']

Zebrocy stores all collected information in a single file before exfiltration.

['TA0009:Collection']

Zebrocy performs persistence with a logon script via adding to the Registry key <code>HKCU\Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript</code>.

['TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']

Zebrocy uses SMTP and POP3 for C2.

['TA0011:Command and Control']

Zebrocy identifies network drives when they are added to victim systems.

['TA0007:Discovery']

Zebrocy enumerates information about connected storage devices.

['TA0007:Discovery']

Zebrocy uses the <code>tasklist</code> and <code>wmic process get Capture, ExecutablePath</code> commands to gather the processes running on the system.

['TA0007:Discovery']

Zebrocy executes the <code>reg query</code> command to obtain information in the Registry.

['TA0007:Discovery']

Zebrocy creates an entry in a Registry Run key for the malware to execute on startup.

['TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']

Zebrocy has a command to create a scheduled task for persistence.

['TA0002:Execution', 'TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']

A variant of Zebrocy captures screenshots of the victim’s machine in JPEG and BMP format.

['TA0009:Collection']

Zebrocy's Delphi variant was packed with UPX.

['TA0005:Defense Evasion']

Zebrocy has used URL/Percent Encoding on data exfiltrated via HTTP POST requests.

['TA0011:Command and Control']

Zebrocy collects the OS version, computer name and serial number for the storage volume C:\. Zebrocy also runs the <code>systeminfo</code> command to gather system information.

['TA0007:Discovery']

Zebrocy runs the <code>ipconfig /all</code> command.

['TA0007:Discovery']

Zebrocy uses <code>netstat -aon</code> to gather network connection information.

['TA0007:Discovery']

Zebrocy gets the username from the system.

['TA0007:Discovery']

Zebrocy gathers the current time zone and date information from the system.

['TA0007:Discovery']

Zebrocy uses HTTP for C2.

['TA0011:Command and Control']

Zebrocy uses cmd.exe to execute commands on the system.

['TA0002:Execution']

One variant of Zebrocy uses WMI queries to gather information.

['TA0002:Execution']

ZeroCleare can deploy a vulnerable, signed driver on a compromised host to bypass operating system safeguards.

['TA0005:Defense Evasion']

ZeroCleare can receive command line arguments from an operator to corrupt the file system using the RawDisk driver.

['TA0002:Execution']

ZeroCleare can corrupt the file system and wipe the system drive on targeted hosts.

['TA0040:Impact']

ZeroCleare has used a vulnerable signed VBoxDrv driver to bypass Microsoft Driver Signature Enforcement protections and subsequently load the unsigned RawDisk driver.

['TA0004:Privilege Escalation']

ZeroCleare has the ability to uninstall the RawDisk driver and delete the `rwdsk` file on disk.

['TA0005:Defense Evasion']

ZeroCleare can call the `GetSystemDirectoryW` API to locate the system directory.

['TA0002:Execution']

ZeroCleare can use a malicious PowerShell script to bypass Windows controls.

['TA0002:Execution']

ZeroCleare can use the `IOCTL_DISK_GET_DRIVE_GEOMETRY_EX`, `IOCTL_DISK_GET_DRIVE_GEOMETRY`, and `IOCTL_DISK_GET_LENGTH_INFO` system calls to compute disk size.

['TA0007:Discovery']

ZeroT has obfuscated DLLs and functions using dummy API calls inserted between real instructions.

['TA0005:Defense Evasion']

Many ZeroT samples can perform UAC bypass by using eventvwr.exe to execute a malicious file.

['TA0005:Defense Evasion', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']

ZeroT has used DLL side-loading to load malicious payloads.

['TA0005:Defense Evasion', 'TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']

ZeroT shellcode decrypts and decompresses its RC4-encrypted payload.

['TA0005:Defense Evasion']

ZeroT has encrypted its payload with RC4.

['TA0005:Defense Evasion']

ZeroT can download additional payloads onto the victim.

['TA0011:Command and Control']

Some ZeroT DLL files have been packed with UPX.

['TA0005:Defense Evasion']

ZeroT has retrieved stage 2 payloads as Bitmap images that use Least Significant Bit steganography.

['TA0011:Command and Control']

ZeroT has used RC4 to encrypt C2 traffic.

['TA0011:Command and Control']

ZeroT gathers the victim's computer name, Windows version, and system language, and then sends it to its C2 server.

['TA0007:Discovery']

ZeroT gathers the victim's IP address and domain information, and then sends it to its C2 server.

['TA0007:Discovery']

ZeroT has used HTTP for C2.

['TA0011:Command and Control']

ZeroT can add a new service to ensure PlugX persists on the system when delivered as another payload onto the system.

['TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']

Some variants of the Zeroaccess Trojan have been known to store data in Extended Attributes.

['TA0005:Defense Evasion']

Zeroaccess is a kernel-mode rootkit.

['TA0005:Defense Evasion']

Zeus Panda can hook GetClipboardData function to watch for clipboard pastes to collect.

['TA0009:Collection']

Zeus Panda obfuscates the macro commands in its initial payload.

['TA0005:Defense Evasion']

Zeus Panda can launch remote scripts on the victim’s machine.

['TA0002:Execution']

Zeus Panda hooks processes by leveraging its own IAT hooked functions.

['TA0009:Collection', 'TA0006:Credential Access']

Zeus Panda decrypts strings in the code during the execution process.

['TA0005:Defense Evasion']

Zeus Panda encrypts strings with XOR. Zeus Panda also encrypts all configuration and settings in AES and RC4.

['TA0005:Defense Evasion']

Zeus Panda has a command to delete a file. It also can uninstall scripts and delete files to cover its track.

['TA0005:Defense Evasion']

Zeus Panda searches for specific directories on the victim’s machine.

['TA0007:Discovery']

Zeus Panda can download additional malware plug-in modules and execute them on the victim’s machine.

['TA0011:Command and Control']

Zeus Panda can perform keylogging on the victim’s machine by hooking the functions TranslateMessage and WM_KEYDOWN.

['TA0009:Collection', 'TA0006:Credential Access']

Zeus Panda modifies several Registry keys under <code>HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\ PhishingFilter\</code> to disable phishing filters.

['TA0005:Defense Evasion']

Zeus Panda checks processes on the system and if they meet the necessary requirements, it injects into that process.

['TA0005:Defense Evasion', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']

Zeus Panda uses PowerShell to download and execute the payload.

['TA0002:Execution']

Zeus Panda checks for running processes on the victim’s machine.

['TA0007:Discovery']

Zeus Panda checks for the existence of a Registry key and if it contains certain values.

['TA0007:Discovery']

Zeus Panda adds persistence by creating Registry Run keys.

['TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']

Zeus Panda can take screenshots of the victim’s machine.

['TA0009:Collection']

Zeus Panda checks to see if anti-virus, anti-spyware, or firewall products are installed in the victim’s environment.

['TA0007:Discovery']

Zeus Panda collects the OS version, system architecture, computer name, product ID, install date, and information on the keyboard mapping to determine the language used on the system.

['TA0007:Discovery']

Zeus Panda queries the system's keyboard mapping to determine the language used on the system. It will terminate execution if it detects LANG_RUSSIAN, LANG_BELARUSIAN, LANG_KAZAK, or LANG_UKRAINIAN.

['TA0007:Discovery']

Zeus Panda collects the current system time and sends it back to the C2 server.

['TA0007:Discovery']

Zeus Panda uses HTTP for C2 communications.

['TA0011:Command and Control']

Zeus Panda can launch an interface where it can execute several commands on the victim’s PC.

['TA0002:Execution']

Zox has the ability to upload files from a targeted system.

['TA0009:Collection']