In supremacy clause cases, the pervasiveness of the regulatory scheme is examined?
462128
Yes.  Federal "occupation of the field" occurs, according to the Supreme Court in Pennsylvania v Nelson (1956), when there is "no room" left for state regulation.  Courts are to look to the pervasiveness of the federal scheme of regulation, the federal interest at stake, and the danger of frustration of federal goals in making the determination as to whether a challenged state law can stand.
129490
I will venture a guess that this is in the contracts/tort law context?  \n\nEssentially, the doctrine requires the innocent/wronged party to be made whole again - as if he/she had not enter into this contract or being harmed by the tort.  \n\nThis doctrine works when the other party also suffered some losses (or did not benefit), but is more culpable than the other party.
986724
A statute can give authority to a government agency or even a non-governmental entity (see the (UK) Lloyd's Act 1982) to pass regulations having the force of law.\n\nThe most obvious case concerns Internal Revenue Regulations.
213786
you're probably talking about the FTCA, or Federal Tort Claims Act.
448340
Your in a for a treat....\n\nhttp://www.state.il.us/court/OPINIONS/SupremeCourt/1996/June/Opinions/HTML/78726.txt
181146
The decision was based on the 14th amendment.  The case was Afroyim vs. Rusk and details can be found at:\nhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afroyim_v._Rusk
109512
It does appear that way. I am not sure if antitrust laws apply to mergers though. With very large mergers I do think people do question the lawfulness of the transaction. I am not too sure though.
617274
It is the statute by which federal administrative decisions and rules are made.  The key rule:  Things cannot be arbitrary or capricious.
818886
For the Feds, the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution. They do it also under the general welfare and common defense clauses. \n\nStates have the absolute right to regulate commerce within their borders (intra-state commerce), which is why all those professional licenses are done by the state.
1014148
Regulatory capture is a phenomenon in which a government regulatory agency becomes dominated by the interests of the industry that it oversees. In the United States, the most notorious historical examples are the Civil Aeronautics Board, which protected airlines from competition; the Interstate Commerce Commission, known as the "trucker's best friend," which restricted competition in transportation; and the Department of Agriculture, which implements policies that are alleged to favor the interests of large corporate farming concerns over those of consumers and family farmers. The term is central in a stream of research that is often referred to as the economics of regulation, which is critical of earlier conceptualizations of regulatory intervention by governments as being motivated to protect public goods. Two often cited articles are Laffont & Tirole (1991) and Levine & Forrence (1990).
203050
This is what happend in the United States when an activist Supreme Court treats the Constitution as a "Living Document".\n\nSeveral democrats have been recently quoted as having concerns about Judicial nominees because the courts can "make laws".\n\nThis is not true.  Judges "interpret" law.  \n\nLiberal activist judges "interpret" law like Clinton "interprets" fidelity and integrity.\n\nCongress "makes" law.  Citizens "make" case law.
987718
based on SC Decision 433 U.S. 36, 475 U.S. 574, and 429 U.S. 477 as precendent, and CC decision 292 F.3d 664, 668-69  and 124 S.Ct. 1321, there is significant evidence that antitrust violation has been commited on a number of situations.\nfor technical definition of antitrust laws and their applicability to specific situations, see  William F. Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the "Common Law" Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 661, 666 (1982).
131180
i agree.\n\nbut how could that really be enforced?
261268
Parliamentary supremacy is as you describe the idea that courts can be overriden by parliament - the democratic body can have the last say if it chooses.\n\nThe effect on common law is negligible, really, until parliament specifically takes on a principle of common law with a statute. Since common law is basically precedential law, parliament's ability to override precedent gives it the ability to overturn any common law, no matter how old or ingrained.
832003
Cause of authority issues.
867344
One of the seminal cases on anti-suit injunctions, Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 235 U.S. App. D.C. 207, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984), provides a detailed analysis of comity. \n\nLaker filed an antitrust action in the United States against several defendants, including domestic, British, and other foreign airlines. The defendants filed suit in the United Kingdom seeking an anti-suit injunction barring Laker from proceeding with its action in the United States. Meanwhile, the district court granted Laker an injunction barring the defendants from proceeding in the United Kingdom. The D.C. Circuit upheld the importance of comity, stating that "comity serves our international system like the mortar which cements together a brick house." Id. at 937. However, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court:\n\n"Comity" summarizes in a brief word a complex and elusive concept -- the degree of deference that a domestic forum must pay to the act of a foreign government not otherwise binding on the forum. . . . However, there are limitations to the application of comity. When the foreign act is inherently inconsistent with the policies underlying comity, domestic recognition could tend either to legitimize the aberration or to encourage retaliation, undercutting the realization of the goals served by comity. No nation is under an unremitting obligation to enforce foreign interests which are fundamentally prejudicial to those of the domestic forum. Thus, from the earliest times, authorities have recognized that the obligation of comity expires when the strong public policies of the forum are vitiated by the foreign act. Id.\n\nThere may be different views among circuits as to the relative importance to be given to comity in deciding whether to file an anti-suit injunction. Compare Quaak, 361 F.3d at 17 ("We deem international comity an important integer in the decisional calculus"), and Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 927 (anti-suit injunctions should be granted "only in the most compelling circumstances"), with Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d 624, 627 (5th Cir. 1996) ("We decline . . . to require a district court to genuflect before a vague and omnipotent notion of comity every time that it must decide whether to enjoin a foreign action").\n\nLaker Airways, 731 F.2d at 927 also states that courts "have a duty to protect their legitimately conferred jurisdiction to the extent necessary to provide full justice to litigants. Thus, when the action of a litigant in another forum threatens to paralyze the jurisdiction of the court, the court may consider the effectiveness and propriety of issuing an [anti-suit] injunction".
441938
The purpose of that provision is to maintain the integrity of the proceedings.  So, having contact with the person includes, but isn’t limited to telephone, in-person face-to-face contact, outside of the proceedings.  This includes the person officiating over the proceedings, his colleagues, subordinates, and any other professional whose position could have have an impact on the case.