What Court Case, reffered back to Nixon v. United States as a Precedent?
460158
I think you mean United States v. Nixon (Richard Nixon)\n\nnot.\nNixon v. United States is a different case. (Walter Nixon)\n\nSearch for "United States v. Nixon" precedent turn up the following:\n\nCheney v. United States Dist. Court\nHohn v. Unites States. 524 US 236 (1998)\nTrammel v. United States 445 US40 (1980)
330181
To Bush: "Allthough I do not agree with what you say I shall defend to the death your right to say it."\n\nTo Nixon: "Right on brother down with the establishment."
403121
Actually, that is not correct. Impeachment is an act by Congress by which the House of Representatives formally requests the Senate to hold a trial of the President for high crimes or misdemeanors. In the case of President Nixon the crime was Obstruction of Justice for destroying evidence after it had been subpoenaed; in the case of President Clinton the crime was perjury for lying under oath during his sexual harrassment trial, not for lies he may have uttered in a press conference.\n\nAfter the House Judiciary Committee had voted to send the request for impeach to the full House for a vote, President Nixon resigned before the House could actually vote on it. Therefor, he was technically not impeached  1973. In the case of President Clinton, the House passed the resolution requesting the trial by the Senate, the Senate held the trial, and the Senate voted to acquit the President. Therefor President Clinton, just like President Andrew Johnson, was impeached but not convicted.\n\nSorry to rain on your parade!
867344
One of the seminal cases on anti-suit injunctions, Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 235 U.S. App. D.C. 207, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984), provides a detailed analysis of comity. \n\nLaker filed an antitrust action in the United States against several defendants, including domestic, British, and other foreign airlines. The defendants filed suit in the United Kingdom seeking an anti-suit injunction barring Laker from proceeding with its action in the United States. Meanwhile, the district court granted Laker an injunction barring the defendants from proceeding in the United Kingdom. The D.C. Circuit upheld the importance of comity, stating that "comity serves our international system like the mortar which cements together a brick house." Id. at 937. However, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court:\n\n"Comity" summarizes in a brief word a complex and elusive concept -- the degree of deference that a domestic forum must pay to the act of a foreign government not otherwise binding on the forum. . . . However, there are limitations to the application of comity. When the foreign act is inherently inconsistent with the policies underlying comity, domestic recognition could tend either to legitimize the aberration or to encourage retaliation, undercutting the realization of the goals served by comity. No nation is under an unremitting obligation to enforce foreign interests which are fundamentally prejudicial to those of the domestic forum. Thus, from the earliest times, authorities have recognized that the obligation of comity expires when the strong public policies of the forum are vitiated by the foreign act. Id.\n\nThere may be different views among circuits as to the relative importance to be given to comity in deciding whether to file an anti-suit injunction. Compare Quaak, 361 F.3d at 17 ("We deem international comity an important integer in the decisional calculus"), and Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 927 (anti-suit injunctions should be granted "only in the most compelling circumstances"), with Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d 624, 627 (5th Cir. 1996) ("We decline . . . to require a district court to genuflect before a vague and omnipotent notion of comity every time that it must decide whether to enjoin a foreign action").\n\nLaker Airways, 731 F.2d at 927 also states that courts "have a duty to protect their legitimately conferred jurisdiction to the extent necessary to provide full justice to litigants. Thus, when the action of a litigant in another forum threatens to paralyze the jurisdiction of the court, the court may consider the effectiveness and propriety of issuing an [anti-suit] injunction".
549767
constitional ,federal, case law, state and common
285031
http://www.justia.us/index.html\n\nSearch for 'telegraph'
843661
In what nation? I do not recall any US jurisdiction terming any of its courts as a "judicial court".
1023599
Nixon was the first to use it during the Watergate Scandal. It was created by Dulles, director of the CIA. As far as I know it hasn't been used lately but who knows...odds are best it is though
459558
1950–1959\nMullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950): proper legal notice in the settlement of a trust \nGraver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950): patent law, doctrine of equivalents \nSweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950): segregation, separate but equal \nMcLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950): Fourteenth Amendment, segregation \nJohnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950): jurisdiction of U.S. civilian courts over nonresident enemy aliens; habeas corpus \nFeiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951): Free speech v. public safety \nDean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, Wisconsin, 340 U.S. 349 (1951): Dormant Commerce Clause \nUniversal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951): judicial review of agency decisions \nJoint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951): freedom of association \nDennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951): First Amendment and the Smith Act \nStack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951): defines excessive bail \nRochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952): restriction of police power \nZorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952): release time programs \nYoungstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952): presidential power to seize steel mills during strike to ensure wartime production \nKawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717 (1952): treason accusation against a person with dual citizenship. \nToolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1952): baseball and antitrust regulation \nUnited States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953): State secrets privilege \nBeginning of active duty of Chief Justice Earl Warren, October 5, 1953 \nBrown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954): segregation, “separate inherently inequal” \nBolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954): segregation in the District of Columbia \nBerman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954): eminent domain, takings \nCommissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955): definition of taxable income \nWilliamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955): Due Process Clause, economic liberties \nGriffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956): access to court transcript for indigent appeals \nReid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957): treaty power, right to jury trial \nRoth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957): obscenity \nTrop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958): Eighth Amendment, loss of citizenship \nByrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958): application of the Erie doctrine \nNAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958): freedom of association, privacy of membership lists \nSpeiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958): loyalty oaths \nCooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958): enforcement of desegregation, "massive resistance" \nLouisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959): Abstention doctrine \nSmith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959):
901712
No.  Nixon resigned before impeachment was voted on in the House.\n\nClinton was impeached, and aquitted in the Senate.
458424
American Ice Company v. Hunter, Appellant.\nNo. 267, Oct. T., 1914\nSUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA\n60 Pa. Super. 311, *; 1915 Pa. Super. LEXIS 187, ** \n60 Pa. Super. 311; 1915 Pa. Super. LEXIS 187\n\nAre you looking for the whole case?
712789
Go online and find the state or federal website with the courts.   Click on "view case history" or "minute entries"....or words similar to these.  Each State is different.  Good Luck
45613
Near v. Minnesota\n283 U.S. 697 (1931)\nAuthor: DK\n\nFacts: A Minnesota law provided for abatement, as a public nuisance, of a malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine or other periodical. D’s newspaper published defamatory and scandalous articles and a court issued an injunction permanently enjoining the newspaper from publishing.\n\nIssue: Was the law unconstitutional?\n\nHolding: Yes\n\nRationale:  According to the court, the injunction was prior restrain on press and was unconstitutional.  The Court stated that the appropriate way of dealing with unprotected speech was after the fact punishment and not prior restraint on the freedom of press.  Therefore, prior restrain can’t be used to punish a publication unless there exist some exceptional circumstances (e.g. national security during times of war).
30333
The facts are set forth within the body of the Supreme Court's opinion here:\nhttp://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=403&invol=528
874862
Oregon v. Mitchell.  400 U.S.  112.  U.S. Sup. Ct. 1970.
596110
The 11th circuit does not have information on cases that far back online. You would need to contact the clerk there to request a copy of the ruling.
106544
No. 89-645 \nSUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES \n497 U.S. 1 \nArgued April 24, 1990 \nDecided June 21, 1990 \n \nSyllabus\nWhile petitioner Milkovich was a high school wrestling coach, his team was involved in an altercation at a match with another high school's team. Both he and School Superintendent Scott testified at an investigatory hearing before the Ohio High School Athletic Association (OHSAA), which placed the team on probation. They testified again during a suit by several parents, in which a county court overturned OHSAA's ruling. The day after the court's decision, respondent Lorain Journal Company's newspaper published a column authored by respondent Diadiun, which implied that Milkovich lied under oath in the judicial proceeding. Milkovich commenced a defamation action against respondents in the county court, alleging that the column accused him of committing the crime of perjury, damaged him in his occupation of teacher and coach, and constituted libel per se. Ultimately, the trial court granted summary judgment for respondents. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed, considering itself bound by the State Supreme Court's determination in Superintendent Scott's separate action against respondents that, as a matter of law, the article was constitutionally protected opinion. \nHeld: \n1. The First Amendment does not require a separate "opinion" privilege limiting the application of state defamation laws. While the Amendment does limit such application, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, the breathing space that freedoms of expression require to survive is adequately secured by existing constitutional doctrine. Foremost, where a media defendant is involved, a statement on matters of public concern must be provable as false before liability can be assessed, Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, thus ensuring full constitutional protection for a statement of opinion having no provably false factual connotation. Next, statements that cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts about an individual are protected, see, e.g., Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Assn., Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, thus assuring that public debate will not suffer for lack of "imaginative expression" or the "rhetorical hyperbole" which has traditionally added much to the discourse of this Nation. The reference to "opinion" in dictum in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-340, was not intended to create a wholesale defamation exemption for "opinion." Read in context, the Gertz dictum is merely a reiteration of Justice Holmes' "marketplace of ideas" concept, see Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630. Simply couching a statement--"Jones is a liar"--in terms of opinion--"In my opinion Jones is a liar"--does not dispel the factual implications contained in the statement. Pp. 11-21. \n2. A reasonable factfinder could conclude that the statements in the Diadiun column imply an assertion that Milkovich perjured himself in a judicial proceeding. The article did not use the sort of loose, figurative, or hyperbolic language that would negate the impression that Diadiun was seriously maintaining Milkovich committed perjury. Nor does the article's general tenor negate this impression. In addition, the connotation that Milkovich committed perjury is sufficiently factual that it is susceptible of being proved true or false by comparing, inter alia, his testimony before the OHSAA board with his subsequent testimony before the trial court. Pp. 21-22. \n3. This decision balances the First Amendment's vital guarantee of free and uninhibited discussion of public issues with the important social values that underlie defamation law and society's pervasive and strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon reputation. Pp. 22-23. \n\n\nThe full case facts can be found at the source link: