how does the law define attempted burgulary?
116390
In most states, it would be sufficient to try and open a door or window, but fail (i.e. jiggle a locked door handle), with the intent to commit a felony (theft, etc.) inside.\n\nJust walking in (without felonious intent) is trespass.
485680
Attempted Murder is not a Capital Offense. For it to be a Capital Offense their must Aggrevating Circumstances. Like killing someone while comitting a armed robbery. Or, doing the killing in a particularly gruesome manner. Like torture.
545648
Well you are trespassing and if the owner feels that charges should be pressed I don't believe you would face serious charges just a warning not to return to the property.
311562
They can still be charged with first degree home invasion if they entered without permission, committed a felony/larceny/assault within the dwelling place AND 1) they were armed; OR 2)someone was inside.\nThey can be charged with second degree home invasion even without 1 and 2.
368475
It depends on the intent when the crime was committed. Ex. Murder one is premeditated with malicious intent.
1107845
"Law to put something into circulation, especially counterfeit money or a forgery, under the pretense that it is genuine."\nThis is the definition in the dictionary, but it doesn't make too much sense to me.
1164462
The law is interrupted by the jurisdiction under which the crime is committed.  Accidentally is the operative word.  Then you shall see who owns your hummer then.
493773
Burglary 2 is not necessarily breaking and entering. It is entering a building with the intent to commit a crime there. That is a Class C felony, punishable by up to 5 years and up to $125,000 with no mandatory minimum. Breaking and entering would more likely fall under criminal trespass, a class A misdemeanor. Look at the sites below for a full definition of each of the crimes.
254268
ENtering a dwelling without permission, at night (some jurisdictions at day) with the intention to commit a felony
676163
What state? Generally state laws include a specific definition for each offense. The definition might describe certain acts or types of actions. The defined term would then be used when describing an element of a criminal charge. (in this case, it would probably be criminal). \n\nIf you can say which state, you can look up the specific definition.
207205
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TEDDY LEE WALL\n\n\nNo. 417PA97\n\n\n(Filed 30 July 1998)\n\n\n1.    Burglary and Unlawful Breakings § 173 (NCI4th)-- burglary -- sentencing -- defendant on parole for prior offenses -- plea bargain -- sentence consecutive\n\n\n    The trial court erred by directing that defendant's sentence be served concurrently rather than consecutively where defendant received a ten-year sentence for larceny and breaking and entering in 1989, with probation; defendant's parole was revoked; he was subsequently paroled again and the parole was again revoked; before the notice of the last parole revocation reached the Department of Correction, defendant entered into a plea agreement for second-degree burglary, larceny, and breaking or entering which called for a consolidated judgment of twenty- five years; the agreement and judgment did not provide for a consecutive or concurrent sentence; the Department of Correction eventually modified defendant's record to reflect that the last sentence was to be consecutive pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 14-52; and defendant filed a motion for appropriate relief which was granted. In accord with the plain meaning of N.C.G.S. § 14-52 (effective until 1 January 1995), defendant's sentence for burglary could commence only at the expiration of the 1989 sentence because he was already serving the 1989 sentence.\n\n\n2.    Criminal Law § 131 (NCI4th Rev.)-- plea agreement -- burglary -- concurrent sentence -- defendant entitled to benefit of bargain -- defendant not entitled to specific performance\n\n\n    A defendant who entered into a plea agreement in 1994 under which several 1993 cases, including burglary, were consolidated for judgment was entitled to the benefit of his bargain where defendant, his attorney, and the prosecutor understood that the 1994 sentence was to run concurrently with the sentence defendant was already serving. However, defendant is not entitled to specific performance because that would violate the law of the state. Defendant may withdraw his plea and proceed to trial or attempt to negotiate another agreement that does not violate N.C.G.S. § 14-52. \n\n    On writ of certiorari pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-32(b) to review an order entered by Caldwell, J., on 7 January 1997 in Superior Court, Gaston County, allowing defendant's motion for appropriate relief and ordering that defendant's sentences be served concurrently, not consecutively. Heard in the Supreme Court 12 February 1998.\n\n    Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Elizabeth F. Parsons, Assistant Attorney General, for the N.C. Department of Correction petitioner-appellant.\n\n\n    Henry L. Fowler, III, for defendant-appellee.\n\n\n    North Carolina Prisoner Legal Services, Inc., by Winnifred H. Dillon, amicus curiae.\n\n\n\n    FRYE, Justice.\n\n\n    In this case we decide: (1) whether the superior court's order directing that defendant's sentences be served concurrently was in violation of N.C.G.S. § 14-52, and (2) whether defendant is entitled to a remedy for his reliance on the validity of his plea agreement.\n\n    This case developed as follows: On 12 December 1989, defendant received a ten-year suspended sentence upon his plea of guilty to several charges of larceny and breaking and entering and was placed on supervised probation. On 16 July 1991, defendant's probation was revoked, and his ten-year suspended sentence was activated. On 5 August 1992, the North Carolina Parole Commission gave notice of its intent to parole defendant from the activated sentence, and he was subsequently paroled. On 30 December 1993, defendant's parole was again revoked, reactivating his 1989 sentence.\n\n    On 26 July 1994, defendant entered into a plea agreement in case number 93CRS5858 to the offenses of second-degree burglary and felonious larceny and in case number 93CRS28258 to felonious breaking or entering and felonious larceny under which it was agreed that the
540166
The crime is escape from lawful custody.  At the time of the escape the custody was due to the conviction, and was lawful.  The offence has been committed.
135840
I would assume that falls under the "assumption of risk"- just like you can't sue someone if you get hit by a baseball at a baseball game.  You would have to prove they attempted to injure you intentionally, or that you did not know that people threw beads from floats at mardi gras.  They would both be incredibly hard to prove.
476441
A burgler wants to get in, grab stuff as quickly as possible and then get out.  They generally won't ransack the place unless it's part of the search. The last thing they want is to be discovered, so it's quick quick quick, grab something of value, (enough to get a fix usually) and then get out.\n\nI can't rule it out but there doesn't seem to be anything particularly unusual in the behaviour you describe.
354078
In Ireland they changed the law after Veronica Guerin was shot, now if you have loads of stuff, cars/houses n the like and you cant prove how you came by the money to buy these things then the police can not only take the house but also everything in it down to the clothes of your back. As far as I know the same thing happens in England. Hope that helps
1091880
This would ordinarily be referred to material evidence.  When the police want something, and they discover it, then they seize it as evidence of a suspected crime.
195510
There is no specific definition. It is merely an act that is done wrongfully, usually meaning it is against the law, but sometimes just that it was done negligently.