# MediaChunks

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loader that's what I was 737.11s - 745.39s | talking about earlier there at 6451 and they will connect to the network pull 745.39s - 748.39s | the software into the PDL you walk to the aircraft and plug the PDL into the 748.39s - 754.46s | aircraft and do it that way and then there's method C which is very similar 754.46s - 762.50s | to method A but it also includes a signed SCDP response as well okay and as 762.50s - 768.26s | far as I'm aware and correct me if I'm wrong but I'm not aware of this method 768.26s - 773.02s | in use for commercial aircraft today may well happen in the future but today it's 773.02s - 777.82s | not currently in operation for commercial aircraft but it does have 777.82s - 784.70s | practical uses where FLS is designed to be kept for a long term because while I 784.70s - 787.86s | said earlier in method A the FLS doesn't need to be reassigned that's only as 787.86s - 793.42s | long as the CA it was issued for from remains valid so that could be a few 793.42s - 798.10s | years or it could be 20 years depending on when you've caught it in that cycle 798.10s - 803.54s | method C allows for really long-term FLS to remain valid with the least amount of 803.54s - 807.98s | disruption to any aircraft FLS you've got loaded on there it's also an 807.98s - 812.14s | interesting solution for record-keeping in aircraft maintenance 812.14s - 815.34s | where you have to keep documentation sometimes for the lifespan of the 815.34s - 818.38s | aircraft and be able and you have to be able to prove that it hasn't been 818.38s - 828.70s | modified during that time so this is a typical process load for the generation 828.70s - 832.38s | of an aircraft certificate it is not by all means the only way of doing it but 832.38s - 838.06s | I'm pressed for time so it's the only one I'm going to cover today so keying an 838.06s - 841.14s | aircraft is part of the maintenance function and this means procedures are 841.14s - 844.70s | in place to make sure it's done only when authorized and there's adequate 844.70s - 850.22s | documentation and approvals


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| years or it could be 20 years depending on when you've caught it in that cycle 798.10s - 803.54s | method C allows for really long-term FLS to remain valid with the least amount of 803.54s - 807.98s | disruption to any aircraft FLS you've got loaded on there it's also an 807.98s - 812.14s | interesting solution for record-keeping in aircraft maintenance 812.14s - 815.34s | where you have to keep documentation sometimes for the lifespan of the 815.34s - 818.38s | aircraft and be able and you have to be able to prove that it hasn't been 818.38s - 828.70s | modified during that time so this is a typical process load for the generation 828.70s - 832.38s | of an aircraft certificate it is not by all means the only way of doing it but 832.38s - 838.06s | I'm pressed for time so it's the only one I'm going to cover today so keying an 838.06s - 841.14s | aircraft is part of the maintenance function and this means procedures are 841.14s - 844.70s | in place to make sure it's done only when authorized and there's adequate 844.70s - 850.22s | documentation and approvals in the process so obviously your device sponsor 850.22s - 854.42s | here or you know somebody in your technical operations department tech ops 854.42s - 860.02s | will generate the key instruction or the key generation work instruction and then 860.02s - 864.58s | someone would go to the aircraft and generate that key pair and then 864.58s - 869.38s | depending on whether you've got over the air or whether you're using PDLs and 869.38s - 875.54s | USBs you will bring that CSR back to the network validate it and then send it off 875.54s - 884.06s | to your PKI provider the RA function there that's the registration authority 884.06s - 889.90s | that's an interesting one so this is an ATA spec 42 requirement and it's all 889.90s - 897.86s | about dual control ATA spec 42 requires the PKI to have this registration 897.86s - 903.74s | authority who proves all registrations and requests and when an airline 903.74s - 908.54s | outsources their PKI operation to a third party there can be a need to 908.54s - 913.42s | insert an airline employee as the RA inside the PKI provider and that's where


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in the process so obviously your device sponsor 850.22s - 854.42s | here or you know somebody in your technical operations department tech ops 854.42s - 860.02s | will generate the key instruction or the key generation work instruction and then 860.02s - 864.58s | someone would go to the aircraft and generate that key pair and then 864.58s - 869.38s | depending on whether you've got over the air or whether you're using PDLs and 869.38s - 875.54s | USBs you will bring that CSR back to the network validate it and then send it off 875.54s - 884.06s | to your PKI provider the RA function there that's the registration authority 884.06s - 889.90s | that's an interesting one so this is an ATA spec 42 requirement and it's all 889.90s - 897.86s | about dual control ATA spec 42 requires the PKI to have this registration 897.86s - 903.74s | authority who proves all registrations and requests and when an airline 903.74s - 908.54s | outsources their PKI operation to a third party there can be a need to 908.54s - 913.42s | insert an airline employee as the RA inside the PKI provider and that's where 913.42s - 918.50s | this stuff gets interesting and this is especially important for confirming 918.50s - 923.78s | aircraft identities because the PKI provider they do PKI they don't do 923.78s - 932.02s | aircraft right not all the time but there is one and this can this creates a 932.02s - 935.70s | challenge when it comes to the audit side of the of the PKI and obviously 935.70s - 940.30s | that audit is a key part of spec 42 but yes the RA will authenticate and 940.30s - 944.22s | approve the CSR that then gets passed on to the certificate authority who will 944.22s - 949.50s | again validate the CSR information and then and the signature and then issue 949.50s - 955.22s | the certificate and then your technician goes back retrieves the certificate 955.22s - 958.86s | generates the word loading work instruction takes it to the aircraft the 958.86s - 963.90s | aircraft validates certificate and you know Bob's your uncle that's a typical 963.90s - 967.74s | process and as you can see one of the key things is that just like if you were 967.74s - 971.42s | generating you


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913.42s - 918.50s | this stuff gets interesting and this is especially important for confirming 918.50s - 923.78s | aircraft identities because the PKI provider they do PKI they don't do 923.78s - 932.02s | aircraft right not all the time but there is one and this can this creates a 932.02s - 935.70s | challenge when it comes to the audit side of the of the PKI and obviously 935.70s - 940.30s | that audit is a key part of spec 42 but yes the RA will authenticate and 940.30s - 944.22s | approve the CSR that then gets passed on to the certificate authority who will 944.22s - 949.50s | again validate the CSR information and then and the signature and then issue 949.50s - 955.22s | the certificate and then your technician goes back retrieves the certificate 955.22s - 958.86s | generates the word loading work instruction takes it to the aircraft the 958.86s - 963.90s | aircraft validates certificate and you know Bob's your uncle that's a typical 963.90s - 967.74s | process and as you can see one of the key things is that just like if you were 967.74s - 971.42s | generating you know a key pair on a server the private key stays on the 971.42s - 984.76s | aircraft spec 42 so the ATA e-business data security working group or the DSWG 984.76s - 989.96s | is set is to set the strategic path for these standards and ensure that all 989.96s - 994.80s | project team efforts and specification changes requests are consistent with the 994.80s - 1000.00s | industry's e-business vision mission and strategic plan I couldn't paste that 1000.00s - 1006.16s | from their website I never sound that professional but basically it's a 1006.16s - 1010.36s | group formed by experts across the industry including OAMs manufacturers 1010.36s - 1018.96s | operators I'm in there I feel very I feel less intelligent than I usually do 1018.96s - 1022.16s | in that room because these guys have just brains the size of a planet but 1022.16s - 1026.34s | it's important that we're there suppliers are in the room and then 1026.34s - 1031.14s | interested parties from the ATA membership as well and an ATA spec 42 1031.14s - 1033.74s | has a strong emphasis on the establishment of trust based on 1033.74s - 1038.66s |


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know a key pair on a server the private key stays on the 971.42s - 984.76s | aircraft spec 42 so the ATA e-business data security working group or the DSWG 984.76s - 989.96s | is set is to set the strategic path for these standards and ensure that all 989.96s - 994.80s | project team efforts and specification changes requests are consistent with the 994.80s - 1000.00s | industry's e-business vision mission and strategic plan I couldn't paste that 1000.00s - 1006.16s | from their website I never sound that professional but basically it's a 1006.16s - 1010.36s | group formed by experts across the industry including OAMs manufacturers 1010.36s - 1018.96s | operators I'm in there I feel very I feel less intelligent than I usually do 1018.96s - 1022.16s | in that room because these guys have just brains the size of a planet but 1022.16s - 1026.34s | it's important that we're there suppliers are in the room and then 1026.34s - 1031.14s | interested parties from the ATA membership as well and an ATA spec 42 1031.14s - 1033.74s | has a strong emphasis on the establishment of trust based on 1033.74s - 1038.66s | verified identity so when you become a subscriber as a person you go through 1038.66s - 1043.50s | identity checks to verify that you are who you say you are and that then goes 1043.50s - 1049.14s | through two-person control as well we also have strong emphasis on certificate 1049.14s - 1055.42s | usage technical and procedural controls protection of PII audit documents it's 1055.54s - 1060.46s | 410 pages and it's very complex language I'm gonna be straight with you the first 1060.46s - 1065.06s | time I read it it was tough I did not get it it took me several reads and it 1065.06s - 1070.38s | also put me to sleep a few times I'm not gonna lie it's a good cure for insomnia 1070.38s - 1078.58s | but we were told that all PKI have to basically used to design software parts 1078.58s - 1082.98s | shall now be compliant with the ATA spec 42 so what that means is if we're using 1083.14s - 1088.42s | one certificate to sign parts then we're gonna start using ATA spec 42 1088.42s - 1093.14s | compliant certificates for all of our PKI so that's what


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verified identity so when you become a subscriber as a person you go through 1038.66s - 1043.50s | identity checks to verify that you are who you say you are and that then goes 1043.50s - 1049.14s | through two-person control as well we also have strong emphasis on certificate 1049.14s - 1055.42s | usage technical and procedural controls protection of PII audit documents it's 1055.54s - 1060.46s | 410 pages and it's very complex language I'm gonna be straight with you the first 1060.46s - 1065.06s | time I read it it was tough I did not get it it took me several reads and it 1065.06s - 1070.38s | also put me to sleep a few times I'm not gonna lie it's a good cure for insomnia 1070.38s - 1078.58s | but we were told that all PKI have to basically used to design software parts 1078.58s - 1082.98s | shall now be compliant with the ATA spec 42 so what that means is if we're using 1083.14s - 1088.42s | one certificate to sign parts then we're gonna start using ATA spec 42 1088.42s - 1093.14s | compliant certificates for all of our PKI so that's what we've been doing 1093.14s - 1098.46s | audit scope is defined by the network and technology used in operating the PKI 1098.46s - 1103.26s | it's a bit like the fruit of the poison tree so everything the PKI touches is in 1103.26s - 1108.70s | scope so remember that RA role I was talking about earlier this is where it 1108.70s - 1113.34s | gets fun because the RA is considered part of the PKI but they use the 1113.34s - 1119.62s | operators IT and network and so to avoid bringing that in the entire operator IT 1119.62s - 1125.10s | into a very painful and thorough audit they need to use a very locked down IT 1125.10s - 1131.58s | device which with you know bare bones of what's required and you know minimum 1131.58s - 1136.14s | interaction with the network and the infrastructure it's strictly controlled 1136.14s - 1139.06s | by the certificate policy and the certificate practice statement and forms 1139.06s - 1142.78s | a part of the on-site checks during the annual audit so we've got a few of these 1142.78s - 1146.42s | in you know all over the country actually because


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we've been doing 1093.14s - 1098.46s | audit scope is defined by the network and technology used in operating the PKI 1098.46s - 1103.26s | it's a bit like the fruit of the poison tree so everything the PKI touches is in 1103.26s - 1108.70s | scope so remember that RA role I was talking about earlier this is where it 1108.70s - 1113.34s | gets fun because the RA is considered part of the PKI but they use the 1113.34s - 1119.62s | operators IT and network and so to avoid bringing that in the entire operator IT 1119.62s - 1125.10s | into a very painful and thorough audit they need to use a very locked down IT 1125.10s - 1131.58s | device which with you know bare bones of what's required and you know minimum 1131.58s - 1136.14s | interaction with the network and the infrastructure it's strictly controlled 1136.14s - 1139.06s | by the certificate policy and the certificate practice statement and forms 1139.06s - 1142.78s | a part of the on-site checks during the annual audit so we've got a few of these 1142.78s - 1146.42s | in you know all over the country actually because a lot of us are remote 1146.42s - 1149.98s | and the auditors gonna have to go and fly and see them and check they're 1149.98s - 1158.66s | locked down to the specifications in the CPS so it's it's fun and then finally so 1158.66s - 1164.42s | the challenges to aviation PKI in a post quantum world this one's been really you 1164.42s - 1170.18s | know eating away at my brain the last you know six to twelve months because 1170.18s - 1173.46s | the the threats are not only very real but also very difficult to figure out in 1173.46s - 1178.62s | terms of aviation depending on who you talk to quantum computer capable of 1178.62s - 1184.10s | breaking Shor's algorithm is either 5 10 15 or 20 years away but regardless an 1184.10s - 1190.02s | aircraft lifespan is typically 30 years or even more and once an aircraft is 1190.02s - 1196.46s | certified it's really hard to change it it's certainly very expensive I mean the 1196.46s - 1199.62s | rumor is it takes so much testing that changing one line of code in the avionics 1199.62s - 1202.14s | costs


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a lot of us are remote 1146.42s - 1149.98s | and the auditors gonna have to go and fly and see them and check they're 1149.98s - 1158.66s | locked down to the specifications in the CPS so it's it's fun and then finally so 1158.66s - 1164.42s | the challenges to aviation PKI in a post quantum world this one's been really you 1164.42s - 1170.18s | know eating away at my brain the last you know six to twelve months because 1170.18s - 1173.46s | the the threats are not only very real but also very difficult to figure out in 1173.46s - 1178.62s | terms of aviation depending on who you talk to quantum computer capable of 1178.62s - 1184.10s | breaking Shor's algorithm is either 5 10 15 or 20 years away but regardless an 1184.10s - 1190.02s | aircraft lifespan is typically 30 years or even more and once an aircraft is 1190.02s - 1196.46s | certified it's really hard to change it it's certainly very expensive I mean the 1196.46s - 1199.62s | rumor is it takes so much testing that changing one line of code in the avionics 1199.62s - 1202.14s | costs a million dollars just because you have to go through all those tests 1202.14s - 1206.70s | afterwards don't know if that's true or not but that's what I've been told so 1206.70s - 1211.94s | imagine how much effort it would take to enable post quantum key sizes across all 1211.94s - 1217.58s | manufacturers and all fleets does the hardware in the LIU have the required 1217.58s - 1223.46s | memory and processing power for PQ algorithms the switch from SHA-1 to 1223.46s - 1229.58s | SHA-2 back in about 2017 caused a friend of mine in a previous job to complain a 1229.58s - 1235.06s | lot about how it now took 10 minutes to create a key pair instead of the 1235.06s - 1239.94s | five minutes that it used to how long with a post quantum safe signature take 1239.94s - 1244.26s | to generate in an LIU I don't know that's that's gonna be interesting one 1244.26s - 1253.64s | to do so I'm coming to the end here and I want to talk about a little bit about 1253.64s - 1260.84s | the way ahead so the operator level some advice from the


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a million dollars just because you have to go through all those tests 1202.14s - 1206.70s | afterwards don't know if that's true or not but that's what I've been told so 1206.70s - 1211.94s | imagine how much effort it would take to enable post quantum key sizes across all 1211.94s - 1217.58s | manufacturers and all fleets does the hardware in the LIU have the required 1217.58s - 1223.46s | memory and processing power for PQ algorithms the switch from SHA-1 to 1223.46s - 1229.58s | SHA-2 back in about 2017 caused a friend of mine in a previous job to complain a 1229.58s - 1235.06s | lot about how it now took 10 minutes to create a key pair instead of the 1235.06s - 1239.94s | five minutes that it used to how long with a post quantum safe signature take 1239.94s - 1244.26s | to generate in an LIU I don't know that's that's gonna be interesting one 1244.26s - 1253.64s | to do so I'm coming to the end here and I want to talk about a little bit about 1253.64s - 1260.84s | the way ahead so the operator level some advice from the DSWG is to start 1260.84s - 1267.00s | invent an inventory of all your PQI use cases and when NIST finally figures out 1267.00s - 1272.64s | which algorithms we are good to use for which use case start identifying those 1272.64s - 1277.00s | suitable algorithms for each one and then with the manufacturers and OEMs 1277.00s - 1279.36s | we're going to figure out the embedded software challenge because that's a big 1279.36s - 1284.40s | one if you've ever coded in C dealing with memory pointers and the 1284.40s - 1288.56s | digital signature which was you know a few dozen kilobytes is now several 1288.56s - 1295.40s | megabytes that's going to be fun and of course we need to do a lot of testing 1295.40s - 1299.96s | regulator approval and it's not going to happen in the timeline we've got for 1299.96s - 1303.84s | post-quantum computing to become a thing but we go threat so we're up 1303.84s - 1307.20s | against it on that front I'm gonna be back in the village after this talk if 1307.20s - 1311.48s | anyone's to come and talk about post-quantum PKI I'm all ears I'd


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DSWG is to start 1260.84s - 1267.00s | invent an inventory of all your PQI use cases and when NIST finally figures out 1267.00s - 1272.64s | which algorithms we are good to use for which use case start identifying those 1272.64s - 1277.00s | suitable algorithms for each one and then with the manufacturers and OEMs 1277.00s - 1279.36s | we're going to figure out the embedded software challenge because that's a big 1279.36s - 1284.40s | one if you've ever coded in C dealing with memory pointers and the 1284.40s - 1288.56s | digital signature which was you know a few dozen kilobytes is now several 1288.56s - 1295.40s | megabytes that's going to be fun and of course we need to do a lot of testing 1295.40s - 1299.96s | regulator approval and it's not going to happen in the timeline we've got for 1299.96s - 1303.84s | post-quantum computing to become a thing but we go threat so we're up 1303.84s - 1307.20s | against it on that front I'm gonna be back in the village after this talk if 1307.20s - 1311.48s | anyone's to come and talk about post-quantum PKI I'm all ears I'd love 1311.48s - 1316.40s | to hear from any experts out there I can take that back to the DSWG and those and 1316.40s - 1320.52s | maybe sound a little bit more intelligent than I usually do but yeah 1320.52s - 1323.68s | or if you want to come back and talk PKI I'll be there for a little bit I've got 1323.68s - 1328.48s | my lot I live in Chicago now so now I'm you know it's obligatory to become a 1328.52s - 1333.08s | fan so I've got my lot if you want that too but yeah I've got a few moments for 1333.08s - 1345.90s | questions I think crack it is light is bright thank you so gentlemen the front 1345.90s - 1365.14s | and it's it's hard to say yes to that the reason being is that it's not 1365.14s - 1370.90s | specifically covered in regulation a lot of this isn't actually it's actually 1370.90s - 1375.98s | more to do with the manufacturers send down recommendations and instructions to 1375.98s - 1379.86s | operators on how to do things and they also build things around a secure 1379.86s - 1384.50s |


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love 1311.48s - 1316.40s | to hear from any experts out there I can take that back to the DSWG and those and 1316.40s - 1320.52s | maybe sound a little bit more intelligent than I usually do but yeah 1320.52s - 1323.68s | or if you want to come back and talk PKI I'll be there for a little bit I've got 1323.68s - 1328.48s | my lot I live in Chicago now so now I'm you know it's obligatory to become a 1328.52s - 1333.08s | fan so I've got my lot if you want that too but yeah I've got a few moments for 1333.08s - 1345.90s | questions I think crack it is light is bright thank you so gentlemen the front 1345.90s - 1365.14s | and it's it's hard to say yes to that the reason being is that it's not 1365.14s - 1370.90s | specifically covered in regulation a lot of this isn't actually it's actually 1370.90s - 1375.98s | more to do with the manufacturers send down recommendations and instructions to 1375.98s - 1379.86s | operators on how to do things and they also build things around a secure 1379.86s - 1384.50s | framework they all have product security teams and they all do a lot of work they 1384.50s - 1387.70s | can't share a lot of information with us except for these recommendations and 1387.70s - 1391.10s | instructions right and the FAA is quite rightly said even if it's a 1391.10s - 1394.46s | recommendation you implemented it as if it was an instruction right so that's 1394.46s - 1400.66s | that's good and that's what we do so that signing of the logs coming off the 1400.66s - 1404.18s | aircraft obviously is probably a part of that risk assessment that the 1404.18s - 1407.90s | manufacturers have gone through because that is potentially safety related if 1407.90s - 1417.78s | the logs are tampered with then either a required you know maintenance check or 1417.78s - 1421.14s | job is not going to be done or it's gonna be done and it's not required 1421.14s - 1425.78s | right and that's a problem so that's why they're signed so when they come off and 1425.78s - 1433.16s | they're analyzed we're sure their integrity yeah good question yes sorry 1433.16s - 1449.76s | Jackie's sorry so again with


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framework they all have product security teams and they all do a lot of work they 1384.50s - 1387.70s | can't share a lot of information with us except for these recommendations and 1387.70s - 1391.10s | instructions right and the FAA is quite rightly said even if it's a 1391.10s - 1394.46s | recommendation you implemented it as if it was an instruction right so that's 1394.46s - 1400.66s | that's good and that's what we do so that signing of the logs coming off the 1400.66s - 1404.18s | aircraft obviously is probably a part of that risk assessment that the 1404.18s - 1407.90s | manufacturers have gone through because that is potentially safety related if 1407.90s - 1417.78s | the logs are tampered with then either a required you know maintenance check or 1417.78s - 1421.14s | job is not going to be done or it's gonna be done and it's not required 1421.14s - 1425.78s | right and that's a problem so that's why they're signed so when they come off and 1425.78s - 1433.16s | they're analyzed we're sure their integrity yeah good question yes sorry 1433.16s - 1449.76s | Jackie's sorry so again with method a you just grab a new certificate and 1449.76s - 1460.72s | carry on with method B you get a new certificate and re-sign everything yes 1460.72s - 1469.96s | sir yeah yeah yeah I would say logs I mean all of it yeah yeah folk was a part 1469.96s - 1474.52s | of that so for those who don't know focal data is engine related and 1474.52s - 1479.96s | actually we don't decode that it goes to back to the engine manufacturers they 1479.96s - 1494.82s | decode it and they're really nice they sell it back to us yeah as well yeah 1494.82s - 1499.14s | all right I think I'm being kicked off stage and so like I said I'm in the 1499.14s - 1504.90s | village you want to come and chat and you know share some a lot thanks


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method a you just grab a new certificate and 1449.76s - 1460.72s | carry on with method B you get a new certificate and re-sign everything yes 1460.72s - 1469.96s | sir yeah yeah yeah I would say logs I mean all of it yeah yeah folk was a part 1469.96s - 1474.52s | of that so for those who don't know focal data is engine related and 1474.52s - 1479.96s | actually we don't decode that it goes to back to the engine manufacturers they 1479.96s - 1494.82s | decode it and they're really nice they sell it back to us yeah as well yeah 1494.82s - 1499.14s | all right I think I'm being kicked off stage and so like I said I'm in the 1499.14s - 1504.90s | village you want to come and chat and you know share some a lot thanks


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{ "webpage_url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zkoTwQRXMz0", "title": "DEF CON 32 - UDSonCAN Attacks Discovering Safety Critical Risks by Fuzzing - Seunghee Han", "description": "Some diagnostic services in UDSonCAN that could affect driving should be disabled while driving and protected by authentication mechanisms such as SecurityAccess. However, without these security measures, attackers can cause a serious safety risk to the driver using only diagnostic messages. In this talk, we introduce UDSonCAN attacks discovered through fuzzing and describe their countermeasures. These attacks can cause a moving car to suddenly stop or a stationary car to suddenly acceleration with just simple diagnostic messages. We discovered these vulnerabilities in the latest electric vehicle model and have prepared a demo.", "channel_url": "https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC6Om9kAkl32dWlDSNlDS9Iw", "duration": 1409, "channel": "DEFCONConference", "uploader": "DEFCONConference", "upload_date": "20241016" } 0.00s - 9.68s | This text was transcribed using whisper model: large-v2 Hello, my name is Seunghee Han. I'm a small girl from Korea and the first author of this talk. 9.68s - 18.48s | It's my first time at DEF CON so I'm very nervous and so excited. Anyway, the title of this talk 18.48s - 28.48s | is UDS on CAN attacks, discovering safety critical risk by fuzzing. In this presentation, I will 28.48s - 34.88s | talk about the weak points that I found in the latest EV models by fuzzing test. 38.74s - 46.02s | Before the presentation, let me introduce ourselves. We are all security researchers 46.02s - 54.82s | at Autocrypt. Autocrypt is a mobility security company. Nowadays, we are focusing on vehicle 54.82s - 68.50s | security. With the 2020 WP.29, it's a car cyber security rules. All car makers must get CSMS 68.50s - 76.42s | certification. So we have been doing fuzzing tests with many OEMs and tier suppliers. 76.42s - 85.22s | During the fuzzing test, I found some strange behavior in the car. The moving car was stopped 85.78s - 95.30s | or it didn't move. This video is showing the weak point that I found in the latest EV model. 95.86s - 119.39s | Let's take a look. Can we play a sound? Okay, let's see one more. The moving car was stopped. 119.95s - 128.11s | Are you interested? Now, I will explain why this happened. So please pay attention. 130.11s - 139.95s | Contents are as follows. First, I will explain UDS and fuzzing. Then I will explain what the 139.95s - 146.59s


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34.88s | talk about the weak points that I found in the latest EV models by fuzzing test. 38.74s - 46.02s | Before the presentation, let me introduce ourselves. We are all security researchers 46.02s - 54.82s | at Autocrypt. Autocrypt is a mobility security company. Nowadays, we are focusing on vehicle 54.82s - 68.50s | security. With the 2020 WP.29, it's a car cyber security rules. All car makers must get CSMS 68.50s - 76.42s | certification. So we have been doing fuzzing tests with many OEMs and tier suppliers. 76.42s - 85.22s | During the fuzzing test, I found some strange behavior in the car. The moving car was stopped 85.78s - 95.30s | or it didn't move. This video is showing the weak point that I found in the latest EV model. 95.86s - 119.39s | Let's take a look. Can we play a sound? Okay, let's see one more. The moving car was stopped. 119.95s - 128.11s | Are you interested? Now, I will explain why this happened. So please pay attention. 130.11s - 139.95s | Contents are as follows. First, I will explain UDS and fuzzing. Then I will explain what the 139.95s - 146.59s | type of attacks that I did and explain how to prevent this weak point. 148.51s - 155.07s | I told you, I found a weakness during the fuzzing test. The moving car was stopped 156.03s - 164.67s | or didn't move at all. I will explain how these problems are connected to UDS and what caused 164.67s - 174.99s | them. First, UDS is a protocol used for communication with vehicles. It is defined in 174.99s - 183.39s | ISO 14229. I don't have a car, but if you have one, you probably go to a repair shop 184.19s - 192.75s | when something goes wrong with your car, right? The tool used to find out what's wrong is UDS. 193.71s - 201.15s | During this process, the diagnostic tool and the car communicate using UDS to determine the 201.15s - 213.71s | problem. As I mentioned, UDS services perform important functions, so not everyone can use 213.71s - 221.31s | these services freely. You can see some of the security measures on this slide. I will give you 221.95s - 233.60s | more details later. To ensure that UDS is well-protected, many car companies do fuzzing 233.60s -


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| type of attacks that I did and explain how to prevent this weak point. 148.51s - 155.07s | I told you, I found a weakness during the fuzzing test. The moving car was stopped 156.03s - 164.67s | or didn't move at all. I will explain how these problems are connected to UDS and what caused 164.67s - 174.99s | them. First, UDS is a protocol used for communication with vehicles. It is defined in 174.99s - 183.39s | ISO 14229. I don't have a car, but if you have one, you probably go to a repair shop 184.19s - 192.75s | when something goes wrong with your car, right? The tool used to find out what's wrong is UDS. 193.71s - 201.15s | During this process, the diagnostic tool and the car communicate using UDS to determine the 201.15s - 213.71s | problem. As I mentioned, UDS services perform important functions, so not everyone can use 213.71s - 221.31s | these services freely. You can see some of the security measures on this slide. I will give you 221.95s - 233.60s | more details later. To ensure that UDS is well-protected, many car companies do fuzzing 233.60s - 242.24s | tests. Fuzzing is a testing method where random or unusual data is fed into a system to find 242.24s - 250.64s | problems. The goal of this test is to see how the system behaves under stress and to find 251.20s - 260.32s | security issues. In the vehicle industry, we commonly do black box fuzzing using commercial 260.32s - 269.60s | fuzzers. There are many talks about CAN, UDS, and UDS fuzzing in CHP. Check out those talks 270.48s - 281.89s | for more details. During the UDS fuzzing test, we discovered something is wrong. The vehicle 282.21s - 291.01s | functions with two services. The first is ECU reset, and the second is communication control. 292.21s - 300.21s | Based on these findings, we made real-world attack scenarios. The first scenario is 300.21s - 312.03s | sudden stop, and the second is disabling of vehicle usage. Before explaining the attacks, 312.03s - 322.19s | you need to understand the two services. The first service is ECU reset. It is used to reset 322.19s - 339.36s | the ECU. It is often used for troubleshooting or testing purposes. This is the actual method 339.92s - 353.28s |


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242.24s | tests. Fuzzing is a testing method where random or unusual data is fed into a system to find 242.24s - 250.64s | problems. The goal of this test is to see how the system behaves under stress and to find 251.20s - 260.32s | security issues. In the vehicle industry, we commonly do black box fuzzing using commercial 260.32s - 269.60s | fuzzers. There are many talks about CAN, UDS, and UDS fuzzing in CHP. Check out those talks 270.48s - 281.89s | for more details. During the UDS fuzzing test, we discovered something is wrong. The vehicle 282.21s - 291.01s | functions with two services. The first is ECU reset, and the second is communication control. 292.21s - 300.21s | Based on these findings, we made real-world attack scenarios. The first scenario is 300.21s - 312.03s | sudden stop, and the second is disabling of vehicle usage. Before explaining the attacks, 312.03s - 322.19s | you need to understand the two services. The first service is ECU reset. It is used to reset 322.19s - 339.36s | the ECU. It is often used for troubleshooting or testing purposes. This is the actual method 339.92s - 353.28s | that I did. You can perform hard reset with the first sub-function. This is the hard reset method. 354.72s - 364.70s | And you can perform soft reset with the third sub-function. It's the soft reset method. 372.72s - 382.96s | With the ECU reset method, you can stop the vehicle's engine. There are two scenarios 382.96s - 390.88s | that I did. The first is sending an ECU reset message to a moving vehicle to make it stop 390.88s - 401.65s | suddenly. And the second scenario is vehicle disabling. Continuously sending ECU reset messages 401.65s - 410.77s | to disable the vehicle's functions. The root cause of these issues is that ECU reset is not 410.77s - 419.97s | disabled in drive mode. Normally, this service is restricted during driving because it can be 419.97s - 432.93s | dangerous. And ISO 14229 says that the condition of server is ignition is on and system not be in 432.93s - 446.51s | an operational mode. I tested this on a new Lattice EV SUV model. And the target ECU is the 446.51s - 459.30s | gateway control unit. I conducted the test while the vehicle was driving. Here are


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that I did. You can perform hard reset with the first sub-function. This is the hard reset method. 354.72s - 364.70s | And you can perform soft reset with the third sub-function. It's the soft reset method. 372.72s - 382.96s | With the ECU reset method, you can stop the vehicle's engine. There are two scenarios 382.96s - 390.88s | that I did. The first is sending an ECU reset message to a moving vehicle to make it stop 390.88s - 401.65s | suddenly. And the second scenario is vehicle disabling. Continuously sending ECU reset messages 401.65s - 410.77s | to disable the vehicle's functions. The root cause of these issues is that ECU reset is not 410.77s - 419.97s | disabled in drive mode. Normally, this service is restricted during driving because it can be 419.97s - 432.93s | dangerous. And ISO 14229 says that the condition of server is ignition is on and system not be in 432.93s - 446.51s | an operational mode. I tested this on a new Lattice EV SUV model. And the target ECU is the 446.51s - 459.30s | gateway control unit. I conducted the test while the vehicle was driving. Here are the attack steps. 460.10s - 468.26s | Connect the laptop to the vehicle's OBD port using a CAN interface and just start the engine. 469.46s - 480.54s | Then we send a message and observe the vehicle. It's that simple. This photo shows the hardware 480.54s - 489.26s | setup. The OBD cable is connected to the OBD port and the laptop is connected via the CAN interface. 490.14s - 500.62s | The CAN bus parameters are set to standard values. The first scenario is sudden stop scenario. 503.28s - 512.64s | Set up the hardware setting and just we send the ECU reset message to moving vehicle. 514.40s - 523.66s | Then the moving vehicle comes to a sudden stop. Let's check it out through the video. 524.78s - 551.10s | The video is very short, so watch it carefully. Um, no sounds. Okay, let's see one more. We sent a message 552.14s - 561.82s | then the moving car was stopped. I'm gonna play one more. This time, please look at the cluster. 567.95s - 575.23s | After the message, the cluster was turned off. It was rebooted, but the car shut down. 576.91s - 591.97s | The


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the attack steps. 460.10s - 468.26s | Connect the laptop to the vehicle's OBD port using a CAN interface and just start the engine. 469.46s - 480.54s | Then we send a message and observe the vehicle. It's that simple. This photo shows the hardware 480.54s - 489.26s | setup. The OBD cable is connected to the OBD port and the laptop is connected via the CAN interface. 490.14s - 500.62s | The CAN bus parameters are set to standard values. The first scenario is sudden stop scenario. 503.28s - 512.64s | Set up the hardware setting and just we send the ECU reset message to moving vehicle. 514.40s - 523.66s | Then the moving vehicle comes to a sudden stop. Let's check it out through the video. 524.78s - 551.10s | The video is very short, so watch it carefully. Um, no sounds. Okay, let's see one more. We sent a message 552.14s - 561.82s | then the moving car was stopped. I'm gonna play one more. This time, please look at the cluster. 567.95s - 575.23s | After the message, the cluster was turned off. It was rebooted, but the car shut down. 576.91s - 591.97s | The video on the left shows the exterior. You can see the car 591.97s - 599.17s | moving back and forth and back and forth, which shows that the brake pedal was not pressed. 601.74s - 610.86s | This attack can cause mechanical failure or damage. At high speeds, this could lead to serious 610.86s - 622.54s | accidents. The second scenario is vehicle disabling. It's similar to the first scenario, 622.54s - 631.82s | but in this case, the ECU reset message is sent continuously. The vehicle cannot be controlled 631.82s - 649.97s | until the attack stops. The vehicle starts and the message is sent continuously. The vehicle 649.97s - 659.01s | will not start and the gear shifting is disabled. The vehicle is completely uncontrollable. 668.21s - 681.01s | Let's watch it one more time. Again, the cluster. Please look at the cluster. The cluster screen 681.01s - 694.10s | turns off and multiple warnings appear. Due to the continuous attack, the cluster shuts down 694.10s - 710.02s | and the vehicle becomes uncontrollable. The driver appears to be very confused. Here are the logs of 710.02s - 718.98s | the ECU reset attacks. Some parts are blurred


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video on the left shows the exterior. You can see the car 591.97s - 599.17s | moving back and forth and back and forth, which shows that the brake pedal was not pressed. 601.74s - 610.86s | This attack can cause mechanical failure or damage. At high speeds, this could lead to serious 610.86s - 622.54s | accidents. The second scenario is vehicle disabling. It's similar to the first scenario, 622.54s - 631.82s | but in this case, the ECU reset message is sent continuously. The vehicle cannot be controlled 631.82s - 649.97s | until the attack stops. The vehicle starts and the message is sent continuously. The vehicle 649.97s - 659.01s | will not start and the gear shifting is disabled. The vehicle is completely uncontrollable. 668.21s - 681.01s | Let's watch it one more time. Again, the cluster. Please look at the cluster. The cluster screen 681.01s - 694.10s | turns off and multiple warnings appear. Due to the continuous attack, the cluster shuts down 694.10s - 710.02s | and the vehicle becomes uncontrollable. The driver appears to be very confused. Here are the logs of 710.02s - 718.98s | the ECU reset attacks. Some parts are blurred for security reasons. You can see the logs of both 718.98s - 730.64s | hard reset and soft reset. To summarize the ECU reset attack, in drive mode, you can stop 730.64s - 739.84s | the engine by using ECU reset message. Continuous attacks can prevent the driver 739.84s - 748.32s | from controlling the vehicle. Also, the cluster will reboot and appear multiple warnings. 748.96s - 758.24s | These attacks can be very dangerous on the road. Therefore, this service must be operated 758.24s - 768.37s | only in not ready state. Here is the first service description. How is it? It's good? 769.09s - 780.72s | Okay, now I will explain the second service. The second service is communication control. 781.60s - 789.68s | This service is, it is used to control the communication functions of the ECU. This is 789.68s - 801.22s | the actual message that I did. And also, you can set the control type using the sub functions. 803.14s - 818.32s | The strange behavior appears with sub function one and three. Use sub function one to enable 819.20s - 828.72s | Rx and disable Tx of the ECU. This is the message for


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for security reasons. You can see the logs of both 718.98s - 730.64s | hard reset and soft reset. To summarize the ECU reset attack, in drive mode, you can stop 730.64s - 739.84s | the engine by using ECU reset message. Continuous attacks can prevent the driver 739.84s - 748.32s | from controlling the vehicle. Also, the cluster will reboot and appear multiple warnings. 748.96s - 758.24s | These attacks can be very dangerous on the road. Therefore, this service must be operated 758.24s - 768.37s | only in not ready state. Here is the first service description. How is it? It's good? 769.09s - 780.72s | Okay, now I will explain the second service. The second service is communication control. 781.60s - 789.68s | This service is, it is used to control the communication functions of the ECU. This is 789.68s - 801.22s | the actual message that I did. And also, you can set the control type using the sub functions. 803.14s - 818.32s | The strange behavior appears with sub function one and three. Use sub function one to enable 819.20s - 828.72s | Rx and disable Tx of the ECU. This is the message for sub function one. 830.24s - 841.44s | And you also use sub function three to disable Rx and Tx. This is the message for sub function 841.44s - 855.31s | three. You can control the ECU's communication type using this method. An attacker can disable 855.31s - 867.47s | Tx and Rx of the ECU by transmitting communication control message. I performed two scenarios. 867.47s - 876.35s | The first is brief pause and sudden movement. And second scenario is vehicle disabling. 877.15s - 884.59s | The root cause of this strange behavior is that communication control is not disabled in drive 884.59s - 898.11s | mode. And also, this service does not require security authentication. The first scenario 898.11s - 907.63s | is brief pause and sudden movement. Set the hardware setting and set the gear to drive. 908.51s - 919.47s | Then just resend the message. The driver will release the brake pedal to move forward. 920.67s - 928.11s | But the vehicle does not move for a few seconds even when the foot is taken off the brake pedal 928.11s - 939.81s | in drive mode. After a few seconds, the vehicle suddenly moves. Okay, let's check


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sub function one. 830.24s - 841.44s | And you also use sub function three to disable Rx and Tx. This is the message for sub function 841.44s - 855.31s | three. You can control the ECU's communication type using this method. An attacker can disable 855.31s - 867.47s | Tx and Rx of the ECU by transmitting communication control message. I performed two scenarios. 867.47s - 876.35s | The first is brief pause and sudden movement. And second scenario is vehicle disabling. 877.15s - 884.59s | The root cause of this strange behavior is that communication control is not disabled in drive 884.59s - 898.11s | mode. And also, this service does not require security authentication. The first scenario 898.11s - 907.63s | is brief pause and sudden movement. Set the hardware setting and set the gear to drive. 908.51s - 919.47s | Then just resend the message. The driver will release the brake pedal to move forward. 920.67s - 928.11s | But the vehicle does not move for a few seconds even when the foot is taken off the brake pedal 928.11s - 939.81s | in drive mode. After a few seconds, the vehicle suddenly moves. Okay, let's check it out through 939.81s - 971.68s | the video. I'm sorry to the sound is not playing. I'm gonna play one more. Please check the cluster. 975.63s - 983.47s | The gear is set to drive. Then we send a message. The vehicle doesn't move even when the brake 983.47s - 992.27s | pedal is released. Then after a few seconds, it suddenly moves. It's an interesting symptom. 996.61s - 1003.17s | I'll explain the second scenario. The second scenario is vehicle disabling attack. 1004.85s - 1009.73s | It's similar to the first, but this time we send message continuously. 1010.61s - 1018.37s | When attack messages are sent in subsection, the driver loses complete control over the vehicle. 1019.25s - 1062.10s | Let's take a look. We sent message continuously. Yeah, the driver sets the gear to drive. 1062.90s - 1076.93s | Then we sent a message. We sent message continuously. The scariest part is that we don't 1077.81s - 1091.09s | know when the attacker will stop. When we stop the attack, the vehicle suddenly starts moving. 1093.52s - 1103.31s | If the driver is pressing the gas, it's very, very dangerous. Okay, let me summarize the communication


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it out through 939.81s - 971.68s | the video. I'm sorry to the sound is not playing. I'm gonna play one more. Please check the cluster. 975.63s - 983.47s | The gear is set to drive. Then we send a message. The vehicle doesn't move even when the brake 983.47s - 992.27s | pedal is released. Then after a few seconds, it suddenly moves. It's an interesting symptom. 996.61s - 1003.17s | I'll explain the second scenario. The second scenario is vehicle disabling attack. 1004.85s - 1009.73s | It's similar to the first, but this time we send message continuously. 1010.61s - 1018.37s | When attack messages are sent in subsection, the driver loses complete control over the vehicle. 1019.25s - 1062.10s | Let's take a look. We sent message continuously. Yeah, the driver sets the gear to drive. 1062.90s - 1076.93s | Then we sent a message. We sent message continuously. The scariest part is that we don't 1077.81s - 1091.09s | know when the attacker will stop. When we stop the attack, the vehicle suddenly starts moving. 1093.52s - 1103.31s | If the driver is pressing the gas, it's very, very dangerous. Okay, let me summarize the communication 1103.31s - 1111.31s | control attack. This type of attack can disable the transmission and reception of the ECU. 1112.27s - 1120.35s | As shown in the previous video, it can control the vehicle either briefly or continuously. 1122.19s - 1130.91s | Unlike on previous attack ECU reset, this attack doesn't turn off ECU. 1132.35s - 1143.54s | So when the attack stops, the vehicle could suddenly move. Therefore, this service should 1143.86s - 1155.20s | be operated only in not ready. Here are the logs of communication attacks. Some parts are blurred 1155.20s - 1167.49s | for security reasons too. So how could these attacks happen in real life? You might wonder. 1168.45s - 1178.85s | Here are some examples. First, an attacker secretly enter the vehicle and connect the 1179.89s - 1190.59s | wireless OBD device. Some OEMs use wireless diagnostic tools. Since drivers usually don't 1190.91s - 1200.27s | check the OBD port, the vehicle could be unprotected. And second, attacks can happen 1200.27s - 1206.51s | from a short distance using wireless communication like Wi-Fi or Bluetooth. 1208.03s - 1217.63s | Some OEMs use Wi-Fi to connect diagnostic tools. Vehicle without security measures are very 1217.63s


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1103.31s - 1111.31s | control attack. This type of attack can disable the transmission and reception of the ECU. 1112.27s - 1120.35s | As shown in the previous video, it can control the vehicle either briefly or continuously. 1122.19s - 1130.91s | Unlike on previous attack ECU reset, this attack doesn't turn off ECU. 1132.35s - 1143.54s | So when the attack stops, the vehicle could suddenly move. Therefore, this service should 1143.86s - 1155.20s | be operated only in not ready. Here are the logs of communication attacks. Some parts are blurred 1155.20s - 1167.49s | for security reasons too. So how could these attacks happen in real life? You might wonder. 1168.45s - 1178.85s | Here are some examples. First, an attacker secretly enter the vehicle and connect the 1179.89s - 1190.59s | wireless OBD device. Some OEMs use wireless diagnostic tools. Since drivers usually don't 1190.91s - 1200.27s | check the OBD port, the vehicle could be unprotected. And second, attacks can happen 1200.27s - 1206.51s | from a short distance using wireless communication like Wi-Fi or Bluetooth. 1208.03s - 1217.63s | Some OEMs use Wi-Fi to connect diagnostic tools. Vehicle without security measures are very 1217.63s - 1224.43s | vulnerable to these type of attacks. That's why such attacks could happen at any time. 1226.27s - 1234.83s | So I'll suggest two countermeasures for these attacks. The first, important services like 1234.83s - 1242.27s | ECU reset and communication control must be operated only in not ready state. It's meaning 1242.27s - 1250.75s | when the engine is off. The second, these services should only be possible after security 1250.75s - 1257.71s | access authorization is granted. I shortly mentioned the security access service earlier. 1261.79s - 1269.31s | To time restrictions, I will explain just one thing about the security access authorization. 1270.11s - 1277.95s | There is the security access service. This service uses a seed and key to provide security 1277.95s - 1287.95s | procedure. It only unlocks security when the correct seed and the key. If authentication 1287.95s - 1299.09s | fails, it locks the ECU for a certain time to enhance security. There is also when connecting 1299.57s - 1309.46s | a diagnostic tool, some OEMs use security algorithms. And another measure is the gateway 1309.46s - 1318.46s | safety function. Previously, various data could be accessed without filtering but now


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- 1224.43s | vulnerable to these type of attacks. That's why such attacks could happen at any time. 1226.27s - 1234.83s | So I'll suggest two countermeasures for these attacks. The first, important services like 1234.83s - 1242.27s | ECU reset and communication control must be operated only in not ready state. It's meaning 1242.27s - 1250.75s | when the engine is off. The second, these services should only be possible after security 1250.75s - 1257.71s | access authorization is granted. I shortly mentioned the security access service earlier. 1261.79s - 1269.31s | To time restrictions, I will explain just one thing about the security access authorization. 1270.11s - 1277.95s | There is the security access service. This service uses a seed and key to provide security 1277.95s - 1287.95s | procedure. It only unlocks security when the correct seed and the key. If authentication 1287.95s - 1299.09s | fails, it locks the ECU for a certain time to enhance security. There is also when connecting 1299.57s - 1309.46s | a diagnostic tool, some OEMs use security algorithms. And another measure is the gateway 1309.46s - 1318.46s | safety function. Previously, various data could be accessed without filtering but now 1319.66s - 1325.42s | the gateway filters the data allowing only certain information to be accessed. 1326.38s - 1336.14s | So I discovered this weak point in April. After conducting additional tests, I reported on June 1336.14s - 1345.90s | 10th. But I was told that the vulnerability is not actionable in reality and that it works as 1346.86s - 1357.90s | is designed. However, I still believe it is a weakness. I believe that after sharing my 1357.90s - 1369.36s | presentation today, you will agree with me. Okay, finally, let me summarize. Some diagnostic 1369.36s - 1378.16s | services can have a significant impact on vehicle driving. If an attacker transmits the diagnostic 1378.16s - 1387.92s | message to driving vehicle, a serious accident may occur. So security for diagnostic services 1387.92s - 1401.02s | is essential. That's all for my presentation. Thank you for listening. Okay, my name is Seunghee Han. 1401.02s - 1406.30s | I'm from South Korea, not North. Thank you.


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1319.66s - 1325.42s | the gateway filters the data allowing only certain information to be accessed. 1326.38s - 1336.14s | So I discovered this weak point in April. After conducting additional tests, I reported on June 1336.14s - 1345.90s | 10th. But I was told that the vulnerability is not actionable in reality and that it works as 1346.86s - 1357.90s | is designed. However, I still believe it is a weakness. I believe that after sharing my 1357.90s - 1369.36s | presentation today, you will agree with me. Okay, finally, let me summarize. Some diagnostic 1369.36s - 1378.16s | services can have a significant impact on vehicle driving. If an attacker transmits the diagnostic 1378.16s - 1387.92s | message to driving vehicle, a serious accident may occur. So security for diagnostic services 1387.92s - 1401.02s | is essential. That's all for my presentation. Thank you for listening. Okay, my name is Seunghee Han. 1401.02s - 1406.30s | I'm from South Korea, not North. Thank you.


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{ "webpage_url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vRjB6TutzuM", "title": "DEF CON 32 - The Village Peoples' Panel What Really Goes On in a Village - Panel", "description": "The Villages are a key part of the DEFCON experience - join this panel of staff members of the DEFCON Villages to get an inside scoop on all the intricacies of organizing a village. Topics from finding sponsors to setting up equipment to making sure everyone gets to take a break during the event - there's a whole lot that goes on behind the scenes at DEFCON villages!", "channel_url": "https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC6Om9kAkl32dWlDSNlDS9Iw", "duration": 3311, "channel": "DEFCONConference", "uploader": "DEFCONConference", "upload_date": "20241016" } 0.27s - 2.57s | This text was transcribed using whisper model: large-v2 Okay. So I'll start the panel since it's 10 o'clock 2.57s - 3.97s | and I'm really on time with stuff. 3.97s - 7.61s | So Honi. Honi is our Village Coordinator. 7.61s - 8.13s | Good morning. 8.13s - 10.29s | Good morning. Hi. Good morning. 10.29s - 14.37s | Honi is our Defcon Village Lead Coordinator. 14.37s - 15.61s | So is Pedro. 15.61s - 17.13s | So is Reyes in the back 17.13s - 19.85s | tweeting because e-mails just came through. 19.85s - 22.05s | Do you want full names or what are we doing? 22.05s - 25.41s | So Tom, ICS Village Lead. 25.41s - 27.41s | Justin, Car Hacking Village. 27.41s - 29.15s | Nina, Biohacking Village. 29.35s - 32.07s | Muteki, Blue Team Village. 32.07s - 33.63s | Do you want your real name? 33.63s - 35.23s | Cassandra from Red Team Village. 35.23s - 36.23s | That's me. It's my real name. 36.23s - 37.75s | Oh, I'm sorry. Savannah. 37.75s - 39.11s | This is my life now. 39.11s - 41.27s | Savannah, Red Team Village. 41.27s - 42.27s | Do you want your real name? 42.27s - 43.19s | Yes. 43.19s - 45.35s | Matt, Aerospace. 45.35s - 47.31s | Now, Honi, what questions do you have for us 47.31s - 49.11s | or do we self-moderate? 49.11s - 51.71s | Go for it. Why do we do what we do? 51.71s - 53.07s | What is the point of the villages? 53.07s - 56.07s | Or actually we should do, what do the villages do? 56.07s - 57.15s | What's the mission vision? 57.15s - 58.67s | Blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah. 58.67s - 60.27s


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22.05s | Do you want full names or what are we doing? 22.05s - 25.41s | So Tom, ICS Village Lead. 25.41s - 27.41s | Justin, Car Hacking Village. 27.41s - 29.15s | Nina, Biohacking Village. 29.35s - 32.07s | Muteki, Blue Team Village. 32.07s - 33.63s | Do you want your real name? 33.63s - 35.23s | Cassandra from Red Team Village. 35.23s - 36.23s | That's me. It's my real name. 36.23s - 37.75s | Oh, I'm sorry. Savannah. 37.75s - 39.11s | This is my life now. 39.11s - 41.27s | Savannah, Red Team Village. 41.27s - 42.27s | Do you want your real name? 42.27s - 43.19s | Yes. 43.19s - 45.35s | Matt, Aerospace. 45.35s - 47.31s | Now, Honi, what questions do you have for us 47.31s - 49.11s | or do we self-moderate? 49.11s - 51.71s | Go for it. Why do we do what we do? 51.71s - 53.07s | What is the point of the villages? 53.07s - 56.07s | Or actually we should do, what do the villages do? 56.07s - 57.15s | What's the mission vision? 57.15s - 58.67s | Blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah. 58.67s - 60.27s | I can start. 60.27s - 63.55s | I have a really adorable little story that I want to tell. 63.55s - 67.27s | So Blue Team Village has been around for about seven years. 67.27s - 69.11s | This is our seventh year. 69.11s - 71.47s | We started, you know, a ragtag bunch of different people 71.47s - 73.23s | who decided to throw a village together 73.23s - 75.15s | and had no idea what the hell they were doing, 75.15s - 77.31s | which is how DEF CON works in general, right? 77.31s - 78.87s | It's a thing. 78.87s - 80.83s | So we've been around for a few years. 80.83s - 83.59s | Over the pandemic, you know, we had to go virtual for DC28. 83.59s - 87.15s | And around that time, we started a mentoring program. 87.23s - 89.31s | So met a lot of different people from all over the world, 89.31s - 93.35s | got to do some remote events, you know, talks, things like that. 93.35s - 97.19s | So this year, one of our first speakers 97.19s - 101.03s | was actually someone who I had met who


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| I can start. 60.27s - 63.55s | I have a really adorable little story that I want to tell. 63.55s - 67.27s | So Blue Team Village has been around for about seven years. 67.27s - 69.11s | This is our seventh year. 69.11s - 71.47s | We started, you know, a ragtag bunch of different people 71.47s - 73.23s | who decided to throw a village together 73.23s - 75.15s | and had no idea what the hell they were doing, 75.15s - 77.31s | which is how DEF CON works in general, right? 77.31s - 78.87s | It's a thing. 78.87s - 80.83s | So we've been around for a few years. 80.83s - 83.59s | Over the pandemic, you know, we had to go virtual for DC28. 83.59s - 87.15s | And around that time, we started a mentoring program. 87.23s - 89.31s | So met a lot of different people from all over the world, 89.31s - 93.35s | got to do some remote events, you know, talks, things like that. 93.35s - 97.19s | So this year, one of our first speakers 97.19s - 101.03s | was actually someone who I had met who was from India 101.03s - 104.39s | and then kind of like progressed in their career 104.39s - 106.03s | with some help in the mentoring program. 106.03s - 109.31s | And he actually gave a talk at Blue Team Village, 109.31s - 110.75s | did a really awesome job. 110.75s - 112.75s | And I got to give an intro, which was really cool. 112.75s - 115.39s | But what really stuck out to me is like, you know, 115.83s - 119.55s | the villages are communities in themselves. 119.55s - 121.75s | They're organizations within DEF CON 121.75s - 123.99s | that really help bring people together 123.99s - 126.43s | based on common interests. 126.43s - 128.19s | And being able to provide that space 128.19s - 129.79s | for someone to like learn and grow, 129.79s - 131.03s | to network within the community, 131.03s - 134.31s | and then be able to progress their career to speak 134.31s - 137.67s | is just like, I get a little like crazy, you know, 137.67s - 139.15s | sometimes planning all this stuff 139.15s - 140.35s | and then watching it come together. 140.35s - 142.59s |


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was from India 101.03s - 104.39s | and then kind of like progressed in their career 104.39s - 106.03s | with some help in the mentoring program. 106.03s - 109.31s | And he actually gave a talk at Blue Team Village, 109.31s - 110.75s | did a really awesome job. 110.75s - 112.75s | And I got to give an intro, which was really cool. 112.75s - 115.39s | But what really stuck out to me is like, you know, 115.83s - 119.55s | the villages are communities in themselves. 119.55s - 121.75s | They're organizations within DEF CON 121.75s - 123.99s | that really help bring people together 123.99s - 126.43s | based on common interests. 126.43s - 128.19s | And being able to provide that space 128.19s - 129.79s | for someone to like learn and grow, 129.79s - 131.03s | to network within the community, 131.03s - 134.31s | and then be able to progress their career to speak 134.31s - 137.67s | is just like, I get a little like crazy, you know, 137.67s - 139.15s | sometimes planning all this stuff 139.15s - 140.35s | and then watching it come together. 140.35s - 142.59s | And then I'm like, why am I doing this? 142.63s - 144.83s | And then like, I get to see someone 144.83s - 146.71s | who has grown because of what we do. 146.71s - 149.11s | And that's like the fucking coolest thing. 149.11s - 150.63s | So that's why I do this. 152.11s - 154.67s | I can add to that because I 100% agree with you. 154.67s - 156.55s | This is my fifth year running Car Wrecking Village. 156.55s - 159.23s | Car Wrecking Village has been around for 10 years. 159.23s - 160.75s | One of the biggest things I really encourage 160.75s - 161.91s | is trying to get younger people 161.91s - 164.07s | or newer people into this industry. 164.07s - 165.51s | Over the last three years, 165.51s - 167.27s | I've brought new people that weren't even 167.27s - 168.27s | security people at all. 168.27s - 170.55s | They were just tech people that are interested. 170.55s - 173.23s | Some of them from ages 17 to 20. 173.23s - 177.15s | And now two of them have jobs in security 177.15s - 178.47s | and come here every


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And then I'm like, why am I doing this? 142.63s - 144.83s | And then like, I get to see someone 144.83s - 146.71s | who has grown because of what we do. 146.71s - 149.11s | And that's like the fucking coolest thing. 149.11s - 150.63s | So that's why I do this. 152.11s - 154.67s | I can add to that because I 100% agree with you. 154.67s - 156.55s | This is my fifth year running Car Wrecking Village. 156.55s - 159.23s | Car Wrecking Village has been around for 10 years. 159.23s - 160.75s | One of the biggest things I really encourage 160.75s - 161.91s | is trying to get younger people 161.91s - 164.07s | or newer people into this industry. 164.07s - 165.51s | Over the last three years, 165.51s - 167.27s | I've brought new people that weren't even 167.27s - 168.27s | security people at all. 168.27s - 170.55s | They were just tech people that are interested. 170.55s - 173.23s | Some of them from ages 17 to 20. 173.23s - 177.15s | And now two of them have jobs in security 177.15s - 178.47s | and come here every year 178.47s - 179.87s | and are part of helping the village. 179.87s - 181.75s | So similar to her, 181.75s - 182.87s | that's the reason why I do this 182.87s - 184.23s | is to grow the communities 184.23s - 186.03s | and to grow the next versions of the, you know, 186.03s - 187.43s | us and people who can ensure 187.43s - 189.83s | that the world's gonna be secure in the future. 189.83s - 192.27s | I really care about cyber physical systems 192.27s - 195.51s | as probably most of us up here on this panel do. 195.51s - 196.79s | So that's why I do what I do. 196.79s - 198.63s | I've also worked some in aerospace, 198.63s - 200.43s | but I just wanna make sure the vehicles 201.31s - 202.15s | and stuff you guys are getting into 202.15s - 203.27s | are somewhat safe 203.27s - 206.51s | and trying to make the people up top care a little bit. 206.51s - 207.63s | It's kind of hard sometimes, 207.63s - 211.19s | but yeah, I do it for the people. 214.75s - 215.79s | Yeah, I guess I


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year 178.47s - 179.87s | and are part of helping the village. 179.87s - 181.75s | So similar to her, 181.75s - 182.87s | that's the reason why I do this 182.87s - 184.23s | is to grow the communities 184.23s - 186.03s | and to grow the next versions of the, you know, 186.03s - 187.43s | us and people who can ensure 187.43s - 189.83s | that the world's gonna be secure in the future. 189.83s - 192.27s | I really care about cyber physical systems 192.27s - 195.51s | as probably most of us up here on this panel do. 195.51s - 196.79s | So that's why I do what I do. 196.79s - 198.63s | I've also worked some in aerospace, 198.63s - 200.43s | but I just wanna make sure the vehicles 201.31s - 202.15s | and stuff you guys are getting into 202.15s - 203.27s | are somewhat safe 203.27s - 206.51s | and trying to make the people up top care a little bit. 206.51s - 207.63s | It's kind of hard sometimes, 207.63s - 211.19s | but yeah, I do it for the people. 214.75s - 215.79s | Yeah, I guess I have to agree 215.79s - 216.83s | with what they were saying too. 216.83s - 219.39s | I think whenever there's a lot of like new students 219.39s - 221.11s | or people in general that come to DEF CON 221.11s - 223.27s | and they want to learn the specific niches. 223.27s - 225.51s | So like all of us are obviously in specific niches 225.51s - 227.63s | in these cybersecurity space. 227.63s - 229.15s | And for example, like we had, 229.15s - 230.43s | I have a friend, 230.43s - 231.43s | it's like a family friend of a friend, 231.43s - 232.51s | but he had come to DEF CON 232.51s - 234.59s | and had never been to anything like this. 234.59s - 236.55s | And he already had spoken to someone on Friday, 236.55s - 239.27s | offering them an internship like within the village 239.27s - 240.87s | and like being able to provide that space 240.87s - 242.83s | where people can network and meet people 242.83s - 245.43s | is I would say anything in any industry, 245.43s - 246.27s | especially in ours, 246.27s - 247.79s | networking is


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have to agree 215.79s - 216.83s | with what they were saying too. 216.83s - 219.39s | I think whenever there's a lot of like new students 219.39s - 221.11s | or people in general that come to DEF CON 221.11s - 223.27s | and they want to learn the specific niches. 223.27s - 225.51s | So like all of us are obviously in specific niches 225.51s - 227.63s | in these cybersecurity space. 227.63s - 229.15s | And for example, like we had, 229.15s - 230.43s | I have a friend, 230.43s - 231.43s | it's like a family friend of a friend, 231.43s - 232.51s | but he had come to DEF CON 232.51s - 234.59s | and had never been to anything like this. 234.59s - 236.55s | And he already had spoken to someone on Friday, 236.55s - 239.27s | offering them an internship like within the village 239.27s - 240.87s | and like being able to provide that space 240.87s - 242.83s | where people can network and meet people 242.83s - 245.43s | is I would say anything in any industry, 245.43s - 246.27s | especially in ours, 246.27s - 247.79s | networking is so important, 247.79s - 249.03s | but then also giving a space 249.03s - 250.11s | to be able to have people grow 250.11s - 252.47s | like their offensive security skills. 252.47s - 254.47s | And then also kind of take that over to other villages 254.47s - 258.14s | to learn other areas too. 258.14s - 260.10s | Okay, so I guess mine's a little bit different 260.18s - 263.50s | because I'll start off with, 263.50s - 266.26s | I'm a pilot and there's a joke in there 266.26s - 268.70s | where like, how do you know you're at a party with pilot? 268.70s - 269.62s | They'll tell you. 269.62s - 272.78s | So that's how I start all my talks. 272.78s - 276.70s | But the qualifier there is when I get in airplanes, 276.70s - 278.58s | when I'm flying them, 278.58s - 282.30s | I want to be comfortable with the risks 282.30s - 284.38s | that are inherent with just flying any airplane 284.38s - 286.26s | and not anybody on the ground 286.26s - 287.86s | or anybody in the back of the airplane 287.86s - 290.10s | doing anything


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so important, 247.79s - 249.03s | but then also giving a space 249.03s - 250.11s | to be able to have people grow 250.11s - 252.47s | like their offensive security skills. 252.47s - 254.47s | And then also kind of take that over to other villages 254.47s - 258.14s | to learn other areas too. 258.14s - 260.10s | Okay, so I guess mine's a little bit different 260.18s - 263.50s | because I'll start off with, 263.50s - 266.26s | I'm a pilot and there's a joke in there 266.26s - 268.70s | where like, how do you know you're at a party with pilot? 268.70s - 269.62s | They'll tell you. 269.62s - 272.78s | So that's how I start all my talks. 272.78s - 276.70s | But the qualifier there is when I get in airplanes, 276.70s - 278.58s | when I'm flying them, 278.58s - 282.30s | I want to be comfortable with the risks 282.30s - 284.38s | that are inherent with just flying any airplane 284.38s - 286.26s | and not anybody on the ground 286.26s - 287.86s | or anybody in the back of the airplane 287.86s - 290.10s | doing anything that they shouldn't be. 290.10s - 291.90s | And so I want to make sure 291.90s - 295.14s | the people on board my airplane are safe. 295.14s - 296.78s | But one of the things that we find 296.78s - 301.42s | in the Aerospace Village is while mentoring is fantastic, 301.42s - 305.38s | we are just struggling to get the companies to show up, 305.38s - 306.54s | the manufacturers, 306.54s - 309.66s | the people that build the systems in the airplanes, 309.66s - 311.42s | everybody's got their silos, 311.42s - 314.70s | everybody wants to keep everything to be black boxes. 314.70s - 319.06s | And so we are really trying to get the manufacturers 319.06s - 322.02s | and all of those other companies involved 322.02s - 324.34s | and talking about the systems 324.34s - 325.54s | that they have on board the airplane 325.54s - 328.34s | because it is fascinating. 328.34s - 330.98s | I mean, I can easily be flying an airplane, 330.98s - 333.50s | a commercial airplane that is 20 years old 333.50s - 335.82s | and I can guarantee you 20 years ago, 335.82s - 337.22s


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that they shouldn't be. 290.10s - 291.90s | And so I want to make sure 291.90s - 295.14s | the people on board my airplane are safe. 295.14s - 296.78s | But one of the things that we find 296.78s - 301.42s | in the Aerospace Village is while mentoring is fantastic, 301.42s - 305.38s | we are just struggling to get the companies to show up, 305.38s - 306.54s | the manufacturers, 306.54s - 309.66s | the people that build the systems in the airplanes, 309.66s - 311.42s | everybody's got their silos, 311.42s - 314.70s | everybody wants to keep everything to be black boxes. 314.70s - 319.06s | And so we are really trying to get the manufacturers 319.06s - 322.02s | and all of those other companies involved 322.02s - 324.34s | and talking about the systems 324.34s - 325.54s | that they have on board the airplane 325.54s - 328.34s | because it is fascinating. 328.34s - 330.98s | I mean, I can easily be flying an airplane, 330.98s - 333.50s | a commercial airplane that is 20 years old 333.50s - 335.82s | and I can guarantee you 20 years ago, 335.82s - 337.22s | they were not built 337.22s - 339.18s | with any sort of cybersecurity standards. 339.18s - 342.14s | So how are you bolting that on in today's world? 342.14s - 344.10s | It needs to be talked about. 344.42s - 345.62s | So that's what's driving me. 345.62s - 347.82s | It's sort of a selfish interest 347.82s - 351.06s | of getting more attention paid to this space. 351.06s - 352.10s | I mean, I hate flying. 352.10s - 353.86s | So like I completely support that. 355.46s - 358.30s | Everyone, my name is Tom Van Norman with ICS Village. 358.30s - 361.54s | We started ICS Village here 11 years ago. 361.54s - 362.38s | Time flies. 363.98s - 365.74s | So we are a registered nonprofit. 365.74s - 367.90s | We go many conferences throughout the year. 367.90s - 370.06s | We have sponsors, we have grants, 370.06s - 371.22s | we have all that fun stuff. 371.22s - 373.46s | But we started it 11 years ago, 373.86s - 374.70s | and it was just a bunch of people 374.70s - 378.82s | that answered a call for villages, I think it was, 378.82s


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| they were not built 337.22s - 339.18s | with any sort of cybersecurity standards. 339.18s - 342.14s | So how are you bolting that on in today's world? 342.14s - 344.10s | It needs to be talked about. 344.42s - 345.62s | So that's what's driving me. 345.62s - 347.82s | It's sort of a selfish interest 347.82s - 351.06s | of getting more attention paid to this space. 351.06s - 352.10s | I mean, I hate flying. 352.10s - 353.86s | So like I completely support that. 355.46s - 358.30s | Everyone, my name is Tom Van Norman with ICS Village. 358.30s - 361.54s | We started ICS Village here 11 years ago. 361.54s - 362.38s | Time flies. 363.98s - 365.74s | So we are a registered nonprofit. 365.74s - 367.90s | We go many conferences throughout the year. 367.90s - 370.06s | We have sponsors, we have grants, 370.06s - 371.22s | we have all that fun stuff. 371.22s - 373.46s | But we started it 11 years ago, 373.86s - 374.70s | and it was just a bunch of people 374.70s - 378.82s | that answered a call for villages, I think it was, 378.82s - 380.90s | and applied for it and went. 381.78s - 385.34s | The reason I got into it was because back then, 385.34s - 387.30s | not so much now, but a little bit now, 387.30s - 388.50s | we'd have people up on the stage, 388.50s - 392.58s | whether it's DEF CON or in a magazine or whatever, 392.58s - 394.98s | talking about hacking that PLC, 394.98s - 397.50s | hacking this thing, and they're full of shit. 397.50s - 400.98s | It didn't, they're just wrong on what they're saying. 400.98s - 405.38s | So I come from control systems, engineering, technician, 405.38s - 408.18s | all that stuff out in the field doing things. 408.18s - 410.42s | And when we see people up on stage saying, 410.42s - 414.38s | oh, we can do this thing with that thing, 414.38s - 416.26s | all right, maybe, but it doesn't matter. 416.26s - 418.10s | It really does not matter. 418.10s - 421.30s | So instead of countering that person saying, 421.30s - 424.46s | hey, you really don't know, let's educate, let's uplift, 424.46s - 426.82s | let's go and spread, instead of


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- 380.90s | and applied for it and went. 381.78s - 385.34s | The reason I got into it was because back then, 385.34s - 387.30s | not so much now, but a little bit now, 387.30s - 388.50s | we'd have people up on the stage, 388.50s - 392.58s | whether it's DEF CON or in a magazine or whatever, 392.58s - 394.98s | talking about hacking that PLC, 394.98s - 397.50s | hacking this thing, and they're full of shit. 397.50s - 400.98s | It didn't, they're just wrong on what they're saying. 400.98s - 405.38s | So I come from control systems, engineering, technician, 405.38s - 408.18s | all that stuff out in the field doing things. 408.18s - 410.42s | And when we see people up on stage saying, 410.42s - 414.38s | oh, we can do this thing with that thing, 414.38s - 416.26s | all right, maybe, but it doesn't matter. 416.26s - 418.10s | It really does not matter. 418.10s - 421.30s | So instead of countering that person saying, 421.30s - 424.46s | hey, you really don't know, let's educate, let's uplift, 424.46s - 426.82s | let's go and spread, instead of spreading FUD, 426.82s - 430.30s | let's go and show people what you can do, what matters, 430.30s - 431.86s | because not everything matters, right? 431.86s - 435.14s | You can put, we can secure your control system 435.14s - 438.50s | 80% pretty easy, the other 10% is hard, 438.50s - 440.74s | and the other 10% is extremely hard. 440.74s - 443.06s | So let's educate, let's make it awareness, 443.06s - 447.26s | let's do things for the community, the people's things. 447.26s - 449.14s | In a long way, let's bring new blood in. 449.14s - 450.02s | We're all getting old. 450.02s - 452.10s | We're all gonna retire here, right? 452.10s - 458.68s | And let's bring new people in. 458.68s - 460.24s | I forgot what I was gonna say. 461.80s - 463.44s | Just wanted to say a couple of things. 463.44s - 464.76s | Yeah, sorry, I'll say a couple of things. 464.76s - 468.80s | So Pedro and I, where you are, the village leads, right? 468.80s - 472.24s | And then Ray's, we brought him on this year to just do, 472.24s - 474.16s | I think it's


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spreading FUD, 426.82s - 430.30s | let's go and show people what you can do, what matters, 430.30s - 431.86s | because not everything matters, right? 431.86s - 435.14s | You can put, we can secure your control system 435.14s - 438.50s | 80% pretty easy, the other 10% is hard, 438.50s - 440.74s | and the other 10% is extremely hard. 440.74s - 443.06s | So let's educate, let's make it awareness, 443.06s - 447.26s | let's do things for the community, the people's things. 447.26s - 449.14s | In a long way, let's bring new blood in. 449.14s - 450.02s | We're all getting old. 450.02s - 452.10s | We're all gonna retire here, right? 452.10s - 458.68s | And let's bring new people in. 458.68s - 460.24s | I forgot what I was gonna say. 461.80s - 463.44s | Just wanted to say a couple of things. 463.44s - 464.76s | Yeah, sorry, I'll say a couple of things. 464.76s - 468.80s | So Pedro and I, where you are, the village leads, right? 468.80s - 472.24s | And then Ray's, we brought him on this year to just do, 472.24s - 474.16s | I think it's just an outstanding job 474.16s - 475.76s | setting up these creator stages. 476.96s - 479.36s | Main focus for this right here is we wanted to 479.36s - 482.04s | kind of like uplift a lot of the content 482.04s - 485.00s | that all the villages are bringing to DEF CON 485.00s - 487.52s | and give it recorded space. 489.20s - 490.84s | I know it's outside of the village spaces, 490.84s - 493.36s | so it's not as conducive as what some of you guys 493.36s - 494.64s | want all the time. 494.64s - 498.44s | But we really wanted to like sort of start upbranding 498.44s - 499.92s | a lot of the content that you're bringing. 499.92s - 502.84s | And that way we can have both the village sponsors, 502.84s - 506.72s | our village brand into it as well on top of that as DEF CONs. 508.36s - 510.68s | The main thing though that like Pedro and I see 510.68s - 512.76s | for ourselves is we're kind of the middlemen 512.76s - 515.00s | between DEF CON and the villages. 515.00s - 517.44s | Villages come to us and


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just an outstanding job 474.16s - 475.76s | setting up these creator stages. 476.96s - 479.36s | Main focus for this right here is we wanted to 479.36s - 482.04s | kind of like uplift a lot of the content 482.04s - 485.00s | that all the villages are bringing to DEF CON 485.00s - 487.52s | and give it recorded space. 489.20s - 490.84s | I know it's outside of the village spaces, 490.84s - 493.36s | so it's not as conducive as what some of you guys 493.36s - 494.64s | want all the time. 494.64s - 498.44s | But we really wanted to like sort of start upbranding 498.44s - 499.92s | a lot of the content that you're bringing. 499.92s - 502.84s | And that way we can have both the village sponsors, 502.84s - 506.72s | our village brand into it as well on top of that as DEF CONs. 508.36s - 510.68s | The main thing though that like Pedro and I see 510.68s - 512.76s | for ourselves is we're kind of the middlemen 512.76s - 515.00s | between DEF CON and the villages. 515.00s - 517.44s | Villages come to us and they have these crazy ideas 517.44s - 518.68s | of things that they're gonna bring this year 518.68s - 519.92s | and we have to figure out, okay, 519.92s - 522.84s | how do we scope and tailor this with DEF CON 522.84s - 525.00s | to make sure that they can bring what they wanna bring? 525.00s - 527.28s | Namely, Nina brought some really, really cool stuff 527.28s - 528.44s | this year. 528.44s - 530.72s | One's like a giant robot. 530.72s - 531.76s | I can talk about that. 531.76s - 532.60s | Okay, I'm sorry. 533.92s - 536.36s | But all those things basically they come with a cost 536.36s - 537.68s | in the sense of like square footage, 537.68s - 539.32s | which we have a finite amount for. 539.32s - 542.76s | So like for us, it is playing the middleman 542.76s - 545.92s | between DEF CON and the village leads 545.92s - 547.72s | and making sure that we can support them 547.72s - 549.44s | as best as we possibly can. 549.96s - 552.32s | And also at the same time, sometimes the requests of like, 552.32s - 553.68s


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they have these crazy ideas 517.44s - 518.68s | of things that they're gonna bring this year 518.68s - 519.92s | and we have to figure out, okay, 519.92s - 522.84s | how do we scope and tailor this with DEF CON 522.84s - 525.00s | to make sure that they can bring what they wanna bring? 525.00s - 527.28s | Namely, Nina brought some really, really cool stuff 527.28s - 528.44s | this year. 528.44s - 530.72s | One's like a giant robot. 530.72s - 531.76s | I can talk about that. 531.76s - 532.60s | Okay, I'm sorry. 533.92s - 536.36s | But all those things basically they come with a cost 536.36s - 537.68s | in the sense of like square footage, 537.68s - 539.32s | which we have a finite amount for. 539.32s - 542.76s | So like for us, it is playing the middleman 542.76s - 545.92s | between DEF CON and the village leads 545.92s - 547.72s | and making sure that we can support them 547.72s - 549.44s | as best as we possibly can. 549.96s - 552.32s | And also at the same time, sometimes the requests of like, 552.32s - 553.68s | hey, we need 20,000 square feet. 553.68s - 555.84s | We're like, do you really though? 555.84s - 558.40s | We maybe tailor that down a little bit. 558.40s - 563.20s | But I think Pedro and I, like we see the villages 563.20s - 566.56s | as some of the premier content at DEF CON. 566.56s - 569.92s | The value that they bring is outstanding. 569.92s - 573.72s | A lot of the pen testing that occurs here is world-class. 573.72s - 575.44s | The value, the return on investment, 575.44s - 577.20s | a lot of the sponsors have when they come 577.20s - 581.24s | and they bring their devices, their vehicles, 581.24s - 584.84s | parts of their planes, the whole nine yards to DEF CON. 584.84s - 587.28s | And the amount of research CVEs 587.28s - 591.00s | that are produced by these villages is outstanding. 591.00s - 593.44s | And in one weekend in comparison to like, 593.44s - 596.12s | if you were to quantify that on the amount of pen tests 596.12s - 597.40s | and the amount of money they'd have to spend 597.40s - 600.76s | in


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| hey, we need 20,000 square feet. 553.68s - 555.84s | We're like, do you really though? 555.84s - 558.40s | We maybe tailor that down a little bit. 558.40s - 563.20s | But I think Pedro and I, like we see the villages 563.20s - 566.56s | as some of the premier content at DEF CON. 566.56s - 569.92s | The value that they bring is outstanding. 569.92s - 573.72s | A lot of the pen testing that occurs here is world-class. 573.72s - 575.44s | The value, the return on investment, 575.44s - 577.20s | a lot of the sponsors have when they come 577.20s - 581.24s | and they bring their devices, their vehicles, 581.24s - 584.84s | parts of their planes, the whole nine yards to DEF CON. 584.84s - 587.28s | And the amount of research CVEs 587.28s - 591.00s | that are produced by these villages is outstanding. 591.00s - 593.44s | And in one weekend in comparison to like, 593.44s - 596.12s | if you were to quantify that on the amount of pen tests 596.12s - 597.40s | and the amount of money they'd have to spend 597.40s - 600.76s | in the normal market, it's insane. 600.76s - 603.84s | So, I mean, Pedro and I are huge fans obviously, 603.84s - 606.24s | cause we stick around and keep doing this for some reason, 606.32s - 608.12s | but we also wanted to say thank you. 609.48s - 612.56s | So, Biohacking Village has been around for 10 years. 612.56s - 613.96s | I've run it for nine. 613.96s - 617.68s | My first year of being with the Biohacking Village, 617.68s - 620.64s | every single time on that pamphlet that they give you 620.64s - 621.48s | was completely wrong. 621.48s - 624.00s | So I sat in the room and at some point they were like, 624.00s - 625.56s | you keep sitting here, what's wrong with you? 625.56s - 626.76s | And I was like, I wanna be part of this, 626.76s - 628.04s | let's hook up, let's do this. 628.04s - 629.48s | So anyway, I've run it for nine years. 629.48s - 631.76s | We have five different labs, the device lab, 631.76s - 633.28s | which is all the manufacturers, 633.28s - 635.04s | the medical device manufacturers bring their wares, 635.04s


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the normal market, it's insane. 600.76s - 603.84s | So, I mean, Pedro and I are huge fans obviously, 603.84s - 606.24s | cause we stick around and keep doing this for some reason, 606.32s - 608.12s | but we also wanted to say thank you. 609.48s - 612.56s | So, Biohacking Village has been around for 10 years. 612.56s - 613.96s | I've run it for nine. 613.96s - 617.68s | My first year of being with the Biohacking Village, 617.68s - 620.64s | every single time on that pamphlet that they give you 620.64s - 621.48s | was completely wrong. 621.48s - 624.00s | So I sat in the room and at some point they were like, 624.00s - 625.56s | you keep sitting here, what's wrong with you? 625.56s - 626.76s | And I was like, I wanna be part of this, 626.76s - 628.04s | let's hook up, let's do this. 628.04s - 629.48s | So anyway, I've run it for nine years. 629.48s - 631.76s | We have five different labs, the device lab, 631.76s - 633.28s | which is all the manufacturers, 633.28s - 635.04s | the medical device manufacturers bring their wares, 635.04s - 638.16s | hardware, software, firmware, embedded, whatever. 638.16s - 640.20s | And they put that in front of the table 640.20s - 643.48s | and they ask the hacker community to break their shit. 643.48s - 644.84s | It is not hyperbole. 644.84s - 646.20s | Over the last 16 hours, 646.20s - 648.00s | there have been 42 vulnerabilities found 648.00s - 652.36s | from 10 medical device manufacturers, 25 devices. 652.36s - 654.08s | These are devices, most of these devices 654.08s - 656.48s | are things that currently live in hospitals. 656.48s - 661.16s | So in that room is $3.5 billion worth of medical devices 661.16s - 664.36s | and about $4 trillion worth of brainpower and IP. 664.40s - 668.44s | We also have a capture the flag, tabletop exercises, talks, 668.44s - 671.28s | and something else that I never remember, workshops. 671.28s - 672.40s | That's what we do. 672.40s - 676.12s | So all of this takes 360 days to put together, 676.12s - 678.72s | two days to load in and three days for a conference. 678.72s - 680.88s | We've already started talking about the badge for next year


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- 638.16s | hardware, software, firmware, embedded, whatever. 638.16s - 640.20s | And they put that in front of the table 640.20s - 643.48s | and they ask the hacker community to break their shit. 643.48s - 644.84s | It is not hyperbole. 644.84s - 646.20s | Over the last 16 hours, 646.20s - 648.00s | there have been 42 vulnerabilities found 648.00s - 652.36s | from 10 medical device manufacturers, 25 devices. 652.36s - 654.08s | These are devices, most of these devices 654.08s - 656.48s | are things that currently live in hospitals. 656.48s - 661.16s | So in that room is $3.5 billion worth of medical devices 661.16s - 664.36s | and about $4 trillion worth of brainpower and IP. 664.40s - 668.44s | We also have a capture the flag, tabletop exercises, talks, 668.44s - 671.28s | and something else that I never remember, workshops. 671.28s - 672.40s | That's what we do. 672.40s - 676.12s | So all of this takes 360 days to put together, 676.12s - 678.72s | two days to load in and three days for a conference. 678.72s - 680.88s | We've already started talking about the badge for next year 680.88s - 683.12s | because this is very consuming. 683.12s - 685.32s | And I agree with a lot of the things that you said 685.32s - 686.88s | about how DEF CON is trying to help us 686.88s - 688.36s | and work through this. 688.36s - 690.88s | Biohacking Village has three times more space 690.88s - 693.00s | than we had last year, which is why this year 693.00s - 694.68s | we could bring a surgical robot. 694.68s - 698.84s | So the pincers are as big as like the ends of two needles 698.84s - 701.32s | trying to get tiny microscopic things 701.32s - 702.68s | out of people's bodies. 702.68s - 703.72s | That's what we have over there. 703.72s - 704.60s | If you have an opportunity, 704.60s - 705.96s | you should definitely play with it 705.96s - 709.16s | because this surgical robot lives in the hospitals. 710.20s - 715.00s | Our sponsors are the million dollar, billion dollar people. 715.00s - 718.00s | I am really harsh with people 718.00s - 720.92s | about how they need to be here and show up. 720.92s - 722.76s | The Biohacking


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680.88s - 683.12s | because this is very consuming. 683.12s - 685.32s | And I agree with a lot of the things that you said 685.32s - 686.88s | about how DEF CON is trying to help us 686.88s - 688.36s | and work through this. 688.36s - 690.88s | Biohacking Village has three times more space 690.88s - 693.00s | than we had last year, which is why this year 693.00s - 694.68s | we could bring a surgical robot. 694.68s - 698.84s | So the pincers are as big as like the ends of two needles 698.84s - 701.32s | trying to get tiny microscopic things 701.32s - 702.68s | out of people's bodies. 702.68s - 703.72s | That's what we have over there. 703.72s - 704.60s | If you have an opportunity, 704.60s - 705.96s | you should definitely play with it 705.96s - 709.16s | because this surgical robot lives in the hospitals. 710.20s - 715.00s | Our sponsors are the million dollar, billion dollar people. 715.00s - 718.00s | I am really harsh with people 718.00s - 720.92s | about how they need to be here and show up. 720.92s - 722.76s | The Biohacking Village has a partnership 723.52s - 725.40s | with the FDA where it's called We Heart Hackers 725.40s - 728.16s | that the manufacturers can write on their submissions 728.16s - 729.56s | that they were hacked at DEF CON. 729.56s - 730.60s | This is a big deal to them. 730.60s - 734.12s | They understand the reasons behind it. 734.12s - 736.72s | The other part is the Biohacking Village is a CNA. 736.72s - 738.56s | So if something is found and they can't report it, 738.56s - 740.28s | the manufacturers can't report it themselves, 740.28s - 742.56s | we will happily report it for them. 743.44s - 744.68s | There was something else that I was gonna say 744.68s - 745.60s | that was probably important. 745.60s - 746.76s | Oh, why do I do this? 746.76s - 749.32s | I am really fucking overwhelmed and tired 749.32s - 751.12s | of patients going into hospitals 751.12s - 753.56s | and being in a world of hurt 753.56s - 755.52s | and then the hospital doesn't work. 755.52s - 757.56s | So they may have to have their surgeries redone 757.56s - 759.60s | or


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Village has a partnership 723.52s - 725.40s | with the FDA where it's called We Heart Hackers 725.40s - 728.16s | that the manufacturers can write on their submissions 728.16s - 729.56s | that they were hacked at DEF CON. 729.56s - 730.60s | This is a big deal to them. 730.60s - 734.12s | They understand the reasons behind it. 734.12s - 736.72s | The other part is the Biohacking Village is a CNA. 736.72s - 738.56s | So if something is found and they can't report it, 738.56s - 740.28s | the manufacturers can't report it themselves, 740.28s - 742.56s | we will happily report it for them. 743.44s - 744.68s | There was something else that I was gonna say 744.68s - 745.60s | that was probably important. 745.60s - 746.76s | Oh, why do I do this? 746.76s - 749.32s | I am really fucking overwhelmed and tired 749.32s - 751.12s | of patients going into hospitals 751.12s - 753.56s | and being in a world of hurt 753.56s - 755.52s | and then the hospital doesn't work. 755.52s - 757.56s | So they may have to have their surgeries redone 757.56s - 759.60s | or they don't understand what's happening to them 759.60s - 761.64s | and nobody is able to explain it. 761.64s - 762.76s | Nobody should go to the hospital, 762.76s - 765.08s | get put attached to a machine and go, 765.08s - 765.92s | what is this? 765.92s - 766.76s | What am I doing here? 766.76s - 768.24s | And nobody has a real answer. 768.24s - 770.12s | When the blue screen of death recently happened 770.12s - 771.36s | because of CrowdStrike, 771.36s - 773.00s | I wasn't working in the hospital, 773.00s - 774.40s | I was working in the hospital. 774.40s - 778.16s | And I was blown away by the nurses and the staff 778.16s - 779.80s | that were like, we gotta go back to paper 779.80s - 781.20s | and I don't even know what the sheet says. 781.20s - 782.56s | I don't know how to do this. 782.56s - 785.20s | So for me, this is one of those things 785.20s - 787.40s | that like sits in my soul about we gotta fix this. 787.40s - 790.44s | This is enough, we gotta do it. 790.44s - 791.40s |


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they don't understand what's happening to them 759.60s - 761.64s | and nobody is able to explain it. 761.64s - 762.76s | Nobody should go to the hospital, 762.76s - 765.08s | get put attached to a machine and go, 765.08s - 765.92s | what is this? 765.92s - 766.76s | What am I doing here? 766.76s - 768.24s | And nobody has a real answer. 768.24s - 770.12s | When the blue screen of death recently happened 770.12s - 771.36s | because of CrowdStrike, 771.36s - 773.00s | I wasn't working in the hospital, 773.00s - 774.40s | I was working in the hospital. 774.40s - 778.16s | And I was blown away by the nurses and the staff 778.16s - 779.80s | that were like, we gotta go back to paper 779.80s - 781.20s | and I don't even know what the sheet says. 781.20s - 782.56s | I don't know how to do this. 782.56s - 785.20s | So for me, this is one of those things 785.20s - 787.40s | that like sits in my soul about we gotta fix this. 787.40s - 790.44s | This is enough, we gotta do it. 790.44s - 791.40s | I appreciate that 791.40s - 793.96s | because I had malpractice as a kid in surgery 793.96s - 796.36s | and I do not trust doctors or any hospitals or any of that. 796.36s - 798.60s | So thank you for doing that. 798.60s - 799.88s | I wanna add to that a little bit. 799.88s - 801.32s | So I talked a lot about, 801.32s - 802.84s | or I talked about like, 802.84s - 803.80s | for me the personal thing, 803.80s - 804.64s | like the mentoring 804.64s - 807.36s | and kind of bringing new people into the field. 807.36s - 809.64s | One thing I love about being part of the Blue Team Village 810.48s - 811.88s | is like we cover all of these areas. 811.88s - 814.68s | Like the people that come to learn about IR, 814.68s - 818.00s | threat hunting, CTI and things like that 818.00s - 821.92s | span every single field on this table. 821.92s - 823.44s | Like, you know, 823.44s - 826.28s | these are the people that are going out to do defense 826.28s - 828.88s | when there's a cyber attack against a hospital


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I appreciate that 791.40s - 793.96s | because I had malpractice as a kid in surgery 793.96s - 796.36s | and I do not trust doctors or any hospitals or any of that. 796.36s - 798.60s | So thank you for doing that. 798.60s - 799.88s | I wanna add to that a little bit. 799.88s - 801.32s | So I talked a lot about, 801.32s - 802.84s | or I talked about like, 802.84s - 803.80s | for me the personal thing, 803.80s - 804.64s | like the mentoring 804.64s - 807.36s | and kind of bringing new people into the field. 807.36s - 809.64s | One thing I love about being part of the Blue Team Village 810.48s - 811.88s | is like we cover all of these areas. 811.88s - 814.68s | Like the people that come to learn about IR, 814.68s - 818.00s | threat hunting, CTI and things like that 818.00s - 821.92s | span every single field on this table. 821.92s - 823.44s | Like, you know, 823.44s - 826.28s | these are the people that are going out to do defense 826.28s - 828.88s | when there's a cyber attack against a hospital 828.88s - 832.24s | or, you know, an airline company or whatever. 832.24s - 833.48s | Apparently it's really hard to hack planes, 833.48s - 835.56s | which is definitely good. 835.56s - 838.24s | Makes me feel better as someone who hates flying. 838.28s - 841.24s | You know, and then that's just to be like, 841.24s - 843.72s | seeing all of these pieces come together 843.72s - 846.24s | is really, really cool. 846.24s - 848.12s | And I've learned a lot from it. 848.12s - 849.20s | Yeah, just love it. 851.08s - 852.92s | Got any more questions for us, Honey? 854.04s - 855.76s | Can we ask Honey questions? 855.76s - 857.44s | Maybe we could talk about. 860.21s - 861.05s | Sure. 867.61s - 868.85s | So Nina, why don't you, 868.85s - 871.81s | you talked about how you, 871.81s - 875.05s | you're able to have the companies actually like say, 875.05s - 877.25s | hey, we were hacked at DEF CON. 877.25s - 880.81s | How are you able to frame that in a positive light? 880.81s - 883.53s | Because we've tried, 884.61s - 888.45s | so a lot


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828.88s - 832.24s | or, you know, an airline company or whatever. 832.24s - 833.48s | Apparently it's really hard to hack planes, 833.48s - 835.56s | which is definitely good. 835.56s - 838.24s | Makes me feel better as someone who hates flying. 838.28s - 841.24s | You know, and then that's just to be like, 841.24s - 843.72s | seeing all of these pieces come together 843.72s - 846.24s | is really, really cool. 846.24s - 848.12s | And I've learned a lot from it. 848.12s - 849.20s | Yeah, just love it. 851.08s - 852.92s | Got any more questions for us, Honey? 854.04s - 855.76s | Can we ask Honey questions? 855.76s - 857.44s | Maybe we could talk about. 860.21s - 861.05s | Sure. 867.61s - 868.85s | So Nina, why don't you, 868.85s - 871.81s | you talked about how you, 871.81s - 875.05s | you're able to have the companies actually like say, 875.05s - 877.25s | hey, we were hacked at DEF CON. 877.25s - 880.81s | How are you able to frame that in a positive light? 880.81s - 883.53s | Because we've tried, 884.61s - 888.45s | so a lot of the aircraft and associated systems 888.45s - 889.69s | are certified. 889.69s - 892.41s | And so if anything happens to them, 892.41s - 893.97s | they are no longer certified. 893.97s - 897.29s | And so there's a very much a line between, 897.29s - 899.21s | hey, us tinkering with things 899.21s - 901.53s | and what actually goes on an airplane. 902.21s - 905.13s | How are you able to get these manufacturers to say, 905.13s - 907.73s | hey, we want to do this. 907.73s - 909.81s | We want to brag about how we brought it to DEF CON. 909.81s - 912.21s | Because on our end, on the aviation side, 912.21s - 913.61s | people are nervous about saying, 913.61s - 915.29s | I brought my airplane. 915.29s - 917.29s | I brought my systems to DEF CON. 917.29s - 919.01s | We're slowly making progress, but yeah. 919.01s - 919.85s | How have you done that? 919.85s - 921.89s | It's a lot of aggressive hope and prayer. 923.01s - 925.61s | So my background is I've worked in hospitals for 20 years 925.61s - 927.29s | and being in the hospital.


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of the aircraft and associated systems 888.45s - 889.69s | are certified. 889.69s - 892.41s | And so if anything happens to them, 892.41s - 893.97s | they are no longer certified. 893.97s - 897.29s | And so there's a very much a line between, 897.29s - 899.21s | hey, us tinkering with things 899.21s - 901.53s | and what actually goes on an airplane. 902.21s - 905.13s | How are you able to get these manufacturers to say, 905.13s - 907.73s | hey, we want to do this. 907.73s - 909.81s | We want to brag about how we brought it to DEF CON. 909.81s - 912.21s | Because on our end, on the aviation side, 912.21s - 913.61s | people are nervous about saying, 913.61s - 915.29s | I brought my airplane. 915.29s - 917.29s | I brought my systems to DEF CON. 917.29s - 919.01s | We're slowly making progress, but yeah. 919.01s - 919.85s | How have you done that? 919.85s - 921.89s | It's a lot of aggressive hope and prayer. 923.01s - 925.61s | So my background is I've worked in hospitals for 20 years 925.61s - 927.29s | and being in the hospital. 927.29s - 928.93s | So I worked on the electronic medical record 928.93s - 929.77s | and then the APIs 929.85s - 931.97s | and putting all of the devices into the EMR. 931.97s - 934.05s | So all of the information would sync 934.05s - 935.93s | and just watching how all of it happened. 935.93s - 937.41s | I was super annoyed. 938.85s - 943.85s | The moment is that one of the FDA humans 944.17s - 946.73s | is the medical device manufacturer. 946.73s - 947.77s | That's bullshit. 947.77s - 950.25s | The medical device cybersecurity director 950.25s - 952.17s | for CDRH at the FDA. 952.17s - 955.01s | She used to work for one of the medical device manufacturers 955.01s - 956.61s | and now she runs the thing at the FDA. 956.61s - 959.81s | And she is super invested in ensuring patient safety. 959.81s - 961.21s | We're all patients at the end of the day. 961.21s - 962.45s | Whether you go to the doctor or not, 962.45s - 963.45s | you have an EMR somewhere. 963.45s - 966.57s | You have an MRN, medical record number, somewhere. 966.57s - 969.17s


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927.29s - 928.93s | So I worked on the electronic medical record 928.93s - 929.77s | and then the APIs 929.85s - 931.97s | and putting all of the devices into the EMR. 931.97s - 934.05s | So all of the information would sync 934.05s - 935.93s | and just watching how all of it happened. 935.93s - 937.41s | I was super annoyed. 938.85s - 943.85s | The moment is that one of the FDA humans 944.17s - 946.73s | is the medical device manufacturer. 946.73s - 947.77s | That's bullshit. 947.77s - 950.25s | The medical device cybersecurity director 950.25s - 952.17s | for CDRH at the FDA. 952.17s - 955.01s | She used to work for one of the medical device manufacturers 955.01s - 956.61s | and now she runs the thing at the FDA. 956.61s - 959.81s | And she is super invested in ensuring patient safety. 959.81s - 961.21s | We're all patients at the end of the day. 961.21s - 962.45s | Whether you go to the doctor or not, 962.45s - 963.45s | you have an EMR somewhere. 963.45s - 966.57s | You have an MRN, medical record number, somewhere. 966.57s - 969.17s | So we are all affected by this no matter what happens. 969.17s - 972.29s | When they come up and they're like, this isn't for me. 972.29s - 973.49s | I'm not okay with this. 973.49s - 976.89s | I'm like, sure, but I'm aggressive. 976.89s - 978.69s | I think we all know that at this point. 979.69s - 982.57s | I will go up to them and tell them their revenue. 982.57s - 984.49s | Your revenue cycles will be affected by this. 984.49s - 986.97s | The ROI of them coming to DEF CON 986.97s - 989.85s | and bringing their devices here will say, you did this. 989.85s - 992.61s | You trusted this community to do the hard thing for you. 992.61s - 994.69s | What they do here is worth, 994.69s - 997.01s | but the vulnerabilities and the pentest here 997.01s - 1001.57s | are worth about 350 to like $750,000 1001.57s - 1004.33s | that they're getting for like nothing to do this. 1004.33s - 1007.89s | So they can come here, get all of their shit tested, 1007.89s - 1010.05s | hardcore, go home and fix it. 1010.05s - 1011.01s


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| So we are all affected by this no matter what happens. 969.17s - 972.29s | When they come up and they're like, this isn't for me. 972.29s - 973.49s | I'm not okay with this. 973.49s - 976.89s | I'm like, sure, but I'm aggressive. 976.89s - 978.69s | I think we all know that at this point. 979.69s - 982.57s | I will go up to them and tell them their revenue. 982.57s - 984.49s | Your revenue cycles will be affected by this. 984.49s - 986.97s | The ROI of them coming to DEF CON 986.97s - 989.85s | and bringing their devices here will say, you did this. 989.85s - 992.61s | You trusted this community to do the hard thing for you. 992.61s - 994.69s | What they do here is worth, 994.69s - 997.01s | but the vulnerabilities and the pentest here 997.01s - 1001.57s | are worth about 350 to like $750,000 1001.57s - 1004.33s | that they're getting for like nothing to do this. 1004.33s - 1007.89s | So they can come here, get all of their shit tested, 1007.89s - 1010.05s | hardcore, go home and fix it. 1010.05s - 1011.01s | No big deal. 1011.01s - 1013.25s | They can report it or just say it's a finding 1013.25s - 1014.45s | and go fix it. 1015.45s - 1018.05s | So great. 1018.05s - 1019.93s | If I have to get involved, 1019.93s - 1022.97s | that is a very different level of annoyance for them. 1022.97s - 1025.09s | They have vulnerability disclosure programs 1025.09s - 1026.33s | that I'm like everything. 1026.33s - 1027.17s | That's a great question. 1027.17s - 1028.65s | So the device lives here. 1029.93s - 1031.81s | Oh, sorry. 1031.81s - 1033.05s | So I was just asking like, 1033.05s - 1035.17s | how does she ensure that these vulnerabilities 1035.17s - 1037.01s | that they're finding actually get fixed? 1037.01s - 1038.37s | So it's cool to find all this stuff, 1038.37s - 1040.21s | but a lot of times you can't guarantee they get fixed. 1040.21s - 1042.17s | So just curious on how you track and monitor 1042.21s - 1044.97s | and ensure these vulnerabilities are getting fixed. 1044.97s - 1048.61s | So every day I send an email back to everybody 1048.61s - 1051.05s | stating this is the


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| No big deal. 1011.01s - 1013.25s | They can report it or just say it's a finding 1013.25s - 1014.45s | and go fix it. 1015.45s - 1018.05s | So great. 1018.05s - 1019.93s | If I have to get involved, 1019.93s - 1022.97s | that is a very different level of annoyance for them. 1022.97s - 1025.09s | They have vulnerability disclosure programs 1025.09s - 1026.33s | that I'm like everything. 1026.33s - 1027.17s | That's a great question. 1027.17s - 1028.65s | So the device lives here. 1029.93s - 1031.81s | Oh, sorry. 1031.81s - 1033.05s | So I was just asking like, 1033.05s - 1035.17s | how does she ensure that these vulnerabilities 1035.17s - 1037.01s | that they're finding actually get fixed? 1037.01s - 1038.37s | So it's cool to find all this stuff, 1038.37s - 1040.21s | but a lot of times you can't guarantee they get fixed. 1040.21s - 1042.17s | So just curious on how you track and monitor 1042.21s - 1044.97s | and ensure these vulnerabilities are getting fixed. 1044.97s - 1048.61s | So every day I send an email back to everybody 1048.61s - 1051.05s | stating this is the number of vulnerabilities we have. 1051.05s - 1052.21s | I talk to the hackers around, 1052.21s - 1053.69s | I talk to the manufacturers and I collate, 1053.69s - 1055.29s | make sure everything is correct. 1056.25s - 1058.97s | They have their own vulnerability disclosure programs 1058.97s - 1061.65s | that everything is supposed to be sent to immediately. 1061.65s - 1064.17s | If they have to go through me as not just me, 1064.17s - 1066.37s | but through the biohacking village as a CNA, 1066.37s - 1067.81s | that becomes a CISA issue 1067.81s - 1069.37s | that they don't want to get involved with. 1069.41s - 1072.29s | So they're pretty good at fixing their things. 1072.29s - 1073.33s | You have some legislation on your side. 1073.33s - 1075.05s | We do have legislation on our side. 1075.05s - 1075.89s | That's nice. 1079.85s - 1081.37s | I think that's why you're making more progress 1081.37s - 1082.57s | than most of us. 1082.57s - 1084.09s | Yeah, I guess. 1084.09s - 1086.93s | So somebody at work told me I was wrong about a piece of law 1086.93s - 1089.09s | and I was


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number of vulnerabilities we have. 1051.05s - 1052.21s | I talk to the hackers around, 1052.21s - 1053.69s | I talk to the manufacturers and I collate, 1053.69s - 1055.29s | make sure everything is correct. 1056.25s - 1058.97s | They have their own vulnerability disclosure programs 1058.97s - 1061.65s | that everything is supposed to be sent to immediately. 1061.65s - 1064.17s | If they have to go through me as not just me, 1064.17s - 1066.37s | but through the biohacking village as a CNA, 1066.37s - 1067.81s | that becomes a CISA issue 1067.81s - 1069.37s | that they don't want to get involved with. 1069.41s - 1072.29s | So they're pretty good at fixing their things. 1072.29s - 1073.33s | You have some legislation on your side. 1073.33s - 1075.05s | We do have legislation on our side. 1075.05s - 1075.89s | That's nice. 1079.85s - 1081.37s | I think that's why you're making more progress 1081.37s - 1082.57s | than most of us. 1082.57s - 1084.09s | Yeah, I guess. 1084.09s - 1086.93s | So somebody at work told me I was wrong about a piece of law 1086.93s - 1089.09s | and I was like, I'm not wrong about what this is. 1089.09s - 1092.53s | And I started law school, so nobody likes me right now 1092.53s - 1095.61s | because I'm like, it's not what that says. 1095.61s - 1098.85s | So Nina, I have to say, 1099.41s - 1100.37s | I had to disagree. 1101.61s - 1105.09s | I had to disagree with most of this stuff here. 1106.41s - 1108.01s | Well, first you can talk about hospitals. 1108.01s - 1108.93s | We all need healthcare. 1108.93s - 1111.09s | Either we need it today, tomorrow, whatever. 1111.09s - 1113.09s | We all need healthcare. 1113.09s - 1115.41s | If we don't have the ICS stuff, guess what doesn't work? 1115.41s - 1117.53s | Your robot, your other stuff, right? 1119.13s - 1123.41s | So where I disagree with a lot of people here, 1123.41s - 1124.97s | I think coming here and finding vulnerabilities 1124.97s - 1126.45s | is a horrible idea. 1126.45s - 1128.09s | From a business, I'm a business owner, 1128.13s - 1129.65s | is a horrible idea. 1129.65s - 1130.49s | Why? 1130.49s - 1131.33s | I don't know who you are. 1131.33s - 1132.17s


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like, I'm not wrong about what this is. 1089.09s - 1092.53s | And I started law school, so nobody likes me right now 1092.53s - 1095.61s | because I'm like, it's not what that says. 1095.61s - 1098.85s | So Nina, I have to say, 1099.41s - 1100.37s | I had to disagree. 1101.61s - 1105.09s | I had to disagree with most of this stuff here. 1106.41s - 1108.01s | Well, first you can talk about hospitals. 1108.01s - 1108.93s | We all need healthcare. 1108.93s - 1111.09s | Either we need it today, tomorrow, whatever. 1111.09s - 1113.09s | We all need healthcare. 1113.09s - 1115.41s | If we don't have the ICS stuff, guess what doesn't work? 1115.41s - 1117.53s | Your robot, your other stuff, right? 1119.13s - 1123.41s | So where I disagree with a lot of people here, 1123.41s - 1124.97s | I think coming here and finding vulnerabilities 1124.97s - 1126.45s | is a horrible idea. 1126.45s - 1128.09s | From a business, I'm a business owner, 1128.13s - 1129.65s | is a horrible idea. 1129.65s - 1130.49s | Why? 1130.49s - 1131.33s | I don't know who you are. 1131.33s - 1132.17s | I don't know who you are. 1132.17s - 1133.01s | I don't know who you are. 1133.01s - 1134.97s | Now I leave here saying my device is secure 1134.97s - 1138.05s | because X, Y, and Z found vulnerabilities. 1138.05s - 1140.77s | Completely bad idea, horrible idea. 1140.77s - 1144.29s | Where if I go and if I pay ABC company, 1145.29s - 1146.85s | they still might not find the vulnerabilities, 1146.85s - 1148.85s | but now I have somebody to hold accountable. 1148.85s - 1150.61s | Now I have somebody to go back and say, 1150.61s - 1153.25s | hey, you know what guys, you gave me a report 1153.25s - 1156.17s | and this low hanging fruit thing was not found. 1156.17s - 1158.81s | Where I come to any conference and find a vulnerability 1158.81s - 1160.09s | and I leave with that good feeling that, 1160.09s - 1161.29s | hey, we found, what'd you say? 1161.29s - 1162.93s | How many vulnerabilities? 1162.93s - 1165.13s | 42, 42. 1165.13s - 1166.61s | Interesting. 1166.61s - 1167.45s | Really interesting. 1167.45s - 1169.37s | Do they have a testing model? 1169.37s - 1170.21s


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| I don't know who you are. 1132.17s - 1133.01s | I don't know who you are. 1133.01s - 1134.97s | Now I leave here saying my device is secure 1134.97s - 1138.05s | because X, Y, and Z found vulnerabilities. 1138.05s - 1140.77s | Completely bad idea, horrible idea. 1140.77s - 1144.29s | Where if I go and if I pay ABC company, 1145.29s - 1146.85s | they still might not find the vulnerabilities, 1146.85s - 1148.85s | but now I have somebody to hold accountable. 1148.85s - 1150.61s | Now I have somebody to go back and say, 1150.61s - 1153.25s | hey, you know what guys, you gave me a report 1153.25s - 1156.17s | and this low hanging fruit thing was not found. 1156.17s - 1158.81s | Where I come to any conference and find a vulnerability 1158.81s - 1160.09s | and I leave with that good feeling that, 1160.09s - 1161.29s | hey, we found, what'd you say? 1161.29s - 1162.93s | How many vulnerabilities? 1162.93s - 1165.13s | 42, 42. 1165.13s - 1166.61s | Interesting. 1166.61s - 1167.45s | Really interesting. 1167.45s - 1169.37s | Do they have a testing model? 1169.37s - 1170.21s | Yeah. 1170.21s - 1171.85s | Didn't seem like it. 1171.85s - 1173.93s | Those are tested before they get here. 1173.93s - 1175.45s | But so if they're tested before they get here, 1175.45s - 1176.65s | how do they find 42? 1177.77s - 1179.97s | Do you wanna go to them just to accept these copies? 1179.97s - 1180.81s | Is that what we're here for? 1180.81s - 1182.53s | Okay, we're leading, it's a leading question. 1182.53s - 1184.89s | Okay, I'm gonna interrupt 1185.21s - 1186.53s | and throw something else out there. 1186.53s - 1188.33s | So I think you can tell by this point 1188.33s - 1190.17s | that we're all really passionate about what we do 1190.17s - 1192.13s | and we've all been doing it for a very long time, 1192.13s - 1193.93s | which brings up a really good point. 1193.93s - 1195.89s | So villages are separate organizations. 1195.89s - 1197.81s | We have very few people 1197.81s - 1199.89s | that have been invested for a long time. 1199.89s - 1201.77s | All of us, I think pretty much, 1201.77s - 1204.13s | we start planning pretty much right


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| Yeah. 1170.21s - 1171.85s | Didn't seem like it. 1171.85s - 1173.93s | Those are tested before they get here. 1173.93s - 1175.45s | But so if they're tested before they get here, 1175.45s - 1176.65s | how do they find 42? 1177.77s - 1179.97s | Do you wanna go to them just to accept these copies? 1179.97s - 1180.81s | Is that what we're here for? 1180.81s - 1182.53s | Okay, we're leading, it's a leading question. 1182.53s - 1184.89s | Okay, I'm gonna interrupt 1185.21s - 1186.53s | and throw something else out there. 1186.53s - 1188.33s | So I think you can tell by this point 1188.33s - 1190.17s | that we're all really passionate about what we do 1190.17s - 1192.13s | and we've all been doing it for a very long time, 1192.13s - 1193.93s | which brings up a really good point. 1193.93s - 1195.89s | So villages are separate organizations. 1195.89s - 1197.81s | We have very few people 1197.81s - 1199.89s | that have been invested for a long time. 1199.89s - 1201.77s | All of us, I think pretty much, 1201.77s - 1204.13s | we start planning pretty much right after DEF CON. 1204.13s - 1206.85s | We have a hot wash, we kind of review lessons, 1206.85s - 1209.09s | you go through lessons, learn, make some changes. 1209.09s - 1212.85s | At the end of the day, it's usually a few people 1212.85s - 1214.37s | at the very top of the organization 1214.85s - 1217.09s | that define what the village does. 1217.09s - 1220.13s | And one of the issues that I think we have with that 1220.13s - 1221.41s | is people get burnt out. 1222.49s - 1224.45s | I don't know how Nina is functioning right now. 1224.45s - 1226.21s | I don't know how I'm functioning right now. 1226.21s - 1228.13s | I went to a metal festival in Germany 1228.13s - 1229.97s | and then flew in from Germany on Tuesday 1229.97s - 1230.81s | and hit the ground running 1230.81s - 1233.49s | because we had unload set up Wednesday, 1233.49s - 1235.33s | 12 hours in the village on Thursday. 1235.33s - 1237.25s | I didn't eat until like 9 p.m. 1237.25s - 1238.61s | I never made it to merch. 1238.61s - 1241.77s | I have like one 4XL,


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after DEF CON. 1204.13s - 1206.85s | We have a hot wash, we kind of review lessons, 1206.85s - 1209.09s | you go through lessons, learn, make some changes. 1209.09s - 1212.85s | At the end of the day, it's usually a few people 1212.85s - 1214.37s | at the very top of the organization 1214.85s - 1217.09s | that define what the village does. 1217.09s - 1220.13s | And one of the issues that I think we have with that 1220.13s - 1221.41s | is people get burnt out. 1222.49s - 1224.45s | I don't know how Nina is functioning right now. 1224.45s - 1226.21s | I don't know how I'm functioning right now. 1226.21s - 1228.13s | I went to a metal festival in Germany 1228.13s - 1229.97s | and then flew in from Germany on Tuesday 1229.97s - 1230.81s | and hit the ground running 1230.81s - 1233.49s | because we had unload set up Wednesday, 1233.49s - 1235.33s | 12 hours in the village on Thursday. 1235.33s - 1237.25s | I didn't eat until like 9 p.m. 1237.25s - 1238.61s | I never made it to merch. 1238.61s - 1241.77s | I have like one 4XL, which is what I got. 1241.77s - 1244.49s | So I think it's like, this kind of passion is great, 1244.49s - 1245.93s | but like, I don't know. 1245.93s - 1247.45s | I guess maybe my question to other panelists is 1247.45s - 1251.29s | how do you work on getting other people involved? 1251.29s - 1254.17s | And because none of us are paid for this either. 1254.17s - 1255.01s | At least I'm not. 1255.01s - 1255.85s | I don't know. 1255.85s - 1256.69s | Are you getting paid? 1256.69s - 1257.53s | Yeah, no. 1257.53s - 1258.37s | This is all volunteer work. 1258.37s - 1259.41s | We have full-time jobs. 1259.41s - 1262.25s | So how do each of your villages handle 1262.25s - 1264.25s | like getting people involved 1264.25s - 1267.41s | so that you don't have to be completely run into the ground? 1268.33s - 1269.45s | Yeah, that's a really good question. 1269.45s - 1271.69s | So I'll start from the Car Hacking Village side. 1272.89s - 1274.61s | We go to a lot of different events as well. 1274.61s - 1276.77s | So we don't just go to DEF CON.


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which is what I got. 1241.77s - 1244.49s | So I think it's like, this kind of passion is great, 1244.49s - 1245.93s | but like, I don't know. 1245.93s - 1247.45s | I guess maybe my question to other panelists is 1247.45s - 1251.29s | how do you work on getting other people involved? 1251.29s - 1254.17s | And because none of us are paid for this either. 1254.17s - 1255.01s | At least I'm not. 1255.01s - 1255.85s | I don't know. 1255.85s - 1256.69s | Are you getting paid? 1256.69s - 1257.53s | Yeah, no. 1257.53s - 1258.37s | This is all volunteer work. 1258.37s - 1259.41s | We have full-time jobs. 1259.41s - 1262.25s | So how do each of your villages handle 1262.25s - 1264.25s | like getting people involved 1264.25s - 1267.41s | so that you don't have to be completely run into the ground? 1268.33s - 1269.45s | Yeah, that's a really good question. 1269.45s - 1271.69s | So I'll start from the Car Hacking Village side. 1272.89s - 1274.61s | We go to a lot of different events as well. 1274.61s - 1276.77s | So we don't just go to DEF CON. 1276.77s - 1278.65s | We do Black Hat Middle East. 1278.65s - 1280.89s | We do a lot of different global events as well. 1280.89s - 1283.33s | So we try to get as much recognition as possible. 1283.33s - 1285.57s | And through that, typically we find a lot of people 1285.57s - 1287.13s | that have no clue what any of this stuff is 1287.13s - 1288.65s | or how to get into car hacking. 1288.65s - 1291.29s | So I usually like to try to bring them as volunteers 1291.29s - 1292.61s | because a lot of those people are pretty driven 1292.61s - 1294.05s | to want to learn and grow. 1294.05s - 1295.77s | And I don't mind if you don't know anything, 1295.77s - 1296.77s | we can teach you that. 1296.77s - 1298.61s | As long as you have motivation and drive, 1298.73s - 1302.49s | then we will welcome you in and bring you to help volunteer. 1302.49s - 1303.81s | So that's kind of been my philosophy. 1303.81s - 1305.81s | As long as I can find someone that's driven and motivated, 1305.81s - 1308.25s | I can teach them the


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1276.77s - 1278.65s | We do Black Hat Middle East. 1278.65s - 1280.89s | We do a lot of different global events as well. 1280.89s - 1283.33s | So we try to get as much recognition as possible. 1283.33s - 1285.57s | And through that, typically we find a lot of people 1285.57s - 1287.13s | that have no clue what any of this stuff is 1287.13s - 1288.65s | or how to get into car hacking. 1288.65s - 1291.29s | So I usually like to try to bring them as volunteers 1291.29s - 1292.61s | because a lot of those people are pretty driven 1292.61s - 1294.05s | to want to learn and grow. 1294.05s - 1295.77s | And I don't mind if you don't know anything, 1295.77s - 1296.77s | we can teach you that. 1296.77s - 1298.61s | As long as you have motivation and drive, 1298.73s - 1302.49s | then we will welcome you in and bring you to help volunteer. 1302.49s - 1303.81s | So that's kind of been my philosophy. 1303.81s - 1305.81s | As long as I can find someone that's driven and motivated, 1305.81s - 1308.25s | I can teach them the ropes and bring them in. 1308.25s - 1309.89s | And usually that's helped us a lot. 1309.89s - 1312.97s | So a lot of our volunteers within the last two years 1312.97s - 1316.37s | have been younger kids from graduating right out of college, 1316.37s - 1318.41s | some that are even younger than that, 1318.41s - 1320.53s | that are just really eager and seeing the stuff in the news 1320.53s - 1322.41s | about cars getting hacked and hearing about these things 1322.41s - 1323.97s | and just wanting to be involved. 1323.97s - 1326.85s | And then they send us an email 1326.85s - 1328.49s | or they see us at a conference and we're just like, 1328.49s - 1330.33s | hey, you seem pretty motivated and driven. 1330.33s - 1332.89s | Here's my contact information, stay in contact with me 1332.89s - 1334.81s | and we'd love to have you volunteer. 1334.81s - 1336.05s | It's worked really well for us, 1336.05s - 1337.77s | but it is kind of more ad hoc. 1337.77s - 1338.81s | So it is difficult, 1338.81s - 1341.85s | but we've tried to do call for volunteers in the


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ropes and bring them in. 1308.25s - 1309.89s | And usually that's helped us a lot. 1309.89s - 1312.97s | So a lot of our volunteers within the last two years 1312.97s - 1316.37s | have been younger kids from graduating right out of college, 1316.37s - 1318.41s | some that are even younger than that, 1318.41s - 1320.53s | that are just really eager and seeing the stuff in the news 1320.53s - 1322.41s | about cars getting hacked and hearing about these things 1322.41s - 1323.97s | and just wanting to be involved. 1323.97s - 1326.85s | And then they send us an email 1326.85s - 1328.49s | or they see us at a conference and we're just like, 1328.49s - 1330.33s | hey, you seem pretty motivated and driven. 1330.33s - 1332.89s | Here's my contact information, stay in contact with me 1332.89s - 1334.81s | and we'd love to have you volunteer. 1334.81s - 1336.05s | It's worked really well for us, 1336.05s - 1337.77s | but it is kind of more ad hoc. 1337.77s - 1338.81s | So it is difficult, 1338.81s - 1341.85s | but we've tried to do call for volunteers in the past 1341.85s - 1343.25s | and it gets a little bit chaotic 1343.25s - 1345.77s | because what you'll learn is you get a bunch of people 1345.77s - 1347.01s | that just want to get a badge 1347.01s - 1348.77s | and they just want to get access to the event. 1348.77s - 1350.09s | And that's the most difficult thing to do 1350.09s - 1352.17s | is how do we find people that are gonna be dedicated 1352.17s - 1354.01s | and stay in the village and not wander off 1354.01s - 1355.21s | and go do other things 1355.21s - 1357.93s | because we want to ensure we put on a show for you guys. 1357.93s - 1359.33s | We want to make sure you guys can actually come 1359.33s - 1361.37s | and hack a car or come and hack a medical device 1361.37s - 1363.93s | or rip apart an airplane or whatever it might be. 1363.93s - 1366.57s | So yeah, it's definitely a difficult thing to do. 1366.57s - 1368.41s | Call for volunteers is hard. 1368.41s - 1370.45s | I recommend trying to go to more events, 1370.45s - 1372.61s | but


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past 1341.85s - 1343.25s | and it gets a little bit chaotic 1343.25s - 1345.77s | because what you'll learn is you get a bunch of people 1345.77s - 1347.01s | that just want to get a badge 1347.01s - 1348.77s | and they just want to get access to the event. 1348.77s - 1350.09s | And that's the most difficult thing to do 1350.09s - 1352.17s | is how do we find people that are gonna be dedicated 1352.17s - 1354.01s | and stay in the village and not wander off 1354.01s - 1355.21s | and go do other things 1355.21s - 1357.93s | because we want to ensure we put on a show for you guys. 1357.93s - 1359.33s | We want to make sure you guys can actually come 1359.33s - 1361.37s | and hack a car or come and hack a medical device 1361.37s - 1363.93s | or rip apart an airplane or whatever it might be. 1363.93s - 1366.57s | So yeah, it's definitely a difficult thing to do. 1366.57s - 1368.41s | Call for volunteers is hard. 1368.41s - 1370.45s | I recommend trying to go to more events, 1370.45s - 1372.61s | but then that exhausts us all. 1373.61s - 1375.89s | On the exhaustion piece, if nobody's seen me yesterday, 1375.89s - 1378.13s | I had an IV in my arm, I don't even drink. 1378.13s - 1379.65s | I was just so dead and exhausted 1379.65s - 1381.17s | and didn't eat or dehydrated. 1381.17s - 1383.69s | So yeah, we're all very stubborn, dedicated people 1383.69s - 1384.77s | and we love what we do 1384.77s - 1387.85s | and we're just gonna keep doing it until we can't. 1388.85s - 1393.85s | So we take a similar model to Car Hacking Village. 1394.57s - 1396.21s | We don't do call for volunteers. 1396.21s - 1398.61s | We just get inundated with people 1398.61s - 1401.53s | that hit us up on LinkedIn, Twitter, whatever, 1401.53s - 1402.81s | say, hey, we want to do something. 1402.81s - 1404.89s | Great, come here, talk to us. 1404.89s - 1405.97s | And they don't show. 1405.97s - 1407.73s | And it takes a lot of recycles. 1409.61s - 1410.49s | We have a Justin here that, 1410.49s - 1413.57s | hey, when you have a person that comes up and says,


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then that exhausts us all. 1373.61s - 1375.89s | On the exhaustion piece, if nobody's seen me yesterday, 1375.89s - 1378.13s | I had an IV in my arm, I don't even drink. 1378.13s - 1379.65s | I was just so dead and exhausted 1379.65s - 1381.17s | and didn't eat or dehydrated. 1381.17s - 1383.69s | So yeah, we're all very stubborn, dedicated people 1383.69s - 1384.77s | and we love what we do 1384.77s - 1387.85s | and we're just gonna keep doing it until we can't. 1388.85s - 1393.85s | So we take a similar model to Car Hacking Village. 1394.57s - 1396.21s | We don't do call for volunteers. 1396.21s - 1398.61s | We just get inundated with people 1398.61s - 1401.53s | that hit us up on LinkedIn, Twitter, whatever, 1401.53s - 1402.81s | say, hey, we want to do something. 1402.81s - 1404.89s | Great, come here, talk to us. 1404.89s - 1405.97s | And they don't show. 1405.97s - 1407.73s | And it takes a lot of recycles. 1409.61s - 1410.49s | We have a Justin here that, 1410.49s - 1413.57s | hey, when you have a person that comes up and says, 1413.57s - 1415.57s | I really want to help out here. 1415.57s - 1416.41s | Fantastic. 1417.05s - 1418.13s | Now you approached me. 1418.13s - 1419.49s | Now you volunteered. 1419.49s - 1421.01s | Now let's go do this. 1421.01s - 1422.01s | It may or may not work out, 1422.01s - 1423.93s | but tell you what, we have people, 1423.93s - 1424.89s | I'll be doing this 11 years. 1424.89s - 1426.97s | We still have people from 10, 11 years ago 1426.97s - 1428.09s | that come around. 1429.49s - 1430.49s | Hey, how can I help? 1430.49s - 1432.81s | They're not involved anymore officially, 1432.81s - 1434.13s | but how can we help? 1434.13s - 1434.97s | What can we do? 1434.97s - 1436.05s | Do you need that stuff moved, set up? 1436.05s - 1437.65s | And we do that. 1437.65s - 1442.65s | The one thing that we struggled with a long time is money. 1443.29s - 1444.13s | Right? 1444.13s - 1448.69s | So Defcon, very, very thankful we get the badges we get, 1448.69s - 1449.53s | but you know what? 1449.53s - 1453.29s | It's going to cost us


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1413.57s - 1415.57s | I really want to help out here. 1415.57s - 1416.41s | Fantastic. 1417.05s - 1418.13s | Now you approached me. 1418.13s - 1419.49s | Now you volunteered. 1419.49s - 1421.01s | Now let's go do this. 1421.01s - 1422.01s | It may or may not work out, 1422.01s - 1423.93s | but tell you what, we have people, 1423.93s - 1424.89s | I'll be doing this 11 years. 1424.89s - 1426.97s | We still have people from 10, 11 years ago 1426.97s - 1428.09s | that come around. 1429.49s - 1430.49s | Hey, how can I help? 1430.49s - 1432.81s | They're not involved anymore officially, 1432.81s - 1434.13s | but how can we help? 1434.13s - 1434.97s | What can we do? 1434.97s - 1436.05s | Do you need that stuff moved, set up? 1436.05s - 1437.65s | And we do that. 1437.65s - 1442.65s | The one thing that we struggled with a long time is money. 1443.29s - 1444.13s | Right? 1444.13s - 1448.69s | So Defcon, very, very thankful we get the badges we get, 1448.69s - 1449.53s | but you know what? 1449.53s - 1453.29s | It's going to cost us almost 40,000 bucks to be here. 1453.29s - 1455.57s | Y'all got $40,000, right? 1455.57s - 1456.41s | Real money. 1456.41s - 1458.25s | This is real money that is coming out of our- 1458.25s - 1459.09s | It's 70. 1461.85s - 1463.61s | The budgets are wild. 1463.61s - 1466.65s | So the one thing that we do now 1466.65s - 1468.89s | is we find sponsors, companies, 1468.89s - 1471.85s | people that want to be involved that pay their own way. 1473.21s - 1474.05s | I'm sorry. 1474.05s - 1475.77s | INL has escape rooms down there. 1475.77s - 1476.61s | Great. 1476.61s - 1477.45s | Bring that stuff. 1477.45s - 1478.27s | You're paying your own way. 1478.27s - 1480.65s | You're a lab, you're a corporation, whatever. 1480.65s - 1483.65s | That 30, 40,000 bucks is just for the village volunteers 1483.65s - 1486.21s | to come here, travel, shipping, stuff like that. 1486.21s - 1490.33s | Our shipping today will be probably three, 4,000 bucks 1490.33s - 1491.17s | going on. 1491.17s - 1492.01s | I don't know what it was coming in. 1492.01s - 1492.85s | We didn't get the bill yet, 1492.85s


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almost 40,000 bucks to be here. 1453.29s - 1455.57s | Y'all got $40,000, right? 1455.57s - 1456.41s | Real money. 1456.41s - 1458.25s | This is real money that is coming out of our- 1458.25s - 1459.09s | It's 70. 1461.85s - 1463.61s | The budgets are wild. 1463.61s - 1466.65s | So the one thing that we do now 1466.65s - 1468.89s | is we find sponsors, companies, 1468.89s - 1471.85s | people that want to be involved that pay their own way. 1473.21s - 1474.05s | I'm sorry. 1474.05s - 1475.77s | INL has escape rooms down there. 1475.77s - 1476.61s | Great. 1476.61s - 1477.45s | Bring that stuff. 1477.45s - 1478.27s | You're paying your own way. 1478.27s - 1480.65s | You're a lab, you're a corporation, whatever. 1480.65s - 1483.65s | That 30, 40,000 bucks is just for the village volunteers 1483.65s - 1486.21s | to come here, travel, shipping, stuff like that. 1486.21s - 1490.33s | Our shipping today will be probably three, 4,000 bucks 1490.33s - 1491.17s | going on. 1491.17s - 1492.01s | I don't know what it was coming in. 1492.01s - 1492.85s | We didn't get the bill yet, 1492.85s - 1495.25s | but it's real money. 1495.25s - 1496.09s | Real money. 1496.09s - 1497.89s | And it used to come out of our own pockets. 1497.89s - 1501.69s | Now we get sponsors and stuff to do this, 1501.69s - 1504.77s | but I saw you got a tractor trailer down there. 1504.77s - 1506.01s | I bet you that was expensive. 1506.01s - 1508.61s | Even if they donated it, there's still a cost there. 1508.61s - 1510.05s | There's hours of coordination. 1510.05s - 1511.73s | There's time, there's effort. 1511.73s - 1513.69s | And you probably have a real job, right? 1513.69s - 1514.53s | Oh yeah. 1514.53s - 1515.37s | Yeah. 1515.37s - 1517.57s | And Nina, you work too, don't you? 1517.57s - 1518.57s | I think so. 1518.57s - 1519.57s | Yeah, all right. 1519.57s - 1524.29s | So we have probably thousands of hours 1524.29s - 1526.09s | between all of us leading up to this event 1526.09s - 1529.53s | starting next week for next year. 1529.53s - 1530.77s | And hopefully you invite us back next year 1530.81s - 1531.81s | because if not, we're gonna be really pissed


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- 1495.25s | but it's real money. 1495.25s - 1496.09s | Real money. 1496.09s - 1497.89s | And it used to come out of our own pockets. 1497.89s - 1501.69s | Now we get sponsors and stuff to do this, 1501.69s - 1504.77s | but I saw you got a tractor trailer down there. 1504.77s - 1506.01s | I bet you that was expensive. 1506.01s - 1508.61s | Even if they donated it, there's still a cost there. 1508.61s - 1510.05s | There's hours of coordination. 1510.05s - 1511.73s | There's time, there's effort. 1511.73s - 1513.69s | And you probably have a real job, right? 1513.69s - 1514.53s | Oh yeah. 1514.53s - 1515.37s | Yeah. 1515.37s - 1517.57s | And Nina, you work too, don't you? 1517.57s - 1518.57s | I think so. 1518.57s - 1519.57s | Yeah, all right. 1519.57s - 1524.29s | So we have probably thousands of hours 1524.29s - 1526.09s | between all of us leading up to this event 1526.09s - 1529.53s | starting next week for next year. 1529.53s - 1530.77s | And hopefully you invite us back next year 1530.81s - 1531.81s | because if not, we're gonna be really pissed 1531.81s - 1533.25s | if we start planning for next year 1533.25s - 1534.53s | and you don't invite us. 1536.37s - 1539.93s | But yeah, anybody wants to get involved, 1539.93s - 1541.17s | I'd highly recommend getting involved. 1541.17s - 1543.89s | A couple of years ago, we brought in the maritime. 1543.89s - 1545.73s | So wave. 1545.73s - 1546.69s | I see you guys back there. 1546.69s - 1547.53s | There you go. 1550.41s - 1552.61s | Maritime folks join ICSY 1552.61s - 1555.21s | because it's a floating control system, isn't it? 1556.13s - 1558.93s | So we have a lot of really, really, really cool stuff there, 1558.93s - 1560.93s | but we can't come here without people saying, 1560.93s - 1562.81s | hey, I wanted to do that, this or that, 1562.81s - 1564.61s | and I wanna help, I wanna volunteer. 1564.61s - 1565.81s | And it could be raising money. 1565.81s - 1567.37s | It could be maintaining a website. 1567.37s - 1571.49s | It could be moving those boxes from A to B. 1571.49s - 1576.29s | So come down, talk, and we'll get you involved. 1577.85s - 1578.97s |


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1531.81s - 1533.25s | if we start planning for next year 1533.25s - 1534.53s | and you don't invite us. 1536.37s - 1539.93s | But yeah, anybody wants to get involved, 1539.93s - 1541.17s | I'd highly recommend getting involved. 1541.17s - 1543.89s | A couple of years ago, we brought in the maritime. 1543.89s - 1545.73s | So wave. 1545.73s - 1546.69s | I see you guys back there. 1546.69s - 1547.53s | There you go. 1550.41s - 1552.61s | Maritime folks join ICSY 1552.61s - 1555.21s | because it's a floating control system, isn't it? 1556.13s - 1558.93s | So we have a lot of really, really, really cool stuff there, 1558.93s - 1560.93s | but we can't come here without people saying, 1560.93s - 1562.81s | hey, I wanted to do that, this or that, 1562.81s - 1564.61s | and I wanna help, I wanna volunteer. 1564.61s - 1565.81s | And it could be raising money. 1565.81s - 1567.37s | It could be maintaining a website. 1567.37s - 1571.49s | It could be moving those boxes from A to B. 1571.49s - 1576.29s | So come down, talk, and we'll get you involved. 1577.85s - 1578.97s | I just wanna reframe real quick. 1578.97s - 1583.53s | How many of you are, this is your first DEF CON. 1583.53s - 1586.21s | How many of you have gone to all the villages 1586.21s - 1587.61s | or seen all the villages? 1587.61s - 1589.53s | There's a lot of villages. 1589.57s - 1591.69s | I just wanted to see, okay. 1591.69s - 1592.53s | Oh, I was just gonna say, 1592.53s - 1593.53s | like agreeing with Justin too, 1593.53s - 1595.89s | with like actually going up at an event, 1595.89s - 1597.29s | I think some of the best volunteers 1597.29s - 1599.41s | that we kind of get out of DEF CON 1599.41s - 1601.01s | are the ones that either one, 1601.01s - 1602.41s | they never even sign up for a call for volunteer. 1602.41s - 1603.77s | They just offer to help. 1603.77s - 1606.09s | And they're the one who ends up staying like the entire time 1606.09s - 1608.29s | and they end up being like a long-term volunteer. 1608.29s - 1610.57s | And it's so helpful to help like delegate out tasks 1610.57s - 1612.61s | with like


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I just wanna reframe real quick. 1578.97s - 1583.53s | How many of you are, this is your first DEF CON. 1583.53s - 1586.21s | How many of you have gone to all the villages 1586.21s - 1587.61s | or seen all the villages? 1587.61s - 1589.53s | There's a lot of villages. 1589.57s - 1591.69s | I just wanted to see, okay. 1591.69s - 1592.53s | Oh, I was just gonna say, 1592.53s - 1593.53s | like agreeing with Justin too, 1593.53s - 1595.89s | with like actually going up at an event, 1595.89s - 1597.29s | I think some of the best volunteers 1597.29s - 1599.41s | that we kind of get out of DEF CON 1599.41s - 1601.01s | are the ones that either one, 1601.01s - 1602.41s | they never even sign up for a call for volunteer. 1602.41s - 1603.77s | They just offer to help. 1603.77s - 1606.09s | And they're the one who ends up staying like the entire time 1606.09s - 1608.29s | and they end up being like a long-term volunteer. 1608.29s - 1610.57s | And it's so helpful to help like delegate out tasks 1610.57s - 1612.61s | with like the crowd control and whatnot. 1612.61s - 1615.69s | And then also like people that just have been with us 1615.69s - 1617.49s | from the beginning or like they're on a shift 1617.49s - 1620.01s | and then they notice people aren't showing up to volunteer 1620.01s - 1621.13s | and then they end up sticking around. 1621.13s - 1622.37s | Like, it's so helpful to us 1622.37s - 1623.69s | to be able to put the village together 1623.69s - 1626.53s | because I think people don't realize how stressful it is. 1626.53s - 1627.65s | Like all of us leading up, 1627.65s - 1629.65s | like everyone probably wants to kill each other, 1629.65s - 1633.13s | like leading up to DEF CON, but we all love each other. 1633.13s - 1634.37s | Yeah. 1634.37s - 1636.49s | I think going kind of off of what Tom was talking about 1636.49s - 1638.61s | with the logistics of getting things here 1638.61s - 1640.73s | and doing, you know, bringing a tractor here. 1640.73s - 1642.61s | So we've been trying to do this tractor trailer 1642.61s - 1644.73s | or this tractor for the last three


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the crowd control and whatnot. 1612.61s - 1615.69s | And then also like people that just have been with us 1615.69s - 1617.49s | from the beginning or like they're on a shift 1617.49s - 1620.01s | and then they notice people aren't showing up to volunteer 1620.01s - 1621.13s | and then they end up sticking around. 1621.13s - 1622.37s | Like, it's so helpful to us 1622.37s - 1623.69s | to be able to put the village together 1623.69s - 1626.53s | because I think people don't realize how stressful it is. 1626.53s - 1627.65s | Like all of us leading up, 1627.65s - 1629.65s | like everyone probably wants to kill each other, 1629.65s - 1633.13s | like leading up to DEF CON, but we all love each other. 1633.13s - 1634.37s | Yeah. 1634.37s - 1636.49s | I think going kind of off of what Tom was talking about 1636.49s - 1638.61s | with the logistics of getting things here 1638.61s - 1640.73s | and doing, you know, bringing a tractor here. 1640.73s - 1642.61s | So we've been trying to do this tractor trailer 1642.61s - 1644.73s | or this tractor for the last three years. 1644.73s - 1648.61s | It's last year they pulled out two weeks before. 1648.61s - 1651.29s | So we had everything planned, we had everything ready to go. 1651.29s - 1652.69s | We worked with them, you know, 1652.69s - 1655.21s | we figured out we can get the vehicle in and everything. 1655.21s - 1658.21s | And the company was like, nope, cold feet and left. 1658.21s - 1660.37s | So we have to really quickly in two weeks figure out, 1660.37s - 1661.73s | okay, how do we bring another vehicle in? 1661.73s - 1662.57s | How do we do all this? 1662.57s - 1664.25s | So there's a lot of complexity 1664.25s - 1666.29s | and logistics that go on behind the scenes 1666.29s - 1668.77s | to ensure that there's actually a tractor here. 1668.77s - 1670.57s | So this year we're really happy to have one. 1670.57s - 1671.53s | And the company that brought it 1671.53s - 1674.21s | actually gave us their diagnostics laptop as well. 1674.21s - 1676.33s | And they said, have fun with it, do whatever you want. 1676.33s - 1678.25s | We're shredding it in a machine when


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years. 1644.73s - 1648.61s | It's last year they pulled out two weeks before. 1648.61s - 1651.29s | So we had everything planned, we had everything ready to go. 1651.29s - 1652.69s | We worked with them, you know, 1652.69s - 1655.21s | we figured out we can get the vehicle in and everything. 1655.21s - 1658.21s | And the company was like, nope, cold feet and left. 1658.21s - 1660.37s | So we have to really quickly in two weeks figure out, 1660.37s - 1661.73s | okay, how do we bring another vehicle in? 1661.73s - 1662.57s | How do we do all this? 1662.57s - 1664.25s | So there's a lot of complexity 1664.25s - 1666.29s | and logistics that go on behind the scenes 1666.29s - 1668.77s | to ensure that there's actually a tractor here. 1668.77s - 1670.57s | So this year we're really happy to have one. 1670.57s - 1671.53s | And the company that brought it 1671.53s - 1674.21s | actually gave us their diagnostics laptop as well. 1674.21s - 1676.33s | And they said, have fun with it, do whatever you want. 1676.33s - 1678.25s | We're shredding it in a machine when it's done. 1678.25s - 1680.53s | So you guys can have fun. 1680.53s - 1682.73s | So it's really cool to see the progress 1682.73s - 1683.93s | that's happened over the years 1683.93s - 1686.49s | and the fact that now these companies are this open 1686.49s - 1687.97s | and willing to work with us 1687.97s - 1690.09s | and actually willing to give us their diagnostics laptop. 1690.09s - 1691.69s | I think that's wild, but yeah, 1691.69s - 1694.69s | it's a lot of logistics going on behind the scenes. 1694.69s - 1698.13s | That makes me really glad that at BTV we have swag. 1698.13s - 1701.85s | Like that's our shipping, nothing crazy, just swag. 1701.85s - 1704.45s | We had a semi-truck, a Rivian, and a Tesla. 1704.45s - 1709.45s | So the Rivian was driven here, the semi-truck, it was SIA. 1709.73s - 1712.81s | So if anybody knows S-A-I-A, they're all over the US. 1712.81s - 1715.57s | So it wasn't really hard for them to pick a truck out 1715.57s - 1719.69s | and get it here, but yeah, it's a lot of logistics going on. 1719.69s - 1721.05s |


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it's done. 1678.25s - 1680.53s | So you guys can have fun. 1680.53s - 1682.73s | So it's really cool to see the progress 1682.73s - 1683.93s | that's happened over the years 1683.93s - 1686.49s | and the fact that now these companies are this open 1686.49s - 1687.97s | and willing to work with us 1687.97s - 1690.09s | and actually willing to give us their diagnostics laptop. 1690.09s - 1691.69s | I think that's wild, but yeah, 1691.69s - 1694.69s | it's a lot of logistics going on behind the scenes. 1694.69s - 1698.13s | That makes me really glad that at BTV we have swag. 1698.13s - 1701.85s | Like that's our shipping, nothing crazy, just swag. 1701.85s - 1704.45s | We had a semi-truck, a Rivian, and a Tesla. 1704.45s - 1709.45s | So the Rivian was driven here, the semi-truck, it was SIA. 1709.73s - 1712.81s | So if anybody knows S-A-I-A, they're all over the US. 1712.81s - 1715.57s | So it wasn't really hard for them to pick a truck out 1715.57s - 1719.69s | and get it here, but yeah, it's a lot of logistics going on. 1719.69s - 1721.05s | So I think one of the common law things 1721.05s - 1722.01s | that we all do with each other 1722.01s - 1723.45s | is we have chat groups with each other. 1723.45s - 1725.57s | And when something happens, it's, did you see this? 1725.57s - 1726.41s | How's it affecting you? 1726.41s - 1727.33s | How's it affecting me? 1727.33s - 1729.61s | How do we do the things? 1729.61s - 1732.81s | And so I'm like you now, I lost my train of thought. 1732.81s - 1735.01s | That always results in Nina calling us. 1735.01s - 1737.69s | I do call a lot of people. 1737.69s - 1739.65s | Hody's up here like, it's really weird 1739.65s - 1741.57s | that all the villages are now asking the same question 1741.57s - 1742.81s | at the same time. 1742.81s - 1744.77s | I know their call has occurred as soon as I start, 1744.77s - 1746.81s | we all, you know, Pedro and I start getting hit up 1746.81s - 1750.05s | by all of you at the same time with the exact same question. 1750.05s - 1751.57s | I don't know why they keep doing


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So I think one of the common law things 1721.05s - 1722.01s | that we all do with each other 1722.01s - 1723.45s | is we have chat groups with each other. 1723.45s - 1725.57s | And when something happens, it's, did you see this? 1725.57s - 1726.41s | How's it affecting you? 1726.41s - 1727.33s | How's it affecting me? 1727.33s - 1729.61s | How do we do the things? 1729.61s - 1732.81s | And so I'm like you now, I lost my train of thought. 1732.81s - 1735.01s | That always results in Nina calling us. 1735.01s - 1737.69s | I do call a lot of people. 1737.69s - 1739.65s | Hody's up here like, it's really weird 1739.65s - 1741.57s | that all the villages are now asking the same question 1741.57s - 1742.81s | at the same time. 1742.81s - 1744.77s | I know their call has occurred as soon as I start, 1744.77s - 1746.81s | we all, you know, Pedro and I start getting hit up 1746.81s - 1750.05s | by all of you at the same time with the exact same question. 1750.05s - 1751.57s | I don't know why they keep doing this. 1751.57s - 1753.97s | We're still ganged up on like all the time. 1753.97s - 1754.85s | We actually do like them. 1754.85s - 1755.69s | They're great people. 1755.69s - 1756.57s | Thank you for what you do. 1756.57s - 1758.61s | Another interesting perspective I'll help you guys 1758.61s - 1760.81s | understand and don't kick me for this one, 1760.81s - 1762.49s | but Defcon pays us nothing. 1762.49s - 1764.05s | They give us nothing. 1764.05s - 1766.13s | All they did this year, which was really awesome. 1766.13s - 1767.29s | They gave us hotel rooms. 1767.29s - 1768.69s | I really appreciated that. 1768.69s - 1770.85s | And that was something new that they did. 1770.85s - 1773.05s | So it's nice to see that Pedro and Hody 1773.05s - 1774.89s | are actually trying to take care of us more. 1774.89s - 1776.45s | In previous years, it's kind of been like, 1776.45s - 1777.89s | hey, call for villages. 1777.89s - 1778.81s | Cool, do your own thing. 1778.81s - 1780.09s | Come on in. 1780.09s - 1782.33s | So it's nice to see that Defcon as an organization 1782.33s -


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this. 1751.57s - 1753.97s | We're still ganged up on like all the time. 1753.97s - 1754.85s | We actually do like them. 1754.85s - 1755.69s | They're great people. 1755.69s - 1756.57s | Thank you for what you do. 1756.57s - 1758.61s | Another interesting perspective I'll help you guys 1758.61s - 1760.81s | understand and don't kick me for this one, 1760.81s - 1762.49s | but Defcon pays us nothing. 1762.49s - 1764.05s | They give us nothing. 1764.05s - 1766.13s | All they did this year, which was really awesome. 1766.13s - 1767.29s | They gave us hotel rooms. 1767.29s - 1768.69s | I really appreciated that. 1768.69s - 1770.85s | And that was something new that they did. 1770.85s - 1773.05s | So it's nice to see that Pedro and Hody 1773.05s - 1774.89s | are actually trying to take care of us more. 1774.89s - 1776.45s | In previous years, it's kind of been like, 1776.45s - 1777.89s | hey, call for villages. 1777.89s - 1778.81s | Cool, do your own thing. 1778.81s - 1780.09s | Come on in. 1780.09s - 1782.33s | So it's nice to see that Defcon as an organization 1782.33s - 1784.77s | is actually caring about what we're bringing 1784.77s - 1787.41s | and what we're doing and trying to bring some value back 1787.45s - 1789.01s | to us to help with what we're doing. 1789.01s - 1790.53s | So sorry about that. 1790.53s - 1791.37s | No, you're good. 1791.37s - 1792.29s | He just whispered to me to be nice. 1792.29s - 1793.49s | I am gonna be nice. 1793.49s - 1794.33s | Let me. 1796.61s - 1799.61s | So I think a good thing, 1799.61s - 1801.77s | and it's not in a perfect state yet, right? 1802.65s - 1804.57s | Well, I will say on the sponsorship side, 1804.57s - 1808.41s | Pedro and I, we started getting a little bit more recognition 1808.41s - 1809.73s | in some of the other places that we go. 1809.73s - 1811.09s | People are coming up to us. 1811.09s - 1812.89s | Our networks are saying, hey, Pedro and Hody, 1812.89s - 1814.73s | they're the village leads. 1814.73s - 1816.45s | We've had a couple sponsors walk up to us 1816.45s - 1818.21s | or people from different companies saying, 1818.21s - 1819.89s | hey, we


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1784.77s | is actually caring about what we're bringing 1784.77s - 1787.41s | and what we're doing and trying to bring some value back 1787.45s - 1789.01s | to us to help with what we're doing. 1789.01s - 1790.53s | So sorry about that. 1790.53s - 1791.37s | No, you're good. 1791.37s - 1792.29s | He just whispered to me to be nice. 1792.29s - 1793.49s | I am gonna be nice. 1793.49s - 1794.33s | Let me. 1796.61s - 1799.61s | So I think a good thing, 1799.61s - 1801.77s | and it's not in a perfect state yet, right? 1802.65s - 1804.57s | Well, I will say on the sponsorship side, 1804.57s - 1808.41s | Pedro and I, we started getting a little bit more recognition 1808.41s - 1809.73s | in some of the other places that we go. 1809.73s - 1811.09s | People are coming up to us. 1811.09s - 1812.89s | Our networks are saying, hey, Pedro and Hody, 1812.89s - 1814.73s | they're the village leads. 1814.73s - 1816.45s | We've had a couple sponsors walk up to us 1816.45s - 1818.21s | or people from different companies saying, 1818.21s - 1819.89s | hey, we would like to sponsor a village. 1819.89s - 1822.85s | So we've tried to marry some of that stuff up. 1822.85s - 1825.25s | I will say that I think a couple of them worked out 1825.25s - 1826.13s | and a few of them didn't, 1826.13s - 1827.49s | but we're always trying to do that. 1827.49s - 1830.49s | I know Kevin from Defcon is definitely trying to do that. 1830.49s - 1832.33s | I think this is a little bit of a weird year 1832.33s - 1835.37s | with the Audible moving from Caesars to LVCC. 1835.37s - 1837.21s | I think that there was a little bit of gun shyness 1837.21s - 1838.05s | on some of those sides. 1838.05s - 1840.69s | So I think that we can definitely do a much better job 1840.69s - 1841.65s | for you guys. 1841.65s - 1844.69s | I'm hoping after this year that we get back on track 1844.69s - 1845.53s | with some of it. 1846.73s - 1848.29s | He mentioned the hotel rooms. 1848.29s - 1853.29s | So there is basically a fund that comes in through, 1854.97s - 1856.93s | I don't know if


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would like to sponsor a village. 1819.89s - 1822.85s | So we've tried to marry some of that stuff up. 1822.85s - 1825.25s | I will say that I think a couple of them worked out 1825.25s - 1826.13s | and a few of them didn't, 1826.13s - 1827.49s | but we're always trying to do that. 1827.49s - 1830.49s | I know Kevin from Defcon is definitely trying to do that. 1830.49s - 1832.33s | I think this is a little bit of a weird year 1832.33s - 1835.37s | with the Audible moving from Caesars to LVCC. 1835.37s - 1837.21s | I think that there was a little bit of gun shyness 1837.21s - 1838.05s | on some of those sides. 1838.05s - 1840.69s | So I think that we can definitely do a much better job 1840.69s - 1841.65s | for you guys. 1841.65s - 1844.69s | I'm hoping after this year that we get back on track 1844.69s - 1845.53s | with some of it. 1846.73s - 1848.29s | He mentioned the hotel rooms. 1848.29s - 1853.29s | So there is basically a fund that comes in through, 1854.97s - 1856.93s | I don't know if I'm allowed to say it. 1856.93s - 1858.33s | We get a fund basically. 1860.61s - 1862.25s | We get a fund of money, right? 1862.25s - 1865.49s | And it's decided on how it's easiest to divvy it out. 1865.49s - 1867.17s | Previously, we had done some stuff with them 1867.17s - 1870.01s | where we were able to supply them funds for food 1870.01s - 1870.85s | during the con, 1870.85s - 1872.25s | because that's, I know, a major pain point for them 1872.25s - 1874.21s | because they're stuck inside of a village. 1874.21s - 1876.65s | Food is 10 miles away 1876.65s - 1878.73s | because we're stuck inside of a convention center 1878.73s - 1880.01s | and you're not allowed to bring outside food 1880.01s - 1881.53s | and drink inside. 1881.53s - 1885.23s | So that was a pain point we tried to help alleviate. 1886.77s - 1888.73s | This year, I thought we were doing it again, 1888.73s - 1889.57s | but I was told not. 1889.57s - 1891.49s | So we got hotel rooms for you guys. 1891.49s - 1894.57s | And once again, Pedro and I are pushing 1894.57s


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I'm allowed to say it. 1856.93s - 1858.33s | We get a fund basically. 1860.61s - 1862.25s | We get a fund of money, right? 1862.25s - 1865.49s | And it's decided on how it's easiest to divvy it out. 1865.49s - 1867.17s | Previously, we had done some stuff with them 1867.17s - 1870.01s | where we were able to supply them funds for food 1870.01s - 1870.85s | during the con, 1870.85s - 1872.25s | because that's, I know, a major pain point for them 1872.25s - 1874.21s | because they're stuck inside of a village. 1874.21s - 1876.65s | Food is 10 miles away 1876.65s - 1878.73s | because we're stuck inside of a convention center 1878.73s - 1880.01s | and you're not allowed to bring outside food 1880.01s - 1881.53s | and drink inside. 1881.53s - 1885.23s | So that was a pain point we tried to help alleviate. 1886.77s - 1888.73s | This year, I thought we were doing it again, 1888.73s - 1889.57s | but I was told not. 1889.57s - 1891.49s | So we got hotel rooms for you guys. 1891.49s - 1894.57s | And once again, Pedro and I are pushing 1894.57s - 1897.73s | for better execution on a lot of these things. 1897.73s - 1900.85s | We had everything set up and we had a different timeline 1900.85s - 1903.53s | than what we were given at the end of the day. 1903.53s - 1906.89s | So we're always pushing and trying to drive 1906.89s - 1910.57s | towards getting you guys as much information as possible. 1910.57s - 1913.13s | That way, it's easier for you to plan and execute on things. 1913.13s - 1914.29s | That way, you're also not spending money 1914.29s - 1916.25s | on something that we're gonna hopefully provide to you 1916.25s - 1917.49s | type deal as well. 1918.73s - 1919.57s | But yeah. 1920.45s - 1921.89s | I had a question for everybody here. 1921.89s - 1922.73s | Can I go real quick? 1922.73s - 1924.29s | Yeah. 1924.29s - 1925.13s | Great. 1926.33s - 1930.97s | So this is a point of admiration for real. 1931.93s - 1933.25s | I've done this for 10 years, right? 1934.13s - 1936.41s | I think two years ago when you took over, was it two? 1936.41s - 1937.25s | Pedro and I took over.


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- 1897.73s | for better execution on a lot of these things. 1897.73s - 1900.85s | We had everything set up and we had a different timeline 1900.85s - 1903.53s | than what we were given at the end of the day. 1903.53s - 1906.89s | So we're always pushing and trying to drive 1906.89s - 1910.57s | towards getting you guys as much information as possible. 1910.57s - 1913.13s | That way, it's easier for you to plan and execute on things. 1913.13s - 1914.29s | That way, you're also not spending money 1914.29s - 1916.25s | on something that we're gonna hopefully provide to you 1916.25s - 1917.49s | type deal as well. 1918.73s - 1919.57s | But yeah. 1920.45s - 1921.89s | I had a question for everybody here. 1921.89s - 1922.73s | Can I go real quick? 1922.73s - 1924.29s | Yeah. 1924.29s - 1925.13s | Great. 1926.33s - 1930.97s | So this is a point of admiration for real. 1931.93s - 1933.25s | I've done this for 10 years, right? 1934.13s - 1936.41s | I think two years ago when you took over, was it two? 1936.41s - 1937.25s | Pedro and I took over. 1937.25s - 1938.09s | Yeah. 1938.09s - 1940.61s | I had so many long discussions with them 1940.61s - 1945.61s | because I am really, village building is my passion. 1945.93s - 1949.09s | So, so many conversations with both of them to be like, 1949.09s - 1952.25s | this is how we as a group like to do the things. 1952.25s - 1954.05s | This is how we need timelines. 1954.05s - 1956.49s | We need help doing this, whatever, whatever, whatever. 1956.49s - 1958.01s | And they actually listened, 1958.01s - 1962.81s | which from the large Defcon Corporation moment perspective, 1962.85s - 1963.77s | super helpful. 1963.77s - 1966.49s | So for me, at least this year, it was, 1967.57s - 1970.05s | honestly, this is the best year for the biohacking village. 1970.05s - 1971.13s | I hardly had to do anything 1971.13s - 1973.69s | because it was so well executed. 1973.69s - 1976.13s | So that's good for you. 1976.13s - 1976.97s | I would agree. 1976.97s - 1978.97s | Even with changing facilities and buildings 1978.97s - 1980.21s | and all that chaos that happened, 1980.21s - 1981.89s | you guys still smoothed


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1937.25s - 1938.09s | Yeah. 1938.09s - 1940.61s | I had so many long discussions with them 1940.61s - 1945.61s | because I am really, village building is my passion. 1945.93s - 1949.09s | So, so many conversations with both of them to be like, 1949.09s - 1952.25s | this is how we as a group like to do the things. 1952.25s - 1954.05s | This is how we need timelines. 1954.05s - 1956.49s | We need help doing this, whatever, whatever, whatever. 1956.49s - 1958.01s | And they actually listened, 1958.01s - 1962.81s | which from the large Defcon Corporation moment perspective, 1962.85s - 1963.77s | super helpful. 1963.77s - 1966.49s | So for me, at least this year, it was, 1967.57s - 1970.05s | honestly, this is the best year for the biohacking village. 1970.05s - 1971.13s | I hardly had to do anything 1971.13s - 1973.69s | because it was so well executed. 1973.69s - 1976.13s | So that's good for you. 1976.13s - 1976.97s | I would agree. 1976.97s - 1978.97s | Even with changing facilities and buildings 1978.97s - 1980.21s | and all that chaos that happened, 1980.21s - 1981.89s | you guys still smoothed it out 1981.89s - 1983.01s | and made it pretty easy for us. 1983.01s - 1985.17s | So yeah, big kudos to you guys for that. 1985.17s - 1988.01s | I'll have you guys know that like in January, February, 1988.01s - 1991.37s | Pedro and I had everything laid out, mapped out, 1991.37s - 1993.49s | every process, every system. 1993.49s - 1995.97s | And then, you know, we get a phone call of, hey, stop. 1995.97s - 1996.81s | And- 1996.81s - 1998.13s | Right, that's a good point 1998.13s - 2001.85s | because all of us were planning for whatever it was. 2001.85s - 2003.81s | All of us were planning for other hotels 2003.81s - 2004.93s | and we were super invested 2004.93s - 2006.89s | because we knew the blueprints, we were there. 2006.89s - 2009.65s | And then suddenly it was like, fuck you, Defcon changed. 2009.65s - 2011.09s | It's like, oh God, what to wear? 2011.09s - 2012.49s | What are we doing now? 2012.49s - 2013.33s | And then it was- 2013.33s - 2014.85s | Our messaging was softer than that, 2014.85s - 2015.85s | just so you're aware. 2017.37s -


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it out 1981.89s - 1983.01s | and made it pretty easy for us. 1983.01s - 1985.17s | So yeah, big kudos to you guys for that. 1985.17s - 1988.01s | I'll have you guys know that like in January, February, 1988.01s - 1991.37s | Pedro and I had everything laid out, mapped out, 1991.37s - 1993.49s | every process, every system. 1993.49s - 1995.97s | And then, you know, we get a phone call of, hey, stop. 1995.97s - 1996.81s | And- 1996.81s - 1998.13s | Right, that's a good point 1998.13s - 2001.85s | because all of us were planning for whatever it was. 2001.85s - 2003.81s | All of us were planning for other hotels 2003.81s - 2004.93s | and we were super invested 2004.93s - 2006.89s | because we knew the blueprints, we were there. 2006.89s - 2009.65s | And then suddenly it was like, fuck you, Defcon changed. 2009.65s - 2011.09s | It's like, oh God, what to wear? 2011.09s - 2012.49s | What are we doing now? 2012.49s - 2013.33s | And then it was- 2013.33s - 2014.85s | Our messaging was softer than that, 2014.85s - 2015.85s | just so you're aware. 2017.37s - 2019.49s | And it was all of us going, well, where are we gonna be? 2019.49s - 2020.33s | What are we gonna do? 2020.33s - 2021.17s | How are we shipping? 2021.81s - 2022.65s | What's the cost? 2022.65s - 2023.49s | What are we doing? 2023.49s - 2024.33s | I know this is recorded. 2024.33s - 2026.49s | I curse a lot, everybody knows. 2026.49s - 2029.49s | So it was, I think you softened it, yes. 2029.49s - 2030.93s | And I think the transition to this year 2030.93s - 2033.65s | was a lot easier than I thought it was going to be. 2033.65s - 2035.33s | I honestly felt so bad for both of you. 2035.33s - 2036.65s | When I saw that, I was like, oh my God, 2036.65s - 2037.49s | they're gonna be slammed. 2037.49s - 2039.85s | So we were, Blue Team Village is pretty organized. 2039.85s - 2041.01s | I mean, like, I like to joke 2041.01s - 2042.17s | that we're the most organized village 2042.17s - 2044.61s | because Blue Teamers are the people that have jobs 2044.61s - 2046.25s | and, you know, are professionals. 2046.25s -


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2019.49s | And it was all of us going, well, where are we gonna be? 2019.49s - 2020.33s | What are we gonna do? 2020.33s - 2021.17s | How are we shipping? 2021.81s - 2022.65s | What's the cost? 2022.65s - 2023.49s | What are we doing? 2023.49s - 2024.33s | I know this is recorded. 2024.33s - 2026.49s | I curse a lot, everybody knows. 2026.49s - 2029.49s | So it was, I think you softened it, yes. 2029.49s - 2030.93s | And I think the transition to this year 2030.93s - 2033.65s | was a lot easier than I thought it was going to be. 2033.65s - 2035.33s | I honestly felt so bad for both of you. 2035.33s - 2036.65s | When I saw that, I was like, oh my God, 2036.65s - 2037.49s | they're gonna be slammed. 2037.49s - 2039.85s | So we were, Blue Team Village is pretty organized. 2039.85s - 2041.01s | I mean, like, I like to joke 2041.01s - 2042.17s | that we're the most organized village 2042.17s - 2044.61s | because Blue Teamers are the people that have jobs 2044.61s - 2046.25s | and, you know, are professionals. 2046.25s - 2047.57s | I don't have a job. 2047.65s - 2049.25s | I don't have a job. 2050.69s - 2052.09s | Them's fighting words, yeah. 2054.73s - 2056.37s | Tell that to my employer, please. 2057.89s - 2059.13s | So I do have a question. 2059.13s - 2059.97s | No, no, I'm not done yet. 2059.97s - 2060.81s | Hang on, hang on, hang on. 2060.81s - 2062.17s | You're gonna give me a job? 2063.33s - 2064.25s | You can interview with me. 2064.25s - 2065.09s | We'll see how it goes. 2065.09s - 2065.93s | It'll be fine. 2066.97s - 2070.81s | But I think, wait, I was going somewhere with that one. 2070.81s - 2073.89s | I think you made me, it was my turn to pause. 2073.89s - 2075.57s | I think what I was really getting at was like, 2075.57s - 2077.05s | you know, we're really organized 2077.57s - 2080.01s | and we kind of have this consistent, like, 2080.01s - 2081.81s | way that we do things and whatnot. 2081.81s - 2083.25s | So I was trying, we were trying to do 2083.25s - 2084.65s | as much as possible by ourselves 2084.65s -


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2047.57s | I don't have a job. 2047.65s - 2049.25s | I don't have a job. 2050.69s - 2052.09s | Them's fighting words, yeah. 2054.73s - 2056.37s | Tell that to my employer, please. 2057.89s - 2059.13s | So I do have a question. 2059.13s - 2059.97s | No, no, I'm not done yet. 2059.97s - 2060.81s | Hang on, hang on, hang on. 2060.81s - 2062.17s | You're gonna give me a job? 2063.33s - 2064.25s | You can interview with me. 2064.25s - 2065.09s | We'll see how it goes. 2065.09s - 2065.93s | It'll be fine. 2066.97s - 2070.81s | But I think, wait, I was going somewhere with that one. 2070.81s - 2073.89s | I think you made me, it was my turn to pause. 2073.89s - 2075.57s | I think what I was really getting at was like, 2075.57s - 2077.05s | you know, we're really organized 2077.57s - 2080.01s | and we kind of have this consistent, like, 2080.01s - 2081.81s | way that we do things and whatnot. 2081.81s - 2083.25s | So I was trying, we were trying to do 2083.25s - 2084.65s | as much as possible by ourselves 2084.65s - 2085.61s | and answer our own questions 2085.61s - 2087.37s | and not, like, rely on Honey and Pedro so much 2087.37s - 2089.57s | because we knew that they were getting inundated with stuff. 2089.57s - 2091.73s | So I'm gonna jump on the train of, like, 2091.73s - 2092.73s | you guys are doing a great job. 2092.73s - 2095.53s | So can we actually give Honey and Pedro a round of applause? 2095.53s - 2098.96s | Yeah. 2100.96s - 2104.52s | Pedro's coming up here. 2104.52s - 2105.48s | Pedro. 2105.48s - 2108.60s | I've been waiting all day to say, no, I'm just kidding. 2108.60s - 2111.12s | I just want to say that I picked up a few nuggets 2111.84s - 2112.68s | here and there, and I would just like to start off 2112.68s - 2116.20s | by saying that Honey and I are also not paid by DEF CON. 2116.20s - 2118.32s | We are stipend volunteers. 2118.32s - 2119.60s | So just keep that in mind 2119.60s - 2123.92s | when everybody's asking for meetings nonstop. 2123.92s - 2126.12s | We also have families and lives and work 2126.12s - 2127.16s |


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2085.61s | and answer our own questions 2085.61s - 2087.37s | and not, like, rely on Honey and Pedro so much 2087.37s - 2089.57s | because we knew that they were getting inundated with stuff. 2089.57s - 2091.73s | So I'm gonna jump on the train of, like, 2091.73s - 2092.73s | you guys are doing a great job. 2092.73s - 2095.53s | So can we actually give Honey and Pedro a round of applause? 2095.53s - 2098.96s | Yeah. 2100.96s - 2104.52s | Pedro's coming up here. 2104.52s - 2105.48s | Pedro. 2105.48s - 2108.60s | I've been waiting all day to say, no, I'm just kidding. 2108.60s - 2111.12s | I just want to say that I picked up a few nuggets 2111.84s - 2112.68s | here and there, and I would just like to start off 2112.68s - 2116.20s | by saying that Honey and I are also not paid by DEF CON. 2116.20s - 2118.32s | We are stipend volunteers. 2118.32s - 2119.60s | So just keep that in mind 2119.60s - 2123.92s | when everybody's asking for meetings nonstop. 2123.92s - 2126.12s | We also have families and lives and work 2126.12s - 2127.16s | and et cetera, right? 2127.16s - 2129.48s | I have two dogs that I love dearly. 2129.48s - 2131.12s | My children think that I love my dogs 2131.12s - 2132.48s | more than I love them. 2132.48s - 2133.88s | And sometimes they're right. 2134.88s - 2136.44s | My dogs never talk back. 2137.76s - 2140.40s | Regarding volunteers, a lot of first timers 2140.40s - 2142.16s | always ask, how can I get involved? 2143.28s - 2146.80s | I'd just like to shout out to one of the new 2146.80s - 2147.96s | to be goons next year. 2147.96s - 2149.44s | His name is Irf. 2149.44s - 2151.20s | He showed up early. 2151.20s - 2152.28s | I think it was Tuesday. 2152.28s - 2153.84s | He was like, hey, I'm here. 2153.84s - 2154.84s | Do you guys need anything? 2154.84s - 2157.48s | Helped us just like with loading in, counting badges. 2157.48s - 2160.12s | We had already counted badges at least five times. 2160.12s - 2162.36s | And since he was fresh blood, I was like, okay, 2162.36s - 2163.88s | do me a favor, open these boxes 2163.88s - 2165.28s | and


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and et cetera, right? 2127.16s - 2129.48s | I have two dogs that I love dearly. 2129.48s - 2131.12s | My children think that I love my dogs 2131.12s - 2132.48s | more than I love them. 2132.48s - 2133.88s | And sometimes they're right. 2134.88s - 2136.44s | My dogs never talk back. 2137.76s - 2140.40s | Regarding volunteers, a lot of first timers 2140.40s - 2142.16s | always ask, how can I get involved? 2143.28s - 2146.80s | I'd just like to shout out to one of the new 2146.80s - 2147.96s | to be goons next year. 2147.96s - 2149.44s | His name is Irf. 2149.44s - 2151.20s | He showed up early. 2151.20s - 2152.28s | I think it was Tuesday. 2152.28s - 2153.84s | He was like, hey, I'm here. 2153.84s - 2154.84s | Do you guys need anything? 2154.84s - 2157.48s | Helped us just like with loading in, counting badges. 2157.48s - 2160.12s | We had already counted badges at least five times. 2160.12s - 2162.36s | And since he was fresh blood, I was like, okay, 2162.36s - 2163.88s | do me a favor, open these boxes 2163.88s - 2165.28s | and start counting them one by one. 2165.28s - 2168.20s | We're talking about 930 plus badges. 2169.16s - 2171.48s | Then he was like, hey, if we're done here, 2171.48s - 2172.44s | I'm gonna go check out 2172.44s - 2174.00s | and see if any of the villages need help. 2174.00s - 2174.96s | So next thing I know, 2174.96s - 2177.80s | he's down at Packet Hacking Village running cable. 2177.80s - 2180.00s | That was Tuesday, Wednesday. 2180.00s - 2181.52s | Thursday, he came back to help us. 2181.52s - 2182.56s | And then he was like, okay, cool. 2182.56s - 2183.88s | I'm going back to Packet Hacking. 2183.88s - 2187.60s | So honestly, reaching out via LinkedIn 2187.60s - 2190.76s | and trying to be like, hey, cool, let me in. 2190.76s - 2192.60s | And then never showing up, that's gonna happen. 2192.60s - 2194.16s | But if you really wanna get involved, 2194.16s - 2196.36s | the easiest thing to do is just to show up 2196.36s - 2199.00s | and just be like, I'm here, what do you need? 2199.00s - 2199.84s | The other- 2199.84s - 2201.28s | You said LinkedIn,


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start counting them one by one. 2165.28s - 2168.20s | We're talking about 930 plus badges. 2169.16s - 2171.48s | Then he was like, hey, if we're done here, 2171.48s - 2172.44s | I'm gonna go check out 2172.44s - 2174.00s | and see if any of the villages need help. 2174.00s - 2174.96s | So next thing I know, 2174.96s - 2177.80s | he's down at Packet Hacking Village running cable. 2177.80s - 2180.00s | That was Tuesday, Wednesday. 2180.00s - 2181.52s | Thursday, he came back to help us. 2181.52s - 2182.56s | And then he was like, okay, cool. 2182.56s - 2183.88s | I'm going back to Packet Hacking. 2183.88s - 2187.60s | So honestly, reaching out via LinkedIn 2187.60s - 2190.76s | and trying to be like, hey, cool, let me in. 2190.76s - 2192.60s | And then never showing up, that's gonna happen. 2192.60s - 2194.16s | But if you really wanna get involved, 2194.16s - 2196.36s | the easiest thing to do is just to show up 2196.36s - 2199.00s | and just be like, I'm here, what do you need? 2199.00s - 2199.84s | The other- 2199.84s - 2201.28s | You said LinkedIn, LinkedIn's a big thing. 2201.28s - 2204.24s | Oh, I mean, you can reach out to me on LinkedIn 2204.24s - 2205.68s | if you can find me. 2205.68s - 2208.20s | That's a contest, right? 2208.20s - 2209.52s | The other thing I wanted to mention 2209.52s - 2213.72s | is that I want to say that I picked up a small tidbit 2213.72s - 2215.56s | over at Car Hacking. 2215.56s - 2219.12s | I do vulnerability research in embedded systems. 2219.12s - 2221.20s | And I picked up a small tidbit. 2221.20s - 2224.12s | I'm contemplating buying a car 2224.12s - 2225.24s | and I'm going for the jugular. 2225.24s - 2228.12s | So on Nina's behalf, 2228.12s - 2229.72s | I do think that these manufacturers 2229.72s - 2231.80s | should be working with us 2231.80s - 2233.88s | to try to find these vulnerabilities, 2233.88s - 2235.00s | get them disclosed and patched 2235.00s - 2237.20s | before it ends up in the public consumption. 2237.20s - 2239.08s | And so reaching over to ICS, 2239.08s - 2241.12s | like if you wanna live in the black box, 2241.12s - 2243.00s | people like


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LinkedIn's a big thing. 2201.28s - 2204.24s | Oh, I mean, you can reach out to me on LinkedIn 2204.24s - 2205.68s | if you can find me. 2205.68s - 2208.20s | That's a contest, right? 2208.20s - 2209.52s | The other thing I wanted to mention 2209.52s - 2213.72s | is that I want to say that I picked up a small tidbit 2213.72s - 2215.56s | over at Car Hacking. 2215.56s - 2219.12s | I do vulnerability research in embedded systems. 2219.12s - 2221.20s | And I picked up a small tidbit. 2221.20s - 2224.12s | I'm contemplating buying a car 2224.12s - 2225.24s | and I'm going for the jugular. 2225.24s - 2228.12s | So on Nina's behalf, 2228.12s - 2229.72s | I do think that these manufacturers 2229.72s - 2231.80s | should be working with us 2231.80s - 2233.88s | to try to find these vulnerabilities, 2233.88s - 2235.00s | get them disclosed and patched 2235.00s - 2237.20s | before it ends up in the public consumption. 2237.20s - 2239.08s | And so reaching over to ICS, 2239.08s - 2241.12s | like if you wanna live in the black box, 2241.12s - 2243.00s | people like me are gonna find it. 2243.00s - 2245.12s | I already know what's there. 2245.12s - 2246.24s | I'm not gonna just put it out there 2246.24s - 2249.36s | because I wanna be the first one to go after it. 2249.36s - 2252.04s | So I'm kind of in between Tom and Nina, literally. 2252.96s - 2255.16s | And one of the things we did this year, 2255.16s - 2256.56s | I still have a question I wanna go back to 2256.56s - 2257.56s | that kind of goes into volunteers, 2257.56s - 2260.20s | but one of the things we actually were able to do this year 2260.20s - 2262.92s | is get the auto ISAC out here to help. 2262.92s - 2265.24s | So for those that don't know what an ISAC is, 2265.24s - 2268.04s | it's an information sharing and analysis center. 2268.04s - 2269.04s | They have one for automotive. 2269.04s - 2270.92s | So this is the first year they came out and sponsored 2270.92s - 2273.00s | and actually tried to be a part of DEF CON, 2273.00s - 2274.08s | which normally they're not 2274.08s - 2276.08s | because they're more


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me are gonna find it. 2243.00s - 2245.12s | I already know what's there. 2245.12s - 2246.24s | I'm not gonna just put it out there 2246.24s - 2249.36s | because I wanna be the first one to go after it. 2249.36s - 2252.04s | So I'm kind of in between Tom and Nina, literally. 2252.96s - 2255.16s | And one of the things we did this year, 2255.16s - 2256.56s | I still have a question I wanna go back to 2256.56s - 2257.56s | that kind of goes into volunteers, 2257.56s - 2260.20s | but one of the things we actually were able to do this year 2260.20s - 2262.92s | is get the auto ISAC out here to help. 2262.92s - 2265.24s | So for those that don't know what an ISAC is, 2265.24s - 2268.04s | it's an information sharing and analysis center. 2268.04s - 2269.04s | They have one for automotive. 2269.04s - 2270.92s | So this is the first year they came out and sponsored 2270.92s - 2273.00s | and actually tried to be a part of DEF CON, 2273.00s - 2274.08s | which normally they're not 2274.08s - 2276.08s | because they're more on the blue team and monitoring side 2276.08s - 2277.52s | and trying to fix things. 2277.52s - 2279.56s | But this is one way we're trying to bridge the gaps 2279.56s - 2283.64s | is bringing companies or organizations like that here 2283.64s - 2285.96s | to help when we do find things or we do have issues, 2285.96s - 2287.92s | they can at least work right away with the OEMs 2287.92s - 2289.88s | and submit that to them. 2289.88s - 2290.92s | Yeah, so I just wanted to say that, 2290.92s - 2291.84s | but the question I had, 2291.84s - 2292.76s | and I know we don't have much time 2292.76s - 2295.16s | because I can see that clock back there. 2295.16s - 2297.40s | How many volunteers do you guys all have 2297.40s - 2302.40s | and how do you work with them regarding like times 2302.60s - 2304.68s | and shifts and stuff like that? 2304.68s - 2307.68s | I'll start on my side and then I'll let it go down. 2307.68s - 2310.00s | So on our side, we have 35 volunteers 2310.00s - 2313.12s | and then about 20 other


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on the blue team and monitoring side 2276.08s - 2277.52s | and trying to fix things. 2277.52s - 2279.56s | But this is one way we're trying to bridge the gaps 2279.56s - 2283.64s | is bringing companies or organizations like that here 2283.64s - 2285.96s | to help when we do find things or we do have issues, 2285.96s - 2287.92s | they can at least work right away with the OEMs 2287.92s - 2289.88s | and submit that to them. 2289.88s - 2290.92s | Yeah, so I just wanted to say that, 2290.92s - 2291.84s | but the question I had, 2291.84s - 2292.76s | and I know we don't have much time 2292.76s - 2295.16s | because I can see that clock back there. 2295.16s - 2297.40s | How many volunteers do you guys all have 2297.40s - 2302.40s | and how do you work with them regarding like times 2302.60s - 2304.68s | and shifts and stuff like that? 2304.68s - 2307.68s | I'll start on my side and then I'll let it go down. 2307.68s - 2310.00s | So on our side, we have 35 volunteers 2310.00s - 2313.12s | and then about 20 other sponsors and people that come in. 2313.12s - 2316.28s | So I have about 60 to 70 people I deal with 2316.28s - 2317.12s | throughout this event 2317.12s - 2319.16s | that are always asking me for information. 2319.16s - 2321.24s | How do they need this or need that? 2321.24s - 2323.08s | And what time do they have to be at places? 2323.08s - 2324.80s | So outside of the logistics of planning 2324.80s - 2325.84s | and getting people here, 2325.84s - 2328.04s | while we're here, it's just chaos. 2328.04s - 2331.20s | Like I'm literally trying to manage 70 people right now 2331.20s - 2332.72s | and it's insane because they're all like, 2332.72s - 2333.56s | hey, where are we eating? 2333.56s - 2334.48s | Where is this going on? 2334.48s - 2335.68s | Where is that going on? 2335.68s - 2337.84s | So it's very complex and difficult to do. 2337.84s - 2340.16s | And I'm curious on how some of you guys handle that 2340.16s - 2341.84s | because I could use some advice. 2344.67s - 2348.43s | So we have about 70 volunteers, if not maybe 80. 2348.43s - 2351.51s


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sponsors and people that come in. 2313.12s - 2316.28s | So I have about 60 to 70 people I deal with 2316.28s - 2317.12s | throughout this event 2317.12s - 2319.16s | that are always asking me for information. 2319.16s - 2321.24s | How do they need this or need that? 2321.24s - 2323.08s | And what time do they have to be at places? 2323.08s - 2324.80s | So outside of the logistics of planning 2324.80s - 2325.84s | and getting people here, 2325.84s - 2328.04s | while we're here, it's just chaos. 2328.04s - 2331.20s | Like I'm literally trying to manage 70 people right now 2331.20s - 2332.72s | and it's insane because they're all like, 2332.72s - 2333.56s | hey, where are we eating? 2333.56s - 2334.48s | Where is this going on? 2334.48s - 2335.68s | Where is that going on? 2335.68s - 2337.84s | So it's very complex and difficult to do. 2337.84s - 2340.16s | And I'm curious on how some of you guys handle that 2340.16s - 2341.84s | because I could use some advice. 2344.67s - 2348.43s | So we have about 70 volunteers, if not maybe 80. 2348.43s - 2351.51s | We have two leads that lead that, Mike and Danielle. 2351.51s - 2353.31s | And Mike actually like built out 2353.31s - 2355.67s | this whole custom portal for us this year. 2355.67s - 2356.51s | I think he was telling, 2356.51s - 2357.35s | he was trying to tell other villages 2357.35s - 2359.63s | that he'll like help y'all like get it too. 2359.63s - 2360.95s | It's just something he like customly built 2360.95s - 2363.39s | to be able to kind of like assign shifts 2363.39s - 2365.59s | because we do, like we were mentioning earlier, 2365.59s - 2367.11s | we don't always have volunteers show up. 2367.63s - 2369.39s | So we always have to kind of like 2369.39s - 2370.51s | reach out to others and whatnot, 2370.51s - 2372.99s | but we do have those two people that are managing those. 2372.99s - 2374.75s | And we do have around 70 people 2374.75s - 2376.55s | that are volunteering throughout the con. 2376.55s - 2379.23s | And it's a lot of names to keep track of as well. 2379.23s - 2380.11s | And I'll let Matt. 2381.55s - 2384.07s | Yeah,


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| We have two leads that lead that, Mike and Danielle. 2351.51s - 2353.31s | And Mike actually like built out 2353.31s - 2355.67s | this whole custom portal for us this year. 2355.67s - 2356.51s | I think he was telling, 2356.51s - 2357.35s | he was trying to tell other villages 2357.35s - 2359.63s | that he'll like help y'all like get it too. 2359.63s - 2360.95s | It's just something he like customly built 2360.95s - 2363.39s | to be able to kind of like assign shifts 2363.39s - 2365.59s | because we do, like we were mentioning earlier, 2365.59s - 2367.11s | we don't always have volunteers show up. 2367.63s - 2369.39s | So we always have to kind of like 2369.39s - 2370.51s | reach out to others and whatnot, 2370.51s - 2372.99s | but we do have those two people that are managing those. 2372.99s - 2374.75s | And we do have around 70 people 2374.75s - 2376.55s | that are volunteering throughout the con. 2376.55s - 2379.23s | And it's a lot of names to keep track of as well. 2379.23s - 2380.11s | And I'll let Matt. 2381.55s - 2384.07s | Yeah, so we have internal volunteers 2384.07s - 2386.71s | and then a lot of our activities, 2386.71s - 2390.39s | the companies that bring their own activities, 2390.39s - 2392.63s | they are sort of in charge of their own. 2392.63s - 2395.63s | So if you're a Boeing, if you're a Lockheed 2396.03s - 2398.39s | and you bring 10 people, it's up to you 2398.39s - 2401.43s | how you wanna staff your activity. 2401.43s - 2406.23s | For, or Embry-Riddle through the Aviation ISAC, 2406.23s - 2410.63s | they brought 15 students and they also just, yeah. 2410.63s - 2412.67s | So for their activity, they were, 2412.67s - 2414.47s | we let them handle their own scheduling. 2414.47s - 2417.87s | There's some activities where it's literally two people 2417.87s - 2422.27s | and they are there every single hour for the entire con. 2422.27s - 2424.75s | And internally, we have our own set of volunteers 2425.87s - 2429.19s | about 20 or so people to help with workshops, 2429.19s - 2433.11s | to help with just organizing everything. 2433.11s - 2435.19s | And thankfully we have a volunteer coordinator 2435.19s - 2436.51s | that


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so we have internal volunteers 2384.07s - 2386.71s | and then a lot of our activities, 2386.71s - 2390.39s | the companies that bring their own activities, 2390.39s - 2392.63s | they are sort of in charge of their own. 2392.63s - 2395.63s | So if you're a Boeing, if you're a Lockheed 2396.03s - 2398.39s | and you bring 10 people, it's up to you 2398.39s - 2401.43s | how you wanna staff your activity. 2401.43s - 2406.23s | For, or Embry-Riddle through the Aviation ISAC, 2406.23s - 2410.63s | they brought 15 students and they also just, yeah. 2410.63s - 2412.67s | So for their activity, they were, 2412.67s - 2414.47s | we let them handle their own scheduling. 2414.47s - 2417.87s | There's some activities where it's literally two people 2417.87s - 2422.27s | and they are there every single hour for the entire con. 2422.27s - 2424.75s | And internally, we have our own set of volunteers 2425.87s - 2429.19s | about 20 or so people to help with workshops, 2429.19s - 2433.11s | to help with just organizing everything. 2433.11s - 2435.19s | And thankfully we have a volunteer coordinator 2435.19s - 2436.51s | that takes care of all that. 2436.51s - 2437.83s | And yeah, we've got, 2437.83s - 2439.59s | we're trying some new software this year. 2439.59s - 2442.07s | We'll see if that actually was a success or not. 2442.07s - 2444.63s | I think so, just to try and get things organized 2444.63s - 2447.95s | because all too often we're just shooting from the hip 2447.95s - 2449.83s | and saying, okay, I've got a need 2449.83s - 2451.99s | and who can do it right now? 2452.99s - 2456.07s | Yeah, we have, we kind of split them up a little bit. 2456.07s - 2458.95s | So we're a 501C3 nonprofit. 2458.95s - 2460.95s | We have board of directors. 2462.03s - 2463.79s | So this year it's basically myself 2463.79s - 2465.79s | and two of the other directors, 2465.79s - 2467.55s | shout out Crime Santa and Omenscan, 2468.51s - 2471.15s | that are, we kind of start the initial planning 2471.15s - 2472.35s | and then we kind of downstream 2472.35s - 2474.63s | to consistent staff that we have. 2474.63s - 2476.51s | So basically our leads. 2476.51s - 2478.23s | So we have


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takes care of all that. 2436.51s - 2437.83s | And yeah, we've got, 2437.83s - 2439.59s | we're trying some new software this year. 2439.59s - 2442.07s | We'll see if that actually was a success or not. 2442.07s - 2444.63s | I think so, just to try and get things organized 2444.63s - 2447.95s | because all too often we're just shooting from the hip 2447.95s - 2449.83s | and saying, okay, I've got a need 2449.83s - 2451.99s | and who can do it right now? 2452.99s - 2456.07s | Yeah, we have, we kind of split them up a little bit. 2456.07s - 2458.95s | So we're a 501C3 nonprofit. 2458.95s - 2460.95s | We have board of directors. 2462.03s - 2463.79s | So this year it's basically myself 2463.79s - 2465.79s | and two of the other directors, 2465.79s - 2467.55s | shout out Crime Santa and Omenscan, 2468.51s - 2471.15s | that are, we kind of start the initial planning 2471.15s - 2472.35s | and then we kind of downstream 2472.35s - 2474.63s | to consistent staff that we have. 2474.63s - 2476.51s | So basically our leads. 2476.51s - 2478.23s | So we have like Daniela and Satan 2478.23s - 2479.99s | who manage all the volunteers. 2480.99s - 2483.75s | We have Definga dealing with the CTF that we have. 2483.75s - 2485.19s | We do our own CTF, 2486.79s - 2487.63s | a whole bunch of other people 2487.63s - 2489.95s | that are involved in kind of organizing things. 2489.95s - 2493.27s | Cheerio handled all the workshops, things like that. 2493.27s - 2495.15s | And then we have also some day volunteers 2495.15s - 2496.55s | where we'll sign like doors 2496.55s - 2499.35s | and kind of that crowd management info booth, 2499.35s - 2500.99s | things like that. 2500.99s - 2503.35s | I would say like staff wise. 2503.35s - 2505.07s | So three directors staff wise, 2505.07s - 2507.79s | maybe 10 to 15 that are involved 2507.79s - 2509.67s | in the actual planning phase. 2510.35s - 2511.19s | And then we wind up with anywhere 2511.19s - 2513.07s | between like 30 and 70 volunteers, 2513.07s - 2514.43s | depending on who shows up. 2515.87s - 2520.87s | So yeah, the badge thing is always challenging. 2521.11s - 2523.67s | Cause you know, we do


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like Daniela and Satan 2478.23s - 2479.99s | who manage all the volunteers. 2480.99s - 2483.75s | We have Definga dealing with the CTF that we have. 2483.75s - 2485.19s | We do our own CTF, 2486.79s - 2487.63s | a whole bunch of other people 2487.63s - 2489.95s | that are involved in kind of organizing things. 2489.95s - 2493.27s | Cheerio handled all the workshops, things like that. 2493.27s - 2495.15s | And then we have also some day volunteers 2495.15s - 2496.55s | where we'll sign like doors 2496.55s - 2499.35s | and kind of that crowd management info booth, 2499.35s - 2500.99s | things like that. 2500.99s - 2503.35s | I would say like staff wise. 2503.35s - 2505.07s | So three directors staff wise, 2505.07s - 2507.79s | maybe 10 to 15 that are involved 2507.79s - 2509.67s | in the actual planning phase. 2510.35s - 2511.19s | And then we wind up with anywhere 2511.19s - 2513.07s | between like 30 and 70 volunteers, 2513.07s - 2514.43s | depending on who shows up. 2515.87s - 2520.87s | So yeah, the badge thing is always challenging. 2521.11s - 2523.67s | Cause you know, we do get badges from DEF CON 2523.67s - 2525.47s | that we try to give to the volunteers, 2525.47s - 2527.43s | but we want to make sure that they go to the people 2527.43s - 2528.67s | that show up year after year. 2528.67s - 2530.11s | And that's always a challenge. 2530.11s - 2531.55s | I knew the spice was coming. 2533.03s - 2534.43s | Not even that spicy. 2534.43s - 2535.27s | Yeah. 2535.27s - 2536.27s | Well, since we're on that topic, 2536.27s - 2537.79s | let's talk about badges. 2537.79s - 2542.79s | So as village logistics advocates, 2543.11s - 2545.79s | we have a finite pool of badges 2545.79s - 2549.19s | that we can sprinkle across all the content creators. 2550.27s - 2551.59s | We have secret shoppers. 2551.59s - 2552.71s | I don't know if you know this, 2552.71s - 2555.23s | but we have secret shoppers that are evaluating you. 2555.23s - 2557.03s | You'll never pick them out. 2557.03s - 2558.07s | And then we get feedback. 2558.07s - 2559.43s | And based off of that feedback, 2559.43s - 2563.87s | that's how we're also providing quantifiable, 2563.87s - 2565.67s |


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get badges from DEF CON 2523.67s - 2525.47s | that we try to give to the volunteers, 2525.47s - 2527.43s | but we want to make sure that they go to the people 2527.43s - 2528.67s | that show up year after year. 2528.67s - 2530.11s | And that's always a challenge. 2530.11s - 2531.55s | I knew the spice was coming. 2533.03s - 2534.43s | Not even that spicy. 2534.43s - 2535.27s | Yeah. 2535.27s - 2536.27s | Well, since we're on that topic, 2536.27s - 2537.79s | let's talk about badges. 2537.79s - 2542.79s | So as village logistics advocates, 2543.11s - 2545.79s | we have a finite pool of badges 2545.79s - 2549.19s | that we can sprinkle across all the content creators. 2550.27s - 2551.59s | We have secret shoppers. 2551.59s - 2552.71s | I don't know if you know this, 2552.71s - 2555.23s | but we have secret shoppers that are evaluating you. 2555.23s - 2557.03s | You'll never pick them out. 2557.03s - 2558.07s | And then we get feedback. 2558.07s - 2559.43s | And based off of that feedback, 2559.43s - 2563.87s | that's how we're also providing quantifiable, 2563.87s - 2565.67s | you know, metrics to DEF CON 2565.67s - 2568.67s | to try to advocate for more badges for villages. 2568.67s - 2572.75s | So one of the things that constantly comes across to us 2572.75s - 2574.87s | is how can I get more badges? 2574.87s - 2576.99s | There's always going to be a limit, right? 2576.99s - 2579.31s | Just because each village thinks 2579.31s - 2580.55s | that they need the most badges 2580.55s - 2583.11s | and each village thinks they need the most space, 2583.11s - 2586.19s | but we only have so much to spread around. 2586.19s - 2589.47s | So you will normally get questions from us 2589.47s - 2592.27s | and we will usually ask for justifications. 2592.27s - 2594.83s | Sometimes, you know, depending on the request, 2594.83s - 2596.47s | we'll even go as far as like, 2596.47s - 2599.55s | provide us a schedule of who's working for how long. 2601.95s - 2602.99s | I'll comment on that. 2602.99s - 2603.91s | Do you really want that? 2603.91s - 2605.35s | Yeah, oh yeah, we're going there. 2605.35s - 2609.03s | So we've been doing this for 11 years


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you know, metrics to DEF CON 2565.67s - 2568.67s | to try to advocate for more badges for villages. 2568.67s - 2572.75s | So one of the things that constantly comes across to us 2572.75s - 2574.87s | is how can I get more badges? 2574.87s - 2576.99s | There's always going to be a limit, right? 2576.99s - 2579.31s | Just because each village thinks 2579.31s - 2580.55s | that they need the most badges 2580.55s - 2583.11s | and each village thinks they need the most space, 2583.11s - 2586.19s | but we only have so much to spread around. 2586.19s - 2589.47s | So you will normally get questions from us 2589.47s - 2592.27s | and we will usually ask for justifications. 2592.27s - 2594.83s | Sometimes, you know, depending on the request, 2594.83s - 2596.47s | we'll even go as far as like, 2596.47s - 2599.55s | provide us a schedule of who's working for how long. 2601.95s - 2602.99s | I'll comment on that. 2602.99s - 2603.91s | Do you really want that? 2603.91s - 2605.35s | Yeah, oh yeah, we're going there. 2605.35s - 2609.03s | So we've been doing this for 11 years now 2609.03s - 2612.67s | and we're going to be $30,000, $40,000 into this. 2612.67s - 2614.59s | A lot of freaking money, right? 2614.59s - 2616.59s | Not even counting the hardware or any, 2616.59s - 2618.55s | and our sponsors will go and bring stuff 2618.55s - 2621.95s | and we're not counting that money. 2621.95s - 2624.67s | I don't think I've ever been asked by DEF CON 2625.51s - 2626.35s | what we put into things, 2626.35s - 2627.55s | how many thousands of hours 2627.55s - 2629.11s | and how many tens of thousands 2629.11s - 2631.11s | or hundreds of thousands of dollars. 2631.11s - 2633.95s | We're asking for a badge that, 2633.95s - 2638.19s | I don't know, what's this thing, $60, $70 for a badge? 2638.19s - 2639.99s | No, no, no, no, no, that's retail. 2639.99s - 2641.51s | What's the thing cost? 2641.51s - 2642.99s | 75 bucks. 2642.99s - 2647.23s | So when we're putting in tens of thousands of dollars, 2647.23s - 2648.83s | those questions never come back to us 2648.83s - 2650.67s | and, hey, what did you put in? 2650.67s - 2654.07s | But


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now 2609.03s - 2612.67s | and we're going to be $30,000, $40,000 into this. 2612.67s - 2614.59s | A lot of freaking money, right? 2614.59s - 2616.59s | Not even counting the hardware or any, 2616.59s - 2618.55s | and our sponsors will go and bring stuff 2618.55s - 2621.95s | and we're not counting that money. 2621.95s - 2624.67s | I don't think I've ever been asked by DEF CON 2625.51s - 2626.35s | what we put into things, 2626.35s - 2627.55s | how many thousands of hours 2627.55s - 2629.11s | and how many tens of thousands 2629.11s - 2631.11s | or hundreds of thousands of dollars. 2631.11s - 2633.95s | We're asking for a badge that, 2633.95s - 2638.19s | I don't know, what's this thing, $60, $70 for a badge? 2638.19s - 2639.99s | No, no, no, no, no, that's retail. 2639.99s - 2641.51s | What's the thing cost? 2641.51s - 2642.99s | 75 bucks. 2642.99s - 2647.23s | So when we're putting in tens of thousands of dollars, 2647.23s - 2648.83s | those questions never come back to us 2648.83s - 2650.67s | and, hey, what did you put in? 2650.67s - 2654.07s | But we're constantly fighting for poker chips for food 2654.11s - 2655.67s | or a couple of hotel rooms. 2655.67s - 2657.23s | Extremely, I think we're all extremely grateful 2657.23s - 2658.47s | for everything. 2658.47s - 2661.35s | It still seems one way on what we're doing here. 2661.35s - 2663.95s | So, you know, we got 40 badges. 2663.95s - 2666.35s | We bought 20 and so we have 60 badges. 2666.35s - 2670.23s | Put $15,000 into the pot here for the other badges. 2670.23s - 2671.71s | All right, 10 minutes. 2671.71s - 2674.63s | The, sell us these things at cost. 2674.63s - 2675.99s | These things aren't 500 bucks. 2675.99s - 2677.63s | They're $75. 2677.63s - 2678.63s | Sell them to us at cost 2678.63s - 2681.31s | because we are down in that village nonstop. 2685.00s - 2689.00s | I'll give you the CEO response type style 2689.00s - 2692.00s | because I don't want to get myself into trouble. 2692.00s - 2695.24s | I will say that everything you see at DEF CON costs money. 2695.24s - 2696.76s | Oh, yeah, 100%. 2696.76s - 2697.60s | Everything in your village, 2697.60s


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we're constantly fighting for poker chips for food 2654.11s - 2655.67s | or a couple of hotel rooms. 2655.67s - 2657.23s | Extremely, I think we're all extremely grateful 2657.23s - 2658.47s | for everything. 2658.47s - 2661.35s | It still seems one way on what we're doing here. 2661.35s - 2663.95s | So, you know, we got 40 badges. 2663.95s - 2666.35s | We bought 20 and so we have 60 badges. 2666.35s - 2670.23s | Put $15,000 into the pot here for the other badges. 2670.23s - 2671.71s | All right, 10 minutes. 2671.71s - 2674.63s | The, sell us these things at cost. 2674.63s - 2675.99s | These things aren't 500 bucks. 2675.99s - 2677.63s | They're $75. 2677.63s - 2678.63s | Sell them to us at cost 2678.63s - 2681.31s | because we are down in that village nonstop. 2685.00s - 2689.00s | I'll give you the CEO response type style 2689.00s - 2692.00s | because I don't want to get myself into trouble. 2692.00s - 2695.24s | I will say that everything you see at DEF CON costs money. 2695.24s - 2696.76s | Oh, yeah, 100%. 2696.76s - 2697.60s | Everything in your village, 2697.60s - 2700.48s | you pay nothing to be in the village. 2700.48s - 2703.00s | The space, the floor, the real estate, 2703.00s - 2706.00s | all the requests that you have, DEF CON is paying for that. 2706.00s - 2707.16s | Not going to go into how much that is 2707.16s - 2709.56s | because even I personally don't know how much that is 2709.56s - 2711.60s | because we're not privy to that knowledge, right? 2711.72s - 2714.56s | But I know that DEF CON does invest a lot of money 2714.56s - 2716.20s | for the real estate, for the space, 2716.20s - 2717.84s | and for a lot of the logistics that go into it. 2717.84s - 2720.96s | I'm not taking away from anything that the villages do 2720.96s - 2721.80s | as far as that goes, 2721.80s - 2724.76s | because I understand Nina and a few of the other leads 2724.76s - 2725.84s | have kind of expressed to me like, 2725.84s - 2727.20s | hey, this is what we're investing in this. 2727.20s - 2730.80s | And trust me, Pedro and I are cognizant of it. 2730.80s - 2732.52s | And that's


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- 2700.48s | you pay nothing to be in the village. 2700.48s - 2703.00s | The space, the floor, the real estate, 2703.00s - 2706.00s | all the requests that you have, DEF CON is paying for that. 2706.00s - 2707.16s | Not going to go into how much that is 2707.16s - 2709.56s | because even I personally don't know how much that is 2709.56s - 2711.60s | because we're not privy to that knowledge, right? 2711.72s - 2714.56s | But I know that DEF CON does invest a lot of money 2714.56s - 2716.20s | for the real estate, for the space, 2716.20s - 2717.84s | and for a lot of the logistics that go into it. 2717.84s - 2720.96s | I'm not taking away from anything that the villages do 2720.96s - 2721.80s | as far as that goes, 2721.80s - 2724.76s | because I understand Nina and a few of the other leads 2724.76s - 2725.84s | have kind of expressed to me like, 2725.84s - 2727.20s | hey, this is what we're investing in this. 2727.20s - 2730.80s | And trust me, Pedro and I are cognizant of it. 2730.80s - 2732.52s | And that's why we're trying to push for more sponsorship 2732.52s - 2734.12s | and everything else like that for you. 2736.04s - 2738.72s | From DEF CON's perspective, 2738.72s - 2742.20s | the badge does mean something more than just the 70 bucks. 2742.20s - 2745.44s | That is access to the con itself. 2745.44s - 2747.88s | And so there is a drastic difference between, 2747.88s - 2751.28s | hey, I have 50 volunteers who are coming 2751.28s - 2752.48s | and they're working the entire time. 2752.48s - 2754.12s | Like, okay, that's easier justification. 2754.12s - 2755.76s | Or I have somebody who's gonna come 2755.76s - 2758.64s | teach a 30 minute workshop, I want a badge. 2758.64s - 2760.32s | There's a drastic difference between the two of those. 2760.32s - 2763.28s | So like, I'm not saying you, I'm not saying you. 2763.28s - 2766.20s | But there are some instances where we are trying 2766.20s - 2767.24s | to kind of clean that up, 2767.24s - 2770.12s | because one, it's not fair to ICS Village 2770.12s - 2773.00s | if we're giving 80 badges to somebody 2773.00s - 2774.20s | and that's what


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why we're trying to push for more sponsorship 2732.52s - 2734.12s | and everything else like that for you. 2736.04s - 2738.72s | From DEF CON's perspective, 2738.72s - 2742.20s | the badge does mean something more than just the 70 bucks. 2742.20s - 2745.44s | That is access to the con itself. 2745.44s - 2747.88s | And so there is a drastic difference between, 2747.88s - 2751.28s | hey, I have 50 volunteers who are coming 2751.28s - 2752.48s | and they're working the entire time. 2752.48s - 2754.12s | Like, okay, that's easier justification. 2754.12s - 2755.76s | Or I have somebody who's gonna come 2755.76s - 2758.64s | teach a 30 minute workshop, I want a badge. 2758.64s - 2760.32s | There's a drastic difference between the two of those. 2760.32s - 2763.28s | So like, I'm not saying you, I'm not saying you. 2763.28s - 2766.20s | But there are some instances where we are trying 2766.20s - 2767.24s | to kind of clean that up, 2767.24s - 2770.12s | because one, it's not fair to ICS Village 2770.12s - 2773.00s | if we're giving 80 badges to somebody 2773.00s - 2774.20s | and that's what they're doing. 2774.20s - 2776.16s | And you're sitting at 50, right? 2776.16s - 2777.52s | Or some of those lines, right? 2777.52s - 2778.36s | Someone got 80 badges. 2778.36s - 2781.08s | We wanna make sure it's equitable across the, shh. 2781.08s - 2782.32s | We wanna make sure it's, 2782.32s - 2784.40s | these are all fake numbers, it's okay. 2784.40s - 2785.76s | We wanna make sure that it's equitable 2785.76s - 2786.88s | across the board, right? 2786.88s - 2790.96s | And that the support that we're giving out is appropriate. 2791.92s - 2794.36s | A lot of times we're also not making the decision. 2794.36s - 2795.92s | We are advocating for you. 2795.96s - 2797.56s | When we ask for the justifications, 2797.56s - 2799.28s | not because Pedro and I want to be nosy 2799.28s - 2800.80s | and be on inside your business. 2800.80s - 2803.44s | It's that way when we take that information 2803.44s - 2804.88s | and we're going and we're advocating, 2804.88s - 2806.56s | we're arguing for you. 2806.56s - 2809.32s | You know, there are behind backroom deals 2809.32s - 2810.72s | that we're trying


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they're doing. 2774.20s - 2776.16s | And you're sitting at 50, right? 2776.16s - 2777.52s | Or some of those lines, right? 2777.52s - 2778.36s | Someone got 80 badges. 2778.36s - 2781.08s | We wanna make sure it's equitable across the, shh. 2781.08s - 2782.32s | We wanna make sure it's, 2782.32s - 2784.40s | these are all fake numbers, it's okay. 2784.40s - 2785.76s | We wanna make sure that it's equitable 2785.76s - 2786.88s | across the board, right? 2786.88s - 2790.96s | And that the support that we're giving out is appropriate. 2791.92s - 2794.36s | A lot of times we're also not making the decision. 2794.36s - 2795.92s | We are advocating for you. 2795.96s - 2797.56s | When we ask for the justifications, 2797.56s - 2799.28s | not because Pedro and I want to be nosy 2799.28s - 2800.80s | and be on inside your business. 2800.80s - 2803.44s | It's that way when we take that information 2803.44s - 2804.88s | and we're going and we're advocating, 2804.88s - 2806.56s | we're arguing for you. 2806.56s - 2809.32s | You know, there are behind backroom deals 2809.32s - 2810.72s | that we're trying to work for you 2810.72s - 2812.64s | to ensure that you guys get as much support 2812.64s - 2813.96s | as we possibly can for you. 2813.96s - 2816.12s | And that's our entire role in this, so. 2816.12s - 2816.96s | I'm gonna pivot off that real quick. 2816.96s - 2818.76s | I have one quick thing to add. 2818.76s - 2819.60s | Hold on. 2819.60s - 2820.44s | It's really small. 2820.44s - 2822.00s | I just wanna say one thing, six minute warning. 2822.00s - 2824.12s | Oh, I just wanna say, 2824.12s - 2826.76s | I think maybe when Kevin or you guys took over, 2826.76s - 2828.92s | I can't remember, but prior to that, 2828.92s - 2831.36s | us village leads and the ones that run everything, 2831.36s - 2834.64s | we used to only get like three or four of these. 2834.64s - 2836.68s | So with having a staff of 30 or 40 people 2836.68s - 2837.92s | and only getting three or four of these 2837.92s - 2839.08s | and trying to bring people in and out 2839.08s - 2840.80s | while we're setting up is very difficult. 2840.80s -


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to work for you 2810.72s - 2812.64s | to ensure that you guys get as much support 2812.64s - 2813.96s | as we possibly can for you. 2813.96s - 2816.12s | And that's our entire role in this, so. 2816.12s - 2816.96s | I'm gonna pivot off that real quick. 2816.96s - 2818.76s | I have one quick thing to add. 2818.76s - 2819.60s | Hold on. 2819.60s - 2820.44s | It's really small. 2820.44s - 2822.00s | I just wanna say one thing, six minute warning. 2822.00s - 2824.12s | Oh, I just wanna say, 2824.12s - 2826.76s | I think maybe when Kevin or you guys took over, 2826.76s - 2828.92s | I can't remember, but prior to that, 2828.92s - 2831.36s | us village leads and the ones that run everything, 2831.36s - 2834.64s | we used to only get like three or four of these. 2834.64s - 2836.68s | So with having a staff of 30 or 40 people 2836.68s - 2837.92s | and only getting three or four of these 2837.92s - 2839.08s | and trying to bring people in and out 2839.08s - 2840.80s | while we're setting up is very difficult. 2840.80s - 2843.64s | So it's been very nice that over the last few years, 2843.64s - 2846.28s | they've been able to get us like 20 badges or 30 badges 2846.28s - 2848.48s | because that's actually the amount of staff that we have. 2848.48s - 2849.68s | And then we don't have the issues 2849.68s - 2851.08s | of people coming in and out during setup. 2851.08s - 2853.96s | So I just wanna say that there has been a lot of improvements 2854.80s - 2855.84s | in the badges and getting us that access 2855.84s - 2857.16s | because prior to it, it was like, 2857.16s - 2859.08s | you'd give it, they'd give us four, maybe five. 2859.08s - 2861.64s | And it's like, it's not really helping us. 2861.64s - 2864.60s | So they have definitely helped us a lot more on that side. 2864.60s - 2866.80s | So what I was gonna add, I think someone, 2866.80s - 2869.08s | I heard the word equitable and it triggered something. 2869.08s - 2873.16s | So the main reason that I think we really wanna have 2873.16s - 2878.00s | more badges is because we have volunteers year


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2843.64s | So it's been very nice that over the last few years, 2843.64s - 2846.28s | they've been able to get us like 20 badges or 30 badges 2846.28s - 2848.48s | because that's actually the amount of staff that we have. 2848.48s - 2849.68s | And then we don't have the issues 2849.68s - 2851.08s | of people coming in and out during setup. 2851.08s - 2853.96s | So I just wanna say that there has been a lot of improvements 2854.80s - 2855.84s | in the badges and getting us that access 2855.84s - 2857.16s | because prior to it, it was like, 2857.16s - 2859.08s | you'd give it, they'd give us four, maybe five. 2859.08s - 2861.64s | And it's like, it's not really helping us. 2861.64s - 2864.60s | So they have definitely helped us a lot more on that side. 2864.60s - 2866.80s | So what I was gonna add, I think someone, 2866.80s - 2869.08s | I heard the word equitable and it triggered something. 2869.08s - 2873.16s | So the main reason that I think we really wanna have 2873.16s - 2878.00s | more badges is because we have volunteers year over year 2878.00s - 2881.44s | who are newer to the industry, 2881.44s - 2883.76s | could really benefit from being here at DEF CON, 2884.56s - 2887.36s | but don't have the financial resources to afford much. 2887.36s - 2889.28s | So they're splitting shitty hotel rooms, 2889.28s - 2893.08s | getting cheap flights and 400 plus dollars 2893.08s - 2895.56s | for a badge is actually quite a lot. 2895.56s - 2896.64s | So, and that's one of the things 2896.64s - 2898.40s | that we can quantifiably provide 2898.40s - 2901.32s | to those volunteers and staff. 2902.24s - 2903.88s | That's ultimately like we're here 2903.88s - 2905.88s | to provide content to people. 2905.88s - 2907.92s | I think a secondary reason that we're here 2907.92s - 2910.60s | is to help people grow in their careers 2910.60s - 2911.76s | and to help them network. 2911.76s - 2913.28s | Like we've had, as Blue Team Village, 2913.28s - 2914.72s | we've had so many people get jobs 2914.72s - 2917.28s | because of volunteering for the village. 2917.28s - 2919.52s | Actually, my last two jobs I got 2919.52s - 2921.52s | because of


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over year 2878.00s - 2881.44s | who are newer to the industry, 2881.44s - 2883.76s | could really benefit from being here at DEF CON, 2884.56s - 2887.36s | but don't have the financial resources to afford much. 2887.36s - 2889.28s | So they're splitting shitty hotel rooms, 2889.28s - 2893.08s | getting cheap flights and 400 plus dollars 2893.08s - 2895.56s | for a badge is actually quite a lot. 2895.56s - 2896.64s | So, and that's one of the things 2896.64s - 2898.40s | that we can quantifiably provide 2898.40s - 2901.32s | to those volunteers and staff. 2902.24s - 2903.88s | That's ultimately like we're here 2903.88s - 2905.88s | to provide content to people. 2905.88s - 2907.92s | I think a secondary reason that we're here 2907.92s - 2910.60s | is to help people grow in their careers 2910.60s - 2911.76s | and to help them network. 2911.76s - 2913.28s | Like we've had, as Blue Team Village, 2913.28s - 2914.72s | we've had so many people get jobs 2914.72s - 2917.28s | because of volunteering for the village. 2917.28s - 2919.52s | Actually, my last two jobs I got 2919.52s - 2921.52s | because of people I knew from Blue Team Village. 2921.52s - 2922.76s | And I wouldn't have been able to do that 2922.76s - 2925.84s | if I couldn't afford to come here and volunteer originally. 2925.84s - 2927.60s | My question is, what are you doing 2927.60s - 2929.92s | with any of that money you might make? 2929.92s - 2931.84s | Because it's what we do is all the money 2931.84s - 2932.80s | we're making during this. 2932.80s - 2934.64s | So we sell badges, obviously, 2934.64s - 2937.16s | we're a nonprofit organization as well. 2937.16s - 2939.56s | The way our board works is all the money we make from this, 2939.56s - 2941.12s | we dump back into this. 2941.16s - 2943.68s | None of us make any of it, none of us keep any of it. 2943.68s - 2945.64s | That's why we're giving away a car this year. 2945.64s - 2947.40s | But we take our money and we pour it 2947.40s - 2949.04s | right back into DEF CON. 2949.04s - 2951.48s | So I'm just curious what you guys are doing with your money 2951.48s - 2953.72s | because I try to,


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people I knew from Blue Team Village. 2921.52s - 2922.76s | And I wouldn't have been able to do that 2922.76s - 2925.84s | if I couldn't afford to come here and volunteer originally. 2925.84s - 2927.60s | My question is, what are you doing 2927.60s - 2929.92s | with any of that money you might make? 2929.92s - 2931.84s | Because it's what we do is all the money 2931.84s - 2932.80s | we're making during this. 2932.80s - 2934.64s | So we sell badges, obviously, 2934.64s - 2937.16s | we're a nonprofit organization as well. 2937.16s - 2939.56s | The way our board works is all the money we make from this, 2939.56s - 2941.12s | we dump back into this. 2941.16s - 2943.68s | None of us make any of it, none of us keep any of it. 2943.68s - 2945.64s | That's why we're giving away a car this year. 2945.64s - 2947.40s | But we take our money and we pour it 2947.40s - 2949.04s | right back into DEF CON. 2949.04s - 2951.48s | So I'm just curious what you guys are doing with your money 2951.48s - 2953.72s | because I try to, like this year, 2953.72s - 2956.16s | I knew one of my volunteers that came out, 2956.16s - 2958.28s | a younger kid, kind of from a family 2958.28s - 2960.00s | that doesn't have a lot of finances. 2960.00s - 2962.96s | And I was able to buy his flight and help him get out here. 2962.96s - 2964.96s | And I've done that with a lot of other people as well. 2964.96s - 2967.28s | I know like Kamal's right here in the stands. 2967.28s - 2969.00s | He's from Japan, we flew him out here. 2969.00s - 2972.60s | So we try to do the best we can to fund our staff as well 2972.60s - 2974.48s | outside of what DEF CON gives us 2974.48s - 2976.16s | based off of what you guys are giving to us 2976.16s - 2979.76s | through badges or other things like that, so. 2979.76s - 2981.16s | Yeah, that's a constant thing that we're working on, 2981.16s - 2983.20s | trying to bring it back to supporting 2983.20s - 2986.04s | the people that make this village possible. 2986.04s - 2987.64s | And I think Nina and I have


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like this year, 2953.72s - 2956.16s | I knew one of my volunteers that came out, 2956.16s - 2958.28s | a younger kid, kind of from a family 2958.28s - 2960.00s | that doesn't have a lot of finances. 2960.00s - 2962.96s | And I was able to buy his flight and help him get out here. 2962.96s - 2964.96s | And I've done that with a lot of other people as well. 2964.96s - 2967.28s | I know like Kamal's right here in the stands. 2967.28s - 2969.00s | He's from Japan, we flew him out here. 2969.00s - 2972.60s | So we try to do the best we can to fund our staff as well 2972.60s - 2974.48s | outside of what DEF CON gives us 2974.48s - 2976.16s | based off of what you guys are giving to us 2976.16s - 2979.76s | through badges or other things like that, so. 2979.76s - 2981.16s | Yeah, that's a constant thing that we're working on, 2981.16s - 2983.20s | trying to bring it back to supporting 2983.20s - 2986.04s | the people that make this village possible. 2986.04s - 2987.64s | And I think Nina and I have had 2987.64s - 2989.32s | some side conversations about that. 2989.32s - 2990.96s | So maybe I'll hand it over to you 2990.96s - 2993.56s | and you can add to that for two minutes. 2993.56s - 2994.44s | Five minute warning. 2994.44s - 2995.76s | 50 seconds on the clock. 2996.76s - 2999.12s | So just circling back to the other question, 2999.12s - 3001.00s | there's eight people on the core for us. 3001.00s - 3005.76s | And then it's, this year we have 25 people 3005.76s - 3010.64s | that are bringing people in through the Hippocratic Oathing. 3010.64s - 3011.96s | But at the end of the day, 3011.96s - 3013.80s | there's about 300 people that I am managing 3013.80s - 3015.80s | that one, I've probably never met before. 3015.80s - 3018.92s | And two, that are highly committed to doing village stuff. 3018.92s - 3020.60s | A lot of them don't end up leaving the village 3020.60s - 3023.20s | because it's highly interactive, it's immersive, 3023.20s - 3024.76s | all of that. 3024.80s - 3026.36s | I don't remember your question. 3026.36s - 3027.52s | What do we do with the money?


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had 2987.64s - 2989.32s | some side conversations about that. 2989.32s - 2990.96s | So maybe I'll hand it over to you 2990.96s - 2993.56s | and you can add to that for two minutes. 2993.56s - 2994.44s | Five minute warning. 2994.44s - 2995.76s | 50 seconds on the clock. 2996.76s - 2999.12s | So just circling back to the other question, 2999.12s - 3001.00s | there's eight people on the core for us. 3001.00s - 3005.76s | And then it's, this year we have 25 people 3005.76s - 3010.64s | that are bringing people in through the Hippocratic Oathing. 3010.64s - 3011.96s | But at the end of the day, 3011.96s - 3013.80s | there's about 300 people that I am managing 3013.80s - 3015.80s | that one, I've probably never met before. 3015.80s - 3018.92s | And two, that are highly committed to doing village stuff. 3018.92s - 3020.60s | A lot of them don't end up leaving the village 3020.60s - 3023.20s | because it's highly interactive, it's immersive, 3023.20s - 3024.76s | all of that. 3024.80s - 3026.36s | I don't remember your question. 3026.36s - 3027.52s | What do we do with the money? 3027.52s - 3028.52s | Is that what we do with the money? 3028.52s - 3029.36s | Sorry. 3029.36s - 3030.20s | Like supporting volunteers. 3030.20s - 3031.72s | Oh, supporting volunteers. 3031.72s - 3035.52s | I, ooh, there's a lot of work that goes into this. 3035.52s - 3038.36s | So I pay for at least the core people. 3038.36s - 3040.36s | I pay for their flights, I pay for their hotels, 3040.36s - 3043.40s | I give them a stipend, and everybody is on their way. 3043.40s - 3046.32s | Because again, this is, it's eight hours 3046.32s - 3048.44s | that the attendees get to be in the room, 3048.44s - 3050.32s | but it's like a 12 hour day for all of us. 3050.32s - 3052.80s | Because they're still set up and there's, yeah. 3052.80s - 3054.52s | It's like 14, 15 most of the time. 3055.28s - 3056.12s | Oh no, I mean during the con, 3056.12s - 3058.48s | because before that we're here for like forever. 3059.36s - 3061.64s | And it's ensuring that the attendees 3061.64s - 3063.36s | get the experience that they came here for, right? 3063.36s - 3065.12s


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3027.52s - 3028.52s | Is that what we do with the money? 3028.52s - 3029.36s | Sorry. 3029.36s - 3030.20s | Like supporting volunteers. 3030.20s - 3031.72s | Oh, supporting volunteers. 3031.72s - 3035.52s | I, ooh, there's a lot of work that goes into this. 3035.52s - 3038.36s | So I pay for at least the core people. 3038.36s - 3040.36s | I pay for their flights, I pay for their hotels, 3040.36s - 3043.40s | I give them a stipend, and everybody is on their way. 3043.40s - 3046.32s | Because again, this is, it's eight hours 3046.32s - 3048.44s | that the attendees get to be in the room, 3048.44s - 3050.32s | but it's like a 12 hour day for all of us. 3050.32s - 3052.80s | Because they're still set up and there's, yeah. 3052.80s - 3054.52s | It's like 14, 15 most of the time. 3055.28s - 3056.12s | Oh no, I mean during the con, 3056.12s - 3058.48s | because before that we're here for like forever. 3059.36s - 3061.64s | And it's ensuring that the attendees 3061.64s - 3063.36s | get the experience that they came here for, right? 3063.36s - 3065.12s | You're paying a lot for this conference. 3065.12s - 3067.32s | We want you to have everything that you need 3067.32s - 3069.16s | to one, be involved. 3069.16s - 3072.12s | Two, three, oh my God, English is hard today. 3072.12s - 3074.12s | Two, be invested. 3075.08s - 3077.32s | The other part of this is, what do we do with the money? 3077.32s - 3078.72s | It just gets poured back in. 3078.72s - 3081.68s | This year, Biohacking Village is functioning at a loss 3081.68s - 3084.56s | because there's, to a lot of the points, right? 3084.56s - 3086.28s | There's a lot of investment that we had to do. 3086.28s - 3088.40s | We are not getting a lot of the money back 3088.40s - 3091.56s | because we just, our prices aren't high 3091.56s - 3093.44s | because we need everybody to do the things. 3093.44s - 3094.72s | So at the end of the day, 3094.72s - 3096.80s | it's what conference are we going to next? 3096.80s - 3099.88s | How do we get support from the people in this room, 3099.88s - 3105.79s | the sponsors, the community, DEF


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| You're paying a lot for this conference. 3065.12s - 3067.32s | We want you to have everything that you need 3067.32s - 3069.16s | to one, be involved. 3069.16s - 3072.12s | Two, three, oh my God, English is hard today. 3072.12s - 3074.12s | Two, be invested. 3075.08s - 3077.32s | The other part of this is, what do we do with the money? 3077.32s - 3078.72s | It just gets poured back in. 3078.72s - 3081.68s | This year, Biohacking Village is functioning at a loss 3081.68s - 3084.56s | because there's, to a lot of the points, right? 3084.56s - 3086.28s | There's a lot of investment that we had to do. 3086.28s - 3088.40s | We are not getting a lot of the money back 3088.40s - 3091.56s | because we just, our prices aren't high 3091.56s - 3093.44s | because we need everybody to do the things. 3093.44s - 3094.72s | So at the end of the day, 3094.72s - 3096.80s | it's what conference are we going to next? 3096.80s - 3099.88s | How do we get support from the people in this room, 3099.88s - 3105.79s | the sponsors, the community, DEF CON, things like that. 3105.79s - 3108.11s | Any last questions before we have to stop? 3108.11s - 3108.95s | I think there's a question in the crowd. 3108.95s - 3118.08s | We got a question out here. 3118.08s - 3119.24s | So we're not associated with. 3120.00s - 3122.56s | Yeah, none of us are subsidiaries. 3122.56s - 3125.08s | So he asked us, are we all 5013Cs 3125.08s - 3127.72s | and are we subsidiaries of, yeah, English is hard. 3127.72s - 3129.32s | Are we subsidiaries of DEF CON? 3129.32s - 3132.64s | And the answer of the 5013C is it's spotty. 3132.64s - 3135.04s | Some of us are, some of us might not be, 3135.04s - 3137.08s | but none of us are subsidiaries of DEF CON. 3137.08s - 3140.78s | We are all independent organizations. 3140.78s - 3142.26s | Yeah, so a lot of the villages though, 3142.26s - 3143.70s | and a lot of the newer ones, 3143.70s - 3146.90s | I think are the ones that aren't 5013Cs. 3146.90s - 3148.94s | We encourage them to push that way 3148.94s - 3150.58s | because it actually changes a lot of the landscape


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CON, things like that. 3105.79s - 3108.11s | Any last questions before we have to stop? 3108.11s - 3108.95s | I think there's a question in the crowd. 3108.95s - 3118.08s | We got a question out here. 3118.08s - 3119.24s | So we're not associated with. 3120.00s - 3122.56s | Yeah, none of us are subsidiaries. 3122.56s - 3125.08s | So he asked us, are we all 5013Cs 3125.08s - 3127.72s | and are we subsidiaries of, yeah, English is hard. 3127.72s - 3129.32s | Are we subsidiaries of DEF CON? 3129.32s - 3132.64s | And the answer of the 5013C is it's spotty. 3132.64s - 3135.04s | Some of us are, some of us might not be, 3135.04s - 3137.08s | but none of us are subsidiaries of DEF CON. 3137.08s - 3140.78s | We are all independent organizations. 3140.78s - 3142.26s | Yeah, so a lot of the villages though, 3142.26s - 3143.70s | and a lot of the newer ones, 3143.70s - 3146.90s | I think are the ones that aren't 5013Cs. 3146.90s - 3148.94s | We encourage them to push that way 3148.94s - 3150.58s | because it actually changes a lot of the landscape 3150.58s - 3152.50s | for them at DEF CON. 3152.50s - 3155.14s | And it opens up some additional funding avenues 3155.14s - 3157.94s | potentially in the future for us, for them as well, so. 3161.90s - 3163.98s | What is the corporate structure of DEF CON itself? 3163.98s - 3165.30s | That's probably outside the scope of this panel. 3165.30s - 3166.14s | Yeah, and we got two minutes left. 3166.14s - 3167.38s | Tony doesn't want to answer that either. 3167.38s - 3169.66s | I definitely don't want to answer that. 3169.66s - 3170.50s | Yeah, I guess- 3170.50s - 3171.58s | I mean, maybe do like a 30 second, 3171.58s - 3173.22s | like for each wrap up or something. 3173.22s - 3174.06s | Yeah, yeah. 3174.06s - 3174.90s | Hey, go for it. 3174.90s - 3175.74s | You want to go first? 3175.74s - 3176.58s | For what? 3176.58s - 3177.42s | 30 second wrap up. 3177.42s - 3179.26s | Oh, come down to Isis Village. 3179.26s - 3180.86s | You'll see everything we have, 3180.90s - 3182.82s | like escape rooms and sponsors, volunteers, 3182.82s - 3183.70s | all that other stuff. 3183.70s -


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3150.58s - 3152.50s | for them at DEF CON. 3152.50s - 3155.14s | And it opens up some additional funding avenues 3155.14s - 3157.94s | potentially in the future for us, for them as well, so. 3161.90s - 3163.98s | What is the corporate structure of DEF CON itself? 3163.98s - 3165.30s | That's probably outside the scope of this panel. 3165.30s - 3166.14s | Yeah, and we got two minutes left. 3166.14s - 3167.38s | Tony doesn't want to answer that either. 3167.38s - 3169.66s | I definitely don't want to answer that. 3169.66s - 3170.50s | Yeah, I guess- 3170.50s - 3171.58s | I mean, maybe do like a 30 second, 3171.58s - 3173.22s | like for each wrap up or something. 3173.22s - 3174.06s | Yeah, yeah. 3174.06s - 3174.90s | Hey, go for it. 3174.90s - 3175.74s | You want to go first? 3175.74s - 3176.58s | For what? 3176.58s - 3177.42s | 30 second wrap up. 3177.42s - 3179.26s | Oh, come down to Isis Village. 3179.26s - 3180.86s | You'll see everything we have, 3180.90s - 3182.82s | like escape rooms and sponsors, volunteers, 3182.82s - 3183.70s | all that other stuff. 3183.70s - 3185.14s | They're really cool hands-on things. 3185.14s - 3189.14s | Remember, ICS is in manufacturing cars in the hospitals. 3189.14s - 3191.86s | We do have jobs also. 3191.86s - 3195.18s | Airports, without ICS, airports don't work. 3195.18s - 3196.86s | So we're everywhere. 3196.86s - 3198.10s | Come down and talk to us. 3199.62s - 3200.74s | Yes, here. 3200.74s - 3201.58s | Sweet, Tom. 3201.58s - 3202.82s | So you're going to take my job, right? 3202.82s - 3203.66s | Yes. 3203.66s - 3205.10s | You own all of us, so it sounds like Tom's next. 3205.10s - 3205.94s | Sweet. 3205.94s - 3206.78s | Cool, thanks. 3206.78s - 3208.42s | Yeah, so Justin Carrick Village. 3208.42s - 3209.38s | Definitely come check us out. 3209.38s - 3211.50s | We got a tractor here, semi-truck. 3211.50s - 3214.58s | We have Rivian who actually put a CTF in their vehicle, 3214.58s - 3216.54s | so you can actually hack their vehicle. 3216.54s - 3219.02s | Obviously, it's not a vulnerability in the car. 3219.02s - 3221.50s | They made it vulnerable theirself and put flags in it. 3221.50s - 3222.34s | So it's really cool. 3222.34s


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3185.14s | They're really cool hands-on things. 3185.14s - 3189.14s | Remember, ICS is in manufacturing cars in the hospitals. 3189.14s - 3191.86s | We do have jobs also. 3191.86s - 3195.18s | Airports, without ICS, airports don't work. 3195.18s - 3196.86s | So we're everywhere. 3196.86s - 3198.10s | Come down and talk to us. 3199.62s - 3200.74s | Yes, here. 3200.74s - 3201.58s | Sweet, Tom. 3201.58s - 3202.82s | So you're going to take my job, right? 3202.82s - 3203.66s | Yes. 3203.66s - 3205.10s | You own all of us, so it sounds like Tom's next. 3205.10s - 3205.94s | Sweet. 3205.94s - 3206.78s | Cool, thanks. 3206.78s - 3208.42s | Yeah, so Justin Carrick Village. 3208.42s - 3209.38s | Definitely come check us out. 3209.38s - 3211.50s | We got a tractor here, semi-truck. 3211.50s - 3214.58s | We have Rivian who actually put a CTF in their vehicle, 3214.58s - 3216.54s | so you can actually hack their vehicle. 3216.54s - 3219.02s | Obviously, it's not a vulnerability in the car. 3219.02s - 3221.50s | They made it vulnerable theirself and put flags in it. 3221.50s - 3222.34s | So it's really cool. 3222.34s - 3224.54s | And we're also giving away a Tesla 3224.54s - 3225.98s | for our first place prize. 3225.98s - 3226.82s | And outside of that, 3226.82s - 3228.38s | we've also done stuff for kids this year. 3228.38s - 3229.22s | We have a kid's badge 3229.22s - 3231.78s | that we've been giving away to the kids. 3231.78s - 3233.42s | And yeah, we're just trying to do as much as we can 3233.42s - 3234.50s | to give back to the community 3234.50s - 3236.02s | and making sure that all the money 3236.02s - 3236.90s | that you guys might give us, 3236.90s - 3238.82s | either through donations or through badges, 3238.86s - 3240.10s | we pour back into this event 3240.10s - 3241.86s | so that way we can keep running it every year 3241.86s - 3244.30s | and go bigger and bigger if we can. 3244.30s - 3245.22s | Everything they said. 3245.22s - 3246.54s | And come to the Biohacking Village. 3246.54s - 3247.38s | You are all patients. 3247.38s - 3248.54s | You should all be very concerned 3248.54s - 3251.50s | about the vulnerabilities in these medical devices 3251.50s


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- 3224.54s | And we're also giving away a Tesla 3224.54s - 3225.98s | for our first place prize. 3225.98s - 3226.82s | And outside of that, 3226.82s - 3228.38s | we've also done stuff for kids this year. 3228.38s - 3229.22s | We have a kid's badge 3229.22s - 3231.78s | that we've been giving away to the kids. 3231.78s - 3233.42s | And yeah, we're just trying to do as much as we can 3233.42s - 3234.50s | to give back to the community 3234.50s - 3236.02s | and making sure that all the money 3236.02s - 3236.90s | that you guys might give us, 3236.90s - 3238.82s | either through donations or through badges, 3238.86s - 3240.10s | we pour back into this event 3240.10s - 3241.86s | so that way we can keep running it every year 3241.86s - 3244.30s | and go bigger and bigger if we can. 3244.30s - 3245.22s | Everything they said. 3245.22s - 3246.54s | And come to the Biohacking Village. 3246.54s - 3247.38s | You are all patients. 3247.38s - 3248.54s | You should all be very concerned 3248.54s - 3251.50s | about the vulnerabilities in these medical devices 3251.50s - 3252.70s | because they will affect your life. 3252.70s - 3254.74s | And every single one of these villages 3254.74s - 3258.22s | impacts Biohacking Village and the medical care you do get. 3258.22s - 3259.18s | I'll keep it brief. 3259.18s - 3260.14s | And just to say, 3260.14s - 3261.62s | if you're thinking about getting involved with the village, 3261.62s - 3262.46s | go volunteer. 3262.46s - 3263.58s | It'll change your life. 3263.58s - 3264.58s | Come see the Red Team Village. 3264.58s - 3266.70s | We have lots of workshops and talks still today. 3266.70s - 3267.54s | Most of us are, I think, 3267.54s - 3269.22s | closing probably like around like 12-ish today, 3269.22s - 3270.14s | but still come see us. 3270.14s - 3270.98s | We'd love to have you guys. 3270.98s - 3272.38s | Lots of swag at Red Team Village still. 3272.38s - 3273.78s | Please come and take it all. 3274.74s - 3275.58s | Okay. 3275.58s - 3276.42s | Airplanes are cool. 3276.42s - 3277.54s | Space is cool. 3278.54s - 3279.42s | Drones are cool. 3279.42s - 3281.02s | Come see us in Aerospace Village. 3281.02s -


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- 3252.70s | because they will affect your life. 3252.70s - 3254.74s | And every single one of these villages 3254.74s - 3258.22s | impacts Biohacking Village and the medical care you do get. 3258.22s - 3259.18s | I'll keep it brief. 3259.18s - 3260.14s | And just to say, 3260.14s - 3261.62s | if you're thinking about getting involved with the village, 3261.62s - 3262.46s | go volunteer. 3262.46s - 3263.58s | It'll change your life. 3263.58s - 3264.58s | Come see the Red Team Village. 3264.58s - 3266.70s | We have lots of workshops and talks still today. 3266.70s - 3267.54s | Most of us are, I think, 3267.54s - 3269.22s | closing probably like around like 12-ish today, 3269.22s - 3270.14s | but still come see us. 3270.14s - 3270.98s | We'd love to have you guys. 3270.98s - 3272.38s | Lots of swag at Red Team Village still. 3272.38s - 3273.78s | Please come and take it all. 3274.74s - 3275.58s | Okay. 3275.58s - 3276.42s | Airplanes are cool. 3276.42s - 3277.54s | Space is cool. 3278.54s - 3279.42s | Drones are cool. 3279.42s - 3281.02s | Come see us in Aerospace Village. 3281.02s - 3288.56s | Pilots are cool. 3288.56s - 3290.48s | My 10 second spiel is, 3290.48s - 3294.00s | Pedro and I have quit at least four times each this year. 3294.00s - 3295.48s | The only reason that we're still around 3295.48s - 3298.56s | is because we've done it on alternating points, 3298.56s - 3300.68s | but also because of these amazing people, 3300.68s - 3301.64s | all the village leaders, 3301.64s - 3304.76s | they do an amazing job bringing content to DEF CON. 3305.64s - 3306.48s | Thank you. 3306.48s - 3307.32s | I'm just here for the swag. 3308.44s - 3309.44s | And to hack cars.


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3288.56s | Pilots are cool. 3288.56s - 3290.48s | My 10 second spiel is, 3290.48s - 3294.00s | Pedro and I have quit at least four times each this year. 3294.00s - 3295.48s | The only reason that we're still around 3295.48s - 3298.56s | is because we've done it on alternating points, 3298.56s - 3300.68s | but also because of these amazing people, 3300.68s - 3301.64s | all the village leaders, 3301.64s - 3304.76s | they do an amazing job bringing content to DEF CON. 3305.64s - 3306.48s | Thank you. 3306.48s - 3307.32s | I'm just here for the swag. 3308.44s - 3309.44s | And to hack cars.


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{ "webpage_url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mrb_3z5OP2M", "title": "DEF CON 32 - Bluetooth Blues: Unmasking CVE 2023-52709-The TI BLE5-Stack Attack - Kevin Mitchell", "description": "In this talk, I will detail my discovery and analysis of CVE 2023-52709, a vulnerability in the TI Bluetooth stack. This flaw allows the stack to fail in generating a resolvable Random Private Address (RPA), which can lead to a Denial of Service (DoS) for already bonded peer devices. The discussion will cover the technical aspects of the vulnerability, the implications for automotive security, and potential mitigation strategies.", "channel_url": "https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC6Om9kAkl32dWlDSNlDS9Iw", "duration": 1590, "channel": "DEFCONConference", "uploader": "DEFCONConference", "upload_date": "20241016" } 0.00s - 6.96s | This text was transcribed using whisper model: large-v2 Okay. Thank you all for joining. My name is Kevin Mitchell. Today I want to talk to you 6.96s - 14.20s | all about a vulnerability that I discovered while testing a phone as key system. The official 14.20s - 22.80s | vulnerability title is CVE-2023-52709. The name of this talk is Bluetooth Blues Unmasking 22.80s - 38.43s | CVE-2023-52709, the TI-BLE5 stack attack. Okay. So here's the agenda. First I'm going 38.43s - 44.87s | to do a brief introduction, go into a little bit of a speaker bio, look at the impact of 44.87s - 49.27s | denial of service attacks on keyless entry systems, and then we're going to jump into 49.27s - 55.43s | the origin of the vulnerability itself, the timeline, the testing setup, the testing results, 55.43s - 59.59s | the outcome, the consequences, and then I want to talk to you about the vulnerability 59.59s - 65.59s | disclosure process with Texas Instruments and Bosch, and then we're going to jump into 65.59s - 71.23s | the denial of service attack details, looking at the attack mechanisms, also looking at 71.23s - 76.25s | some Wireshark analysis, and then I'm going to jump into the root cause analysis, give 76.25s - 82.95s | you some context behind the root cause analysis, some background, and then a detailed explanation. 82.95s - 88.15s | Then we're going to jump into the affected devices, the initial assessment of the affected 88.15s - 96.95s | devices, the updated list. After a couple of months of looking at this vulnerability, 96.95s - 101.31s | we found that it was more and more devices that were impacted by it. Then we're going 101.31s - 107.19s | to look


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bio, look at the impact of 44.87s - 49.27s | denial of service attacks on keyless entry systems, and then we're going to jump into 49.27s - 55.43s | the origin of the vulnerability itself, the timeline, the testing setup, the testing results, 55.43s - 59.59s | the outcome, the consequences, and then I want to talk to you about the vulnerability 59.59s - 65.59s | disclosure process with Texas Instruments and Bosch, and then we're going to jump into 65.59s - 71.23s | the denial of service attack details, looking at the attack mechanisms, also looking at 71.23s - 76.25s | some Wireshark analysis, and then I'm going to jump into the root cause analysis, give 76.25s - 82.95s | you some context behind the root cause analysis, some background, and then a detailed explanation. 82.95s - 88.15s | Then we're going to jump into the affected devices, the initial assessment of the affected 88.15s - 96.95s | devices, the updated list. After a couple of months of looking at this vulnerability, 96.95s - 101.31s | we found that it was more and more devices that were impacted by it. Then we're going 101.31s - 107.19s | to look at some of the real world impacts, potentially the supplier pre-production cost 107.19s - 111.79s | of the vulnerability, just looking at it from how much it would cost like Texas Instruments 111.79s - 117.95s | before these devices actually go into vehicles, and then just to give you some context, look 117.95s - 123.23s | at like some NISTA recall numbers as far as like how many recalls are typically done by 123.23s - 130.45s | NISTA on a year-to-year basis, and then going to the mitigation strategy, how Texas Instruments 130.45s - 137.03s | put out like an SDK to mitigate this issue, and then the conclusion, outcome, consequences, 137.03s - 140.59s | and then we're going to do a question and answers, and then you all can connect with 140.59s - 147.19s | me if you like. So a little bit about myself. My name is Kevin Mitchell. I've been doing 147.19s - 152.07s | IT since about 2008 once I joined the Army as a human resources information management 152.07s - 160.23s | system specialist. Then I worked for Hewlett-Packard for a little bit. Then I went to FCA where 160.23s - 166.67s | I was


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at some of the real world impacts, potentially the supplier pre-production cost 107.19s - 111.79s | of the vulnerability, just looking at it from how much it would cost like Texas Instruments 111.79s - 117.95s | before these devices actually go into vehicles, and then just to give you some context, look 117.95s - 123.23s | at like some NISTA recall numbers as far as like how many recalls are typically done by 123.23s - 130.45s | NISTA on a year-to-year basis, and then going to the mitigation strategy, how Texas Instruments 130.45s - 137.03s | put out like an SDK to mitigate this issue, and then the conclusion, outcome, consequences, 137.03s - 140.59s | and then we're going to do a question and answers, and then you all can connect with 140.59s - 147.19s | me if you like. So a little bit about myself. My name is Kevin Mitchell. I've been doing 147.19s - 152.07s | IT since about 2008 once I joined the Army as a human resources information management 152.07s - 160.23s | system specialist. Then I worked for Hewlett-Packard for a little bit. Then I went to FCA where 160.23s - 166.67s | I was hired as a certified ethical hacker on the Uconnect team after the infamous Jeep 166.67s - 171.15s | attack. I was like the only cybersecurity professional on the Uconnect team out of like 171.15s - 178.71s | a team of 30 QREs. I was like the only one specializing in automotive cybersecurity then, 178.71s - 182.95s | and then I went on to work for Mercedes-Benz Financial Services where I was doing some 182.95s - 188.97s | penetration testing, vulnerability management, as well as penetration testing management. 188.97s - 193.47s | Then I got into like some web application penetration testing, and then now to my current 193.47s - 197.91s | job right now where I am a senior automotive security tester where I work for a company 197.91s - 205.51s | called ETAS, and ETAS's primary goal is to enhance tomorrow's automotive software, and 205.51s - 209.05s | so like the way that I contribute to that goal is just by being an automotive security 209.05s - 217.55s | tester. I hack cars. And so I want to give you a quote by a famous hacker. The advance 217.55s - 221.35s | of technology is based on making it


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hired as a certified ethical hacker on the Uconnect team after the infamous Jeep 166.67s - 171.15s | attack. I was like the only cybersecurity professional on the Uconnect team out of like 171.15s - 178.71s | a team of 30 QREs. I was like the only one specializing in automotive cybersecurity then, 178.71s - 182.95s | and then I went on to work for Mercedes-Benz Financial Services where I was doing some 182.95s - 188.97s | penetration testing, vulnerability management, as well as penetration testing management. 188.97s - 193.47s | Then I got into like some web application penetration testing, and then now to my current 193.47s - 197.91s | job right now where I am a senior automotive security tester where I work for a company 197.91s - 205.51s | called ETAS, and ETAS's primary goal is to enhance tomorrow's automotive software, and 205.51s - 209.05s | so like the way that I contribute to that goal is just by being an automotive security 209.05s - 217.55s | tester. I hack cars. And so I want to give you a quote by a famous hacker. The advance 217.55s - 221.35s | of technology is based on making it fit in so that you really don't even notice it, so 221.35s - 229.11s | it's a part of everyday life by Bill Gates. And so if you look at technology, it's really 229.11s - 233.11s | baked into every aspect of our life. Like from the time that you wake up, you're probably 233.11s - 238.71s | using technology to make coffee to your daily commutes, and that's really where I want to 238.71s - 243.43s | focus on because I'm an automotive security tester, so I'm looking at technology when 243.43s - 251.35s | it comes to the automotive industry. And so I'm not here to pick on any one OEM, but 251.35s - 256.23s | I just did a random Google search, like how many vehicles does GM produce in a year? And 256.23s - 264.75s | so it says in the year 2023, GM sold about 6.2 million vehicles, right? So my next point 264.75s - 270.07s | is what is the average cost of an automotive recall? And so that average cost of an automotive 270.07s - 278.15s | recall is about $500. And so if you're looking at 6.2 million vehicles times 500, you


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fit in so that you really don't even notice it, so 221.35s - 229.11s | it's a part of everyday life by Bill Gates. And so if you look at technology, it's really 229.11s - 233.11s | baked into every aspect of our life. Like from the time that you wake up, you're probably 233.11s - 238.71s | using technology to make coffee to your daily commutes, and that's really where I want to 238.71s - 243.43s | focus on because I'm an automotive security tester, so I'm looking at technology when 243.43s - 251.35s | it comes to the automotive industry. And so I'm not here to pick on any one OEM, but 251.35s - 256.23s | I just did a random Google search, like how many vehicles does GM produce in a year? And 256.23s - 264.75s | so it says in the year 2023, GM sold about 6.2 million vehicles, right? So my next point 264.75s - 270.07s | is what is the average cost of an automotive recall? And so that average cost of an automotive 270.07s - 278.15s | recall is about $500. And so if you're looking at 6.2 million vehicles times 500, you really 278.15s - 282.39s | get to see, like, the impact. And that might not be an accurate number, but we're just, 282.39s - 287.63s | you know, providing these numbers for context and seeing, like, how much, you know, a recall 287.63s - 294.63s | could actually affect your everyday life. And so it leads me to my next quote. The problem 294.63s - 300.39s | with technology is when it doesn't work, you're SOL. That's from a clerk at a corner 300.39s - 308.87s | store after a failed tap to pay. So now I'm going to jump into the origin of the CVE itself. 308.87s - 314.39s | Okay, so if you look at these updates, I didn't provide exact dates for them. I just kind 314.39s - 319.59s | of provided the months. But if you're tracking, we'll just say each update was a different 319.59s - 325.55s | day. So the first update, Texas Instruments acknowledges the vulnerability disclosure 325.55s - 332.39s | that we provided them on the phone as key systems in the BLE-5 stack. The next update 332.39s - 340.03s | the next day, the Texas Instruments engineers were unable to reproduce


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really 278.15s - 282.39s | get to see, like, the impact. And that might not be an accurate number, but we're just, 282.39s - 287.63s | you know, providing these numbers for context and seeing, like, how much, you know, a recall 287.63s - 294.63s | could actually affect your everyday life. And so it leads me to my next quote. The problem 294.63s - 300.39s | with technology is when it doesn't work, you're SOL. That's from a clerk at a corner 300.39s - 308.87s | store after a failed tap to pay. So now I'm going to jump into the origin of the CVE itself. 308.87s - 314.39s | Okay, so if you look at these updates, I didn't provide exact dates for them. I just kind 314.39s - 319.59s | of provided the months. But if you're tracking, we'll just say each update was a different 319.59s - 325.55s | day. So the first update, Texas Instruments acknowledges the vulnerability disclosure 325.55s - 332.39s | that we provided them on the phone as key systems in the BLE-5 stack. The next update 332.39s - 340.03s | the next day, the Texas Instruments engineers were unable to reproduce the issue based on 340.03s - 347.77s | the report that we sent them. Then I replied with instructions on how to actually reproduce 347.81s - 353.45s | the issue. The next day, they came back and said, we cannot reproduce this issue. And 353.45s - 358.85s | so after that, I doubled down and just reworded my previous email in telling them how to reproduce 358.85s - 363.53s | the issue. And then, you know, I was working with Bosch. So a couple of Bosch engineers 363.53s - 371.81s | suggested that I test the TI launch pad, which is just like, yeah, it's essentially just 371.81s - 377.59s | like a microcontroller that's used for development. And they were like, you should pretty much 377.59s - 381.91s | test the launch pad to see if you can get the launch pad to fail in the same way that 381.91s - 387.45s | you got the phone as key systems to fail. And so the next update, TI engineers were 387.45s - 391.81s | asking me clarifying questions and tripling down based on the previous communications 391.81s - 395.19s | that they actually couldn't just reproduce the issue. So


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the issue based on 340.03s - 347.77s | the report that we sent them. Then I replied with instructions on how to actually reproduce 347.81s - 353.45s | the issue. The next day, they came back and said, we cannot reproduce this issue. And 353.45s - 358.85s | so after that, I doubled down and just reworded my previous email in telling them how to reproduce 358.85s - 363.53s | the issue. And then, you know, I was working with Bosch. So a couple of Bosch engineers 363.53s - 371.81s | suggested that I test the TI launch pad, which is just like, yeah, it's essentially just 371.81s - 377.59s | like a microcontroller that's used for development. And they were like, you should pretty much 377.59s - 381.91s | test the launch pad to see if you can get the launch pad to fail in the same way that 381.91s - 387.45s | you got the phone as key systems to fail. And so the next update, TI engineers were 387.45s - 391.81s | asking me clarifying questions and tripling down based on the previous communications 391.81s - 395.19s | that they actually couldn't just reproduce the issue. So then I decided to schedule a 395.19s - 401.15s | meeting with the stakeholders. I demoed the issue, and I was able to reproduce the issue 401.15s - 407.71s | and show them the actual testing method on how I was actually able to do that. And this 407.71s - 411.23s | is happening. You know, this is going on the entire month of August and then the entire 411.23s - 417.83s | month of September. And so the Bosch engineers that I actually worked with, they were able 417.83s - 422.87s | to reproduce the same issue that we had initially sent them, that we had initially sent Texas 422.87s - 427.51s | Instruments. And so the reason why it was important that Bosch engineers actually, you 427.51s - 432.75s | know, helped me verify that this was actually an issue, because if I'm telling them they 432.75s - 437.11s | have a vulnerability and I'm the only one who can demo the vulnerability, is it really 437.11s - 442.51s | a vulnerability? Or if it's not really reproducible by anybody besides me, is it even something 442.51s - 448.43s | that can be verified? Where's the veracity in


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then I decided to schedule a 395.19s - 401.15s | meeting with the stakeholders. I demoed the issue, and I was able to reproduce the issue 401.15s - 407.71s | and show them the actual testing method on how I was actually able to do that. And this 407.71s - 411.23s | is happening. You know, this is going on the entire month of August and then the entire 411.23s - 417.83s | month of September. And so the Bosch engineers that I actually worked with, they were able 417.83s - 422.87s | to reproduce the same issue that we had initially sent them, that we had initially sent Texas 422.87s - 427.51s | Instruments. And so the reason why it was important that Bosch engineers actually, you 427.51s - 432.75s | know, helped me verify that this was actually an issue, because if I'm telling them they 432.75s - 437.11s | have a vulnerability and I'm the only one who can demo the vulnerability, is it really 437.11s - 442.51s | a vulnerability? Or if it's not really reproducible by anybody besides me, is it even something 442.51s - 448.43s | that can be verified? Where's the veracity in that? So then we actually had the Bosch 448.43s - 453.79s | engineers come into the ETAS office, and the Bosch engineers were also able to reproduce 453.79s - 458.31s | the issue on the Phonus key systems. And before then, I was able to reproduce the issue 458.31s - 463.59s | on the launch pad, like they suggested. And so we now have, I was able to reproduce the 463.59s - 468.35s | issue on the Phonus key systems and the launch pad, and Bosch engineers were able to do the 468.35s - 472.59s | exact same thing. And so at this point, I think it's a pretty good time to report it 472.59s - 478.07s | to Bosch PSIRT. And the reason why I reported it to Bosch PSIRT is because they're a CNA. 478.07s - 485.23s | They have the ability to, they have the ability to create CVEs. And so, you know, I wanted 485.23s - 490.87s | to get this out there as soon as possible. So then Texas Instruments stakeholders respond 490.87s - 497.39s | to Bosch really, you know, putting forth that CVE and contacting them. And they said that 497.39s - 504.03s


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that? So then we actually had the Bosch 448.43s - 453.79s | engineers come into the ETAS office, and the Bosch engineers were also able to reproduce 453.79s - 458.31s | the issue on the Phonus key systems. And before then, I was able to reproduce the issue 458.31s - 463.59s | on the launch pad, like they suggested. And so we now have, I was able to reproduce the 463.59s - 468.35s | issue on the Phonus key systems and the launch pad, and Bosch engineers were able to do the 468.35s - 472.59s | exact same thing. And so at this point, I think it's a pretty good time to report it 472.59s - 478.07s | to Bosch PSIRT. And the reason why I reported it to Bosch PSIRT is because they're a CNA. 478.07s - 485.23s | They have the ability to, they have the ability to create CVEs. And so, you know, I wanted 485.23s - 490.87s | to get this out there as soon as possible. So then Texas Instruments stakeholders respond 490.87s - 497.39s | to Bosch really, you know, putting forth that CVE and contacting them. And they said that 497.39s - 504.03s | they needed, you know, time to review the issue and try to reproduce again. So the next 504.03s - 511.39s | update, you know, this happened, like I said, August, September, November. Yeah. August, 511.39s - 517.91s | September, October, November. And by the time we get to November, the TI engineers are like 517.91s - 524.11s | quadrupling down and they're pretty much saying, we're going to stop testing this issue until 524.11s - 527.75s | you can show us exactly how to do this. But at this time, I had already shown them how 527.75s - 535.15s | to do this like three or four times. So internally, TI is actually escalating this issue. And 535.15s - 541.55s | then Bosch, some Bosch engineers pretty much detail the differences in Texas Instruments 541.55s - 549.21s | testing setup and my testing setup. A few moments later, Texas Instruments engineers 549.21s - 558.09s | are finally able to reproduce the vulnerability on the launch pad or aka the CC26X2R1. And 558.09s - 564.77s | the reason why this is important, this is important is because the vulnerability or 564.77s - 572.25s | I'm sorry, the responsible disclosure period


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| they needed, you know, time to review the issue and try to reproduce again. So the next 504.03s - 511.39s | update, you know, this happened, like I said, August, September, November. Yeah. August, 511.39s - 517.91s | September, October, November. And by the time we get to November, the TI engineers are like 517.91s - 524.11s | quadrupling down and they're pretty much saying, we're going to stop testing this issue until 524.11s - 527.75s | you can show us exactly how to do this. But at this time, I had already shown them how 527.75s - 535.15s | to do this like three or four times. So internally, TI is actually escalating this issue. And 535.15s - 541.55s | then Bosch, some Bosch engineers pretty much detail the differences in Texas Instruments 541.55s - 549.21s | testing setup and my testing setup. A few moments later, Texas Instruments engineers 549.21s - 558.09s | are finally able to reproduce the vulnerability on the launch pad or aka the CC26X2R1. And 558.09s - 564.77s | the reason why this is important, this is important is because the vulnerability or 564.77s - 572.25s | I'm sorry, the responsible disclosure period does not start until after the engineers of 572.25s - 579.69s | the responsible company are able to reproduce the issue. And so that responsible disclosure 579.69s - 584.85s | period was about like six months. And so that mean, that meant that I actually couldn't 584.85s - 589.57s | talk about this vulnerability until six months till after they were able to reproduce the 589.57s - 595.77s | issue. Coincidentally enough, two weeks after they were able to reproduce the issue, they 595.77s - 604.49s | had a mitigating SDK, and they were ready to push out that the mitigations. Okay, so 604.49s - 609.13s | now I'm going to go into like the testing setup. And I forgot to give my disclaimer 609.13s - 614.85s | that all the images were created by chat GPT. But we have like an Alice in Wonderland theme 614.85s - 619.81s | here. So you'll keep seeing like Alice in Wonderland kind of theme here. And what I'm 619.81s - 625.45s | trying to show with this image is like you're using legacy systems on new vehicles, you're 625.45s - 629.65s | using the legacy technology on new vehicles, and there's pretty


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does not start until after the engineers of 572.25s - 579.69s | the responsible company are able to reproduce the issue. And so that responsible disclosure 579.69s - 584.85s | period was about like six months. And so that mean, that meant that I actually couldn't 584.85s - 589.57s | talk about this vulnerability until six months till after they were able to reproduce the 589.57s - 595.77s | issue. Coincidentally enough, two weeks after they were able to reproduce the issue, they 595.77s - 604.49s | had a mitigating SDK, and they were ready to push out that the mitigations. Okay, so 604.49s - 609.13s | now I'm going to go into like the testing setup. And I forgot to give my disclaimer 609.13s - 614.85s | that all the images were created by chat GPT. But we have like an Alice in Wonderland theme 614.85s - 619.81s | here. So you'll keep seeing like Alice in Wonderland kind of theme here. And what I'm 619.81s - 625.45s | trying to show with this image is like you're using legacy systems on new vehicles, you're 625.45s - 629.65s | using the legacy technology on new vehicles, and there's pretty much making them vulnerable. 629.65s - 637.77s | So the hardware setup that you know, we use was going to be the CCX2, the CC26X2R1 as 637.77s - 645.37s | the device under test. And then we also had a BLE654 dongle as the central device that's 645.37s - 650.45s | actually connecting to the device under test and testing it. And then we're also using 651.45s - 657.13s | Defensics test case. The specific test case for this vulnerability was test case 1001. 657.13s - 662.53s | And it's a security manager protocol test case. And I'll jump into that in detail. Shout 662.53s - 668.33s | out to Synopsys for in Defensics for, you know, helping me discover this vulnerability 668.33s - 673.93s | and you know, having the tools that allow me to do my job. So it's my quick shout out. 673.93s - 679.89s | So the testing results. So the outcome of the test when running Defensics fuzzing test 679.89s - 688.13s | case 1001 on loop mode, the device under test using a resolvable private address for 688.13s - 697.57s | connecting or connectable advertising, the device ends up generating unresolvable RPAs 697.57s -


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much making them vulnerable. 629.65s - 637.77s | So the hardware setup that you know, we use was going to be the CCX2, the CC26X2R1 as 637.77s - 645.37s | the device under test. And then we also had a BLE654 dongle as the central device that's 645.37s - 650.45s | actually connecting to the device under test and testing it. And then we're also using 651.45s - 657.13s | Defensics test case. The specific test case for this vulnerability was test case 1001. 657.13s - 662.53s | And it's a security manager protocol test case. And I'll jump into that in detail. Shout 662.53s - 668.33s | out to Synopsys for in Defensics for, you know, helping me discover this vulnerability 668.33s - 673.93s | and you know, having the tools that allow me to do my job. So it's my quick shout out. 673.93s - 679.89s | So the testing results. So the outcome of the test when running Defensics fuzzing test 679.89s - 688.13s | case 1001 on loop mode, the device under test using a resolvable private address for 688.13s - 697.57s | connecting or connectable advertising, the device ends up generating unresolvable RPAs 697.57s - 702.09s | after a while, which causes a denial of service. And I'll really jump into this. So I went 702.09s - 710.05s | back and forth with Texas Instruments on the CVE base score because in the phone as 710.05s - 715.85s | a key system, it failed every time. And once it failed, if you are using your phone as 715.85s - 723.77s | a key and you lock your door and I come behind you and run this exploit, you actually can't 723.77s - 729.13s | get back into your vehicle until you hard reset the vehicle. So if we're looking at 729.13s - 735.05s | the CIA or, you know, triad, we're looking at confidentiality, integrity and availability. 735.05s - 739.77s | In my mind, if I knocked off one of those, you know, triads, if I knocked off availability, 739.77s - 743.93s | I would think it's a high severity vulnerability at the very least. But they, you know, came 743.93s - 747.25s | back and said, you know, this is the case when it comes to phone as key systems, but 747.25s - 754.85s | it might not be the case in every other


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702.09s | after a while, which causes a denial of service. And I'll really jump into this. So I went 702.09s - 710.05s | back and forth with Texas Instruments on the CVE base score because in the phone as 710.05s - 715.85s | a key system, it failed every time. And once it failed, if you are using your phone as 715.85s - 723.77s | a key and you lock your door and I come behind you and run this exploit, you actually can't 723.77s - 729.13s | get back into your vehicle until you hard reset the vehicle. So if we're looking at 729.13s - 735.05s | the CIA or, you know, triad, we're looking at confidentiality, integrity and availability. 735.05s - 739.77s | In my mind, if I knocked off one of those, you know, triads, if I knocked off availability, 739.77s - 743.93s | I would think it's a high severity vulnerability at the very least. But they, you know, came 743.93s - 747.25s | back and said, you know, this is the case when it comes to phone as key systems, but 747.25s - 754.85s | it might not be the case in every other application that uses the TI BLE5 stack. And so that made 754.85s - 761.73s | me think that, oh, this might be a little bit bigger, you know, issue than just automotive. 761.73s - 768.01s | So the consequence of this is the vulnerability can impact BLE devices running the affected 768.01s - 775.29s | SDK versions and the devices that are enabled with Bluetooth privacy with resolvable private 775.29s - 779.29s | address feature. And I'm going to jump into this a little bit later about the context 779.29s - 785.73s | about the RPAs. And so the vulnerability disclosure, the, you know, the vulnerability 785.73s - 793.03s | disclosure that the Texas Instruments PSIRT team came back and pretty much they created 793.03s - 800.33s | an internal PSIRT ID. And this is the PSIRT ID. And this was the initial advisory, the 800.33s - 805.13s | very, very initial advisory before we started to discover how many different devices that 805.13s - 812.65s | this actually affected. So they just labeled this as the CCX or CC26X2R1 BLE denial of 812.65s - 817.85s | service through unexpected RPAs. And like I said, this is just the first


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application that uses the TI BLE5 stack. And so that made 754.85s - 761.73s | me think that, oh, this might be a little bit bigger, you know, issue than just automotive. 761.73s - 768.01s | So the consequence of this is the vulnerability can impact BLE devices running the affected 768.01s - 775.29s | SDK versions and the devices that are enabled with Bluetooth privacy with resolvable private 775.29s - 779.29s | address feature. And I'm going to jump into this a little bit later about the context 779.29s - 785.73s | about the RPAs. And so the vulnerability disclosure, the, you know, the vulnerability 785.73s - 793.03s | disclosure that the Texas Instruments PSIRT team came back and pretty much they created 793.03s - 800.33s | an internal PSIRT ID. And this is the PSIRT ID. And this was the initial advisory, the 800.33s - 805.13s | very, very initial advisory before we started to discover how many different devices that 805.13s - 812.65s | this actually affected. So they just labeled this as the CCX or CC26X2R1 BLE denial of 812.65s - 817.85s | service through unexpected RPAs. And like I said, this is just the first response that 817.85s - 825.09s | they gave us. When Bosch PSIRT actually published their security advisory based on what Texas 825.09s - 831.81s | Instruments sent us, they created the CVE with the same base score, and they updated 831.81s - 837.97s | the title of that CVE to TI Bluetooth stack can fail to generate resolvable random private 837.97s - 842.49s | addresses leading to a denial of service for already peer-bonded devices. And I'm going 842.49s - 847.85s | to jump into that because it's, you know, it's kind of deep because if a device is already 847.85s - 854.17s | peer-bonded to it and I'm running this attack on it, then every device that was previously 854.17s - 858.61s | connected to it will not be able to actually connect to it again until there is a hard 858.61s - 862.13s | reset. Now, if we're talking about a vehicle, then you actually have to get into the vehicle 862.13s - 866.69s | and hard reset the vehicle or restart it. But if you're only like using your phone as 866.69s - 871.53s | a key, then how are you going to do that? So looking


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response that 817.85s - 825.09s | they gave us. When Bosch PSIRT actually published their security advisory based on what Texas 825.09s - 831.81s | Instruments sent us, they created the CVE with the same base score, and they updated 831.81s - 837.97s | the title of that CVE to TI Bluetooth stack can fail to generate resolvable random private 837.97s - 842.49s | addresses leading to a denial of service for already peer-bonded devices. And I'm going 842.49s - 847.85s | to jump into that because it's, you know, it's kind of deep because if a device is already 847.85s - 854.17s | peer-bonded to it and I'm running this attack on it, then every device that was previously 854.17s - 858.61s | connected to it will not be able to actually connect to it again until there is a hard 858.61s - 862.13s | reset. Now, if we're talking about a vehicle, then you actually have to get into the vehicle 862.13s - 866.69s | and hard reset the vehicle or restart it. But if you're only like using your phone as 866.69s - 871.53s | a key, then how are you going to do that? So looking at the details itself, we're looking 871.53s - 879.01s | at Defensics Test Case 1001, and this is specifically on the CC26X2R1. And the reason why I'm showing 879.01s - 888.53s | this is because Defensics Test Case 1001 does not always work on the development chip 888.53s - 894.41s | or the development board, but the test case works 100% of the time on the phone as key 894.41s - 901.37s | systems. And the reason why I decided to escalate this to Bosch PSIRT is because there was another 901.37s - 910.81s | test case that worked specifically on the phone as key systems and on the CC26X2R1. 910.81s - 914.85s | And this is Test Case 3. And I'm not sure how small that font is, but I can kind of 914.85s - 920.69s | go over it with you all. So you get a pairing request, and then you get a pairing confirm 920.69s - 926.01s | that the testing device or the central is sending the device under test. So it sends 926.01s - 931.05s | it a pairing request, and then it also sends it a pairing confirmation, and then it sends 931.05s -


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at the details itself, we're looking 871.53s - 879.01s | at Defensics Test Case 1001, and this is specifically on the CC26X2R1. And the reason why I'm showing 879.01s - 888.53s | this is because Defensics Test Case 1001 does not always work on the development chip 888.53s - 894.41s | or the development board, but the test case works 100% of the time on the phone as key 894.41s - 901.37s | systems. And the reason why I decided to escalate this to Bosch PSIRT is because there was another 901.37s - 910.81s | test case that worked specifically on the phone as key systems and on the CC26X2R1. 910.81s - 914.85s | And this is Test Case 3. And I'm not sure how small that font is, but I can kind of 914.85s - 920.69s | go over it with you all. So you get a pairing request, and then you get a pairing confirm 920.69s - 926.01s | that the testing device or the central is sending the device under test. So it sends 926.01s - 931.05s | it a pairing request, and then it also sends it a pairing confirmation, and then it sends 931.05s - 936.89s | it a pairing random. And when it sends it that pairing random, essentially, encryption 936.89s - 942.01s | fails and the device no longer is responding to previously peer-bonded devices. And this 942.01s - 946.97s | is a little bit of context to showing you exactly, like, the structure of the packets 946.97s - 954.78s | that were being sent to the device under test. Okay. And so we're looking at a Wireshark 954.78s - 960.98s | analysis of Test Case 3 because Test Case 3 is, you know, something that we're building 960.98s - 967.02s | our proof of concept off of. So like I said, you send it the 128 bytes plus the 8-byte 967.02s - 974.66s | header, and it receives that pairing request. And then it – then you also send it a pairing 974.66s - 980.46s | confirmation, and then you send it a pairing random. And so we developed a POC that pretty 980.46s - 985.78s | much automates the connection of the pairing process with the Bluetooth device, sending 985.78s - 990.62s | a specific sequence of pairing messages that, you know, like I said, the pairing request, 990.62s - 994.38s


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936.89s | it a pairing random. And when it sends it that pairing random, essentially, encryption 936.89s - 942.01s | fails and the device no longer is responding to previously peer-bonded devices. And this 942.01s - 946.97s | is a little bit of context to showing you exactly, like, the structure of the packets 946.97s - 954.78s | that were being sent to the device under test. Okay. And so we're looking at a Wireshark 954.78s - 960.98s | analysis of Test Case 3 because Test Case 3 is, you know, something that we're building 960.98s - 967.02s | our proof of concept off of. So like I said, you send it the 128 bytes plus the 8-byte 967.02s - 974.66s | header, and it receives that pairing request. And then it – then you also send it a pairing 974.66s - 980.46s | confirmation, and then you send it a pairing random. And so we developed a POC that pretty 980.46s - 985.78s | much automates the connection of the pairing process with the Bluetooth device, sending 985.78s - 990.62s | a specific sequence of pairing messages that, you know, like I said, the pairing request, 990.62s - 994.38s | encryption confirmation, pairing random. And like I said, this will pretty much get 994.38s - 1000.82s | the device to fail 100 percent of the time. So we'll have a GitHub, and the POC isn't 1000.82s - 1004.62s | published as of yet, but as soon as I get done with this talk, I'll make sure that I 1004.62s - 1010.30s | make this, like, available to everybody. And so if we're looking at the root cause analysis, 1010.30s - 1014.66s | this is where it's going to get maybe a little technical, maybe a little bit boring. Every 1014.66s - 1020.80s | Bluetooth low-energy device has a unique 48-bit address, and these addresses are pretty 1020.80s - 1025.94s | much characterized into public addresses and then random addresses. And the random addresses 1025.94s - 1032.02s | can be further classified into static addresses or private addresses, and depending on whether 1032.02s - 1038.16s | or not they change. And furthermore, private addresses can either be resolvable or non-resolvable. 1038.16s - 1044.18s | So all BLE devices must either have a public address or a random static address, and they 1044.18s - 1050.30s | also can have a resolvable


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| encryption confirmation, pairing random. And like I said, this will pretty much get 994.38s - 1000.82s | the device to fail 100 percent of the time. So we'll have a GitHub, and the POC isn't 1000.82s - 1004.62s | published as of yet, but as soon as I get done with this talk, I'll make sure that I 1004.62s - 1010.30s | make this, like, available to everybody. And so if we're looking at the root cause analysis, 1010.30s - 1014.66s | this is where it's going to get maybe a little technical, maybe a little bit boring. Every 1014.66s - 1020.80s | Bluetooth low-energy device has a unique 48-bit address, and these addresses are pretty 1020.80s - 1025.94s | much characterized into public addresses and then random addresses. And the random addresses 1025.94s - 1032.02s | can be further classified into static addresses or private addresses, and depending on whether 1032.02s - 1038.16s | or not they change. And furthermore, private addresses can either be resolvable or non-resolvable. 1038.16s - 1044.18s | So all BLE devices must either have a public address or a random static address, and they 1044.18s - 1050.30s | also can have a resolvable or non-resolvable private address, which is pretty much just 1050.30s - 1055.66s | typically used for, like, security reasons. And so this is the boring but exciting part 1055.66s - 1061.14s | for me. Okay, so you have random addresses, random private addresses, which are pretty 1061.14s - 1066.06s | much used in addition to public or random static addresses when a device wishes to protect 1066.06s - 1073.14s | its privacy. And then moving on to the resolvable random private addresses, a resolvable private 1073.14s - 1078.14s | address is true to its name. It's intended to have users, like, have this pre-shared 1078.14s - 1083.70s | key that the device can pretty much figure out the address every time it changes. And 1083.70s - 1088.98s | so the pre-shared key is the identity-resolving key, which is used to generate and resolve 1088.98s - 1095.38s | random addresses. Kind of boring stuff, right? And then we have non-resolvable random private 1095.38s - 1102.70s | addresses. And non-resolvable random private addresses is pretty much used by devices when 1102.70s - 1110.34s | they want to prevent tracking. And this is not commonly used, but it's relevant for this, 1110.34s -


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or non-resolvable private address, which is pretty much just 1050.30s - 1055.66s | typically used for, like, security reasons. And so this is the boring but exciting part 1055.66s - 1061.14s | for me. Okay, so you have random addresses, random private addresses, which are pretty 1061.14s - 1066.06s | much used in addition to public or random static addresses when a device wishes to protect 1066.06s - 1073.14s | its privacy. And then moving on to the resolvable random private addresses, a resolvable private 1073.14s - 1078.14s | address is true to its name. It's intended to have users, like, have this pre-shared 1078.14s - 1083.70s | key that the device can pretty much figure out the address every time it changes. And 1083.70s - 1088.98s | so the pre-shared key is the identity-resolving key, which is used to generate and resolve 1088.98s - 1095.38s | random addresses. Kind of boring stuff, right? And then we have non-resolvable random private 1095.38s - 1102.70s | addresses. And non-resolvable random private addresses is pretty much used by devices when 1102.70s - 1110.34s | they want to prevent tracking. And this is not commonly used, but it's relevant for this, 1110.34s - 1119.30s | you know, hack. And so providing a little bit of context, the BLE core specification 1119.30s - 1125.90s | of the Bluetooth 5.3 core specification of Volume 6, Part B, 4.7, the resolving list, 1125.90s - 1130.94s | if the link layer using the resolving list and the peer device has been resolved but 1130.94s - 1136.38s | encryption fails, the resolvable private address shall be immediately discarded and 1136.38s - 1140.74s | a new private address will be generated. So this is kind of like, you know, where we're 1140.74s - 1144.86s | looking at. I'm providing you all a little bit of context as well as, like, this root 1144.86s - 1152.10s | cause analysis. So this is what we received back from Texas Instruments verbatim for, 1152.10s - 1157.90s | like the reason for the failure. So the malformed packet in our stack map link layer encrypt 1158.06s - 1163.50s | decrypt will return false and then trigger RPA update. But however, at this point, the stack 1163.50s - 1168.94s | has not terminated the link. So for the next ACL packet within the same connection, that function 1168.94s - 1173.42s | will still get


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1119.30s | you know, hack. And so providing a little bit of context, the BLE core specification 1119.30s - 1125.90s | of the Bluetooth 5.3 core specification of Volume 6, Part B, 4.7, the resolving list, 1125.90s - 1130.94s | if the link layer using the resolving list and the peer device has been resolved but 1130.94s - 1136.38s | encryption fails, the resolvable private address shall be immediately discarded and 1136.38s - 1140.74s | a new private address will be generated. So this is kind of like, you know, where we're 1140.74s - 1144.86s | looking at. I'm providing you all a little bit of context as well as, like, this root 1144.86s - 1152.10s | cause analysis. So this is what we received back from Texas Instruments verbatim for, 1152.10s - 1157.90s | like the reason for the failure. So the malformed packet in our stack map link layer encrypt 1158.06s - 1163.50s | decrypt will return false and then trigger RPA update. But however, at this point, the stack 1163.50s - 1168.94s | has not terminated the link. So for the next ACL packet within the same connection, that function 1168.94s - 1173.42s | will still get called. And when that function gets called right before the RPA update is 1173.42s - 1179.46s | happening, then the RPA update using encryption will fail, which leads to non-resolvable private 1179.46s - 1184.42s | addresses. And so the reason why I gave you this context before is because it's like the 1184.42s - 1188.62s | device is actually operating according to the Bluetooth stack itself or according to the 1188.62s - 1194.82s | Bluetooth specification itself, right? It receives a pairing request, it receives a 1194.82s - 1199.22s | pairing confirmation, and then it receives a pairing random and that pairing random 1199.26s - 1204.42s | actually makes the encryption fail. And once the encryption fails, then the MAC address is 1204.46s - 1209.38s | automatically discarded. The MAC address is automatically discarded. And when the MAC 1209.38s - 1214.46s | address is automatically discarded, every previously peer bonded device can no longer can 1214.46s - 1220.26s | connect to the device. So that's what we're seeing. And that's kind of like, you know, the 1220.26s - 1227.50s | root cause analysis of of the vulnerability itself. I found it exciting, you know, to really 1227.50s - 1231.50s |


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called. And when that function gets called right before the RPA update is 1173.42s - 1179.46s | happening, then the RPA update using encryption will fail, which leads to non-resolvable private 1179.46s - 1184.42s | addresses. And so the reason why I gave you this context before is because it's like the 1184.42s - 1188.62s | device is actually operating according to the Bluetooth stack itself or according to the 1188.62s - 1194.82s | Bluetooth specification itself, right? It receives a pairing request, it receives a 1194.82s - 1199.22s | pairing confirmation, and then it receives a pairing random and that pairing random 1199.26s - 1204.42s | actually makes the encryption fail. And once the encryption fails, then the MAC address is 1204.46s - 1209.38s | automatically discarded. The MAC address is automatically discarded. And when the MAC 1209.38s - 1214.46s | address is automatically discarded, every previously peer bonded device can no longer can 1214.46s - 1220.26s | connect to the device. So that's what we're seeing. And that's kind of like, you know, the 1220.26s - 1227.50s | root cause analysis of of the vulnerability itself. I found it exciting, you know, to really 1227.50s - 1231.50s | do like a deep dive and understand exactly what's happening, because it's not like Texas 1231.50s - 1238.34s | Instruments, like, did a bad job at actually, like, you know, developing this system. Things 1238.38s - 1243.46s | just happened too fast. And like I said, the link wasn't actually terminating. So it just 1243.46s - 1249.90s | caused a denial of service. So now we want to look at the affected devices. So initially, we 1249.90s - 1257.18s | had 19 different affected parts and two different software development kits. And so these 1257.18s - 1261.86s | are all the kits and the software versions that were affected by it in the software stack. I 1261.86s - 1267.02s | was pretty proud of myself, like the BLE-5 stack, you know, vulnerability on that. It seemed, 1267.06s - 1272.98s | you know, rewarding, especially being a penetration tester on automotive, you know, on 1272.98s - 1277.42s | vehicles. And sometimes if you don't go about it the right way, you really can't talk about some 1277.42s - 1281.62s | of your research. And so this was just a confirmation that we went about it the right way, 1281.62s - 1286.38s


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do like a deep dive and understand exactly what's happening, because it's not like Texas 1231.50s - 1238.34s | Instruments, like, did a bad job at actually, like, you know, developing this system. Things 1238.38s - 1243.46s | just happened too fast. And like I said, the link wasn't actually terminating. So it just 1243.46s - 1249.90s | caused a denial of service. So now we want to look at the affected devices. So initially, we 1249.90s - 1257.18s | had 19 different affected parts and two different software development kits. And so these 1257.18s - 1261.86s | are all the kits and the software versions that were affected by it in the software stack. I 1261.86s - 1267.02s | was pretty proud of myself, like the BLE-5 stack, you know, vulnerability on that. It seemed, 1267.06s - 1272.98s | you know, rewarding, especially being a penetration tester on automotive, you know, on 1272.98s - 1277.42s | vehicles. And sometimes if you don't go about it the right way, you really can't talk about some 1277.42s - 1281.62s | of your research. And so this was just a confirmation that we went about it the right way, 1281.62s - 1286.38s | we handled the responsible disclosure period the right way. And now, you know, we're, you 1286.38s - 1293.98s | know, enjoying the fruits of my labor. So Texas Instruments, after a couple of months, you 1293.98s - 1297.06s | know, I was asking them, hey, when are you guys going to publish? When are you guys going to 1297.06s - 1301.54s | publish? And I realized that they weren't publishing because they were still discovering 1301.98s - 1307.70s | devices within their inventory that were still vulnerable. And so they updated it from 19 1307.70s - 1314.30s | parts to 28 parts in six different software versions. And I found this pretty interesting, 1314.30s - 1323.42s | right? There's a BLE-5 stack, BLE-5 stack, BLE stack 2.X, I don't know what that is. But at 1323.42s - 1330.54s | any rate, we have, you know, an updated parts list, and it included 28 parts. And I did a, you 1330.54s - 1336.66s | know, a little bit of a research on the, on all of these parts that are listed here. And I was 1336.66s - 1340.58s | looking at the real world impact. And so if you go


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| we handled the responsible disclosure period the right way. And now, you know, we're, you 1286.38s - 1293.98s | know, enjoying the fruits of my labor. So Texas Instruments, after a couple of months, you 1293.98s - 1297.06s | know, I was asking them, hey, when are you guys going to publish? When are you guys going to 1297.06s - 1301.54s | publish? And I realized that they weren't publishing because they were still discovering 1301.98s - 1307.70s | devices within their inventory that were still vulnerable. And so they updated it from 19 1307.70s - 1314.30s | parts to 28 parts in six different software versions. And I found this pretty interesting, 1314.30s - 1323.42s | right? There's a BLE-5 stack, BLE-5 stack, BLE stack 2.X, I don't know what that is. But at 1323.42s - 1330.54s | any rate, we have, you know, an updated parts list, and it included 28 parts. And I did a, you 1330.54s - 1336.66s | know, a little bit of a research on the, on all of these parts that are listed here. And I was 1336.66s - 1340.58s | looking at the real world impact. And so if you go on texasinstruments.com, you can actually 1340.58s - 1344.86s | search their inventory by parts. And so I was able to see all of these vulnerable parts that 1344.86s - 1349.78s | were listed here. And what I have in bold are just the automotive parts. And so, you know, I'm 1349.78s - 1354.42s | suspecting in Texas Instruments, the reason why they said that this is not a high severity 1354.42s - 1358.10s | vulnerability is because they have other devices such as like medical devices that this 1358.10s - 1363.18s | vulnerable, that this vulnerability is, is, is present on. I haven't done the research to see, 1363.18s - 1368.94s | you know, what devices are actually affected. But you know, I was just more so concerned about 1368.94s - 1374.06s | like the automotive part of it. So there's like, 2.6 million devices that they have in their 1374.06s - 1380.54s | inventory. And that's about $2.6 million in inventory that they have. But that is before 1380.54s - 1387.38s | these devices actually get sold to any OEM and OEM puts their software on top of that. So that's 1387.38s - 1391.42s | why I call it


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on texasinstruments.com, you can actually 1340.58s - 1344.86s | search their inventory by parts. And so I was able to see all of these vulnerable parts that 1344.86s - 1349.78s | were listed here. And what I have in bold are just the automotive parts. And so, you know, I'm 1349.78s - 1354.42s | suspecting in Texas Instruments, the reason why they said that this is not a high severity 1354.42s - 1358.10s | vulnerability is because they have other devices such as like medical devices that this 1358.10s - 1363.18s | vulnerable, that this vulnerability is, is, is present on. I haven't done the research to see, 1363.18s - 1368.94s | you know, what devices are actually affected. But you know, I was just more so concerned about 1368.94s - 1374.06s | like the automotive part of it. So there's like, 2.6 million devices that they have in their 1374.06s - 1380.54s | inventory. And that's about $2.6 million in inventory that they have. But that is before 1380.54s - 1387.38s | these devices actually get sold to any OEM and OEM puts their software on top of that. So that's 1387.38s - 1391.42s | why I call it a supplier pre production costs of the vulnerability because we're just looking at 1391.42s - 1397.34s | it from Texas Instruments. We're not looking at it if like GM or Ford purchased one of these and 1397.34s - 1403.34s | then they developed, you know, vulnerable software on top of that. And so I think I'm 1404.42s - 1412.06s | think I'm good on time. I got like two minutes left. Okay, so Mr. recall. So, you know, I 1412.06s - 1417.54s | believe this is for the year 2022. And we're just looking at electrical systems. And so if we 1417.54s - 1424.98s | have, you know, 3.4 million, you know, electrical system recalls averaging at around like 1424.98s - 1433.30s | $500, then that's like $1.7 billion. Right. And the reason why I put this here is because like, 1433.66s - 1441.54s | as as a security engineer, or as a penetration tester, it's kind of hard to quantify your impact 1441.62s - 1447.82s | on the world. It's kind of hard to quantify exactly, you know, the impact that you're having 1447.98s - 1453.02s | on figuring out some of these things. And so my thing is


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a supplier pre production costs of the vulnerability because we're just looking at 1391.42s - 1397.34s | it from Texas Instruments. We're not looking at it if like GM or Ford purchased one of these and 1397.34s - 1403.34s | then they developed, you know, vulnerable software on top of that. And so I think I'm 1404.42s - 1412.06s | think I'm good on time. I got like two minutes left. Okay, so Mr. recall. So, you know, I 1412.06s - 1417.54s | believe this is for the year 2022. And we're just looking at electrical systems. And so if we 1417.54s - 1424.98s | have, you know, 3.4 million, you know, electrical system recalls averaging at around like 1424.98s - 1433.30s | $500, then that's like $1.7 billion. Right. And the reason why I put this here is because like, 1433.66s - 1441.54s | as as a security engineer, or as a penetration tester, it's kind of hard to quantify your impact 1441.62s - 1447.82s | on the world. It's kind of hard to quantify exactly, you know, the impact that you're having 1447.98s - 1453.02s | on figuring out some of these things. And so my thing is like, say, for instance, each one of 1453.02s - 1458.82s | these recalls doesn't cost $500. Maybe if it only costs 1% of that, we're still looking at $17 1458.82s - 1464.06s | million. So you should really just do a penetration test on your system before you're stuck 1464.06s - 1468.38s | paying, you know, for recalls that that might cost you, you know, billions or millions of 1468.38s - 1475.14s | dollars. And so like I said before, it was pretty interesting that Texas Instruments was able to 1475.14s - 1481.74s | come up with a fix and publish that fix two weeks after they were able to reproduce it but 1481.74s - 1488.86s | couldn't reproduce the issue for like six months. I thought that was, you know, genius of them. And 1488.86s - 1494.62s | this is the mitigating strategies that they put out. I know that they still have a lot of SDKs 1494.62s - 1501.54s | that they have to publish in order to make sure that all of the systems are mitigated or 1501.54s - 1508.74s | remediated in the right way. But they're still working on that right now. And right on


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like, say, for instance, each one of 1453.02s - 1458.82s | these recalls doesn't cost $500. Maybe if it only costs 1% of that, we're still looking at $17 1458.82s - 1464.06s | million. So you should really just do a penetration test on your system before you're stuck 1464.06s - 1468.38s | paying, you know, for recalls that that might cost you, you know, billions or millions of 1468.38s - 1475.14s | dollars. And so like I said before, it was pretty interesting that Texas Instruments was able to 1475.14s - 1481.74s | come up with a fix and publish that fix two weeks after they were able to reproduce it but 1481.74s - 1488.86s | couldn't reproduce the issue for like six months. I thought that was, you know, genius of them. And 1488.86s - 1494.62s | this is the mitigating strategies that they put out. I know that they still have a lot of SDKs 1494.62s - 1501.54s | that they have to publish in order to make sure that all of the systems are mitigated or 1501.54s - 1508.74s | remediated in the right way. But they're still working on that right now. And right on time. 1509.18s - 1526.28s | Questions? Any questions? Right there. So for scanning and talking to the launchpad, we use 1526.32s - 1542.38s | Defensics as well. We also use Bluetooth CTL. And we also use the TI launchpad with a software 1542.38s - 1549.82s | called Sniffle that was developed by NCC group. And it specifically scans for long range 1549.82s - 1556.10s | advertisements or extended advertisements that are specific to BLE 5. That answers your 1556.10s - 1571.37s | question. Mr. McKee. Oh, can I get this last question right here? All of the devices, the 19 1571.37s - 1577.49s | devices are in the CVE. The extended list has not been updated or published yet. We're still 1577.49s - 1583.09s | waiting. You can get it. Yes, yes. And I believe that this is publicly available. There's a QR 1583.09s - 1586.21s | code. You guys can connect with me on LinkedIn. Thank you for your time.


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time. 1509.18s - 1526.28s | Questions? Any questions? Right there. So for scanning and talking to the launchpad, we use 1526.32s - 1542.38s | Defensics as well. We also use Bluetooth CTL. And we also use the TI launchpad with a software 1542.38s - 1549.82s | called Sniffle that was developed by NCC group. And it specifically scans for long range 1549.82s - 1556.10s | advertisements or extended advertisements that are specific to BLE 5. That answers your 1556.10s - 1571.37s | question. Mr. McKee. Oh, can I get this last question right here? All of the devices, the 19 1571.37s - 1577.49s | devices are in the CVE. The extended list has not been updated or published yet. We're still 1577.49s - 1583.09s | waiting. You can get it. Yes, yes. And I believe that this is publicly available. There's a QR 1583.09s - 1586.21s | code. You guys can connect with me on LinkedIn. Thank you for your time.


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{ "webpage_url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ldsK81hGs_Q", "title": "DEF CON 32 - The wild and wonderful world of early Microprocessors w/a focus on 6502 - Michael Brown", "description": "This presentation will be a combination of history lesson, technical introduction, and some demonstration. The target audience are those who may never had a chance to experience early microcomputers but want to get an introduction to the world of \u201cretro computing.\n\nToday everyone's laptop or smartphone either run an Intel, AMD, or ARM processor. And most probably can't tell you exactly what they have or know any details of them. It\u2019s all a black box to most. But back in the 70s and 80s, computer hobbyists & hackers knew they had a Z80, 6502, 6809, 68000 or other processor, and often knew the details and could and did program them in assembly. But while the industry has moved past the Apple II, Atari 400/800/XL/XE, Commodore 64 et al, there are still many who continue to use and enjoy these computers. Even to build and create new and exciting items for them as well as brand new systems using this old tech.\n\nIn this presentation, we will delve into microprocessor history of the 8-bit and early 16-bit systems, with a particular focus on the MOS 6502, one of the most popular microprocessors. We will touch a little on the systems that used the 6502, and take a quick look into how to program the 6502, even showing a couple of 6502-based systems. Importantly for many, we will delve into some of the resources available for those wishing to enter this world also.", "channel_url": "https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC6Om9kAkl32dWlDSNlDS9Iw", "duration": 3209, "channel": "DEFCONConference", "uploader": "DEFCONConference", "upload_date": "20241016" } 0.00s - 1.60s | This text was transcribed using whisper model: large-v2 Thank you all for coming. 1.60s - 7.70s | This is the 12 o'clock talk on the wild and wonderful world of 8-bit microprocessors. 8.08s - 11.94s | And I'll be doing a focus on the MOS6502. 12.24s - 13.54s | I do apologize. 13.54s - 17.16s | There is not much of a demo in this talk. 17.16s - 20.26s | I was hoping to have more of a demo, but I've had some technical problems. 20.26s - 23.74s | So, this, we're going to go more into more of history and technology. 24.08s - 27.54s | For some of you, this might be stuff you've never heard of before. 27.98s - 29.32s


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a particular focus on the MOS 6502, one of the most popular microprocessors. We will touch a little on the systems that used the 6502, and take a quick look into how to program the 6502, even showing a couple of 6502-based systems. Importantly for many, we will delve into some of the resources available for those wishing to enter this world also.", "channel_url": "https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC6Om9kAkl32dWlDSNlDS9Iw", "duration": 3209, "channel": "DEFCONConference", "uploader": "DEFCONConference", "upload_date": "20241016" } 0.00s - 1.60s | This text was transcribed using whisper model: large-v2 Thank you all for coming. 1.60s - 7.70s | This is the 12 o'clock talk on the wild and wonderful world of 8-bit microprocessors. 8.08s - 11.94s | And I'll be doing a focus on the MOS6502. 12.24s - 13.54s | I do apologize. 13.54s - 17.16s | There is not much of a demo in this talk. 17.16s - 20.26s | I was hoping to have more of a demo, but I've had some technical problems. 20.26s - 23.74s | So, this, we're going to go more into more of history and technology. 24.08s - 27.54s | For some of you, this might be stuff you've never heard of before. 27.98s - 29.32s | That's what it's all about. 29.32s - 33.58s | And I have quite a few slides with a lot of resources and information. 33.94s - 37.64s | So, you're certainly welcome, and I encourage you guys to take pictures of them. 38.04s - 41.62s | I've been actually adding to these slides. 41.90s - 44.34s | So, they might not have, they're not going to have the latest version. 45.00s - 46.50s | So, let me start. 46.50s - 47.52s | My name is Michael Brown. 47.84s - 51.86s | This is my normal bio I do with these talks, which I typically talk about InfoSec stuff. 52.26s - 54.20s | This isn't an InfoSec talk. 54.20s - 56.80s | So, I'm not going to really go over this. 57.32s - 58.66s | But why am I here? 58.90s - 62.38s | I actually grew up in the era of 8-bit computers. 62.38s - 67.40s | You know, when I was a kid, it was the Apple II and the Atari 8-bit, Commodore 8-bit. 67.80s - 71.02s | My first game console was an Atari 2600. 71.70s - 75.36s | My first computer was actually an Atari 800XL, 75.82s


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| That's what it's all about. 29.32s - 33.58s | And I have quite a few slides with a lot of resources and information. 33.94s - 37.64s | So, you're certainly welcome, and I encourage you guys to take pictures of them. 38.04s - 41.62s | I've been actually adding to these slides. 41.90s - 44.34s | So, they might not have, they're not going to have the latest version. 45.00s - 46.50s | So, let me start. 46.50s - 47.52s | My name is Michael Brown. 47.84s - 51.86s | This is my normal bio I do with these talks, which I typically talk about InfoSec stuff. 52.26s - 54.20s | This isn't an InfoSec talk. 54.20s - 56.80s | So, I'm not going to really go over this. 57.32s - 58.66s | But why am I here? 58.90s - 62.38s | I actually grew up in the era of 8-bit computers. 62.38s - 67.40s | You know, when I was a kid, it was the Apple II and the Atari 8-bit, Commodore 8-bit. 67.80s - 71.02s | My first game console was an Atari 2600. 71.70s - 75.36s | My first computer was actually an Atari 800XL, 75.82s - 78.46s | which I got around in 84 when I was going to college. 78.98s - 86.22s | And I can tell you that it was a big change going from writing papers on a typewriter 86.80s - 91.28s | to using a word processor to write up my papers. 91.76s - 97.08s | And I actually remember an incident when I turned in one of my first papers 97.08s - 101.28s | to my English teacher that I use on the word processor. 101.66s - 109.12s | And she marked off the fact that I didn't put quotes around the book, all the titles. 109.68s - 112.36s | And I had to go and take it back to her and tell her, like, no, no, no, no, no. 113.00s - 115.58s | I italicized the titles. 115.96s - 117.52s | They don't need to be quoted. 118.56s - 119.84s | And she didn't realize that. 119.84s - 121.74s | And then, of course, gave me back the points. 122.28s - 124.76s | Because that was just too new at that time. 126.00s - 129.34s | My second computer was an Atari 1040ST-FM. 129.84s - 133.96s | You will


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- 78.46s | which I got around in 84 when I was going to college. 78.98s - 86.22s | And I can tell you that it was a big change going from writing papers on a typewriter 86.80s - 91.28s | to using a word processor to write up my papers. 91.76s - 97.08s | And I actually remember an incident when I turned in one of my first papers 97.08s - 101.28s | to my English teacher that I use on the word processor. 101.66s - 109.12s | And she marked off the fact that I didn't put quotes around the book, all the titles. 109.68s - 112.36s | And I had to go and take it back to her and tell her, like, no, no, no, no, no. 113.00s - 115.58s | I italicized the titles. 115.96s - 117.52s | They don't need to be quoted. 118.56s - 119.84s | And she didn't realize that. 119.84s - 121.74s | And then, of course, gave me back the points. 122.28s - 124.76s | Because that was just too new at that time. 126.00s - 129.34s | My second computer was an Atari 1040ST-FM. 129.84s - 133.96s | You will impress me if you come up afterwards and tell me what 133.96s - 136.70s | that means without looking it up. 137.80s - 143.36s | When I was in college, among other things, I actually did programming in the 6502 and the 68000. 144.02s - 146.60s | You know, these are some of the computers I used. 146.60s - 150.16s | And I used these wonderful programming languages that maybe some of you know of, 150.16s - 152.34s | maybe you don't, later on I do see. 152.84s - 154.50s | I still got my computers. 154.74s - 156.42s | I've added to my collection. 156.42s - 157.78s | I don't have a huge collection. 158.18s - 161.20s | But I, you know, I enjoyed using these computers at the time. 161.54s - 164.00s | I enjoy using modern computers. 164.54s - 170.98s | What I find kind of disappointing with a lot of people who get into computer science is they, 171.36s - 173.12s | because I'm a computer science major. 173.12s - 174.96s | I was never a computer engineer. 175.24s - 177.94s | I wasn't, you know, hardware wasn't what I was about. 177.94s - 179.28s |


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impress me if you come up afterwards and tell me what 133.96s - 136.70s | that means without looking it up. 137.80s - 143.36s | When I was in college, among other things, I actually did programming in the 6502 and the 68000. 144.02s - 146.60s | You know, these are some of the computers I used. 146.60s - 150.16s | And I used these wonderful programming languages that maybe some of you know of, 150.16s - 152.34s | maybe you don't, later on I do see. 152.84s - 154.50s | I still got my computers. 154.74s - 156.42s | I've added to my collection. 156.42s - 157.78s | I don't have a huge collection. 158.18s - 161.20s | But I, you know, I enjoyed using these computers at the time. 161.54s - 164.00s | I enjoy using modern computers. 164.54s - 170.98s | What I find kind of disappointing with a lot of people who get into computer science is they, 171.36s - 173.12s | because I'm a computer science major. 173.12s - 174.96s | I was never a computer engineer. 175.24s - 177.94s | I wasn't, you know, hardware wasn't what I was about. 177.94s - 179.28s | I was about writing software. 179.58s - 184.68s | But my view is always, from the beginning, was I'm writing software. 184.96s - 186.06s | It runs on a computer. 186.06s - 187.56s | I should know about the hardware. 188.14s - 191.60s | And unfortunately, what I saw was a lot of computer science majors, 192.24s - 194.24s | the computer was just a black box. 194.74s - 198.14s | I remember talking to them and asking them, hey, what processor is in that computer? 198.14s - 200.68s | And they're like, I don't know. 201.08s - 203.38s | And of course, today it's even worse. 203.68s - 208.58s | I know that my computer here, my laptop, is a Core i7. 208.58s - 216.42s | But I'd have to look it up to find out which of the 20-some generations of the i7 it is 216.42s - 220.42s | or what capabilities, because, you know, nowadays we're just pretty much oblivious. 220.90s - 226.00s | So kind of the outline, we'll talk about some of the timeline, computer types. 226.44s - 229.64s | We'll get into like some of the semiconductor companies, 229.64s - 231.08s | which I


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I was about writing software. 179.58s - 184.68s | But my view is always, from the beginning, was I'm writing software. 184.96s - 186.06s | It runs on a computer. 186.06s - 187.56s | I should know about the hardware. 188.14s - 191.60s | And unfortunately, what I saw was a lot of computer science majors, 192.24s - 194.24s | the computer was just a black box. 194.74s - 198.14s | I remember talking to them and asking them, hey, what processor is in that computer? 198.14s - 200.68s | And they're like, I don't know. 201.08s - 203.38s | And of course, today it's even worse. 203.68s - 208.58s | I know that my computer here, my laptop, is a Core i7. 208.58s - 216.42s | But I'd have to look it up to find out which of the 20-some generations of the i7 it is 216.42s - 220.42s | or what capabilities, because, you know, nowadays we're just pretty much oblivious. 220.90s - 226.00s | So kind of the outline, we'll talk about some of the timeline, computer types. 226.44s - 229.64s | We'll get into like some of the semiconductor companies, 229.64s - 231.08s | which I find kind of interesting. 231.46s - 234.10s | We'll look at, you know, more about the microprocessor units. 234.10s - 235.80s | We'll look more at the 6502. 235.80s - 239.76s | We'll talk a little bit about assembly language, which it's either something 239.76s - 243.30s | that is really interesting to you or freaking boring. 243.76s - 247.16s | You know, it's, or, you know, the worst thing possible. 247.16s - 249.92s | And then I want to, I put together a lot of good resources, 249.92s - 252.16s | at least a lot of things that I think are good resources. 252.52s - 255.56s | So I encourage you guys to take pictures of that. 256.28s - 261.92s | So the timeline, the 70s, which is what, as I said, this is when I was in high school, you know, 261.92s - 267.86s | we had Intel came out with the 8080, which kicked off the microcomputer era. 267.86s - 272.94s | We have the Altair, you know, followed up by other processors. 273.20s - 279.06s | You know, you had the Apple II, the Commodore, you know, the TRS-80 Model 1, 279.06s - 285.44s | the


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find kind of interesting. 231.46s - 234.10s | We'll look at, you know, more about the microprocessor units. 234.10s - 235.80s | We'll look more at the 6502. 235.80s - 239.76s | We'll talk a little bit about assembly language, which it's either something 239.76s - 243.30s | that is really interesting to you or freaking boring. 243.76s - 247.16s | You know, it's, or, you know, the worst thing possible. 247.16s - 249.92s | And then I want to, I put together a lot of good resources, 249.92s - 252.16s | at least a lot of things that I think are good resources. 252.52s - 255.56s | So I encourage you guys to take pictures of that. 256.28s - 261.92s | So the timeline, the 70s, which is what, as I said, this is when I was in high school, you know, 261.92s - 267.86s | we had Intel came out with the 8080, which kicked off the microcomputer era. 267.86s - 272.94s | We have the Altair, you know, followed up by other processors. 273.20s - 279.06s | You know, you had the Apple II, the Commodore, you know, the TRS-80 Model 1, 279.06s - 285.44s | the so-called Trash 80, as everyone called it, and so forth into the 70s. 285.44s - 288.38s | The TI's computer, and the rest. 288.38s - 290.44s | And then in the 80s, we get more. 290.44s - 298.36s | We get the VIC-20, the Commodore 64, the IBM PC, the Macintosh, and then, of course, 298.36s - 301.52s | you know, the Macintosh, the ST, the Amiga. 302.02s - 305.28s | I didn't want to go further, because now we're getting outside of 8-bit. 305.28s - 310.62s | When I was doing this, I wondered, should I get into RISC processors? 310.92s - 315.42s | Because that's another whole, you know, topic, and that's kind of interesting and kind of sad. 315.86s - 318.76s | So, I didn't want to kind of overwhelm things. 319.26s - 324.16s | When we talk about computer types, there's a lot of different ways to categorize them. 324.46s - 327.62s | These are the ones that I understood when I was into computer science. 327.62s - 332.56s | We talked about the mainframes, you had minicomputers, and you had microcomputers. 333.06s - 339.66s | And I'll be honest, this is the distinction I've always


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so-called Trash 80, as everyone called it, and so forth into the 70s. 285.44s - 288.38s | The TI's computer, and the rest. 288.38s - 290.44s | And then in the 80s, we get more. 290.44s - 298.36s | We get the VIC-20, the Commodore 64, the IBM PC, the Macintosh, and then, of course, 298.36s - 301.52s | you know, the Macintosh, the ST, the Amiga. 302.02s - 305.28s | I didn't want to go further, because now we're getting outside of 8-bit. 305.28s - 310.62s | When I was doing this, I wondered, should I get into RISC processors? 310.92s - 315.42s | Because that's another whole, you know, topic, and that's kind of interesting and kind of sad. 315.86s - 318.76s | So, I didn't want to kind of overwhelm things. 319.26s - 324.16s | When we talk about computer types, there's a lot of different ways to categorize them. 324.46s - 327.62s | These are the ones that I understood when I was into computer science. 327.62s - 332.56s | We talked about the mainframes, you had minicomputers, and you had microcomputers. 333.06s - 339.66s | And I'll be honest, this is the distinction I've always been told about what, 339.78s - 342.46s | why is this a mainframe, why is this a minicomputer? 342.82s - 345.34s | And usually, the way they said it's like, well, it's about size. 345.70s - 350.36s | Your mainframes were your huge room-based computers, the ones you see in the TVs 350.36s - 353.40s | and movies with the tape drives going and whatnot. 353.98s - 356.86s | And the minicomputers were smaller, the size of a refrigerator. 357.52s - 363.16s | Earlier on, it was, you know, these companies, you know, IBM and these others, 363.16s - 365.12s | they were called Snow White and the Seven Dwarves. 366.22s - 368.58s | Through mergers, it became IBM and the Bunch. 369.12s - 375.70s | And today, yes, mainframe computers are still being made, but now by these companies. 376.38s - 378.52s | The minicomputers were kind of interesting. 378.52s - 382.40s | You had, you know, digital and data, data general and all these others. 382.72s - 385.14s | And they no longer exist. 385.62s - 388.64s | You know, there are no minicomputers as a market. 389.02s - 393.88s | And almost all those companies either don't


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been told about what, 339.78s - 342.46s | why is this a mainframe, why is this a minicomputer? 342.82s - 345.34s | And usually, the way they said it's like, well, it's about size. 345.70s - 350.36s | Your mainframes were your huge room-based computers, the ones you see in the TVs 350.36s - 353.40s | and movies with the tape drives going and whatnot. 353.98s - 356.86s | And the minicomputers were smaller, the size of a refrigerator. 357.52s - 363.16s | Earlier on, it was, you know, these companies, you know, IBM and these others, 363.16s - 365.12s | they were called Snow White and the Seven Dwarves. 366.22s - 368.58s | Through mergers, it became IBM and the Bunch. 369.12s - 375.70s | And today, yes, mainframe computers are still being made, but now by these companies. 376.38s - 378.52s | The minicomputers were kind of interesting. 378.52s - 382.40s | You had, you know, digital and data, data general and all these others. 382.72s - 385.14s | And they no longer exist. 385.62s - 388.64s | You know, there are no minicomputers as a market. 389.02s - 393.88s | And almost all those companies either don't exist or they've moved out. 394.74s - 398.90s | Microcomputers started, of course, as the small, you know, more of a hobbyist, 399.26s - 402.32s | getting into the business computers with MIT or the MITS, 402.82s - 406.46s | MSci, Sol, you know, and the Apple, Atari, Commodore. 407.02s - 409.82s | But as microprocessors became more and more powerful, 410.10s - 413.34s | you now had microprocessor-based servers. 413.54s - 416.94s | And those kind of moved in and wiped out the minicomputers. 417.60s - 421.92s | And then I debated putting a lower level, 421.92s - 427.22s | which would have been your microcontrollers, which in many cases are microprocessors being used 427.22s - 433.46s | to control hardware, you know, disk drives and this sort of stuff. 433.46s - 436.30s | So let's talk about micro semiconductor manufacturers. 436.30s - 437.24s | This is kind of interesting. 437.58s - 440.52s | The first major one is called Shockley Semiconductor. 440.90s - 446.10s | It was founded by the guy who created transistors, a guy named William Shockley. 446.56s - 451.24s | Unfortunately, Shockley was one of these people who was like a brilliant, 452.08s - 454.92s


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exist or they've moved out. 394.74s - 398.90s | Microcomputers started, of course, as the small, you know, more of a hobbyist, 399.26s - 402.32s | getting into the business computers with MIT or the MITS, 402.82s - 406.46s | MSci, Sol, you know, and the Apple, Atari, Commodore. 407.02s - 409.82s | But as microprocessors became more and more powerful, 410.10s - 413.34s | you now had microprocessor-based servers. 413.54s - 416.94s | And those kind of moved in and wiped out the minicomputers. 417.60s - 421.92s | And then I debated putting a lower level, 421.92s - 427.22s | which would have been your microcontrollers, which in many cases are microprocessors being used 427.22s - 433.46s | to control hardware, you know, disk drives and this sort of stuff. 433.46s - 436.30s | So let's talk about micro semiconductor manufacturers. 436.30s - 437.24s | This is kind of interesting. 437.58s - 440.52s | The first major one is called Shockley Semiconductor. 440.90s - 446.10s | It was founded by the guy who created transistors, a guy named William Shockley. 446.56s - 451.24s | Unfortunately, Shockley was one of these people who was like a brilliant, 452.08s - 454.92s | you know, scientist, a lousy manager. 455.72s - 457.12s | So he established his company. 457.32s - 459.48s | He brought all these engineers on board. 459.76s - 460.78s | He trained them. 461.72s - 463.88s | They didn't like working for him, and they left. 464.38s - 470.16s | And these people, there was eight of them, and they are known as, and I'm not making this up, 470.60s - 475.58s | they are the traitorous eight who left Shockley Semiconductor 475.98s - 479.32s | to go found a new company called Fairchild Semiconductor. 479.96s - 483.38s | And Fairchild was a subsidiary of Fairchild Camera. 483.80s - 490.76s | And we have Fairchild Semiconductor for having Silicon Valley. 491.14s - 493.88s | They literally created Silicon Valley. 494.30s - 496.38s | They were established in California. 496.82s - 503.04s | And then the funny thing was with Fairchild is many of the people that came to Fairchild left 503.72s - 508.00s | to establish other companies, and sometimes even left those and established other companies. 508.30s - 510.56s | And these are referred to as the Fairchildren. 511.34s - 514.92s | And there's even, you can go


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| you know, scientist, a lousy manager. 455.72s - 457.12s | So he established his company. 457.32s - 459.48s | He brought all these engineers on board. 459.76s - 460.78s | He trained them. 461.72s - 463.88s | They didn't like working for him, and they left. 464.38s - 470.16s | And these people, there was eight of them, and they are known as, and I'm not making this up, 470.60s - 475.58s | they are the traitorous eight who left Shockley Semiconductor 475.98s - 479.32s | to go found a new company called Fairchild Semiconductor. 479.96s - 483.38s | And Fairchild was a subsidiary of Fairchild Camera. 483.80s - 490.76s | And we have Fairchild Semiconductor for having Silicon Valley. 491.14s - 493.88s | They literally created Silicon Valley. 494.30s - 496.38s | They were established in California. 496.82s - 503.04s | And then the funny thing was with Fairchild is many of the people that came to Fairchild left 503.72s - 508.00s | to establish other companies, and sometimes even left those and established other companies. 508.30s - 510.56s | And these are referred to as the Fairchildren. 511.34s - 514.92s | And there's even, you can go online and you can see these charts of all these companies 515.20s - 517.82s | that have been like second generation from Fairchild 517.82s - 521.32s | that spread this knowledge of the semiconductors. 521.72s - 526.06s | Fairchild's big claim to fame is that they were one of two companies 526.06s - 530.82s | that created the integrated circuit that gives us all the computer chips that we use today. 531.54s - 533.96s | They did create their own microprocessor, 533.96s - 537.72s | which until recently I didn't even know existed, called the F8. 538.42s - 543.90s | And they created their own game console called the Channel F, which I again have to admit, 544.70s - 547.94s | I don't remember that when I was a kid. 548.46s - 552.96s | But the big thing that made the Channel F important is it was the first one 552.96s - 557.62s | to use ROM cartridges for the games, which became the standard 557.62s - 559.48s | of all the game consoles that followed. 559.80s - 565.02s | You know, all the Atari's used game consoles, the Nintendo and Super Nintendo 565.02s - 568.80s | and the Sega


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online and you can see these charts of all these companies 515.20s - 517.82s | that have been like second generation from Fairchild 517.82s - 521.32s | that spread this knowledge of the semiconductors. 521.72s - 526.06s | Fairchild's big claim to fame is that they were one of two companies 526.06s - 530.82s | that created the integrated circuit that gives us all the computer chips that we use today. 531.54s - 533.96s | They did create their own microprocessor, 533.96s - 537.72s | which until recently I didn't even know existed, called the F8. 538.42s - 543.90s | And they created their own game console called the Channel F, which I again have to admit, 544.70s - 547.94s | I don't remember that when I was a kid. 548.46s - 552.96s | But the big thing that made the Channel F important is it was the first one 552.96s - 557.62s | to use ROM cartridges for the games, which became the standard 557.62s - 559.48s | of all the game consoles that followed. 559.80s - 565.02s | You know, all the Atari's used game consoles, the Nintendo and Super Nintendo 565.02s - 568.80s | and the Sega Genesis and all those, all used ROM cartridges 569.06s - 571.36s | until they came along sort of using CDs. 573.10s - 576.70s | One of the big Fairchildren is this little company called Intel, 577.08s - 581.26s | which was for, it stood for Integrated Electronics, very, very creative name. 581.76s - 586.84s | And it was actually two of the guys that were the traders that went and founded Intel. 587.56s - 590.98s | Intel, when they were established, made memory chips. 591.26s - 592.40s | That's really what they did. 594.14s - 599.94s | But what made a difference is when, was when a Japanese calculator company went to them 599.94s - 607.20s | and said, hey, we need some chips made because we're going to make four sets of calculators 607.62s - 611.02s | and we need chips in them to make them function. 611.40s - 615.16s | And they were saying like, well, okay, we have four calculators with different features. 615.50s - 621.42s | So why don't you make us four sets of chips for these four calculators? 621.84s - 625.58s | But one of the engineers at Intel said like, no, that's not


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Genesis and all those, all used ROM cartridges 569.06s - 571.36s | until they came along sort of using CDs. 573.10s - 576.70s | One of the big Fairchildren is this little company called Intel, 577.08s - 581.26s | which was for, it stood for Integrated Electronics, very, very creative name. 581.76s - 586.84s | And it was actually two of the guys that were the traders that went and founded Intel. 587.56s - 590.98s | Intel, when they were established, made memory chips. 591.26s - 592.40s | That's really what they did. 594.14s - 599.94s | But what made a difference is when, was when a Japanese calculator company went to them 599.94s - 607.20s | and said, hey, we need some chips made because we're going to make four sets of calculators 607.62s - 611.02s | and we need chips in them to make them function. 611.40s - 615.16s | And they were saying like, well, okay, we have four calculators with different features. 615.50s - 621.42s | So why don't you make us four sets of chips for these four calculators? 621.84s - 625.58s | But one of the engineers at Intel said like, no, that's not a good idea. 625.94s - 632.84s | Let's make one set of chips that we can program and use in all four of these. 633.20s - 639.76s | And that, what they created was the 4004, which is a four-bit processor. 640.60s - 642.82s | That was actually the first microprocessor. 643.10s - 645.44s | It was then replaced with a better 4040. 646.18s - 650.66s | And then shortly thereafter, another calculator company came with the same thing 651.06s - 657.52s | and the same engineers then created the 8008, now an eight-bit processor. 657.84s - 661.52s | And then they made it better and created the 8080. 662.62s - 666.28s | And again, they created these to be used in calculators. 666.56s - 669.70s | No one created these for being used in computers. 670.04s - 675.12s | It took other people to look at this and go like, hey, I can take this 8080 chip 675.68s - 677.44s | and make it into a computer. 678.14s - 683.82s | And those were the guys at MITS or MITS, depending on what you believe is the name 683.82s - 690.46s | of the company, and that was the


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a good idea. 625.94s - 632.84s | Let's make one set of chips that we can program and use in all four of these. 633.20s - 639.76s | And that, what they created was the 4004, which is a four-bit processor. 640.60s - 642.82s | That was actually the first microprocessor. 643.10s - 645.44s | It was then replaced with a better 4040. 646.18s - 650.66s | And then shortly thereafter, another calculator company came with the same thing 651.06s - 657.52s | and the same engineers then created the 8008, now an eight-bit processor. 657.84s - 661.52s | And then they made it better and created the 8080. 662.62s - 666.28s | And again, they created these to be used in calculators. 666.56s - 669.70s | No one created these for being used in computers. 670.04s - 675.12s | It took other people to look at this and go like, hey, I can take this 8080 chip 675.68s - 677.44s | and make it into a computer. 678.14s - 683.82s | And those were the guys at MITS or MITS, depending on what you believe is the name 683.82s - 690.46s | of the company, and that was the Altair 8800, which was, it's not the first personal 690.46s - 697.24s | computer, but it was the first commercially available personal computer. 697.46s - 698.84s | And that kicked it all off. 699.04s - 702.46s | And of course, the people that wanted these were more people that were hobbyists and 702.46s - 703.10s | engineers. 703.10s - 707.32s | They, you know, at that time, as I said, you had many computers and mainframes that 707.64s - 710.36s | you didn't get to sit at and work on the computers. 710.68s - 716.18s | People wanted their own computer that they could have and can work on and do stuff 716.20s - 721.28s | with, as well as now they can be used for practical purposes and businesses. 722.96s - 728.68s | Shortly thereafter, Intel created the 8086, which is now a 16-bit processor. 729.60s - 732.74s | And that then, of course, was used for more powerful computers. 733.22s - 739.40s | They then started a series of kind of iterations that gave us the 80186 and so 739.40s - 742.88s | forth. You know, the 286, the 386. 743.14s - 748.02s | The 386 is now


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Altair 8800, which was, it's not the first personal 690.46s - 697.24s | computer, but it was the first commercially available personal computer. 697.46s - 698.84s | And that kicked it all off. 699.04s - 702.46s | And of course, the people that wanted these were more people that were hobbyists and 702.46s - 703.10s | engineers. 703.10s - 707.32s | They, you know, at that time, as I said, you had many computers and mainframes that 707.64s - 710.36s | you didn't get to sit at and work on the computers. 710.68s - 716.18s | People wanted their own computer that they could have and can work on and do stuff 716.20s - 721.28s | with, as well as now they can be used for practical purposes and businesses. 722.96s - 728.68s | Shortly thereafter, Intel created the 8086, which is now a 16-bit processor. 729.60s - 732.74s | And that then, of course, was used for more powerful computers. 733.22s - 739.40s | They then started a series of kind of iterations that gave us the 80186 and so 739.40s - 742.88s | forth. You know, the 286, the 386. 743.14s - 748.02s | The 386 is now a 32-bit processor, so now we're moving up and becoming more and more 748.02s - 756.66s | powerful. And the 486, the next one was supposed to be the 8586, but instead, 756.66s - 762.06s | Intel decided to call it a Pentium because you can't copyright a number, but you can 762.06s - 763.06s | copyright a name. 764.18s - 766.88s | And then with the Pentium, there was all the various different variations of the 766.88s - 771.10s | Pentium, which, I'm sorry, I can't, I couldn't keep up with it even at the time. 771.10s - 775.28s | We had the Pentium 2 and the 3 and the 4 and the DX and so forth. 776.20s - 779.44s | I think around the Pentium 4 is when they went to 64-bit. 781.48s - 784.36s | Intel also tried their hand at RISC processors. 784.64s - 788.00s | That's the i86, 860 and 960. 789.12s - 789.96s | Those are dead. 790.92s - 795.80s | Most of the other ones, they actually made them for several decades, but then stopped 795.80s - 798.76s | doing so. And then there was also the Itanium. 798.80s - 801.00s | That


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a 32-bit processor, so now we're moving up and becoming more and more 748.02s - 756.66s | powerful. And the 486, the next one was supposed to be the 8586, but instead, 756.66s - 762.06s | Intel decided to call it a Pentium because you can't copyright a number, but you can 762.06s - 763.06s | copyright a name. 764.18s - 766.88s | And then with the Pentium, there was all the various different variations of the 766.88s - 771.10s | Pentium, which, I'm sorry, I can't, I couldn't keep up with it even at the time. 771.10s - 775.28s | We had the Pentium 2 and the 3 and the 4 and the DX and so forth. 776.20s - 779.44s | I think around the Pentium 4 is when they went to 64-bit. 781.48s - 784.36s | Intel also tried their hand at RISC processors. 784.64s - 788.00s | That's the i86, 860 and 960. 789.12s - 789.96s | Those are dead. 790.92s - 795.80s | Most of the other ones, they actually made them for several decades, but then stopped 795.80s - 798.76s | doing so. And then there was also the Itanium. 798.80s - 801.00s | That was another architecture they tried out. 801.40s - 805.20s | That was useful for a while, and it's also dead. 805.60s - 810.12s | Nowadays, it's the one on the next line, the Atom and the Celeron, which are the 810.12s - 814.64s | low-power ones for, meant for like tablets and embedded systems. 815.28s - 822.40s | The Core 3579, which for laptops and desktops, and then the Xeon for servers. 823.84s - 827.56s | One thing that I've noticed in the last few years with Intel, and maybe others of 827.56s - 833.54s | you have noticed the same thing, is that Intel is still pretty big with desktops and 833.54s - 836.54s | laptops and servers, but that's it. 838.54s - 842.34s | They, you know, they tried getting into smartphones. 842.82s - 843.86s | That didn't go. 844.42s - 848.54s | They tried getting into like the Arduino space. 848.58s - 851.58s | There was actually an Intel-based Arduino called the 101. 852.18s - 853.30s | That didn't last. 853.80s - 858.64s | They tried getting into the single board computer like the Raspberry Pi. 859.28s - 864.04s | I'm not sure how many people here


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was another architecture they tried out. 801.40s - 805.20s | That was useful for a while, and it's also dead. 805.60s - 810.12s | Nowadays, it's the one on the next line, the Atom and the Celeron, which are the 810.12s - 814.64s | low-power ones for, meant for like tablets and embedded systems. 815.28s - 822.40s | The Core 3579, which for laptops and desktops, and then the Xeon for servers. 823.84s - 827.56s | One thing that I've noticed in the last few years with Intel, and maybe others of 827.56s - 833.54s | you have noticed the same thing, is that Intel is still pretty big with desktops and 833.54s - 836.54s | laptops and servers, but that's it. 838.54s - 842.34s | They, you know, they tried getting into smartphones. 842.82s - 843.86s | That didn't go. 844.42s - 848.54s | They tried getting into like the Arduino space. 848.58s - 851.58s | There was actually an Intel-based Arduino called the 101. 852.18s - 853.30s | That didn't last. 853.80s - 858.64s | They tried getting into the single board computer like the Raspberry Pi. 859.28s - 864.04s | I'm not sure how many people here remember the Minnow board that they put together. 864.68s - 865.68s | That didn't last. 865.96s - 872.44s | They tried other little IoT devices like the Edison, which, you know, I got and several 872.44s - 880.64s | others. And, you know, it's like outside of desktop servers and laptops, Intel doesn't 880.64s - 882.20s | exist. Everything else is ARM. 883.10s - 887.94s | You know, every one of you who has a smartphone with you, that's an ARM-based 887.94s - 892.30s | processor. You know, I seriously doubt you have anything that's not an ARM-based 892.30s - 899.70s | smartphone. ARM is now being used by Apple for their systems. 901.14s - 906.90s | There is actually already, we're seeing ARM-based laptops that'll run Windows. 907.34s - 909.46s | I'm hearing of ARM-based servers. 909.82s - 912.18s | So I don't know what that means. 912.74s - 913.94s | So it's kind of interesting what's happening. 915.74s - 921.78s | Subbing back, I mentioned that certain engineers at Intel had created the 4040 and 921.78s - 927.78s | 8080. Those were a gentleman by the name of Federico Fagan, along with a Japanese 927.78s - 930.50s |


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remember the Minnow board that they put together. 864.68s - 865.68s | That didn't last. 865.96s - 872.44s | They tried other little IoT devices like the Edison, which, you know, I got and several 872.44s - 880.64s | others. And, you know, it's like outside of desktop servers and laptops, Intel doesn't 880.64s - 882.20s | exist. Everything else is ARM. 883.10s - 887.94s | You know, every one of you who has a smartphone with you, that's an ARM-based 887.94s - 892.30s | processor. You know, I seriously doubt you have anything that's not an ARM-based 892.30s - 899.70s | smartphone. ARM is now being used by Apple for their systems. 901.14s - 906.90s | There is actually already, we're seeing ARM-based laptops that'll run Windows. 907.34s - 909.46s | I'm hearing of ARM-based servers. 909.82s - 912.18s | So I don't know what that means. 912.74s - 913.94s | So it's kind of interesting what's happening. 915.74s - 921.78s | Subbing back, I mentioned that certain engineers at Intel had created the 4040 and 921.78s - 927.78s | 8080. Those were a gentleman by the name of Federico Fagan, along with a Japanese 927.78s - 930.50s | engineer named Masatoshi Ishima. 931.10s - 938.90s | They actually left Intel to form Zilog, which is, and I'm not joking, it was picked 938.92s - 942.72s | because it's the last name in integrated electronics. 943.36s - 950.60s | And they created the Z80, which was a much improved version of the 8080, so improved 950.92s - 957.16s | that the Z80 in the market kind of displaced the 8080 from systems. 957.16s - 961.48s | And so everyone who was using what would have been an 8080-based system was using a 961.54s - 970.66s | Z80. And until April of this year, they were still manufacturing the original Z80 chip 970.94s - 971.86s | and selling it. 973.46s - 974.90s | That's not the end of the Z80. 974.90s - 979.38s | They have replacement chips such as the EZ80 you can still get. 979.38s - 982.42s | So you can still get Z80 chips and use them. 982.82s - 984.58s | They try their hand at others. 984.58s - 988.08s | They did a Z800, which is a 16-bit processor. 988.92s - 992.80s | And then they went with a 32-bit with a Z80,000. 993.00s - 997.40s


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engineer named Masatoshi Ishima. 931.10s - 938.90s | They actually left Intel to form Zilog, which is, and I'm not joking, it was picked 938.92s - 942.72s | because it's the last name in integrated electronics. 943.36s - 950.60s | And they created the Z80, which was a much improved version of the 8080, so improved 950.92s - 957.16s | that the Z80 in the market kind of displaced the 8080 from systems. 957.16s - 961.48s | And so everyone who was using what would have been an 8080-based system was using a 961.54s - 970.66s | Z80. And until April of this year, they were still manufacturing the original Z80 chip 970.94s - 971.86s | and selling it. 973.46s - 974.90s | That's not the end of the Z80. 974.90s - 979.38s | They have replacement chips such as the EZ80 you can still get. 979.38s - 982.42s | So you can still get Z80 chips and use them. 982.82s - 984.58s | They try their hand at others. 984.58s - 988.08s | They did a Z800, which is a 16-bit processor. 988.92s - 992.80s | And then they went with a 32-bit with a Z80,000. 993.00s - 997.40s | And if you're like, I never heard of those, well, it wasn't that successful. 999.40s - 1005.08s | These are what we refer to, and I don't know if I, where I got the term from, is these 1005.08s - 1009.88s | are the eights, that almost the processors use the letter eight, the number eight on 1009.88s - 1014.48s | it. The other set that we talked about that's really major starts off with 1014.48s - 1019.74s | Motorola. They start off with the Z, the 6800 processor. 1020.78s - 1022.30s | It had some success. 1022.98s - 1029.10s | A lot of the early computer companies, MITS and MSCI, did release 6800-based systems 1029.10s - 1031.90s | with an 8-bit processor, but it wasn't that big. 1032.50s - 1037.82s | They replaced it with a more powerful 6809, which is an 816-based system. 1038.26s - 1043.74s | Probably its claim to fame is it was one used in the Tandy color computer. 1044.54s - 1046.10s | Which was used for many years. 1046.26s - 1052.18s | And I was actually really surprised to learn how much involvement Motorola had in 1052.18s - 1055.62s | actually the creation


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| And if you're like, I never heard of those, well, it wasn't that successful. 999.40s - 1005.08s | These are what we refer to, and I don't know if I, where I got the term from, is these 1005.08s - 1009.88s | are the eights, that almost the processors use the letter eight, the number eight on 1009.88s - 1014.48s | it. The other set that we talked about that's really major starts off with 1014.48s - 1019.74s | Motorola. They start off with the Z, the 6800 processor. 1020.78s - 1022.30s | It had some success. 1022.98s - 1029.10s | A lot of the early computer companies, MITS and MSCI, did release 6800-based systems 1029.10s - 1031.90s | with an 8-bit processor, but it wasn't that big. 1032.50s - 1037.82s | They replaced it with a more powerful 6809, which is an 816-based system. 1038.26s - 1043.74s | Probably its claim to fame is it was one used in the Tandy color computer. 1044.54s - 1046.10s | Which was used for many years. 1046.26s - 1052.18s | And I was actually really surprised to learn how much involvement Motorola had in 1052.18s - 1055.62s | actually the creation of the color computer, which I never knew. 1055.62s - 1057.86s | I learned that, you know, like the last couple of years. 1059.86s - 1065.46s | Then, of course, much more famously is the 6800, sorry, 68000, which is, of course, 1065.46s - 1070.50s | used in the Macintosh, the ST, the Commodore, many Unix workstations. 1070.72s - 1074.48s | Sega Genesis used it and so forth. 1074.92s - 1076.96s | So a very, very popular processor. 1077.36s - 1084.60s | They then extended out, the 68000 is a 1632-bit system, and then the full 32-bit was 1084.60s - 1087.88s | a 68020, or the 020, as we call it. 1088.40s - 1093.72s | And there was a progression of those, the 020 to 060, which was used in subsequent 1093.72s - 1097.52s | Macintoshes, Amigas, and Atari systems. 1098.26s - 1103.50s | Motorola also got into trying their hand at RISC processors with the 88000. 1104.54s - 1116.50s | However, in the mid-90s, they got involved with the AIM consortium, which was Apple, IBM, 1116.80s - 1128.64s | and Motorola to compete against the Windows, sorry, the Microsoft Intel duopoly. 1129.60s - 1133.12s | And they were going


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of the color computer, which I never knew. 1055.62s - 1057.86s | I learned that, you know, like the last couple of years. 1059.86s - 1065.46s | Then, of course, much more famously is the 6800, sorry, 68000, which is, of course, 1065.46s - 1070.50s | used in the Macintosh, the ST, the Commodore, many Unix workstations. 1070.72s - 1074.48s | Sega Genesis used it and so forth. 1074.92s - 1076.96s | So a very, very popular processor. 1077.36s - 1084.60s | They then extended out, the 68000 is a 1632-bit system, and then the full 32-bit was 1084.60s - 1087.88s | a 68020, or the 020, as we call it. 1088.40s - 1093.72s | And there was a progression of those, the 020 to 060, which was used in subsequent 1093.72s - 1097.52s | Macintoshes, Amigas, and Atari systems. 1098.26s - 1103.50s | Motorola also got into trying their hand at RISC processors with the 88000. 1104.54s - 1116.50s | However, in the mid-90s, they got involved with the AIM consortium, which was Apple, IBM, 1116.80s - 1128.64s | and Motorola to compete against the Windows, sorry, the Microsoft Intel duopoly. 1129.60s - 1133.12s | And they were going to make, you know, and part of that was the PowerPC. 1133.52s - 1138.68s | Now, the PowerPC was a RISC-based architecture from IBM, but the idea was 1138.68s - 1141.76s | that Motorola and IBM would create the chips. 1142.06s - 1147.54s | Motorola, IBM, and Apple would all build PowerPC systems. 1149.18s - 1152.14s | Apple would move Macintosh to PowerPC and so forth. 1152.86s - 1156.38s | The funny thing is, as I was actually at IBM at that time and then went to 1156.38s - 1162.02s | Motorola, so I got to see a lot of PowerPC-based systems that never got to 1162.02s - 1162.46s | market. 1162.50s - 1165.70s | There were some cool ones, but that's just how it is. 1166.68s - 1172.16s | Going back to the 6800, as I said, that was Motorola's, you know, 8-bit processor 1172.16s - 1175.28s | initially, and there were some problems with it. 1175.28s - 1180.92s | One thing they discovered from feedback from their customers or potential customers 1181.24s - 1184.68s | was that, one, they thought it was just a little bit too powerful for what they 1184.68s - 1190.48s | needed, but more


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to make, you know, and part of that was the PowerPC. 1133.52s - 1138.68s | Now, the PowerPC was a RISC-based architecture from IBM, but the idea was 1138.68s - 1141.76s | that Motorola and IBM would create the chips. 1142.06s - 1147.54s | Motorola, IBM, and Apple would all build PowerPC systems. 1149.18s - 1152.14s | Apple would move Macintosh to PowerPC and so forth. 1152.86s - 1156.38s | The funny thing is, as I was actually at IBM at that time and then went to 1156.38s - 1162.02s | Motorola, so I got to see a lot of PowerPC-based systems that never got to 1162.02s - 1162.46s | market. 1162.50s - 1165.70s | There were some cool ones, but that's just how it is. 1166.68s - 1172.16s | Going back to the 6800, as I said, that was Motorola's, you know, 8-bit processor 1172.16s - 1175.28s | initially, and there were some problems with it. 1175.28s - 1180.92s | One thing they discovered from feedback from their customers or potential customers 1181.24s - 1184.68s | was that, one, they thought it was just a little bit too powerful for what they 1184.68s - 1190.48s | needed, but more importantly, a lot of their potential customers thought it was 1190.48s - 1192.08s | too expensive as a chip. 1192.14s - 1198.78s | Motorola was charging over $300 for a chip, and you need to understand that when 1198.78s - 1204.42s | you're building a system, yes, your CPU chip is important, but there's also other 1204.42s - 1209.14s | chips you need, and if it's already $300 for that CPU chip, and then add the 1209.14s - 1212.74s | others, then you have kind of an expensive system, and that was a problem. 1213.10s - 1217.50s | One of the engineers at Motorola by the name of Chuck Peddle was involved with 1217.50s - 1223.08s | that, and he was, like, trying to work out a low-cost alternative at Motorola for 1223.08s - 1229.64s | the 6800 until basically Motorola told him to knock it off, yeah, and so he 1229.64s - 1233.12s | wasn't happy by that, and some of those people weren't happy, so they left 1233.12s - 1236.88s | Motorola, and this was a group of people that included Chuck Peddle, an 1236.88s - 1242.28s | associate by the name of Bill Minch, and they left


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importantly, a lot of their potential customers thought it was 1190.48s - 1192.08s | too expensive as a chip. 1192.14s - 1198.78s | Motorola was charging over $300 for a chip, and you need to understand that when 1198.78s - 1204.42s | you're building a system, yes, your CPU chip is important, but there's also other 1204.42s - 1209.14s | chips you need, and if it's already $300 for that CPU chip, and then add the 1209.14s - 1212.74s | others, then you have kind of an expensive system, and that was a problem. 1213.10s - 1217.50s | One of the engineers at Motorola by the name of Chuck Peddle was involved with 1217.50s - 1223.08s | that, and he was, like, trying to work out a low-cost alternative at Motorola for 1223.08s - 1229.64s | the 6800 until basically Motorola told him to knock it off, yeah, and so he 1229.64s - 1233.12s | wasn't happy by that, and some of those people weren't happy, so they left 1233.12s - 1236.88s | Motorola, and this was a group of people that included Chuck Peddle, an 1236.88s - 1242.28s | associate by the name of Bill Minch, and they left Motorola, and they went to the 1242.28s - 1245.24s | next company on the slide there. 1245.86s - 1251.30s | So let me make a couple of things really clear about this company, because a lot 1251.30s - 1253.94s | of people get this wrong, get these two things wrong. 1253.98s - 1258.26s | I've seen it in YouTube channels, on videos on YouTube that are incorrect. 1258.46s - 1262.02s | So first of all is, how do you say its name? 1263.66s - 1267.14s | If you think it's MOS Technology, you're wrong. 1267.74s - 1274.22s | It is MOS Technology, because you don't want to confuse it with another company 1274.24s - 1279.88s | that exists at the time called MOS Tech, which I listed up there, and that's very 1279.88s - 1284.56s | true, because I know as a kid, well, at that time, I was even confused myself. 1285.56s - 1291.12s | The next thing that I've seen that several videos would claim is that Chuck 1291.12s - 1295.88s | Peddle and the other guys from Motorola founded MOS Technology. 1296.12s - 1297.20s | No, they did not. 1297.56s - 1303.08s | MOS had already been


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Motorola, and they went to the 1242.28s - 1245.24s | next company on the slide there. 1245.86s - 1251.30s | So let me make a couple of things really clear about this company, because a lot 1251.30s - 1253.94s | of people get this wrong, get these two things wrong. 1253.98s - 1258.26s | I've seen it in YouTube channels, on videos on YouTube that are incorrect. 1258.46s - 1262.02s | So first of all is, how do you say its name? 1263.66s - 1267.14s | If you think it's MOS Technology, you're wrong. 1267.74s - 1274.22s | It is MOS Technology, because you don't want to confuse it with another company 1274.24s - 1279.88s | that exists at the time called MOS Tech, which I listed up there, and that's very 1279.88s - 1284.56s | true, because I know as a kid, well, at that time, I was even confused myself. 1285.56s - 1291.12s | The next thing that I've seen that several videos would claim is that Chuck 1291.12s - 1295.88s | Peddle and the other guys from Motorola founded MOS Technology. 1296.12s - 1297.20s | No, they did not. 1297.56s - 1303.08s | MOS had already been in existence for several years as a, again, as a memory 1303.26s - 1306.58s | company. They just joined the company. 1306.94s - 1311.58s | There, they created two chips, the 6501 and the 6502. 1312.14s - 1317.66s | And if you're going, well, I've heard of the 6502, I never heard of the 6501. 1317.70s - 1319.34s | Well, there's a reason, let me explain it. 1320.70s - 1325.34s | These two chips are largely, are mostly the same in terms of architecturally. 1326.38s - 1329.22s | It was meant to be a scaled down version of 6800. 1329.22s - 1331.46s | I'll show, I'll show, I'll explain that shortly. 1331.96s - 1334.16s | But there were some differences. 1334.60s - 1341.48s | The main difference is the 6501 was pin compatible with a 6800. 1341.72s - 1349.12s | That means if you're, if you have a board that you designed to use the 6800, you 1349.12s - 1355.04s | can then go get a 6501, which would be way, way, way cheaper, and plop it in and 1355.04s - 1356.64s | off you, off you run. 1356.92s - 1360.40s | Yeah, the opcode would not be compatible, you


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in existence for several years as a, again, as a memory 1303.26s - 1306.58s | company. They just joined the company. 1306.94s - 1311.58s | There, they created two chips, the 6501 and the 6502. 1312.14s - 1317.66s | And if you're going, well, I've heard of the 6502, I never heard of the 6501. 1317.70s - 1319.34s | Well, there's a reason, let me explain it. 1320.70s - 1325.34s | These two chips are largely, are mostly the same in terms of architecturally. 1326.38s - 1329.22s | It was meant to be a scaled down version of 6800. 1329.22s - 1331.46s | I'll show, I'll show, I'll explain that shortly. 1331.96s - 1334.16s | But there were some differences. 1334.60s - 1341.48s | The main difference is the 6501 was pin compatible with a 6800. 1341.72s - 1349.12s | That means if you're, if you have a board that you designed to use the 6800, you 1349.12s - 1355.04s | can then go get a 6501, which would be way, way, way cheaper, and plop it in and 1355.04s - 1356.64s | off you, off you run. 1356.92s - 1360.40s | Yeah, the opcode would not be compatible, you would still have to program it. 1360.62s - 1364.02s | But you would save your development time because you've got, you know, you've 1364.02s - 1365.50s | already got a board that'll use it. 1366.74s - 1369.14s | Motorola didn't like that, and they sued them. 1369.38s - 1371.46s | So they never brought it to market. 1371.70s - 1375.58s | I don't understand how you can sue over that. 1375.58s - 1378.18s | I mean, you, you know, you copyright your pinouts. 1378.18s - 1379.34s | I don't, I don't understand that. 1379.58s - 1384.78s | Because Intel didn't, as far as I know, never, never, you know, sued Zilog about 1384.78s - 1385.58s | the Z80. 1386.22s - 1388.06s | So I don't understand that. 1388.08s - 1392.32s | So anyway, so the 6502 is what came out, they did make a lot of different 1392.32s - 1394.92s | derivatives, things that were like slightly different, different of it, and 1394.92s - 1395.56s | so forth. 1395.92s - 1401.40s | MOS technology existed in a separate company, Commodore later soon bought them 1401.40s - 1401.88s | out. 1402.36s - 1404.84s | So they would have a ready source


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would still have to program it. 1360.62s - 1364.02s | But you would save your development time because you've got, you know, you've 1364.02s - 1365.50s | already got a board that'll use it. 1366.74s - 1369.14s | Motorola didn't like that, and they sued them. 1369.38s - 1371.46s | So they never brought it to market. 1371.70s - 1375.58s | I don't understand how you can sue over that. 1375.58s - 1378.18s | I mean, you, you know, you copyright your pinouts. 1378.18s - 1379.34s | I don't, I don't understand that. 1379.58s - 1384.78s | Because Intel didn't, as far as I know, never, never, you know, sued Zilog about 1384.78s - 1385.58s | the Z80. 1386.22s - 1388.06s | So I don't understand that. 1388.08s - 1392.32s | So anyway, so the 6502 is what came out, they did make a lot of different 1392.32s - 1394.92s | derivatives, things that were like slightly different, different of it, and 1394.92s - 1395.56s | so forth. 1395.92s - 1401.40s | MOS technology existed in a separate company, Commodore later soon bought them 1401.40s - 1401.88s | out. 1402.36s - 1404.84s | So they would have a ready source of chips. 1405.00s - 1408.36s | So they also were the ones that manufactured the specialized chips for 1408.36s - 1410.36s | the Commodores and the Amiga computers. 1412.20s - 1416.08s | And unfortunately, MOS went under when Commodore went under. 1416.26s - 1422.02s | However, one of the other guys I mentioned, Bill Minch, he left Commodore 1422.54s - 1426.74s | and formed his own company called Western Design Company. 1427.18s - 1430.50s | I had to be kind of careful, sometimes I say Western Digital, which is wrong. 1431.94s - 1437.70s | And then he licensed the 6502 chip to make it because that was the common 1437.70s - 1440.30s | thing there is you'd have multiple companies making chips. 1440.82s - 1445.50s | Then what he did was he teamed up with with a couple other companies that were 1445.50s - 1446.88s | making 6502. 1447.16s - 1451.92s | And they developed a new version of it called the 65CO2. 1451.92s - 1454.56s | The C means it's made using CMOS. 1455.76s - 1458.08s | And it's an improved version of 6502. 1458.28s - 1461.28s | They fixed some bugs, they added some opcodes. 1462.40s - 1464.60s


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of chips. 1405.00s - 1408.36s | So they also were the ones that manufactured the specialized chips for 1408.36s - 1410.36s | the Commodores and the Amiga computers. 1412.20s - 1416.08s | And unfortunately, MOS went under when Commodore went under. 1416.26s - 1422.02s | However, one of the other guys I mentioned, Bill Minch, he left Commodore 1422.54s - 1426.74s | and formed his own company called Western Design Company. 1427.18s - 1430.50s | I had to be kind of careful, sometimes I say Western Digital, which is wrong. 1431.94s - 1437.70s | And then he licensed the 6502 chip to make it because that was the common 1437.70s - 1440.30s | thing there is you'd have multiple companies making chips. 1440.82s - 1445.50s | Then what he did was he teamed up with with a couple other companies that were 1445.50s - 1446.88s | making 6502. 1447.16s - 1451.92s | And they developed a new version of it called the 65CO2. 1451.92s - 1454.56s | The C means it's made using CMOS. 1455.76s - 1458.08s | And it's an improved version of 6502. 1458.28s - 1461.28s | They fixed some bugs, they added some opcodes. 1462.40s - 1464.60s | And they still make them today. 1465.04s - 1469.36s | You want a 6502 chip today, you can still buy them, they're a few bucks. 1469.56s - 1474.24s | You can go to like DigiKey and Mouser and those guys and you can still get it. 1474.50s - 1477.86s | Shortly thereafter, he made a new version. 1478.14s - 1485.02s | And that's the 65816, which is an 816 bit version of the 6502. 1485.26s - 1493.18s | It can emulate fully the 6502 or can go, you know, an 816 bit processor. 1494.10s - 1500.18s | It's best known and use has been in the Apple IIgs, which was not quite the last 1500.18s - 1502.42s | Apple II, but probably one of the best ones. 1502.84s - 1505.76s | And it was used in the Super Nintendo. 1506.36s - 1509.36s | So if you use a Super Nintendo, guess what, you use that. 1510.04s - 1515.84s | So that's and these, as the other group is compute processor, that's the eights. 1516.00s - 1517.64s | So these are the sixes. 1518.76s - 1522.08s | There are a few other companies, I just want to quickly mention Texas


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| And they still make them today. 1465.04s - 1469.36s | You want a 6502 chip today, you can still buy them, they're a few bucks. 1469.56s - 1474.24s | You can go to like DigiKey and Mouser and those guys and you can still get it. 1474.50s - 1477.86s | Shortly thereafter, he made a new version. 1478.14s - 1485.02s | And that's the 65816, which is an 816 bit version of the 6502. 1485.26s - 1493.18s | It can emulate fully the 6502 or can go, you know, an 816 bit processor. 1494.10s - 1500.18s | It's best known and use has been in the Apple IIgs, which was not quite the last 1500.18s - 1502.42s | Apple II, but probably one of the best ones. 1502.84s - 1505.76s | And it was used in the Super Nintendo. 1506.36s - 1509.36s | So if you use a Super Nintendo, guess what, you use that. 1510.04s - 1515.84s | So that's and these, as the other group is compute processor, that's the eights. 1516.00s - 1517.64s | So these are the sixes. 1518.76s - 1522.08s | There are a few other companies, I just want to quickly mention Texas Instrument. 1523.56s - 1526.40s | Huge in calculators, still big in calculators. 1527.28s - 1530.88s | But I was surprised to learn that that for a period of time, they actually made 1530.88s - 1532.08s | many computers. 1533.40s - 1540.00s | They took that architecture and made a processor called the TMS 9900, which they 1540.00s - 1545.84s | used in their computer called the TI 99 slash four, which I remember it, it was, 1546.48s - 1551.72s | it was an interesting computer, I'll say it that say it that way, that the 1551.72s - 1554.04s | processor was an 816 processor. 1554.24s - 1559.52s | The problem was, was, you know, I, there's debate whether it was kind of a 1559.52s - 1563.22s | crippled design because of infighting within the company. 1563.34s - 1564.90s | So it wasn't very successful. 1566.34s - 1571.58s | Another company, which is I thought I should list more as a could have been is 1571.58s - 1573.02s | National Semiconductor. 1573.78s - 1576.66s | They had a series of chips called the 32,000. 1577.16s - 1584.18s | And I do know that Atari looked at them, maybe Amiga looked at


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Instrument. 1523.56s - 1526.40s | Huge in calculators, still big in calculators. 1527.28s - 1530.88s | But I was surprised to learn that that for a period of time, they actually made 1530.88s - 1532.08s | many computers. 1533.40s - 1540.00s | They took that architecture and made a processor called the TMS 9900, which they 1540.00s - 1545.84s | used in their computer called the TI 99 slash four, which I remember it, it was, 1546.48s - 1551.72s | it was an interesting computer, I'll say it that say it that way, that the 1551.72s - 1554.04s | processor was an 816 processor. 1554.24s - 1559.52s | The problem was, was, you know, I, there's debate whether it was kind of a 1559.52s - 1563.22s | crippled design because of infighting within the company. 1563.34s - 1564.90s | So it wasn't very successful. 1566.34s - 1571.58s | Another company, which is I thought I should list more as a could have been is 1571.58s - 1573.02s | National Semiconductor. 1573.78s - 1576.66s | They had a series of chips called the 32,000. 1577.16s - 1584.18s | And I do know that Atari looked at them, maybe Amiga looked at them as possibly 1584.62s - 1588.58s | then the processor for the next generation, but they didn't go with them 1588.60s - 1591.12s | and said they went to motor with Motorola 68,000. 1591.40s - 1595.08s | So who knows what might have happened if that didn't, that didn't go. 1595.92s - 1598.60s | The last one I'll mention is RCA. 1598.64s - 1600.84s | Yes, yes, that's Radio Communications of America. 1601.24s - 1604.68s | They had an 8-bit processor called the 1802. 1605.32s - 1608.36s | All I would say for that is take a look at that on Wikipedia. 1608.36s - 1609.60s | It's very, very interesting. 1609.88s - 1614.12s | They actually use that in space probes. 1614.88s - 1616.28s | So kind of insane. 1616.50s - 1619.74s | Now, if you're like, well, you forgot this company, you forgot that company. 1619.74s - 1621.02s | There are other companies out there. 1621.26s - 1623.38s | A lot of them, all they do is they make chips. 1623.58s - 1625.22s | They don't design chips. 1626.14s - 1633.34s | Even today, Apple designs their own software, their own silicon, the M1, 2, 3, 1633.34s - 1635.06s


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them as possibly 1584.62s - 1588.58s | then the processor for the next generation, but they didn't go with them 1588.60s - 1591.12s | and said they went to motor with Motorola 68,000. 1591.40s - 1595.08s | So who knows what might have happened if that didn't, that didn't go. 1595.92s - 1598.60s | The last one I'll mention is RCA. 1598.64s - 1600.84s | Yes, yes, that's Radio Communications of America. 1601.24s - 1604.68s | They had an 8-bit processor called the 1802. 1605.32s - 1608.36s | All I would say for that is take a look at that on Wikipedia. 1608.36s - 1609.60s | It's very, very interesting. 1609.88s - 1614.12s | They actually use that in space probes. 1614.88s - 1616.28s | So kind of insane. 1616.50s - 1619.74s | Now, if you're like, well, you forgot this company, you forgot that company. 1619.74s - 1621.02s | There are other companies out there. 1621.26s - 1623.38s | A lot of them, all they do is they make chips. 1623.58s - 1625.22s | They don't design chips. 1626.14s - 1633.34s | Even today, Apple designs their own software, their own silicon, the M1, 2, 3, 1633.34s - 1635.06s | and 4, but they don't make it. 1635.30s - 1639.46s | They go to another company and say, here, here's a design, make us these chips. 1640.50s - 1645.06s | ARM, you know, ARM is nothing more than, you know, a licensing company. 1645.48s - 1646.88s | They don't make ARM chips. 1647.12s - 1649.08s | They design the ARM architecture. 1649.24s - 1653.64s | They give it to other companies like Broadcom and all the others, and they make it. 1654.36s - 1658.08s | You know, this has a, you know, an ARM processor in it. 1658.20s - 1659.16s | ARM didn't make it. 1659.56s - 1664.08s | They went to Broadcom and, you know, which is part, you know, tied to the Raspberry Pi 1664.08s - 1665.40s | people, and they made it. 1665.40s - 1666.44s | That's just how it is. 1668.36s - 1671.52s | I thought I should make, I should mention this because a lot of people don't 1671.52s - 1674.32s | understand again about, you know, if you don't understand the history of computers, 1674.78s - 1678.38s | when you think about the IBM PC and they, some people think how, oh, how


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| and 4, but they don't make it. 1635.30s - 1639.46s | They go to another company and say, here, here's a design, make us these chips. 1640.50s - 1645.06s | ARM, you know, ARM is nothing more than, you know, a licensing company. 1645.48s - 1646.88s | They don't make ARM chips. 1647.12s - 1649.08s | They design the ARM architecture. 1649.24s - 1653.64s | They give it to other companies like Broadcom and all the others, and they make it. 1654.36s - 1658.08s | You know, this has a, you know, an ARM processor in it. 1658.20s - 1659.16s | ARM didn't make it. 1659.56s - 1664.08s | They went to Broadcom and, you know, which is part, you know, tied to the Raspberry Pi 1664.08s - 1665.40s | people, and they made it. 1665.40s - 1666.44s | That's just how it is. 1668.36s - 1671.52s | I thought I should make, I should mention this because a lot of people don't 1671.52s - 1674.32s | understand again about, you know, if you don't understand the history of computers, 1674.78s - 1678.38s | when you think about the IBM PC and they, some people think how, oh, how radical it 1678.38s - 1683.22s | is and, you know, it's standardized things, and that's just not quite the way it was. 1683.22s - 1688.18s | In the early seventies, we did have a standard, which was, you know, many 1688.18s - 1692.26s | companies, and I mentioned several, you know, Altair, M-Sci, Promenco, and a lot 1692.26s - 1697.22s | of these others who built standard business computers, they used, used the Z80 1697.22s - 1703.10s | chip, they had what was called the S100 bus, which also known as the Altair bus, 1703.10s - 1709.12s | which was an IEEE standard bus up until the 19, the mid nineties, people were 1709.12s - 1717.08s | still making S100 based systems, and they use CPM as the operating system. 1718.56s - 1721.72s | But unfortunately, other than that, there was, there was little standards that, you 1721.72s - 1726.24s | know, floppies, dries was all of those, you had eight, you know, eight inch, you 1726.24s - 1730.64s | had five and a quarter, you had, you know, you might not know what the, what I mean 1730.64s - 1735.66s | by hard sector and soft sector, double sided,


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radical it 1678.38s - 1683.22s | is and, you know, it's standardized things, and that's just not quite the way it was. 1683.22s - 1688.18s | In the early seventies, we did have a standard, which was, you know, many 1688.18s - 1692.26s | companies, and I mentioned several, you know, Altair, M-Sci, Promenco, and a lot 1692.26s - 1697.22s | of these others who built standard business computers, they used, used the Z80 1697.22s - 1703.10s | chip, they had what was called the S100 bus, which also known as the Altair bus, 1703.10s - 1709.12s | which was an IEEE standard bus up until the 19, the mid nineties, people were 1709.12s - 1717.08s | still making S100 based systems, and they use CPM as the operating system. 1718.56s - 1721.72s | But unfortunately, other than that, there was, there was little standards that, you 1721.72s - 1726.24s | know, floppies, dries was all of those, you had eight, you know, eight inch, you 1726.24s - 1730.64s | had five and a quarter, you had, you know, you might not know what the, what I mean 1730.64s - 1735.66s | by hard sector and soft sector, double sided, double density, you know, is all a 1735.66s - 1738.86s | lot of complexity with these things, it was pretty crazy. 1740.50s - 1745.46s | Look into the CPM operating system, again, it's one of like, what might have 1745.46s - 1752.90s | been CP, we might have been using CPN instead of MS-DOS, if certain things had 1752.90s - 1759.74s | not gone certain ways, it's either a, either a ridiculous story, or a sad story, 1759.74s - 1761.04s | or however you want to look at it. 1763.24s - 1766.44s | So it goes a little beyond what I wanted to talk about here, but it is 1766.44s - 1767.04s | interesting. 1769.24s - 1775.08s | So, um, I don't know if people, I've been saying things like eight bits, 16 1775.08s - 1777.48s | bit, I've even said that I ate 16. 1778.44s - 1780.76s | Does anyone know understand what the hell I'm saying? 1780.98s - 1786.68s | When I say these things, I see some hand raised, okay, good, if that's the case, 1786.68s - 1789.94s | because a lot of people don't, it's ridiculous. 1791.58s - 1797.54s | To give you an example, the


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double density, you know, is all a 1735.66s - 1738.86s | lot of complexity with these things, it was pretty crazy. 1740.50s - 1745.46s | Look into the CPM operating system, again, it's one of like, what might have 1745.46s - 1752.90s | been CP, we might have been using CPN instead of MS-DOS, if certain things had 1752.90s - 1759.74s | not gone certain ways, it's either a, either a ridiculous story, or a sad story, 1759.74s - 1761.04s | or however you want to look at it. 1763.24s - 1766.44s | So it goes a little beyond what I wanted to talk about here, but it is 1766.44s - 1767.04s | interesting. 1769.24s - 1775.08s | So, um, I don't know if people, I've been saying things like eight bits, 16 1775.08s - 1777.48s | bit, I've even said that I ate 16. 1778.44s - 1780.76s | Does anyone know understand what the hell I'm saying? 1780.98s - 1786.68s | When I say these things, I see some hand raised, okay, good, if that's the case, 1786.68s - 1789.94s | because a lot of people don't, it's ridiculous. 1791.58s - 1797.54s | To give you an example, the Atari came out with one of their game consoles 1797.54s - 1804.10s | toward the end called the Jaguar, which they toted as being a 64 bit system. 1804.66s - 1810.22s | And their, their marketing tagline was, you know, do the math. 1810.86s - 1815.70s | But if you look at the system, and I'm pretty positive that no, it was not a 1815.72s - 1817.28s | 64 bit system. 1817.56s - 1820.60s | It was, I think either 16 or 32. 1820.74s - 1824.80s | That's the problem with these terminologies is that we as technology 1824.80s - 1828.00s | people, we understand that, oh, this is an eight bit system. 1828.00s - 1829.14s | This is a 16 bit. 1829.28s - 1831.08s | Oh, yeah, we haven't, we can have an eight 16. 1831.08s - 1832.76s | That's in between, that's more powerful. 1833.08s - 1837.52s | But then you get to these marketing dweebs, and they just do ridiculous 1837.52s - 1837.84s | things. 1837.84s - 1841.80s | I came across an article around this time where they talked about this system, 1842.04s - 1844.36s | and they were claiming it was a 64 bit system.


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Atari came out with one of their game consoles 1797.54s - 1804.10s | toward the end called the Jaguar, which they toted as being a 64 bit system. 1804.66s - 1810.22s | And their, their marketing tagline was, you know, do the math. 1810.86s - 1815.70s | But if you look at the system, and I'm pretty positive that no, it was not a 1815.72s - 1817.28s | 64 bit system. 1817.56s - 1820.60s | It was, I think either 16 or 32. 1820.74s - 1824.80s | That's the problem with these terminologies is that we as technology 1824.80s - 1828.00s | people, we understand that, oh, this is an eight bit system. 1828.00s - 1829.14s | This is a 16 bit. 1829.28s - 1831.08s | Oh, yeah, we haven't, we can have an eight 16. 1831.08s - 1832.76s | That's in between, that's more powerful. 1833.08s - 1837.52s | But then you get to these marketing dweebs, and they just do ridiculous 1837.52s - 1837.84s | things. 1837.84s - 1841.80s | I came across an article around this time where they talked about this system, 1842.04s - 1844.36s | and they were claiming it was a 64 bit system. 1844.36s - 1848.86s | And I'm like, wait, wait a minute, I know what the processor is in that system. 1849.06s - 1851.86s | It isn't, it isn't a 64 bit. 1851.86s - 1855.50s | And I'm reading the article and realizing that the person who wrote it was like 1855.52s - 1860.94s | adding things together, like, oh, well, it's, you know, I'm taking the address 1860.94s - 1865.26s | bus and the data bus and this and I'm adding them all together in a 64 bit. 1865.26s - 1866.54s | So it's a 64 bit system. 1866.54s - 1869.46s | And I'm like, no, that's not how it works. 1869.56s - 1875.64s | I was also surprised to learn, because only because I never use these computers 1875.64s - 1882.24s | that we also had 12 and 24 bit and 48 bit computers at one time, which I was 1882.24s - 1884.56s | surprised, but I never I never use those. 1885.52s - 1889.52s | You know, when we talk about processors, these the things we look at, you know, 1889.52s - 1892.62s | clock speed, I remember people think that clock speed is real important. 1892.88s -


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1844.36s - 1848.86s | And I'm like, wait, wait a minute, I know what the processor is in that system. 1849.06s - 1851.86s | It isn't, it isn't a 64 bit. 1851.86s - 1855.50s | And I'm reading the article and realizing that the person who wrote it was like 1855.52s - 1860.94s | adding things together, like, oh, well, it's, you know, I'm taking the address 1860.94s - 1865.26s | bus and the data bus and this and I'm adding them all together in a 64 bit. 1865.26s - 1866.54s | So it's a 64 bit system. 1866.54s - 1869.46s | And I'm like, no, that's not how it works. 1869.56s - 1875.64s | I was also surprised to learn, because only because I never use these computers 1875.64s - 1882.24s | that we also had 12 and 24 bit and 48 bit computers at one time, which I was 1882.24s - 1884.56s | surprised, but I never I never use those. 1885.52s - 1889.52s | You know, when we talk about processors, these the things we look at, you know, 1889.52s - 1892.62s | clock speed, I remember people think that clock speed is real important. 1892.88s - 1894.96s | And it's not as important as people think. 1895.90s - 1900.02s | If you go and watch these YouTube videos where people are doing it, you know, 1900.02s - 1903.02s | they're looking at a new board and seeing how powerful it is, they're not 1903.02s - 1906.38s | going and looking at the dang clock speed, they're going to run benchmarks 1906.54s - 1909.58s | to see, oh, how fast can it do these things. 1909.74s - 1911.02s | So that's more important. 1912.06s - 1919.70s | But this is kind of interesting is that the 6502 has a 0.43 versus a 68,000 of 0.75. 1919.98s - 1924.50s | If that's not clear, that means that the 6502 is actually faster than the 1924.50s - 1925.72s | 68,000. 1926.28s - 1930.20s | But that's also gets into logic of, you know, why, why we went with RISC 1930.20s - 1933.64s | processors, because, you know, they're more powerful, because they're kind of 1933.64s - 1934.40s | stripped down. 1935.80s - 1939.08s | The address bus is entering that tells us how much memory we can access. 1939.40s - 1943.88s | Almost all eight bit systems have a


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1894.96s | And it's not as important as people think. 1895.90s - 1900.02s | If you go and watch these YouTube videos where people are doing it, you know, 1900.02s - 1903.02s | they're looking at a new board and seeing how powerful it is, they're not 1903.02s - 1906.38s | going and looking at the dang clock speed, they're going to run benchmarks 1906.54s - 1909.58s | to see, oh, how fast can it do these things. 1909.74s - 1911.02s | So that's more important. 1912.06s - 1919.70s | But this is kind of interesting is that the 6502 has a 0.43 versus a 68,000 of 0.75. 1919.98s - 1924.50s | If that's not clear, that means that the 6502 is actually faster than the 1924.50s - 1925.72s | 68,000. 1926.28s - 1930.20s | But that's also gets into logic of, you know, why, why we went with RISC 1930.20s - 1933.64s | processors, because, you know, they're more powerful, because they're kind of 1933.64s - 1934.40s | stripped down. 1935.80s - 1939.08s | The address bus is entering that tells us how much memory we can access. 1939.40s - 1943.88s | Almost all eight bit systems have a 24 bit address bus, which which is why they 1943.88s - 1946.44s | only have 64 k of memory. 1947.76s - 1951.36s | The size number register is kind of interesting, because you got some CPUs 1951.36s - 1956.78s | that have like, one or two registers, and others would like multiple, if you 1956.78s - 1959.66s | don't understand what I mean by a register, that's the storage space, if 1959.66s - 1962.98s | you will, within the processor, if you're going to do anything, you have to 1962.98s - 1966.30s | pull it out of memory, pull it into the processor and work with it. 1966.90s - 1969.90s | The data bus is what's important, because that's the that's the, that's 1969.90s - 1973.90s | the highway, the data highway within the computer, that data is moving around. 1974.10s - 1978.30s | If you got an eight bit processor, all the auxiliary chips need to be eight 1978.30s - 1980.46s | bit, you can't be mixing and matching. 1982.06s - 1987.82s | So I always like to throw this out, which is the IBM PC, which had all these 1987.82s - 1988.82s | capabilities. 1989.58s - 1992.14s |


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24 bit address bus, which which is why they 1943.88s - 1946.44s | only have 64 k of memory. 1947.76s - 1951.36s | The size number register is kind of interesting, because you got some CPUs 1951.36s - 1956.78s | that have like, one or two registers, and others would like multiple, if you 1956.78s - 1959.66s | don't understand what I mean by a register, that's the storage space, if 1959.66s - 1962.98s | you will, within the processor, if you're going to do anything, you have to 1962.98s - 1966.30s | pull it out of memory, pull it into the processor and work with it. 1966.90s - 1969.90s | The data bus is what's important, because that's the that's the, that's 1969.90s - 1973.90s | the highway, the data highway within the computer, that data is moving around. 1974.10s - 1978.30s | If you got an eight bit processor, all the auxiliary chips need to be eight 1978.30s - 1980.46s | bit, you can't be mixing and matching. 1982.06s - 1987.82s | So I always like to throw this out, which is the IBM PC, which had all these 1987.82s - 1988.82s | capabilities. 1989.58s - 1992.14s | How many people think this was a 16 bit system? 1993.24s - 1995.26s | How many people think this was an eight bit system? 1996.02s - 1997.14s | Okay, good. 1997.14s - 2002.66s | It's an eight bit system, because the 8088 processor is really an eight 16 bit 2002.66s - 2003.46s | processor. 2003.62s - 2007.90s | So the PC is an eight bit system, even though most people think it's 16 bits. 2008.40s - 2010.00s | A lot of the 2011.92s - 2015.60s | I really can't call them a clone in the early days more than IBM compatible. 2015.92s - 2022.44s | They were full 16, because they either use the 8086, or the 8186, and so forth. 2022.78s - 2024.40s | So it's actually kind of interesting. 2025.44s - 2027.44s | So let's get into the these chips. 2027.44s - 2029.12s | I talked about the 6800. 2030.04s - 2031.76s | These are the specs, I'm not going to read it. 2033.08s - 2034.60s | That's actually what they look like. 2035.42s - 2039.10s | Please note, it had 72 instructions, what we call opcode. 2040.14s - 2043.02s | As I said, it was really cost


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How many people think this was a 16 bit system? 1993.24s - 1995.26s | How many people think this was an eight bit system? 1996.02s - 1997.14s | Okay, good. 1997.14s - 2002.66s | It's an eight bit system, because the 8088 processor is really an eight 16 bit 2002.66s - 2003.46s | processor. 2003.62s - 2007.90s | So the PC is an eight bit system, even though most people think it's 16 bits. 2008.40s - 2010.00s | A lot of the 2011.92s - 2015.60s | I really can't call them a clone in the early days more than IBM compatible. 2015.92s - 2022.44s | They were full 16, because they either use the 8086, or the 8186, and so forth. 2022.78s - 2024.40s | So it's actually kind of interesting. 2025.44s - 2027.44s | So let's get into the these chips. 2027.44s - 2029.12s | I talked about the 6800. 2030.04s - 2031.76s | These are the specs, I'm not going to read it. 2033.08s - 2034.60s | That's actually what they look like. 2035.42s - 2039.10s | Please note, it had 72 instructions, what we call opcode. 2040.14s - 2043.02s | As I said, it was really cost $360. 2043.02s - 2045.14s | That was in 70s dollars. 2046.06s - 2049.98s | Then over time, they reduced it to $179, then to $69. 2050.42s - 2052.46s | I don't know how long they were making this. 2052.46s - 2056.66s | But what I've been able to see is they were, they were still making these for 2056.66s - 2058.22s | probably a couple of decades. 2059.98s - 2065.04s | Now, I was trying to find a similar chart that what I show here. 2065.06s - 2069.62s | For the 6502, but this I thought that was useful, because again, people need to 2069.62s - 2073.82s | understand that when a company makes a processor, they're making other chips to 2073.82s - 2074.90s | work with it. 2075.22s - 2078.42s | So in this case, you see that, you know, you have the 68,000 processor. 2078.74s - 2081.38s | In this case, they have a separate chip for the for the clock. 2082.74s - 2085.22s | Then they have, of course, chips for ROM and RAM. 2085.94s - 2090.50s | And then they have a PIA, that's a Peripheral Interface Adapter, that's and 2090.50s - 2092.18s | then of


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$360. 2043.02s - 2045.14s | That was in 70s dollars. 2046.06s - 2049.98s | Then over time, they reduced it to $179, then to $69. 2050.42s - 2052.46s | I don't know how long they were making this. 2052.46s - 2056.66s | But what I've been able to see is they were, they were still making these for 2056.66s - 2058.22s | probably a couple of decades. 2059.98s - 2065.04s | Now, I was trying to find a similar chart that what I show here. 2065.06s - 2069.62s | For the 6502, but this I thought that was useful, because again, people need to 2069.62s - 2073.82s | understand that when a company makes a processor, they're making other chips to 2073.82s - 2074.90s | work with it. 2075.22s - 2078.42s | So in this case, you see that, you know, you have the 68,000 processor. 2078.74s - 2081.38s | In this case, they have a separate chip for the for the clock. 2082.74s - 2085.22s | Then they have, of course, chips for ROM and RAM. 2085.94s - 2090.50s | And then they have a PIA, that's a Peripheral Interface Adapter, that's and 2090.50s - 2092.18s | then of course, a communications adapter. 2092.18s - 2097.00s | So the whole idea was that if Motorola was not just selling you the processor, 2097.00s - 2101.32s | that's what two of all these companies, they're selling you the complete set of 2101.32s - 2103.24s | chips for your system. 2104.76s - 2108.13s | Architecturally, this is what we look at. 2108.13s - 2112.93s | We look at the inside with the with the registers, you see the 6800 versus the 2112.93s - 2113.85s | 6502. 2114.49s - 2117.73s | The 6800 had two registers, they got rid of one. 2118.41s - 2119.81s | But otherwise, they're pretty similar. 2119.81s - 2122.61s | They have index registers and stack registers and so forth. 2122.61s - 2126.15s | Those are all needed in time inside the chip to do the work that it does. 2126.87s - 2132.41s | So then we have the 6502, which of course, you see it's a it looks just just the 2132.41s - 2135.29s | same as if it's a four pin dip, as it's called. 2136.69s - 2142.17s | It has only 55 instructions versus the 77 of the 6800. 2143.65s - 2147.13s | So the


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course, a communications adapter. 2092.18s - 2097.00s | So the whole idea was that if Motorola was not just selling you the processor, 2097.00s - 2101.32s | that's what two of all these companies, they're selling you the complete set of 2101.32s - 2103.24s | chips for your system. 2104.76s - 2108.13s | Architecturally, this is what we look at. 2108.13s - 2112.93s | We look at the inside with the with the registers, you see the 6800 versus the 2112.93s - 2113.85s | 6502. 2114.49s - 2117.73s | The 6800 had two registers, they got rid of one. 2118.41s - 2119.81s | But otherwise, they're pretty similar. 2119.81s - 2122.61s | They have index registers and stack registers and so forth. 2122.61s - 2126.15s | Those are all needed in time inside the chip to do the work that it does. 2126.87s - 2132.41s | So then we have the 6502, which of course, you see it's a it looks just just the 2132.41s - 2135.29s | same as if it's a four pin dip, as it's called. 2136.69s - 2142.17s | It has only 55 instructions versus the 77 of the 6800. 2143.65s - 2147.13s | So the funny thing is, I've actually read some stuff where people have complaint 2147.17s - 2154.41s | have claimed, I don't know if that's true or not, is that the 6502 is a 2154.41s - 2160.63s | 6502 might be the first risk chip, because they reduce the instruction set. 2161.39s - 2164.63s | I don't know who can make that determination. 2165.75s - 2167.27s | But that's what they did. 2168.87s - 2172.51s | The original cost for this chip was $25. 2173.23s - 2177.47s | And one of the ways they were able to do this was not just that it was a reduced 2177.47s - 2181.15s | design was they were able to improve manufacturing. 2181.53s - 2185.89s | Now, as I understand it, and those of you who have more knowledge, you can you can 2186.61s - 2189.85s | get with the actor and tell me I'm got this wrong. 2190.05s - 2195.25s | But as I understand it, the chip yield at that time was pretty lousy, as in you'd 2195.25s - 2201.77s | run a make a bunch of chips, and 70% of them were bad, i.e. had to throw them 2201.77s - 2207.01s |


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funny thing is, I've actually read some stuff where people have complaint 2147.17s - 2154.41s | have claimed, I don't know if that's true or not, is that the 6502 is a 2154.41s - 2160.63s | 6502 might be the first risk chip, because they reduce the instruction set. 2161.39s - 2164.63s | I don't know who can make that determination. 2165.75s - 2167.27s | But that's what they did. 2168.87s - 2172.51s | The original cost for this chip was $25. 2173.23s - 2177.47s | And one of the ways they were able to do this was not just that it was a reduced 2177.47s - 2181.15s | design was they were able to improve manufacturing. 2181.53s - 2185.89s | Now, as I understand it, and those of you who have more knowledge, you can you can 2186.61s - 2189.85s | get with the actor and tell me I'm got this wrong. 2190.05s - 2195.25s | But as I understand it, the chip yield at that time was pretty lousy, as in you'd 2195.25s - 2201.77s | run a make a bunch of chips, and 70% of them were bad, i.e. had to throw them 2201.77s - 2207.01s | away, which is why chips are so costly, because the yield was so poor. 2207.31s - 2211.75s | But apparently someone that you know, one of the motor engineers that came to MOS had 2211.75s - 2216.11s | worked out a way I don't know what it is, I'm sorry, I'm not an engineer in this 2216.11s - 2223.15s | area, a way of fixing the chips after production, such that they had a good 2223.15s - 2229.39s | yield going and suddenly going being 70% bad to like 30% bad. 2229.91s - 2232.67s | And thus they were able to sell the chips a lot cheaper. 2233.13s - 2238.85s | And it was because of this price, that a couple of guys by the name of Steve Jobs 2238.85s - 2243.37s | and Steve Wozniak looked at this and go like, hey, this is the chip that we can 2243.37s - 2248.05s | use to put together this little home computer we've been thinking about, which 2248.29s - 2251.49s | if you don't know who those people are, those are the guys that created the Apple 2251.49s - 2253.29s | one and the Apple two, and so forth. 2254.27s


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away, which is why chips are so costly, because the yield was so poor. 2207.31s - 2211.75s | But apparently someone that you know, one of the motor engineers that came to MOS had 2211.75s - 2216.11s | worked out a way I don't know what it is, I'm sorry, I'm not an engineer in this 2216.11s - 2223.15s | area, a way of fixing the chips after production, such that they had a good 2223.15s - 2229.39s | yield going and suddenly going being 70% bad to like 30% bad. 2229.91s - 2232.67s | And thus they were able to sell the chips a lot cheaper. 2233.13s - 2238.85s | And it was because of this price, that a couple of guys by the name of Steve Jobs 2238.85s - 2243.37s | and Steve Wozniak looked at this and go like, hey, this is the chip that we can 2243.37s - 2248.05s | use to put together this little home computer we've been thinking about, which 2248.29s - 2251.49s | if you don't know who those people are, those are the guys that created the Apple 2251.49s - 2253.29s | one and the Apple two, and so forth. 2254.27s - 2261.99s | So, so what have been the 6502 been used for a lot of stuff over and over in the 2261.99s - 2268.55s | UK, they, you know, the acorn computers, the BBC micro was used it, the Apple one, 2268.55s - 2275.43s | the two and the three, and all the variations used it, the Atari home game 2275.43s - 2281.39s | systems, the Atari eight bit systems used it, Commodore used it for their that all 2281.45s - 2289.37s | the pet models of vic 2064, and so forth, the Nintendo used it, others used it, and 2290.45s - 2294.41s | Bender from Futurama, use the 6502. 2295.45s - 2300.97s | So then, of course, as I said, the 65816 chip was used in the two GS and the super 2300.97s - 2301.49s | NES. 2301.97s - 2306.25s | And as I said, Western design is still making and selling these chips. 2306.31s - 2309.43s | Yeah, that's all they do is they, as far as I know, that's pretty much what they 2309.43s - 2310.23s | manufacture. 2310.39s - 2312.91s | So clearly, people are using these for a lot of embedded system. 2312.95s -


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- 2261.99s | So, so what have been the 6502 been used for a lot of stuff over and over in the 2261.99s - 2268.55s | UK, they, you know, the acorn computers, the BBC micro was used it, the Apple one, 2268.55s - 2275.43s | the two and the three, and all the variations used it, the Atari home game 2275.43s - 2281.39s | systems, the Atari eight bit systems used it, Commodore used it for their that all 2281.45s - 2289.37s | the pet models of vic 2064, and so forth, the Nintendo used it, others used it, and 2290.45s - 2294.41s | Bender from Futurama, use the 6502. 2295.45s - 2300.97s | So then, of course, as I said, the 65816 chip was used in the two GS and the super 2300.97s - 2301.49s | NES. 2301.97s - 2306.25s | And as I said, Western design is still making and selling these chips. 2306.31s - 2309.43s | Yeah, that's all they do is they, as far as I know, that's pretty much what they 2309.43s - 2310.23s | manufacture. 2310.39s - 2312.91s | So clearly, people are using these for a lot of embedded system. 2312.95s - 2317.71s | Sadly, I don't know, they don't even say specifically what they're being used for, 2317.71s - 2319.07s | but it's got to be used heavily. 2319.95s - 2324.19s | Another interesting computer is the Kim one, which was created by Chuck Peddle at 2324.19s - 2329.83s | MOS, it was a way to, it was a single board pewter to kind of sell the 6502, it 2329.83s - 2331.51s | was so cheap that people bought that. 2331.51s - 2335.05s | Those are very collectible, I've never never seen one. 2335.25s - 2337.93s | So I'm not even sure, I think they were probably about yay big. 2339.25s - 2346.45s | And if it's not clear, that keypad is basically hexadecimal numbers, and some 2346.45s - 2347.17s | other commands. 2347.17s - 2349.33s | So no, it's not a typewriter keyboard. 2351.97s - 2355.57s | I know that Commodore was still making these even though after they bought out. 2356.19s - 2359.91s | I know that Commodore was still making these even though after they bought out 2361.35s - 2365.83s | MOS, and then of course, some of the secondary sources were 652 made their 2365.83s - 2369.03s


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2317.71s | Sadly, I don't know, they don't even say specifically what they're being used for, 2317.71s - 2319.07s | but it's got to be used heavily. 2319.95s - 2324.19s | Another interesting computer is the Kim one, which was created by Chuck Peddle at 2324.19s - 2329.83s | MOS, it was a way to, it was a single board pewter to kind of sell the 6502, it 2329.83s - 2331.51s | was so cheap that people bought that. 2331.51s - 2335.05s | Those are very collectible, I've never never seen one. 2335.25s - 2337.93s | So I'm not even sure, I think they were probably about yay big. 2339.25s - 2346.45s | And if it's not clear, that keypad is basically hexadecimal numbers, and some 2346.45s - 2347.17s | other commands. 2347.17s - 2349.33s | So no, it's not a typewriter keyboard. 2351.97s - 2355.57s | I know that Commodore was still making these even though after they bought out. 2356.19s - 2359.91s | I know that Commodore was still making these even though after they bought out 2361.35s - 2365.83s | MOS, and then of course, some of the secondary sources were 652 made their 2365.83s - 2369.03s | own the the sim one and the aim 65. 2369.31s - 2372.95s | And then I found this kind of interesting slide, I thought was 2372.95s - 2375.99s | interesting that showed all the different systems that the clones of it 2375.99s - 2380.63s | that popped up, I actually brought one that I've been building that I need to 2380.63s - 2384.41s | try to fix, which is, this is the power one. 2384.77s - 2389.53s | So you can see it's pretty small, it's got a keypad, an LED, there's something 2389.53s - 2391.85s | wrong with it, I got to try to figure out how to fix this. 2392.09s - 2396.01s | But, you know, if you come to me, if you visit me at the hacker halt at the 2396.17s - 2399.49s | hardware hacking village, you can take it, you can have a chance to take a look 2399.49s - 2400.37s | at it and so forth. 2400.61s - 2401.61s | That's why I brought it. 2402.83s - 2408.93s | So programming, which is always so much fun, which is a semi language program, 2408.93s - 2412.15s | which is either miserable or whatever.


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| own the the sim one and the aim 65. 2369.31s - 2372.95s | And then I found this kind of interesting slide, I thought was 2372.95s - 2375.99s | interesting that showed all the different systems that the clones of it 2375.99s - 2380.63s | that popped up, I actually brought one that I've been building that I need to 2380.63s - 2384.41s | try to fix, which is, this is the power one. 2384.77s - 2389.53s | So you can see it's pretty small, it's got a keypad, an LED, there's something 2389.53s - 2391.85s | wrong with it, I got to try to figure out how to fix this. 2392.09s - 2396.01s | But, you know, if you come to me, if you visit me at the hacker halt at the 2396.17s - 2399.49s | hardware hacking village, you can take it, you can have a chance to take a look 2399.49s - 2400.37s | at it and so forth. 2400.61s - 2401.61s | That's why I brought it. 2402.83s - 2408.93s | So programming, which is always so much fun, which is a semi language program, 2408.93s - 2412.15s | which is either miserable or whatever. 2413.07s - 2415.87s | I think most people have you've done programming, probably done high level 2415.87s - 2420.43s | programming, I know I have, you know, C and basic and Pascal and so forth. 2421.39s - 2426.55s | The way I look at it is these programs are written to make it easier for us to 2426.55s - 2431.35s | put in put down our ideas into how a program should work. 2432.27s - 2437.75s | But the thing is, is they have to be then converted into the language of the 2437.77s - 2441.73s | machines, which is machine code, which is, you know, binary coding, and so 2441.73s - 2442.21s | forth. 2443.21s - 2444.97s | How good that is, is unknown. 2444.97s - 2449.49s | That's why many people do still write a do a semi language programming because 2450.41s - 2453.73s | they can, you know, get down to the nitty gritty of the hardware and actually 2453.73s - 2454.57s | write to it. 2455.01s - 2457.01s | Unfortunately, it's not really fun. 2457.33s - 2458.97s | But people do write it. 2458.97s - 2463.91s | I was actually surprised that if you visit no


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2413.07s - 2415.87s | I think most people have you've done programming, probably done high level 2415.87s - 2420.43s | programming, I know I have, you know, C and basic and Pascal and so forth. 2421.39s - 2426.55s | The way I look at it is these programs are written to make it easier for us to 2426.55s - 2431.35s | put in put down our ideas into how a program should work. 2432.27s - 2437.75s | But the thing is, is they have to be then converted into the language of the 2437.77s - 2441.73s | machines, which is machine code, which is, you know, binary coding, and so 2441.73s - 2442.21s | forth. 2443.21s - 2444.97s | How good that is, is unknown. 2444.97s - 2449.49s | That's why many people do still write a do a semi language programming because 2450.41s - 2453.73s | they can, you know, get down to the nitty gritty of the hardware and actually 2453.73s - 2454.57s | write to it. 2455.01s - 2457.01s | Unfortunately, it's not really fun. 2457.33s - 2458.97s | But people do write it. 2458.97s - 2463.91s | I was actually surprised that if you visit no starch press here, they actually 2463.91s - 2467.89s | have a book on arm, a semi language programming, and I think they also have 2467.89s - 2470.41s | one for x86 programming. 2470.89s - 2475.37s | So the thing is also with parameters, when we do these higher level languages, 2475.37s - 2479.29s | there's things like, you know, an if then statement, you know, if this 2479.29s - 2483.33s | condition has been met, then do this, if you get a for loop or a while loop, and 2483.33s - 2488.13s | all that they don't, that doesn't exist in a semi languages, you do have things 2488.13s - 2494.23s | like a compare command, like, hey, do these two things compare, which is 2494.23s - 2495.39s | higher, which is lower. 2495.75s - 2500.01s | But from that, then you have to build that logic of that if statement or the 2500.01s - 2501.35s | for loop and this sort of stuff. 2501.71s - 2504.27s | So it becomes a little bit more complex. 2506.55s - 2509.91s | So this is what 6502 looks like. 2509.91s - 2511.83s | And it's I guess, three letter coding. 2512.27s -


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starch press here, they actually 2463.91s - 2467.89s | have a book on arm, a semi language programming, and I think they also have 2467.89s - 2470.41s | one for x86 programming. 2470.89s - 2475.37s | So the thing is also with parameters, when we do these higher level languages, 2475.37s - 2479.29s | there's things like, you know, an if then statement, you know, if this 2479.29s - 2483.33s | condition has been met, then do this, if you get a for loop or a while loop, and 2483.33s - 2488.13s | all that they don't, that doesn't exist in a semi languages, you do have things 2488.13s - 2494.23s | like a compare command, like, hey, do these two things compare, which is 2494.23s - 2495.39s | higher, which is lower. 2495.75s - 2500.01s | But from that, then you have to build that logic of that if statement or the 2500.01s - 2501.35s | for loop and this sort of stuff. 2501.71s - 2504.27s | So it becomes a little bit more complex. 2506.55s - 2509.91s | So this is what 6502 looks like. 2509.91s - 2511.83s | And it's I guess, three letter coding. 2512.27s - 2516.51s | And these are some of the ones in like, there's an ad with carry, there's the 2516.51s - 2522.29s | compare, there's the load, the accumulator, that means you're grabbing a 2522.29s - 2526.01s | number out of memory and pulling the accumulator so you can do math on it. 2527.61s - 2533.65s | The 6502 has only two math, math commands, it can add, and it can 2533.65s - 2534.41s | subtract. 2534.57s - 2535.53s | And that's it. 2536.19s - 2540.89s | If you want to do multiply and divide, you're going to have to use add and 2540.89s - 2541.85s | subtract. 2542.55s - 2548.67s | So, and of course, if you're have any sense, you're going to, you're going to 2548.67s - 2549.71s | comment your code. 2549.71s - 2552.95s | Otherwise, we were going to look at your semi language, your semi coding, like, I 2552.95s - 2554.23s | don't know what the hell you're doing here. 2555.27s - 2560.27s | If you would like to try out 6502 semi language, I found this really cool 2560.27s - 2562.55s | website, it uses JavaScript. 2562.55s - 2565.35s | So you can actually do


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2516.51s | And these are some of the ones in like, there's an ad with carry, there's the 2516.51s - 2522.29s | compare, there's the load, the accumulator, that means you're grabbing a 2522.29s - 2526.01s | number out of memory and pulling the accumulator so you can do math on it. 2527.61s - 2533.65s | The 6502 has only two math, math commands, it can add, and it can 2533.65s - 2534.41s | subtract. 2534.57s - 2535.53s | And that's it. 2536.19s - 2540.89s | If you want to do multiply and divide, you're going to have to use add and 2540.89s - 2541.85s | subtract. 2542.55s - 2548.67s | So, and of course, if you're have any sense, you're going to, you're going to 2548.67s - 2549.71s | comment your code. 2549.71s - 2552.95s | Otherwise, we were going to look at your semi language, your semi coding, like, I 2552.95s - 2554.23s | don't know what the hell you're doing here. 2555.27s - 2560.27s | If you would like to try out 6502 semi language, I found this really cool 2560.27s - 2562.55s | website, it uses JavaScript. 2562.55s - 2565.35s | So you can actually do a semi language programming there. 2565.55s - 2568.61s | And it's both not it's not just it's not just like, oh, here's a window to do a 2568.61s - 2569.19s | semi language. 2569.43s - 2573.23s | It is done as a tutorial, where you can go on there and you can write, you know, 2573.23s - 2575.63s | put in the code, you can see what happens and so forth. 2575.99s - 2578.79s | And also to serve with this other one, which is an online tutorial. 2579.35s - 2581.43s | Yeah, feel free to take pictures of these. 2582.03s - 2582.79s | These are really good. 2583.13s - 2585.35s | So this is what a semi language looks like. 2587.67s - 2590.99s | The left side is a semi language to do a bubble sort. 2591.51s - 2596.63s | And then on the right side is bubble sort in thing C. 2598.63s - 2603.55s | So that looks like really, really fun things to write, which is probably why I 2603.55s - 2608.55s | don't recall doing a whole lot of out of a semi language even in college, really 2608.55s - 2609.15s | simple stuff. 2609.87s -


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a semi language programming there. 2565.55s - 2568.61s | And it's both not it's not just it's not just like, oh, here's a window to do a 2568.61s - 2569.19s | semi language. 2569.43s - 2573.23s | It is done as a tutorial, where you can go on there and you can write, you know, 2573.23s - 2575.63s | put in the code, you can see what happens and so forth. 2575.99s - 2578.79s | And also to serve with this other one, which is an online tutorial. 2579.35s - 2581.43s | Yeah, feel free to take pictures of these. 2582.03s - 2582.79s | These are really good. 2583.13s - 2585.35s | So this is what a semi language looks like. 2587.67s - 2590.99s | The left side is a semi language to do a bubble sort. 2591.51s - 2596.63s | And then on the right side is bubble sort in thing C. 2598.63s - 2603.55s | So that looks like really, really fun things to write, which is probably why I 2603.55s - 2608.55s | don't recall doing a whole lot of out of a semi language even in college, really 2608.55s - 2609.15s | simple stuff. 2609.87s - 2614.87s | Okay, this is the point where I would recommend you might want to pull your 2614.87s - 2618.03s | phones out, because I'm going to be giving a lot of resources, you are 2618.03s - 2619.79s | totally free to take pictures. 2619.79s - 2621.11s | That's why I do this. 2621.83s - 2627.35s | I'm always the mind of I'm here to help educate you and show you where you can go 2627.35s - 2628.59s | next after this. 2629.51s - 2636.67s | So websites, right at the top 6502.org is like the place for anything about this. 2636.71s - 2642.95s | The 6502, there's Buku resources, emulators, software sources, hardware, 2643.27s - 2645.31s | tutorials, and everything like that. 2645.59s - 2649.51s | The other one is a neat one that I discovered, they have a lot of pages on 2649.51s - 2655.11s | the 6502, and so forth, and a lot on the Kim one, including PDF scans of a lot of 2655.11s - 2658.15s | the documentation, which I thought was really, really cool. 2659.59s - 2661.79s | The last one is the Internet Archive. 2662.43s - 2666.59s | If you are interested in


