# MediaChunks

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your time. 2089.98s - 2092.98s | If you can, download the app. It's not perfect. 2092.98s - 2095.98s | Every two weeks, we are pushing an update. 2095.98s - 2098.98s | What we want is to have an app that is working for you, 2098.98s - 2102.98s | available for anyone like you, and designed by you, by the people, 2102.98s - 2105.98s | by users for something that you really like, 2105.98s - 2107.98s | instead of us just coming with an idea and saying, 2107.98s - 2109.98s | hey, this is how it's going to work. 2109.98s - 2112.98s | So you can just download it, give us your feedback, 2112.98s - 2122.98s | and we will try to tailor the application to your designs or your needs. 2122.98s - 2124.98s | Okay? Thank you so much. 2124.98s - 2128.98s | And if you need me, that's my email, if you want also to email me. 2128.98s - 2130.98s | Thank you.


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{ "webpage_url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A-J3jGofYN8", "title": "DEF CON 32 - Tough Adversary Don\u2019t Blame Sun Tzu - Gregory Carpenter, DrPH", "description": "Years ago, when I started working at the NSA, I said to myself, now I can see what\u2019s really happening and what needs to be done to address our adversaries and put an end to cybercrime. Well, I was sure wrong. I worked in a few different offices and participated in hundreds of operations, only to find frustration time and time again. What happened? What was it that we just couldn\u2019t put our finger on? Yes, we were successful in addressing criminal activity. Yes, we could successfully negotiate the contested cyberspace domain. But adversarial activity kept popping up on our radar. It was Whack-A-Mole 2.0.\n\nWas it the technologies we used? No, we had state-of-the-art capabilities. Was there a lack of technical training amongst operators? No, again, taxpayers coughed up plenty, and they got their money\u2019s worth. I concluded that it was strategy; it was philosophy. Sure, we had all the technical capabilities in the world, but we were using everything wrong.\n\nI was in the Information Warfare Support Center. We were supposed to know what to do and how to do it! So, I started studying not only traditional but contemporary philosophy as well. I gained access to curricula in China, Russia, and the USA. This presentation informs the attendees of the adversarial philosophy taught in the military academies in China and Russia, which is taken from their curricula and papers published in various journals and practice today.", "channel_url": "https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC6Om9kAkl32dWlDSNlDS9Iw", "duration": 1365, "channel": "DEFCONConference", "uploader": "DEFCONConference", "upload_date": "20241016" } 0.00s - 7.32s | This text was transcribed using whisper model: large-v2 I am Greg Carpenter, former NSA guy outed on WikiLeaks, so I get to come out here and 7.32s - 13.51s | do stuff now and meet real people, so it's nice. 13.51s - 17.31s | I have an interesting, I think it's an interesting talk today, I've studied for the last couple 17.31s - 28.91s | years now, pulling information from Russian and Chinese curriculum at their military universities. 28.91s - 35.17s | And we're going to take a look at how that ties to national strategic goals, their philosophy 35.17s - 37.71s | and their strategy. 37.71s - 42.99s | So this is, pretty much it's a no Sun Tzu zone, so no quotes from Sun Tzu for anybody


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So, I started studying not only traditional but contemporary philosophy as well. I gained access to curricula in China, Russia, and the USA. This presentation informs the attendees of the adversarial philosophy taught in the military academies in China and Russia, which is taken from their curricula and papers published in various journals and practice today.", "channel_url": "https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC6Om9kAkl32dWlDSNlDS9Iw", "duration": 1365, "channel": "DEFCONConference", "uploader": "DEFCONConference", "upload_date": "20241016" } 0.00s - 7.32s | This text was transcribed using whisper model: large-v2 I am Greg Carpenter, former NSA guy outed on WikiLeaks, so I get to come out here and 7.32s - 13.51s | do stuff now and meet real people, so it's nice. 13.51s - 17.31s | I have an interesting, I think it's an interesting talk today, I've studied for the last couple 17.31s - 28.91s | years now, pulling information from Russian and Chinese curriculum at their military universities. 28.91s - 35.17s | And we're going to take a look at how that ties to national strategic goals, their philosophy 35.17s - 37.71s | and their strategy. 37.71s - 42.99s | So this is, pretty much it's a no Sun Tzu zone, so no quotes from Sun Tzu for anybody 42.99s - 43.99s | out here today, okay? 43.99s - 48.50s | I don't want to hear any. 48.50s - 52.76s | Quick agenda, just so you can see where we're going to go, pretty straightforward, Chinese 52.76s - 57.30s | history influences how they're working it today and how it links to national goals, 57.30s - 61.16s | and the same thing with Russia. 61.16s - 67.52s | One thing that's common in both Chinese and Russian, and I would say American psychological 67.52s - 74.94s | warfare and information warfare strategies, are basically controlling the language, controlling 74.94s - 77.20s | the meaning of words. 77.20s - 80.84s | Russia has a deep rooted history in this, China's come along just in the last hundred 80.84s - 88.64s | years or so and started to focus on epistemology and ontology, basically the meaning of words 88.64s - 92.02s | and the meaning of reality. 92.02s - 98.10s | I think Philip Dick said it best, because it's the basis for all three psychological 98.10s - 100.98s | warfare programs. 100.98s - 106.50s | I'm doing some work on Iran right now too, I'd like to have that soon.


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42.99s - 43.99s | out here today, okay? 43.99s - 48.50s | I don't want to hear any. 48.50s - 52.76s | Quick agenda, just so you can see where we're going to go, pretty straightforward, Chinese 52.76s - 57.30s | history influences how they're working it today and how it links to national goals, 57.30s - 61.16s | and the same thing with Russia. 61.16s - 67.52s | One thing that's common in both Chinese and Russian, and I would say American psychological 67.52s - 74.94s | warfare and information warfare strategies, are basically controlling the language, controlling 74.94s - 77.20s | the meaning of words. 77.20s - 80.84s | Russia has a deep rooted history in this, China's come along just in the last hundred 80.84s - 88.64s | years or so and started to focus on epistemology and ontology, basically the meaning of words 88.64s - 92.02s | and the meaning of reality. 92.02s - 98.10s | I think Philip Dick said it best, because it's the basis for all three psychological 98.10s - 100.98s | warfare programs. 100.98s - 106.50s | I'm doing some work on Iran right now too, I'd like to have that soon. 106.50s - 111.08s | Theirs is a little bit different approach, but they use the same concept as put out by 111.08s - 113.42s | Philip Dick. 113.42s - 117.90s | So standard disclaimer from NSA, I've got to tell you this because this is, if I don't 117.90s - 123.10s | say this, they told me I get to go to jail, which is fine, I met a lot of good people 123.10s - 126.06s | there, so that's that. 126.06s - 129.58s | So let's start talking about Chinese influences real quick. 129.58s - 134.98s | Now everyone, pretty much everyone's heard of Sun Tzu, which is probably why you're here, 134.98s - 139.70s | the whole art of war, and that's about as much as we're going to talk about him. 139.70s - 146.42s | Now even though he is the seminal historical figure in Chinese information warfare, he's 146.42s - 150.50s | not the only one taught at the universities. 150.50s - 154.58s | China focuses on these seven military classics. 154.58s - 156.86s | Of course the first is the art of war. 156.86s - 161.74s | Has anyone heard of these other books that


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106.50s - 111.08s | Theirs is a little bit different approach, but they use the same concept as put out by 111.08s - 113.42s | Philip Dick. 113.42s - 117.90s | So standard disclaimer from NSA, I've got to tell you this because this is, if I don't 117.90s - 123.10s | say this, they told me I get to go to jail, which is fine, I met a lot of good people 123.10s - 126.06s | there, so that's that. 126.06s - 129.58s | So let's start talking about Chinese influences real quick. 129.58s - 134.98s | Now everyone, pretty much everyone's heard of Sun Tzu, which is probably why you're here, 134.98s - 139.70s | the whole art of war, and that's about as much as we're going to talk about him. 139.70s - 146.42s | Now even though he is the seminal historical figure in Chinese information warfare, he's 146.42s - 150.50s | not the only one taught at the universities. 150.50s - 154.58s | China focuses on these seven military classics. 154.58s - 156.86s | Of course the first is the art of war. 156.86s - 161.74s | Has anyone heard of these other books that are in Chinese curriculum at all? 161.74s - 165.36s | A few, okay great, that's great. 165.36s - 170.38s | So think of it this way, the art of war is considered or understood to be the oldest 170.38s - 174.98s | influence in Chinese strategy and philosophy right now. 175.02s - 181.22s | But these other books, four of them came out during the warring period, back when China 181.22s - 184.94s | was consolidating into one national entity. 184.94s - 191.34s | The rest of them came on 1600s or so, but they're all a different twist on strategy. 191.34s - 197.98s | For example, the Three Strategies is directly translated into Mao Tse Tung's Art of War, 197.98s - 199.54s | which we'll go through a little bit later. 200.10s - 206.34s | Of course Mao had to have his own art of war because he can't be left out, right? 206.34s - 215.30s | Wu Xi, the fourth one down, basically talked about, as a politician, how do you manipulate 215.30s - 218.50s | and influence other politicians? 218.50s - 221.30s | And how do you manipulate and influence the public? 221.30s - 225.22s | Not


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are in Chinese curriculum at all? 161.74s - 165.36s | A few, okay great, that's great. 165.36s - 170.38s | So think of it this way, the art of war is considered or understood to be the oldest 170.38s - 174.98s | influence in Chinese strategy and philosophy right now. 175.02s - 181.22s | But these other books, four of them came out during the warring period, back when China 181.22s - 184.94s | was consolidating into one national entity. 184.94s - 191.34s | The rest of them came on 1600s or so, but they're all a different twist on strategy. 191.34s - 197.98s | For example, the Three Strategies is directly translated into Mao Tse Tung's Art of War, 197.98s - 199.54s | which we'll go through a little bit later. 200.10s - 206.34s | Of course Mao had to have his own art of war because he can't be left out, right? 206.34s - 215.30s | Wu Xi, the fourth one down, basically talked about, as a politician, how do you manipulate 215.30s - 218.50s | and influence other politicians? 218.50s - 221.30s | And how do you manipulate and influence the public? 221.30s - 225.22s | Not only your public, but everybody else. 225.22s - 231.26s | So each of these connects back to the Chinese strategy of influencing everyone in different 231.26s - 232.26s | ways. 232.26s - 235.94s | But wait, there's more. 235.94s - 241.30s | Anybody hear of Sun Bin, Sun Tzu's relative? 241.30s - 242.94s | No. 242.94s - 249.66s | So until 1972, all of Sun Bin's work, that's his picture there in the middle by the way, 249.66s - 253.38s | all of his work was considered to be Sun Tzu's work. 253.38s - 257.06s | And Sun Tzu's Art of War was this huge piece. 257.06s - 263.10s | Only until they found the documents from Sun Bin in 1972, when they were excavating one 263.10s - 269.26s | of the emperor's gravesites, did they realize that they had more than one document. 269.26s - 275.42s | Now other documents in here, like the Book of Swindles, is not a strategic book. 275.42s - 282.02s | It's basically, you could use it at the lock picking village, because it's for thievery. 282.02s - 288.14s | But it's linked back to, conceptually, a philosophy on how to manipulate other people.


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only your public, but everybody else. 225.22s - 231.26s | So each of these connects back to the Chinese strategy of influencing everyone in different 231.26s - 232.26s | ways. 232.26s - 235.94s | But wait, there's more. 235.94s - 241.30s | Anybody hear of Sun Bin, Sun Tzu's relative? 241.30s - 242.94s | No. 242.94s - 249.66s | So until 1972, all of Sun Bin's work, that's his picture there in the middle by the way, 249.66s - 253.38s | all of his work was considered to be Sun Tzu's work. 253.38s - 257.06s | And Sun Tzu's Art of War was this huge piece. 257.06s - 263.10s | Only until they found the documents from Sun Bin in 1972, when they were excavating one 263.10s - 269.26s | of the emperor's gravesites, did they realize that they had more than one document. 269.26s - 275.42s | Now other documents in here, like the Book of Swindles, is not a strategic book. 275.42s - 282.02s | It's basically, you could use it at the lock picking village, because it's for thievery. 282.02s - 288.14s | But it's linked back to, conceptually, a philosophy on how to manipulate other people. 288.14s - 294.70s | So all of these books are extremely interesting and important in Chinese philosophy, because 294.70s - 297.66s | they're all taught today. 297.66s - 304.18s | The periods in China that were the most influential and had the biggest impact on how China would 304.18s - 309.66s | engage the rest of the world was during, number one, the Warring States period, back 309.66s - 315.00s | 500 or so BC to 200 BC, right? 315.00s - 320.58s | Each of the different parts of China were fighting for autonomy and control over the 320.58s - 322.74s | rest of China. 322.74s - 330.18s | And there was, you know, consolidation in, I think, 220 BC or something like that. 330.18s - 336.90s | That's when the art of war was actually consolidated into a national program. 336.90s - 342.10s | Not like we'd know a national program today, but it was the emperor's philosophy at the 342.10s - 349.62s | time to control and manage the population in China as one China. 349.62s - 355.66s | The century of humiliation was from 1839 to 1949. 355.66s - 358.18s | And what happened in that period?


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288.14s - 294.70s | So all of these books are extremely interesting and important in Chinese philosophy, because 294.70s - 297.66s | they're all taught today. 297.66s - 304.18s | The periods in China that were the most influential and had the biggest impact on how China would 304.18s - 309.66s | engage the rest of the world was during, number one, the Warring States period, back 309.66s - 315.00s | 500 or so BC to 200 BC, right? 315.00s - 320.58s | Each of the different parts of China were fighting for autonomy and control over the 320.58s - 322.74s | rest of China. 322.74s - 330.18s | And there was, you know, consolidation in, I think, 220 BC or something like that. 330.18s - 336.90s | That's when the art of war was actually consolidated into a national program. 336.90s - 342.10s | Not like we'd know a national program today, but it was the emperor's philosophy at the 342.10s - 349.62s | time to control and manage the population in China as one China. 349.62s - 355.66s | The century of humiliation was from 1839 to 1949. 355.66s - 358.18s | And what happened in that period? 358.18s - 363.06s | Well, you had the Opium Wars, the Boxer Rebellion. 363.06s - 367.34s | There were numerous treaties that China was forced to sign where they got the raw end 367.34s - 371.10s | of the deal, specifically from the West. 371.10s - 377.54s | They considered the West to be extremely manipulative of their national sovereignty and national 377.54s - 378.90s | goals. 378.90s - 384.10s | So they take great offense to the West in many ways. 384.10s - 387.90s | And you'll see that when we get into the curriculum a little bit later. 387.90s - 393.42s | And then 8-1-29, anybody know that date by chance? 393.42s - 394.42s | It's on there. 394.42s - 395.42s | It's on the flag. 395.42s - 397.06s | It's a People's Liberation Army. 397.06s - 400.58s | That's the date that it was formed. 400.58s - 411.26s | And the star and the Chinese characters for 8-1, Gaoyat. 411.26s - 421.02s | So here's a copy of the syllabus in the National Defense University of the People's Liberation 421.02s - 422.02s | Army. 422.02s - 428.62s | I pulled this out of their website, their internal


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358.18s - 363.06s | Well, you had the Opium Wars, the Boxer Rebellion. 363.06s - 367.34s | There were numerous treaties that China was forced to sign where they got the raw end 367.34s - 371.10s | of the deal, specifically from the West. 371.10s - 377.54s | They considered the West to be extremely manipulative of their national sovereignty and national 377.54s - 378.90s | goals. 378.90s - 384.10s | So they take great offense to the West in many ways. 384.10s - 387.90s | And you'll see that when we get into the curriculum a little bit later. 387.90s - 393.42s | And then 8-1-29, anybody know that date by chance? 393.42s - 394.42s | It's on there. 394.42s - 395.42s | It's on the flag. 395.42s - 397.06s | It's a People's Liberation Army. 397.06s - 400.58s | That's the date that it was formed. 400.58s - 411.26s | And the star and the Chinese characters for 8-1, Gaoyat. 411.26s - 421.02s | So here's a copy of the syllabus in the National Defense University of the People's Liberation 421.02s - 422.02s | Army. 422.02s - 428.62s | I pulled this out of their website, their internal website. 428.62s - 436.26s | And if you look closely, you'll see, and I'll translate it for you basically. 436.26s - 439.70s | Item number one is Chinese National Defense. 439.70s - 441.94s | Number two is China's armed forces. 441.94s - 445.90s | And then they get into the international and how to develop the army. 445.90s - 449.98s | Number five of topics is Mao Zedong's art of war. 449.98s - 458.86s | Mao is the first theory taught linking Chinese teaching to Chinese strategic goals. 458.86s - 460.42s | After that, it's Sun Tzu. 460.42s - 462.06s | Number six is Sun Tzu. 462.06s - 465.98s | And it goes into seven is the military revolution. 465.98s - 468.66s | And then number eight is information warfare. 468.66s - 470.66s | It's not kinetic warfare. 470.66s - 473.02s | It's all information warfare. 473.02s - 481.90s | Because 95% of the Chinese historical background for teaching and understanding information 481.90s - 485.58s | warfare is about non-kinetic activity. 485.58s - 487.26s | It's not about kinetic activity. 487.26s - 492.10s | All those books that I showed you, and if anybody wants the references and have some


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website. 428.62s - 436.26s | And if you look closely, you'll see, and I'll translate it for you basically. 436.26s - 439.70s | Item number one is Chinese National Defense. 439.70s - 441.94s | Number two is China's armed forces. 441.94s - 445.90s | And then they get into the international and how to develop the army. 445.90s - 449.98s | Number five of topics is Mao Zedong's art of war. 449.98s - 458.86s | Mao is the first theory taught linking Chinese teaching to Chinese strategic goals. 458.86s - 460.42s | After that, it's Sun Tzu. 460.42s - 462.06s | Number six is Sun Tzu. 462.06s - 465.98s | And it goes into seven is the military revolution. 465.98s - 468.66s | And then number eight is information warfare. 468.66s - 470.66s | It's not kinetic warfare. 470.66s - 473.02s | It's all information warfare. 473.02s - 481.90s | Because 95% of the Chinese historical background for teaching and understanding information 481.90s - 485.58s | warfare is about non-kinetic activity. 485.58s - 487.26s | It's not about kinetic activity. 487.26s - 492.10s | All those books that I showed you, and if anybody wants the references and have some 492.10s - 500.36s | other stuff, there'll be a PDF available for anybody to download later on. 500.36s - 504.26s | But the information warfare aspect, number eight, is extremely important because that 504.26s - 507.58s | includes all of the other authors. 507.58s - 512.10s | Now some of them are intermingled in number five, which is Mao Zedong's art of war. 512.10s - 514.62s | Like I talked about the three strategies before. 514.62s - 516.78s | But it's all right here. 516.94s - 522.78s | Everything from the warring period, from the age of humiliation, everything is right here 522.78s - 528.58s | in this orientation to the National Defense University. 528.58s - 530.78s | So immediately first thing up, you come in. 530.78s - 537.37s | These guys here are the teachers of the class. 537.37s - 546.37s | In Mao Zedong's art of war, it kind of sums up what Chinese internal philosophy is in 546.37s - 551.17s | how China fits in the universe. 551.17s - 560.37s | China compared to the rest of the environment and with the rest of the international community, 560.37s - 564.93s | how they see themselves and how


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492.10s - 500.36s | other stuff, there'll be a PDF available for anybody to download later on. 500.36s - 504.26s | But the information warfare aspect, number eight, is extremely important because that 504.26s - 507.58s | includes all of the other authors. 507.58s - 512.10s | Now some of them are intermingled in number five, which is Mao Zedong's art of war. 512.10s - 514.62s | Like I talked about the three strategies before. 514.62s - 516.78s | But it's all right here. 516.94s - 522.78s | Everything from the warring period, from the age of humiliation, everything is right here 522.78s - 528.58s | in this orientation to the National Defense University. 528.58s - 530.78s | So immediately first thing up, you come in. 530.78s - 537.37s | These guys here are the teachers of the class. 537.37s - 546.37s | In Mao Zedong's art of war, it kind of sums up what Chinese internal philosophy is in 546.37s - 551.17s | how China fits in the universe. 551.17s - 560.37s | China compared to the rest of the environment and with the rest of the international community, 560.37s - 564.93s | how they see themselves and how they plan their strategy. 564.93s - 569.69s | So for example, if the foe moves in, I scram. 569.69s - 573.77s | That's a rough translation. 573.77s - 580.61s | It applies to information warfare in the same manner that it applies to a kinetic activity. 580.61s - 587.33s | So if you're hunting and you're chasing Chinese guys on the web, for the most part, if you 587.33s - 592.49s | try to go after them, they'll disappear on you and you won't find them. 592.49s - 596.89s | Some groups stay around, but for the most part, they'll go away. 596.89s - 604.01s | We were working a number of years ago with APT1 and a guy named Ugly Gorilla, Wang Dong, 604.01s - 610.21s | and he literally, any time that we came across him or found him on a computer anywhere, he 610.21s - 613.13s | was gone like a ghost. 613.13s - 620.53s | So Chinese philosophy is definitely linked to Mao Zedong's interpretation and understanding 620.53s - 624.29s | of the historical books. 624.29s - 632.69s | But externally from China out, they study Americans and they study Russians in the same 632.69s -


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they plan their strategy. 564.93s - 569.69s | So for example, if the foe moves in, I scram. 569.69s - 573.77s | That's a rough translation. 573.77s - 580.61s | It applies to information warfare in the same manner that it applies to a kinetic activity. 580.61s - 587.33s | So if you're hunting and you're chasing Chinese guys on the web, for the most part, if you 587.33s - 592.49s | try to go after them, they'll disappear on you and you won't find them. 592.49s - 596.89s | Some groups stay around, but for the most part, they'll go away. 596.89s - 604.01s | We were working a number of years ago with APT1 and a guy named Ugly Gorilla, Wang Dong, 604.01s - 610.21s | and he literally, any time that we came across him or found him on a computer anywhere, he 610.21s - 613.13s | was gone like a ghost. 613.13s - 620.53s | So Chinese philosophy is definitely linked to Mao Zedong's interpretation and understanding 620.53s - 624.29s | of the historical books. 624.29s - 632.69s | But externally from China out, they study Americans and they study Russians in the same 632.69s - 642.14s | way that we try to study their techniques, tools, procedures, things like that. 642.14s - 649.36s | This is also, this website is also from the state controlled information office. 649.36s - 655.16s | So their plan is to not only teach the people that are going into the military, but the 655.16s - 657.96s | general population. 657.96s - 662.68s | So the state controlled information office broadcasts to the rest of the population in 662.68s - 668.52s | China and there's tons of documents on there, you can go there and download anything you 668.52s - 676.24s | want about what China is teaching the people of China and how they should act and interact 676.24s - 679.32s | with foreigners. 679.32s - 687.56s | An interesting note here, this is the, this is the most interesting classes in the PLA 687.56s - 693.60s | National Defense University and you can see there, the fifth most popular class is the 693.60s - 704.28s | Art of War and that is Sun Tzu, Sun Bin, and Mao Zedong's philosophy all linked together. 704.28s - 713.20s | And the key thing here is that all of these classes,


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642.14s | way that we try to study their techniques, tools, procedures, things like that. 642.14s - 649.36s | This is also, this website is also from the state controlled information office. 649.36s - 655.16s | So their plan is to not only teach the people that are going into the military, but the 655.16s - 657.96s | general population. 657.96s - 662.68s | So the state controlled information office broadcasts to the rest of the population in 662.68s - 668.52s | China and there's tons of documents on there, you can go there and download anything you 668.52s - 676.24s | want about what China is teaching the people of China and how they should act and interact 676.24s - 679.32s | with foreigners. 679.32s - 687.56s | An interesting note here, this is the, this is the most interesting classes in the PLA 687.56s - 693.60s | National Defense University and you can see there, the fifth most popular class is the 693.60s - 704.28s | Art of War and that is Sun Tzu, Sun Bin, and Mao Zedong's philosophy all linked together. 704.28s - 713.20s | And the key thing here is that all of these classes, the top classes, all involve elements 713.20s - 721.28s | of understanding human behavior, decision making, or systems of organization, I would 721.28s - 722.64s | say. 722.64s - 730.16s | So to understand from the individual up to the strategic level in any organization is 730.16s - 738.64s | how China looks at implementing a different information environment for you to operate 738.64s - 739.64s | in. 739.64s - 745.28s | So we all know that the information environment is a contested environment. 745.28s - 752.72s | Chinese philosophy is to let it be contested, let it be confusing, like in a Clausewitz 752.72s - 761.40s | type of a way, but that gives us exactly what we need to not apply kinetic resources 761.40s - 764.04s | to achieve our sovereignty. 764.04s - 769.56s | And Chinese sovereignty is basically regional control, they're looking to be a regional 769.56s - 770.56s | power. 770.56s - 776.26s | In 2000 there was a great book that came out on the National Defense University Press by 776.26s - 781.52s | Michael Pillsbury called China Debates Future Security Environment. 781.52s - 788.84s | And in there he lays out how Chinese


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the top classes, all involve elements 713.20s - 721.28s | of understanding human behavior, decision making, or systems of organization, I would 721.28s - 722.64s | say. 722.64s - 730.16s | So to understand from the individual up to the strategic level in any organization is 730.16s - 738.64s | how China looks at implementing a different information environment for you to operate 738.64s - 739.64s | in. 739.64s - 745.28s | So we all know that the information environment is a contested environment. 745.28s - 752.72s | Chinese philosophy is to let it be contested, let it be confusing, like in a Clausewitz 752.72s - 761.40s | type of a way, but that gives us exactly what we need to not apply kinetic resources 761.40s - 764.04s | to achieve our sovereignty. 764.04s - 769.56s | And Chinese sovereignty is basically regional control, they're looking to be a regional 769.56s - 770.56s | power. 770.56s - 776.26s | In 2000 there was a great book that came out on the National Defense University Press by 776.26s - 781.52s | Michael Pillsbury called China Debates Future Security Environment. 781.52s - 788.84s | And in there he lays out how Chinese generals and politicians understood how easy it would 788.84s - 795.16s | be for North Korea to defeat the United States in a one-on-one war. 795.16s - 800.84s | And that caused me to think for a minute because the disparity of how we would look at a war 800.84s - 806.22s | with North Korea and how China looked at it was extremely interesting to me. 806.22s - 812.66s | And it told a lot about the Chinese understanding of what they believe the information environment 812.66s - 816.02s | really is. 816.02s - 823.10s | They see America declining and by 2032 we'll be a regional power, the same as Russia and 823.10s - 824.34s | the same as China. 824.34s - 833.88s | They see themselves rising and they see us declining and this is in a balanced world. 833.88s - 839.70s | Let's go to Russia for a minute. 839.70s - 848.10s | Russia had three significant periods of influence into their information warfare strategy and 848.10s - 850.22s | philosophy. 850.22s - 859.42s | The pre-Kremlin period, Lenin, Marx, their theory on war, and the development of military 859.42s - 869.10s | theory under recent


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generals and politicians understood how easy it would 788.84s - 795.16s | be for North Korea to defeat the United States in a one-on-one war. 795.16s - 800.84s | And that caused me to think for a minute because the disparity of how we would look at a war 800.84s - 806.22s | with North Korea and how China looked at it was extremely interesting to me. 806.22s - 812.66s | And it told a lot about the Chinese understanding of what they believe the information environment 812.66s - 816.02s | really is. 816.02s - 823.10s | They see America declining and by 2032 we'll be a regional power, the same as Russia and 823.10s - 824.34s | the same as China. 824.34s - 833.88s | They see themselves rising and they see us declining and this is in a balanced world. 833.88s - 839.70s | Let's go to Russia for a minute. 839.70s - 848.10s | Russia had three significant periods of influence into their information warfare strategy and 848.10s - 850.22s | philosophy. 850.22s - 859.42s | The pre-Kremlin period, Lenin, Marx, their theory on war, and the development of military 859.42s - 869.10s | theory under recent Soviet leadership in the late 70s, early 80s. 869.10s - 878.62s | The biggest impact on Russian control of information was the Slavophile and Westernizers 878.62s - 883.38s | fight that was happening in the 1800s. 883.38s - 889.54s | Russia was an imperial power and more than half, I would say, of the population, or at 889.54s - 895.78s | least the imperial court, believed that Russia could be strong by itself, separate from Western 895.78s - 897.06s | influence. 897.10s - 904.26s | The Westernizers were the people in the court who wanted to be able to influence the Russian 904.26s - 915.38s | philosophy for socioeconomic power structure, politics, from Western democracy. 915.38s - 922.18s | And during this period of time, significant propaganda was actually infused into the Russian 922.18s - 932.59s | population, which kind of changed how things had operated from the 1600s, 1500s or so. 932.59s - 939.31s | Russia became a much more censored country, even back then, and it followed through. 939.31s - 950.92s | And it's still a significant part of the strategy today. 950.92s - 958.72s | So in Russia, you see, to this day, you still see state-controlled


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Soviet leadership in the late 70s, early 80s. 869.10s - 878.62s | The biggest impact on Russian control of information was the Slavophile and Westernizers 878.62s - 883.38s | fight that was happening in the 1800s. 883.38s - 889.54s | Russia was an imperial power and more than half, I would say, of the population, or at 889.54s - 895.78s | least the imperial court, believed that Russia could be strong by itself, separate from Western 895.78s - 897.06s | influence. 897.10s - 904.26s | The Westernizers were the people in the court who wanted to be able to influence the Russian 904.26s - 915.38s | philosophy for socioeconomic power structure, politics, from Western democracy. 915.38s - 922.18s | And during this period of time, significant propaganda was actually infused into the Russian 922.18s - 932.59s | population, which kind of changed how things had operated from the 1600s, 1500s or so. 932.59s - 939.31s | Russia became a much more censored country, even back then, and it followed through. 939.31s - 950.92s | And it's still a significant part of the strategy today. 950.92s - 958.72s | So in Russia, you see, to this day, you still see state-controlled media. 958.72s - 965.00s | State-controlled newspapers were a big thing back during the Slavophile-Westernizer fight 965.00s - 967.60s | back in the 1800s. 967.60s - 976.92s | And the idea for Pravda came out of that historical aspect of controlling the information environment. 976.92s - 983.34s | Fast forward a few years, we get into the Cold War aspect of it. 983.34s - 988.54s | And the Cold War was—let's start with World War II first, sorry about that. 988.54s - 992.62s | World War II was a significant event for Russia, right? 992.62s - 997.54s | It was—how would you say? 997.54s - 999.58s | More Russians died, right? 999.58s - 1006.38s | The population shift in Russia was huge compared to pretty much any other country in the world. 1006.38s - 1009.72s | And that really affected politics in Russia. 1009.72s - 1015.22s | It became a much more closed society and started to close even tighter, which meant that they 1015.22s - 1018.58s | had more control over their information. 1018.58s - 1023.90s | Into the Cold War period, the U.S. started to infuse Russia because they saw them as 1023.90s - 1028.46s | a threat,


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media. 958.72s - 965.00s | State-controlled newspapers were a big thing back during the Slavophile-Westernizer fight 965.00s - 967.60s | back in the 1800s. 967.60s - 976.92s | And the idea for Pravda came out of that historical aspect of controlling the information environment. 976.92s - 983.34s | Fast forward a few years, we get into the Cold War aspect of it. 983.34s - 988.54s | And the Cold War was—let's start with World War II first, sorry about that. 988.54s - 992.62s | World War II was a significant event for Russia, right? 992.62s - 997.54s | It was—how would you say? 997.54s - 999.58s | More Russians died, right? 999.58s - 1006.38s | The population shift in Russia was huge compared to pretty much any other country in the world. 1006.38s - 1009.72s | And that really affected politics in Russia. 1009.72s - 1015.22s | It became a much more closed society and started to close even tighter, which meant that they 1015.22s - 1018.58s | had more control over their information. 1018.58s - 1023.90s | Into the Cold War period, the U.S. started to infuse Russia because they saw them as 1023.90s - 1028.46s | a threat, right, with more propaganda at every aspect they could. 1028.46s - 1034.02s | I mean, we sent Louis Armstrong over, right, to Europe to tour throughout Europe to teach 1034.02s - 1036.78s | people that America was better than Russia. 1036.78s - 1040.46s | We did some very popular and interesting things. 1040.46s - 1046.98s | Jackson Pollock, famous painter, right, paid through a third party, through the CIA, to 1046.98s - 1055.10s | go make art, art, you know, dripping paint on a drop cloth to show Russia that we were 1055.10s - 1058.02s | much more advanced in an artistic manner. 1058.02s - 1064.54s | So the Russians, what they did was they actually sent people over to be art critics in the 1064.54s - 1065.54s | States. 1065.54s - 1070.30s | And there's many cases of this where they became the people to judge what art was. 1070.30s - 1073.34s | So we were giving them and saying, this is great art. 1073.34s - 1077.06s | Then they sent us art critics to counterbalance. 1077.06s - 1082.14s | And this type of a back and forth control of information happened all the way through 1082.14s - 1083.14s


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right, with more propaganda at every aspect they could. 1028.46s - 1034.02s | I mean, we sent Louis Armstrong over, right, to Europe to tour throughout Europe to teach 1034.02s - 1036.78s | people that America was better than Russia. 1036.78s - 1040.46s | We did some very popular and interesting things. 1040.46s - 1046.98s | Jackson Pollock, famous painter, right, paid through a third party, through the CIA, to 1046.98s - 1055.10s | go make art, art, you know, dripping paint on a drop cloth to show Russia that we were 1055.10s - 1058.02s | much more advanced in an artistic manner. 1058.02s - 1064.54s | So the Russians, what they did was they actually sent people over to be art critics in the 1064.54s - 1065.54s | States. 1065.54s - 1070.30s | And there's many cases of this where they became the people to judge what art was. 1070.30s - 1073.34s | So we were giving them and saying, this is great art. 1073.34s - 1077.06s | Then they sent us art critics to counterbalance. 1077.06s - 1082.14s | And this type of a back and forth control of information happened all the way through 1082.14s - 1083.14s | the 80s. 1083.14s - 1091.34s | And it wasn't until the early 90s or so when there was a change that the big propaganda 1091.34s - 1098.06s | that went against each country started to subside a little bit. 1098.06s - 1104.14s | And Russia focused more internally on, again, going back to the base and population and 1104.14s - 1107.54s | propagandizing them. 1107.54s - 1112.34s | So that's a background of the Russian history. 1112.34s - 1120.42s | Now, this is basically a list of all the universities in Russia from the Ministry of Defense's website, 1120.42s - 1128.50s | their internal website, showing everyone that conducts information warfare and propaganda 1128.50s - 1133.86s | integrated with offensive cyber actions. 1133.86s - 1137.70s | So and again, this will be available to anybody you want to go there, you know, you figure 1137.70s - 1140.10s | out how to get in. 1140.10s - 1144.94s | The big picture on the right is just big enough so you can see it. 1144.94s - 1151.22s | But they literally have information warfare and propaganda integrated into everything 1151.22s - 1153.18s | that they teach. 1153.18s - 1161.88s | It's


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| the 80s. 1083.14s - 1091.34s | And it wasn't until the early 90s or so when there was a change that the big propaganda 1091.34s - 1098.06s | that went against each country started to subside a little bit. 1098.06s - 1104.14s | And Russia focused more internally on, again, going back to the base and population and 1104.14s - 1107.54s | propagandizing them. 1107.54s - 1112.34s | So that's a background of the Russian history. 1112.34s - 1120.42s | Now, this is basically a list of all the universities in Russia from the Ministry of Defense's website, 1120.42s - 1128.50s | their internal website, showing everyone that conducts information warfare and propaganda 1128.50s - 1133.86s | integrated with offensive cyber actions. 1133.86s - 1137.70s | So and again, this will be available to anybody you want to go there, you know, you figure 1137.70s - 1140.10s | out how to get in. 1140.10s - 1144.94s | The big picture on the right is just big enough so you can see it. 1144.94s - 1151.22s | But they literally have information warfare and propaganda integrated into everything 1151.22s - 1153.18s | that they teach. 1153.18s - 1161.88s | It's not separate, a little different from the Chinese model. 1161.88s - 1169.14s | So let's talk about how they're similar first. 1169.14s - 1176.18s | Both Russia and China, and the US, by the way, all focus on psychological operations 1176.18s - 1184.34s | and influence campaigns at a strategic level and at a tactical level. 1184.34s - 1191.46s | If information can be infused in a tactical level that will actually affect national policy, 1191.46s - 1192.46s | it'll happen. 1192.46s - 1198.62s | Just think of any incident that had, it was a one-off, you would call it, that had strategic 1198.62s - 1200.90s | influence. 1200.90s - 1205.74s | Several years ago, there was a guy who was caned, American, who was caned in Thailand, 1205.74s - 1206.74s | right? 1206.74s - 1209.70s | He violated a very simple law, right? 1209.70s - 1215.70s | How do you think that played in Russian propaganda, in Chinese propaganda against the United States 1215.70s - 1221.94s | as the unruly, the people that won't follow or respect other laws? 1221.94s - 1228.85s | It played extremely well to their base. 1228.85s - 1235.17s | And of course, both are


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not separate, a little different from the Chinese model. 1161.88s - 1169.14s | So let's talk about how they're similar first. 1169.14s - 1176.18s | Both Russia and China, and the US, by the way, all focus on psychological operations 1176.18s - 1184.34s | and influence campaigns at a strategic level and at a tactical level. 1184.34s - 1191.46s | If information can be infused in a tactical level that will actually affect national policy, 1191.46s - 1192.46s | it'll happen. 1192.46s - 1198.62s | Just think of any incident that had, it was a one-off, you would call it, that had strategic 1198.62s - 1200.90s | influence. 1200.90s - 1205.74s | Several years ago, there was a guy who was caned, American, who was caned in Thailand, 1205.74s - 1206.74s | right? 1206.74s - 1209.70s | He violated a very simple law, right? 1209.70s - 1215.70s | How do you think that played in Russian propaganda, in Chinese propaganda against the United States 1215.70s - 1221.94s | as the unruly, the people that won't follow or respect other laws? 1221.94s - 1228.85s | It played extremely well to their base. 1228.85s - 1235.17s | And of course, both are affected by historical injuries that happened to them from the West, 1235.17s - 1239.49s | like for the last couple of hundred years. 1239.49s - 1241.49s | Differences. 1241.49s - 1248.21s | The context in how Russia operates and how China operate are completely, I would say, 1248.21s - 1251.17s | unique to their culture. 1251.17s - 1255.49s | China controls vast numbers. 1255.49s - 1262.57s | And they have a bunch of attackers, they have a bunch of defenders, and they're integrated. 1262.57s - 1267.69s | And some are really loud, you may have noticed, and some are really stealthy. 1267.69s - 1269.29s | And you really don't know what you get. 1269.29s - 1273.53s | And sometimes the Chinese will come in and they'll do OSIN on a website, you know, and 1273.53s - 1276.49s | they'll leave the language setting to Russian. 1276.49s - 1279.81s | So you know, on first glance, you're looking at a Russian. 1279.81s - 1280.81s | No, you're not. 1280.97s - 1284.13s | You're looking at somebody else, just look at the searches, okay? 1284.13s - 1290.13s | So China will come in and do a whole bunch of different types of


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affected by historical injuries that happened to them from the West, 1235.17s - 1239.49s | like for the last couple of hundred years. 1239.49s - 1241.49s | Differences. 1241.49s - 1248.21s | The context in how Russia operates and how China operate are completely, I would say, 1248.21s - 1251.17s | unique to their culture. 1251.17s - 1255.49s | China controls vast numbers. 1255.49s - 1262.57s | And they have a bunch of attackers, they have a bunch of defenders, and they're integrated. 1262.57s - 1267.69s | And some are really loud, you may have noticed, and some are really stealthy. 1267.69s - 1269.29s | And you really don't know what you get. 1269.29s - 1273.53s | And sometimes the Chinese will come in and they'll do OSIN on a website, you know, and 1273.53s - 1276.49s | they'll leave the language setting to Russian. 1276.49s - 1279.81s | So you know, on first glance, you're looking at a Russian. 1279.81s - 1280.81s | No, you're not. 1280.97s - 1284.13s | You're looking at somebody else, just look at the searches, okay? 1284.13s - 1290.13s | So China will come in and do a whole bunch of different types of operations. 1290.13s - 1295.85s | On the other hand, the Russians will come in very strategic, and they try to be really 1295.85s - 1302.41s | good about how they're operating, because limited resources in Russia only allow them 1302.41s - 1312.64s | to do onesies, twosies in a very strategic manner, directly linked to national strategies. 1312.64s - 1320.76s | So in short, these two guys are still directing and managing national strategy and philosophy, 1320.76s - 1325.92s | but it's only based and only linked to the historical injuries that China and Russia 1325.92s - 1331.36s | have had incurred on them from the West. 1331.36s - 1338.46s | And with that, I'll leave it up if anybody has any questions at all. 1338.46s - 1339.46s | No. 1339.46s - 1342.46s | Okay, fair enough. 1342.46s - 1345.30s | So as I promised, no Sun Tzu, okay? 1345.30s - 1349.70s | We didn't give any theory on Sun Tzu, thank God, but there's a Twitter, the Discord, all 1349.70s - 1350.70s | that stuff. 1350.70s - 1354.98s | If you want a copy of the slides, you know, hit me up, and I'll send you a PDF, including


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operations. 1290.13s - 1295.85s | On the other hand, the Russians will come in very strategic, and they try to be really 1295.85s - 1302.41s | good about how they're operating, because limited resources in Russia only allow them 1302.41s - 1312.64s | to do onesies, twosies in a very strategic manner, directly linked to national strategies. 1312.64s - 1320.76s | So in short, these two guys are still directing and managing national strategy and philosophy, 1320.76s - 1325.92s | but it's only based and only linked to the historical injuries that China and Russia 1325.92s - 1331.36s | have had incurred on them from the West. 1331.36s - 1338.46s | And with that, I'll leave it up if anybody has any questions at all. 1338.46s - 1339.46s | No. 1339.46s - 1342.46s | Okay, fair enough. 1342.46s - 1345.30s | So as I promised, no Sun Tzu, okay? 1345.30s - 1349.70s | We didn't give any theory on Sun Tzu, thank God, but there's a Twitter, the Discord, all 1349.70s - 1350.70s | that stuff. 1350.70s - 1354.98s | If you want a copy of the slides, you know, hit me up, and I'll send you a PDF, including 1354.98s - 1360.74s | all the references, and you can have at it yourself. 1360.74s - 1361.38s | Thank you very much.


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1354.98s - 1360.74s | all the references, and you can have at it yourself. 1360.74s - 1361.38s | Thank you very much.


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{ "webpage_url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=13o-MQtANpo", "title": "DEF CON 32 - The Risk and Reward of Distributed Industrial Control - Joe Slowik", "description": "Economic efficiency and increasing automation mean that many industrial assets are remotely monitored and controlled. While some assets, such as oil production platforms, remain manned in isolated conditions, the ecosystem of renewable energy and distributed energy resources (DERs), pipelines, and other assets are increasingly unmanned with control extending over common information links. While this has been a boon for cost, it has also resulted in a radical extension of attack surface for cyber operations.\n\nIn this discussion, we will explore the nature of distributed industrial asset operation and the opportunities this presents for adversaries to infiltrate and potentially disrupt critical infrastructure operations. To make this point, we will review examples of adversary activity, from the 2022 ViaSat incident through historical pipeline intrusions (NOT Colonial!), showing how adversaries intentionally or inadvertently prey on brittle communication links for industrial disruption. We will conclude with a discussion of how these risks can be mitigated in a way that is sensible and economical, because wind farm operators won't lay their own dedicated fiber anytime soon.", "channel_url": "https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC6Om9kAkl32dWlDSNlDS9Iw", "duration": 1595, "channel": "DEFCONConference", "uploader": "DEFCONConference", "upload_date": "20241016" } 0.00s - 5.60s | This text was transcribed using whisper model: large-v2 So, should we get started? Okay, I guess we're getting started. So, hello everyone. Welcome to 5.60s - 10.00s | DEF CON at the lovely Las Vegas Convention Center. A fabulous new venue that we're all 10.00s - 14.00s | learning to deal with. First off, can folks who are sitting in the back hear me? Because I know 14.00s - 19.68s | it's a pretty difficult room. So, there's plenty of space up here. Feel free to move forward or 19.68s - 23.28s | whatever. The screens are also a little tiny if you're sitting in the back. Trust me, I don't 23.28s - 27.52s | bite and I don't think anyone else here does either. But what we'll talk about today is 27.52s - 32.96s | getting into the risk and reward of distributed industrial control systems. First, who am I? My 32.96s - 37.68s | name is Joe Slowik. I currently do a bunch of things over at the MITRE Corporation, like leading 37.68s - 41.76s | up some of the functions within ATT&CK and doing critical infrastructure research. And I've done 41.76s -


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} 0.00s - 5.60s | This text was transcribed using whisper model: large-v2 So, should we get started? Okay, I guess we're getting started. So, hello everyone. Welcome to 5.60s - 10.00s | DEF CON at the lovely Las Vegas Convention Center. A fabulous new venue that we're all 10.00s - 14.00s | learning to deal with. First off, can folks who are sitting in the back hear me? Because I know 14.00s - 19.68s | it's a pretty difficult room. So, there's plenty of space up here. Feel free to move forward or 19.68s - 23.28s | whatever. The screens are also a little tiny if you're sitting in the back. Trust me, I don't 23.28s - 27.52s | bite and I don't think anyone else here does either. But what we'll talk about today is 27.52s - 32.96s | getting into the risk and reward of distributed industrial control systems. First, who am I? My 32.96s - 37.68s | name is Joe Slowik. I currently do a bunch of things over at the MITRE Corporation, like leading 37.68s - 41.76s | up some of the functions within ATT&CK and doing critical infrastructure research. And I've done 41.76s - 45.60s | a bunch of things previously, but no one gives a crap about me. We're here to talk about industrial 45.60s - 50.40s | control systems and how these things are increasingly interconnected and exposed. 50.40s - 54.56s | So, our agenda is we're going to talk about what distributed operations mean and how this 54.56s - 60.56s | works to extend the ATT&CK surface of industrial assets. We'll look at this from the perspective 60.56s - 65.12s | of what opportunities this affords adversaries, and then talk about some risks and considerations 65.12s - 69.76s | and what we can meaningfully do about this new interconnected, networked, and exposed 69.76s - 74.00s | landscape that we're dealing with for fairly important things like critical infrastructure 74.00s - 79.52s | operations. So first, distributed industrial operations. What does that actually mean? 80.16s - 83.92s | Well, if you talk to a lot of people that don't have a whole lot of experience or have a lot of 83.92s - 87.84s | assumptions around what industrial environments look like, you would get a picture such as what I 87.84s - 93.28s | hope is up on the screen right now,


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45.60s | a bunch of things previously, but no one gives a crap about me. We're here to talk about industrial 45.60s - 50.40s | control systems and how these things are increasingly interconnected and exposed. 50.40s - 54.56s | So, our agenda is we're going to talk about what distributed operations mean and how this 54.56s - 60.56s | works to extend the ATT&CK surface of industrial assets. We'll look at this from the perspective 60.56s - 65.12s | of what opportunities this affords adversaries, and then talk about some risks and considerations 65.12s - 69.76s | and what we can meaningfully do about this new interconnected, networked, and exposed 69.76s - 74.00s | landscape that we're dealing with for fairly important things like critical infrastructure 74.00s - 79.52s | operations. So first, distributed industrial operations. What does that actually mean? 80.16s - 83.92s | Well, if you talk to a lot of people that don't have a whole lot of experience or have a lot of 83.92s - 87.84s | assumptions around what industrial environments look like, you would get a picture such as what I 87.84s - 93.28s | hope is up on the screen right now, because I know there's been some issues, that there is an 93.28s - 98.88s | error gap that exists segmenting networks quite thoroughly between an internet-connected environment 98.88s - 104.08s | and a plant environment, which has no external connectivity whatsoever. That may still be the 104.08s - 108.64s | case in certain areas, like nuclear generation, for example, but has largely never really been 108.64s - 113.52s | the case in many environments and certainly isn't the case anymore for the majority of operations 113.52s - 118.96s | that exist. Instead, we're all living in a networked world right now, where we're increasingly 118.96s - 123.76s | seeing systems that you would normally assume would be walled off from the rest of the world 123.76s - 130.32s | are connected and need to be connected to systems that need to talk to something external to your 130.32s - 134.56s | environment. There is a measure of internet connectivity involved. It can be controlled, 134.56s - 138.48s | limited. You can talk about things like data diodes and other sorts of technologies, 138.48s - 142.40s | but generally speaking, data needs to get in and some data is going to


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because I know there's been some issues, that there is an 93.28s - 98.88s | error gap that exists segmenting networks quite thoroughly between an internet-connected environment 98.88s - 104.08s | and a plant environment, which has no external connectivity whatsoever. That may still be the 104.08s - 108.64s | case in certain areas, like nuclear generation, for example, but has largely never really been 108.64s - 113.52s | the case in many environments and certainly isn't the case anymore for the majority of operations 113.52s - 118.96s | that exist. Instead, we're all living in a networked world right now, where we're increasingly 118.96s - 123.76s | seeing systems that you would normally assume would be walled off from the rest of the world 123.76s - 130.32s | are connected and need to be connected to systems that need to talk to something external to your 130.32s - 134.56s | environment. There is a measure of internet connectivity involved. It can be controlled, 134.56s - 138.48s | limited. You can talk about things like data diodes and other sorts of technologies, 138.48s - 142.40s | but generally speaking, data needs to get in and some data is going to need to get out. 143.04s - 148.08s | So in looking at this, in legacy environments, we're really talking about operations and control 148.08s - 152.96s | are co-located. So one of the things that enabled that error gap to exist is that you had 152.96s - 157.20s | your operators and the physical equipment they were dealing with were co-located at the same 157.20s - 162.80s | physical site where plant networks stop at the physical boundary of the facility. So you didn't 162.80s - 167.12s | have to worry about networking these things. However, more modern operations, if we're talking 167.12s - 172.16s | about things like wind farms, pipelines, increasingly ambitious mining operations, 172.16s - 177.92s | or offshore oil and gas exploration, we're really talking about controlling systems that now extend 177.92s - 183.76s | in geographically dispersed ways where we have to distribute operations and a lack of manning, 183.76s - 188.64s | both because it's very difficult to try to staff every single compressor station along a pipeline 188.64s - 193.52s | or every single wind farm that exists in Western Kansas or something along those lines, 193.52s - 197.84s | that we need


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need to get out. 143.04s - 148.08s | So in looking at this, in legacy environments, we're really talking about operations and control 148.08s - 152.96s | are co-located. So one of the things that enabled that error gap to exist is that you had 152.96s - 157.20s | your operators and the physical equipment they were dealing with were co-located at the same 157.20s - 162.80s | physical site where plant networks stop at the physical boundary of the facility. So you didn't 162.80s - 167.12s | have to worry about networking these things. However, more modern operations, if we're talking 167.12s - 172.16s | about things like wind farms, pipelines, increasingly ambitious mining operations, 172.16s - 177.92s | or offshore oil and gas exploration, we're really talking about controlling systems that now extend 177.92s - 183.76s | in geographically dispersed ways where we have to distribute operations and a lack of manning, 183.76s - 188.64s | both because it's very difficult to try to staff every single compressor station along a pipeline 188.64s - 193.52s | or every single wind farm that exists in Western Kansas or something along those lines, 193.52s - 197.84s | that we need remote operations control, monitoring, et cetera, to make these things happen. 197.84s - 202.32s | So this isn't just a cost-saving mechanism at this point. It's a necessity based upon how we have 202.32s - 207.28s | built out infrastructure and how very vital aspects of the current critical infrastructure 207.28s - 212.88s | mix function. Now, this isn't especially new. So those of you who are familiar with the electric 213.68s - 217.84s | operations and similar, like, well, we've had energy management systems, transmission management 217.84s - 223.36s | systems, and similar that have centralized management of fairly complex and geographically 223.36s - 228.80s | distributed systems for quite some time and has operated in a fairly analog fashion in a number 228.80s - 234.48s | of cases as well. So even getting outside of digital technologies. So we've been doing bits 234.48s - 239.76s | of this for quite some time and do it rather well in certain cases, too. But what we're really 239.76s - 243.92s | looking at now is a radicalization of how this connectivity works, because now we're getting 243.92s - 249.76s | away from things like hardline connectivity to all of these


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remote operations control, monitoring, et cetera, to make these things happen. 197.84s - 202.32s | So this isn't just a cost-saving mechanism at this point. It's a necessity based upon how we have 202.32s - 207.28s | built out infrastructure and how very vital aspects of the current critical infrastructure 207.28s - 212.88s | mix function. Now, this isn't especially new. So those of you who are familiar with the electric 213.68s - 217.84s | operations and similar, like, well, we've had energy management systems, transmission management 217.84s - 223.36s | systems, and similar that have centralized management of fairly complex and geographically 223.36s - 228.80s | distributed systems for quite some time and has operated in a fairly analog fashion in a number 228.80s - 234.48s | of cases as well. So even getting outside of digital technologies. So we've been doing bits 234.48s - 239.76s | of this for quite some time and do it rather well in certain cases, too. But what we're really 239.76s - 243.92s | looking at now is a radicalization of how this connectivity works, because now we're getting 243.92s - 249.76s | away from things like hardline connectivity to all of these assets or using things like, 249.76s - 254.96s | you know, telephone lines or buried fiber and getting into an increasingly wireless ecosystem 254.96s - 260.08s | to facilitate this communication where we're relying upon things like satellite communications, 260.08s - 264.40s | 5G, 4G networks, and similar to make this happen, which introduced some interesting 264.40s - 270.24s | security repercussions to how this communication is taking place. So what we're looking at is that, 270.24s - 274.08s | yes, we've done some of this remote management historically, but now we're doing it in a much 274.08s - 280.64s | more prevalent and in a much more potentially insecure or attack surface magnifying way, 280.64s - 285.44s | where economics, efficiency, and just the way that we operate have driven unmanned and remote 285.44s - 290.24s | operations in a number of sectors. Technology advances, however, are permitting easier 290.24s - 294.96s | connectivity with remote assets. Having a classic VSAT, very small arpiture terminal, 294.96s - 299.44s | 10 or 20 years ago for a remote mining site is like trying to suck a grape through a straw 299.44s - 305.12s | when it comes to bandwidth and


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assets or using things like, 249.76s - 254.96s | you know, telephone lines or buried fiber and getting into an increasingly wireless ecosystem 254.96s - 260.08s | to facilitate this communication where we're relying upon things like satellite communications, 260.08s - 264.40s | 5G, 4G networks, and similar to make this happen, which introduced some interesting 264.40s - 270.24s | security repercussions to how this communication is taking place. So what we're looking at is that, 270.24s - 274.08s | yes, we've done some of this remote management historically, but now we're doing it in a much 274.08s - 280.64s | more prevalent and in a much more potentially insecure or attack surface magnifying way, 280.64s - 285.44s | where economics, efficiency, and just the way that we operate have driven unmanned and remote 285.44s - 290.24s | operations in a number of sectors. Technology advances, however, are permitting easier 290.24s - 294.96s | connectivity with remote assets. Having a classic VSAT, very small arpiture terminal, 294.96s - 299.44s | 10 or 20 years ago for a remote mining site is like trying to suck a grape through a straw 299.44s - 305.12s | when it comes to bandwidth and connectivity, whereas now advances in technology, 305.12s - 309.12s | the expansion of satellite constellations and so forth have dramatically increased the bandwidth 309.12s - 314.80s | available for these type of networks and expanded the scope of what we could reasonably expect to do 314.80s - 319.04s | with these sorts of control systems. And furthermore, industry trends like distributed 319.04s - 324.16s | energy resources, as well as things like vendor remote telemetry and remote preventative maintenance 324.16s - 329.36s | and so forth, are accelerating these trends by requiring that asset owners increasingly 329.36s - 334.32s | allow for connectivity to their industrial assets. So now we're getting into things like having 334.32s - 339.76s | assets or at least elements of assets connected to, if not residing, in cloud-based instances, 339.76s - 346.16s | which dramatically changes what the ideas of segmentation look like in terms of how these 346.16s - 350.96s | environments can operate. So in looking at our options for remote connectivity, we certainly 350.96s - 355.68s | have some traditional items that are out there, like our plain old telephone system, dedicated 355.68s - 361.28s | fiber, or fairly uncontroversial and historical


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connectivity, whereas now advances in technology, 305.12s - 309.12s | the expansion of satellite constellations and so forth have dramatically increased the bandwidth 309.12s - 314.80s | available for these type of networks and expanded the scope of what we could reasonably expect to do 314.80s - 319.04s | with these sorts of control systems. And furthermore, industry trends like distributed 319.04s - 324.16s | energy resources, as well as things like vendor remote telemetry and remote preventative maintenance 324.16s - 329.36s | and so forth, are accelerating these trends by requiring that asset owners increasingly 329.36s - 334.32s | allow for connectivity to their industrial assets. So now we're getting into things like having 334.32s - 339.76s | assets or at least elements of assets connected to, if not residing, in cloud-based instances, 339.76s - 346.16s | which dramatically changes what the ideas of segmentation look like in terms of how these 346.16s - 350.96s | environments can operate. So in looking at our options for remote connectivity, we certainly 350.96s - 355.68s | have some traditional items that are out there, like our plain old telephone system, dedicated 355.68s - 361.28s | fiber, or fairly uncontroversial and historical in nature. But now we're really talking about 361.28s - 364.72s | expanding the use of cellular modems, which have also been around for quite some time, 365.36s - 370.56s | getting into increased adoption of satellite systems for enabling these systems to talk to 370.56s - 376.00s | one another, and using a variety of 5G and wireless technologies to facilitate this sort 376.00s - 382.08s | of communication. So what does this mean? Well, it has lots of operational elements to it in terms 382.08s - 388.48s | of how industrial asset management, monitoring, and control function, but also adversaries are 388.48s - 393.12s | involved in these conversations as well, because we're also talking about dramatic changes to what 393.12s - 398.32s | the attack surface looks like for these types of resources. So when looking at always online 398.32s - 403.20s | industrial systems, we're really expanding scope out so that if we're talking about a distributed 403.20s - 407.92s | satellite communication network, where you have communications bouncing to an overhead asset and 407.92s - 412.96s | then going to a ground communication center, that you have a variety of wired and wireless links that


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in nature. But now we're really talking about 361.28s - 364.72s | expanding the use of cellular modems, which have also been around for quite some time, 365.36s - 370.56s | getting into increased adoption of satellite systems for enabling these systems to talk to 370.56s - 376.00s | one another, and using a variety of 5G and wireless technologies to facilitate this sort 376.00s - 382.08s | of communication. So what does this mean? Well, it has lots of operational elements to it in terms 382.08s - 388.48s | of how industrial asset management, monitoring, and control function, but also adversaries are 388.48s - 393.12s | involved in these conversations as well, because we're also talking about dramatic changes to what 393.12s - 398.32s | the attack surface looks like for these types of resources. So when looking at always online 398.32s - 403.20s | industrial systems, we're really expanding scope out so that if we're talking about a distributed 403.20s - 407.92s | satellite communication network, where you have communications bouncing to an overhead asset and 407.92s - 412.96s | then going to a ground communication center, that you have a variety of wired and wireless links that 412.96s - 418.16s | become involved in connecting various assets up and multiple potential touch points to get into 418.16s - 423.76s | and interact with that network. Similarly, for 5G or other sorts of wireless terrestrial networks, 423.76s - 428.64s | we're talking about mesh networks of multiple devices that can talk to one another and communicate 428.64s - 433.44s | in a variety of ways that introduce a very interesting landscape in terms of who can 433.44s - 438.16s | talk to whom and how you control the directionality of such communication. But also, we're talking 438.16s - 443.20s | about systems where we're rapidly integrating vendors being able to consistently monitor and 443.20s - 449.44s | potentially even interact with their environments as well, such as the GE Atlanta data highway for 453.84s - 458.48s | generating assets produced by that company. We're seeing this across a variety of vendors where you 458.56s - 464.08s | have assets tied to vendor management and monitoring for preventative maintenance, remote 464.08s - 469.12s | management, and just big data analytics and so forth to fuel product development and product 469.12s - 474.32s | support. So in looking at these


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412.96s - 418.16s | become involved in connecting various assets up and multiple potential touch points to get into 418.16s - 423.76s | and interact with that network. Similarly, for 5G or other sorts of wireless terrestrial networks, 423.76s - 428.64s | we're talking about mesh networks of multiple devices that can talk to one another and communicate 428.64s - 433.44s | in a variety of ways that introduce a very interesting landscape in terms of who can 433.44s - 438.16s | talk to whom and how you control the directionality of such communication. But also, we're talking 438.16s - 443.20s | about systems where we're rapidly integrating vendors being able to consistently monitor and 443.20s - 449.44s | potentially even interact with their environments as well, such as the GE Atlanta data highway for 453.84s - 458.48s | generating assets produced by that company. We're seeing this across a variety of vendors where you 458.56s - 464.08s | have assets tied to vendor management and monitoring for preventative maintenance, remote 464.08s - 469.12s | management, and just big data analytics and so forth to fuel product development and product 469.12s - 474.32s | support. So in looking at these connectivity functions and dependencies, there's certainly 474.32s - 479.52s | the remote access and maintenance aspect of things of how do you operate power plants that are spread 479.52s - 484.96s | out over a wide geographic area and control them in a way that makes sense, that remote control and 484.96s - 489.36s | operations aspect, but also the telemetry and health check aspect of how do I make sure things 489.36s - 494.40s | are running and running as I want them to, but also getting into very commercial aspects like 494.40s - 499.20s | licensing and use monitoring. Are you operating your equipment in line with the contract that 499.20s - 503.84s | you signed and using it within the boundaries of what it is that we agreed to commercially? 504.56s - 509.20s | Finally, we get system of system items as well, such as coordination, balancing, and management 509.20s - 513.28s | of wider scope systems, whether we're talking about things like maintaining frequency phase, 513.28s - 517.60s | et cetera, for the overall electric system or managing pipelines to ensure that they are 517.60s - 522.88s | adequately pressurized along their entire length to allow


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connectivity functions and dependencies, there's certainly 474.32s - 479.52s | the remote access and maintenance aspect of things of how do you operate power plants that are spread 479.52s - 484.96s | out over a wide geographic area and control them in a way that makes sense, that remote control and 484.96s - 489.36s | operations aspect, but also the telemetry and health check aspect of how do I make sure things 489.36s - 494.40s | are running and running as I want them to, but also getting into very commercial aspects like 494.40s - 499.20s | licensing and use monitoring. Are you operating your equipment in line with the contract that 499.20s - 503.84s | you signed and using it within the boundaries of what it is that we agreed to commercially? 504.56s - 509.20s | Finally, we get system of system items as well, such as coordination, balancing, and management 509.20s - 513.28s | of wider scope systems, whether we're talking about things like maintaining frequency phase, 513.28s - 517.60s | et cetera, for the overall electric system or managing pipelines to ensure that they are 517.60s - 522.88s | adequately pressurized along their entire length to allow for product delivery across their entire 522.88s - 527.92s | network. So what this means is that as we've started expanding these sorts of functionalities 527.92s - 532.88s | and exposing these items through wireless and other means, it's providing opportunities for 532.88s - 538.00s | adversaries to interact with these elements in ways that didn't really exist previously. 538.00s - 542.88s | So what does that look like? Well, what it looks like is that we have distributed overlapping 542.88s - 549.20s | communications that are really good for efficient, reasonably reliable if there are fail-safes and 549.20s - 553.76s | backups involved in how these are put together. But in doing so, we've also expanded the attack 553.76s - 561.04s | surface in such a manner that it's no longer about accessing the external facing IT or classic 561.04s - 565.84s | business network assets of an industrial asset owner and operator, and then digging your way 565.84s - 570.40s | through the network to get into the industrial environment through several lateral movement hops 570.40s - 575.12s | and so forth. But instead, I may be able to hit those assets directly either through a wireless 575.12s


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for product delivery across their entire 522.88s - 527.92s | network. So what this means is that as we've started expanding these sorts of functionalities 527.92s - 532.88s | and exposing these items through wireless and other means, it's providing opportunities for 532.88s - 538.00s | adversaries to interact with these elements in ways that didn't really exist previously. 538.00s - 542.88s | So what does that look like? Well, what it looks like is that we have distributed overlapping 542.88s - 549.20s | communications that are really good for efficient, reasonably reliable if there are fail-safes and 549.20s - 553.76s | backups involved in how these are put together. But in doing so, we've also expanded the attack 553.76s - 561.04s | surface in such a manner that it's no longer about accessing the external facing IT or classic 561.04s - 565.84s | business network assets of an industrial asset owner and operator, and then digging your way 565.84s - 570.40s | through the network to get into the industrial environment through several lateral movement hops 570.40s - 575.12s | and so forth. But instead, I may be able to hit those assets directly either through a wireless 575.12s - 580.56s | communication mechanism or because the way in which these assets are networked overall allows 580.56s - 585.60s | me to access the provider in such a way that I can now start delivering payloads directly to 585.60s - 590.72s | the critical assets within the environment, or at least the networking assets that are facilitating 590.72s - 594.40s | the connectivity of those assets to the wider environment. And we're going to look at an 594.40s - 599.44s | example of that here in just one slide. But the thing is that we're really talking about 599.44s - 604.16s | expanding the opportunities of adversaries to interact via these new communication mechanisms 604.16s - 610.24s | in a distributed environment that increases the opportunities for adversaries to interfere with, 610.24s - 617.60s | inject into, or otherwise send commands to these sorts of assets for a variety of potential reasons. 617.60s - 622.48s | So what does this look like in practice? Well, we have one really interesting example from a couple 622.48s - 626.48s | of years ago. For those who were following the news at the time, at the very start of the current 626.48s


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- 580.56s | communication mechanism or because the way in which these assets are networked overall allows 580.56s - 585.60s | me to access the provider in such a way that I can now start delivering payloads directly to 585.60s - 590.72s | the critical assets within the environment, or at least the networking assets that are facilitating 590.72s - 594.40s | the connectivity of those assets to the wider environment. And we're going to look at an 594.40s - 599.44s | example of that here in just one slide. But the thing is that we're really talking about 599.44s - 604.16s | expanding the opportunities of adversaries to interact via these new communication mechanisms 604.16s - 610.24s | in a distributed environment that increases the opportunities for adversaries to interfere with, 610.24s - 617.60s | inject into, or otherwise send commands to these sorts of assets for a variety of potential reasons. 617.60s - 622.48s | So what does this look like in practice? Well, we have one really interesting example from a couple 622.48s - 626.48s | of years ago. For those who were following the news at the time, at the very start of the current 626.48s - 633.52s | phase of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, there was a interruption to the KASAT network owned by 633.52s - 639.20s | Viasat, managed by a subsidiary, by a contracting entity that resulted not just in a disruption of 639.20s - 645.60s | communication for Ukrainian military operations that was using the KASAT network, but also resulted 645.60s - 651.12s | in a significant outage for wind turbines manufactured by a German company called Enercon, 651.12s - 658.08s | where essentially a loss of view and debatably a loss of control situation manifested because the 658.96s - 663.76s | terminals, the modems that were being used to connect these wind farm systems to remote control 663.76s - 669.36s | and management systems were bricked by a family of malware labeled by Sentinel-1 researchers as 669.36s - 675.04s | acid rain. While it was not intentional, or we at least do not think that it was intentional in this 675.04s - 681.76s | event, that taking out this wind generation was purposeful, still in attacking the KASAT network 681.76s - 688.00s | through the delivery of the push of basically a malicious software payload to customer terminals 688.00s - 693.28s


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- 633.52s | phase of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, there was a interruption to the KASAT network owned by 633.52s - 639.20s | Viasat, managed by a subsidiary, by a contracting entity that resulted not just in a disruption of 639.20s - 645.60s | communication for Ukrainian military operations that was using the KASAT network, but also resulted 645.60s - 651.12s | in a significant outage for wind turbines manufactured by a German company called Enercon, 651.12s - 658.08s | where essentially a loss of view and debatably a loss of control situation manifested because the 658.96s - 663.76s | terminals, the modems that were being used to connect these wind farm systems to remote control 663.76s - 669.36s | and management systems were bricked by a family of malware labeled by Sentinel-1 researchers as 669.36s - 675.04s | acid rain. While it was not intentional, or we at least do not think that it was intentional in this 675.04s - 681.76s | event, that taking out this wind generation was purposeful, still in attacking the KASAT network 681.76s - 688.00s | through the delivery of the push of basically a malicious software payload to customer terminals 688.00s - 693.28s | within the overall environment, they were able to knock offline a variety of generating assets. Now 693.28s - 699.36s | certainly if you're talking about remote wind and etc, there are fail safes that step into play in 699.36s - 704.96s | order to cause these things to at least fail safely, fail relatively securely, but we're still 704.96s - 709.92s | talking about placing these assets into a state where they're no longer able to sync effectively 709.92s - 715.04s | with the broader environment and no longer able to effectively manage them as we would if that 715.04s - 720.24s | connectivity existed as it was intended to do so. So certainly putting a fairly interesting element 720.24s - 725.04s | and an increasingly important element of our generating mix at risk when we start talking 725.04s - 730.64s | about things like distributed wind, distributed solar, and even getting into things like rooftop 730.64s - 735.20s | solar etc, which may rely upon wireless communication mechanisms and the use of 736.08s - 740.88s | various networking devices and so forth that have vulnerabilities in them, or have the possibility 740.88s - 745.84s | of a acid


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| within the overall environment, they were able to knock offline a variety of generating assets. Now 693.28s - 699.36s | certainly if you're talking about remote wind and etc, there are fail safes that step into play in 699.36s - 704.96s | order to cause these things to at least fail safely, fail relatively securely, but we're still 704.96s - 709.92s | talking about placing these assets into a state where they're no longer able to sync effectively 709.92s - 715.04s | with the broader environment and no longer able to effectively manage them as we would if that 715.04s - 720.24s | connectivity existed as it was intended to do so. So certainly putting a fairly interesting element 720.24s - 725.04s | and an increasingly important element of our generating mix at risk when we start talking 725.04s - 730.64s | about things like distributed wind, distributed solar, and even getting into things like rooftop 730.64s - 735.20s | solar etc, which may rely upon wireless communication mechanisms and the use of 736.08s - 740.88s | various networking devices and so forth that have vulnerabilities in them, or have the possibility 740.88s - 745.84s | of a acid rain like scenario where we could potentially push a malicious payload via access 745.84s - 751.20s | to some other elements within the overall network to cause widespread impacts and outages across all 751.20s - 756.96s | the interlinked devices. We also have the colonial pipeline incident. I put an asterisk on this 756.96s - 762.00s | because this really was more of a proof of concept in terms of what may have occurred as 762.00s - 767.36s | opposed to what actually occurred. So for colonial pipeline, colonial pipeline basically shut their 767.36s - 772.08s | own operations down because they lacked the visibility and the confidence in saying that 772.08s - 776.96s | they were able to run a effective network that was also that could be ran safe but also could 776.96s - 781.92s | track things like product delivery as a result of a ransomware incident. But out of the colonial 781.92s - 788.96s | pipeline event, you saw a number of commentators, I'll use that word pejoratively, that asked 788.96s - 792.08s | questions about, well, why not just air gap everything? It's like, it's a couple thousand 792.08s - 796.80s | mile pipeline. It's


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rain like scenario where we could potentially push a malicious payload via access 745.84s - 751.20s | to some other elements within the overall network to cause widespread impacts and outages across all 751.20s - 756.96s | the interlinked devices. We also have the colonial pipeline incident. I put an asterisk on this 756.96s - 762.00s | because this really was more of a proof of concept in terms of what may have occurred as 762.00s - 767.36s | opposed to what actually occurred. So for colonial pipeline, colonial pipeline basically shut their 767.36s - 772.08s | own operations down because they lacked the visibility and the confidence in saying that 772.08s - 776.96s | they were able to run a effective network that was also that could be ran safe but also could 776.96s - 781.92s | track things like product delivery as a result of a ransomware incident. But out of the colonial 781.92s - 788.96s | pipeline event, you saw a number of commentators, I'll use that word pejoratively, that asked 788.96s - 792.08s | questions about, well, why not just air gap everything? It's like, it's a couple thousand 792.08s - 796.80s | mile pipeline. It's only got like seven or eight compressor stations and maybe a dozen PLCs, right? 796.80s - 801.68s | How hard could that be to network all that together with buried fiber? The answer to that is 801.68s - 806.80s | that it's not easy. And while colonial pipeline resulted from an impact on the business network, 806.80s - 811.12s | it doesn't take a whole lot to expand our conception of what a pipeline incident might look 811.12s - 817.60s | like to being able to interact with compressor stations that are remote, often unmanned, and 817.60s - 822.48s | relying upon increasingly wireless communications, although there are still hardwired communications 822.48s - 827.60s | in play, to allow for interaction with how that pipeline functions to induce conditions like a 827.60s - 831.76s | loss of view because you're no longer able to communicate with a specific compressor station. 831.76s - 835.92s | Depending on how things work, and this gets a little bit more interesting in terms of what 835.92s - 841.20s | possibilities are available, you could, with sufficient access and poor segmentation and so 841.20s - 846.48s | forth, be able to inject controls into a


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only got like seven or eight compressor stations and maybe a dozen PLCs, right? 796.80s - 801.68s | How hard could that be to network all that together with buried fiber? The answer to that is 801.68s - 806.80s | that it's not easy. And while colonial pipeline resulted from an impact on the business network, 806.80s - 811.12s | it doesn't take a whole lot to expand our conception of what a pipeline incident might look 811.12s - 817.60s | like to being able to interact with compressor stations that are remote, often unmanned, and 817.60s - 822.48s | relying upon increasingly wireless communications, although there are still hardwired communications 822.48s - 827.60s | in play, to allow for interaction with how that pipeline functions to induce conditions like a 827.60s - 831.76s | loss of view because you're no longer able to communicate with a specific compressor station. 831.76s - 835.92s | Depending on how things work, and this gets a little bit more interesting in terms of what 835.92s - 841.20s | possibilities are available, you could, with sufficient access and poor segmentation and so 841.20s - 846.48s | forth, be able to inject controls into a legitimate way of operating and maintaining that pipeline 846.48s - 850.96s | to start inducing potential catastrophic events like an overpressure or underpressure 850.96s - 856.88s | situation that would result in pipeline disruption. Not really easy, and it's debatable how practical 856.88s - 861.44s | that would be for an adversary to do, but if we're exposing control systems that relate to the 861.44s - 865.52s | fundamental operation of these assets, then especially if those controls are going over the 865.52s - 870.32s | air in an unencrypted way that aren't using proper check sums to validate commands and controls that 870.32s - 876.16s | are going over that environment, the possibilities for replaying, capturing, or potentially modifying 876.16s - 881.44s | control system logic as it moves over unsecure lines or over the air starts becoming a very 881.44s - 886.96s | interesting scenario for how to achieve far more lasting and concerning effects than what we saw 886.96s - 892.32s | with the ransomware incident a few years ago. So, in looking overall at this, we see that there's 892.32s - 897.04s | a variety of diverse opportunities that are available for adversaries in terms of


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legitimate way of operating and maintaining that pipeline 846.48s - 850.96s | to start inducing potential catastrophic events like an overpressure or underpressure 850.96s - 856.88s | situation that would result in pipeline disruption. Not really easy, and it's debatable how practical 856.88s - 861.44s | that would be for an adversary to do, but if we're exposing control systems that relate to the 861.44s - 865.52s | fundamental operation of these assets, then especially if those controls are going over the 865.52s - 870.32s | air in an unencrypted way that aren't using proper check sums to validate commands and controls that 870.32s - 876.16s | are going over that environment, the possibilities for replaying, capturing, or potentially modifying 876.16s - 881.44s | control system logic as it moves over unsecure lines or over the air starts becoming a very 881.44s - 886.96s | interesting scenario for how to achieve far more lasting and concerning effects than what we saw 886.96s - 892.32s | with the ransomware incident a few years ago. So, in looking overall at this, we see that there's 892.32s - 897.04s | a variety of diverse opportunities that are available for adversaries in terms of their 897.04s - 904.64s | ability to control or to interact with critical infrastructure elements enabled by an increasingly 904.64s - 909.60s | remote perspective on how these systems are managed and maintained. So, certainly there are 909.60s - 914.88s | IT-focused disruption mechanisms that can take place against control centers, which can be very 914.88s - 919.76s | interesting because rather than having, say, control centers distributed among various assets, 919.76s - 925.76s | now I have one centralized control and management station sitting in Spain, if I'm Siemens Gamesa 925.76s - 931.20s | or something like that, or one centralized control station located elsewhere that the vendor is 931.20s - 935.84s | managing in order to maintain a wind farm or a fleet of wind farms, that if that gets taken out 935.84s - 941.04s | through ransomware, something deliberate and more malicious, etc., can I still operate all those 941.04s - 945.44s | facilities in a safe and effective manner that allows for them to continue to be part of the 945.44s - 953.92s | overall energy mix? But also, we have more end state or field device potential scenarios that 953.92s - 959.28s | come from


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their 897.04s - 904.64s | ability to control or to interact with critical infrastructure elements enabled by an increasingly 904.64s - 909.60s | remote perspective on how these systems are managed and maintained. So, certainly there are 909.60s - 914.88s | IT-focused disruption mechanisms that can take place against control centers, which can be very 914.88s - 919.76s | interesting because rather than having, say, control centers distributed among various assets, 919.76s - 925.76s | now I have one centralized control and management station sitting in Spain, if I'm Siemens Gamesa 925.76s - 931.20s | or something like that, or one centralized control station located elsewhere that the vendor is 931.20s - 935.84s | managing in order to maintain a wind farm or a fleet of wind farms, that if that gets taken out 935.84s - 941.04s | through ransomware, something deliberate and more malicious, etc., can I still operate all those 941.04s - 945.44s | facilities in a safe and effective manner that allows for them to continue to be part of the 945.44s - 953.92s | overall energy mix? But also, we have more end state or field device potential scenarios that 953.92s - 959.28s | come from subversion or injection into these communication environments. So, here we're talking 959.28s - 965.52s | about possibilities like, well, looking at the Enercon scenario where I can specifically and 965.52s - 970.72s | deliberately take out the communication devices that tie these systems back into 970.72s - 977.28s | centralized monitoring and control, or like a theoretical pipeline attack scenario, 977.28s - 982.96s | leverage my ability to inject into insecure communication streams to send rogue commands 982.96s - 988.56s | similar to what we see – ooh, there's a microphone – similar to what we see like the using of a tool 988.56s - 994.72s | like Frosty Goop, which was in the news a few weeks ago, in terms of injecting Modbus communication 994.72s - 998.64s | logic in order to have effects on central heating in Ukraine, but something like that 998.64s - 1004.24s | taking place without having the IT intrusion, but rather based off of the ability to interact 1004.24s - 1009.12s | directly with control systems over a wireless communication link that doesn't involve breaching 1009.12s - 1015.12s | another aspect of the asset owner's network, or may involve breaching the contracting entity 1015.12s


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subversion or injection into these communication environments. So, here we're talking 959.28s - 965.52s | about possibilities like, well, looking at the Enercon scenario where I can specifically and 965.52s - 970.72s | deliberately take out the communication devices that tie these systems back into 970.72s - 977.28s | centralized monitoring and control, or like a theoretical pipeline attack scenario, 977.28s - 982.96s | leverage my ability to inject into insecure communication streams to send rogue commands 982.96s - 988.56s | similar to what we see – ooh, there's a microphone – similar to what we see like the using of a tool 988.56s - 994.72s | like Frosty Goop, which was in the news a few weeks ago, in terms of injecting Modbus communication 994.72s - 998.64s | logic in order to have effects on central heating in Ukraine, but something like that 998.64s - 1004.24s | taking place without having the IT intrusion, but rather based off of the ability to interact 1004.24s - 1009.12s | directly with control systems over a wireless communication link that doesn't involve breaching 1009.12s - 1015.12s | another aspect of the asset owner's network, or may involve breaching the contracting entity 1015.12s - 1020.88s | that's providing that communication infrastructure in order to then deliver that follow-on effect 1020.88s - 1025.60s | to the actual industrial assets that are interesting. Either way, we look at these 1025.60s - 1031.20s | two different sides of the equation between going after the centralized control and management, 1031.20s - 1035.12s | the single points of failure for how these networks are operated in many ways, which is why 1035.12s - 1040.80s | they are typically very well secured. If you've gone to an electric utilities EMS or transmission 1040.80s - 1045.68s | management system, where it's physically located, there is significant physical security. These are 1045.68s - 1051.52s | crown jewel assets for IT security. They're not exactly poorly defended, but if we start talking 1051.52s - 1056.24s | one layer up from the actual management and maintenance, that if you can't get commands 1056.24s - 1061.04s | out from that center, from those consoles out to the devices in the field that you're trying to 1061.04s - 1066.40s | maintain and manage, things can go south very quickly and result in systems that, if they don't 1066.40s - 1073.44s | have the proper resilience


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- 1020.88s | that's providing that communication infrastructure in order to then deliver that follow-on effect 1020.88s - 1025.60s | to the actual industrial assets that are interesting. Either way, we look at these 1025.60s - 1031.20s | two different sides of the equation between going after the centralized control and management, 1031.20s - 1035.12s | the single points of failure for how these networks are operated in many ways, which is why 1035.12s - 1040.80s | they are typically very well secured. If you've gone to an electric utilities EMS or transmission 1040.80s - 1045.68s | management system, where it's physically located, there is significant physical security. These are 1045.68s - 1051.52s | crown jewel assets for IT security. They're not exactly poorly defended, but if we start talking 1051.52s - 1056.24s | one layer up from the actual management and maintenance, that if you can't get commands 1056.24s - 1061.04s | out from that center, from those consoles out to the devices in the field that you're trying to 1061.04s - 1066.40s | maintain and manage, things can go south very quickly and result in systems that, if they don't 1066.40s - 1073.44s | have the proper resilience and failovers in place, can start entering into very unsafe and uncertain 1073.44s - 1079.60s | states fairly quickly. In looking at these considerations, the main worry that I have, 1079.60s - 1085.68s | at least, and that we're starting to see in some of these technologies and implementations is that 1085.68s - 1090.96s | in the drive for efficiency, like, oh, we could use the Starlink constellation and just put little 1090.96s - 1096.24s | satellite receivers or whatever at all of our end stations, and we have connectivity for relatively 1096.24s - 1101.52s | low cost with fairly good bandwidth that we can tie all these items together. That's true, but if 1101.52s - 1106.40s | that constellation should go down or if there is a malicious update that's pushed to Starlink 1106.40s - 1111.92s | terminals or some other scenario manifests, how do we then ensure that that system can retain 1111.92s - 1116.96s | operational, and how long do we have until that system needs to switch into an emergency state 1116.96s - 1121.60s | to ensure the continued viable operation of critical infrastructure assets like 1121.60s - 1127.68s | electricity generation, pipeline operations, remote mining


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and failovers in place, can start entering into very unsafe and uncertain 1073.44s - 1079.60s | states fairly quickly. In looking at these considerations, the main worry that I have, 1079.60s - 1085.68s | at least, and that we're starting to see in some of these technologies and implementations is that 1085.68s - 1090.96s | in the drive for efficiency, like, oh, we could use the Starlink constellation and just put little 1090.96s - 1096.24s | satellite receivers or whatever at all of our end stations, and we have connectivity for relatively 1096.24s - 1101.52s | low cost with fairly good bandwidth that we can tie all these items together. That's true, but if 1101.52s - 1106.40s | that constellation should go down or if there is a malicious update that's pushed to Starlink 1106.40s - 1111.92s | terminals or some other scenario manifests, how do we then ensure that that system can retain 1111.92s - 1116.96s | operational, and how long do we have until that system needs to switch into an emergency state 1116.96s - 1121.60s | to ensure the continued viable operation of critical infrastructure assets like 1121.60s - 1127.68s | electricity generation, pipeline operations, remote mining operations, offshore oil and gas 1127.68s - 1133.20s | exploration and drilling, etc. So, the result is that the possibilities emerge for severing or 1134.00s - 1138.80s | degrading active control mechanisms in these sorts of environments that can place these 1138.80s - 1144.00s | ecosystems at risk. This gets us into a situation where, if you're familiar with ICS for ATT&CK, 1144.00s - 1148.88s | the framework for mapping out potential adversary opportunities for interacting 1148.88s - 1153.68s | with industrial assets, that we can start seeing the possibilities emerge for inducing a loss of 1153.68s - 1158.48s | view, the ability to monitor and extract information from these environments for the 1158.48s - 1164.00s | purpose of determining are they operating in the way that we want them to, and are they 1164.00s - 1169.76s | doing their job safely, efficiently, etc., but also potentially and more worryingly a loss of control 1169.76s - 1174.64s | where we get into a scenario not whether I can start a process, but rather can I stop it if that 1174.64s - 1181.12s | process starts deviating from safe or desirable parameters for its overall functionality. 1182.00s - 1186.88s | So,


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operations, offshore oil and gas 1127.68s - 1133.20s | exploration and drilling, etc. So, the result is that the possibilities emerge for severing or 1134.00s - 1138.80s | degrading active control mechanisms in these sorts of environments that can place these 1138.80s - 1144.00s | ecosystems at risk. This gets us into a situation where, if you're familiar with ICS for ATT&CK, 1144.00s - 1148.88s | the framework for mapping out potential adversary opportunities for interacting 1148.88s - 1153.68s | with industrial assets, that we can start seeing the possibilities emerge for inducing a loss of 1153.68s - 1158.48s | view, the ability to monitor and extract information from these environments for the 1158.48s - 1164.00s | purpose of determining are they operating in the way that we want them to, and are they 1164.00s - 1169.76s | doing their job safely, efficiently, etc., but also potentially and more worryingly a loss of control 1169.76s - 1174.64s | where we get into a scenario not whether I can start a process, but rather can I stop it if that 1174.64s - 1181.12s | process starts deviating from safe or desirable parameters for its overall functionality. 1182.00s - 1186.88s | So, in looking at this, what risks are we talking about and what considerations are involved in this 1186.88s - 1191.20s | discussion? Well, first, you know, we could make the argument, well, why not just turn back the 1191.20s - 1195.68s | clock? And I've seen people say this, you know, why not just air gap all the important control 1195.68s - 1200.72s | systems? Well, that'd be really hard, really expensive, and I don't think anyone really 1200.72s - 1205.20s | expects that we could realistically do this at this point. That ship has sailed and it probably 1205.20s - 1210.56s | sailed a very, very long time ago, and looking at things like the type of energy mix that we need 1210.56s - 1215.60s | for the future, as well as increasingly ambitious things like oil and gas exploration and mining 1215.60s - 1222.64s | operations, we're going to need these sorts of non-wired, over-the-air, and distributed 1222.64s - 1228.48s | communication environments to tie all these assets into centralized data retrieval, monitoring, 1228.48s - 1232.96s | maintenance, and control in order for them to be effective. So, we're not able to turn back 1232.96s - 1238.88s |


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in looking at this, what risks are we talking about and what considerations are involved in this 1186.88s - 1191.20s | discussion? Well, first, you know, we could make the argument, well, why not just turn back the 1191.20s - 1195.68s | clock? And I've seen people say this, you know, why not just air gap all the important control 1195.68s - 1200.72s | systems? Well, that'd be really hard, really expensive, and I don't think anyone really 1200.72s - 1205.20s | expects that we could realistically do this at this point. That ship has sailed and it probably 1205.20s - 1210.56s | sailed a very, very long time ago, and looking at things like the type of energy mix that we need 1210.56s - 1215.60s | for the future, as well as increasingly ambitious things like oil and gas exploration and mining 1215.60s - 1222.64s | operations, we're going to need these sorts of non-wired, over-the-air, and distributed 1222.64s - 1228.48s | communication environments to tie all these assets into centralized data retrieval, monitoring, 1228.48s - 1232.96s | maintenance, and control in order for them to be effective. So, we're not able to turn back 1232.96s - 1238.88s | the clock. We can't just say wire all the things together, bury, you know, 7,000 kilometers worth 1238.88s - 1243.04s | of dedicated fiber to tie all these things together is just not a realistic option at this 1243.04s - 1249.12s | point, unless everyone's willing to pay a lot more for a lot of these services that are enabled by 1249.12s - 1253.92s | the various infrastructure sectors. So, instead, we need to acknowledge reality, that remote 1253.92s - 1260.16s | connectivity and especially management of critical assets is a fact of existence right now. However, 1260.16s - 1263.68s | in doing so, that doesn't mean that we just need to throw our hands up and say, well, okay, 1263.68s - 1268.40s | I accept the risk and bad things are going to happen. There are ways that we can and must do 1268.40s - 1273.76s | these sorts of items safely, securely, but also redundantly to ensure that we have the sort of 1275.04s - 1278.56s | resiliency built in to allow these operations to continue. 1279.76s - 1284.64s | So, in a very simplified way, we can break this down in terms of OT remote operations between


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the clock. We can't just say wire all the things together, bury, you know, 7,000 kilometers worth 1238.88s - 1243.04s | of dedicated fiber to tie all these things together is just not a realistic option at this 1243.04s - 1249.12s | point, unless everyone's willing to pay a lot more for a lot of these services that are enabled by 1249.12s - 1253.92s | the various infrastructure sectors. So, instead, we need to acknowledge reality, that remote 1253.92s - 1260.16s | connectivity and especially management of critical assets is a fact of existence right now. However, 1260.16s - 1263.68s | in doing so, that doesn't mean that we just need to throw our hands up and say, well, okay, 1263.68s - 1268.40s | I accept the risk and bad things are going to happen. There are ways that we can and must do 1268.40s - 1273.76s | these sorts of items safely, securely, but also redundantly to ensure that we have the sort of 1275.04s - 1278.56s | resiliency built in to allow these operations to continue. 1279.76s - 1284.64s | So, in a very simplified way, we can break this down in terms of OT remote operations between 1284.64s - 1289.36s | security considerations and reliability considerations. From a security standpoint, 1289.36s - 1294.56s | you know, availability, if we talk our classic confidentiality, integrity, availability triad, 1294.56s - 1298.00s | we're not going to really worry about availability right now. We're going to assume availability has 1298.00s - 1303.20s | to be there and we're going to work our damnedest to ensure it, and that is where reliability comes 1303.20s - 1308.00s | into play. But for ComSec or communication security considerations, we're really talking 1308.00s - 1312.56s | about ensuring the integrity of those communications, which can be as simple as ensuring that 1312.56s - 1319.12s | we're doing a robust checksums applied to controls that are communicated over insecure networks. 1319.76s - 1323.52s | You know, if we're talking about a satellite downlink or wireless communications, 1323.52s - 1328.40s | some of these links, as you can probably tell from other talks that have taken place at DEF CON's 1328.40s - 1332.96s | past and present, have emphasized the insecurity of some of these links and how they can be both 1332.96s - 1338.32s | eavesdropped upon as well as potentially injected into or otherwise


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1284.64s - 1289.36s | security considerations and reliability considerations. From a security standpoint, 1289.36s - 1294.56s | you know, availability, if we talk our classic confidentiality, integrity, availability triad, 1294.56s - 1298.00s | we're not going to really worry about availability right now. We're going to assume availability has 1298.00s - 1303.20s | to be there and we're going to work our damnedest to ensure it, and that is where reliability comes 1303.20s - 1308.00s | into play. But for ComSec or communication security considerations, we're really talking 1308.00s - 1312.56s | about ensuring the integrity of those communications, which can be as simple as ensuring that 1312.56s - 1319.12s | we're doing a robust checksums applied to controls that are communicated over insecure networks. 1319.76s - 1323.52s | You know, if we're talking about a satellite downlink or wireless communications, 1323.52s - 1328.40s | some of these links, as you can probably tell from other talks that have taken place at DEF CON's 1328.40s - 1332.96s | past and present, have emphasized the insecurity of some of these links and how they can be both 1332.96s - 1338.32s | eavesdropped upon as well as potentially injected into or otherwise subverted for malicious purposes. 1338.32s - 1343.20s | So, being able to verify the integrity of commands that are sent over these links is vital and 1343.20s - 1348.80s | something that we need to start pursuing or layering on top of existing industrial control 1348.80s - 1353.92s | protocols and similar to make that happen. Confidentiality may be part of this. You could 1353.92s - 1358.64s | argue, well, why not just encrypt all of these items? That might work. There is debate as to 1358.64s - 1363.84s | how useful or how effective that would be because encryption adds overhead and potential latency in 1363.84s - 1368.16s | terms of how these commands get passed and processed. And as we start talking about pretty 1368.16s - 1373.52s | thin pipes like remote satellite communication links and so forth and potential latency issues 1373.52s - 1378.48s | that surround that, it might not be desirable. But it is something that, especially when it comes to 1378.48s - 1383.20s | OT or ICS-related protocols, that needs to be considered more strongly instead of just throwing 1383.20s - 1388.16s | up our hands in the air and saying, well, this is


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subverted for malicious purposes. 1338.32s - 1343.20s | So, being able to verify the integrity of commands that are sent over these links is vital and 1343.20s - 1348.80s | something that we need to start pursuing or layering on top of existing industrial control 1348.80s - 1353.92s | protocols and similar to make that happen. Confidentiality may be part of this. You could 1353.92s - 1358.64s | argue, well, why not just encrypt all of these items? That might work. There is debate as to 1358.64s - 1363.84s | how useful or how effective that would be because encryption adds overhead and potential latency in 1363.84s - 1368.16s | terms of how these commands get passed and processed. And as we start talking about pretty 1368.16s - 1373.52s | thin pipes like remote satellite communication links and so forth and potential latency issues 1373.52s - 1378.48s | that surround that, it might not be desirable. But it is something that, especially when it comes to 1378.48s - 1383.20s | OT or ICS-related protocols, that needs to be considered more strongly instead of just throwing 1383.20s - 1388.16s | up our hands in the air and saying, well, this is hard, so let's not do it. From a reliability 1388.16s - 1392.40s | standpoint, yes, it is cheap and easy just to try to wire things together with commercial satellite 1392.40s - 1396.96s | modems and so forth and call it good. But if we're talking about critical assets that feed into 1396.96s - 1402.56s | national critical infrastructure, we need to have something more or build in the correct ways of 1402.56s - 1406.80s | ensuring those operations can be sustained in a challenging environment, whether that be because 1406.80s - 1411.04s | a satellite constellation gets knocked out by an anti-satellite missile or something along those 1411.04s - 1416.56s | lines or similar wild scenarios, or something like we saw with the KASAT event with the distributed 1416.56s - 1422.08s | denial of service mechanism that was used in parallel with the acid rain wiper that was 1422.08s - 1426.72s | causing significant degradation to that network. How do we operate in a way that if this link is 1426.72s - 1432.88s | removed, that we have a backup link or a way of securely and safely winding down operations until 1432.88s - 1437.68s | those links can


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hard, so let's not do it. From a reliability 1388.16s - 1392.40s | standpoint, yes, it is cheap and easy just to try to wire things together with commercial satellite 1392.40s - 1396.96s | modems and so forth and call it good. But if we're talking about critical assets that feed into 1396.96s - 1402.56s | national critical infrastructure, we need to have something more or build in the correct ways of 1402.56s - 1406.80s | ensuring those operations can be sustained in a challenging environment, whether that be because 1406.80s - 1411.04s | a satellite constellation gets knocked out by an anti-satellite missile or something along those 1411.04s - 1416.56s | lines or similar wild scenarios, or something like we saw with the KASAT event with the distributed 1416.56s - 1422.08s | denial of service mechanism that was used in parallel with the acid rain wiper that was 1422.08s - 1426.72s | causing significant degradation to that network. How do we operate in a way that if this link is 1426.72s - 1432.88s | removed, that we have a backup link or a way of securely and safely winding down operations until 1432.88s - 1437.68s | those links can be restored? That's going to cost a little bit of money, unfortunately, but if we want 1437.68s - 1444.08s | to reap the rewards of having the flexibility created by these sorts of environments, we need 1444.08s - 1449.36s | to ensure that we're also doing so in a way that is maintainable and sustainable in realistic fashion. 1450.40s - 1454.48s | It also means, and this is where we come to DEF CON and most of the audience here, 1454.48s - 1459.28s | offensive security testing has a role to play here, validating communications and how they work, 1459.28s - 1464.40s | especially from an adversary's mindset and in the eyes of disruption, is critical, which means 1464.40s - 1469.28s | offensive testing, which could be anything from tabletop exercises that run through like, oh wait, 1469.28s - 1473.76s | if that goes away, what do we actually do, to validating that certain networks can be reached 1473.76s - 1478.24s | or interacted with through over-the-air links and thus demonstrating risk to decision makers that, 1478.24s - 1483.12s | oh wait a minute, this is not a notional problem but actually can manifest, can allow asset owners 1483.12s -


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be restored? That's going to cost a little bit of money, unfortunately, but if we want 1437.68s - 1444.08s | to reap the rewards of having the flexibility created by these sorts of environments, we need 1444.08s - 1449.36s | to ensure that we're also doing so in a way that is maintainable and sustainable in realistic fashion. 1450.40s - 1454.48s | It also means, and this is where we come to DEF CON and most of the audience here, 1454.48s - 1459.28s | offensive security testing has a role to play here, validating communications and how they work, 1459.28s - 1464.40s | especially from an adversary's mindset and in the eyes of disruption, is critical, which means 1464.40s - 1469.28s | offensive testing, which could be anything from tabletop exercises that run through like, oh wait, 1469.28s - 1473.76s | if that goes away, what do we actually do, to validating that certain networks can be reached 1473.76s - 1478.24s | or interacted with through over-the-air links and thus demonstrating risk to decision makers that, 1478.24s - 1483.12s | oh wait a minute, this is not a notional problem but actually can manifest, can allow asset owners 1483.12s - 1488.80s | to deploy well, evaluating what risk propositions are available. And this gets into a variety of 1488.80s - 1493.20s | disciplines that become very interesting very quickly in terms of what we can do to test and 1493.20s - 1498.32s | validate how these networks are deployed and how they function. In terms of additional considerations, 1498.32s - 1502.24s | there are other things that we need to worry about, and we only have a short period of time here, 1502.24s - 1506.16s | but I'll have a link to some resources if you want to look a little bit further, that we do 1506.16s - 1510.96s | have the possibility of physical attacks and disruptions on remote links, insecure protocols 1510.96s - 1514.64s | that are used over the air, which I talked about a little bit already, as well as latency and 1514.64s - 1518.96s | observability concerns that come about with communications that start getting pushed into 1518.96s - 1525.20s | more extreme and more interesting arenas. But overall, the central point or thesis behind this 1525.20s - 1530.16s | is that we're in a state where we've extended attack surface but haven't really validated


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1488.80s | to deploy well, evaluating what risk propositions are available. And this gets into a variety of 1488.80s - 1493.20s | disciplines that become very interesting very quickly in terms of what we can do to test and 1493.20s - 1498.32s | validate how these networks are deployed and how they function. In terms of additional considerations, 1498.32s - 1502.24s | there are other things that we need to worry about, and we only have a short period of time here, 1502.24s - 1506.16s | but I'll have a link to some resources if you want to look a little bit further, that we do 1506.16s - 1510.96s | have the possibility of physical attacks and disruptions on remote links, insecure protocols 1510.96s - 1514.64s | that are used over the air, which I talked about a little bit already, as well as latency and 1514.64s - 1518.96s | observability concerns that come about with communications that start getting pushed into 1518.96s - 1525.20s | more extreme and more interesting arenas. But overall, the central point or thesis behind this 1525.20s - 1530.16s | is that we're in a state where we've extended attack surface but haven't really validated how 1530.16s - 1534.64s | we will operate securely and safely in that new environment as effectively as I think that we 1534.64s - 1539.20s | should. And these are considerations that asset owners need to keep in mind. So I don't think we 1539.20s - 1543.92s | have much time for questions, but before I get back to that slide, if anyone wants to snap a 1543.92s - 1547.28s | picture of this or these slides will be available on the media server, I believe, 1547.28s - 1551.04s | just a couple of links to articles and some of the things I talked about. But also, if you're 1551.04s - 1555.20s | really interested in a deep dive into one particular event on this, I'll be presenting 1555.20s - 1559.68s | at length, including a very lengthy paper at the Virus Bulletin Conference later this year on the 1559.68s - 1564.32s | KASAT incident. That'll get published in October, so bookmark this if you're interested and really 1564.32s - 1568.64s | want to explore the nuts and bolts of what not just an attack scenario looks like in this regard, 1568.64s - 1573.44s | but also what defensive options


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how 1530.16s - 1534.64s | we will operate securely and safely in that new environment as effectively as I think that we 1534.64s - 1539.20s | should. And these are considerations that asset owners need to keep in mind. So I don't think we 1539.20s - 1543.92s | have much time for questions, but before I get back to that slide, if anyone wants to snap a 1543.92s - 1547.28s | picture of this or these slides will be available on the media server, I believe, 1547.28s - 1551.04s | just a couple of links to articles and some of the things I talked about. But also, if you're 1551.04s - 1555.20s | really interested in a deep dive into one particular event on this, I'll be presenting 1555.20s - 1559.68s | at length, including a very lengthy paper at the Virus Bulletin Conference later this year on the 1559.68s - 1564.32s | KASAT incident. That'll get published in October, so bookmark this if you're interested and really 1564.32s - 1568.64s | want to explore the nuts and bolts of what not just an attack scenario looks like in this regard, 1568.64s - 1573.44s | but also what defensive options exist when it comes to doing this sort of activity. 1573.44s - 1578.16s | So that's forthcoming, and certainly look out for that if you are interested. Otherwise, 1578.88s - 1582.96s | there's my information. So happy to answer questions. I know we got a quick turnaround 1582.96s - 1587.76s | time here, so I will hang out probably in the back of the room so that our next speaker can get ready. 1587.76s - 1591.68s | And yeah, I'm good to go. Thanks, everyone, for hanging out.


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exist when it comes to doing this sort of activity. 1573.44s - 1578.16s | So that's forthcoming, and certainly look out for that if you are interested. Otherwise, 1578.88s - 1582.96s | there's my information. So happy to answer questions. I know we got a quick turnaround 1582.96s - 1587.76s | time here, so I will hang out probably in the back of the room so that our next speaker can get ready. 1587.76s - 1591.68s | And yeah, I'm good to go. Thanks, everyone, for hanging out.


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{ "webpage_url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q1Uap5uinIo", "title": "DEF CON 32 - Color Blasted Badge Making: How Hard Could It Be - Abhinav Panda, Brada\u0301n Lane", "description": "Without plan or intent, three Makers took three paths to achieve colorful badges and none were smart enough to turn back. Join our panel discussion to learn our different approaches, the strengths and weaknesses of each, and ask your probing questions. Perhaps you too will be foolish enough to venture into the technicolor labyrinth.", "channel_url": "https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC6Om9kAkl32dWlDSNlDS9Iw", "duration": 3047, "channel": "DEFCONConference", "uploader": "DEFCONConference", "upload_date": "20241016" } 0.00s - 2.00s | This text was transcribed using whisper model: large-v2 Is this thing on? Hi, guys. Welcome. 5.00s - 8.00s | I'm Reanimation of the Badgelife Discord, 8.00s - 12.00s | and today we're going to be talking about color-blasted badge making. 12.00s - 13.00s | How hard could it be? 13.00s - 17.00s | On our panel here, we're going to start with Panda, 17.00s - 21.50s | who's going to talk about UV printing. 21.50s - 24.50s | All right, so my name's Abhinav. 24.50s - 27.50s | So I have been doing Badgelife for eight years now, 27.50s - 30.50s | and it's a funny story how I started. 30.50s - 31.50s | I started very randomly. 31.50s - 34.50s | I was trying to make badges for an Indian conference, 34.50s - 37.50s | and I happened to just hang on to it instantly, 37.50s - 39.50s | and that's what I wanted to do. 39.50s - 41.50s | Over the time, we built our own Badgelife lab 41.50s - 45.50s | with our own machineries and our fabrication and all the stuff, 45.50s - 49.50s | so we keep doing a hell of a lot of crazy weird experiments 49.50s - 53.50s | with crazy failures and crazy successes. 53.50s - 60.50s | So my technique for the full-color badge making is UV printing, 60.50s - 65.50s | and so you must have seen UV printing in a lot of technology. 65.50s - 68.50s | They print banners with it. 68.50s - 75.50s | They print acrylic and phone cases and a lot of stuff, 75.50s - 79.50s | and so that is how the UV printer looks like. 79.50s - 81.50s | It has a header that goes back and forth 81.50s - 85.50s | and tries to print the stuff on it. 85.50s


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I started. 30.50s - 31.50s | I started very randomly. 31.50s - 34.50s | I was trying to make badges for an Indian conference, 34.50s - 37.50s | and I happened to just hang on to it instantly, 37.50s - 39.50s | and that's what I wanted to do. 39.50s - 41.50s | Over the time, we built our own Badgelife lab 41.50s - 45.50s | with our own machineries and our fabrication and all the stuff, 45.50s - 49.50s | so we keep doing a hell of a lot of crazy weird experiments 49.50s - 53.50s | with crazy failures and crazy successes. 53.50s - 60.50s | So my technique for the full-color badge making is UV printing, 60.50s - 65.50s | and so you must have seen UV printing in a lot of technology. 65.50s - 68.50s | They print banners with it. 68.50s - 75.50s | They print acrylic and phone cases and a lot of stuff, 75.50s - 79.50s | and so that is how the UV printer looks like. 79.50s - 81.50s | It has a header that goes back and forth 81.50s - 85.50s | and tries to print the stuff on it. 85.50s - 92.50s | So my story started with these are all just examples. 92.50s - 100.50s | So the very bottom one, the RSA badge, was our first UV printed badge. 100.50s - 105.50s | The conference had a very unique logo with a specific shade of pink 105.50s - 107.50s | on the bottom right corner, 107.50s - 112.50s | and despite all the efforts, we couldn't get it done in the screen printing. 112.50s - 119.20s | So we got thinking, what could we do here? 119.20s - 123.20s | Yeah, what could we do here? 123.20s - 128.20s | A sudden light bulb came up, and we heard UV can print on anything. 128.20s - 133.20s | So we started doing those trials, and long story short, 133.20s - 138.20s | that eventually became our UV printing thing. 138.20s - 142.20s | We bought our own UV printer, and over the course of time, 142.20s - 145.20s | we did a lot of badges. 145.20s - 150.20s | There's a Pacific Hackers badge, a really cool community in Silicon Valley. 150.20s - 153.20s | There's a Wombat badge from PCS Adelaide, 153.20s - 160.20s | and we're


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- 92.50s | So my story started with these are all just examples. 92.50s - 100.50s | So the very bottom one, the RSA badge, was our first UV printed badge. 100.50s - 105.50s | The conference had a very unique logo with a specific shade of pink 105.50s - 107.50s | on the bottom right corner, 107.50s - 112.50s | and despite all the efforts, we couldn't get it done in the screen printing. 112.50s - 119.20s | So we got thinking, what could we do here? 119.20s - 123.20s | Yeah, what could we do here? 123.20s - 128.20s | A sudden light bulb came up, and we heard UV can print on anything. 128.20s - 133.20s | So we started doing those trials, and long story short, 133.20s - 138.20s | that eventually became our UV printing thing. 138.20s - 142.20s | We bought our own UV printer, and over the course of time, 142.20s - 145.20s | we did a lot of badges. 145.20s - 150.20s | There's a Pacific Hackers badge, a really cool community in Silicon Valley. 150.20s - 153.20s | There's a Wombat badge from PCS Adelaide, 153.20s - 160.20s | and we're trying to mix around with a lot of materials and a lot of unique ideas. 160.20s - 163.20s | For example, there's an old badge on the top, 163.20s - 168.20s | which is a combination of some gemstones and gold plating and so on. 168.20s - 174.20s | So we keep experimenting, keep trying to find something new that's out there 174.20s - 177.20s | that's not yet done before. 177.20s - 180.20s | So this is how the process looks like. 180.20s - 183.20s | The machine has its own software, 183.20s - 189.20s | and so you can load your PNGs or PDFs in that. 189.20s - 193.20s | You adjust the print positions on the bed. 193.20s - 197.20s | The bed is basically the area that you print. 197.20s - 205.20s | So what we eventually learned to do is we print directly on the bed first. 205.20s - 207.20s | So we print a layer on the bed, 207.20s - 213.20s | and we manually align each PCB on top of that bed and then print it once again. 213.20s - 217.20s | So that is how we managed to fix the alignment issues,


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trying to mix around with a lot of materials and a lot of unique ideas. 160.20s - 163.20s | For example, there's an old badge on the top, 163.20s - 168.20s | which is a combination of some gemstones and gold plating and so on. 168.20s - 174.20s | So we keep experimenting, keep trying to find something new that's out there 174.20s - 177.20s | that's not yet done before. 177.20s - 180.20s | So this is how the process looks like. 180.20s - 183.20s | The machine has its own software, 183.20s - 189.20s | and so you can load your PNGs or PDFs in that. 189.20s - 193.20s | You adjust the print positions on the bed. 193.20s - 197.20s | The bed is basically the area that you print. 197.20s - 205.20s | So what we eventually learned to do is we print directly on the bed first. 205.20s - 207.20s | So we print a layer on the bed, 207.20s - 213.20s | and we manually align each PCB on top of that bed and then print it once again. 213.20s - 217.20s | So that is how we managed to fix the alignment issues, 217.20s - 220.20s | which is very common with EU printing. 220.20s - 224.20s | So the machine we have, this is actually the second machine we have. 224.20s - 229.20s | It's a local brand with a custom Epson header on it 229.20s - 233.20s | because the machines are super expensive if you want to go big. 233.20s - 236.20s | So this is like 2 feet by 3 feet. 236.20s - 238.20s | It fits in about 60, 70 badges, 238.20s - 244.20s | and on average it's like a minute for each badge to print. 244.20s - 248.20s | And there are many cheaper EU printers in market, 248.20s - 252.20s | and those take longer time to cure, I think. 252.20s - 258.20s | And we tried with both assembled badges and preassembled badges. 258.20s - 261.20s | And if you assemble the badges first, you need to use the jig 261.20s - 265.20s | to keep things in place and not wobble it. 265.20s - 269.20s | So a lot of experimentation. 269.20s - 273.20s | I find out that when we print on assembled badges, 273.20s - 276.20s | the UV layer also


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217.20s - 220.20s | which is very common with EU printing. 220.20s - 224.20s | So the machine we have, this is actually the second machine we have. 224.20s - 229.20s | It's a local brand with a custom Epson header on it 229.20s - 233.20s | because the machines are super expensive if you want to go big. 233.20s - 236.20s | So this is like 2 feet by 3 feet. 236.20s - 238.20s | It fits in about 60, 70 badges, 238.20s - 244.20s | and on average it's like a minute for each badge to print. 244.20s - 248.20s | And there are many cheaper EU printers in market, 248.20s - 252.20s | and those take longer time to cure, I think. 252.20s - 258.20s | And we tried with both assembled badges and preassembled badges. 258.20s - 261.20s | And if you assemble the badges first, you need to use the jig 261.20s - 265.20s | to keep things in place and not wobble it. 265.20s - 269.20s | So a lot of experimentation. 269.20s - 273.20s | I find out that when we print on assembled badges, 273.20s - 276.20s | the UV layer also prints on the components, on top of components. 276.20s - 281.20s | It colors the components as well, which is super funny. 281.20s - 284.20s | And the hand soldering is perfectly fine. 284.20s - 289.20s | There's no issue with hand soldering after EU print. 289.20s - 293.20s | Reflow on is where you run into your first problems. 293.20s - 300.20s | When you reflow a UV printed layer, it does get yellowish or it loses its shade. 300.20s - 303.20s | And for that, you have to keep adjusting. 303.20s - 307.20s | If you get a UV printer, you have to keep experimenting a lot to find a sweet spot. 307.20s - 309.20s | And that's for every design and every badge. 309.20s - 313.20s | So there's a lot of experimentation involved. 313.20s - 318.20s | And so UV printer on its own is a super high maintenance. 318.20s - 322.20s | You have to print. On average, you should print something every day. 322.20s - 329.20s | So to keep it healthy, so to speak, and not let the hair dry. 329.20s - 333.20s | Yeah, and that's what we have been doing for


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prints on the components, on top of components. 276.20s - 281.20s | It colors the components as well, which is super funny. 281.20s - 284.20s | And the hand soldering is perfectly fine. 284.20s - 289.20s | There's no issue with hand soldering after EU print. 289.20s - 293.20s | Reflow on is where you run into your first problems. 293.20s - 300.20s | When you reflow a UV printed layer, it does get yellowish or it loses its shade. 300.20s - 303.20s | And for that, you have to keep adjusting. 303.20s - 307.20s | If you get a UV printer, you have to keep experimenting a lot to find a sweet spot. 307.20s - 309.20s | And that's for every design and every badge. 309.20s - 313.20s | So there's a lot of experimentation involved. 313.20s - 318.20s | And so UV printer on its own is a super high maintenance. 318.20s - 322.20s | You have to print. On average, you should print something every day. 322.20s - 329.20s | So to keep it healthy, so to speak, and not let the hair dry. 329.20s - 333.20s | Yeah, and that's what we have been doing for the most part. 333.20s - 342.20s | So over the course of time, we built all this tech for badges that we made in-house. 342.20s - 348.20s | And I might start PCB assembly service or just UV printing service in the future, this year or later on. 348.20s - 350.20s | So stay tuned. 350.20s - 352.20s | Off to Hamster now. 352.20s - 355.20s | It's breeding. 355.20s - 358.20s | We chose to do this alphabetically. 358.20s - 359.20s | All right. So, yeah. 359.20s - 363.20s | Next, we have Brayden Lane, who's going to talk about screen printing as a different method. 363.20s - 366.20s | Yeah, so I'm Brayden Lane. 366.20s - 370.20s | And actually, I've been talking to Panda quite a bit about colored PCBs. 370.20s - 378.20s | But I didn't have the resources, I guess is a good choice of word, to do UV printing. 378.20s - 387.20s | And also in talking to Panda about the solutions and the challenges that they were encountering about things like reflow. 387.20s - 393.20s | I started thinking about, well, what would be tolerant of the whole reflow process? 393.20s - 397.20s


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the most part. 333.20s - 342.20s | So over the course of time, we built all this tech for badges that we made in-house. 342.20s - 348.20s | And I might start PCB assembly service or just UV printing service in the future, this year or later on. 348.20s - 350.20s | So stay tuned. 350.20s - 352.20s | Off to Hamster now. 352.20s - 355.20s | It's breeding. 355.20s - 358.20s | We chose to do this alphabetically. 358.20s - 359.20s | All right. So, yeah. 359.20s - 363.20s | Next, we have Brayden Lane, who's going to talk about screen printing as a different method. 363.20s - 366.20s | Yeah, so I'm Brayden Lane. 366.20s - 370.20s | And actually, I've been talking to Panda quite a bit about colored PCBs. 370.20s - 378.20s | But I didn't have the resources, I guess is a good choice of word, to do UV printing. 378.20s - 387.20s | And also in talking to Panda about the solutions and the challenges that they were encountering about things like reflow. 387.20s - 393.20s | I started thinking about, well, what would be tolerant of the whole reflow process? 393.20s - 397.20s | Well, solder mask ink is going to be completely tolerant of it. 397.20s - 399.20s | So I said, well, if I've got ink, how can I print ink? 399.20s - 409.26s | And the answer was traditional silk screening. 409.26s - 413.26s | So this is me a few years ago when I started this process. 413.26s - 416.26s | You can see it aged me quite a bit. 416.26s - 418.26s | But this is not me. 418.26s - 420.26s | But this is the technology I use. 420.26s - 425.26s | It's the old school, classic silk screening for making T-shirts. 425.26s - 428.26s | I just applied it to doing printed circuit boards. 428.26s - 437.02s | And so the entire process that you'd go through for traditional silk screening. 437.02s - 438.02s | Can you advance it for me? 438.02s - 441.02s | Yeah. 441.02s - 443.02s | I'm looking. That's the one. Thank you. 443.02s - 446.02s | So the process is exactly the same as if you're doing a T-shirt. 446.02s - 452.02s | So I start out with, you know, publicly commercially available silk screens. 452.02s - 456.02s | They're aluminum


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| Well, solder mask ink is going to be completely tolerant of it. 397.20s - 399.20s | So I said, well, if I've got ink, how can I print ink? 399.20s - 409.26s | And the answer was traditional silk screening. 409.26s - 413.26s | So this is me a few years ago when I started this process. 413.26s - 416.26s | You can see it aged me quite a bit. 416.26s - 418.26s | But this is not me. 418.26s - 420.26s | But this is the technology I use. 420.26s - 425.26s | It's the old school, classic silk screening for making T-shirts. 425.26s - 428.26s | I just applied it to doing printed circuit boards. 428.26s - 437.02s | And so the entire process that you'd go through for traditional silk screening. 437.02s - 438.02s | Can you advance it for me? 438.02s - 441.02s | Yeah. 441.02s - 443.02s | I'm looking. That's the one. Thank you. 443.02s - 446.02s | So the process is exactly the same as if you're doing a T-shirt. 446.02s - 452.02s | So I start out with, you know, publicly commercially available silk screens. 452.02s - 456.02s | They're aluminum frame and they've got a stretch silk screen on them. 456.02s - 463.02s | I go through the process of applying a UV exposed emulsion on them, just like you do for doing T-shirts. 463.02s - 465.02s | And then I expose that with UV light. 465.02s - 470.02s | And if you look in the very center of that slide, there's some black and white. 470.02s - 473.02s | That's my negative. 473.02s - 476.02s | And so I just expose the screen. 476.02s - 478.02s | It takes about eight minutes. 478.02s - 481.02s | And then I rinse them out, wash them out. 481.02s - 482.02s | And I end up with a screen. 482.02s - 489.02s | Once that screen has been washed out, I can leave it for a year and it doesn't change. 489.02s - 496.02s | And then I go through the process of setting up what would be a traditional silk screening piece of equipment. 496.02s - 502.02s | But for doing PCBs, which are very small, I want something that's very accurate. 502.02s - 514.02s | And so the only thing I had at my disposal that could allow me to


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frame and they've got a stretch silk screen on them. 456.02s - 463.02s | I go through the process of applying a UV exposed emulsion on them, just like you do for doing T-shirts. 463.02s - 465.02s | And then I expose that with UV light. 465.02s - 470.02s | And if you look in the very center of that slide, there's some black and white. 470.02s - 473.02s | That's my negative. 473.02s - 476.02s | And so I just expose the screen. 476.02s - 478.02s | It takes about eight minutes. 478.02s - 481.02s | And then I rinse them out, wash them out. 481.02s - 482.02s | And I end up with a screen. 482.02s - 489.02s | Once that screen has been washed out, I can leave it for a year and it doesn't change. 489.02s - 496.02s | And then I go through the process of setting up what would be a traditional silk screening piece of equipment. 496.02s - 502.02s | But for doing PCBs, which are very small, I want something that's very accurate. 502.02s - 514.02s | And so the only thing I had at my disposal that could allow me to align very accurately a silk screen to a PCB was my solder paste stenciling printer. 514.02s - 521.02s | So that's what you see, the orange with the yellow second to the right. 521.02s - 529.02s | That's actually just the standard manual solder paste stenciling piece of equipment that a lot of makers use when they're making their PCBs and putting down solder paste. 529.02s - 534.02s | I pull out my solder paste stencil and I put in my silk screening stencil. 534.02s - 542.02s | And there's a quick example right there, but I want to bring up the samples page. 542.02s - 544.02s | There we go. 544.02s - 550.02s | So some of the challenges that come to be is it doesn't really scale that well. 550.02s - 557.02s | So if we look at the bottom left corner, that is the 2023 Challenge coin. 557.02s - 561.02s | I order PCBs from the manufacturer in black and white. 561.02s - 567.02s | And the white is anything that I want to be white, but the white is also anything I want to be colored. 567.02s - 571.02s | And then I go through the


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align very accurately a silk screen to a PCB was my solder paste stenciling printer. 514.02s - 521.02s | So that's what you see, the orange with the yellow second to the right. 521.02s - 529.02s | That's actually just the standard manual solder paste stenciling piece of equipment that a lot of makers use when they're making their PCBs and putting down solder paste. 529.02s - 534.02s | I pull out my solder paste stencil and I put in my silk screening stencil. 534.02s - 542.02s | And there's a quick example right there, but I want to bring up the samples page. 542.02s - 544.02s | There we go. 544.02s - 550.02s | So some of the challenges that come to be is it doesn't really scale that well. 550.02s - 557.02s | So if we look at the bottom left corner, that is the 2023 Challenge coin. 557.02s - 561.02s | I order PCBs from the manufacturer in black and white. 561.02s - 567.02s | And the white is anything that I want to be white, but the white is also anything I want to be colored. 567.02s - 571.02s | And then I go through the process of silk screening any color. 571.02s - 575.02s | Well, one color is one entire silk screening process. 575.02s - 579.02s | Two colors is two entire silk screening processes. 579.02s - 587.02s | So that board had to go through the silk screening process four times, which meant it also had to be exposed to UV light four times and everything else is four times. 587.02s - 594.02s | And so it's good for adding a couple of colors, but you don't want to go wild with it. 594.02s - 601.02s | You also really can't do, you know, full RGB color with it. 601.02s - 602.02s | It's just not going to work. 602.02s - 609.02s | What you can do is in the traditional silk screening process, there's something called a split fountain. 609.02s - 614.02s | We would know it as a gradient, but there is a difference between split fountain and a gradient. 614.02s - 619.02s | And actually, you can just see it in the DC Kids example. 619.02s - 623.02s | So what I ordered from the PCB manufacturer is the top one. 623.02s - 636.02s | I then did one pass


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process of silk screening any color. 571.02s - 575.02s | Well, one color is one entire silk screening process. 575.02s - 579.02s | Two colors is two entire silk screening processes. 579.02s - 587.02s | So that board had to go through the silk screening process four times, which meant it also had to be exposed to UV light four times and everything else is four times. 587.02s - 594.02s | And so it's good for adding a couple of colors, but you don't want to go wild with it. 594.02s - 601.02s | You also really can't do, you know, full RGB color with it. 601.02s - 602.02s | It's just not going to work. 602.02s - 609.02s | What you can do is in the traditional silk screening process, there's something called a split fountain. 609.02s - 614.02s | We would know it as a gradient, but there is a difference between split fountain and a gradient. 614.02s - 619.02s | And actually, you can just see it in the DC Kids example. 619.02s - 623.02s | So what I ordered from the PCB manufacturer is the top one. 623.02s - 636.02s | I then did one pass in gray, and then I did one pass in a single pass with the red and blue, and then they blend together in the process of applying it. 636.02s - 642.02s | It's, now can we go to the, there we go. 642.02s - 648.02s | So I wanted to show this example of that same DC Kids badge. 648.02s - 650.02s | You'll notice that the blue changed over time. 650.02s - 662.02s | So the left side of that bottom photo was the very first PCB that I squeegeed across, and the right side is the very last PCB that I squeegeed across. 662.02s - 666.02s | And you'll notice that the blues and the reds started to bleed together. 666.02s - 677.02s | So that was one of the issues I had to realize that if you do split fountain, yes, it's very creative, but it doesn't scale because after a certain number of PCBs, everything kind of turns into mud. 677.02s - 681.02s | Another thing to think about is silk screening is ink. 681.02s - 691.02s | It's the old CMYK, which means when you think of digital art, if you mix red and blue


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in gray, and then I did one pass in a single pass with the red and blue, and then they blend together in the process of applying it. 636.02s - 642.02s | It's, now can we go to the, there we go. 642.02s - 648.02s | So I wanted to show this example of that same DC Kids badge. 648.02s - 650.02s | You'll notice that the blue changed over time. 650.02s - 662.02s | So the left side of that bottom photo was the very first PCB that I squeegeed across, and the right side is the very last PCB that I squeegeed across. 662.02s - 666.02s | And you'll notice that the blues and the reds started to bleed together. 666.02s - 677.02s | So that was one of the issues I had to realize that if you do split fountain, yes, it's very creative, but it doesn't scale because after a certain number of PCBs, everything kind of turns into mud. 677.02s - 681.02s | Another thing to think about is silk screening is ink. 681.02s - 691.02s | It's the old CMYK, which means when you think of digital art, if you mix red and blue together, you get a purple. 691.02s - 698.02s | In the world of inks, if you mix red and blue together, you get a kind of a cocoa gray. 698.02s - 702.02s | And so you have to take that into account when you're mixing colors. 702.02s - 704.02s | It's not going to be like on a computer. 704.02s - 706.02s | It ends up being something very different. 706.02s - 722.02s | The other challenge, and I thank Panda for this because we were talking about both my technique of traditional silk screening and his technique of using UV printing, you still need to UV cure the inks afterwards. 722.02s - 730.02s | And when I did the original challenge coin, I just had fixed UV lights that I bought from online. 730.02s - 735.02s | And I learned that the closer they are to the PCB, the better they work. 735.02s - 738.02s | But they still need to be there for a period of time. 738.02s - 745.02s | And so what Panda had done was they had built, I think you built a custom conveyor system for yours. 745.02s - 748.02s | Well, I tried


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together, you get a purple. 691.02s - 698.02s | In the world of inks, if you mix red and blue together, you get a kind of a cocoa gray. 698.02s - 702.02s | And so you have to take that into account when you're mixing colors. 702.02s - 704.02s | It's not going to be like on a computer. 704.02s - 706.02s | It ends up being something very different. 706.02s - 722.02s | The other challenge, and I thank Panda for this because we were talking about both my technique of traditional silk screening and his technique of using UV printing, you still need to UV cure the inks afterwards. 722.02s - 730.02s | And when I did the original challenge coin, I just had fixed UV lights that I bought from online. 730.02s - 735.02s | And I learned that the closer they are to the PCB, the better they work. 735.02s - 738.02s | But they still need to be there for a period of time. 738.02s - 745.02s | And so what Panda had done was they had built, I think you built a custom conveyor system for yours. 745.02s - 748.02s | Well, I tried to do that and I failed miserably. 748.02s - 751.02s | But then I realized I have a conveyor system. 751.02s - 753.02s | It is my reflow oven. 753.02s - 756.02s | So I popped open my reflow oven. 756.02s - 759.02s | I stacked in four UV lamps. 759.02s - 763.02s | And I can now basically feed as fast as I can feed boards into it. 763.02s - 765.02s | It will UV cure them for me. 765.02s - 770.02s | So that's what that rig is in the upper corner there. 770.02s - 778.02s | Another difference between doing a T-shirt and doing a PCB is a PCB is very small versus a T-shirt. 778.02s - 791.02s | And so to get the level of detail that we grow accustomed to on PCBs, instead of using, say, a 100 or a 160 mesh, I end up at 230 and 305. 791.02s - 794.02s | And 305 is now my standard. 794.02s - 805.02s | So from that standpoint, the technique is the same, but the equipment has to get more and more refined to keep the accuracy that we want. 805.02s - 811.02s | I would


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to do that and I failed miserably. 748.02s - 751.02s | But then I realized I have a conveyor system. 751.02s - 753.02s | It is my reflow oven. 753.02s - 756.02s | So I popped open my reflow oven. 756.02s - 759.02s | I stacked in four UV lamps. 759.02s - 763.02s | And I can now basically feed as fast as I can feed boards into it. 763.02s - 765.02s | It will UV cure them for me. 765.02s - 770.02s | So that's what that rig is in the upper corner there. 770.02s - 778.02s | Another difference between doing a T-shirt and doing a PCB is a PCB is very small versus a T-shirt. 778.02s - 791.02s | And so to get the level of detail that we grow accustomed to on PCBs, instead of using, say, a 100 or a 160 mesh, I end up at 230 and 305. 791.02s - 794.02s | And 305 is now my standard. 794.02s - 805.02s | So from that standpoint, the technique is the same, but the equipment has to get more and more refined to keep the accuracy that we want. 805.02s - 811.02s | I would say, in general, it's more of an art than a science. 811.02s - 817.02s | And with that, I'm going to hand it off to Hamster. 817.02s - 823.02s | Next, we have Hamster, and he's going to describe yet another method of coloring called dye sublimation. 823.02s - 830.20s | All right. Howdy. I'm Hamster. 830.20s - 834.20s | I've been doing badge making for a number of years now. 834.20s - 837.20s | I really like hacking the process. 837.20s - 847.20s | I often wonder what the Chinese fabs think about us abusing their machines to do artistic things when, historically, you know, they're used to square green boards coming out. 847.20s - 852.20s | And here we are, like, trying to cram all this artwork into the process. 852.20s - 863.20s | So I've, in the process of trying to add color to PCBs, there's lots of ways of doing with the standard silkscreen and solder mask and copper to get colors. 863.20s - 868.20s | But I've always kind of wanted to do full color things. 868.20s - 878.20s | I settled on dye sublimation mostly because my wife is an avid crafter, and she


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say, in general, it's more of an art than a science. 811.02s - 817.02s | And with that, I'm going to hand it off to Hamster. 817.02s - 823.02s | Next, we have Hamster, and he's going to describe yet another method of coloring called dye sublimation. 823.02s - 830.20s | All right. Howdy. I'm Hamster. 830.20s - 834.20s | I've been doing badge making for a number of years now. 834.20s - 837.20s | I really like hacking the process. 837.20s - 847.20s | I often wonder what the Chinese fabs think about us abusing their machines to do artistic things when, historically, you know, they're used to square green boards coming out. 847.20s - 852.20s | And here we are, like, trying to cram all this artwork into the process. 852.20s - 863.20s | So I've, in the process of trying to add color to PCBs, there's lots of ways of doing with the standard silkscreen and solder mask and copper to get colors. 863.20s - 868.20s | But I've always kind of wanted to do full color things. 868.20s - 878.20s | I settled on dye sublimation mostly because my wife is an avid crafter, and she buys all kinds of interesting things. 878.20s - 886.20s | She bought an entire setup for doing dye sublimation to dye t-shirts and coffee mugs and such to sell on Etsy. 886.20s - 889.20s | But the equipment sits idle for quite a while. 890.20s - 894.20s | And I kind of got to looking at it one day, and I'm like, wait, I have some white PCBs. 894.20s - 898.20s | I wonder if the dye sublimation technique will work on PCBs. 898.20s - 900.20s | And it turns out that it does. 900.20s - 903.20s | I was very surprised with it. 903.20s - 906.20s | It's a fairly simple process. 906.20s - 909.20s | You create the image on your computer. 909.20s - 913.20s | You modify your inkjet printer to use dye sub ink, which is cheap. 913.20s - 916.20s | You print it out on dye sub paper, which is cheap. 916.20s - 927.20s | And then you put the PCB onto the paper and put it in a t-shirt press, which is reasonably priced, $150 or so for a heated t-shirt press. 927.20s - 930.20s | And then your badge comes out the other


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buys all kinds of interesting things. 878.20s - 886.20s | She bought an entire setup for doing dye sublimation to dye t-shirts and coffee mugs and such to sell on Etsy. 886.20s - 889.20s | But the equipment sits idle for quite a while. 890.20s - 894.20s | And I kind of got to looking at it one day, and I'm like, wait, I have some white PCBs. 894.20s - 898.20s | I wonder if the dye sublimation technique will work on PCBs. 898.20s - 900.20s | And it turns out that it does. 900.20s - 903.20s | I was very surprised with it. 903.20s - 906.20s | It's a fairly simple process. 906.20s - 909.20s | You create the image on your computer. 909.20s - 913.20s | You modify your inkjet printer to use dye sub ink, which is cheap. 913.20s - 916.20s | You print it out on dye sub paper, which is cheap. 916.20s - 927.20s | And then you put the PCB onto the paper and put it in a t-shirt press, which is reasonably priced, $150 or so for a heated t-shirt press. 927.20s - 930.20s | And then your badge comes out the other end. 930.20s - 932.20s | So it's not painful. 932.20s - 943.20s | You can kind of go quick through these sort of things, and it gives you the ability to get that whatever you put on the screen, you can get on the final PCB. 944.20s - 945.20s | Let's see. 945.20s - 948.45s | It'll go forward a slide. 948.45s - 951.45s | So for some examples here. 951.45s - 953.45s | Sorry, if you go back a slide. 953.45s - 961.45s | So for some of the examples here, so like the DCZ badge that we did last year had a nice color gradient to it. 961.45s - 963.45s | I've got another one of my friend Bob. 963.45s - 972.45s | I took a photo of him at one point, and I made these SAOs with his face on it, which you can't really see in here, but the eyes bleed through. 972.45s - 977.45s | He's got some LEDs behind it, so it has a nice strobe effect with his eyes. 977.45s - 984.45s | The only real downsides I've seen so far with it is that it's really hard to get rich colors out


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end. 930.20s - 932.20s | So it's not painful. 932.20s - 943.20s | You can kind of go quick through these sort of things, and it gives you the ability to get that whatever you put on the screen, you can get on the final PCB. 944.20s - 945.20s | Let's see. 945.20s - 948.45s | It'll go forward a slide. 948.45s - 951.45s | So for some examples here. 951.45s - 953.45s | Sorry, if you go back a slide. 953.45s - 961.45s | So for some of the examples here, so like the DCZ badge that we did last year had a nice color gradient to it. 961.45s - 963.45s | I've got another one of my friend Bob. 963.45s - 972.45s | I took a photo of him at one point, and I made these SAOs with his face on it, which you can't really see in here, but the eyes bleed through. 972.45s - 977.45s | He's got some LEDs behind it, so it has a nice strobe effect with his eyes. 977.45s - 984.45s | The only real downsides I've seen so far with it is that it's really hard to get rich colors out of it. 984.45s - 987.45s | So your black colors kind of get washed out. 987.45s - 990.45s | So you kind of have to take that into account. 990.45s - 997.45s | I'm experimenting with it still to see what I can do with it to try to help that situation out. 997.45s - 1000.45s | But so far, it's been working out for me. 1000.45s - 1002.45s | One more slide there. 1002.45s - 1004.45s | Yeah, so we talked a little bit about a process. 1004.45s - 1006.45s | So this is kind of what it looks like for me with a PCB. 1006.45s - 1014.45s | So there at the top, I have the dye sub paper where I've printed the image reversed on the paper. 1014.45s - 1020.45s | And I usually put an outline on it so I can kind of visually line up the board. 1020.45s - 1025.45s | One of the other issues with this system is that dye sub is a heat process. 1025.45s - 1030.45s | It won't go through a reflow oven without losing most of your color. 1030.45s - 1034.45s | So you need to populate and reflow


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of it. 984.45s - 987.45s | So your black colors kind of get washed out. 987.45s - 990.45s | So you kind of have to take that into account. 990.45s - 997.45s | I'm experimenting with it still to see what I can do with it to try to help that situation out. 997.45s - 1000.45s | But so far, it's been working out for me. 1000.45s - 1002.45s | One more slide there. 1002.45s - 1004.45s | Yeah, so we talked a little bit about a process. 1004.45s - 1006.45s | So this is kind of what it looks like for me with a PCB. 1006.45s - 1014.45s | So there at the top, I have the dye sub paper where I've printed the image reversed on the paper. 1014.45s - 1020.45s | And I usually put an outline on it so I can kind of visually line up the board. 1020.45s - 1025.45s | One of the other issues with this system is that dye sub is a heat process. 1025.45s - 1030.45s | It won't go through a reflow oven without losing most of your color. 1030.45s - 1034.45s | So you need to populate and reflow your boards first. 1034.45s - 1040.45s | And then you put them onto the dye sub paper, tape it down with some Kapton tape, polymide tape. 1040.45s - 1042.45s | And then it goes into the heat press. 1042.45s - 1050.45s | So I usually have to use, like, I've got some bits of flooring that I use to space the board up off of the press 1050.45s - 1052.45s | so that the components can fit underneath there. 1052.45s - 1057.45s | And then it's, you know, about 30 seconds in the press at about 360 degrees Fahrenheit. 1057.45s - 1062.45s | You pull them off, let them cool down, peel it off, and you have the final result. 1062.45s - 1069.45s | So the fun part about this is that it's a cheap enough process. 1069.45s - 1075.45s | We have a convention back in Utah, St. Con, that's reasonably close to my house, 1075.45s - 1080.45s | that it's kind of fun to see what's happening at St. Con, go home at the end of the night, 1080.45s - 1085.45s | and then make a whole bunch of SAOs the next day that are topical. 1085.45s -


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your boards first. 1034.45s - 1040.45s | And then you put them onto the dye sub paper, tape it down with some Kapton tape, polymide tape. 1040.45s - 1042.45s | And then it goes into the heat press. 1042.45s - 1050.45s | So I usually have to use, like, I've got some bits of flooring that I use to space the board up off of the press 1050.45s - 1052.45s | so that the components can fit underneath there. 1052.45s - 1057.45s | And then it's, you know, about 30 seconds in the press at about 360 degrees Fahrenheit. 1057.45s - 1062.45s | You pull them off, let them cool down, peel it off, and you have the final result. 1062.45s - 1069.45s | So the fun part about this is that it's a cheap enough process. 1069.45s - 1075.45s | We have a convention back in Utah, St. Con, that's reasonably close to my house, 1075.45s - 1080.45s | that it's kind of fun to see what's happening at St. Con, go home at the end of the night, 1080.45s - 1085.45s | and then make a whole bunch of SAOs the next day that are topical. 1085.45s - 1089.45s | So it's really neat to be able to turn these things around very quickly. 1089.45s - 1093.45s | It also allows for when I design the badge, artwork can come later. 1093.45s - 1098.45s | I can concentrate on getting the hardware done, and then the artist can work on it, 1098.45s - 1103.45s | and then art can literally slap on at the very end. 1103.45s - 1105.45s | I think that's it. 1105.45s - 1108.45s | Nope, I guess I do have one more slide. 1108.45s - 1113.45s | One of the tricks about it is time and temperature make a big difference. 1113.45s - 1117.45s | So I always have to make sure that I have enough extra boards so that I can try out, 1117.45s - 1122.45s | okay, do I need to go a little hotter, do I need to go longer so that I get the best color transfer? 1122.45s - 1125.45s | Because it can vary wildly, as you can see in these images. 1125.45s - 1132.45s | So, again, really hard to get that deep black color, but it's really easy to not get the deep black color. 1132.45s -


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1089.45s | So it's really neat to be able to turn these things around very quickly. 1089.45s - 1093.45s | It also allows for when I design the badge, artwork can come later. 1093.45s - 1098.45s | I can concentrate on getting the hardware done, and then the artist can work on it, 1098.45s - 1103.45s | and then art can literally slap on at the very end. 1103.45s - 1105.45s | I think that's it. 1105.45s - 1108.45s | Nope, I guess I do have one more slide. 1108.45s - 1113.45s | One of the tricks about it is time and temperature make a big difference. 1113.45s - 1117.45s | So I always have to make sure that I have enough extra boards so that I can try out, 1117.45s - 1122.45s | okay, do I need to go a little hotter, do I need to go longer so that I get the best color transfer? 1122.45s - 1125.45s | Because it can vary wildly, as you can see in these images. 1125.45s - 1132.45s | So, again, really hard to get that deep black color, but it's really easy to not get the deep black color. 1132.45s - 1137.45s | And the whole setup for me, anyway, under $250, I'm all in on this. 1137.45s - 1142.45s | It's approachable by the home gamer to put this together. 1142.45s - 1145.45s | It's not overly painful to do this process. 1145.45s - 1154.52s | I think I've done like 100 panels in about four hours and been okay with that. 1154.52s - 1157.52s | All right, so this is formatted as a panel. 1157.52s - 1163.52s | So if anybody has any questions, I'd ask that we kind of come up and form a line. 1163.52s - 1169.52s | If you don't have any questions, I've got some that I can ask the panel. 1169.52s - 1172.52s | So, yeah. 1172.52s - 1175.52s | We'll start off with a couple of those. 1175.52s - 1176.52s | So a question for Panda. 1176.52s - 1180.52s | How long does it take to fully color one batch? 1180.52s - 1189.52s | So depending on how you place those PCBs or the bed, for me it takes a minute if I use the entire bed, 1189.52s - 1192.52s | which was like two feet by three feet. 1192.52s - 1198.52s |


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1137.45s | And the whole setup for me, anyway, under $250, I'm all in on this. 1137.45s - 1142.45s | It's approachable by the home gamer to put this together. 1142.45s - 1145.45s | It's not overly painful to do this process. 1145.45s - 1154.52s | I think I've done like 100 panels in about four hours and been okay with that. 1154.52s - 1157.52s | All right, so this is formatted as a panel. 1157.52s - 1163.52s | So if anybody has any questions, I'd ask that we kind of come up and form a line. 1163.52s - 1169.52s | If you don't have any questions, I've got some that I can ask the panel. 1169.52s - 1172.52s | So, yeah. 1172.52s - 1175.52s | We'll start off with a couple of those. 1175.52s - 1176.52s | So a question for Panda. 1176.52s - 1180.52s | How long does it take to fully color one batch? 1180.52s - 1189.52s | So depending on how you place those PCBs or the bed, for me it takes a minute if I use the entire bed, 1189.52s - 1192.52s | which was like two feet by three feet. 1192.52s - 1198.52s | Could be like one and a half minutes if we use maybe half the bed or something. 1198.52s - 1200.52s | Got a couple people up here. 1200.52s - 1203.52s | Panda, I'm going to steal your mic actually. 1203.52s - 1205.52s | I think they've got a mic down there maybe. 1205.52s - 1221.99s | Yeah, go ahead. 1221.99s - 1226.34s | I think there's a mic on the floor there for that. 1226.34s - 1238.45s | So you guys have talked about how there's different issues with color quality across the different methods. 1238.45s - 1247.41s | If you wanted to do, does that come into these different methods as well? 1247.41s - 1254.62s | Have you seen sort of like one method is more capable than others for that? 1254.62s - 1259.62s | He's asking if you have to worry about matte versus shiny. 1259.62s - 1270.84s | Yeah, so the question was you guys focused on color quality, but what about finish like matte versus shiny? 1270.84s - 1272.84s | How can you kind of control that? 1272.84s - 1274.84s | And do you want that from all three of us? 1274.84s - 1275.84s | Okay.


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Could be like one and a half minutes if we use maybe half the bed or something. 1198.52s - 1200.52s | Got a couple people up here. 1200.52s - 1203.52s | Panda, I'm going to steal your mic actually. 1203.52s - 1205.52s | I think they've got a mic down there maybe. 1205.52s - 1221.99s | Yeah, go ahead. 1221.99s - 1226.34s | I think there's a mic on the floor there for that. 1226.34s - 1238.45s | So you guys have talked about how there's different issues with color quality across the different methods. 1238.45s - 1247.41s | If you wanted to do, does that come into these different methods as well? 1247.41s - 1254.62s | Have you seen sort of like one method is more capable than others for that? 1254.62s - 1259.62s | He's asking if you have to worry about matte versus shiny. 1259.62s - 1270.84s | Yeah, so the question was you guys focused on color quality, but what about finish like matte versus shiny? 1270.84s - 1272.84s | How can you kind of control that? 1272.84s - 1274.84s | And do you want that from all three of us? 1274.84s - 1275.84s | Okay. 1275.84s - 1276.84s | So I'll start. 1276.84s - 1281.84s | So in the world of silk screening, it's going to be one finish. 1281.84s - 1284.84s | It's going to be sort of a semi. 1284.84s - 1290.84s | The truth is in silk screening, I am using actual PCB UV ink. 1290.84s - 1296.84s | So it's going to be the same as your solder mask, the same as your silk screen that you'd get from a PCB manufacturer. 1296.84s - 1300.84s | Most of the time, that's going to be a fairly glossy finish. 1300.84s - 1304.84s | It's possible to add a matting agent to it. 1304.84s - 1309.84s | But in general, because this is more, in my case, it's more art than science. 1309.84s - 1311.84s | That's going to be very variable. 1311.84s - 1314.84s | So my default is I would never try for a matte finish. 1314.84s - 1320.84s | I'm always going to get the default glossy finish of a UV ink. 1320.84s - 1321.84s | Yeah, similar for me. 1321.84s - 1328.84s | It's going to be whatever the surface of the PCB is since it's so small amount


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1275.84s - 1276.84s | So I'll start. 1276.84s - 1281.84s | So in the world of silk screening, it's going to be one finish. 1281.84s - 1284.84s | It's going to be sort of a semi. 1284.84s - 1290.84s | The truth is in silk screening, I am using actual PCB UV ink. 1290.84s - 1296.84s | So it's going to be the same as your solder mask, the same as your silk screen that you'd get from a PCB manufacturer. 1296.84s - 1300.84s | Most of the time, that's going to be a fairly glossy finish. 1300.84s - 1304.84s | It's possible to add a matting agent to it. 1304.84s - 1309.84s | But in general, because this is more, in my case, it's more art than science. 1309.84s - 1311.84s | That's going to be very variable. 1311.84s - 1314.84s | So my default is I would never try for a matte finish. 1314.84s - 1320.84s | I'm always going to get the default glossy finish of a UV ink. 1320.84s - 1321.84s | Yeah, similar for me. 1321.84s - 1328.84s | It's going to be whatever the surface of the PCB is since it's so small amount of ink that's getting transferred over. 1328.84s - 1337.18s | So whatever that standard silk screen or solder mask layer is going to be, it's going to end up being like that. 1337.18s - 1338.18s | Right. 1338.18s - 1342.18s | So for the UV printing, the default is matte finish. 1342.18s - 1345.18s | But I have this one example here where we tried. 1345.18s - 1351.18s | So this is like UV printed on an actual surface and then we put like a varnish coating on it. 1351.18s - 1356.18s | So that has brought in a little bit of glossy finishing to it. 1356.18s - 1364.18s | If not that, then you can try putting like an acrylic layer and that has like nothing gets more glossier than this. 1364.18s - 1367.18s | So this is like the gold standard of being glossy. 1367.18s - 1371.18s | But as far as UV printing goes, the default is matte finish. 1372.18s - 1374.18s | OK. 1374.18s - 1377.18s | I have a question for Panda. 1377.18s - 1387.18s | Brayden was saying that you reflow or not reflow, but you pass your boards under the UV light on


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of ink that's getting transferred over. 1328.84s - 1337.18s | So whatever that standard silk screen or solder mask layer is going to be, it's going to end up being like that. 1337.18s - 1338.18s | Right. 1338.18s - 1342.18s | So for the UV printing, the default is matte finish. 1342.18s - 1345.18s | But I have this one example here where we tried. 1345.18s - 1351.18s | So this is like UV printed on an actual surface and then we put like a varnish coating on it. 1351.18s - 1356.18s | So that has brought in a little bit of glossy finishing to it. 1356.18s - 1364.18s | If not that, then you can try putting like an acrylic layer and that has like nothing gets more glossier than this. 1364.18s - 1367.18s | So this is like the gold standard of being glossy. 1367.18s - 1371.18s | But as far as UV printing goes, the default is matte finish. 1372.18s - 1374.18s | OK. 1374.18s - 1377.18s | I have a question for Panda. 1377.18s - 1387.18s | Brayden was saying that you reflow or not reflow, but you pass your boards under the UV light on a custom conveyor thing. 1387.18s - 1392.18s | So one question is, doesn't the UV printer cure the ink as it's printing? 1392.18s - 1394.18s | So why would it need to go through a second time? 1394.18s - 1398.18s | And also, I forgot my other question. 1398.18s - 1399.18s | So that's the only one I got. 1399.18s - 1400.18s | Thanks. 1400.18s - 1401.18s | Yeah. 1401.18s - 1412.18s | So when we were experimenting with the screen printing and we're trying to put more and more layers on colors basically on top of one another. 1412.18s - 1415.18s | And so we wanted a faster way to cure those colors. 1415.18s - 1422.18s | So we built that custom UV curing conveyor belt. 1422.18s - 1430.18s | And that was when we were using, we use it right now for the masking ink, usually on the backside of the board. 1430.18s - 1436.18s | And for the UV printing, of course, the UV printer, it cures the ink instantly when you use the UV printer. 1436.18s - 1442.18s | So it sprays the color from one nozzle and then it goes back and forth and back


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a custom conveyor thing. 1387.18s - 1392.18s | So one question is, doesn't the UV printer cure the ink as it's printing? 1392.18s - 1394.18s | So why would it need to go through a second time? 1394.18s - 1398.18s | And also, I forgot my other question. 1398.18s - 1399.18s | So that's the only one I got. 1399.18s - 1400.18s | Thanks. 1400.18s - 1401.18s | Yeah. 1401.18s - 1412.18s | So when we were experimenting with the screen printing and we're trying to put more and more layers on colors basically on top of one another. 1412.18s - 1415.18s | And so we wanted a faster way to cure those colors. 1415.18s - 1422.18s | So we built that custom UV curing conveyor belt. 1422.18s - 1430.18s | And that was when we were using, we use it right now for the masking ink, usually on the backside of the board. 1430.18s - 1436.18s | And for the UV printing, of course, the UV printer, it cures the ink instantly when you use the UV printer. 1436.18s - 1442.18s | So it sprays the color from one nozzle and then it goes back and forth and back and forth. 1442.18s - 1445.18s | And the curing time for it is like instant. 1445.18s - 1446.18s | It doesn't take too long. 1446.18s - 1451.18s | So there's two UV curing now we are doing it, one for masking and then one for UV. 1451.18s - 1453.18s | And I remember my other question. 1453.18s - 1456.18s | So you said you printed on the bed to align. 1456.18s - 1460.18s | Are you doing like a full print or are you just kind of doing like an outline print? 1460.18s - 1461.18s | Yeah. 1461.18s - 1469.18s | So when we're using the full bed, sometimes we're able to fit like 50 or 60 badges depending on the size. 1469.18s - 1473.18s | So we typically print on the entire bed. 1473.18s - 1475.18s | But are you printing full color? 1475.18s - 1478.18s | Yeah, we're printing full color on the entire bed. 1478.18s - 1479.18s | Why? 1480.18s - 1487.18s | We need to do that, one, because we need to ensure the print is coming out right and it has enough resolution. 1487.18s - 1489.18s | Second, the color correction on it. 1489.18s -


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and forth. 1442.18s - 1445.18s | And the curing time for it is like instant. 1445.18s - 1446.18s | It doesn't take too long. 1446.18s - 1451.18s | So there's two UV curing now we are doing it, one for masking and then one for UV. 1451.18s - 1453.18s | And I remember my other question. 1453.18s - 1456.18s | So you said you printed on the bed to align. 1456.18s - 1460.18s | Are you doing like a full print or are you just kind of doing like an outline print? 1460.18s - 1461.18s | Yeah. 1461.18s - 1469.18s | So when we're using the full bed, sometimes we're able to fit like 50 or 60 badges depending on the size. 1469.18s - 1473.18s | So we typically print on the entire bed. 1473.18s - 1475.18s | But are you printing full color? 1475.18s - 1478.18s | Yeah, we're printing full color on the entire bed. 1478.18s - 1479.18s | Why? 1480.18s - 1487.18s | We need to do that, one, because we need to ensure the print is coming out right and it has enough resolution. 1487.18s - 1489.18s | Second, the color correction on it. 1489.18s - 1497.18s | So sometimes we put like a banner, which is like your standard, you know, banners and white color banner. 1497.18s - 1505.18s | And you just basically print on that banner and you have better color correction when you print on that. 1506.18s - 1517.18s | So once we print on just the bed and then we just keep the PCBs on it and then at the exact spot and print it once more. 1517.18s - 1518.18s | Thank you. 1518.18s - 1520.18s | Yeah, thank you. 1520.18s - 1522.18s | Yes, this is one of the badges we did. 1522.18s - 1526.18s | We combined FR4 with masking. 1526.18s - 1530.18s | So the side, the portion where there are LEDs, that's like FR4. 1530.18s - 1533.18s | And the rest of the PCB is like proper white masking. 1533.18s - 1539.18s | So that was like a combination and more explanation on how we print. 1539.18s - 1546.18s | For UV printing, can you print transparently if you wanted to avoid printing on top of LEDs that were already populated? 1546.18s - 1547.18s | Certainly. 1547.18s - 1553.18s | So the way UV printer works is


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1497.18s | So sometimes we put like a banner, which is like your standard, you know, banners and white color banner. 1497.18s - 1505.18s | And you just basically print on that banner and you have better color correction when you print on that. 1506.18s - 1517.18s | So once we print on just the bed and then we just keep the PCBs on it and then at the exact spot and print it once more. 1517.18s - 1518.18s | Thank you. 1518.18s - 1520.18s | Yeah, thank you. 1520.18s - 1522.18s | Yes, this is one of the badges we did. 1522.18s - 1526.18s | We combined FR4 with masking. 1526.18s - 1530.18s | So the side, the portion where there are LEDs, that's like FR4. 1530.18s - 1533.18s | And the rest of the PCB is like proper white masking. 1533.18s - 1539.18s | So that was like a combination and more explanation on how we print. 1539.18s - 1546.18s | For UV printing, can you print transparently if you wanted to avoid printing on top of LEDs that were already populated? 1546.18s - 1547.18s | Certainly. 1547.18s - 1553.18s | So the way UV printer works is that it prints the file that you provide. 1553.18s - 1560.18s | And so when we want that a certain area should not be printed, we need to make that area transparent. 1560.18s - 1563.18s | And that can happen only in PNG format. 1563.18s - 1569.18s | So the trick here is you need to, one, you need to make sure you have a good source file. 1569.18s - 1577.18s | And when you have the good source file, you convert that to really high-risk PNG with close to 500 dpi. 1577.18s - 1583.18s | And you make those areas transparent where you do not want the print. 1583.18s - 1587.18s | And how high does the printhead traverse? 1587.18s - 1595.18s | Like if you had potentiometers or something that were high and populated already, can you adjust the height or how does it work? 1595.18s - 1597.18s | Adjust the height of the? 1597.18s - 1599.18s | Of the printhead that's sweeping over it. 1599.18s - 1604.18s | You can adjust the height of the printhead, but I don't think it will make a difference for potentiometer. 1604.18s - 1611.18s | So either way, it's still going


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that it prints the file that you provide. 1553.18s - 1560.18s | And so when we want that a certain area should not be printed, we need to make that area transparent. 1560.18s - 1563.18s | And that can happen only in PNG format. 1563.18s - 1569.18s | So the trick here is you need to, one, you need to make sure you have a good source file. 1569.18s - 1577.18s | And when you have the good source file, you convert that to really high-risk PNG with close to 500 dpi. 1577.18s - 1583.18s | And you make those areas transparent where you do not want the print. 1583.18s - 1587.18s | And how high does the printhead traverse? 1587.18s - 1595.18s | Like if you had potentiometers or something that were high and populated already, can you adjust the height or how does it work? 1595.18s - 1597.18s | Adjust the height of the? 1597.18s - 1599.18s | Of the printhead that's sweeping over it. 1599.18s - 1604.18s | You can adjust the height of the printhead, but I don't think it will make a difference for potentiometer. 1604.18s - 1611.18s | So either way, it's still going to get printed on if you don't have that removed in the file. 1611.18s - 1614.18s | If you don't have that transparent in the file. 1614.18s - 1617.18s | So the printhead is how high off the board typically? 1617.18s - 1620.18s | That's typically like 5 to 10 centimeters high. 1620.18s - 1622.18s | It's not too much. 1622.18s - 1625.18s | So can you raise that if you had a higher component? 1625.18s - 1633.18s | You can raise that, but we haven't played around with that because almost all of our badges are totally flush on front side. 1633.18s - 1638.18s | We don't put components on front side to avoid the issue in the first place. 1638.18s - 1648.18s | But a good turnaround for that is you just make those areas transparent in the PNG file and that should avoid printing over it. 1648.18s - 1651.18s | Are there any concerns with printing on both sides? 1651.18s - 1653.18s | I mean, I guess you just flip it over and it acts like any other. 1653.18s - 1654.18s | No, not at all. 1654.18s - 1664.18s | The only concern is you have to


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to get printed on if you don't have that removed in the file. 1611.18s - 1614.18s | If you don't have that transparent in the file. 1614.18s - 1617.18s | So the printhead is how high off the board typically? 1617.18s - 1620.18s | That's typically like 5 to 10 centimeters high. 1620.18s - 1622.18s | It's not too much. 1622.18s - 1625.18s | So can you raise that if you had a higher component? 1625.18s - 1633.18s | You can raise that, but we haven't played around with that because almost all of our badges are totally flush on front side. 1633.18s - 1638.18s | We don't put components on front side to avoid the issue in the first place. 1638.18s - 1648.18s | But a good turnaround for that is you just make those areas transparent in the PNG file and that should avoid printing over it. 1648.18s - 1651.18s | Are there any concerns with printing on both sides? 1651.18s - 1653.18s | I mean, I guess you just flip it over and it acts like any other. 1653.18s - 1654.18s | No, not at all. 1654.18s - 1664.18s | The only concern is you have to deduct each and every single component if you don't want to be printing on those components, on top of those components. 1664.18s - 1669.18s | So that is just a lot of manual work, so to speak. 1669.18s - 1671.18s | Okay, this is going to be a little weird. 1671.18s - 1675.18s | As a panel member, I'm going to ask a question of everybody on the panel. 1675.18s - 1687.18s | So for each of these three techniques, when do you color the PCB in the assembly process? 1687.18s - 1692.18s | Yeah, for the die sublimation, I color a PCB just before I assemble them. 1692.18s - 1696.18s | So it'll be close to the last thing I do. 1696.18s - 1699.18s | I've already populated everything. 1699.18s - 1702.18s | It's ready to be bolted together or whatever is needed. 1702.18s - 1707.18s | So it's very tail end of things. 1707.18s - 1710.18s | Yeah, so for UV, it's similar. 1710.18s - 1712.18s | It's right in the end. 1712.18s - 1717.18s | Sometimes it is before the assembly and sometimes it's right after the assembly. 1717.18s - 1720.18s | It depends on the artwork.


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deduct each and every single component if you don't want to be printing on those components, on top of those components. 1664.18s - 1669.18s | So that is just a lot of manual work, so to speak. 1669.18s - 1671.18s | Okay, this is going to be a little weird. 1671.18s - 1675.18s | As a panel member, I'm going to ask a question of everybody on the panel. 1675.18s - 1687.18s | So for each of these three techniques, when do you color the PCB in the assembly process? 1687.18s - 1692.18s | Yeah, for the die sublimation, I color a PCB just before I assemble them. 1692.18s - 1696.18s | So it'll be close to the last thing I do. 1696.18s - 1699.18s | I've already populated everything. 1699.18s - 1702.18s | It's ready to be bolted together or whatever is needed. 1702.18s - 1707.18s | So it's very tail end of things. 1707.18s - 1710.18s | Yeah, so for UV, it's similar. 1710.18s - 1712.18s | It's right in the end. 1712.18s - 1717.18s | Sometimes it is before the assembly and sometimes it's right after the assembly. 1717.18s - 1720.18s | It depends on the artwork. 1720.18s - 1726.18s | And that's actually why I wanted to ask the question because in the case of traditional silk screening, it's the very first process. 1726.18s - 1734.18s | So literally as soon as my PCBs arrive from the manufacturer, I run them through the silk screening process because they're completely tolerant of heat. 1734.18s - 1739.18s | No matter how much heat I bake into them, it doesn't matter because it's solder mask inks. 1739.18s - 1745.18s | And so I do it before I even start the whole process of paste and population and reflow. 1745.18s - 1749.18s | So mine's at the very beginning of the process rather than anywhere in the middle or the end. 1750.18s - 1752.18s | Yeah. 1752.18s - 1753.18s | All right. 1753.18s - 1756.18s | If you guys don't have any further questions, I've got some more. 1756.18s - 1760.18s | So this question is for Hamster. 1760.18s - 1768.18s | If I'm ordering badges, how many extras should I order to print and test and perfect the process? 1768.18s - 1769.18s | Yeah, that's a good question. 1769.18s - 1775.18s | I typically try to order like an


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1720.18s - 1726.18s | And that's actually why I wanted to ask the question because in the case of traditional silk screening, it's the very first process. 1726.18s - 1734.18s | So literally as soon as my PCBs arrive from the manufacturer, I run them through the silk screening process because they're completely tolerant of heat. 1734.18s - 1739.18s | No matter how much heat I bake into them, it doesn't matter because it's solder mask inks. 1739.18s - 1745.18s | And so I do it before I even start the whole process of paste and population and reflow. 1745.18s - 1749.18s | So mine's at the very beginning of the process rather than anywhere in the middle or the end. 1750.18s - 1752.18s | Yeah. 1752.18s - 1753.18s | All right. 1753.18s - 1756.18s | If you guys don't have any further questions, I've got some more. 1756.18s - 1760.18s | So this question is for Hamster. 1760.18s - 1768.18s | If I'm ordering badges, how many extras should I order to print and test and perfect the process? 1768.18s - 1769.18s | Yeah, that's a good question. 1769.18s - 1775.18s | I typically try to order like an extra between 25 and 30 blanks. 1775.18s - 1786.18s | And usually I will end up using the front and back of them to try to get to dial in color temperature, trying to dial in artwork, registration. 1786.18s - 1795.18s | If you're still wishy-washy about what you want the design to look like and you want to see it on the real thing, you might consider bumping that number up a little bit. 1795.18s - 1805.18s | I usually do runs of about 100 badges, so it is a substantial amount, but cost-wise, it's really not much money. 1805.18s - 1806.18s | Okay. 1806.18s - 1810.18s | This is a question for Panda, but you might all answer this. 1810.18s - 1815.18s | Any failure stories and any interesting ways you corrected them? 1815.18s - 1819.18s | We have had some failure stories all the time. 1819.18s - 1823.18s | And if you go back to slides. 1823.18s - 1826.18s | How do you... 1826.18s - 1827.18s | Let me... 1827.18s - 1835.18s | Yeah, so when we started, one of the first challenges, of course, the ink turning yellowish after you reflow. 1835.18s - 1842.18s | And


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extra between 25 and 30 blanks. 1775.18s - 1786.18s | And usually I will end up using the front and back of them to try to get to dial in color temperature, trying to dial in artwork, registration. 1786.18s - 1795.18s | If you're still wishy-washy about what you want the design to look like and you want to see it on the real thing, you might consider bumping that number up a little bit. 1795.18s - 1805.18s | I usually do runs of about 100 badges, so it is a substantial amount, but cost-wise, it's really not much money. 1805.18s - 1806.18s | Okay. 1806.18s - 1810.18s | This is a question for Panda, but you might all answer this. 1810.18s - 1815.18s | Any failure stories and any interesting ways you corrected them? 1815.18s - 1819.18s | We have had some failure stories all the time. 1819.18s - 1823.18s | And if you go back to slides. 1823.18s - 1826.18s | How do you... 1826.18s - 1827.18s | Let me... 1827.18s - 1835.18s | Yeah, so when we started, one of the first challenges, of course, the ink turning yellowish after you reflow. 1835.18s - 1842.18s | And that we figured out, maybe we'll just print it after assembly and that solved the problem. 1842.18s - 1851.18s | And then the other time, we just kept experimenting to find the accurate temperature to reduce the impact as much as possible. 1851.18s - 1854.18s | So there are some badges here. 1854.18s - 1865.18s | So some of the badges shown here, we did a lot of refining with each badge and every process. 1865.18s - 1874.18s | So one of the badge, in particular, we had seen it had like a flaking off or like a peeling off issue. 1875.18s - 1879.18s | And we chose the Wombat badge, actually. 1879.18s - 1882.18s | It was from a conference called B-Sides AdLib. 1882.18s - 1889.18s | And so what happened is we couldn't figure out why, because it never happened before. 1889.18s - 1893.18s | And the coating started to kind of peel off. 1893.18s - 1898.18s | And so we talked to the manufacturer and we asked, what the hell is this? 1898.18s - 1900.18s | And they were like, we don't know. 1900.18s - 1904.18s | We have never given you inks for like the PCBs


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that we figured out, maybe we'll just print it after assembly and that solved the problem. 1842.18s - 1851.18s | And then the other time, we just kept experimenting to find the accurate temperature to reduce the impact as much as possible. 1851.18s - 1854.18s | So there are some badges here. 1854.18s - 1865.18s | So some of the badges shown here, we did a lot of refining with each badge and every process. 1865.18s - 1874.18s | So one of the badge, in particular, we had seen it had like a flaking off or like a peeling off issue. 1875.18s - 1879.18s | And we chose the Wombat badge, actually. 1879.18s - 1882.18s | It was from a conference called B-Sides AdLib. 1882.18s - 1889.18s | And so what happened is we couldn't figure out why, because it never happened before. 1889.18s - 1893.18s | And the coating started to kind of peel off. 1893.18s - 1898.18s | And so we talked to the manufacturer and we asked, what the hell is this? 1898.18s - 1900.18s | And they were like, we don't know. 1900.18s - 1904.18s | We have never given you inks for like the PCBs and stuff. 1904.18s - 1907.18s | And so we started getting into it. 1907.18s - 1914.18s | And they were like, yeah, maybe it has to do with moisture in Australia or like the heat or even part of it outdoors. 1914.18s - 1916.18s | So maybe it was outdoor heat in Australia. 1916.18s - 1922.18s | So we kept going through it and we still don't know exactly why it happened. 1922.18s - 1928.18s | But we tried recreating it and we couldn't recreate. 1928.18s - 1934.18s | So that is one of like a small failure story, so to speak. 1934.18s - 1938.18s | And eventually we realized we could just avoid printing the masking at all. 1938.18s - 1941.18s | And then we just print on FR4 plate. 1941.18s - 1943.18s | And that seemed to fix the problem. 1943.18s - 1950.18s | I think it was due to the ink being printed on a glossy surface that was resulting in those things. 1950.18s - 1958.12s | Yeah, I'd say for me, man, I hate inkjet printers. 1958.12s - 1963.12s | The problem is that a lot of times is my Dice-Up printer will sit for a


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and stuff. 1904.18s - 1907.18s | And so we started getting into it. 1907.18s - 1914.18s | And they were like, yeah, maybe it has to do with moisture in Australia or like the heat or even part of it outdoors. 1914.18s - 1916.18s | So maybe it was outdoor heat in Australia. 1916.18s - 1922.18s | So we kept going through it and we still don't know exactly why it happened. 1922.18s - 1928.18s | But we tried recreating it and we couldn't recreate. 1928.18s - 1934.18s | So that is one of like a small failure story, so to speak. 1934.18s - 1938.18s | And eventually we realized we could just avoid printing the masking at all. 1938.18s - 1941.18s | And then we just print on FR4 plate. 1941.18s - 1943.18s | And that seemed to fix the problem. 1943.18s - 1950.18s | I think it was due to the ink being printed on a glossy surface that was resulting in those things. 1950.18s - 1958.12s | Yeah, I'd say for me, man, I hate inkjet printers. 1958.12s - 1963.12s | The problem is that a lot of times is my Dice-Up printer will sit for a long time. 1963.12s - 1970.12s | And if I don't remember to print a nozzle check once in a while, I start to lose nozzles. 1970.12s - 1980.12s | And it really sucks when you're counting on the thing and you go to print it and half your nozzles aren't printing and the color is coming out wrong and you're under the wire. 1980.12s - 1985.12s | There is a process out there for doing laser, for doing Dice-Up with laser. 1985.12s - 1988.12s | But the cartridges are way more expensive. 1988.12s - 1995.12s | Dice-Up ink is like $40, gets you like 400mm bottle or 100ml bottles of ink. 1995.12s - 1999.12s | But the laser process, you're looking at like $500 in toner. 1999.12s - 2004.12s | But yeah, I wish I could get rid of the inkjet printer part of it. 2004.12s - 2013.12s | Outside of that, some of the very early runs I did, I didn't really take into account how many boards I would need to test to get the color. 2013.12s - 2016.12s | Or get the time and temperature correct. 2016.12s - 2023.12s | And I just about ran out of


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long time. 1963.12s - 1970.12s | And if I don't remember to print a nozzle check once in a while, I start to lose nozzles. 1970.12s - 1980.12s | And it really sucks when you're counting on the thing and you go to print it and half your nozzles aren't printing and the color is coming out wrong and you're under the wire. 1980.12s - 1985.12s | There is a process out there for doing laser, for doing Dice-Up with laser. 1985.12s - 1988.12s | But the cartridges are way more expensive. 1988.12s - 1995.12s | Dice-Up ink is like $40, gets you like 400mm bottle or 100ml bottles of ink. 1995.12s - 1999.12s | But the laser process, you're looking at like $500 in toner. 1999.12s - 2004.12s | But yeah, I wish I could get rid of the inkjet printer part of it. 2004.12s - 2013.12s | Outside of that, some of the very early runs I did, I didn't really take into account how many boards I would need to test to get the color. 2013.12s - 2016.12s | Or get the time and temperature correct. 2016.12s - 2023.12s | And I just about ran out of boards trying to get it down before I started eating into the actual production run. 2023.12s - 2032.30s | Probably the biggest process problem I ran into, and I never would have thought this was the case, was registration. 2032.30s - 2039.30s | And it isn't the registration of my silkscreen to my PCB. 2039.30s - 2047.30s | It turned out the fact that, as I pointed out in mine, I have the black and the white printed by the PCB manufacturer. 2047.30s - 2049.30s | And then I do the colors on top of that. 2049.30s - 2061.30s | Which means my registration of my silkscreen art has to be 100% accurate to whatever process the printed circuit board manufacturer did. 2062.30s - 2073.30s | And I found that for whatever reason, my nice high-quality laser printer has about a 1.5% error in one axis only. 2073.30s - 2080.30s | Which meant I have to go back and scale my artwork and stretch it in one axis only. 2080.30s - 2088.30s | To get my art that goes onto the silkscreen to match up with the art that came from the PCB manufacturer. 2088.30s - 2091.30s | And I


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boards trying to get it down before I started eating into the actual production run. 2023.12s - 2032.30s | Probably the biggest process problem I ran into, and I never would have thought this was the case, was registration. 2032.30s - 2039.30s | And it isn't the registration of my silkscreen to my PCB. 2039.30s - 2047.30s | It turned out the fact that, as I pointed out in mine, I have the black and the white printed by the PCB manufacturer. 2047.30s - 2049.30s | And then I do the colors on top of that. 2049.30s - 2061.30s | Which means my registration of my silkscreen art has to be 100% accurate to whatever process the printed circuit board manufacturer did. 2062.30s - 2073.30s | And I found that for whatever reason, my nice high-quality laser printer has about a 1.5% error in one axis only. 2073.30s - 2080.30s | Which meant I have to go back and scale my artwork and stretch it in one axis only. 2080.30s - 2088.30s | To get my art that goes onto the silkscreen to match up with the art that came from the PCB manufacturer. 2088.30s - 2091.30s | And I had never anticipated that that would be a problem. 2091.30s - 2095.30s | Once I found it and documented it, it was easy to resolve. 2095.30s - 2098.30s | But that was the one thing I never anticipated happening. 2098.30s - 2109.30s | What I did find that makes my life a lot easier is the UV inks, both for the emulsion on my silkscreen and then the UV ink itself. 2109.30s - 2116.30s | I started out with the traditional darkroom set with the amber lights and the timers and all that stuff. 2116.30s - 2121.30s | Because I was afraid of things getting overexposed or exposed out of sync and stuff. 2121.30s - 2123.30s | I found out the stuff is really, really tolerant. 2123.30s - 2128.30s | So I just do it in my garage with the lights turned off on a cloudy day and it's fine. 2128.30s - 2131.30s | The exposure of my screens is about eight minutes. 2131.30s - 2140.30s | And so what I do is I wash out all my old screens in one day, dry them out and then apply an emulsion to them and stack them in a box. 2140.30s


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had never anticipated that that would be a problem. 2091.30s - 2095.30s | Once I found it and documented it, it was easy to resolve. 2095.30s - 2098.30s | But that was the one thing I never anticipated happening. 2098.30s - 2109.30s | What I did find that makes my life a lot easier is the UV inks, both for the emulsion on my silkscreen and then the UV ink itself. 2109.30s - 2116.30s | I started out with the traditional darkroom set with the amber lights and the timers and all that stuff. 2116.30s - 2121.30s | Because I was afraid of things getting overexposed or exposed out of sync and stuff. 2121.30s - 2123.30s | I found out the stuff is really, really tolerant. 2123.30s - 2128.30s | So I just do it in my garage with the lights turned off on a cloudy day and it's fine. 2128.30s - 2131.30s | The exposure of my screens is about eight minutes. 2131.30s - 2140.30s | And so what I do is I wash out all my old screens in one day, dry them out and then apply an emulsion to them and stack them in a box. 2140.30s - 2143.30s | And two or three months later when I need a screen, I pull it out. 2143.30s - 2148.30s | I put the artwork on it and I expose it and then it sits until the PCBs arrive. 2148.30s - 2152.30s | So I can do things in stages, which saves me a lot of time. 2152.30s - 2160.30s | But the alignment of my laser printer to what the Chinese company did to the PCBs, I never anticipated that that would be an issue. 2160.30s - 2167.71s | So this question is for Braden again. 2167.71s - 2176.71s | So along that same line of getting started, what did you need to get started and what special equipment did you add and why? 2179.06s - 2182.06s | So when I started, I looked at it as traditional silk screening. 2182.06s - 2191.06s | And so I just went online and bought, I think I started originally with a 230 mesh because I found an article that said, you know, 2191.06s - 2197.06s | you get sort of good accuracy and fairly high resolution with a 230 mesh screen. 2197.06s - 2201.06s | And those screens are $17


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- 2143.30s | And two or three months later when I need a screen, I pull it out. 2143.30s - 2148.30s | I put the artwork on it and I expose it and then it sits until the PCBs arrive. 2148.30s - 2152.30s | So I can do things in stages, which saves me a lot of time. 2152.30s - 2160.30s | But the alignment of my laser printer to what the Chinese company did to the PCBs, I never anticipated that that would be an issue. 2160.30s - 2167.71s | So this question is for Braden again. 2167.71s - 2176.71s | So along that same line of getting started, what did you need to get started and what special equipment did you add and why? 2179.06s - 2182.06s | So when I started, I looked at it as traditional silk screening. 2182.06s - 2191.06s | And so I just went online and bought, I think I started originally with a 230 mesh because I found an article that said, you know, 2191.06s - 2197.06s | you get sort of good accuracy and fairly high resolution with a 230 mesh screen. 2197.06s - 2201.06s | And those screens are $17 or $18 a piece. 2201.06s - 2203.06s | And I bought, I think, two of them. 2203.06s - 2205.06s | And so that was my initial. 2205.06s - 2211.06s | And then I realized, OK, you can get emulsion films, but they're expensive and stuff. 2211.06s - 2214.06s | But a tub of emulsion will last me years. 2214.06s - 2216.06s | And it cost me $12 or $15. 2216.06s - 2219.06s | And a squeegee was $3 or $4. 2219.06s - 2224.06s | And a UV lamp was, I think, $18 or $20. 2224.06s - 2227.06s | And that's all I had to get started. 2227.06s - 2232.06s | Along the line, to make things go faster, you know, I got two more screens. 2232.06s - 2234.06s | And eventually I got two more after that. 2234.06s - 2244.06s | And the last two I went to a 305 mesh, which is basically it's 300 dpi in screen format. 2244.06s - 2253.06s | And instead of using one LED UV lamp that is rated at, I think, 60 or 75 watts, I went to two. 2253.06s - 2259.06s | And eventually I'm now at four that sit inside my


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or $18 a piece. 2201.06s - 2203.06s | And I bought, I think, two of them. 2203.06s - 2205.06s | And so that was my initial. 2205.06s - 2211.06s | And then I realized, OK, you can get emulsion films, but they're expensive and stuff. 2211.06s - 2214.06s | But a tub of emulsion will last me years. 2214.06s - 2216.06s | And it cost me $12 or $15. 2216.06s - 2219.06s | And a squeegee was $3 or $4. 2219.06s - 2224.06s | And a UV lamp was, I think, $18 or $20. 2224.06s - 2227.06s | And that's all I had to get started. 2227.06s - 2232.06s | Along the line, to make things go faster, you know, I got two more screens. 2232.06s - 2234.06s | And eventually I got two more after that. 2234.06s - 2244.06s | And the last two I went to a 305 mesh, which is basically it's 300 dpi in screen format. 2244.06s - 2253.06s | And instead of using one LED UV lamp that is rated at, I think, 60 or 75 watts, I went to two. 2253.06s - 2259.06s | And eventually I'm now at four that sit inside my reflow oven in a conveyor. 2259.06s - 2264.06s | The one thing that Panda taught me that was really useful was the proximity of the UV lamps to the board. 2264.06s - 2266.06s | I started out at, like, eight inches. 2266.06s - 2269.06s | And it was taking forever for me to cure my boards with the ink on it. 2269.06s - 2273.06s | I got it down to about 10 or 15 centimeters, which is about a half inch. 2273.06s - 2277.06s | And then it was, like, really fast. 2277.06s - 2283.06s | But to get started, it was probably $65 or $70. 2283.06s - 2290.06s | And I would probably say I'm into it now for $250 or $300. 2290.06s - 2301.06s | I started out, I found out that literally the little 100 milliliter container of UV ink in each color was more than enough to do hundreds of boards. 2301.06s - 2307.06s | So I didn't need the big, you know, one kilo tub of ink. 2307.06s - 2311.06s | The little ones were more than enough to get me through all my designs. 2311.06s - 2313.06s | This is for Hamster first. 2313.06s


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reflow oven in a conveyor. 2259.06s - 2264.06s | The one thing that Panda taught me that was really useful was the proximity of the UV lamps to the board. 2264.06s - 2266.06s | I started out at, like, eight inches. 2266.06s - 2269.06s | And it was taking forever for me to cure my boards with the ink on it. 2269.06s - 2273.06s | I got it down to about 10 or 15 centimeters, which is about a half inch. 2273.06s - 2277.06s | And then it was, like, really fast. 2277.06s - 2283.06s | But to get started, it was probably $65 or $70. 2283.06s - 2290.06s | And I would probably say I'm into it now for $250 or $300. 2290.06s - 2301.06s | I started out, I found out that literally the little 100 milliliter container of UV ink in each color was more than enough to do hundreds of boards. 2301.06s - 2307.06s | So I didn't need the big, you know, one kilo tub of ink. 2307.06s - 2311.06s | The little ones were more than enough to get me through all my designs. 2311.06s - 2313.06s | This is for Hamster first. 2313.06s - 2321.06s | Speaking of quantity, how viable is it for you to do, like, 100 badges versus 500 badges? 2321.06s - 2325.06s | So, like, scaling, time, things like that. 2325.06s - 2329.34s | Yeah, I don't know if this mic is still on. 2330.34s - 2332.34s | There you go. 2332.34s - 2336.34s | Yeah, so it's fairly scalable. 2336.34s - 2339.34s | Doing 100 boards isn't painful. 2339.34s - 2345.34s | If I was doing 1,000 boards, I'd probably rethink a lot of things beyond just trying to put color on it. 2345.34s - 2348.34s | But a lot of the process is kind of automated. 2348.34s - 2350.34s | Like, you have to print out. 2350.34s - 2353.34s | You have every single board has to get a printout. 2353.34s - 2356.34s | So you have that time to bake into it. 2356.34s - 2365.34s | But, you know, the printer can go off and do its thing unless you've got a printer like mine that every fifth sheet decides that it can't recognize one of the color tanks. 2365.34s - 2374.34s | And then you have to tape each one of them individually onto each


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- 2321.06s | Speaking of quantity, how viable is it for you to do, like, 100 badges versus 500 badges? 2321.06s - 2325.06s | So, like, scaling, time, things like that. 2325.06s - 2329.34s | Yeah, I don't know if this mic is still on. 2330.34s - 2332.34s | There you go. 2332.34s - 2336.34s | Yeah, so it's fairly scalable. 2336.34s - 2339.34s | Doing 100 boards isn't painful. 2339.34s - 2345.34s | If I was doing 1,000 boards, I'd probably rethink a lot of things beyond just trying to put color on it. 2345.34s - 2348.34s | But a lot of the process is kind of automated. 2348.34s - 2350.34s | Like, you have to print out. 2350.34s - 2353.34s | You have every single board has to get a printout. 2353.34s - 2356.34s | So you have that time to bake into it. 2356.34s - 2365.34s | But, you know, the printer can go off and do its thing unless you've got a printer like mine that every fifth sheet decides that it can't recognize one of the color tanks. 2365.34s - 2374.34s | And then you have to tape each one of them individually onto each printed thing and then put it through the heated T-shirt press. 2374.34s - 2383.34s | You kind of get into a rhythm, but I probably wouldn't want to do more than, say, 250 boards through this process without rethinking life. 2384.34s - 2385.34s | Okay. 2385.34s - 2388.34s | Did either of you want to answer that one? 2388.34s - 2393.34s | It's like, again, how well does it scale and how does it impact time to do more? 2393.34s - 2397.34s | I think in terms of scale, it's extremely scalable. 2397.34s - 2410.34s | We have done, like, the thing is it just takes, like, initial setup, as I said, to set up the bed and to do the alignment and do the initial print and that. 2410.34s - 2415.34s | But afterwards, it's just about printing on and on. 2415.34s - 2421.34s | So it doesn't make a difference if you do 100 or you do 10,000. 2421.34s - 2426.96s | So it's very, very scalable. 2426.96s - 2429.96s | For me, the scalability comes down to the size of the PCB. 2429.96s - 2441.96s | So if the PCB is so big that I can only


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printed thing and then put it through the heated T-shirt press. 2374.34s - 2383.34s | You kind of get into a rhythm, but I probably wouldn't want to do more than, say, 250 boards through this process without rethinking life. 2384.34s - 2385.34s | Okay. 2385.34s - 2388.34s | Did either of you want to answer that one? 2388.34s - 2393.34s | It's like, again, how well does it scale and how does it impact time to do more? 2393.34s - 2397.34s | I think in terms of scale, it's extremely scalable. 2397.34s - 2410.34s | We have done, like, the thing is it just takes, like, initial setup, as I said, to set up the bed and to do the alignment and do the initial print and that. 2410.34s - 2415.34s | But afterwards, it's just about printing on and on. 2415.34s - 2421.34s | So it doesn't make a difference if you do 100 or you do 10,000. 2421.34s - 2426.96s | So it's very, very scalable. 2426.96s - 2429.96s | For me, the scalability comes down to the size of the PCB. 2429.96s - 2441.96s | So if the PCB is so big that I can only put one under the silkscreen at a time, then the squeegeeing process takes, you know, 10 or 15 seconds, lifting the board out, putting it away. 2441.96s - 2444.96s | And so, you know, there's a lot of manual steps. 2444.96s - 2449.96s | When I did the first e-challenge coin, I did the silkscreening in panel form. 2449.96s - 2453.96s | So all of a sudden, that one squeegee was four challenge coins at a time. 2453.96s - 2459.96s | If I had done those panels at eight, it would be eight challenge coins in that same 15 seconds. 2459.96s - 2471.96s | So from that standpoint, my scalability comes down to the manual labor, and it really comes down to how many of the end unit PCBs can I fit on my silkscreen in one shot. 2471.96s - 2474.96s | And that's the only way I can scale. 2474.96s - 2487.96s | From a reality standpoint, 100 boards or 100 panels is fairly easy because, like I said, they take, you know, 20 or 30 seconds maximum between them. 2487.96s - 2490.96s | So that was fairly easy. 2490.96s - 2497.96s | And because the e-challenge coin, there


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put one under the silkscreen at a time, then the squeegeeing process takes, you know, 10 or 15 seconds, lifting the board out, putting it away. 2441.96s - 2444.96s | And so, you know, there's a lot of manual steps. 2444.96s - 2449.96s | When I did the first e-challenge coin, I did the silkscreening in panel form. 2449.96s - 2453.96s | So all of a sudden, that one squeegee was four challenge coins at a time. 2453.96s - 2459.96s | If I had done those panels at eight, it would be eight challenge coins in that same 15 seconds. 2459.96s - 2471.96s | So from that standpoint, my scalability comes down to the manual labor, and it really comes down to how many of the end unit PCBs can I fit on my silkscreen in one shot. 2471.96s - 2474.96s | And that's the only way I can scale. 2474.96s - 2487.96s | From a reality standpoint, 100 boards or 100 panels is fairly easy because, like I said, they take, you know, 20 or 30 seconds maximum between them. 2487.96s - 2490.96s | So that was fairly easy. 2490.96s - 2497.96s | And because the e-challenge coin, there was four coins on a panel, that was 400 coins. 2497.96s - 2499.96s | And so that went fairly quickly. 2499.96s - 2511.24s | But if I had had to do a board that I could only put one, you know, one badge down at a time, you know, I probably would start to rethink after about 100 or 150. 2511.24s - 2512.24s | All right. 2512.24s - 2515.24s | This one's for Panda. 2515.24s - 2519.24s | You've made a lot of different badges, and it seems like you've experimented a lot. 2519.24s - 2524.24s | Can you tell us about your experiments with different materials and boards? 2524.24s - 2530.24s | Right. 2530.24s - 2537.24s | So over there on the corner, we have the owl badge, the red one. 2537.24s - 2543.24s | And that was the combination of gold plated PCB with the gemstone on it. 2543.24s - 2553.24s | And the gemstone was like, well, like the main focus of it was like the point was to make the PCB as special as possible. 2553.24s - 2558.24s | So there was that combination of gemstone and U printing and gold plating. 2558.24s - 2565.24s |


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was four coins on a panel, that was 400 coins. 2497.96s - 2499.96s | And so that went fairly quickly. 2499.96s - 2511.24s | But if I had had to do a board that I could only put one, you know, one badge down at a time, you know, I probably would start to rethink after about 100 or 150. 2511.24s - 2512.24s | All right. 2512.24s - 2515.24s | This one's for Panda. 2515.24s - 2519.24s | You've made a lot of different badges, and it seems like you've experimented a lot. 2519.24s - 2524.24s | Can you tell us about your experiments with different materials and boards? 2524.24s - 2530.24s | Right. 2530.24s - 2537.24s | So over there on the corner, we have the owl badge, the red one. 2537.24s - 2543.24s | And that was the combination of gold plated PCB with the gemstone on it. 2543.24s - 2553.24s | And the gemstone was like, well, like the main focus of it was like the point was to make the PCB as special as possible. 2553.24s - 2558.24s | So there was that combination of gemstone and U printing and gold plating. 2558.24s - 2565.24s | There's a Budobot badge, which is like red and there's a white, it's called hurricane in it. 2565.24s - 2571.24s | So that was a really interesting, like a crash course in light diffusion. 2571.24s - 2573.24s | And I hated that topic in school. 2573.24s - 2581.24s | And so what happened is they had this idea, they were basically like, we want to make a digital version of our logo. 2581.24s - 2588.24s | It needs to glow as brightly as possible at every inch on it. 2588.24s - 2594.24s | No glow spots and no shadow spots on it, which is what typically what happens in PCBs. 2595.24s - 2600.24s | So we just filled the board with red and white LEDs at first, and then we are testing it. 2600.24s - 2609.24s | And we put one layer of acrylic and we can see that some spots are glowing too high and then some spots are like not glowing too high. 2609.24s - 2615.24s | And as a result, the spots with more glow were like yellowish and the others were like reddish. 2615.24s - 2621.24s | And so we kept reiterating and then we were


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There's a Budobot badge, which is like red and there's a white, it's called hurricane in it. 2565.24s - 2571.24s | So that was a really interesting, like a crash course in light diffusion. 2571.24s - 2573.24s | And I hated that topic in school. 2573.24s - 2581.24s | And so what happened is they had this idea, they were basically like, we want to make a digital version of our logo. 2581.24s - 2588.24s | It needs to glow as brightly as possible at every inch on it. 2588.24s - 2594.24s | No glow spots and no shadow spots on it, which is what typically what happens in PCBs. 2595.24s - 2600.24s | So we just filled the board with red and white LEDs at first, and then we are testing it. 2600.24s - 2609.24s | And we put one layer of acrylic and we can see that some spots are glowing too high and then some spots are like not glowing too high. 2609.24s - 2615.24s | And as a result, the spots with more glow were like yellowish and the others were like reddish. 2615.24s - 2621.24s | And so we kept reiterating and then we were thinking, well, how can we make this better? 2621.24s - 2628.24s | And so we put one layer of white on the bottom and then we print the artwork once again. 2628.24s - 2632.24s | And we see how that turns out and that seemed to improvise. 2632.24s - 2634.24s | We were like, OK, cool. 2634.24s - 2637.24s | So let's do one more layer. 2637.24s - 2640.24s | And so and that seemed to improvise further. 2640.24s - 2646.24s | So now we are at three UV print layers on the bottom and then one UV print layer on the top. 2646.24s - 2649.24s | And that is how that badge ended up becoming. 2649.24s - 2653.24s | It was like a four layer on top of one another on an acrylic. 2653.24s - 2664.24s | And that is mounted with a screw on a PCB to distribute all that glow to just as equally as that we wanted. 2664.24s - 2667.24s | So there was that badge. 2667.24s - 2679.24s | There was, of course, the Pacific Hackers I talked about, a combination of FR4 on the side with LEDs behind it and just the masking for


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thinking, well, how can we make this better? 2621.24s - 2628.24s | And so we put one layer of white on the bottom and then we print the artwork once again. 2628.24s - 2632.24s | And we see how that turns out and that seemed to improvise. 2632.24s - 2634.24s | We were like, OK, cool. 2634.24s - 2637.24s | So let's do one more layer. 2637.24s - 2640.24s | And so and that seemed to improvise further. 2640.24s - 2646.24s | So now we are at three UV print layers on the bottom and then one UV print layer on the top. 2646.24s - 2649.24s | And that is how that badge ended up becoming. 2649.24s - 2653.24s | It was like a four layer on top of one another on an acrylic. 2653.24s - 2664.24s | And that is mounted with a screw on a PCB to distribute all that glow to just as equally as that we wanted. 2664.24s - 2667.24s | So there was that badge. 2667.24s - 2679.24s | There was, of course, the Pacific Hackers I talked about, a combination of FR4 on the side with LEDs behind it and just the masking for the most part. 2679.24s - 2684.24s | There's Wombat with a drill hole right in the center. 2684.24s - 2690.24s | And so we, over the course of time, we did a fair amount of experiments. 2690.24s - 2693.24s | Yeah, that should be it. 2693.24s - 2695.24s | Quick follow up to that. 2695.24s - 2701.24s | Yours is obviously the probably the most costly of all the setups in terms of equipment. 2701.24s - 2709.24s | So what would you say equipment that you're using here to do UV printing would cost if you were to build your own? 2709.24s - 2714.24s | Right. So the first printer we bought, it was still a local brand. 2714.24s - 2717.24s | And that was just all right. 2717.24s - 2720.24s | We did. There's an astronaut badge in the bottom. 2720.24s - 2723.24s | We did that with that printer. 2723.24s - 2726.24s | There's a world global thing. 2726.24s - 2730.24s | And that badge we did with that printer, they turned out OK. 2730.24s - 2736.24s | But I had this really bad thought of it. It's not it's not printing black, blacker enough. 2736.24s - 2740.24s


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the most part. 2679.24s - 2684.24s | There's Wombat with a drill hole right in the center. 2684.24s - 2690.24s | And so we, over the course of time, we did a fair amount of experiments. 2690.24s - 2693.24s | Yeah, that should be it. 2693.24s - 2695.24s | Quick follow up to that. 2695.24s - 2701.24s | Yours is obviously the probably the most costly of all the setups in terms of equipment. 2701.24s - 2709.24s | So what would you say equipment that you're using here to do UV printing would cost if you were to build your own? 2709.24s - 2714.24s | Right. So the first printer we bought, it was still a local brand. 2714.24s - 2717.24s | And that was just all right. 2717.24s - 2720.24s | We did. There's an astronaut badge in the bottom. 2720.24s - 2723.24s | We did that with that printer. 2723.24s - 2726.24s | There's a world global thing. 2726.24s - 2730.24s | And that badge we did with that printer, they turned out OK. 2730.24s - 2736.24s | But I had this really bad thought of it. It's not it's not printing black, blacker enough. 2736.24s - 2740.24s | And so we go out and try to make it better. 2740.24s - 2747.24s | And the first UV printer we bought was close to $10,000. 2747.24s - 2753.24s | And then somehow we thought we had to keep doing better and we had to keep improvising. 2753.24s - 2761.24s | So we went ahead and bought another printer which was much larger and could do badges faster and print faster. 2761.24s - 2765.24s | And that was another $10,000 in the hole. 2765.24s - 2772.24s | So and we figured that it still wasn't actually there where we wanted. 2772.24s - 2776.24s | And so we take out his head and we put an Epson head on it. 2776.24s - 2784.24s | So now it's our own custom badge UV printer with so much of funds went into it that it's now. 2784.24s - 2788.24s | Yeah, it's a white elephant for us, but it's a lovely white elephant. 2788.24s - 2791.24s | I love that machine. So. 2791.24s - 2797.24s | So, yeah. So if you want a good UV printer, there's typically they start at $10,000. 2797.24s - 2801.24s | If you want the really, really


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| And so we go out and try to make it better. 2740.24s - 2747.24s | And the first UV printer we bought was close to $10,000. 2747.24s - 2753.24s | And then somehow we thought we had to keep doing better and we had to keep improvising. 2753.24s - 2761.24s | So we went ahead and bought another printer which was much larger and could do badges faster and print faster. 2761.24s - 2765.24s | And that was another $10,000 in the hole. 2765.24s - 2772.24s | So and we figured that it still wasn't actually there where we wanted. 2772.24s - 2776.24s | And so we take out his head and we put an Epson head on it. 2776.24s - 2784.24s | So now it's our own custom badge UV printer with so much of funds went into it that it's now. 2784.24s - 2788.24s | Yeah, it's a white elephant for us, but it's a lovely white elephant. 2788.24s - 2791.24s | I love that machine. So. 2791.24s - 2797.24s | So, yeah. So if you want a good UV printer, there's typically they start at $10,000. 2797.24s - 2801.24s | If you want the really, really fancier ones, those are like $50,000. 2801.24s - 2804.24s | But, you know, you don't need that. That would be like overkill. 2804.24s - 2814.24s | So a standard one somewhere, if you just want to make one badge a year, that I think should be around $5,000 or something. 2814.24s - 2820.24s | But don't take my word for it. The ink varies what the manufacturer recommends you for inks. 2820.24s - 2825.24s | Those inks vary and the cost varies. And as I said, it's a really high maintenance machine. 2826.24s - 2834.24s | So you can't you can't push it in a storage unit for a year and expect it to work on like 365 days. 2834.24s - 2839.24s | So, yeah, it's a lot of heavy use, heavy maintenance thing. Yeah. 2839.24s - 2843.24s | So that should give some idea. All right. 2843.24s - 2846.24s | This will be my last question. We've got about four minutes left. 2846.24s - 2853.24s | So you each chose your own printing method. Starting with you, Brayden, would you choose the same method again? 2853.24s - 2860.24s | Would you would you use silk screening again or would


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fancier ones, those are like $50,000. 2801.24s - 2804.24s | But, you know, you don't need that. That would be like overkill. 2804.24s - 2814.24s | So a standard one somewhere, if you just want to make one badge a year, that I think should be around $5,000 or something. 2814.24s - 2820.24s | But don't take my word for it. The ink varies what the manufacturer recommends you for inks. 2820.24s - 2825.24s | Those inks vary and the cost varies. And as I said, it's a really high maintenance machine. 2826.24s - 2834.24s | So you can't you can't push it in a storage unit for a year and expect it to work on like 365 days. 2834.24s - 2839.24s | So, yeah, it's a lot of heavy use, heavy maintenance thing. Yeah. 2839.24s - 2843.24s | So that should give some idea. All right. 2843.24s - 2846.24s | This will be my last question. We've got about four minutes left. 2846.24s - 2853.24s | So you each chose your own printing method. Starting with you, Brayden, would you choose the same method again? 2853.24s - 2860.24s | Would you would you use silk screening again or would you maybe consider one of your your colleagues printing methods here? 2860.24s - 2872.24s | Yes. I like the artistic side of silk screening and I will do it again. 2872.24s - 2876.24s | I will pick a project very carefully for it or vice versa. 2876.24s - 2883.24s | I will pick the process of color very careful for the project that I want to do. 2883.24s - 2889.24s | And I'll be totally honest. So I originally had planned to do what is now the D.C. 2889.24s - 2893.24s | Next Gen badge using traditional silk screening. 2893.24s - 2903.24s | There was a decision made fairly late in the game where they needed very specific Pantone accurate color. 2904.24s - 2907.24s | And I couldn't guarantee that in my technique. 2907.24s - 2914.24s | It just I mean, I could have tried, but it would have been a massive amount of trial and error to get to an accurate Pantone color. 2914.24s - 2923.24s | And so ultimately for that badge, I transitioned to a manufacturer to do the UV printing for me. 2923.24s - 2931.24s | And so if I either have to scale very large


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you maybe consider one of your your colleagues printing methods here? 2860.24s - 2872.24s | Yes. I like the artistic side of silk screening and I will do it again. 2872.24s - 2876.24s | I will pick a project very carefully for it or vice versa. 2876.24s - 2883.24s | I will pick the process of color very careful for the project that I want to do. 2883.24s - 2889.24s | And I'll be totally honest. So I originally had planned to do what is now the D.C. 2889.24s - 2893.24s | Next Gen badge using traditional silk screening. 2893.24s - 2903.24s | There was a decision made fairly late in the game where they needed very specific Pantone accurate color. 2904.24s - 2907.24s | And I couldn't guarantee that in my technique. 2907.24s - 2914.24s | It just I mean, I could have tried, but it would have been a massive amount of trial and error to get to an accurate Pantone color. 2914.24s - 2923.24s | And so ultimately for that badge, I transitioned to a manufacturer to do the UV printing for me. 2923.24s - 2931.24s | And so if I either have to scale very large on a large badge, I would use UV printing. 2931.24s - 2936.24s | But I would like to do silk screening, knowing now where it works well and where it doesn't work. 2936.24s - 2943.24s | And so don't be surprised if you see at least one next year that's traditional silk screening. 2943.24s - 2949.24s | I like the art side of it. It's a it's a very tactile experience to play with inks. 2949.24s - 2960.93s | Yeah, I I like hacking with a process and silk screening sounds scary, which means I really want to try it now. 2960.93s - 2969.93s | So I may have a process next year where I do partial silk screen and then dye sublimation because I got to keep that inkjet printer from clogging up anyway. 2969.93s - 2983.98s | Yeah, I think we've been doing silk screening a lot of times when we started and really trying to do something unique every time. 2983.98s - 2990.98s | But as the number of badges grew, we kept realizing we had to find something more scalable. 2990.98s - 3002.98s | And UV printing was that unexpected moment that helped us scale to


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on a large badge, I would use UV printing. 2931.24s - 2936.24s | But I would like to do silk screening, knowing now where it works well and where it doesn't work. 2936.24s - 2943.24s | And so don't be surprised if you see at least one next year that's traditional silk screening. 2943.24s - 2949.24s | I like the art side of it. It's a it's a very tactile experience to play with inks. 2949.24s - 2960.93s | Yeah, I I like hacking with a process and silk screening sounds scary, which means I really want to try it now. 2960.93s - 2969.93s | So I may have a process next year where I do partial silk screen and then dye sublimation because I got to keep that inkjet printer from clogging up anyway. 2969.93s - 2983.98s | Yeah, I think we've been doing silk screening a lot of times when we started and really trying to do something unique every time. 2983.98s - 2990.98s | But as the number of badges grew, we kept realizing we had to find something more scalable. 2990.98s - 3002.98s | And UV printing was that unexpected moment that helped us scale to the scale where we are making almost a badge or many badges a month somewhere across the world. 3002.98s - 3015.98s | So even if I wanted to, maybe for a smaller limited badge runs, I would really love to go back to silk screening and try to do some stuff there. 3015.98s - 3029.45s | But as the situation is right now, we can't let go of UV printing for the scalability and the efficiency and speed that it offers. 3029.45s - 3035.45s | All right. I think that I think that does it for our questions. Any final questions from the audience? 3035.45s - 3043.18s | It looks like a no. So thank you very much to our panelists. We appreciate you guys sharing your knowledge. 3043.18s - 3046.18s | And that's it. Thank you.


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the scale where we are making almost a badge or many badges a month somewhere across the world. 3002.98s - 3015.98s | So even if I wanted to, maybe for a smaller limited badge runs, I would really love to go back to silk screening and try to do some stuff there. 3015.98s - 3029.45s | But as the situation is right now, we can't let go of UV printing for the scalability and the efficiency and speed that it offers. 3029.45s - 3035.45s | All right. I think that I think that does it for our questions. Any final questions from the audience? 3035.45s - 3043.18s | It looks like a no. So thank you very much to our panelists. We appreciate you guys sharing your knowledge. 3043.18s - 3046.18s | And that's it. Thank you.


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{ "webpage_url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tJyH6FDFy_E", "title": "DEF CON 32 - Famous and Not So Famous Unsolved Codes - Elonka Dunin & Klaus", "description": "There are many famous codes and ciphers still waiting to be solved, such as the encrypted Voynich manuscript and Edward Elgar's Dorabella cipher. All hold a special fascination. In this talk, prepare to be entertained and informed by Elonka Dunin and Klaus Schmeh, as we briefly discuss the encryption on Kryptos, the mysterious sculpture at the center of CIA Headquarters; NKrypt, an encrypted sculpture in Australia; an encrypted engraving on an early 20th century German silver cigarette case; details about the message attached to the leg of a WWII carrier pigeon that was found in an English chimney; an encrypted postcard by the owner of UK's Luton soccer team; and the intriguing encrypted messages created by the mysterious Henry Debosnys while awaiting his murder trial in New York in the late 1800s.", "channel_url": "https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC6Om9kAkl32dWlDSNlDS9Iw", "duration": 2971, "channel": "DEFCONConference", "uploader": "DEFCONConference", "upload_date": "20241016" } 0.00s - 6.32s | This text was transcribed using whisper model: large-v2 Welcome, everyone. Today, our last day of DEF CON, congratulations on surviving. 8.24s - 16.16s | We're going to be talking about famous and not so famous unsolved codes. So I am Ilan Kadunin, 16.16s - 22.00s | and I am a game developer and a crypto authority and a book author and... 22.56s - 28.48s | Hello, I'm Klaus Schmee. I'm a German IT security expert, crypto expert, 28.48s - 34.56s | crypto history expert and book author. Right. And together, we wrote a couple books, 35.28s - 42.32s | one of which is Codebreaking, a practical guide, which I believe is sold out in the vendor hall 42.32s - 47.52s | right now. They might have like one copy left. And it came out in September of last year. So 47.52s - 53.28s | we're going to be going through a very small number of unsolved encrypted messages, 54.16s - 65.66s | starting with one of my favorites. Cryptos. This is Langley, Virginia, CIA headquarters. 66.22s - 72.22s | And that white building with the funny shaped roof is the cafeteria. And outside the windows 72.22s - 79.02s | of the cafeteria, there is a green landscaped area with a sculpture called Cryptos. It was 80.62s - 89.58s | commissioned in 1988, installed in 1990. And it has an encrypted inscription on


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not so famous unsolved codes. So I am Ilan Kadunin, 16.16s - 22.00s | and I am a game developer and a crypto authority and a book author and... 22.56s - 28.48s | Hello, I'm Klaus Schmee. I'm a German IT security expert, crypto expert, 28.48s - 34.56s | crypto history expert and book author. Right. And together, we wrote a couple books, 35.28s - 42.32s | one of which is Codebreaking, a practical guide, which I believe is sold out in the vendor hall 42.32s - 47.52s | right now. They might have like one copy left. And it came out in September of last year. So 47.52s - 53.28s | we're going to be going through a very small number of unsolved encrypted messages, 54.16s - 65.66s | starting with one of my favorites. Cryptos. This is Langley, Virginia, CIA headquarters. 66.22s - 72.22s | And that white building with the funny shaped roof is the cafeteria. And outside the windows 72.22s - 79.02s | of the cafeteria, there is a green landscaped area with a sculpture called Cryptos. It was 80.62s - 89.58s | commissioned in 1988, installed in 1990. And it has an encrypted inscription on it. And there are 89.58s - 99.74s | four parts. So the sculptor was or is Jim Sanborn. And the designer of the ciphers on it is Ed Scheidt. 100.46s - 109.90s | I've met both of them. Jim Sanborn, no public list of his works really existed until I started 109.90s - 115.50s | making one around 2003. And then he kind of called me up and he said, Who are you? And why do you 115.50s - 123.02s | have a web page about me? And I explained that I was a big fan. And now we're getting along much 123.02s - 131.34s | better. And Ed Scheidt, also he's listed as the retired chairman of a CIA cryptographic center. 131.90s - 139.18s | There is no CIA cryptographic center, but he is. He's a spook. Okay. He's been involved with the 139.18s - 146.14s | CIA for a long time. So the inscription, I won't go into great detail about how these are made. 146.14s - 154.70s | We kind of number them K1 through K4. And we solved the first three parts. The fourth part 154.70s - 160.54s | has not been solved yet. So it


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it. And there are 89.58s - 99.74s | four parts. So the sculptor was or is Jim Sanborn. And the designer of the ciphers on it is Ed Scheidt. 100.46s - 109.90s | I've met both of them. Jim Sanborn, no public list of his works really existed until I started 109.90s - 115.50s | making one around 2003. And then he kind of called me up and he said, Who are you? And why do you 115.50s - 123.02s | have a web page about me? And I explained that I was a big fan. And now we're getting along much 123.02s - 131.34s | better. And Ed Scheidt, also he's listed as the retired chairman of a CIA cryptographic center. 131.90s - 139.18s | There is no CIA cryptographic center, but he is. He's a spook. Okay. He's been involved with the 139.18s - 146.14s | CIA for a long time. So the inscription, I won't go into great detail about how these are made. 146.14s - 154.70s | We kind of number them K1 through K4. And we solved the first three parts. The fourth part 154.70s - 160.54s | has not been solved yet. So it is one of the most famous unsolved codes in the world. And 160.54s - 168.54s | Sanborn has actually given us some clues about it. He gave us the clue that in 2010, 169.18s - 176.14s | that starting at the 64th character, there is the word Berlin. And after that, we have the word 176.70s - 183.10s | clock. So there's been a lot of research done on clocks in Berlin. And then in January 2020, 183.10s - 188.38s | he gave us another clue, the word Northeast. And then the pandemic started and he kind of wanted 188.38s - 195.34s | to stir things up. And so he gave another clue, which is the word East. So it's kind of embarrassing 195.34s - 202.46s | now because we have a big chunk of what is supposedly the deciphered text, and we still 202.46s - 210.70s | don't know what it says. So the cryptos I should also mention is a big part of a book by Dan Brown, 210.70s - 217.82s | who wrote the book, The Da Vinci Code in 2003, which and this sequel, The Lost Symbol takes 217.82s - 226.30s | place in Washington, DC,


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is one of the most famous unsolved codes in the world. And 160.54s - 168.54s | Sanborn has actually given us some clues about it. He gave us the clue that in 2010, 169.18s - 176.14s | that starting at the 64th character, there is the word Berlin. And after that, we have the word 176.70s - 183.10s | clock. So there's been a lot of research done on clocks in Berlin. And then in January 2020, 183.10s - 188.38s | he gave us another clue, the word Northeast. And then the pandemic started and he kind of wanted 188.38s - 195.34s | to stir things up. And so he gave another clue, which is the word East. So it's kind of embarrassing 195.34s - 202.46s | now because we have a big chunk of what is supposedly the deciphered text, and we still 202.46s - 210.70s | don't know what it says. So the cryptos I should also mention is a big part of a book by Dan Brown, 210.70s - 217.82s | who wrote the book, The Da Vinci Code in 2003, which and this sequel, The Lost Symbol takes 217.82s - 226.30s | place in Washington, DC, published in 2009. And it does feature both cryptos and Freemasons as 226.30s - 233.42s | recurring themes. And in the book, there is a character named Nola K, which he put in there, 233.42s - 239.98s | he named after me. So it's sort of a scrambled version of my name there, because I helped him 239.98s - 246.46s | with some of the research for the book. So why hasn't K4 been solved yet? Well, it's short, 246.46s - 255.58s | it's just 97 characters. So it's very difficult. There may be a key that is only accessible on CIA 255.58s - 263.26s | grounds, we might have missed something, we might have been misdirected. And he may have messed it 263.26s - 270.94s | up, there might be a mistake that makes it unsolvable. So we have it on our list here as 271.50s - 273.42s | an unsolved cryptomystery. 275.74s - 282.94s | Okay, let's now come to the next cryptomystery, the so called de Bosnian cryptograms. Well, this 282.94s - 292.86s | story takes us to the year 1882. And it takes place in New York State. Well, honestly, there 292.86s - 300.78s | are


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published in 2009. And it does feature both cryptos and Freemasons as 226.30s - 233.42s | recurring themes. And in the book, there is a character named Nola K, which he put in there, 233.42s - 239.98s | he named after me. So it's sort of a scrambled version of my name there, because I helped him 239.98s - 246.46s | with some of the research for the book. So why hasn't K4 been solved yet? Well, it's short, 246.46s - 255.58s | it's just 97 characters. So it's very difficult. There may be a key that is only accessible on CIA 255.58s - 263.26s | grounds, we might have missed something, we might have been misdirected. And he may have messed it 263.26s - 270.94s | up, there might be a mistake that makes it unsolvable. So we have it on our list here as 271.50s - 273.42s | an unsolved cryptomystery. 275.74s - 282.94s | Okay, let's now come to the next cryptomystery, the so called de Bosnian cryptograms. Well, this 282.94s - 292.86s | story takes us to the year 1882. And it takes place in New York State. Well, honestly, there 292.86s - 300.78s | are not many pictures about this story. So I created a couple of pictures myself. I use Lego 300.78s - 311.34s | for it. So the story takes place in Essex County, New York. And in the year 1882, a stranger came 311.34s - 320.14s | to this place. His name was Henry de Bosnius. And after only a few weeks, he started courting 320.14s - 329.26s | a widow who lived in this area. Her name was Elizabeth Wells. And after only a few weeks later, 329.98s - 336.54s | the two married. So all this went pretty fast. And it was all already Henry de Bosnius third 336.54s - 344.94s | marriage. His first two wives had died pretty early after the wedding. Now, he had found a 344.94s - 350.86s | third wife. But again, the marriage didn't last very long because after only about five weeks or 350.86s - 361.34s | so, his wife was found dead. She was both stabbed and shot. And well, it's no wonder that 361.34s - 367.50s | Henry de Bosnius became the prime suspect. And all the events I told you about took place within 367.50s - 374.38s | a very


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not many pictures about this story. So I created a couple of pictures myself. I use Lego 300.78s - 311.34s | for it. So the story takes place in Essex County, New York. And in the year 1882, a stranger came 311.34s - 320.14s | to this place. His name was Henry de Bosnius. And after only a few weeks, he started courting 320.14s - 329.26s | a widow who lived in this area. Her name was Elizabeth Wells. And after only a few weeks later, 329.98s - 336.54s | the two married. So all this went pretty fast. And it was all already Henry de Bosnius third 336.54s - 344.94s | marriage. His first two wives had died pretty early after the wedding. Now, he had found a 344.94s - 350.86s | third wife. But again, the marriage didn't last very long because after only about five weeks or 350.86s - 361.34s | so, his wife was found dead. She was both stabbed and shot. And well, it's no wonder that 361.34s - 367.50s | Henry de Bosnius became the prime suspect. And all the events I told you about took place within 367.50s - 374.38s | a very short timeframe. On May the 1st, Henry de Bosnius came to Essex County. Only five weeks 374.38s - 382.46s | later, he married. And seven weeks later, his wife was murdered. And as I said, Henry de Bosnius 382.46s - 391.82s | became the prime suspect. He was arrested, put into jail. And while he was in jail, he wrote a 391.82s - 398.78s | couple of poems, a couple of other texts. He drew a few pictures. Apparently, he was quite good at 398.78s - 405.42s | things like that. He knew a lot about literature. He spoke several languages. And he also was a 405.42s - 413.98s | good artist. And in addition, he created a couple of encrypted messages. I will come back to this 413.98s - 425.42s | later. Well, then he was put on trial. The trial started on January 20th, 1883. It ended with a 425.42s - 432.62s | verdict. He was condemned to death on April 16th. And well, there's an interesting story about this. 433.50s - 441.42s | Before he died, or before he went to execution, he sold his body to a local physician who could 441.42s - 449.02s | use


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short timeframe. On May the 1st, Henry de Bosnius came to Essex County. Only five weeks 374.38s - 382.46s | later, he married. And seven weeks later, his wife was murdered. And as I said, Henry de Bosnius 382.46s - 391.82s | became the prime suspect. He was arrested, put into jail. And while he was in jail, he wrote a 391.82s - 398.78s | couple of poems, a couple of other texts. He drew a few pictures. Apparently, he was quite good at 398.78s - 405.42s | things like that. He knew a lot about literature. He spoke several languages. And he also was a 405.42s - 413.98s | good artist. And in addition, he created a couple of encrypted messages. I will come back to this 413.98s - 425.42s | later. Well, then he was put on trial. The trial started on January 20th, 1883. It ended with a 425.42s - 432.62s | verdict. He was condemned to death on April 16th. And well, there's an interesting story about this. 433.50s - 441.42s | Before he died, or before he went to execution, he sold his body to a local physician who could 441.42s - 449.02s | use it for scientific experiments. And with the money he gained, he bought himself a suit so 449.98s - 458.06s | he could die in a nice suit. And apparently, that was important to him. Well, he was hanged. 458.78s - 465.98s | And as you can see here, he was hanged in his nice suit he had purchased with the money he had made. 465.98s - 474.14s | And that was on April 27th, 1883. And somehow, well, as I said, he sold his body to a physician. 474.22s - 482.30s | And somehow, his skull finally made it to a local museum, the Adirondack History Center Museum. 482.30s - 488.94s | And there it can be seen along with the hangman's rope that was used. Well, this is certainly an 488.94s - 495.50s | interesting case with a couple of open questions. For example, the first question, of course, is 495.50s - 502.86s | was Henry de Bosnitz really guilty? Well, he probably was. He always denied being the murderer 502.86s - 510.70s | of his wife. But apparently, there was enough evidence to find him guilty. Well, as I said, 510.70s - 517.02s | his first two wives


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it for scientific experiments. And with the money he gained, he bought himself a suit so 449.98s - 458.06s | he could die in a nice suit. And apparently, that was important to him. Well, he was hanged. 458.78s - 465.98s | And as you can see here, he was hanged in his nice suit he had purchased with the money he had made. 465.98s - 474.14s | And that was on April 27th, 1883. And somehow, well, as I said, he sold his body to a physician. 474.22s - 482.30s | And somehow, his skull finally made it to a local museum, the Adirondack History Center Museum. 482.30s - 488.94s | And there it can be seen along with the hangman's rope that was used. Well, this is certainly an 488.94s - 495.50s | interesting case with a couple of open questions. For example, the first question, of course, is 495.50s - 502.86s | was Henry de Bosnitz really guilty? Well, he probably was. He always denied being the murderer 502.86s - 510.70s | of his wife. But apparently, there was enough evidence to find him guilty. Well, as I said, 510.70s - 517.02s | his first two wives died pretty early too. So the question is, of course, did he murder them too? 517.74s - 524.46s | We don't know. And who was he anyway? Because while on trial, he said, well, I'm not really 524.46s - 530.86s | Henry de Bosnitz. This is only a pseudonym. I'm somebody else. This is not my true identity. 531.42s - 536.94s | This might have been a lie. But it was not really clear who he really was. And his background was 536.94s - 543.26s | not really clear. So there are a couple of questions. And maybe these questions could be 543.26s - 551.02s | answered if it was possible to decipher the encrypted messages he created in jail. Well, 551.02s - 557.74s | altogether, he created four messages, four cryptograms. As you see here, he also added a 557.74s - 566.06s | couple of drawings. And as you can also see, these messages contain a lot of different letters. 566.06s - 574.94s | So the alphabet he used was pretty large. And we have no clue what is written in these notes. 576.30s - 581.26s | De Bosnitz, he spoke several languages, English, French, Portuguese, Latin, Greek. So


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died pretty early too. So the question is, of course, did he murder them too? 517.74s - 524.46s | We don't know. And who was he anyway? Because while on trial, he said, well, I'm not really 524.46s - 530.86s | Henry de Bosnitz. This is only a pseudonym. I'm somebody else. This is not my true identity. 531.42s - 536.94s | This might have been a lie. But it was not really clear who he really was. And his background was 536.94s - 543.26s | not really clear. So there are a couple of questions. And maybe these questions could be 543.26s - 551.02s | answered if it was possible to decipher the encrypted messages he created in jail. Well, 551.02s - 557.74s | altogether, he created four messages, four cryptograms. As you see here, he also added a 557.74s - 566.06s | couple of drawings. And as you can also see, these messages contain a lot of different letters. 566.06s - 574.94s | So the alphabet he used was pretty large. And we have no clue what is written in these notes. 576.30s - 581.26s | De Bosnitz, he spoke several languages, English, French, Portuguese, Latin, Greek. So it's not 581.26s - 589.42s | even clear which plain text language he used. Of course, when one tries to solve an encrypted 589.42s - 595.74s | message of this kind, it's always a good idea to look for crypts. And in this case, there is a 595.74s - 602.06s | potential crypt. Because what you see here is a poem de Bosnitz wrote while in jail. And this 602.06s - 607.50s | looks pretty similar as one of his encrypted messages. So maybe there's a one-to-one relationship. 608.46s - 615.90s | If this really is the case, it would go a long way in solving the mystery. But so far, nobody 615.90s - 625.66s | has really managed to match the two texts and to make sense of it. So maybe it is not a crypt, 625.66s - 630.38s | or maybe the correct way to use this crypt hasn't been found yet. 631.26s - 637.74s | So the message is still undeciphered. And so we are dealing with an unsolved, 637.74s - 642.78s | more or less unsolved criminal case. And it's also an unsolved crypto mystery. 643.66s - 656.32s | So next, we're going to go to


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it's not 581.26s - 589.42s | even clear which plain text language he used. Of course, when one tries to solve an encrypted 589.42s - 595.74s | message of this kind, it's always a good idea to look for crypts. And in this case, there is a 595.74s - 602.06s | potential crypt. Because what you see here is a poem de Bosnitz wrote while in jail. And this 602.06s - 607.50s | looks pretty similar as one of his encrypted messages. So maybe there's a one-to-one relationship. 608.46s - 615.90s | If this really is the case, it would go a long way in solving the mystery. But so far, nobody 615.90s - 625.66s | has really managed to match the two texts and to make sense of it. So maybe it is not a crypt, 625.66s - 630.38s | or maybe the correct way to use this crypt hasn't been found yet. 631.26s - 637.74s | So the message is still undeciphered. And so we are dealing with an unsolved, 637.74s - 642.78s | more or less unsolved criminal case. And it's also an unsolved crypto mystery. 643.66s - 656.32s | So next, we're going to go to something I find super interesting. This is from World War Two. 656.40s - 665.84s | World War Two, a pigeon, a carrier pigeon was found in the chimney of someone in Surrey in 665.84s - 675.60s | England. He found it in 1982, brought it to public attention and in 2012. So we think that the pigeon 675.60s - 685.76s | was on its way to RAF Bomber Command in High Wycombe there. And the pigeon carried an encrypted 685.76s - 694.08s | message. So carrier pigeons very briefly in World War Two were used extensively. There were over 694.08s - 702.72s | 250,000 that were being used. And there was even a special medal that was created for particularly 702.72s - 709.92s | brave pigeons such as ones that took an injury and still managed to get to their destination. 710.48s - 717.28s | This was a medal that was also given to other animals, dogs, horses, and even some cats received 717.28s - 725.28s | it. So here's the message. It was in the and that's actually the the leg of the pigeon and a 725.28s - 733.52s | red canister there. Red canisters tended to be used


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something I find super interesting. This is from World War Two. 656.40s - 665.84s | World War Two, a pigeon, a carrier pigeon was found in the chimney of someone in Surrey in 665.84s - 675.60s | England. He found it in 1982, brought it to public attention and in 2012. So we think that the pigeon 675.60s - 685.76s | was on its way to RAF Bomber Command in High Wycombe there. And the pigeon carried an encrypted 685.76s - 694.08s | message. So carrier pigeons very briefly in World War Two were used extensively. There were over 694.08s - 702.72s | 250,000 that were being used. And there was even a special medal that was created for particularly 702.72s - 709.92s | brave pigeons such as ones that took an injury and still managed to get to their destination. 710.48s - 717.28s | This was a medal that was also given to other animals, dogs, horses, and even some cats received 717.28s - 725.28s | it. So here's the message. It was in the and that's actually the the leg of the pigeon and a 725.28s - 733.52s | red canister there. Red canisters tended to be used either by the United States forces or by the 733.52s - 742.16s | British Army. And there's the code two, which we know was RAF Bomber Command in High Wycombe. And 742.16s - 748.48s | these are the identifiers of the two pigeons. This was a message that was sent in duplicate. 749.20s - 759.04s | The NURP there, N-U-R-P, meant National Union of Racing Pigeons. And then the 40 and 37 were the 759.04s - 767.04s | years that these particular pigeons were banded. Then these were probably the the homes of the 767.04s - 773.12s | pigeons where they were hatched and raised and then their number in that particular year. 773.92s - 783.44s | So the T-W probably means either Twickenham or Tunbridge Wells and the D-K probably means 783.44s - 791.36s | Dorking. Also we have, so of the numbers there, there's the number six, which would have been 791.36s - 799.92s | the day of the month, which would tie in with D-Day, June 6, 1944. The time that the form was 799.92s - 806.48s | filled in, the time that the message was created, and the number of copies sent. 807.92s - 813.68s |


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either by the United States forces or by the 733.52s - 742.16s | British Army. And there's the code two, which we know was RAF Bomber Command in High Wycombe. And 742.16s - 748.48s | these are the identifiers of the two pigeons. This was a message that was sent in duplicate. 749.20s - 759.04s | The NURP there, N-U-R-P, meant National Union of Racing Pigeons. And then the 40 and 37 were the 759.04s - 767.04s | years that these particular pigeons were banded. Then these were probably the the homes of the 767.04s - 773.12s | pigeons where they were hatched and raised and then their number in that particular year. 773.92s - 783.44s | So the T-W probably means either Twickenham or Tunbridge Wells and the D-K probably means 783.44s - 791.36s | Dorking. Also we have, so of the numbers there, there's the number six, which would have been 791.36s - 799.92s | the day of the month, which would tie in with D-Day, June 6, 1944. The time that the form was 799.92s - 806.48s | filled in, the time that the message was created, and the number of copies sent. 807.92s - 813.68s | So this section was in different handwriting, was probably filled in by someone else, 813.68s - 820.48s | probably someone in France, as opposed to someone who was English. And that would tie in with that 820.48s - 828.08s | word L-I-B, which would mean Libéré, the pigeon was freed at that particular time at 425. 829.04s - 836.24s | And it was sent by a Sergeant Stott. And research shows that there was a Sergeant William Stott, 836.24s - 843.84s | he was 27 years old, a paratrooper, and did parachute into occupied Normandy on a reconnaissance 843.84s - 850.24s | mission on D-Day. So this was probably him sending a message back to home after that. 851.20s - 858.80s | Now of this message, there are 27 groups of letters, five letters each. And we also know 858.80s - 868.32s | that this A-O-A-K-N appears twice, both at the beginning and at the end. So what kind of system 868.32s - 874.56s | might have been used? Well, there's several. It might have been a manual cipher, might have been 875.52s - 882.00s | a codebook, or an encryption machine, or a one-time pad. There's several kinds of


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So this section was in different handwriting, was probably filled in by someone else, 813.68s - 820.48s | probably someone in France, as opposed to someone who was English. And that would tie in with that 820.48s - 828.08s | word L-I-B, which would mean Libéré, the pigeon was freed at that particular time at 425. 829.04s - 836.24s | And it was sent by a Sergeant Stott. And research shows that there was a Sergeant William Stott, 836.24s - 843.84s | he was 27 years old, a paratrooper, and did parachute into occupied Normandy on a reconnaissance 843.84s - 850.24s | mission on D-Day. So this was probably him sending a message back to home after that. 851.20s - 858.80s | Now of this message, there are 27 groups of letters, five letters each. And we also know 858.80s - 868.32s | that this A-O-A-K-N appears twice, both at the beginning and at the end. So what kind of system 868.32s - 874.56s | might have been used? Well, there's several. It might have been a manual cipher, might have been 875.52s - 882.00s | a codebook, or an encryption machine, or a one-time pad. There's several kinds of machines 882.00s - 889.76s | that were used in World War II around the time. So we don't know. And so it is one of the unsolved 889.76s - 900.42s | mysteries. Yes. And let's now look at another unsolved crypto mystery. This one takes us to 900.42s - 907.94s | my home country, to Germany. To be more precise, it takes us to Thuringia, which is today one of 907.94s - 916.50s | the 16 states of Germany. And a couple of years ago, a blog reader of mine contacted me and he 916.50s - 925.14s | said, well, my family is from Thuringia. And for generations, we have possessed a cigarette case. 926.02s - 933.54s | And this cigarette case, well, first of all, it bears this two-letter engravement here. These 933.54s - 940.02s | letters stand for AES, but this is not the important part. In addition, it contains a 940.02s - 948.50s | dedication, which was probably engraved here, probably not by a professional, but maybe by 948.50s - 955.94s | the person who used this cigarette case as a gift, as a present for somebody. And apparently, 955.94s - 964.82s | this dedication is encrypted.


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machines 882.00s - 889.76s | that were used in World War II around the time. So we don't know. And so it is one of the unsolved 889.76s - 900.42s | mysteries. Yes. And let's now look at another unsolved crypto mystery. This one takes us to 900.42s - 907.94s | my home country, to Germany. To be more precise, it takes us to Thuringia, which is today one of 907.94s - 916.50s | the 16 states of Germany. And a couple of years ago, a blog reader of mine contacted me and he 916.50s - 925.14s | said, well, my family is from Thuringia. And for generations, we have possessed a cigarette case. 926.02s - 933.54s | And this cigarette case, well, first of all, it bears this two-letter engravement here. These 933.54s - 940.02s | letters stand for AES, but this is not the important part. In addition, it contains a 940.02s - 948.50s | dedication, which was probably engraved here, probably not by a professional, but maybe by 948.50s - 955.94s | the person who used this cigarette case as a gift, as a present for somebody. And apparently, 955.94s - 964.82s | this dedication is encrypted. You can see it here. We have four lines of unknown symbols. 964.82s - 970.18s | We have no idea how this can be read, how this can be deciphered. At least it's clear 970.90s - 980.98s | that the date mentioned here is Christmas Eve, the 24th of December in 1909. And in Germany, 980.98s - 990.34s | in my home country, Christmas presents are usually given on Christmas Eve. So my suspicion is that 990.34s - 998.18s | this cigarette case was a Christmas present for somebody. And of course, as I already mentioned, 998.66s - 1002.98s | when trying to break such an encryption, it's always good to look for crypts. 1002.98s - 1008.26s | And if this really was a Christmas present, it seems possible that something like 1008.26s - 1015.54s | Merry Christmas, or in German, Frohe Weihnachten, is included. But this crypt, if it is one, 1015.54s - 1021.94s | hasn't helped so far. I can't find anything here that looks like Frohe Weihnachten. So 1022.90s - 1029.86s | in my view, the whole cryptogram is pretty strange. Well, first of all, it's not strange at all. 1030.98s - 1038.50s | Because there are


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You can see it here. We have four lines of unknown symbols. 964.82s - 970.18s | We have no idea how this can be read, how this can be deciphered. At least it's clear 970.90s - 980.98s | that the date mentioned here is Christmas Eve, the 24th of December in 1909. And in Germany, 980.98s - 990.34s | in my home country, Christmas presents are usually given on Christmas Eve. So my suspicion is that 990.34s - 998.18s | this cigarette case was a Christmas present for somebody. And of course, as I already mentioned, 998.66s - 1002.98s | when trying to break such an encryption, it's always good to look for crypts. 1002.98s - 1008.26s | And if this really was a Christmas present, it seems possible that something like 1008.26s - 1015.54s | Merry Christmas, or in German, Frohe Weihnachten, is included. But this crypt, if it is one, 1015.54s - 1021.94s | hasn't helped so far. I can't find anything here that looks like Frohe Weihnachten. So 1022.90s - 1029.86s | in my view, the whole cryptogram is pretty strange. Well, first of all, it's not strange at all. 1030.98s - 1038.50s | Because there are many encryptions that look like this. Here you have a few on the right side, 1038.50s - 1044.18s | you have a few encrypted texts from the same time. And I think the similarity is obvious. 1045.06s - 1050.50s | These encrypted texts from the right side are from encrypted postcards. And it would be no 1050.74s - 1057.54s | problem to add 100 more here. This is the kind of encryption that was used by people who wrote 1057.54s - 1064.18s | encrypted postcards or maybe encrypted letters 100 years ago. And almost all of these encryptions 1064.18s - 1071.70s | can be broken very easily today. So this dedication is an absolute exception because 1071.70s - 1077.06s | it looks like all the encryptions from this time. But contrary to almost all others, 1077.62s - 1084.74s | we have no idea how it can be deciphered. So it's something that looks easy, 1084.74s - 1090.50s | but appears to be very difficult. If you have an idea on how this can be broken, 1091.06s - 1094.82s | let us know. But so far, this is an unsolved crypto mystery. 1100.29s - 1105.25s | So here's one when we


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many encryptions that look like this. Here you have a few on the right side, 1038.50s - 1044.18s | you have a few encrypted texts from the same time. And I think the similarity is obvious. 1045.06s - 1050.50s | These encrypted texts from the right side are from encrypted postcards. And it would be no 1050.74s - 1057.54s | problem to add 100 more here. This is the kind of encryption that was used by people who wrote 1057.54s - 1064.18s | encrypted postcards or maybe encrypted letters 100 years ago. And almost all of these encryptions 1064.18s - 1071.70s | can be broken very easily today. So this dedication is an absolute exception because 1071.70s - 1077.06s | it looks like all the encryptions from this time. But contrary to almost all others, 1077.62s - 1084.74s | we have no idea how it can be deciphered. So it's something that looks easy, 1084.74s - 1090.50s | but appears to be very difficult. If you have an idea on how this can be broken, 1091.06s - 1094.82s | let us know. But so far, this is an unsolved crypto mystery. 1100.29s - 1105.25s | So here's one when we talk about famous and not so famous. This is one of the famous ones, 1105.97s - 1116.53s | the Dorabella cryptogram from Worcester. And it was created by the composer Edward Elgar, 1116.53s - 1125.49s | who is most famous for a piece called Pomp and Circumstance that you've probably heard 1125.49s - 1133.17s | at graduation ceremonies. He had an interest in puzzles, and even wrote something called the 1133.17s - 1141.33s | Enigma variations with 14 different sections, each one that was dedicated to a different person. 1145.47s - 1157.15s | And one of them was a young woman named Dora Penny, who frequently accompanied his family 1157.15s - 1165.39s | as they traveled around. She was one of his companions. And she later wrote an autobiography 1165.39s - 1174.43s | called Memories of Variation. And at one point when his family was staying with her family, 1174.43s - 1182.27s | and his mother sent a thank you note, and he included a small note of his own to Dora, 1182.91s - 1193.95s | and it was in code. This was in 1897. And she was not able to decrypt it and later printed it 1193.95s - 1200.59s


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talk about famous and not so famous. This is one of the famous ones, 1105.97s - 1116.53s | the Dorabella cryptogram from Worcester. And it was created by the composer Edward Elgar, 1116.53s - 1125.49s | who is most famous for a piece called Pomp and Circumstance that you've probably heard 1125.49s - 1133.17s | at graduation ceremonies. He had an interest in puzzles, and even wrote something called the 1133.17s - 1141.33s | Enigma variations with 14 different sections, each one that was dedicated to a different person. 1145.47s - 1157.15s | And one of them was a young woman named Dora Penny, who frequently accompanied his family 1157.15s - 1165.39s | as they traveled around. She was one of his companions. And she later wrote an autobiography 1165.39s - 1174.43s | called Memories of Variation. And at one point when his family was staying with her family, 1174.43s - 1182.27s | and his mother sent a thank you note, and he included a small note of his own to Dora, 1182.91s - 1193.95s | and it was in code. This was in 1897. And she was not able to decrypt it and later printed it 1193.95s - 1200.59s | in her autobiography, right? And said, if anyone can solve it, I would most appreciate it if you 1200.59s - 1209.07s | could tell me what it says. But no one was able to. And here it is, well over 100 years later, 1209.07s - 1214.43s | we still don't know what it says. It looks like a simple substitution cipher. 1215.07s - 1222.75s | Now, Elgar did write other encrypted messages. We have access to his notes. And, you know, 1222.83s - 1231.23s | some of them are alphabetical and very similar symbols, but applying them to the Dorabella 1231.23s - 1238.03s | cryptogram does not really give us anything. So if we take that alphabet and apply it, 1238.03s - 1246.91s | we get something that is not intelligible. And if we try doing other methods of frequency analysis, 1247.63s - 1254.67s | that is not intelligible either. We've done frequency analysis and said, well, you know, 1254.67s - 1262.19s | maybe this one is, you know, the highest frequency one is the letter E and haven't come up with 1262.19s - 1268.67s | anything there either. We've done other methods. We could, you know, just guessing


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| in her autobiography, right? And said, if anyone can solve it, I would most appreciate it if you 1200.59s - 1209.07s | could tell me what it says. But no one was able to. And here it is, well over 100 years later, 1209.07s - 1214.43s | we still don't know what it says. It looks like a simple substitution cipher. 1215.07s - 1222.75s | Now, Elgar did write other encrypted messages. We have access to his notes. And, you know, 1222.83s - 1231.23s | some of them are alphabetical and very similar symbols, but applying them to the Dorabella 1231.23s - 1238.03s | cryptogram does not really give us anything. So if we take that alphabet and apply it, 1238.03s - 1246.91s | we get something that is not intelligible. And if we try doing other methods of frequency analysis, 1247.63s - 1254.67s | that is not intelligible either. We've done frequency analysis and said, well, you know, 1254.67s - 1262.19s | maybe this one is, you know, the highest frequency one is the letter E and haven't come up with 1262.19s - 1268.67s | anything there either. We've done other methods. We could, you know, just guessing words, 1268.67s - 1274.91s | which is difficult because it doesn't really have spaces between the words. And we've tried a 1274.91s - 1280.99s | technique called hill climbing, but has not come up with anything. The best it has is like 1280.99s - 1290.51s | now droop beige weeds. So that doesn't seem helpful. And so why do these methods fail? 1291.39s - 1298.11s | Well, maybe it's not a substitution cipher. Maybe it's some other method entirely, 1298.11s - 1303.71s | Morse code or something. Maybe these things are meant to indicate musical notes 1304.67s - 1311.87s | or something musical. Maybe he made a mistake. Maybe he wrote it when he wasn't feeling well 1311.87s - 1318.83s | or inebriated or something. And so maybe there's a mistake and maybe it was never intended to mean 1318.83s - 1327.95s | anything, which is unlikely. I mean, she was a friend and there's no reason that he would have 1327.95s - 1334.83s | sent her a fraudulent message. And maybe the plain text can't be solved because it doesn't 1334.83s - 1341.79s | have the patterns of English. For example, there's a sentence, do you go to London


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words, 1268.67s - 1274.91s | which is difficult because it doesn't really have spaces between the words. And we've tried a 1274.91s - 1280.99s | technique called hill climbing, but has not come up with anything. The best it has is like 1280.99s - 1290.51s | now droop beige weeds. So that doesn't seem helpful. And so why do these methods fail? 1291.39s - 1298.11s | Well, maybe it's not a substitution cipher. Maybe it's some other method entirely, 1298.11s - 1303.71s | Morse code or something. Maybe these things are meant to indicate musical notes 1304.67s - 1311.87s | or something musical. Maybe he made a mistake. Maybe he wrote it when he wasn't feeling well 1311.87s - 1318.83s | or inebriated or something. And so maybe there's a mistake and maybe it was never intended to mean 1318.83s - 1327.95s | anything, which is unlikely. I mean, she was a friend and there's no reason that he would have 1327.95s - 1334.83s | sent her a fraudulent message. And maybe the plain text can't be solved because it doesn't 1334.83s - 1341.79s | have the patterns of English. For example, there's a sentence, do you go to London tomorrow, 1341.79s - 1346.67s | which would be very difficult to solve. It doesn't have any ease in it. It doesn't 1347.23s - 1353.71s | match the normal frequencies. So this remains an unsolved message. 1356.82s - 1362.18s | Let's now come to the next one. This is again one of the not so famous 1363.38s - 1371.38s | cipher mysteries. You won't find this one in the collection you find on YouTube or in the books 1371.38s - 1377.06s | that have been published. So this is something not very famous, but very interesting. 1378.42s - 1384.82s | Well, first of all, let's talk about encrypted postcards. About a hundred years ago in the early 1385.70s - 1391.78s | 20th century, encrypted postcards were very popular. There are literally hundreds of them. 1391.78s - 1397.22s | I know several people who collect encrypted postcards and I've seen large collections. 1397.22s - 1404.10s | I've seen series of encrypted postcards. The longest ones are something like 200 postcards 1404.10s - 1411.30s | written back and forth, usually between lovers. I think 90% of the encrypted postcards I've seen 1411.38s - 1420.02s | are from men to their lovers. So apparently


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tomorrow, 1341.79s - 1346.67s | which would be very difficult to solve. It doesn't have any ease in it. It doesn't 1347.23s - 1353.71s | match the normal frequencies. So this remains an unsolved message. 1356.82s - 1362.18s | Let's now come to the next one. This is again one of the not so famous 1363.38s - 1371.38s | cipher mysteries. You won't find this one in the collection you find on YouTube or in the books 1371.38s - 1377.06s | that have been published. So this is something not very famous, but very interesting. 1378.42s - 1384.82s | Well, first of all, let's talk about encrypted postcards. About a hundred years ago in the early 1385.70s - 1391.78s | 20th century, encrypted postcards were very popular. There are literally hundreds of them. 1391.78s - 1397.22s | I know several people who collect encrypted postcards and I've seen large collections. 1397.22s - 1404.10s | I've seen series of encrypted postcards. The longest ones are something like 200 postcards 1404.10s - 1411.30s | written back and forth, usually between lovers. I think 90% of the encrypted postcards I've seen 1411.38s - 1420.02s | are from men to their lovers. So apparently they contained love messages. So apparently 1420.02s - 1423.38s | love messages were encrypted quite often a hundred years ago. 1424.10s - 1432.58s | And here you see two examples. It would be no problem to show many more. Here are two more 1432.58s - 1438.98s | encrypted postcards. And most of these encrypted postcards are not very difficult to solve. 1439.78s - 1444.66s | Well, this one is especially easy. If you read it backwards, you get 1445.46s - 1451.38s | you darling. Of course, most others are not that easy, but still for an experienced code breakers, 1451.38s - 1459.22s | it's not really a challenge usually. For example, this encrypted message consists of numbers from 1459.38s - 1467.70s | 1 to 25, I think. So probably every number stands for a letter. And in fact, 1468.50s - 1473.14s | with some frequency analysis and some word guessing, it's not very difficult to find 1473.14s - 1479.14s | the substitution table. And there's one complication. This message is written from 1479.14s - 1486.42s | right to left, but that's easy to get because as you see, it's a straight line on the right side. 1486.42s - 1493.70s |


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they contained love messages. So apparently 1420.02s - 1423.38s | love messages were encrypted quite often a hundred years ago. 1424.10s - 1432.58s | And here you see two examples. It would be no problem to show many more. Here are two more 1432.58s - 1438.98s | encrypted postcards. And most of these encrypted postcards are not very difficult to solve. 1439.78s - 1444.66s | Well, this one is especially easy. If you read it backwards, you get 1445.46s - 1451.38s | you darling. Of course, most others are not that easy, but still for an experienced code breakers, 1451.38s - 1459.22s | it's not really a challenge usually. For example, this encrypted message consists of numbers from 1459.38s - 1467.70s | 1 to 25, I think. So probably every number stands for a letter. And in fact, 1468.50s - 1473.14s | with some frequency analysis and some word guessing, it's not very difficult to find 1473.14s - 1479.14s | the substitution table. And there's one complication. This message is written from 1479.14s - 1486.42s | right to left, but that's easy to get because as you see, it's a straight line on the right side. 1486.42s - 1493.70s | So if you look at it, it's a good guess to assume that it's written from right to left. 1493.70s - 1499.94s | And again, it's a love message. Baby, I wanted to talk to you so bad. I'm so sorry you did not 1499.94s - 1505.14s | have time and so on. This is very typical. Most of the encrypted postcards we have looked at 1505.78s - 1513.62s | have a message of this kind. So as I said, most of the postcard, almost all of them are solved, 1514.18s - 1520.58s | but there's one, this one exception, which is almost driving me mad because I really 1520.58s - 1526.90s | have absolutely no idea what to do with this postcard. Well, first of all, it's the oldest 1526.90s - 1534.82s | one I know. It's from 1873. All other encrypted postcards I've seen so far were written at a later 1534.82s - 1542.02s | point of time. And well, this is the front side. As you can see here, it was written to a certain 1542.02s - 1550.82s | Lizzie Furlong. She lived actually near Luton. And this is the rear side. Here's the message 1550.82s -


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So if you look at it, it's a good guess to assume that it's written from right to left. 1493.70s - 1499.94s | And again, it's a love message. Baby, I wanted to talk to you so bad. I'm so sorry you did not 1499.94s - 1505.14s | have time and so on. This is very typical. Most of the encrypted postcards we have looked at 1505.78s - 1513.62s | have a message of this kind. So as I said, most of the postcard, almost all of them are solved, 1514.18s - 1520.58s | but there's one, this one exception, which is almost driving me mad because I really 1520.58s - 1526.90s | have absolutely no idea what to do with this postcard. Well, first of all, it's the oldest 1526.90s - 1534.82s | one I know. It's from 1873. All other encrypted postcards I've seen so far were written at a later 1534.82s - 1542.02s | point of time. And well, this is the front side. As you can see here, it was written to a certain 1542.02s - 1550.82s | Lizzie Furlong. She lived actually near Luton. And this is the rear side. Here's the message 1550.82s - 1559.94s | written to this Lizzie. It was written from Luton and the sender was a certain George Furlong. And 1559.94s - 1566.50s | in fact, it was the great, great grandson of George Furlong, who today lives in Canada, 1566.50s - 1572.02s | who informed me about this postcard. It's in family position for generation and he has 1572.02s - 1577.86s | absolutely no clue what this message means. He sent it to me and he was hoping I could decipher 1577.86s - 1583.38s | it or my blog readers could decipher it. But in fact, nobody was successful. 1585.06s - 1591.38s | Well, if you look at this text here, it looks different from almost all other encrypted 1591.38s - 1598.58s | postcards. Well, first of all, apparently the writer was fluent. So my guess would be that 1598.58s - 1605.38s | it's by far not the first time that this person wrote in this script. And this is unusual. Most 1605.38s - 1613.14s | other postcards look not like the writer was so fluent. And then some of the letters are not 1614.98s - 1620.50s | all of the letters are in one line, which is also


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1559.94s | written to this Lizzie. It was written from Luton and the sender was a certain George Furlong. And 1559.94s - 1566.50s | in fact, it was the great, great grandson of George Furlong, who today lives in Canada, 1566.50s - 1572.02s | who informed me about this postcard. It's in family position for generation and he has 1572.02s - 1577.86s | absolutely no clue what this message means. He sent it to me and he was hoping I could decipher 1577.86s - 1583.38s | it or my blog readers could decipher it. But in fact, nobody was successful. 1585.06s - 1591.38s | Well, if you look at this text here, it looks different from almost all other encrypted 1591.38s - 1598.58s | postcards. Well, first of all, apparently the writer was fluent. So my guess would be that 1598.58s - 1605.38s | it's by far not the first time that this person wrote in this script. And this is unusual. Most 1605.38s - 1613.14s | other postcards look not like the writer was so fluent. And then some of the letters are not 1614.98s - 1620.50s | all of the letters are in one line, which is also unusual. I don't know if these additional letters 1621.22s - 1629.06s | are meant as a correction or if it's from the beginning it was supposed to look this way. 1629.06s - 1637.92s | I have no idea. Usually frequency analysis is a good tool to start 1639.04s - 1643.92s | analyzing such an encrypted message. But in this case, frequency analysis is really different 1643.92s - 1651.92s | because it's sometimes different to distinguish between the symbols. So this doesn't help very 1651.92s - 1657.84s | much. Of course, looking for crypts is always a good idea. And well, my guess would be that 1657.84s - 1664.56s | this is a month, but I don't know which one and I don't know how to make sense of it. 1665.92s - 1672.48s | This is probably the name of the recipient, which would be Lizzie. But can you make Lizzie 1672.48s - 1680.24s | out of these letters? I can't. And finally, here's an underlined word at the top. 1680.24s - 1686.16s | It's probably not a place because the place Lutent is mentioned in the clear. Basically, 1686.16s - 1692.32s | I have no idea what it is. So


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unusual. I don't know if these additional letters 1621.22s - 1629.06s | are meant as a correction or if it's from the beginning it was supposed to look this way. 1629.06s - 1637.92s | I have no idea. Usually frequency analysis is a good tool to start 1639.04s - 1643.92s | analyzing such an encrypted message. But in this case, frequency analysis is really different 1643.92s - 1651.92s | because it's sometimes different to distinguish between the symbols. So this doesn't help very 1651.92s - 1657.84s | much. Of course, looking for crypts is always a good idea. And well, my guess would be that 1657.84s - 1664.56s | this is a month, but I don't know which one and I don't know how to make sense of it. 1665.92s - 1672.48s | This is probably the name of the recipient, which would be Lizzie. But can you make Lizzie 1672.48s - 1680.24s | out of these letters? I can't. And finally, here's an underlined word at the top. 1680.24s - 1686.16s | It's probably not a place because the place Lutent is mentioned in the clear. Basically, 1686.16s - 1692.32s | I have no idea what it is. So if you would know what would be written at the top of such a message, 1693.28s - 1702.72s | please let me know. Okay, so I have looked at many hypotheses of what all this could be about. 1702.72s - 1709.92s | And so far, the best one in my view I found is that it's a phonetic script. Well, as we all know, 1709.92s - 1714.88s | in the English language, it happens quite often that letter combinations or that the same letter 1714.88s - 1720.96s | combination is pronounced in a different way or sometimes several letters stand for one 1721.92s - 1728.64s | sound or sometimes some letters are not pronounced at all. And for this reason, 1728.64s - 1734.64s | in the 19th century, there were linguists who tried to create phonetic scripts. A phonetic 1734.64s - 1747.44s | script is a script where every letter corresponds to one sound of the language. And here on the 1747.44s - 1753.20s | right, you see a few examples, the Shaw alphabet, the Désiré alphabet, and the QuickScript alphabet. 1754.56s - 1760.00s | I think there is a certain similarity and I wouldn't be surprised if this message


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if you would know what would be written at the top of such a message, 1693.28s - 1702.72s | please let me know. Okay, so I have looked at many hypotheses of what all this could be about. 1702.72s - 1709.92s | And so far, the best one in my view I found is that it's a phonetic script. Well, as we all know, 1709.92s - 1714.88s | in the English language, it happens quite often that letter combinations or that the same letter 1714.88s - 1720.96s | combination is pronounced in a different way or sometimes several letters stand for one 1721.92s - 1728.64s | sound or sometimes some letters are not pronounced at all. And for this reason, 1728.64s - 1734.64s | in the 19th century, there were linguists who tried to create phonetic scripts. A phonetic 1734.64s - 1747.44s | script is a script where every letter corresponds to one sound of the language. And here on the 1747.44s - 1753.20s | right, you see a few examples, the Shaw alphabet, the Désiré alphabet, and the QuickScript alphabet. 1754.56s - 1760.00s | I think there is a certain similarity and I wouldn't be surprised if this message had been 1760.00s - 1765.28s | written in a phonetic script too. But so far, I didn't find a phonetic script that looks like this. 1765.28s - 1772.96s | So it seems like a good theory, but so far, it has proven to be a dead end. 1772.96s - 1783.44s | Finally, this is the cover of our book. And as you can see here, the Furlong postcard is one of 1783.44s - 1789.68s | our favorite unsolved crypto mysteries. And this is why we even mentioned it or we even used it 1789.68s - 1796.40s | on the cover of our book. So the lines you see here are from the Furlong postcard. So maybe 1796.40s - 1801.28s | someday somebody will see the cover of the book and we will immediately recognize, well, this is 1801.28s - 1807.84s | the so-and-so script and he will tell us how all this works. But so far, this hasn't happened. 1808.96s - 1812.56s | Again, we are dealing with an unsolved crypto mystery. 1816.61s - 1826.14s | Thank you. So now we're going to talk about something that surely is solvable, which is 1826.14s - 1836.22s | called Encrypt. And it's


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had been 1760.00s - 1765.28s | written in a phonetic script too. But so far, I didn't find a phonetic script that looks like this. 1765.28s - 1772.96s | So it seems like a good theory, but so far, it has proven to be a dead end. 1772.96s - 1783.44s | Finally, this is the cover of our book. And as you can see here, the Furlong postcard is one of 1783.44s - 1789.68s | our favorite unsolved crypto mysteries. And this is why we even mentioned it or we even used it 1789.68s - 1796.40s | on the cover of our book. So the lines you see here are from the Furlong postcard. So maybe 1796.40s - 1801.28s | someday somebody will see the cover of the book and we will immediately recognize, well, this is 1801.28s - 1807.84s | the so-and-so script and he will tell us how all this works. But so far, this hasn't happened. 1808.96s - 1812.56s | Again, we are dealing with an unsolved crypto mystery. 1816.61s - 1826.14s | Thank you. So now we're going to talk about something that surely is solvable, which is 1826.14s - 1836.22s | called Encrypt. And it's from south of the equator in Canberra, where a science museum has 1836.22s - 1844.30s | a science educator who created this sculpture. You might call it the Southern Cryptos, but he 1844.30s - 1854.70s | called it Encrypt. And for the anniversary, one of the Canberra founding anniversaries in 2013, 1855.50s - 1864.22s | he created the sculpture, right? And this is Glenn McIntosh, who's probably one of the number 1864.22s - 1869.98s | one fans of Encrypt and has a website with lots of information about it. 1871.74s - 1881.66s | So Encrypt comprises eight pillars. And on these pillars, there are cryptograms of different types. 1881.66s - 1890.70s | We know that there are at least 16 there, about six of which are solved. Here is an example of 1890.70s - 1899.74s | one on pillar C. The rings there that you see on the pillar can be turned. So it's clearly 1899.74s - 1907.18s | indicating something relating to Enigma and the rotors on the Enigma machine. And so you can map 1907.18s - 1914.38s | out how the different letters are connected to each other. And this is one that is solved, 1914.38s - 1924.22s


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from south of the equator in Canberra, where a science museum has 1836.22s - 1844.30s | a science educator who created this sculpture. You might call it the Southern Cryptos, but he 1844.30s - 1854.70s | called it Encrypt. And for the anniversary, one of the Canberra founding anniversaries in 2013, 1855.50s - 1864.22s | he created the sculpture, right? And this is Glenn McIntosh, who's probably one of the number 1864.22s - 1869.98s | one fans of Encrypt and has a website with lots of information about it. 1871.74s - 1881.66s | So Encrypt comprises eight pillars. And on these pillars, there are cryptograms of different types. 1881.66s - 1890.70s | We know that there are at least 16 there, about six of which are solved. Here is an example of 1890.70s - 1899.74s | one on pillar C. The rings there that you see on the pillar can be turned. So it's clearly 1899.74s - 1907.18s | indicating something relating to Enigma and the rotors on the Enigma machine. And so you can map 1907.18s - 1914.38s | out how the different letters are connected to each other. And this is one that is solved, 1914.38s - 1924.22s | that is on pillar B. So with this narrower portion of pillar B, it's as though you could 1924.22s - 1932.62s | wrap something around it with a very specific diameter. And this is indicating an old system 1932.62s - 1942.30s | called a scatale, where you would wrap a piece of leather or papyrus around some sort of a wooden 1942.94s - 1950.86s | stick and write the message and then unwrap it and send it. And the receiver would have to have 1950.86s - 1959.34s | a stick of the exact same diameter in order to be able to read the message. And this is the message 1959.34s - 1971.10s | from pillar B. And here's pillar H, one of the ones that is still unsolved. And if you look at 1971.10s - 1977.34s | the different letters that are on this metallic pillar, you'll see that certain of the letters, 1977.90s - 1986.78s | specifically P, L, and V, are a little bit larger than the other letters. We don't know why. 1987.66s - 1995.18s | We've talked to the artist and he has told us that all of the different puzzles together 1995.98s - 2004.06s


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| that is on pillar B. So with this narrower portion of pillar B, it's as though you could 1924.22s - 1932.62s | wrap something around it with a very specific diameter. And this is indicating an old system 1932.62s - 1942.30s | called a scatale, where you would wrap a piece of leather or papyrus around some sort of a wooden 1942.94s - 1950.86s | stick and write the message and then unwrap it and send it. And the receiver would have to have 1950.86s - 1959.34s | a stick of the exact same diameter in order to be able to read the message. And this is the message 1959.34s - 1971.10s | from pillar B. And here's pillar H, one of the ones that is still unsolved. And if you look at 1971.10s - 1977.34s | the different letters that are on this metallic pillar, you'll see that certain of the letters, 1977.90s - 1986.78s | specifically P, L, and V, are a little bit larger than the other letters. We don't know why. 1987.66s - 1995.18s | We've talked to the artist and he has told us that all of the different puzzles together 1995.98s - 2004.06s | are connected and some need to be solved before others. And that this particular one 2004.06s - 2009.10s | is one that will have to wait till towards the end before it can be solved. 2010.06s - 2014.54s | All right. And all together, there are several unsolved crypto mysteries. 2016.54s - 2023.50s | Okay. So this is the last chapter now. We are going to look at a few more crypto mysteries 2023.50s - 2030.70s | in brief now. For example, this is a mystery we found on a Russian website. 2031.98s - 2038.14s | This takes us to Kaliningrad, which is today a city in Russia. It used to be German until 2039.02s - 2045.82s | the end of the Second World War. The name was Königsberg. And near Kaliningrad, there's a 2045.82s - 2053.10s | place or a town named Baltisk. And according to this Russian website we found a couple of years 2053.10s - 2061.10s | ago, something was found in Baltisk. It was a bottle post. Well, as you can see here, this 2061.10s - 2066.62s | place is not on the seashore or it is not near water. So it's certainly unusual to


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| are connected and some need to be solved before others. And that this particular one 2004.06s - 2009.10s | is one that will have to wait till towards the end before it can be solved. 2010.06s - 2014.54s | All right. And all together, there are several unsolved crypto mysteries. 2016.54s - 2023.50s | Okay. So this is the last chapter now. We are going to look at a few more crypto mysteries 2023.50s - 2030.70s | in brief now. For example, this is a mystery we found on a Russian website. 2031.98s - 2038.14s | This takes us to Kaliningrad, which is today a city in Russia. It used to be German until 2039.02s - 2045.82s | the end of the Second World War. The name was Königsberg. And near Kaliningrad, there's a 2045.82s - 2053.10s | place or a town named Baltisk. And according to this Russian website we found a couple of years 2053.10s - 2061.10s | ago, something was found in Baltisk. It was a bottle post. Well, as you can see here, this 2061.10s - 2066.62s | place is not on the seashore or it is not near water. So it's certainly unusual to find a bottle 2066.62s - 2074.38s | post there. But it happened next to this house. In 2015, a bottle post was found here. 2075.74s - 2081.90s | And this is, we don't have a picture of the bottle, but we have a picture of the message. 2081.90s - 2089.58s | It's the front side and the rear side. And we don't know what this message says. 2089.74s - 2096.54s | And it's also completely unclear what the purpose or the background of this message is. 2098.54s - 2105.34s | Our estimation is that it's from the 1950s, more or less, or maybe a little later, maybe a little 2105.34s - 2111.98s | earlier. And of course, it could be a Cold War dead drop. Maybe it was a message written by a spy 2111.98s - 2120.22s | or for a spy with an encryption system used by secret services. And maybe somebody put this 2120.22s - 2126.86s | bottle with this message somewhere there for a spy to pick it up. Would be a possibility. Of 2126.86s - 2133.42s | course, it would be a spectacular possibility. Maybe it could also be a toy created by a couple 2133.42s


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find a bottle 2066.62s - 2074.38s | post there. But it happened next to this house. In 2015, a bottle post was found here. 2075.74s - 2081.90s | And this is, we don't have a picture of the bottle, but we have a picture of the message. 2081.90s - 2089.58s | It's the front side and the rear side. And we don't know what this message says. 2089.74s - 2096.54s | And it's also completely unclear what the purpose or the background of this message is. 2098.54s - 2105.34s | Our estimation is that it's from the 1950s, more or less, or maybe a little later, maybe a little 2105.34s - 2111.98s | earlier. And of course, it could be a Cold War dead drop. Maybe it was a message written by a spy 2111.98s - 2120.22s | or for a spy with an encryption system used by secret services. And maybe somebody put this 2120.22s - 2126.86s | bottle with this message somewhere there for a spy to pick it up. Would be a possibility. Of 2126.86s - 2133.42s | course, it would be a spectacular possibility. Maybe it could also be a toy created by a couple 2133.42s - 2138.86s | of children or something like that. You never know. Of course, it would be interesting to know 2138.86s - 2145.26s | what the message says. But so far, it's an unsolved crypto mystery. Here's a completely 2145.26s - 2152.30s | different one, but also very interesting. The man here is Ignatius Polacki, a private detective from 2152.30s - 2160.62s | London in the 19th century. He was one of the first private detectives known in history. And some 2160.62s - 2166.70s | people call him the real Sherlock Holmes. It's pretty clear that when Arthur Conan Doyle wrote 2166.70s - 2172.86s | his Sherlock Holmes stories a few decades later, he clearly had Polacki and maybe a few other real 2172.86s - 2181.18s | detectives in his mind. So Polacki certainly influenced the criminal literature of the times. 2181.98s - 2190.38s | And contrary to Sherlock Holmes, Ignatius Polacki published encrypted newspaper advertisements in 2190.38s - 2196.86s | the times. We actually don't know how many he published, but we know about five or six 2196.86s - 2203.90s | that contain his name. There might be many more because usually if you publish a secret message 2203.90s


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- 2138.86s | of children or something like that. You never know. Of course, it would be interesting to know 2138.86s - 2145.26s | what the message says. But so far, it's an unsolved crypto mystery. Here's a completely 2145.26s - 2152.30s | different one, but also very interesting. The man here is Ignatius Polacki, a private detective from 2152.30s - 2160.62s | London in the 19th century. He was one of the first private detectives known in history. And some 2160.62s - 2166.70s | people call him the real Sherlock Holmes. It's pretty clear that when Arthur Conan Doyle wrote 2166.70s - 2172.86s | his Sherlock Holmes stories a few decades later, he clearly had Polacki and maybe a few other real 2172.86s - 2181.18s | detectives in his mind. So Polacki certainly influenced the criminal literature of the times. 2181.98s - 2190.38s | And contrary to Sherlock Holmes, Ignatius Polacki published encrypted newspaper advertisements in 2190.38s - 2196.86s | the times. We actually don't know how many he published, but we know about five or six 2196.86s - 2203.90s | that contain his name. There might be many more because usually if you publish a secret message 2203.90s - 2208.62s | on encrypted message, you don't mention your name. But in some cases, he apparently did. 2209.66s - 2216.46s | This one is more a code message. Turkeys are in gangs, eagles fly alone. We have no idea what 2216.46s - 2223.66s | this sentence means, and it will be pretty difficult to find out. Here we have a few more, 2223.66s - 2228.06s | and these are not code messages, but really encrypted messages, cipher messages. 2229.50s - 2234.94s | You see in all of these messages, the name Polacki is mentioned, sometimes including the 2234.94s - 2243.58s | address. And honestly, we have no clue how these messages can be deciphered. So Polacki might have 2243.58s - 2250.46s | used a code book. So it could be possible to decipher the messages if we find the code book he 2250.46s - 2256.22s | used. But it looks difficult because even if he used a code book, he might have used super 2256.22s - 2263.74s | encryptions or an additional encryption. Very difficult. So these are clearly unsolved crypto 2263.74s - 2271.10s | mysteries, but very hard one. Or if you look at the lower one, he


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- 2208.62s | on encrypted message, you don't mention your name. But in some cases, he apparently did. 2209.66s - 2216.46s | This one is more a code message. Turkeys are in gangs, eagles fly alone. We have no idea what 2216.46s - 2223.66s | this sentence means, and it will be pretty difficult to find out. Here we have a few more, 2223.66s - 2228.06s | and these are not code messages, but really encrypted messages, cipher messages. 2229.50s - 2234.94s | You see in all of these messages, the name Polacki is mentioned, sometimes including the 2234.94s - 2243.58s | address. And honestly, we have no clue how these messages can be deciphered. So Polacki might have 2243.58s - 2250.46s | used a code book. So it could be possible to decipher the messages if we find the code book he 2250.46s - 2256.22s | used. But it looks difficult because even if he used a code book, he might have used super 2256.22s - 2263.74s | encryptions or an additional encryption. Very difficult. So these are clearly unsolved crypto 2263.74s - 2271.10s | mysteries, but very hard one. Or if you look at the lower one, he uses symbols. I've never seen 2271.74s - 2277.58s | symbols like these before. And in my view, they're pretty complicated to encrypt something. You don't 2277.58s - 2283.34s | need symbols of this kind, especially if you want to print this in a newspaper. So I have absolutely 2283.34s - 2291.66s | no idea why he used these symbols and what they mean. And all of them are different. So frequency 2291.66s - 2298.38s | analysis doesn't help very much. Almost all are different. There's one repetition. So frequency 2298.38s - 2307.74s | analysis doesn't help. We have no idea what all this is about. And finally, a list of unsolved 2307.74s - 2315.42s | crypto mysteries would be incomplete without the famous Voynich manuscript. The Voynich manuscript 2315.42s - 2322.86s | is a handwritten book from the 15th century, probably. It was handmade, so it was handwritten. 2322.86s - 2335.74s | The drawings were made by hand. It has 230 pages and over 200 illustrations. And the remarkable 2335.74s - 2341.58s | thing about the Voynich manuscript is that it's written in a script nobody knows and nobody can 2341.58s - 2349.50s | read. So we have 230 pages


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uses symbols. I've never seen 2271.74s - 2277.58s | symbols like these before. And in my view, they're pretty complicated to encrypt something. You don't 2277.58s - 2283.34s | need symbols of this kind, especially if you want to print this in a newspaper. So I have absolutely 2283.34s - 2291.66s | no idea why he used these symbols and what they mean. And all of them are different. So frequency 2291.66s - 2298.38s | analysis doesn't help very much. Almost all are different. There's one repetition. So frequency 2298.38s - 2307.74s | analysis doesn't help. We have no idea what all this is about. And finally, a list of unsolved 2307.74s - 2315.42s | crypto mysteries would be incomplete without the famous Voynich manuscript. The Voynich manuscript 2315.42s - 2322.86s | is a handwritten book from the 15th century, probably. It was handmade, so it was handwritten. 2322.86s - 2335.74s | The drawings were made by hand. It has 230 pages and over 200 illustrations. And the remarkable 2335.74s - 2341.58s | thing about the Voynich manuscript is that it's written in a script nobody knows and nobody can 2341.58s - 2349.50s | read. So we have 230 pages filled with this writing. And of course, there have been dozens of 2349.50s - 2359.42s | analyses of all kinds, but this has led nowhere so far. So this is a really fascinating and really 2359.42s - 2366.94s | hard crypto mystery. And of course, the question is, is it solvable at all? It could also be a 2366.94s - 2374.70s | hoax. It could be an encrypted text. It's also possible that an ordinary writing system was used, 2374.70s - 2382.14s | but that this writing system is lost now. Basically, we have no idea. I think every year, 2382.14s - 2390.30s | two or three new solutions are published. But so far, I think 70 solutions also can be found on 2390.30s - 2397.98s | the internet. But in my view, everything is crap so far. And I'm not the only one who thinks this 2397.98s - 2405.50s | way. Okay, so it's another unsolved crypto mystery and certainly a very famous one. 2407.71s - 2416.27s | So in conclusion, there are lots of unsolved messages out there. If you would like to help 2416.27s - 2425.47s | with any of these, a site that we recommend is


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filled with this writing. And of course, there have been dozens of 2349.50s - 2359.42s | analyses of all kinds, but this has led nowhere so far. So this is a really fascinating and really 2359.42s - 2366.94s | hard crypto mystery. And of course, the question is, is it solvable at all? It could also be a 2366.94s - 2374.70s | hoax. It could be an encrypted text. It's also possible that an ordinary writing system was used, 2374.70s - 2382.14s | but that this writing system is lost now. Basically, we have no idea. I think every year, 2382.14s - 2390.30s | two or three new solutions are published. But so far, I think 70 solutions also can be found on 2390.30s - 2397.98s | the internet. But in my view, everything is crap so far. And I'm not the only one who thinks this 2397.98s - 2405.50s | way. Okay, so it's another unsolved crypto mystery and certainly a very famous one. 2407.71s - 2416.27s | So in conclusion, there are lots of unsolved messages out there. If you would like to help 2416.27s - 2425.47s | with any of these, a site that we recommend is Mystery Twister. And they have hundreds of 2425.47s - 2433.87s | different challenges. Some are solved, some are not solved. And you can go in there and you can 2433.87s - 2440.59s | sort them by what you want. If you want something easy to cut your teeth on, go to a level one 2441.23s - 2448.35s | cipher. And if you want one of the unsolved messages or one of the very difficult ones, 2448.35s - 2463.10s | go for a level X. And thank you. Thank you. We have 17 more minutes for questions. Are there any? 2464.14s - 2471.50s | And again, congratulations to everyone on surviving DEF CON thus far. Just a little 2471.50s - 2483.26s | bit more to go. Okay. Any questions? Yes. Yes. Back there. Well, we did a book signing 2483.26s - 2488.94s | on Friday. And of course, we are welcome. You're welcome to come here and we will sign 2488.94s - 2495.02s | any books. No problem. We also have some book plates with our autographs on them. 2495.02s - 2508.70s | If someone doesn't have a book. Yes. Repeat the question. The question was, during our research, 2508.70s -


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Mystery Twister. And they have hundreds of 2425.47s - 2433.87s | different challenges. Some are solved, some are not solved. And you can go in there and you can 2433.87s - 2440.59s | sort them by what you want. If you want something easy to cut your teeth on, go to a level one 2441.23s - 2448.35s | cipher. And if you want one of the unsolved messages or one of the very difficult ones, 2448.35s - 2463.10s | go for a level X. And thank you. Thank you. We have 17 more minutes for questions. Are there any? 2464.14s - 2471.50s | And again, congratulations to everyone on surviving DEF CON thus far. Just a little 2471.50s - 2483.26s | bit more to go. Okay. Any questions? Yes. Yes. Back there. Well, we did a book signing 2483.26s - 2488.94s | on Friday. And of course, we are welcome. You're welcome to come here and we will sign 2488.94s - 2495.02s | any books. No problem. We also have some book plates with our autographs on them. 2495.02s - 2508.70s | If someone doesn't have a book. Yes. Repeat the question. The question was, during our research, 2508.70s - 2516.22s | if we also solved any crypto mysteries? Well, definitely. Well, honestly, we are more the people 2516.22s - 2523.02s | who talk about it. We are not the great code breakers. But of course, many of the cryptograms 2523.02s - 2529.66s | that are found are solved. I had a blog introducing unsolved crypto mysteries 2530.54s - 2537.42s | twice a week or three times a week. And most of the cryptograms I introduced were solved by my 2537.42s - 2542.94s | blog readers pretty soon. For example, encrypted postcards. I at least published 100 encrypted 2542.94s - 2550.46s | postcards on my blogs. And I think 99% were solved, except for this only one. So in many cases, 2550.46s - 2554.78s | it's not even very difficult. In some cases, it's very difficult. So there are very good 2554.78s - 2560.46s | code breakers around. And in some cases, but that's the exception, no solution is found. 2560.46s - 2568.38s | Yeah, I mean, I solved probably the biggest one is the Cyrillic Projector. This is also created by 2568.38s - 2574.78s | Jim Sanborn. And this is a cylinder, which is currently at the University of


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2516.22s | if we also solved any crypto mysteries? Well, definitely. Well, honestly, we are more the people 2516.22s - 2523.02s | who talk about it. We are not the great code breakers. But of course, many of the cryptograms 2523.02s - 2529.66s | that are found are solved. I had a blog introducing unsolved crypto mysteries 2530.54s - 2537.42s | twice a week or three times a week. And most of the cryptograms I introduced were solved by my 2537.42s - 2542.94s | blog readers pretty soon. For example, encrypted postcards. I at least published 100 encrypted 2542.94s - 2550.46s | postcards on my blogs. And I think 99% were solved, except for this only one. So in many cases, 2550.46s - 2554.78s | it's not even very difficult. In some cases, it's very difficult. So there are very good 2554.78s - 2560.46s | code breakers around. And in some cases, but that's the exception, no solution is found. 2560.46s - 2568.38s | Yeah, I mean, I solved probably the biggest one is the Cyrillic Projector. This is also created by 2568.38s - 2574.78s | Jim Sanborn. And this is a cylinder, which is currently at the University of North Carolina, 2574.78s - 2581.18s | Charlotte. And it's all the letters are in the Cyrillic language. And I didn't do it alone, 2581.18s - 2586.62s | it was part of a team. But that's probably the most famous one. Yes. 2603.74s - 2609.42s | Okay, so if I have understood the question correctly, you ask how to start. If you have 2609.42s - 2617.34s | an encrypted text, you don't know what it is, how to start? Okay, well, usually you start by, 2617.98s - 2621.74s | well, first of all, you need background information. So if you get an encrypted text, 2621.74s - 2626.14s | you always look who might have created it, which languages did this person speak, 2626.70s - 2632.78s | when was it created? This is important background information. And then you usually 2632.78s - 2639.02s | apply statistics. So you do a frequency count of the letters, frequency count of the letter pairs 2639.02s - 2644.94s | of the letter triplets of the word lengths and things like that. Very often, this tells you 2646.38s - 2652.70s | where to go or what kind of encryption system might have been used. And word guessing


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North Carolina, 2574.78s - 2581.18s | Charlotte. And it's all the letters are in the Cyrillic language. And I didn't do it alone, 2581.18s - 2586.62s | it was part of a team. But that's probably the most famous one. Yes. 2603.74s - 2609.42s | Okay, so if I have understood the question correctly, you ask how to start. If you have 2609.42s - 2617.34s | an encrypted text, you don't know what it is, how to start? Okay, well, usually you start by, 2617.98s - 2621.74s | well, first of all, you need background information. So if you get an encrypted text, 2621.74s - 2626.14s | you always look who might have created it, which languages did this person speak, 2626.70s - 2632.78s | when was it created? This is important background information. And then you usually 2632.78s - 2639.02s | apply statistics. So you do a frequency count of the letters, frequency count of the letter pairs 2639.02s - 2644.94s | of the letter triplets of the word lengths and things like that. Very often, this tells you 2646.38s - 2652.70s | where to go or what kind of encryption system might have been used. And word guessing is also 2653.66s - 2661.98s | sometimes a very helpful tool. So yes, and maybe in a couple of years, there will be AI tools who 2661.98s - 2667.90s | can do this part of the job. I know people who work on this question, and maybe in a couple of 2667.90s - 2673.74s | years, you feed such a message to an AI tool, and it will at least tell you, well, this looks like 2674.70s - 2679.82s | a substitution cipher, or this looks like a transposition cipher. And maybe it will even be 2680.62s - 2684.62s | capable of breaking the cipher. Yeah, some years in the future. And, you know, 2684.62s - 2688.54s | Captain Picard, computer, please solve the Voynich manuscript, right? 2689.10s - 2695.90s | Okay, yeah, you can ask. Well, I don't think that this will be successful, but we will see. Yes. 2706.62s - 2715.34s | Could be. The question was if the encrypted postcard could be something like a pigpen cipher. 2715.34s - 2721.34s | The pigpen cipher was a very popular cipher for centuries. It's also named the Freemason cipher, 2721.34s - 2729.58s | because the Freemasons used it, but


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is also 2653.66s - 2661.98s | sometimes a very helpful tool. So yes, and maybe in a couple of years, there will be AI tools who 2661.98s - 2667.90s | can do this part of the job. I know people who work on this question, and maybe in a couple of 2667.90s - 2673.74s | years, you feed such a message to an AI tool, and it will at least tell you, well, this looks like 2674.70s - 2679.82s | a substitution cipher, or this looks like a transposition cipher. And maybe it will even be 2680.62s - 2684.62s | capable of breaking the cipher. Yeah, some years in the future. And, you know, 2684.62s - 2688.54s | Captain Picard, computer, please solve the Voynich manuscript, right? 2689.10s - 2695.90s | Okay, yeah, you can ask. Well, I don't think that this will be successful, but we will see. Yes. 2706.62s - 2715.34s | Could be. The question was if the encrypted postcard could be something like a pigpen cipher. 2715.34s - 2721.34s | The pigpen cipher was a very popular cipher for centuries. It's also named the Freemason cipher, 2721.34s - 2729.58s | because the Freemasons used it, but others used it as well. I wouldn't know how to match 2729.58s - 2734.46s | these letters of this message with the Freemason cipher with the pigpen cipher. But 2734.46s - 2738.54s | maybe that's something we could look at again. Who knows? 2739.34s - 2755.06s | Yeah. Any other questions? Yes. Yes. 2758.58s - 2774.56s | Okay. Okay. Okay. Yeah. Yeah. I mean, there's so many different ways to slice and dice it. 2775.60s - 2781.92s | If you have an idea, by all means, have at it. Yes. Well, one thing might be important to note, 2781.92s - 2788.72s | the spaces that can be seen here are added by us. So there are no spaces in the original. It's just 2788.72s - 2794.96s | to make the thing better readable. Yeah. Put it in groups of five up to the end of the line and 2794.96s - 2801.92s | then start the next line with groups of five. Sure. No. Any other? All the help we can get. 2801.92s - 2834.35s | Yes. I can't hear. Sorry. You mean that this message here that it was created with a system 2834.35s - 2841.63s | that includes a


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others used it as well. I wouldn't know how to match 2729.58s - 2734.46s | these letters of this message with the Freemason cipher with the pigpen cipher. But 2734.46s - 2738.54s | maybe that's something we could look at again. Who knows? 2739.34s - 2755.06s | Yeah. Any other questions? Yes. Yes. 2758.58s - 2774.56s | Okay. Okay. Okay. Yeah. Yeah. I mean, there's so many different ways to slice and dice it. 2775.60s - 2781.92s | If you have an idea, by all means, have at it. Yes. Well, one thing might be important to note, 2781.92s - 2788.72s | the spaces that can be seen here are added by us. So there are no spaces in the original. It's just 2788.72s - 2794.96s | to make the thing better readable. Yeah. Put it in groups of five up to the end of the line and 2794.96s - 2801.92s | then start the next line with groups of five. Sure. No. Any other? All the help we can get. 2801.92s - 2834.35s | Yes. I can't hear. Sorry. You mean that this message here that it was created with a system 2834.35s - 2841.63s | that includes a key and without the key, it's not possible? Well, this kind of system, this 2841.63s - 2848.03s | was available at the time at the end of the 19th century. So it's certainly possible. The question 2848.03s - 2855.71s | is if Edward Elgar used such a system to write a message to a friend who apparently had no clue 2855.71s - 2862.91s | about cryptography. But it certainly would have been possible to use a system that is not 2862.91s - 2884.11s | breakable today. Yes. You mean a language? You mean a cipher and a writing system? 2884.11s - 2893.68s | How do we tell if we're dealing with a language or a cipher? Great question. 2894.56s - 2900.32s | Well, from a cryptographic point of view, a writing system and a simple substitution cipher 2900.32s - 2909.20s | are the same. So you can use the same methods to break them. So if simply other letters are used, 2909.20s - 2915.12s | it can be regarded as an encryption, although it was not really meant to be an encryption. It was 2915.12s - 2922.08s | simply used, simply another system was used. If the encryption is more


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key and without the key, it's not possible? Well, this kind of system, this 2841.63s - 2848.03s | was available at the time at the end of the 19th century. So it's certainly possible. The question 2848.03s - 2855.71s | is if Edward Elgar used such a system to write a message to a friend who apparently had no clue 2855.71s - 2862.91s | about cryptography. But it certainly would have been possible to use a system that is not 2862.91s - 2884.11s | breakable today. Yes. You mean a language? You mean a cipher and a writing system? 2884.11s - 2893.68s | How do we tell if we're dealing with a language or a cipher? Great question. 2894.56s - 2900.32s | Well, from a cryptographic point of view, a writing system and a simple substitution cipher 2900.32s - 2909.20s | are the same. So you can use the same methods to break them. So if simply other letters are used, 2909.20s - 2915.12s | it can be regarded as an encryption, although it was not really meant to be an encryption. It was 2915.12s - 2922.08s | simply used, simply another system was used. If the encryption is more complicated, 2922.08s - 2927.68s | you usually see this when you look at the statistics. For example, in English, 2927.68s - 2934.00s | the E is the most frequent letter with a frequency of about 12 or 14 percent. 2935.52s - 2941.60s | And if the distribution looks more even, you know that it's not a simple substitution cipher and not 2941.60s - 2946.64s | an unknown writing system. It must be something else, either a good or a better encryption system 2946.88s - 2954.00s | or maybe random data or whatever. Sometimes it's difficult to tell. 2960.48s - 2962.00s | Any other questions? 2963.84s - 2970.48s | All right. Okay. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Good questions.


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complicated, 2922.08s - 2927.68s | you usually see this when you look at the statistics. For example, in English, 2927.68s - 2934.00s | the E is the most frequent letter with a frequency of about 12 or 14 percent. 2935.52s - 2941.60s | And if the distribution looks more even, you know that it's not a simple substitution cipher and not 2941.60s - 2946.64s | an unknown writing system. It must be something else, either a good or a better encryption system 2946.88s - 2954.00s | or maybe random data or whatever. Sometimes it's difficult to tell. 2960.48s - 2962.00s | Any other questions? 2963.84s - 2970.48s | All right. Okay. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Good questions.


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{ "webpage_url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=piW-nUKIqkE", "title": "DEF CON 32 - An adversarial approach to Airline Revenue Management Proving Ground - Craig Lester", "description": "Richard Branson is oft quoted with the quip that the quickest way to become a millionaire in the Airline Industry is to start as a billionaire. An Industry constrained by high fixed capital costs, bi-lateral capacity treaties, airport slots and curfews, labour etc; Airlines use the practice of revenue management to fill planes, maximise earnings and keep competitors at bay. But you\u2019re not interested in an economics talk \u2013 this is a hacker con. I\u2019m here to provide a birds-eye view and introduction into how fares and ticketing work, debunking some myths while outlining system constraints and limitations that introduce vulnerabilities. As an outcome, attendees should gain an introductory understanding of airline industry pricing, published fares and terminology. With most blogged 'deals' patched quicker than RCEs, the deeper understanding of not what but how, facilitates a progression for those interested to interact on more specialised discussion forums.", "channel_url": "https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC6Om9kAkl32dWlDSNlDS9Iw", "duration": 2556, "channel": "DEFCONConference", "uploader": "DEFCONConference", "upload_date": "20241016" } 0.14s - 7.84s | This text was transcribed using whisper model: large-v2 Good morning. Ah, there we go. Good morning everyone. I am a Lillian Ashbaker. I represent the aerospace village 7.84s - 15.78s | I do the speaker CFP process the aerospace village is in conjunction with the creator stage team is pleased to introduce Craig 16.06s - 23.10s | He is presenting on an adversarial approach to airline revenue management. So please welcome Craig to the stage 30.14s - 32.14s | Well, hey everyone 37.50s - 39.98s | I'm Craig a little about me. I 42.38s - 45.54s | First moved interstate for work about 15 years ago and 46.34s - 48.34s | started flying a lot since then 48.50s - 53.28s | by trade, I'm I work with Splunk and Simtools now, but my 54.06s - 57.18s | Background was Cisco and carrier sort of networking stuff 57.94s - 59.94s | But yeah 60.02s - 63.86s | So firstly what what's this talk not about so it's I'm not all about 65.74s - 72.50s | These big clickbait, you know sort of travel articles where when really when you break them down at the end of the day 72.66s - 75.80s | It's like sign up for this credit card get a sign on bonus 76.90s - 80.86s


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{ "webpage_url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bLgQNSQANx0", "title": "DEF CON 32 - Navigating the Turbulent Skies of Aviation Cyber Regulation - M. Weigand, S. Wagner", "description": "This combination presentation and panel discussion will surface the policy and technical challenges associated with securing civil aviation, bringing together perspectives from government, industry, and aviation cybersecurity companies.\n\nGiven the continued growth in civil aviation and impending regulation in the United States of America and Europe, this talk will describe the key technical challenges and the resulting policy challenges that should be addressed to keep civil aviation secure.", "channel_url": "https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC6Om9kAkl32dWlDSNlDS9Iw", "duration": 3285, "channel": "DEFCONConference", "uploader": "DEFCONConference", "upload_date": "20241016" } 0.00s - 2.44s | This text was transcribed using whisper model: large-v2 Hey everybody, thank you so much for coming. 2.44s - 6.08s | Welcome to Flying Blind, where we're gonna talk about 6.08s - 8.76s | aviation policy, we're gonna share some lessons learned 8.76s - 11.64s | from our experience in the Air Force 11.64s - 15.00s | and in civil aviation, everything from Capitol Hill 15.00s - 18.72s | to actually hacking some fighter jets today. 18.72s - 20.68s | So thank you, my name's Michael Wiggins 20.68s - 22.08s | and I'm joined today by. 22.08s - 24.12s | Hey, I'm Stuart Wagner. 24.12s - 26.46s | Just a little bit of background on ourselves. 26.46s - 28.94s | I am a reformed Army officer 29.00s - 30.72s | and recovering entrepreneur. 30.72s - 34.00s | I served in the Army as one of the first cyber officers 34.00s - 36.24s | and then I decided I wanted to start a company 36.24s - 38.96s | so that we could bring hardware and software solutions 38.96s - 41.84s | to the market to help protect aircraft 41.84s - 44.04s | because they don't have antivirus and stuff on it. 44.04s - 45.64s | It seemed like a good idea at the time 45.64s - 48.04s | and we grew it pretty tremendously, 48.04s - 50.80s | but along the way I realized that there was 50.80s - 52.74s | a lot of policy and law that needed to change 52.74s - 54.64s | to make the market possible and so real excited 54.64s - 56.96s | to share with you what I've learned. 56.96s - 58.22s | Stuart? 58.24s - 60.08s | Sure, so I'm Stuart. 60.08s - 63.24s | I was a software developer at


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- 24.12s | Hey, I'm Stuart Wagner. 24.12s - 26.46s | Just a little bit of background on ourselves. 26.46s - 28.94s | I am a reformed Army officer 29.00s - 30.72s | and recovering entrepreneur. 30.72s - 34.00s | I served in the Army as one of the first cyber officers 34.00s - 36.24s | and then I decided I wanted to start a company 36.24s - 38.96s | so that we could bring hardware and software solutions 38.96s - 41.84s | to the market to help protect aircraft 41.84s - 44.04s | because they don't have antivirus and stuff on it. 44.04s - 45.64s | It seemed like a good idea at the time 45.64s - 48.04s | and we grew it pretty tremendously, 48.04s - 50.80s | but along the way I realized that there was 50.80s - 52.74s | a lot of policy and law that needed to change 52.74s - 54.64s | to make the market possible and so real excited 54.64s - 56.96s | to share with you what I've learned. 56.96s - 58.22s | Stuart? 58.24s - 60.08s | Sure, so I'm Stuart. 60.08s - 63.24s | I was a software developer at Microsoft 63.24s - 67.46s | focused on data engineering, like telemetry systems, 67.46s - 70.88s | so data off of operating systems, 70.88s - 72.72s | data off of cloud services, 72.72s - 76.00s | then came over to the DOD and eventually ending up 76.00s - 79.44s | in the Air Force as the Chief Digital Transformation Officer 79.44s - 82.36s | where we basically tried to learn and adapt 82.36s - 84.64s | from data off of weapon systems. 84.64s - 87.36s | So Mike asked me to kind of share 87.36s - 88.46s | some of the things we've learned 88.46s - 90.42s | and how that might apply to cybersecurity. 90.42s - 91.94s | So really excited to give this talk 91.94s - 97.13s | and hopefully jump into some questions. 97.13s - 99.29s | All right, so today we're just gonna 99.29s - 101.53s | give a really quick overview of at least 101.53s - 103.45s | my personal thoughts on the state of affairs 103.45s - 106.69s | of cybersecurity and civil aviation 106.69s - 108.81s | and we'll touch a little bit on where we are 108.81s - 110.11s | like securing weapon


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Microsoft 63.24s - 67.46s | focused on data engineering, like telemetry systems, 67.46s - 70.88s | so data off of operating systems, 70.88s - 72.72s | data off of cloud services, 72.72s - 76.00s | then came over to the DOD and eventually ending up 76.00s - 79.44s | in the Air Force as the Chief Digital Transformation Officer 79.44s - 82.36s | where we basically tried to learn and adapt 82.36s - 84.64s | from data off of weapon systems. 84.64s - 87.36s | So Mike asked me to kind of share 87.36s - 88.46s | some of the things we've learned 88.46s - 90.42s | and how that might apply to cybersecurity. 90.42s - 91.94s | So really excited to give this talk 91.94s - 97.13s | and hopefully jump into some questions. 97.13s - 99.29s | All right, so today we're just gonna 99.29s - 101.53s | give a really quick overview of at least 101.53s - 103.45s | my personal thoughts on the state of affairs 103.45s - 106.69s | of cybersecurity and civil aviation 106.69s - 108.81s | and we'll touch a little bit on where we are 108.81s - 110.11s | like securing weapon systems, 110.11s - 113.01s | which is important for their deterrence mission. 113.01s - 116.73s | Talk about some of the recent developments in regulations. 116.75s - 119.99s | We just got the FAA Reauthorization Act, 119.99s - 121.43s | which is passed every four years 121.43s - 122.79s | that just got signed into law. 122.79s - 125.59s | So we'll touch on some of the exciting developments 125.59s - 128.51s | in that law that hopefully is gonna help advance safety 128.51s - 130.31s | and security interests. 130.31s - 132.79s | Stuart's gonna share some lessons from the Air Force 132.79s - 135.87s | where he actually led a series of hackathons 135.87s - 137.27s | against fighter jets. 137.27s - 139.71s | And then we're gonna talk about how data 139.71s - 143.97s | and instrumentation from those defense experiments, 144.11s - 149.11s | what lessons there may exist for civil aviation. 149.87s - 153.11s | Then we'll have an open discussion about policy next steps. 153.11s - 154.55s | And I'm gonna try and convince you 154.55s - 157.07s | that everybody in this room can actually 157.07s - 159.39s | have a voice in


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systems, 110.11s - 113.01s | which is important for their deterrence mission. 113.01s - 116.73s | Talk about some of the recent developments in regulations. 116.75s - 119.99s | We just got the FAA Reauthorization Act, 119.99s - 121.43s | which is passed every four years 121.43s - 122.79s | that just got signed into law. 122.79s - 125.59s | So we'll touch on some of the exciting developments 125.59s - 128.51s | in that law that hopefully is gonna help advance safety 128.51s - 130.31s | and security interests. 130.31s - 132.79s | Stuart's gonna share some lessons from the Air Force 132.79s - 135.87s | where he actually led a series of hackathons 135.87s - 137.27s | against fighter jets. 137.27s - 139.71s | And then we're gonna talk about how data 139.71s - 143.97s | and instrumentation from those defense experiments, 144.11s - 149.11s | what lessons there may exist for civil aviation. 149.87s - 153.11s | Then we'll have an open discussion about policy next steps. 153.11s - 154.55s | And I'm gonna try and convince you 154.55s - 157.07s | that everybody in this room can actually 157.07s - 159.39s | have a voice in that conversation. 162.26s - 165.70s | So without further ado, really kind of excited 165.70s - 168.06s | to share that this year, every four years, 168.06s - 169.72s | the FAA gets reauthorized. 169.72s - 171.50s | So we don't have air traffic controllers 171.50s - 174.14s | without actually Congress passing a law 174.16s - 177.24s | to pay these people to help us make sure 177.24s - 179.38s | that we can all fly home safely. 179.38s - 180.92s | That's a good thing. 180.92s - 183.60s | It's also a chance for us to kind of update the way 183.60s - 187.08s | that the entire aviation industry does business. 187.08s - 189.68s | And there's all kinds of important 189.68s - 191.60s | and sometimes special interest components 191.60s - 193.86s | that get into that legislation. 193.86s - 198.86s | There's a subsection in it in section 360 something 199.10s - 201.78s | that talks about cybersecurity. 201.78s - 204.88s | And the crazy thing about where we are today 204.88s - 207.24s | is that most aircraft continue 207.24s - 209.68s | to be increasingly interconnected, 209.68s - 212.88s | increasingly fly-by-wire, computer


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that conversation. 162.26s - 165.70s | So without further ado, really kind of excited 165.70s - 168.06s | to share that this year, every four years, 168.06s - 169.72s | the FAA gets reauthorized. 169.72s - 171.50s | So we don't have air traffic controllers 171.50s - 174.14s | without actually Congress passing a law 174.16s - 177.24s | to pay these people to help us make sure 177.24s - 179.38s | that we can all fly home safely. 179.38s - 180.92s | That's a good thing. 180.92s - 183.60s | It's also a chance for us to kind of update the way 183.60s - 187.08s | that the entire aviation industry does business. 187.08s - 189.68s | And there's all kinds of important 189.68s - 191.60s | and sometimes special interest components 191.60s - 193.86s | that get into that legislation. 193.86s - 198.86s | There's a subsection in it in section 360 something 199.10s - 201.78s | that talks about cybersecurity. 201.78s - 204.88s | And the crazy thing about where we are today 204.88s - 207.24s | is that most aircraft continue 207.24s - 209.68s | to be increasingly interconnected, 209.68s - 212.88s | increasingly fly-by-wire, computer and software dependent, 212.88s - 215.44s | but there is no flying commercial aircraft today 215.44s - 218.52s | with a running antivirus intrusion detection 218.52s - 220.32s | or intrusion prevention system. 220.32s - 223.00s | In fact, do we have any pilots in the room? 223.00s - 224.96s | Just by show of hands, we have a handful. 224.96s - 227.18s | I'm a pilot too, I'm a private pilot. 227.18s - 229.62s | There's no such thing as a crew indication, 229.62s - 232.92s | any type of warning, caution or advisory light to the crew 232.92s - 234.64s | to let them know that like, 234.64s - 236.44s | hey, something really fishy is going on 236.44s - 238.36s | and maybe don't take off. 238.36s - 240.76s | Maybe you have like, you know, 240.76s - 243.88s | an indication of malicious messages on the data bus 243.88s - 247.76s | or your firmware or software is like bad. 247.76s - 250.40s | And unfortunately we use in industry 250.40s - 253.44s | really solid flight worthy technology, 253.44s - 255.64s | which means it's often really old. 255.64s - 258.52s | And because of


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and software dependent, 212.88s - 215.44s | but there is no flying commercial aircraft today 215.44s - 218.52s | with a running antivirus intrusion detection 218.52s - 220.32s | or intrusion prevention system. 220.32s - 223.00s | In fact, do we have any pilots in the room? 223.00s - 224.96s | Just by show of hands, we have a handful. 224.96s - 227.18s | I'm a pilot too, I'm a private pilot. 227.18s - 229.62s | There's no such thing as a crew indication, 229.62s - 232.92s | any type of warning, caution or advisory light to the crew 232.92s - 234.64s | to let them know that like, 234.64s - 236.44s | hey, something really fishy is going on 236.44s - 238.36s | and maybe don't take off. 238.36s - 240.76s | Maybe you have like, you know, 240.76s - 243.88s | an indication of malicious messages on the data bus 243.88s - 247.76s | or your firmware or software is like bad. 247.76s - 250.40s | And unfortunately we use in industry 250.40s - 253.44s | really solid flight worthy technology, 253.44s - 255.64s | which means it's often really old. 255.64s - 258.52s | And because of that conveniences 258.74s - 261.02s | that we all take for granted or security technologies 261.02s - 263.14s | that we take for granted with like our mobile devices 263.14s - 265.18s | where all of the software delivery 265.18s - 266.86s | is cryptographically signed 266.86s - 269.58s | and there's some pretty good supply chain 270.54s - 274.80s | and delivery processes, a lot of that doesn't exist. 274.80s - 276.38s | And the first rule of, you know, 276.38s - 278.66s | one of the principal rules of cybersecurity obviously 278.66s - 281.50s | is if you have physical access to an aircraft, 281.50s - 284.02s | you can compromise or to a computer, you can compromise it. 284.02s - 286.42s | Well, a lot of our commercial jets, 286.42s - 288.26s | they fly all over the planet 289.00s - 291.40s | and there's a variety of people that have physical access 291.40s - 292.80s | even to the avionics. 292.80s - 295.88s | So all of these things kind of taken for granted, 295.88s - 298.92s | I like make me a little bit uncomfortable. 298.92s - 301.84s | Unfortunately, we don't have a really


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that conveniences 258.74s - 261.02s | that we all take for granted or security technologies 261.02s - 263.14s | that we take for granted with like our mobile devices 263.14s - 265.18s | where all of the software delivery 265.18s - 266.86s | is cryptographically signed 266.86s - 269.58s | and there's some pretty good supply chain 270.54s - 274.80s | and delivery processes, a lot of that doesn't exist. 274.80s - 276.38s | And the first rule of, you know, 276.38s - 278.66s | one of the principal rules of cybersecurity obviously 278.66s - 281.50s | is if you have physical access to an aircraft, 281.50s - 284.02s | you can compromise or to a computer, you can compromise it. 284.02s - 286.42s | Well, a lot of our commercial jets, 286.42s - 288.26s | they fly all over the planet 289.00s - 291.40s | and there's a variety of people that have physical access 291.40s - 292.80s | even to the avionics. 292.80s - 295.88s | So all of these things kind of taken for granted, 295.88s - 298.92s | I like make me a little bit uncomfortable. 298.92s - 301.84s | Unfortunately, we don't have a really good example 301.84s - 303.96s | of a plane being hacked out of the sky, thank God. 303.96s - 306.24s | But the idea obviously is to stay ahead of that. 306.24s - 308.92s | We don't want to react to safety events. 308.92s - 311.52s | And unfortunately, I will make an aggressive statement 311.52s - 315.16s | and say that many significant evolutions 315.18s - 316.90s | in aviation and safety policy 316.90s - 318.94s | have been driven by fatalities. 318.94s - 322.42s | And so, you know, part of our mission in life, if you will, 322.42s - 325.56s | has been to try and flip that paradigm. 325.56s - 327.78s | And I really appreciate everybody being here today 327.78s - 331.16s | because I know that that resonates with folks at DEF CON. 331.16s - 334.58s | So in the FAA Reauthorization Act this year, 334.58s - 338.06s | I got most excited about the fact that 338.06s - 341.10s | Congress directed the administrator 341.10s - 342.10s | and therefore the FAA 342.10s - 344.58s | to change the type certification process 344.64s - 346.76s | and make sure that cybersecurity 346.76s -


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good example 301.84s - 303.96s | of a plane being hacked out of the sky, thank God. 303.96s - 306.24s | But the idea obviously is to stay ahead of that. 306.24s - 308.92s | We don't want to react to safety events. 308.92s - 311.52s | And unfortunately, I will make an aggressive statement 311.52s - 315.16s | and say that many significant evolutions 315.18s - 316.90s | in aviation and safety policy 316.90s - 318.94s | have been driven by fatalities. 318.94s - 322.42s | And so, you know, part of our mission in life, if you will, 322.42s - 325.56s | has been to try and flip that paradigm. 325.56s - 327.78s | And I really appreciate everybody being here today 327.78s - 331.16s | because I know that that resonates with folks at DEF CON. 331.16s - 334.58s | So in the FAA Reauthorization Act this year, 334.58s - 338.06s | I got most excited about the fact that 338.06s - 341.10s | Congress directed the administrator 341.10s - 342.10s | and therefore the FAA 342.10s - 344.58s | to change the type certification process 344.64s - 346.76s | and make sure that cybersecurity 346.76s - 349.42s | and continuous monitoring of avionics 349.42s - 352.32s | is now a requirement for any new aircraft design 352.32s - 353.96s | that gets approved. 353.96s - 356.10s | Previously, it was like a suggestion, 356.10s - 357.58s | but this time around, 357.58s - 359.68s | it was a requirement that they must do it. 360.56s - 362.52s | There are a whole bunch of other problems though 362.52s - 363.92s | that have to be solved. 363.92s - 368.12s | And they also provided a little bit through like study, 368.12s - 371.12s | we're gonna help identify and make the case that 371.12s - 374.48s | you need better people through a GAO report and study. 375.38s - 376.22s | Do you have the right people? 376.22s - 377.04s | Do you have the right funding? 377.04s - 377.98s | Do you have the right structures? 377.98s - 379.78s | Is there the right kind of committee 379.78s - 381.86s | to make sure that voices from industry, 381.86s - 386.10s | the OEMs, the airlines, operators, unions, 386.10s - 388.66s | technologists are all heard as the rules 388.66s - 392.50s | on how


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349.42s | and continuous monitoring of avionics 349.42s - 352.32s | is now a requirement for any new aircraft design 352.32s - 353.96s | that gets approved. 353.96s - 356.10s | Previously, it was like a suggestion, 356.10s - 357.58s | but this time around, 357.58s - 359.68s | it was a requirement that they must do it. 360.56s - 362.52s | There are a whole bunch of other problems though 362.52s - 363.92s | that have to be solved. 363.92s - 368.12s | And they also provided a little bit through like study, 368.12s - 371.12s | we're gonna help identify and make the case that 371.12s - 374.48s | you need better people through a GAO report and study. 375.38s - 376.22s | Do you have the right people? 376.22s - 377.04s | Do you have the right funding? 377.04s - 377.98s | Do you have the right structures? 377.98s - 379.78s | Is there the right kind of committee 379.78s - 381.86s | to make sure that voices from industry, 381.86s - 386.10s | the OEMs, the airlines, operators, unions, 386.10s - 388.66s | technologists are all heard as the rules 388.66s - 392.50s | on how all of this gets implemented actually happen. 392.50s - 394.66s | So all of that was in the legislation this year. 394.66s - 396.04s | And over the next couple of years, 396.04s - 397.22s | we're gonna see that implemented. 397.22s - 400.30s | And hopefully by the end of this decade, 400.30s - 402.62s | we will actually see airliners come out 402.64s - 406.08s | with real onboard continuous monitoring of their avionics, 406.08s - 408.72s | which sounds like a good idea to me. 408.72s - 410.88s | So just as a state of affairs, 410.88s - 412.96s | the situation if I were to put it really bluntly 412.96s - 416.84s | is it's kind of not great as it is today, 416.84s - 417.80s | but it's gonna get better. 417.80s - 419.92s | And unfortunately, the legislation 419.92s - 423.04s | is coming along quite quickly. 423.04s - 425.88s | Actually hats off to our European colleagues. 425.88s - 428.62s | If we have anybody that flew across the pond, 428.62s - 431.04s | YASA has been moving exceptionally fast 431.06s - 433.62s | in actually implementing regulations. 433.62s - 436.74s | And


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all of this gets implemented actually happen. 392.50s - 394.66s | So all of that was in the legislation this year. 394.66s - 396.04s | And over the next couple of years, 396.04s - 397.22s | we're gonna see that implemented. 397.22s - 400.30s | And hopefully by the end of this decade, 400.30s - 402.62s | we will actually see airliners come out 402.64s - 406.08s | with real onboard continuous monitoring of their avionics, 406.08s - 408.72s | which sounds like a good idea to me. 408.72s - 410.88s | So just as a state of affairs, 410.88s - 412.96s | the situation if I were to put it really bluntly 412.96s - 416.84s | is it's kind of not great as it is today, 416.84s - 417.80s | but it's gonna get better. 417.80s - 419.92s | And unfortunately, the legislation 419.92s - 423.04s | is coming along quite quickly. 423.04s - 425.88s | Actually hats off to our European colleagues. 425.88s - 428.62s | If we have anybody that flew across the pond, 428.62s - 431.04s | YASA has been moving exceptionally fast 431.06s - 433.62s | in actually implementing regulations. 433.62s - 436.74s | And so this is great that kind of the two major 436.74s - 439.54s | aviation regulators that set the standard 439.54s - 443.26s | for what rules look like in building 443.26s - 446.58s | and flying and maintaining aircraft and airlines 446.58s - 448.30s | are largely getting on the same page 448.30s - 451.18s | and moving quickly to adapt all of this. 451.18s - 454.06s | So those are some of those recent developments 454.06s - 458.10s | and state of affairs, but I wanna turn over to Stewart 458.10s - 460.02s | because he has a really interesting perspective 460.04s - 461.92s | from industry and then within the Air Force 461.92s - 466.51s | that I think informs the policy discussion. 466.51s - 468.19s | Thanks, Mike, appreciate it. 468.19s - 469.95s | Okay, so number one, first of all, 469.95s - 472.23s | these slides that I'm gonna show you now, 473.23s - 474.91s | I created them while I was in the Air Force, 474.91s - 478.71s | so I need to cite myself and release them publicly. 478.71s - 481.35s | And so I can show you these today, which is cool.


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so this is great that kind of the two major 436.74s - 439.54s | aviation regulators that set the standard 439.54s - 443.26s | for what rules look like in building 443.26s - 446.58s | and flying and maintaining aircraft and airlines 446.58s - 448.30s | are largely getting on the same page 448.30s - 451.18s | and moving quickly to adapt all of this. 451.18s - 454.06s | So those are some of those recent developments 454.06s - 458.10s | and state of affairs, but I wanna turn over to Stewart 458.10s - 460.02s | because he has a really interesting perspective 460.04s - 461.92s | from industry and then within the Air Force 461.92s - 466.51s | that I think informs the policy discussion. 466.51s - 468.19s | Thanks, Mike, appreciate it. 468.19s - 469.95s | Okay, so number one, first of all, 469.95s - 472.23s | these slides that I'm gonna show you now, 473.23s - 474.91s | I created them while I was in the Air Force, 474.91s - 478.71s | so I need to cite myself and release them publicly. 478.71s - 481.35s | And so I can show you these today, which is cool. 482.31s - 487.31s | All right, so basically when I got to the Air Force, 487.47s - 489.83s | what we were trying to do in terms of, 489.83s - 491.23s | they call it digital transformation. 491.73s - 492.57s | I don't know if it means anything, 492.57s - 494.45s | but basically what we were trying to do, 494.45s - 497.57s | I took it to mean learning from data 497.57s - 500.73s | off of operational systems like telemetry data. 500.73s - 505.17s | And this is kind of what I used to try to make the case 505.17s - 507.41s | to like generals and senior leaders, 507.41s - 510.85s | senior civilians in the DoD to learn and adapt 510.85s - 513.29s | from data off of operational systems. 513.29s - 517.29s | And in the Air Force, this is like bits off jets, 517.29s - 520.61s | bits off munitions, bits off any type 520.95s - 524.91s | of operational system, but a lot of bits off of jets. 524.91s - 528.39s | But in the DoD, this could be bits off of really ships, 528.39s - 530.07s | submarines, et cetera. 530.07s -


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482.31s - 487.31s | All right, so basically when I got to the Air Force, 487.47s - 489.83s | what we were trying to do in terms of, 489.83s - 491.23s | they call it digital transformation. 491.73s - 492.57s | I don't know if it means anything, 492.57s - 494.45s | but basically what we were trying to do, 494.45s - 497.57s | I took it to mean learning from data 497.57s - 500.73s | off of operational systems like telemetry data. 500.73s - 505.17s | And this is kind of what I used to try to make the case 505.17s - 507.41s | to like generals and senior leaders, 507.41s - 510.85s | senior civilians in the DoD to learn and adapt 510.85s - 513.29s | from data off of operational systems. 513.29s - 517.29s | And in the Air Force, this is like bits off jets, 517.29s - 520.61s | bits off munitions, bits off any type 520.95s - 524.91s | of operational system, but a lot of bits off of jets. 524.91s - 528.39s | But in the DoD, this could be bits off of really ships, 528.39s - 530.07s | submarines, et cetera. 530.07s - 532.39s | And so we were trying to figure out how do we like 532.39s - 535.09s | encourage and demonstrate the potential of this data, 535.09s - 536.95s | which could be used for cyber stuff. 536.95s - 539.15s | A lot of times hackathons are confused for cyber. 539.15s - 542.47s | They can be cyber, but they also can do other things too. 542.47s - 545.55s | I come from more of a capability development side. 545.55s - 548.03s | So what we were trying to do is basically emphasize 548.21s - 550.65s | and demonstrate the potential of this. 550.65s - 552.77s | It starts with kind of this story here, 552.77s - 555.41s | which my background coming from Microsoft, 555.41s - 557.17s | we did this, I worked on health of systems 557.17s - 558.73s | or reliability data. 558.73s - 561.19s | Every time there's a crash on a Windows device, 561.19s - 562.25s | log data is produced. 562.25s - 565.77s | That log data in many cases is actually sent back 565.77s - 568.25s | to kind of home station to be analyzed, 568.25s - 570.01s | to understand like the


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532.39s | And so we were trying to figure out how do we like 532.39s - 535.09s | encourage and demonstrate the potential of this data, 535.09s - 536.95s | which could be used for cyber stuff. 536.95s - 539.15s | A lot of times hackathons are confused for cyber. 539.15s - 542.47s | They can be cyber, but they also can do other things too. 542.47s - 545.55s | I come from more of a capability development side. 545.55s - 548.03s | So what we were trying to do is basically emphasize 548.21s - 550.65s | and demonstrate the potential of this. 550.65s - 552.77s | It starts with kind of this story here, 552.77s - 555.41s | which my background coming from Microsoft, 555.41s - 557.17s | we did this, I worked on health of systems 557.17s - 558.73s | or reliability data. 558.73s - 561.19s | Every time there's a crash on a Windows device, 561.19s - 562.25s | log data is produced. 562.25s - 565.77s | That log data in many cases is actually sent back 565.77s - 568.25s | to kind of home station to be analyzed, 568.25s - 570.01s | to understand like the health of the system, right? 570.01s - 572.13s | And I can, we can talk about that more 572.13s - 573.37s | if people have specific questions, 573.91s - 578.19s | but basically you can learn from various beta builds 578.19s - 581.07s | that are released and you can learn basically 581.07s - 583.71s | what you want to fix and what will basically solve 583.71s - 584.55s | the biggest problem. 584.55s - 586.15s | And that was what we kind of focused on. 586.15s - 588.19s | But like, there's all these other cases 588.19s - 592.11s | where big tech, my argument here is basically 592.11s - 594.23s | every big tech company in the world 594.23s - 597.47s | undergirds with automatically collected data. 597.47s - 599.27s | You call it telemetry, you can call it whatever you want, 599.27s - 601.59s | but it's automatically collected data for their systems. 601.59s - 602.47s | And there's all these examples. 602.47s - 604.45s | I won't go through each one. 604.45s - 608.09s | Tesla, of course, is AI automation, 608.09s - 610.53s | is what you see SpaceX, electronic resilience, 610.53s - 612.45s |


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health of the system, right? 570.01s - 572.13s | And I can, we can talk about that more 572.13s - 573.37s | if people have specific questions, 573.91s - 578.19s | but basically you can learn from various beta builds 578.19s - 581.07s | that are released and you can learn basically 581.07s - 583.71s | what you want to fix and what will basically solve 583.71s - 584.55s | the biggest problem. 584.55s - 586.15s | And that was what we kind of focused on. 586.15s - 588.19s | But like, there's all these other cases 588.19s - 592.11s | where big tech, my argument here is basically 592.11s - 594.23s | every big tech company in the world 594.23s - 597.47s | undergirds with automatically collected data. 597.47s - 599.27s | You call it telemetry, you can call it whatever you want, 599.27s - 601.59s | but it's automatically collected data for their systems. 601.59s - 602.47s | And there's all these examples. 602.47s - 604.45s | I won't go through each one. 604.45s - 608.09s | Tesla, of course, is AI automation, 608.09s - 610.53s | is what you see SpaceX, electronic resilience, 610.53s - 612.45s | so the Starlink example. 612.45s - 613.81s | A lot of people like to focus on the fact 613.81s - 615.57s | that there was a software patch pushed 615.57s - 618.49s | to mitigate basically jamming. 618.49s - 620.49s | But the thing that's kind of underrepresented 620.49s - 622.61s | is like how did they know what to fix? 622.61s - 624.05s | How did they know what was being jammed 624.05s - 625.09s | and how to fix it, right? 625.09s - 627.85s | And the automatic collection of data is critical for that. 627.85s - 628.97s | And et cetera, et cetera. 628.97s - 631.97s | I'll key in on Google as well. 632.31s - 633.99s | A lot of people think of the search engine 633.99s - 635.71s | and PageRank and other AI algorithms 635.71s - 636.83s | which automatically collect data. 636.83s - 639.47s | But what I actually am really fascinated by 639.47s - 642.95s | is their unplanned, basically crowdsourced learning 642.95s - 646.35s | with flu data, so Google Trends actually, 646.35s - 648.67s | if you're familiar, was able to actually out-predict 648.67s - 650.53s | the CDC for


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so the Starlink example. 612.45s - 613.81s | A lot of people like to focus on the fact 613.81s - 615.57s | that there was a software patch pushed 615.57s - 618.49s | to mitigate basically jamming. 618.49s - 620.49s | But the thing that's kind of underrepresented 620.49s - 622.61s | is like how did they know what to fix? 622.61s - 624.05s | How did they know what was being jammed 624.05s - 625.09s | and how to fix it, right? 625.09s - 627.85s | And the automatic collection of data is critical for that. 627.85s - 628.97s | And et cetera, et cetera. 628.97s - 631.97s | I'll key in on Google as well. 632.31s - 633.99s | A lot of people think of the search engine 633.99s - 635.71s | and PageRank and other AI algorithms 635.71s - 636.83s | which automatically collect data. 636.83s - 639.47s | But what I actually am really fascinated by 639.47s - 642.95s | is their unplanned, basically crowdsourced learning 642.95s - 646.35s | with flu data, so Google Trends actually, 646.35s - 648.67s | if you're familiar, was able to actually out-predict 648.67s - 650.53s | the CDC for the spread of flu 650.53s - 652.31s | basically by the use of search terms. 652.31s - 654.49s | So there's all this richness in data 654.49s - 656.39s | when automatically collected that's really valuable 656.39s - 658.47s | and we were trying to emphasize that 658.47s - 661.87s | to the DOD and to the Air Force. 662.57s - 663.41s | There's basically like four ways 663.41s - 665.73s | we think about learning from data 666.63s - 668.77s | that's collected off of operational systems 668.77s - 670.69s | and I'll just point to that green box 670.69s - 672.09s | that's most relevant to this talk 672.09s - 675.07s | which is basically you can adapt the system itself. 675.07s - 677.13s | So adapt like the operational system. 677.13s - 680.49s | You can also adapt the tactics, techniques, and procedures. 680.49s - 682.37s | So how you use the system. 682.37s - 683.85s | You can adapt kind of strategy 683.85s - 685.97s | which probably is less critical. 685.97s - 688.45s | It could be useful with the FAA, I would think. 688.45s - 690.25s | And then actually you can adapt the


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the spread of flu 650.53s - 652.31s | basically by the use of search terms. 652.31s - 654.49s | So there's all this richness in data 654.49s - 656.39s | when automatically collected that's really valuable 656.39s - 658.47s | and we were trying to emphasize that 658.47s - 661.87s | to the DOD and to the Air Force. 662.57s - 663.41s | There's basically like four ways 663.41s - 665.73s | we think about learning from data 666.63s - 668.77s | that's collected off of operational systems 668.77s - 670.69s | and I'll just point to that green box 670.69s - 672.09s | that's most relevant to this talk 672.09s - 675.07s | which is basically you can adapt the system itself. 675.07s - 677.13s | So adapt like the operational system. 677.13s - 680.49s | You can also adapt the tactics, techniques, and procedures. 680.49s - 682.37s | So how you use the system. 682.37s - 683.85s | You can adapt kind of strategy 683.85s - 685.97s | which probably is less critical. 685.97s - 688.45s | It could be useful with the FAA, I would think. 688.45s - 690.25s | And then actually you can adapt the way 690.27s - 692.43s | you actually exercise and train with data. 692.43s - 693.79s | All right, okay. 693.79s - 698.39s | And so how did we go about basically learning 698.39s - 700.71s | and adapting from data in the Air Force? 700.71s - 704.71s | And so I'll give you kind of a hypothetical example 704.71s - 706.31s | that I've illustrated here and then I'm gonna kind of 706.31s - 709.43s | generalize it to the DOD and it may also generalize now 709.43s - 711.83s | to the FAA and commercial flight. 711.83s - 716.07s | So the basic idea is like in the examples I gave 716.07s - 718.07s | with big tech, you basically have data, 718.07s - 719.75s | you collect, you do something with it, 720.25s - 721.81s | and then you ultimately find a way to like put it 721.81s - 725.65s | into a production-like environment or a test environment 725.65s - 728.17s | and trial effects with it of some kind 728.17s - 730.45s | and then ultimately collect on that to improve it. 730.45s - 733.01s | And that's your kind of typical iteration pipeline. 733.01s -


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way 690.27s - 692.43s | you actually exercise and train with data. 692.43s - 693.79s | All right, okay. 693.79s - 698.39s | And so how did we go about basically learning 698.39s - 700.71s | and adapting from data in the Air Force? 700.71s - 704.71s | And so I'll give you kind of a hypothetical example 704.71s - 706.31s | that I've illustrated here and then I'm gonna kind of 706.31s - 709.43s | generalize it to the DOD and it may also generalize now 709.43s - 711.83s | to the FAA and commercial flight. 711.83s - 716.07s | So the basic idea is like in the examples I gave 716.07s - 718.07s | with big tech, you basically have data, 718.07s - 719.75s | you collect, you do something with it, 720.25s - 721.81s | and then you ultimately find a way to like put it 721.81s - 725.65s | into a production-like environment or a test environment 725.65s - 728.17s | and trial effects with it of some kind 728.17s - 730.45s | and then ultimately collect on that to improve it. 730.45s - 733.01s | And that's your kind of typical iteration pipeline. 733.01s - 735.13s | They call that like DevOps, right? 735.13s - 737.65s | In the Air Force, it's a little bit harder 737.65s - 740.09s | because we have to deal with things like classification. 740.09s - 742.05s | We may have like degraded comms. 742.05s - 743.55s | It's not as simple as just sending bits 743.55s - 745.01s | over an internet connection. 745.01s - 748.07s | And so it starts with, and this is example again, 748.09s - 750.33s | I would use this to pitch to senior leaders. 750.33s - 753.43s | The idea is basically a mission captures some information 753.43s - 756.29s | so we fly some sort of jet that may or may not 756.29s - 759.09s | collect on a neutral or adversarial 759.09s - 761.85s | or friendly system of some kind 761.85s - 764.13s | and you produce bits during that process. 764.13s - 766.37s | That sensor data needs to get like shared 766.37s - 769.01s | to some human or machine that can do something with it 769.01s - 771.69s | so you gotta get it off the operational system, right? 771.69s - 774.01s | And then you need


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735.13s | They call that like DevOps, right? 735.13s - 737.65s | In the Air Force, it's a little bit harder 737.65s - 740.09s | because we have to deal with things like classification. 740.09s - 742.05s | We may have like degraded comms. 742.05s - 743.55s | It's not as simple as just sending bits 743.55s - 745.01s | over an internet connection. 745.01s - 748.07s | And so it starts with, and this is example again, 748.09s - 750.33s | I would use this to pitch to senior leaders. 750.33s - 753.43s | The idea is basically a mission captures some information 753.43s - 756.29s | so we fly some sort of jet that may or may not 756.29s - 759.09s | collect on a neutral or adversarial 759.09s - 761.85s | or friendly system of some kind 761.85s - 764.13s | and you produce bits during that process. 764.13s - 766.37s | That sensor data needs to get like shared 766.37s - 769.01s | to some human or machine that can do something with it 769.01s - 771.69s | so you gotta get it off the operational system, right? 771.69s - 774.01s | And then you need to, this is like a critical difference 774.01s - 776.33s | in the DOD is like you need to classify the data 776.35s - 778.51s | so you need to know like what is the classification 778.51s - 779.33s | of the data? 779.33s - 780.31s | It could be secret, it could be top secret, 780.31s - 782.71s | it could be unclassified, it could be lots of things. 782.71s - 784.87s | There's a lot we can go into on that too, 784.87s - 786.19s | especially when you combine data. 786.19s - 789.59s | Sometimes it's up classes, which is complicated. 789.59s - 792.39s | So if you wanna learn, sometimes you have to learn 792.39s - 793.99s | at higher classifications. 793.99s - 797.65s | And then basically you need to get that to like doers 797.65s - 799.85s | or machines that can learn from that data. 799.85s - 801.55s | So that could be analytics, that fourth box 801.55s - 804.67s | with too many words in it is doers doing stuff with data 804.67s - 805.99s | and it could be machines or humans trying 806.65s - 808.81s | to build stuff in


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to, this is like a critical difference 774.01s - 776.33s | in the DOD is like you need to classify the data 776.35s - 778.51s | so you need to know like what is the classification 778.51s - 779.33s | of the data? 779.33s - 780.31s | It could be secret, it could be top secret, 780.31s - 782.71s | it could be unclassified, it could be lots of things. 782.71s - 784.87s | There's a lot we can go into on that too, 784.87s - 786.19s | especially when you combine data. 786.19s - 789.59s | Sometimes it's up classes, which is complicated. 789.59s - 792.39s | So if you wanna learn, sometimes you have to learn 792.39s - 793.99s | at higher classifications. 793.99s - 797.65s | And then basically you need to get that to like doers 797.65s - 799.85s | or machines that can learn from that data. 799.85s - 801.55s | So that could be analytics, that fourth box 801.55s - 804.67s | with too many words in it is doers doing stuff with data 804.67s - 805.99s | and it could be machines or humans trying 806.65s - 808.81s | to build stuff in a permissive environment 808.81s - 810.53s | where you can basically do stuff, right? 810.53s - 814.21s | And then you wanna field those solutions in some way 814.21s - 816.89s | or employ them in some way that produce new data 816.89s - 818.97s | that allows you to restart this process, right? 818.97s - 821.97s | And so what we kind of call this in the DOD 821.97s - 823.33s | is like we call this bits to effect. 823.33s - 825.29s | They're focused on effects, but you could think of those 825.29s - 827.37s | as just being changes to a system. 827.37s - 829.61s | And so the idea, and this is how it generalizes. 829.61s - 832.61s | So basically, fundamentally those steps generalize 832.61s - 833.59s | in this format. 833.59s - 835.95s | Number one, you need to instrument and collect data. 836.77s - 837.97s | If you have no instrumentation off the system, 837.97s - 841.09s | you do not produce a change or effect based on data 841.09s - 843.33s | because the data never existed in the first place. 843.33s - 845.57s | There were no bits to collect.


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a permissive environment 808.81s - 810.53s | where you can basically do stuff, right? 810.53s - 814.21s | And then you wanna field those solutions in some way 814.21s - 816.89s | or employ them in some way that produce new data 816.89s - 818.97s | that allows you to restart this process, right? 818.97s - 821.97s | And so what we kind of call this in the DOD 821.97s - 823.33s | is like we call this bits to effect. 823.33s - 825.29s | They're focused on effects, but you could think of those 825.29s - 827.37s | as just being changes to a system. 827.37s - 829.61s | And so the idea, and this is how it generalizes. 829.61s - 832.61s | So basically, fundamentally those steps generalize 832.61s - 833.59s | in this format. 833.59s - 835.95s | Number one, you need to instrument and collect data. 836.77s - 837.97s | If you have no instrumentation off the system, 837.97s - 841.09s | you do not produce a change or effect based on data 841.09s - 843.33s | because the data never existed in the first place. 843.33s - 845.57s | There were no bits to collect. 846.81s - 849.65s | Once you have collection of those bits on the system, 849.65s - 851.37s | you need to get them off the system. 851.37s - 853.97s | If you're going to try to generalize learning 853.97s - 857.97s | across a system and not just to that specific device, right? 857.97s - 860.01s | And so piping and data engineering, 861.33s - 864.17s | that's important I think in operational systems 864.17s - 867.29s | that are disconnected, such as like aircraft. 868.27s - 870.29s | The next is probably less relevant, 870.29s - 872.59s | but potentially relevant is like data classification 872.59s - 873.43s | and access. 873.43s - 876.31s | So certain data is gonna be like restricted or protected. 876.31s - 880.43s | You need to figure out like what is that restricted portion 880.43s - 884.73s | and what to do with it. 884.73s - 888.15s | I'll give one example that I think about 888.15s - 892.41s | and it may be relevant also in general aviation as well, 892.43s - 896.75s | which is basically even if the device you're collecting from 896.75s - 900.75s | is not of some


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846.81s - 849.65s | Once you have collection of those bits on the system, 849.65s - 851.37s | you need to get them off the system. 851.37s - 853.97s | If you're going to try to generalize learning 853.97s - 857.97s | across a system and not just to that specific device, right? 857.97s - 860.01s | And so piping and data engineering, 861.33s - 864.17s | that's important I think in operational systems 864.17s - 867.29s | that are disconnected, such as like aircraft. 868.27s - 870.29s | The next is probably less relevant, 870.29s - 872.59s | but potentially relevant is like data classification 872.59s - 873.43s | and access. 873.43s - 876.31s | So certain data is gonna be like restricted or protected. 876.31s - 880.43s | You need to figure out like what is that restricted portion 880.43s - 884.73s | and what to do with it. 884.73s - 888.15s | I'll give one example that I think about 888.15s - 892.41s | and it may be relevant also in general aviation as well, 892.43s - 896.75s | which is basically even if the device you're collecting from 896.75s - 900.75s | is not of some sophisticated protected 900.75s - 902.79s | or classified origin, 902.79s - 906.47s | if it has the ability to collect things near it 906.47s - 909.61s | that are highly classified or protected, 909.61s - 911.35s | then the data that's collected 911.35s - 914.11s | then is classified at that level. 914.11s - 916.31s | So we might fly something like say an F-16 916.31s - 917.99s | next to something maybe more classified, 917.99s - 920.51s | like say, I don't know, an F-22 or something, right? 921.17s - 923.37s | That data would become much more classified 923.37s - 926.49s | because it collected near something of high importance. 926.49s - 928.53s | And so, yeah, I could imagine some examples 928.53s - 930.89s | in civil aviation where that could take place. 930.89s - 933.05s | The next is the ability to do stuff with the data. 933.05s - 934.57s | So you need to be able to bring that data 934.57s - 936.85s | into an environment where you can try and do stuff. 936.85s - 939.69s | And so what we did is we actually like produced 939.69s - 941.49s | these really permissive


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sophisticated protected 900.75s - 902.79s | or classified origin, 902.79s - 906.47s | if it has the ability to collect things near it 906.47s - 909.61s | that are highly classified or protected, 909.61s - 911.35s | then the data that's collected 911.35s - 914.11s | then is classified at that level. 914.11s - 916.31s | So we might fly something like say an F-16 916.31s - 917.99s | next to something maybe more classified, 917.99s - 920.51s | like say, I don't know, an F-22 or something, right? 921.17s - 923.37s | That data would become much more classified 923.37s - 926.49s | because it collected near something of high importance. 926.49s - 928.53s | And so, yeah, I could imagine some examples 928.53s - 930.89s | in civil aviation where that could take place. 930.89s - 933.05s | The next is the ability to do stuff with the data. 933.05s - 934.57s | So you need to be able to bring that data 934.57s - 936.85s | into an environment where you can try and do stuff. 936.85s - 939.69s | And so what we did is we actually like produced 939.69s - 941.49s | these really permissive environments 941.49s - 943.77s | that isolated the protected data 943.77s - 945.57s | and allowed people to do stuff with it. 945.57s - 946.41s | Then you employ the effects 946.41s - 948.13s | and that's how it kind of generalizes. 948.13s - 950.19s | Okay, back to you. 950.57s - 954.03s | So anytime I hear classification, 954.03s - 957.93s | I see a lot of my civil colleagues roll their eyes. 957.93s - 959.61s | I just think we have the exact same thing. 959.61s - 961.01s | We just call it proprietary data 961.01s - 963.11s | and different versions of that. 963.11s - 965.13s | There's actually a lot of generalizations 965.13s - 967.13s | between those two problem sets. 968.05s - 973.05s | I want to just throw out a couple thoughts and perspectives. 973.61s - 976.97s | Number one, I hear a lot of companies in aerospace say, 976.97s - 979.95s | hey, we're already collecting like more data off of systems 979.97s - 981.53s | than we know what to do with. 981.53s - 983.81s | And I think that that's actually a fallacy. 983.81s - 986.41s | I think that we


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environments 941.49s - 943.77s | that isolated the protected data 943.77s - 945.57s | and allowed people to do stuff with it. 945.57s - 946.41s | Then you employ the effects 946.41s - 948.13s | and that's how it kind of generalizes. 948.13s - 950.19s | Okay, back to you. 950.57s - 954.03s | So anytime I hear classification, 954.03s - 957.93s | I see a lot of my civil colleagues roll their eyes. 957.93s - 959.61s | I just think we have the exact same thing. 959.61s - 961.01s | We just call it proprietary data 961.01s - 963.11s | and different versions of that. 963.11s - 965.13s | There's actually a lot of generalizations 965.13s - 967.13s | between those two problem sets. 968.05s - 973.05s | I want to just throw out a couple thoughts and perspectives. 973.61s - 976.97s | Number one, I hear a lot of companies in aerospace say, 976.97s - 979.95s | hey, we're already collecting like more data off of systems 979.97s - 981.53s | than we know what to do with. 981.53s - 983.81s | And I think that that's actually a fallacy. 983.81s - 986.41s | I think that we can do a significantly better job 986.41s - 990.29s | actually instrumenting, especially fly-by-wire assets 990.29s - 993.65s | and must do that for safety, reliability, 993.65s - 994.53s | it's really good business 994.53s - 997.09s | or an economic efficiency reasons to do that. 997.09s - 1002.05s | But the order of magnitude data problem 1002.05s - 1004.57s | that a lot of people complain about, 1004.57s - 1005.93s | like what would we do with all of this? 1005.93s - 1007.89s | It's expensive to collect and record all of that. 1008.87s - 1011.75s | I think that folks in aerospace that say that 1011.75s - 1013.87s | don't really appreciate how other industries 1013.87s - 1014.83s | have solved that problem 1014.83s - 1017.27s | and how important and useful that data is. 1017.27s - 1022.27s | That data also, I am worried about how collected aviation 1022.99s - 1026.27s | aggregated or desensitized data 1026.27s - 1028.15s | makes its way into the policy process 1028.15s - 1030.71s | because I actually don't see a lot of examples of that. 1030.71s - 1033.87s | I think that there are tremendous data silos in industry. 1033.87s


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can do a significantly better job 986.41s - 990.29s | actually instrumenting, especially fly-by-wire assets 990.29s - 993.65s | and must do that for safety, reliability, 993.65s - 994.53s | it's really good business 994.53s - 997.09s | or an economic efficiency reasons to do that. 997.09s - 1002.05s | But the order of magnitude data problem 1002.05s - 1004.57s | that a lot of people complain about, 1004.57s - 1005.93s | like what would we do with all of this? 1005.93s - 1007.89s | It's expensive to collect and record all of that. 1008.87s - 1011.75s | I think that folks in aerospace that say that 1011.75s - 1013.87s | don't really appreciate how other industries 1013.87s - 1014.83s | have solved that problem 1014.83s - 1017.27s | and how important and useful that data is. 1017.27s - 1022.27s | That data also, I am worried about how collected aviation 1022.99s - 1026.27s | aggregated or desensitized data 1026.27s - 1028.15s | makes its way into the policy process 1028.15s - 1030.71s | because I actually don't see a lot of examples of that. 1030.71s - 1033.87s | I think that there are tremendous data silos in industry. 1033.87s - 1037.11s | You have operators that have data insights, 1037.13s - 1038.61s | OEMs that have data insights. 1038.61s - 1041.35s | Those two often do not share appropriately. 1041.35s - 1043.21s | And then almost the last people 1043.21s - 1045.55s | to kind of get high level insights, 1045.55s - 1049.13s | knowledge out of that are regulatory bodies. 1049.13s - 1050.79s | And so breaking down those silos, 1050.79s - 1053.61s | I think actually has a tremendous impact on safety 1053.61s - 1055.47s | and the security conversation. 1056.61s - 1059.69s | So the whole data, what the Air Force calls an OODA loop, 1059.69s - 1060.83s | it's a learning cycle. 1061.93s - 1063.61s | In civil aviation, 1063.73s - 1067.51s | there's a real significant policy problem, 1067.51s - 1071.03s | which is that we've learned over time to build safe systems. 1071.87s - 1074.75s | We have really strict software development, 1074.75s - 1076.95s | testing and approval processes 1076.95s - 1078.79s | to make sure that an aircraft 1078.79s - 1081.19s | and the software on it is safe to fly. 1081.19s - 1083.53s | And we wanna reduce that risk


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- 1037.11s | You have operators that have data insights, 1037.13s - 1038.61s | OEMs that have data insights. 1038.61s - 1041.35s | Those two often do not share appropriately. 1041.35s - 1043.21s | And then almost the last people 1043.21s - 1045.55s | to kind of get high level insights, 1045.55s - 1049.13s | knowledge out of that are regulatory bodies. 1049.13s - 1050.79s | And so breaking down those silos, 1050.79s - 1053.61s | I think actually has a tremendous impact on safety 1053.61s - 1055.47s | and the security conversation. 1056.61s - 1059.69s | So the whole data, what the Air Force calls an OODA loop, 1059.69s - 1060.83s | it's a learning cycle. 1061.93s - 1063.61s | In civil aviation, 1063.73s - 1067.51s | there's a real significant policy problem, 1067.51s - 1071.03s | which is that we've learned over time to build safe systems. 1071.87s - 1074.75s | We have really strict software development, 1074.75s - 1076.95s | testing and approval processes 1076.95s - 1078.79s | to make sure that an aircraft 1078.79s - 1081.19s | and the software on it is safe to fly. 1081.19s - 1083.53s | And we wanna reduce that risk as much as possible. 1083.53s - 1085.87s | But that means that it takes a lot of time 1085.87s - 1088.43s | and a lot of money in order to make changes 1088.43s - 1090.31s | to important software systems. 1090.31s - 1092.23s | There's a talk at 12 that's gonna dive 1092.23s - 1095.21s | into all the nuance there, 1095.21s - 1097.01s | different design assurance levels. 1097.01s - 1099.17s | Like you obviously are gonna put more attention 1099.17s - 1101.79s | to things that are what they call DAL-A, 1101.79s - 1103.73s | the most important computers on board a plane, 1103.73s - 1105.29s | as opposed to the things that don't matter 1105.29s - 1107.03s | or not safety critical. 1107.03s - 1109.91s | But this is directly at odds with a patching process, 1109.91s - 1111.87s | which fundamentally does not exist. 1111.87s - 1113.59s | So from a policy perspective, 1114.43s - 1116.11s | really nobody has figured out yet 1116.11s - 1121.11s | if you identify a zero day on an avionics computer, 1121.27s - 1124.85s | that is really important for the function of that aircraft. 1124.85s - 1129.85s | How


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as much as possible. 1083.53s - 1085.87s | But that means that it takes a lot of time 1085.87s - 1088.43s | and a lot of money in order to make changes 1088.43s - 1090.31s | to important software systems. 1090.31s - 1092.23s | There's a talk at 12 that's gonna dive 1092.23s - 1095.21s | into all the nuance there, 1095.21s - 1097.01s | different design assurance levels. 1097.01s - 1099.17s | Like you obviously are gonna put more attention 1099.17s - 1101.79s | to things that are what they call DAL-A, 1101.79s - 1103.73s | the most important computers on board a plane, 1103.73s - 1105.29s | as opposed to the things that don't matter 1105.29s - 1107.03s | or not safety critical. 1107.03s - 1109.91s | But this is directly at odds with a patching process, 1109.91s - 1111.87s | which fundamentally does not exist. 1111.87s - 1113.59s | So from a policy perspective, 1114.43s - 1116.11s | really nobody has figured out yet 1116.11s - 1121.11s | if you identify a zero day on an avionics computer, 1121.27s - 1124.85s | that is really important for the function of that aircraft. 1124.85s - 1129.85s | How do you quickly spin a fix and then propagate that 1130.11s - 1133.07s | without either grounding the fleet in the interim 1133.07s - 1135.41s | or just ignoring that problem, 1135.41s - 1136.63s | working on it in the background, 1136.63s - 1139.43s | letting everybody probably not even know 1139.43s - 1140.63s | that there's a potential risk 1140.63s - 1142.71s | and then rolling out a software update 1142.71s - 1143.55s | once it goes through 1143.55s - 1146.23s | the normal software development process. 1146.23s - 1150.25s | And there's different DO, 178, 360, et cetera. 1150.25s - 1153.97s | So that's really interesting 1153.97s - 1157.69s | that we have both safety and a lack of security processes, 1157.69s - 1161.21s | but adapting existing IT security processes 1161.21s - 1163.97s | such as patching will come into direct conflict 1163.97s - 1166.33s | with the way that we build, certify, test 1166.33s - 1167.77s | and deliver software today. 1168.97s - 1172.61s | The instrumentation and data kind of loop 1172.61s - 1175.97s | and the time horizons there all intersect. 1175.97s - 1178.33s | And back to the legislation, 1179.17s - 1183.81s |


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do you quickly spin a fix and then propagate that 1130.11s - 1133.07s | without either grounding the fleet in the interim 1133.07s - 1135.41s | or just ignoring that problem, 1135.41s - 1136.63s | working on it in the background, 1136.63s - 1139.43s | letting everybody probably not even know 1139.43s - 1140.63s | that there's a potential risk 1140.63s - 1142.71s | and then rolling out a software update 1142.71s - 1143.55s | once it goes through 1143.55s - 1146.23s | the normal software development process. 1146.23s - 1150.25s | And there's different DO, 178, 360, et cetera. 1150.25s - 1153.97s | So that's really interesting 1153.97s - 1157.69s | that we have both safety and a lack of security processes, 1157.69s - 1161.21s | but adapting existing IT security processes 1161.21s - 1163.97s | such as patching will come into direct conflict 1163.97s - 1166.33s | with the way that we build, certify, test 1166.33s - 1167.77s | and deliver software today. 1168.97s - 1172.61s | The instrumentation and data kind of loop 1172.61s - 1175.97s | and the time horizons there all intersect. 1175.97s - 1178.33s | And back to the legislation, 1179.17s - 1183.81s | there's now a committee that's gonna be stood up 1183.81s - 1185.57s | to try and grapple with these issues. 1185.57s - 1188.09s | And the way that we can all get involved 1188.09s - 1192.13s | is that there's a request for comment 1192.13s - 1194.53s | in a process that many of us are familiar with. 1194.53s - 1196.21s | A lot of people underutilize that 1196.21s - 1198.29s | or when they do comment and candidly, 1198.29s - 1203.29s | a lot of the comments are not offering solutions 1203.41s - 1204.81s | or not really technically rich. 1204.81s - 1206.41s | Like if you have thoughts and opinions 1206.41s - 1210.09s | on how these processes or how specific technology 1210.09s - 1213.65s | should be implemented, it is fascinating to me 1213.65s - 1216.13s | to have seen examples of how individual comments 1216.13s - 1218.49s | get bubbled up and actually like discussed 1218.49s - 1220.93s | in the committees that actually set the rules 1220.93s - 1224.65s | and the regulations for how this law is implemented 1224.65s - 1226.57s | and how safety technologies actually get rolled out. 1226.57s - 1229.25s |


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there's now a committee that's gonna be stood up 1183.81s - 1185.57s | to try and grapple with these issues. 1185.57s - 1188.09s | And the way that we can all get involved 1188.09s - 1192.13s | is that there's a request for comment 1192.13s - 1194.53s | in a process that many of us are familiar with. 1194.53s - 1196.21s | A lot of people underutilize that 1196.21s - 1198.29s | or when they do comment and candidly, 1198.29s - 1203.29s | a lot of the comments are not offering solutions 1203.41s - 1204.81s | or not really technically rich. 1204.81s - 1206.41s | Like if you have thoughts and opinions 1206.41s - 1210.09s | on how these processes or how specific technology 1210.09s - 1213.65s | should be implemented, it is fascinating to me 1213.65s - 1216.13s | to have seen examples of how individual comments 1216.13s - 1218.49s | get bubbled up and actually like discussed 1218.49s - 1220.93s | in the committees that actually set the rules 1220.93s - 1224.65s | and the regulations for how this law is implemented 1224.65s - 1226.57s | and how safety technologies actually get rolled out. 1226.57s - 1229.25s | So I would encourage everybody to actually check that out. 1229.25s - 1232.69s | If you see a component of this problem, that's interesting 1232.69s - 1235.25s | and you wanna get that voice out there. 1236.01s - 1237.69s | There's both kind of a government-sponsored 1237.69s - 1240.29s | and an industry-sponsored side to this world. 1240.29s - 1243.57s | And so for those that are unaware, 1243.57s - 1247.37s | there's a set of committees run by an organization 1247.37s - 1250.89s | called RTCA that essentially builds all of this. 1250.89s - 1253.61s | It usually has representation from government 1253.61s - 1256.01s | but mostly industry-focused. 1256.01s - 1259.33s | And these two things intersect at higher policy levels 1259.33s - 1262.65s | but it's really important to kind of interface with both. 1262.69s - 1265.73s | So we, just looking at the clock, 1265.73s - 1267.97s | actually wanted to reserve a bunch of time 1267.97s - 1270.29s | with all of this background for questions. 1271.17s - 1272.93s | I know that we have a lot of experience in the audience. 1272.93s - 1276.89s | So I think we will, we're just gonna ask


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So I would encourage everybody to actually check that out. 1229.25s - 1232.69s | If you see a component of this problem, that's interesting 1232.69s - 1235.25s | and you wanna get that voice out there. 1236.01s - 1237.69s | There's both kind of a government-sponsored 1237.69s - 1240.29s | and an industry-sponsored side to this world. 1240.29s - 1243.57s | And so for those that are unaware, 1243.57s - 1247.37s | there's a set of committees run by an organization 1247.37s - 1250.89s | called RTCA that essentially builds all of this. 1250.89s - 1253.61s | It usually has representation from government 1253.61s - 1256.01s | but mostly industry-focused. 1256.01s - 1259.33s | And these two things intersect at higher policy levels 1259.33s - 1262.65s | but it's really important to kind of interface with both. 1262.69s - 1265.73s | So we, just looking at the clock, 1265.73s - 1267.97s | actually wanted to reserve a bunch of time 1267.97s - 1270.29s | with all of this background for questions. 1271.17s - 1272.93s | I know that we have a lot of experience in the audience. 1272.93s - 1276.89s | So I think we will, we're just gonna ask Stuart 1276.89s - 1279.21s | if you wanna talk about hackathons 1279.21s - 1282.55s | and I wanna preface the Air Force, 1284.05s - 1287.29s | your component here that I'm really excited 1287.29s - 1289.77s | to have seen the Aviation Village at DEF CON. 1290.77s - 1292.37s | Are we out of, are we looking? 1293.65s - 1296.65s | Oh, get out, are you serious? 1296.65s - 1297.77s | All right, well, we won't hold you that long. 1297.77s - 1299.33s | We'll give you some time. 1299.33s - 1302.45s | But really excited to see how the Aviation Village 1302.45s - 1303.93s | has evolved over the last couple of years 1303.93s - 1305.85s | and that major manufacturers are showing up 1305.85s - 1306.79s | and participating. 1308.01s - 1313.01s | However, there still is, I think, a lot of work to be done 1314.37s - 1318.25s | in terms of looking at pen testing, building processes 1318.25s - 1320.69s | and providing protections for security researchers 1320.69s - 1324.65s | to do more work, especially on core avionic elements 1324.65s - 1326.41s | where you can't buy this stuff on eBay. 1326.41s - 1328.45s |


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Stuart 1276.89s - 1279.21s | if you wanna talk about hackathons 1279.21s - 1282.55s | and I wanna preface the Air Force, 1284.05s - 1287.29s | your component here that I'm really excited 1287.29s - 1289.77s | to have seen the Aviation Village at DEF CON. 1290.77s - 1292.37s | Are we out of, are we looking? 1293.65s - 1296.65s | Oh, get out, are you serious? 1296.65s - 1297.77s | All right, well, we won't hold you that long. 1297.77s - 1299.33s | We'll give you some time. 1299.33s - 1302.45s | But really excited to see how the Aviation Village 1302.45s - 1303.93s | has evolved over the last couple of years 1303.93s - 1305.85s | and that major manufacturers are showing up 1305.85s - 1306.79s | and participating. 1308.01s - 1313.01s | However, there still is, I think, a lot of work to be done 1314.37s - 1318.25s | in terms of looking at pen testing, building processes 1318.25s - 1320.69s | and providing protections for security researchers 1320.69s - 1324.65s | to do more work, especially on core avionic elements 1324.65s - 1326.41s | where you can't buy this stuff on eBay. 1326.41s - 1328.45s | So there's first like an access problem. 1328.45s - 1330.29s | How do you get access to the tech? 1330.29s - 1333.65s | Second, a lot of the work that's been done 1333.65s - 1337.69s | in the IT industry when it comes to bug bounties 1337.69s - 1339.43s | and reporting processes and protections 1339.43s - 1341.57s | for security researchers needs to kind of be ported 1341.57s - 1342.77s | over to aviation. 1342.77s - 1344.89s | And the Air Force has done some really cool stuff here 1344.89s - 1347.53s | with the Bravo program. 1347.53s - 1349.49s | So Stuart, can you talk a little bit about 1349.49s - 1351.81s | how you stood that up and how it resulted 1351.81s - 1353.53s | and what civil aviation can learn? 1354.57s - 1355.41s | Yeah, sure. 1355.41s - 1359.29s | So it's kind of, it's not so different from, 1359.29s - 1360.57s | and it's an honor to be here at DEF CON. 1360.57s - 1363.59s | I've been an admirer, but this is my first time here. 1364.89s - 1367.73s | But basically what we did is we started 1367.73s - 1371.01s | with this


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So there's first like an access problem. 1328.45s - 1330.29s | How do you get access to the tech? 1330.29s - 1333.65s | Second, a lot of the work that's been done 1333.65s - 1337.69s | in the IT industry when it comes to bug bounties 1337.69s - 1339.43s | and reporting processes and protections 1339.43s - 1341.57s | for security researchers needs to kind of be ported 1341.57s - 1342.77s | over to aviation. 1342.77s - 1344.89s | And the Air Force has done some really cool stuff here 1344.89s - 1347.53s | with the Bravo program. 1347.53s - 1349.49s | So Stuart, can you talk a little bit about 1349.49s - 1351.81s | how you stood that up and how it resulted 1351.81s - 1353.53s | and what civil aviation can learn? 1354.57s - 1355.41s | Yeah, sure. 1355.41s - 1359.29s | So it's kind of, it's not so different from, 1359.29s - 1360.57s | and it's an honor to be here at DEF CON. 1360.57s - 1363.59s | I've been an admirer, but this is my first time here. 1364.89s - 1367.73s | But basically what we did is we started 1367.73s - 1371.01s | with this premise as described of what can we do 1371.01s - 1373.69s | with kind of recorded operational data? 1373.69s - 1375.89s | And similar to the Aviation Village here, 1375.89s - 1377.77s | we basically started running events 1377.77s - 1380.29s | where like engineers from within DOD, 1380.29s - 1382.81s | so these are civilian and military personnel, 1382.81s - 1386.93s | as well as, and actually there was a talk given earlier, 1387.77s - 1391.65s | the DOD lawyer versus open source software developer, 1391.65s - 1394.25s | Rebecca Lively ran that, I think on Friday, 1394.25s - 1396.29s | and really enjoyed that talks. 1396.29s - 1397.95s | And I think that was inspired in part 1397.95s - 1399.01s | by one of these events. 1399.01s - 1401.17s | But basically we ran about 10 of these events, 1401.17s - 1404.31s | ranging in size from around 50, 75 people 1404.31s - 1407.07s | to actually 700, which is pretty large. 1407.07s - 1411.07s | These were classified and protected events, 1411.07s - 1412.43s | but actually any American citizen 1412.43s - 1415.47s | for a number of these events was able to participate. 1415.47s - 1418.17s


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premise as described of what can we do 1371.01s - 1373.69s | with kind of recorded operational data? 1373.69s - 1375.89s | And similar to the Aviation Village here, 1375.89s - 1377.77s | we basically started running events 1377.77s - 1380.29s | where like engineers from within DOD, 1380.29s - 1382.81s | so these are civilian and military personnel, 1382.81s - 1386.93s | as well as, and actually there was a talk given earlier, 1387.77s - 1391.65s | the DOD lawyer versus open source software developer, 1391.65s - 1394.25s | Rebecca Lively ran that, I think on Friday, 1394.25s - 1396.29s | and really enjoyed that talks. 1396.29s - 1397.95s | And I think that was inspired in part 1397.95s - 1399.01s | by one of these events. 1399.01s - 1401.17s | But basically we ran about 10 of these events, 1401.17s - 1404.31s | ranging in size from around 50, 75 people 1404.31s - 1407.07s | to actually 700, which is pretty large. 1407.07s - 1411.07s | These were classified and protected events, 1411.07s - 1412.43s | but actually any American citizen 1412.43s - 1415.47s | for a number of these events was able to participate. 1415.47s - 1418.17s | So like anybody here who's an American citizen 1418.17s - 1420.67s | could have applied and participated. 1420.67s - 1424.91s | We ended up producing about 200 software prototypes 1424.91s - 1428.79s | from real operational data, which is very unusual at DOD. 1428.79s - 1432.31s | Oftentimes the prototypes are produced without the data. 1432.31s - 1434.15s | What did we kind of learn from this? 1434.99s - 1435.83s | I'd say a couple of things. 1435.83s - 1436.65s | So number one, we found that within 1436.65s - 1437.75s | the Department of Defense, 1437.75s - 1440.27s | there's actually a massive set of talent. 1440.27s - 1444.79s | Just like when your number N is so large, 1444.79s - 1447.19s | DOD, I think, I mean, I know Air Force 1447.19s - 1448.71s | has around two million employees, 1448.71s - 1449.99s | I don't know the size of DOD, 1449.99s - 1451.71s | but it's probably around three X that. 1451.71s - 1453.65s | When your N is sufficiently large, 1453.65s - 1456.99s | you just have tinkerers, engineers, 1456.99s - 1461.71s | people who just wanna go play with different systems. 1461.71s - 1464.31s


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| So like anybody here who's an American citizen 1418.17s - 1420.67s | could have applied and participated. 1420.67s - 1424.91s | We ended up producing about 200 software prototypes 1424.91s - 1428.79s | from real operational data, which is very unusual at DOD. 1428.79s - 1432.31s | Oftentimes the prototypes are produced without the data. 1432.31s - 1434.15s | What did we kind of learn from this? 1434.99s - 1435.83s | I'd say a couple of things. 1435.83s - 1436.65s | So number one, we found that within 1436.65s - 1437.75s | the Department of Defense, 1437.75s - 1440.27s | there's actually a massive set of talent. 1440.27s - 1444.79s | Just like when your number N is so large, 1444.79s - 1447.19s | DOD, I think, I mean, I know Air Force 1447.19s - 1448.71s | has around two million employees, 1448.71s - 1449.99s | I don't know the size of DOD, 1449.99s - 1451.71s | but it's probably around three X that. 1451.71s - 1453.65s | When your N is sufficiently large, 1453.65s - 1456.99s | you just have tinkerers, engineers, 1456.99s - 1461.71s | people who just wanna go play with different systems. 1461.71s - 1464.31s | And so we were able to kind of create that opportunity 1464.31s - 1468.39s | across these 10 events and do so as well as international. 1468.39s - 1471.21s | We ran one in Europe, in Germany. 1471.21s - 1474.55s | We ran one in the Indo-PACOM region in Hawaii. 1474.55s - 1477.81s | We ran one in coordination with CENTCOM, 1478.75s - 1480.35s | which they publicly disclosed 1480.35s - 1483.47s | was on counter unmanned aerial systems. 1483.47s - 1485.43s | And so we were able to do some pretty cool 1485.43s - 1487.55s | and interesting things and like inspire a lot of people 1487.55s - 1488.91s | just like DEFCON does every year. 1488.91s - 1491.39s | And so I think we took some inspiration from DEFCON 1492.39s - 1494.79s | and we're able to kind of produce projects, 1494.79s - 1497.07s | some of which we're able to enter 1497.07s - 1498.55s | kind of production within DOD 1498.55s - 1499.79s | and actually make some impact, 1499.79s - 1503.27s | some of which I can't even talk about here, but yeah. 1503.27s - 1507.23s | And then the last slide I'll cover real


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| And so we were able to kind of create that opportunity 1464.31s - 1468.39s | across these 10 events and do so as well as international. 1468.39s - 1471.21s | We ran one in Europe, in Germany. 1471.21s - 1474.55s | We ran one in the Indo-PACOM region in Hawaii. 1474.55s - 1477.81s | We ran one in coordination with CENTCOM, 1478.75s - 1480.35s | which they publicly disclosed 1480.35s - 1483.47s | was on counter unmanned aerial systems. 1483.47s - 1485.43s | And so we were able to do some pretty cool 1485.43s - 1487.55s | and interesting things and like inspire a lot of people 1487.55s - 1488.91s | just like DEFCON does every year. 1488.91s - 1491.39s | And so I think we took some inspiration from DEFCON 1492.39s - 1494.79s | and we're able to kind of produce projects, 1494.79s - 1497.07s | some of which we're able to enter 1497.07s - 1498.55s | kind of production within DOD 1498.55s - 1499.79s | and actually make some impact, 1499.79s - 1503.27s | some of which I can't even talk about here, but yeah. 1503.27s - 1507.23s | And then the last slide I'll cover real quick. 1507.23s - 1510.15s | So those were all kind of like events that we organized, 1510.15s - 1512.19s | but there's so much more happening 1512.19s - 1516.63s | in terms of kind of these events 1516.63s - 1518.23s | where people gather together 1518.23s - 1520.63s | to kind of learn and adapt from data office systems 1520.67s - 1524.51s | or do engage in cyber testing and penetration testing. 1524.51s - 1526.31s | And so these are some of those things 1526.31s - 1527.57s | that have come out of this. 1527.57s - 1529.43s | And it's important to note that like this is occurring 1529.43s - 1530.87s | definitely in the United States 1530.87s - 1534.57s | and with other democratic allies and things like that. 1534.57s - 1537.43s | There was a national security hackathon in El Segundo. 1537.43s - 1539.69s | There was one in Stanford. 1541.15s - 1543.91s | There's been venture capital involved. 1543.91s - 1545.83s | There's been kind of just citizens 1545.83s - 1547.91s | wanting to do this as well. 1547.91s - 1552.07s | In Ukraine, you have the anti-Shaheed hackathon 1552.07s - 1552.91s | that took place, 1552.91s


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quick. 1507.23s - 1510.15s | So those were all kind of like events that we organized, 1510.15s - 1512.19s | but there's so much more happening 1512.19s - 1516.63s | in terms of kind of these events 1516.63s - 1518.23s | where people gather together 1518.23s - 1520.63s | to kind of learn and adapt from data office systems 1520.67s - 1524.51s | or do engage in cyber testing and penetration testing. 1524.51s - 1526.31s | And so these are some of those things 1526.31s - 1527.57s | that have come out of this. 1527.57s - 1529.43s | And it's important to note that like this is occurring 1529.43s - 1530.87s | definitely in the United States 1530.87s - 1534.57s | and with other democratic allies and things like that. 1534.57s - 1537.43s | There was a national security hackathon in El Segundo. 1537.43s - 1539.69s | There was one in Stanford. 1541.15s - 1543.91s | There's been venture capital involved. 1543.91s - 1545.83s | There's been kind of just citizens 1545.83s - 1547.91s | wanting to do this as well. 1547.91s - 1552.07s | In Ukraine, you have the anti-Shaheed hackathon 1552.07s - 1552.91s | that took place, 1552.91s - 1555.27s | focused on basically defending their interests. 1555.27s - 1556.67s | And then you've also got, 1556.67s - 1558.75s | of course this is taking place 1558.75s - 1562.59s | in some kind of, some would say adversarial countries, 1562.59s - 1565.85s | to democratic republics such as in Russia and China 1565.85s - 1567.63s | where they're also using these activities. 1567.63s - 1570.11s | So this is occurring kind of everywhere 1570.11s - 1573.83s | and we're seeing various ways in which it's being employed. 1573.83s - 1575.67s | And I can talk more about that in the questions, 1575.67s - 1577.11s | but Mike, back to you. 1578.03s - 1580.67s | Yeah, so crazy, crazy policy ideas. 1580.67s - 1583.43s | One, it would be really cool to see the FAA 1583.43s - 1585.71s | actually run and sponsor some hackathons 1585.71s - 1588.47s | and also for industry to open their doors 1588.47s - 1592.15s | and make some of the most kind of exclusive 1592.15s - 1596.71s | avionics components that are on many of the planes 1596.71s - 1599.79s | that provide the most seat carrying capacity. 1599.79s - 1603.07s | So


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- 1555.27s | focused on basically defending their interests. 1555.27s - 1556.67s | And then you've also got, 1556.67s - 1558.75s | of course this is taking place 1558.75s - 1562.59s | in some kind of, some would say adversarial countries, 1562.59s - 1565.85s | to democratic republics such as in Russia and China 1565.85s - 1567.63s | where they're also using these activities. 1567.63s - 1570.11s | So this is occurring kind of everywhere 1570.11s - 1573.83s | and we're seeing various ways in which it's being employed. 1573.83s - 1575.67s | And I can talk more about that in the questions, 1575.67s - 1577.11s | but Mike, back to you. 1578.03s - 1580.67s | Yeah, so crazy, crazy policy ideas. 1580.67s - 1583.43s | One, it would be really cool to see the FAA 1583.43s - 1585.71s | actually run and sponsor some hackathons 1585.71s - 1588.47s | and also for industry to open their doors 1588.47s - 1592.15s | and make some of the most kind of exclusive 1592.15s - 1596.71s | avionics components that are on many of the planes 1596.71s - 1599.79s | that provide the most seat carrying capacity. 1599.79s - 1603.07s | So therefore like the highest impact systems, 1603.07s - 1607.27s | it'd be really cool to see more of that made available 1607.35s - 1609.63s | for the community to mess with. 1610.47s - 1614.03s | We have to figure out a patching process, second. 1614.03s - 1616.71s | And we have to figure out how we're gonna balance 1616.71s - 1621.51s | speed with safety and software review. 1621.51s - 1623.31s | That's really tough not to crack, 1623.31s - 1627.19s | but I think that there are really important lessons 1627.19s - 1628.03s | to learn. 1628.03s - 1630.87s | We don't want to move so fast that you have 1631.91s - 1634.19s | the ability for somebody to make a mistake 1634.19s - 1635.75s | like CrowdStrike did the other day. 1635.75s - 1640.47s | But at the same time, we have to quickly address 1640.47s - 1643.47s | emerging threats and new discoveries 1643.47s - 1646.39s | and do so on like a smaller time horizon 1646.39s - 1648.87s | than the 12 or 18 months that it typically takes 1648.87s - 1652.83s | to rush through a DAL-A software change 1652.83s - 1655.91s | to a


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therefore like the highest impact systems, 1603.07s - 1607.27s | it'd be really cool to see more of that made available 1607.35s - 1609.63s | for the community to mess with. 1610.47s - 1614.03s | We have to figure out a patching process, second. 1614.03s - 1616.71s | And we have to figure out how we're gonna balance 1616.71s - 1621.51s | speed with safety and software review. 1621.51s - 1623.31s | That's really tough not to crack, 1623.31s - 1627.19s | but I think that there are really important lessons 1627.19s - 1628.03s | to learn. 1628.03s - 1630.87s | We don't want to move so fast that you have 1631.91s - 1634.19s | the ability for somebody to make a mistake 1634.19s - 1635.75s | like CrowdStrike did the other day. 1635.75s - 1640.47s | But at the same time, we have to quickly address 1640.47s - 1643.47s | emerging threats and new discoveries 1643.47s - 1646.39s | and do so on like a smaller time horizon 1646.39s - 1648.87s | than the 12 or 18 months that it typically takes 1648.87s - 1652.83s | to rush through a DAL-A software change 1652.83s - 1655.91s | to a major component and actually get that proliferated. 1655.91s - 1658.31s | We also have to figure out somehow 1658.31s - 1660.87s | what the policy and economic frameworks are 1660.87s - 1663.75s | that support that to make a more inclusive 1663.75s - 1665.63s | kind of environment to make all that possible. 1666.63s - 1669.39s | We would love to get some feedback from the audience 1669.39s - 1672.07s | and answer any questions or engage in discussion. 1672.07s - 1677.07s | So with that, we'll just pause there and see. 1677.15s - 1679.51s | I will start by posing a question to you guys. 1679.51s - 1682.35s | Which of these crazy ideas that we've thrown out 1682.35s - 1685.07s | or any of the insights here has really resonated 1685.07s - 1687.19s | or you think is a terrible idea? 1688.95s - 1689.79s | Sir. 1745.64s - 1746.52s | Great question. 1746.52s - 1748.52s | The first thing that comes to mind is 1749.32s - 1752.40s | as a technologist, telemetry and real-time monitoring 1752.40s - 1754.48s | sounds like a phenomenal idea. 1754.48s - 1757.40s | And I wanna acknowledge as a pilot 1757.40s - 1758.84s


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major component and actually get that proliferated. 1655.91s - 1658.31s | We also have to figure out somehow 1658.31s - 1660.87s | what the policy and economic frameworks are 1660.87s - 1663.75s | that support that to make a more inclusive 1663.75s - 1665.63s | kind of environment to make all that possible. 1666.63s - 1669.39s | We would love to get some feedback from the audience 1669.39s - 1672.07s | and answer any questions or engage in discussion. 1672.07s - 1677.07s | So with that, we'll just pause there and see. 1677.15s - 1679.51s | I will start by posing a question to you guys. 1679.51s - 1682.35s | Which of these crazy ideas that we've thrown out 1682.35s - 1685.07s | or any of the insights here has really resonated 1685.07s - 1687.19s | or you think is a terrible idea? 1688.95s - 1689.79s | Sir. 1745.64s - 1746.52s | Great question. 1746.52s - 1748.52s | The first thing that comes to mind is 1749.32s - 1752.40s | as a technologist, telemetry and real-time monitoring 1752.40s - 1754.48s | sounds like a phenomenal idea. 1754.48s - 1757.40s | And I wanna acknowledge as a pilot 1757.40s - 1758.84s | the first concern that comes to mind, 1758.84s - 1761.56s | which is like, wait, are they gonna instrument 1761.56s - 1763.60s | and know every single time 1763.60s - 1765.64s | that I don't make an absolutely perfect touchdown? 1765.64s - 1768.20s | And then is my job gonna be potentially at risk 1768.20s - 1770.24s | if I'm on the back half of that curve? 1770.24s - 1772.44s | So that's like the first thing that I wanna share 1772.44s - 1774.36s | that actually came to mind. 1774.36s - 1776.48s | To your point, sorry, could you just restate 1776.48s - 1808.16s | very concisely the final question that you asked? 1808.16s - 1809.44s | Evolving to, yeah. 1809.44s - 1811.64s | Okay, so my thoughts on this 1811.64s - 1815.12s | from a crew alerting perspective. 1815.12s - 1819.36s | Just really, really quick to bring us all up to speed. 1820.52s - 1821.92s | I think it's really important to acknowledge 1821.92s - 1824.80s | that one of the fundamental and most important things 1824.80s - 1827.32s | that a crew does obviously is decision-making 1827.32s - 1830.76s | and you want to preserve


