# MediaChunks

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over 50 of these newspaper ads. Here you see one. It was 423.10s - 433.02s | published in 1853. If we have a closer look, this one is the same. We clearly see that it is 433.02s - 443.30s | encrypted. And there's no obvious way to decipher this message. So, it's certainly not clear what it 443.30s - 454.62s | means. Let's now go ahead for 130 years to the year 1980. In 1980, the Times, so the same 454.66s - 461.18s | newspaper, published one of these messages again. Apparently, they didn't realize that there was a 461.18s - 467.74s | whole series of these messages. So, they only found one. And they wondered what it meant. And so, 467.74s - 475.06s | they published it. And they challenged their readers to solve it. But there was no success. So, 475.06s - 482.34s | apparently, none of the Times readers in 1980 was able to break this encryption. The only thing 482.34s - 491.70s | that was found out is that these numbers and letters that are marked here probably referred to latitude 491.70s - 500.02s | and longitude. And it leads to a place in northern Canada. Well, this is certainly unusual because in 500.02s - 509.94s | the 1850s, not very many people traveled to northern Canada. So, this is certainly unusual. And one 509.94s - 517.22s | reader of the Times in 1980 suspected, well, this might have got to do with the Franklin edition. I 517.22s - 524.18s | don't know if you're familiar with the Franklin edition. Sorry, with the Franklin expedition. But if 524.18s - 527.74s | you're not, Ilanka is going to tell you what it was. 529.14s - 538.50s | So, the Franklin expedition. This was one of the great mysteries of the late 1800s. So, there was Lord 538.58s - 547.78s | John Franklin. And he started an expedition in 1845. It was a British naval expedition. He had 547.78s - 554.18s | two ships. They were called the Terror and the Erebus. The reason they had these names is because 554.18s - 560.18s | originally they had been warships. And the theory was is that because they were warships and they 560.18s - 568.42s | were built very, very strongly, that they would be able to be good icebreakers going into the 568.42s - 577.06s | ice packs


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Well, this is certainly unusual because in 500.02s - 509.94s | the 1850s, not very many people traveled to northern Canada. So, this is certainly unusual. And one 509.94s - 517.22s | reader of the Times in 1980 suspected, well, this might have got to do with the Franklin edition. I 517.22s - 524.18s | don't know if you're familiar with the Franklin edition. Sorry, with the Franklin expedition. But if 524.18s - 527.74s | you're not, Ilanka is going to tell you what it was. 529.14s - 538.50s | So, the Franklin expedition. This was one of the great mysteries of the late 1800s. So, there was Lord 538.58s - 547.78s | John Franklin. And he started an expedition in 1845. It was a British naval expedition. He had 547.78s - 554.18s | two ships. They were called the Terror and the Erebus. The reason they had these names is because 554.18s - 560.18s | originally they had been warships. And the theory was is that because they were warships and they 560.18s - 568.42s | were built very, very strongly, that they would be able to be good icebreakers going into the 568.42s - 577.06s | ice packs above north of Canada. The goal was to find this northwest passage. So, instead of going 577.06s - 584.98s | south around South America, was it possible to go north, northwest, and get to Asia that way? 585.54s - 594.58s | So, this particular expedition, they set off from England from great fanfare. They stopped off in 594.58s - 602.26s | Greenland to get some supplies and to offload a couple of sailors who had fallen ill. And then 602.26s - 613.36s | they headed west across the Baffin Bay and vanished. Nothing was heard from them. No one else 613.36s - 622.40s | saw them. Now, it was a five-year mission. So, it wasn't entirely surprising. But a couple years 622.40s - 631.92s | went by and then Lady Franklin started beating the drum and, hey, where's my husband? And so, 631.92s - 640.80s | she was going to the Admiralty and demanding that they set off some search expeditions, find out 640.80s - 651.76s | what had happened to these two ships. So, nothing was found from them. And it was actually 150 years 651.76s - 662.48s | later that the ships were finally found, right? 150? Yeah.


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above north of Canada. The goal was to find this northwest passage. So, instead of going 577.06s - 584.98s | south around South America, was it possible to go north, northwest, and get to Asia that way? 585.54s - 594.58s | So, this particular expedition, they set off from England from great fanfare. They stopped off in 594.58s - 602.26s | Greenland to get some supplies and to offload a couple of sailors who had fallen ill. And then 602.26s - 613.36s | they headed west across the Baffin Bay and vanished. Nothing was heard from them. No one else 613.36s - 622.40s | saw them. Now, it was a five-year mission. So, it wasn't entirely surprising. But a couple years 622.40s - 631.92s | went by and then Lady Franklin started beating the drum and, hey, where's my husband? And so, 631.92s - 640.80s | she was going to the Admiralty and demanding that they set off some search expeditions, find out 640.80s - 651.76s | what had happened to these two ships. So, nothing was found from them. And it was actually 150 years 651.76s - 662.48s | later that the ships were finally found, right? 150? Yeah. So, in 2014 and 2016, the ships were located 663.28s - 670.00s | off of King William Island. The Terror was found in the coincidentally named Terror Bay. 670.64s - 677.76s | And then south of it was the Erebus. Now, many books have been written about the Franklin 677.76s - 684.56s | expedition because it was this great mystery of why did they disappear? Had aliens come down 684.56s - 691.92s | and got them? Or had they, you know, some sort of sea monster had sunk their ships? So, basically, 691.92s - 697.92s | anyone who wanted could come up with any theory that they wanted. And as I said, there were many 697.92s - 704.16s | different rescue expeditions that were sent. There was this great reward that was offered. This is 704.16s - 712.72s | just a few of the expeditions. There were many more. And now, let's come back to that classified ad. 713.36s - 720.64s | Did it have anything to do with the Franklin expedition? Was there some relationship between 720.64s - 726.24s | the ad and the Franklin expedition or the ad and one of the rescue expeditions? 728.64s - 737.04s |


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So, in 2014 and 2016, the ships were located 663.28s - 670.00s | off of King William Island. The Terror was found in the coincidentally named Terror Bay. 670.64s - 677.76s | And then south of it was the Erebus. Now, many books have been written about the Franklin 677.76s - 684.56s | expedition because it was this great mystery of why did they disappear? Had aliens come down 684.56s - 691.92s | and got them? Or had they, you know, some sort of sea monster had sunk their ships? So, basically, 691.92s - 697.92s | anyone who wanted could come up with any theory that they wanted. And as I said, there were many 697.92s - 704.16s | different rescue expeditions that were sent. There was this great reward that was offered. This is 704.16s - 712.72s | just a few of the expeditions. There were many more. And now, let's come back to that classified ad. 713.36s - 720.64s | Did it have anything to do with the Franklin expedition? Was there some relationship between 720.64s - 726.24s | the ad and the Franklin expedition or the ad and one of the rescue expeditions? 728.64s - 737.04s | Yes. So, let's now come back to this article in the Times in 1980 when the readers were 737.04s - 744.80s | challenged to break this encrypted advertisement from the 1850s. Well, as I said, in 1980, 744.80s - 751.60s | nobody was able to solve this mystery. But 12 years later, this article was published by 751.84s - 759.52s | British encryption expert named John Rapson. He published this article in Cryptoloja, which is 760.80s - 766.48s | a scientific journal dedicated to crypto history mainly. And in this article, he 768.00s - 775.44s | introduced the solution of this mystery. So, this is the advertisement he looked at. 776.00s - 783.20s | And when he analyzed this advertisement, well, he saw it mainly consists of four letter groups 784.48s - 793.28s | and of some three letter groups. And the letters used here or the lowercase letters all run from 793.28s - 799.92s | G to Q, excluding the J, which means that there are 10 different lowercase letters used here. 800.00s - 808.08s | There are also a couple of capital letters running from B to F. And in addition, the S was used. 808.72s - 814.80s


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Yes. So, let's now come back to this article in the Times in 1980 when the readers were 737.04s - 744.80s | challenged to break this encrypted advertisement from the 1850s. Well, as I said, in 1980, 744.80s - 751.60s | nobody was able to solve this mystery. But 12 years later, this article was published by 751.84s - 759.52s | British encryption expert named John Rapson. He published this article in Cryptoloja, which is 760.80s - 766.48s | a scientific journal dedicated to crypto history mainly. And in this article, he 768.00s - 775.44s | introduced the solution of this mystery. So, this is the advertisement he looked at. 776.00s - 783.20s | And when he analyzed this advertisement, well, he saw it mainly consists of four letter groups 784.48s - 793.28s | and of some three letter groups. And the letters used here or the lowercase letters all run from 793.28s - 799.92s | G to Q, excluding the J, which means that there are 10 different lowercase letters used here. 800.00s - 808.08s | There are also a couple of capital letters running from B to F. And in addition, the S was used. 808.72s - 814.80s | And there was also some clear text in this message. For example, the signature at the end, 815.76s - 819.84s | JEDW is clearly not an encryption. It's an abbreviation. 821.60s - 827.04s | Well, if one is familiar with the encryption systems used in the 19th century, 827.04s - 832.96s | it's quite obvious that a codebook was used here, or it's at least very likely. Ilanka has 833.68s - 839.04s | introduced a few, or at least one advertisement that was apparently encrypted with a codebook. 839.76s - 845.76s | And this is not a new situation for codebreakers because many codebook encrypted messages were 845.76s - 852.40s | created over the centuries. And the best way to break a codebook encrypted message is usually 852.64s - 861.84s | to find the codebook that was used. Not very surprising, but this method usually very often 861.84s - 868.40s | works quite well because there were not too many codebooks in use, at least if you know when a 868.40s - 874.72s | message was created and who created it. You usually can tell, well, if it was in the military, maybe 874.72s - 881.52s | it was


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| And there was also some clear text in this message. For example, the signature at the end, 815.76s - 819.84s | JEDW is clearly not an encryption. It's an abbreviation. 821.60s - 827.04s | Well, if one is familiar with the encryption systems used in the 19th century, 827.04s - 832.96s | it's quite obvious that a codebook was used here, or it's at least very likely. Ilanka has 833.68s - 839.04s | introduced a few, or at least one advertisement that was apparently encrypted with a codebook. 839.76s - 845.76s | And this is not a new situation for codebreakers because many codebook encrypted messages were 845.76s - 852.40s | created over the centuries. And the best way to break a codebook encrypted message is usually 852.64s - 861.84s | to find the codebook that was used. Not very surprising, but this method usually very often 861.84s - 868.40s | works quite well because there were not too many codebooks in use, at least if you know when a 868.40s - 874.72s | message was created and who created it. You usually can tell, well, if it was in the military, maybe 874.72s - 881.52s | it was a military codebook of the time, or if it was some business-related, maybe it was a business 881.52s - 887.92s | codebook. A codebook can be imagined like a dictionary, so for every word of a language, 887.92s - 897.60s | there's a number or maybe a sequence of letters. And many ciphertexts have been solved by finding 897.60s - 904.64s | the codebook that was used. So the question John Rapson asked himself was, well, is there a 904.64s - 911.20s | codebook or was there a codebook at the time in question that used four letter groups based on 911.20s - 919.44s | the letters from G to Q? And the answer was no, or at least we and John Rapson didn't know of a 919.44s - 927.04s | codebook that matched this requirement. But the letters from G to Q, excluding the J, make exactly 927.04s - 934.56s | ten letters. So maybe the letters were used instead of digits. So maybe the G stands for zero 934.56s - 941.36s | and the H for one and so on. And in fact, John Rapson found a codebook that was a very good 941.36s - 949.04s | match.


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a military codebook of the time, or if it was some business-related, maybe it was a business 881.52s - 887.92s | codebook. A codebook can be imagined like a dictionary, so for every word of a language, 887.92s - 897.60s | there's a number or maybe a sequence of letters. And many ciphertexts have been solved by finding 897.60s - 904.64s | the codebook that was used. So the question John Rapson asked himself was, well, is there a 904.64s - 911.20s | codebook or was there a codebook at the time in question that used four letter groups based on 911.20s - 919.44s | the letters from G to Q? And the answer was no, or at least we and John Rapson didn't know of a 919.44s - 927.04s | codebook that matched this requirement. But the letters from G to Q, excluding the J, make exactly 927.04s - 934.56s | ten letters. So maybe the letters were used instead of digits. So maybe the G stands for zero 934.56s - 941.36s | and the H for one and so on. And in fact, John Rapson found a codebook that was a very good 941.36s - 949.04s | match. It was the so-called Marriott Signal Code. It was introduced in 1817. There were several 949.04s - 958.72s | editions and it was quite popular in the 1850s in England. So this looked like a good guess. If 958.72s - 964.96s | you look into this codebook, you see that it was created for sending a signal or flag signal 964.96s - 971.36s | messages. This is not relevant here. We are not dealing with flags, but it could also be used for 971.36s - 978.36s | any other kind of messages as long as such a message could be noted in digits from zero to nine. 978.52s - 986.52s | Here on the right you see an excerpt from this codebook. So as I said, it's like a dictionary and 986.52s - 992.60s | this one replaces every word of the English language with a number between zero, zero, zero, zero 992.60s - 1002.60s | and nine, nine, nine, nine. Okay, so what did Rapson do? Well, he took one of the advertisements and 1002.60s - 1010.60s | replaced every four-digit word, every letter in a four-digit word with the numbers from zero to 1010.60s - 1018.20s | nine


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It was the so-called Marriott Signal Code. It was introduced in 1817. There were several 949.04s - 958.72s | editions and it was quite popular in the 1850s in England. So this looked like a good guess. If 958.72s - 964.96s | you look into this codebook, you see that it was created for sending a signal or flag signal 964.96s - 971.36s | messages. This is not relevant here. We are not dealing with flags, but it could also be used for 971.36s - 978.36s | any other kind of messages as long as such a message could be noted in digits from zero to nine. 978.52s - 986.52s | Here on the right you see an excerpt from this codebook. So as I said, it's like a dictionary and 986.52s - 992.60s | this one replaces every word of the English language with a number between zero, zero, zero, zero 992.60s - 1002.60s | and nine, nine, nine, nine. Okay, so what did Rapson do? Well, he took one of the advertisements and 1002.60s - 1010.60s | replaced every four-digit word, every letter in a four-digit word with the numbers from zero to 1010.60s - 1018.20s | nine with the table you can see here, the substitution table you can see here. And then he 1018.20s - 1025.08s | applied the codebook, the Marriott codebook, and what did he get? Nothing. Or at least nothing that 1025.08s - 1033.88s | really looked like meaningful text. So maybe the mistake was that the replacement table running 1033.88s - 1043.08s | from zero to nine was wrong. It was certainly a difficult question what else or which other table 1043.08s - 1051.08s | could have been used. So John Rapson looked for crypts, for words he could guess in the ciphertext. 1052.04s - 1062.76s | So here he found one. Here you can see the word IQHL and followed by the word born. So what is 1062.76s - 1070.44s | born? Of course a child is born, a son is born, a daughter is born. This required some guessing but 1070.44s - 1077.80s | one of the hypotheses he tested was, well, let's assume that this stands for son and if this is the 1077.80s - 1090.52s | case IQHL would be replaced by 8196 and maybe this is the correct replacement and if it was the 1090.52s - 1097.16s


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with the table you can see here, the substitution table you can see here. And then he 1018.20s - 1025.08s | applied the codebook, the Marriott codebook, and what did he get? Nothing. Or at least nothing that 1025.08s - 1033.88s | really looked like meaningful text. So maybe the mistake was that the replacement table running 1033.88s - 1043.08s | from zero to nine was wrong. It was certainly a difficult question what else or which other table 1043.08s - 1051.08s | could have been used. So John Rapson looked for crypts, for words he could guess in the ciphertext. 1052.04s - 1062.76s | So here he found one. Here you can see the word IQHL and followed by the word born. So what is 1062.76s - 1070.44s | born? Of course a child is born, a son is born, a daughter is born. This required some guessing but 1070.44s - 1077.80s | one of the hypotheses he tested was, well, let's assume that this stands for son and if this is the 1077.80s - 1090.52s | case IQHL would be replaced by 8196 and maybe this is the correct replacement and if it was the 1090.52s - 1097.16s | correct replacement this would be how a part of the substitution table looked like. Here's 1097.16s - 1105.16s | another crypt he found. Here we have the number three followed by the word MIOQ. So what could 1105.64s - 1112.12s | stand after three? Well, just about anything. Three days, three weeks, three months, three years. 1112.12s - 1120.92s | Again he guessed and tested several hypotheses and one of these was, well, maybe month was the 1120.92s - 1126.92s | correct word used here. And again he created a part of a substitution table based on this 1126.92s - 1136.92s | assumption and, well, the two guesses he had made matched. So this looked quite good. So maybe 1136.92s - 1145.56s | in addition, the replacement table you see here looks quite plausible. It starts with a zero, 1145.56s - 1155.56s | then 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1. This looks like a good guess. So again he tried to decrypt a 1155.56s - 1165.56s | message. He took this message, he replaced the letters in every four letter word with the 1165.56s - 1173.56s | digit according to this table. Then he applied the


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| correct replacement this would be how a part of the substitution table looked like. Here's 1097.16s - 1105.16s | another crypt he found. Here we have the number three followed by the word MIOQ. So what could 1105.64s - 1112.12s | stand after three? Well, just about anything. Three days, three weeks, three months, three years. 1112.12s - 1120.92s | Again he guessed and tested several hypotheses and one of these was, well, maybe month was the 1120.92s - 1126.92s | correct word used here. And again he created a part of a substitution table based on this 1126.92s - 1136.92s | assumption and, well, the two guesses he had made matched. So this looked quite good. So maybe 1136.92s - 1145.56s | in addition, the replacement table you see here looks quite plausible. It starts with a zero, 1145.56s - 1155.56s | then 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1. This looks like a good guess. So again he tried to decrypt a 1155.56s - 1165.56s | message. He took this message, he replaced the letters in every four letter word with the 1165.56s - 1173.56s | digit according to this table. Then he applied the code from the code book and he got meaningful 1173.56s - 1183.56s | text. So apparently this was the correct way to decrypt. Yes. So let's give John Rapson an 1183.64s - 1192.20s | applause because this was a really great piece of cryptanalysis back in 1992. Here we see an 1192.20s - 1199.08s | example. As mentioned, there were not only these four letter groups but also a couple of 1199.08s - 1204.76s | uppercase letters and it now became clear what these uppercase letters mean because the code 1204.76s - 1212.68s | book consists of five parts and one of the parts is divided into subdivisions and apparently each 1213.64s - 1222.92s | capital letter in the message stands for one of the altogether six parts. And this is exactly 1222.92s - 1231.24s | how the encryption and the decryption worked. So here we have the E standing for part 4 and 1231.24s - 1237.72s | this would be part 4 in the code book. Let's now look at the decryption of one of the 1237.72s - 1246.44s | messages. All are well at Bowdoin and so on. And as it seems, as we see now, this latitude


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code from the code book and he got meaningful 1173.56s - 1183.56s | text. So apparently this was the correct way to decrypt. Yes. So let's give John Rapson an 1183.64s - 1192.20s | applause because this was a really great piece of cryptanalysis back in 1992. Here we see an 1192.20s - 1199.08s | example. As mentioned, there were not only these four letter groups but also a couple of 1199.08s - 1204.76s | uppercase letters and it now became clear what these uppercase letters mean because the code 1204.76s - 1212.68s | book consists of five parts and one of the parts is divided into subdivisions and apparently each 1213.64s - 1222.92s | capital letter in the message stands for one of the altogether six parts. And this is exactly 1222.92s - 1231.24s | how the encryption and the decryption worked. So here we have the E standing for part 4 and 1231.24s - 1237.72s | this would be part 4 in the code book. Let's now look at the decryption of one of the 1237.72s - 1246.44s | messages. All are well at Bowdoin and so on. And as it seems, as we see now, this latitude and 1246.44s - 1253.88s | longitude appears to make sense. We are still not really sure what exactly this means being 1253.88s - 1263.88s | accurately seen drifts and so on but at least it's plausible. Here's another plain text. You 1264.44s - 1270.28s | see the original in the upper left corner and this translates to or this decrypts to all are 1270.28s - 1276.28s | well at home and elsewhere. Margaret had another boy in the evening on Christmas Day and so on. 1276.28s - 1286.28s | Well, this is family gossip. It's a little disappointing because of course other encrypted 1286.84s - 1294.52s | messages contain the location of a hidden treasure or politics or important businesses. In this case 1294.52s - 1299.72s | it's about family news but that's also very interesting because family news from the 19th 1299.72s - 1309.32s | century, that's not something you encounter every day. So we tried to decrypt this message. It 1309.80s - 1317.64s | wasn't, it was difficult because some of the words are not, are ambiguous. For example, 1317.64s - 1325.56s | popularity could also mean population. That's not, both words are possible in the code book.


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and 1246.44s - 1253.88s | longitude appears to make sense. We are still not really sure what exactly this means being 1253.88s - 1263.88s | accurately seen drifts and so on but at least it's plausible. Here's another plain text. You 1264.44s - 1270.28s | see the original in the upper left corner and this translates to or this decrypts to all are 1270.28s - 1276.28s | well at home and elsewhere. Margaret had another boy in the evening on Christmas Day and so on. 1276.28s - 1286.28s | Well, this is family gossip. It's a little disappointing because of course other encrypted 1286.84s - 1294.52s | messages contain the location of a hidden treasure or politics or important businesses. In this case 1294.52s - 1299.72s | it's about family news but that's also very interesting because family news from the 19th 1299.72s - 1309.32s | century, that's not something you encounter every day. So we tried to decrypt this message. It 1309.80s - 1317.64s | wasn't, it was difficult because some of the words are not, are ambiguous. For example, 1317.64s - 1325.56s | popularity could also mean population. That's not, both words are possible in the code book. P and 1325.56s - 1333.24s | M, that might stand for Papa and Mama but that's of course also a guess. And this is also a guess 1333.24s - 1340.36s | because the words used here are coal and rich so maybe this refers to a person named Coleridge. 1341.24s - 1348.12s | We don't know but it makes sense in our view. So decryption is difficult, many ambiguities. 1348.92s - 1355.24s | Here's another plain text. This is especially interesting because it mentions two names that 1355.24s - 1362.68s | can be identified, Captain Penny and Captain Austin. And as it turned out, both captains were 1362.68s - 1372.28s | shipmasters who engaged in Franklin rescue expeditions. So we are now back at the Franklin 1373.40s - 1379.56s | and at Franklin and his rescue expeditions, there appears to be a connection. 1379.88s - 1386.44s | Here's a list of some of the most important Franklin rescue expeditions which mainly took 1386.44s - 1396.12s | place or which took place after 1850 when Franklin's wife was calling for help. And if we look 1396.12s - 1403.88s | at the ads, all of them were published between 1850 and 1855


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P and 1325.56s - 1333.24s | M, that might stand for Papa and Mama but that's of course also a guess. And this is also a guess 1333.24s - 1340.36s | because the words used here are coal and rich so maybe this refers to a person named Coleridge. 1341.24s - 1348.12s | We don't know but it makes sense in our view. So decryption is difficult, many ambiguities. 1348.92s - 1355.24s | Here's another plain text. This is especially interesting because it mentions two names that 1355.24s - 1362.68s | can be identified, Captain Penny and Captain Austin. And as it turned out, both captains were 1362.68s - 1372.28s | shipmasters who engaged in Franklin rescue expeditions. So we are now back at the Franklin 1373.40s - 1379.56s | and at Franklin and his rescue expeditions, there appears to be a connection. 1379.88s - 1386.44s | Here's a list of some of the most important Franklin rescue expeditions which mainly took 1386.44s - 1396.12s | place or which took place after 1850 when Franklin's wife was calling for help. And if we look 1396.12s - 1403.88s | at the ads, all of them were published between 1850 and 1855 and this matches exactly with the 1403.88s - 1413.08s | rescue expedition of Richard Collinson. So was it really Richard Collinson who wrote or received 1413.08s - 1421.16s | all these encrypted messages? Well, we'll see. Richard Collinson, here you see a picture of him 1421.16s - 1429.56s | and let's now look at the rescue expedition of Richard Collinson. So Richard Collinson set out 1430.36s - 1440.04s | on a rescue expedition with two ships, one of them being the Enterprise, on a five-year mission 1441.88s - 1448.84s | to go and try to find Franklin's expedition. All right, they did not have any success. 1449.40s - 1457.24s | What they were trying to do is to come around from England, go around and come in 1457.24s - 1464.20s | from the western side to see if they could find him from that direction. No luck. 1466.12s - 1474.12s | There's many books written about his expedition, in part because his brother 1475.24s - 1483.80s | went through his logbooks and wrote another book about Collinson's expedition. And this is one page 1483.80s - 1493.59s | from that where they talk about cipher notices in the times that use


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and this matches exactly with the 1403.88s - 1413.08s | rescue expedition of Richard Collinson. So was it really Richard Collinson who wrote or received 1413.08s - 1421.16s | all these encrypted messages? Well, we'll see. Richard Collinson, here you see a picture of him 1421.16s - 1429.56s | and let's now look at the rescue expedition of Richard Collinson. So Richard Collinson set out 1430.36s - 1440.04s | on a rescue expedition with two ships, one of them being the Enterprise, on a five-year mission 1441.88s - 1448.84s | to go and try to find Franklin's expedition. All right, they did not have any success. 1449.40s - 1457.24s | What they were trying to do is to come around from England, go around and come in 1457.24s - 1464.20s | from the western side to see if they could find him from that direction. No luck. 1466.12s - 1474.12s | There's many books written about his expedition, in part because his brother 1475.24s - 1483.80s | went through his logbooks and wrote another book about Collinson's expedition. And this is one page 1483.80s - 1493.59s | from that where they talk about cipher notices in the times that use the signal book of the 1493.59s - 1504.82s | Royal Navy and that this advertisement was regularly published. So now we know the mystery 1504.82s - 1514.10s | or the purpose of the messages was sought. So we call this the first known secure global 1514.10s - 1520.58s | communication system. His family published encrypted ads in the times. The times was 1520.58s - 1527.70s | available in every major port in the world and he could receive messages from his family during his 1527.70s - 1537.78s | journey. So did the system work? Well, to our knowledge, only in 1855, on his way home, Collinson 1537.78s - 1546.82s | got access to the times in this port in Indonesia called Banguwangi or Banguwangi. And one thing I've 1546.82s - 1553.46s | learned from my research is there are many ways to spell Banguwangi. I have found probably 10 1553.46s - 1560.42s | different ways. And in that page from Collinson's journal, there was a mention of Banguwangi. 1561.14s - 1569.54s | And I was just at the Royal Museum at Greenwich a couple weeks ago going through the logbooks 1569.54s - 1580.98s | of Collinson and found this entry


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the signal book of the 1493.59s - 1504.82s | Royal Navy and that this advertisement was regularly published. So now we know the mystery 1504.82s - 1514.10s | or the purpose of the messages was sought. So we call this the first known secure global 1514.10s - 1520.58s | communication system. His family published encrypted ads in the times. The times was 1520.58s - 1527.70s | available in every major port in the world and he could receive messages from his family during his 1527.70s - 1537.78s | journey. So did the system work? Well, to our knowledge, only in 1855, on his way home, Collinson 1537.78s - 1546.82s | got access to the times in this port in Indonesia called Banguwangi or Banguwangi. And one thing I've 1546.82s - 1553.46s | learned from my research is there are many ways to spell Banguwangi. I have found probably 10 1553.46s - 1560.42s | different ways. And in that page from Collinson's journal, there was a mention of Banguwangi. 1561.14s - 1569.54s | And I was just at the Royal Museum at Greenwich a couple weeks ago going through the logbooks 1569.54s - 1580.98s | of Collinson and found this entry from December 12th, 1854, saying that at 2 p.m. he anchored 1580.98s - 1588.58s | four miles off of Banguwangi at the time. So again, we had that link. Here's the only really 1588.58s - 1595.06s | good picture we've been able to find of Banguwangi. This is when there was an undersea cable that was 1595.06s - 1604.18s | being built and this is from 1871. So when he was in Banguwangi, Collinson was able to get four 1604.18s - 1616.62s | copies of the times and was able to get some news from home that way. Okay, let's now look at the 1616.62s - 1625.02s | situation half a year ago at the beginning of 2024. As I mentioned, the encryption system that 1625.02s - 1632.14s | was used for these advertisements was broken. But while breaking a system and decrypting all the 1632.14s - 1638.54s | messages is of course two different things. In this case, there were 55 messages and not very 1638.54s - 1646.14s | many of them had been really decrypted. And up to that point, no scholar or no expert of the Franklin 1646.94s - 1657.58s | Expedition had read the messages. So


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from December 12th, 1854, saying that at 2 p.m. he anchored 1580.98s - 1588.58s | four miles off of Banguwangi at the time. So again, we had that link. Here's the only really 1588.58s - 1595.06s | good picture we've been able to find of Banguwangi. This is when there was an undersea cable that was 1595.06s - 1604.18s | being built and this is from 1871. So when he was in Banguwangi, Collinson was able to get four 1604.18s - 1616.62s | copies of the times and was able to get some news from home that way. Okay, let's now look at the 1616.62s - 1625.02s | situation half a year ago at the beginning of 2024. As I mentioned, the encryption system that 1625.02s - 1632.14s | was used for these advertisements was broken. But while breaking a system and decrypting all the 1632.14s - 1638.54s | messages is of course two different things. In this case, there were 55 messages and not very 1638.54s - 1646.14s | many of them had been really decrypted. And up to that point, no scholar or no expert of the Franklin 1646.94s - 1657.58s | Expedition had read the messages. So what we did, Ilonka and I, we started a decryption project. We 1657.58s - 1666.14s | introduced our concept at the American Cryptogram Association, ACA, and we were joined by Taylor 1666.14s - 1674.22s | Leach, who is a member of this organization and who took part or who is now taking part in the 1674.22s - 1680.86s | project. And there were other members from the ACA supporting us. We had a virtual meeting at an 1680.86s - 1690.06s | ACA convention in 2023 and a couple of Zoom calls and our goal was to decrypt all the Collinson 1690.06s - 1699.26s | advertisements and this project is still ongoing. Here's a list of all the messages. There are over 1699.26s - 1706.78s | 50. There was one published every month and as you see here, there are gaps. So there were months 1706.78s - 1713.82s | where no message was published and we don't know why. Maybe there were messages but we haven't 1713.82s - 1721.82s | found them. Maybe they were published on the wrong day or maybe the newspaper didn't publish them for 1721.82s - 1731.26s | some reason or there was nothing placed in the


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what we did, Ilonka and I, we started a decryption project. We 1657.58s - 1666.14s | introduced our concept at the American Cryptogram Association, ACA, and we were joined by Taylor 1666.14s - 1674.22s | Leach, who is a member of this organization and who took part or who is now taking part in the 1674.22s - 1680.86s | project. And there were other members from the ACA supporting us. We had a virtual meeting at an 1680.86s - 1690.06s | ACA convention in 2023 and a couple of Zoom calls and our goal was to decrypt all the Collinson 1690.06s - 1699.26s | advertisements and this project is still ongoing. Here's a list of all the messages. There are over 1699.26s - 1706.78s | 50. There was one published every month and as you see here, there are gaps. So there were months 1706.78s - 1713.82s | where no message was published and we don't know why. Maybe there were messages but we haven't 1713.82s - 1721.82s | found them. Maybe they were published on the wrong day or maybe the newspaper didn't publish them for 1721.82s - 1731.26s | some reason or there was nothing placed in the newspaper. We simply don't know. Taylor, he wrote a 1731.26s - 1739.90s | decryption tool based on JavaScript and this decryption tool is available online so if you want to 1739.90s - 1749.10s | try your luck yourself, here's the URL. So Taylor's decryption tool, it contains a code table taken 1749.10s - 1756.94s | from the code book and it includes a section to ignore clear text which appears in messages or in 1756.94s - 1766.94s | many messages such as in or at, so frequent words. And we found out, as already mentioned, this 1766.94s - 1773.02s | decryption work isn't trivial because there are ambiguities so it's not possible to do everything 1773.10s - 1782.06s | with a tool. It always requires some manual cleanup afterwards. Here we have a list of all the 1782.06s - 1789.10s | ciphertext on the left side, all the decryptions of the decryption tool on the right side and in the 1789.10s - 1796.06s | middle the cleaned up versions. So it's of course a lot of work to do all this description work but 1796.14s - 1804.14s | it's very fascinating because as I said this is all about family


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newspaper. We simply don't know. Taylor, he wrote a 1731.26s - 1739.90s | decryption tool based on JavaScript and this decryption tool is available online so if you want to 1739.90s - 1749.10s | try your luck yourself, here's the URL. So Taylor's decryption tool, it contains a code table taken 1749.10s - 1756.94s | from the code book and it includes a section to ignore clear text which appears in messages or in 1756.94s - 1766.94s | many messages such as in or at, so frequent words. And we found out, as already mentioned, this 1766.94s - 1773.02s | decryption work isn't trivial because there are ambiguities so it's not possible to do everything 1773.10s - 1782.06s | with a tool. It always requires some manual cleanup afterwards. Here we have a list of all the 1782.06s - 1789.10s | ciphertext on the left side, all the decryptions of the decryption tool on the right side and in the 1789.10s - 1796.06s | middle the cleaned up versions. So it's of course a lot of work to do all this description work but 1796.14s - 1804.14s | it's very fascinating because as I said this is all about family activities in the 1850s. It's 1804.14s - 1815.58s | a first hand information from what happened in a certain family and well it's a fascinating look 1815.58s - 1822.94s | into history. One important question is well who actually published the ads or who wrote these 1822.94s - 1831.66s | messages? It obviously was somebody from the family or maybe a close friend. Some of the ads 1831.66s - 1839.66s | are signed J.D.W. This is clearly Julia de Winton, the sister of Collinson and some of the 1839.66s - 1847.66s | messages are signed A.C. We are not sure what this means, which person signed A.C. It might be 1848.22s - 1856.22s | another sister of Collinson but we are not sure. Well Julia de Winton who created many of these 1856.22s - 1863.74s | messages was also a novelist in the Victorian era so very interesting. Well honestly I haven't 1863.74s - 1869.90s | ever read any of these books but it's of course interesting to see that a novelist also wrote 1869.90s - 1878.30s | encrypted messages to her brother being on an expedition in northern Canada or wherever in the world. 1882.76s - 1890.60s | So


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activities in the 1850s. It's 1804.14s - 1815.58s | a first hand information from what happened in a certain family and well it's a fascinating look 1815.58s - 1822.94s | into history. One important question is well who actually published the ads or who wrote these 1822.94s - 1831.66s | messages? It obviously was somebody from the family or maybe a close friend. Some of the ads 1831.66s - 1839.66s | are signed J.D.W. This is clearly Julia de Winton, the sister of Collinson and some of the 1839.66s - 1847.66s | messages are signed A.C. We are not sure what this means, which person signed A.C. It might be 1848.22s - 1856.22s | another sister of Collinson but we are not sure. Well Julia de Winton who created many of these 1856.22s - 1863.74s | messages was also a novelist in the Victorian era so very interesting. Well honestly I haven't 1863.74s - 1869.90s | ever read any of these books but it's of course interesting to see that a novelist also wrote 1869.90s - 1878.30s | encrypted messages to her brother being on an expedition in northern Canada or wherever in the world. 1882.76s - 1890.60s | So while we were doing research at the Maritime Library we did find several letters. It's a 1890.60s - 1896.52s | little difficult because they're not entirely in context so there'll be a folder that says 1897.32s - 1903.08s | Collinson letters and just a big stack of letters and so we're kind of going through them and 1903.08s - 1910.44s | we found that some of these were letters from Collinson's other relatives like 1910.44s - 1919.16s | Sophia and Amelia. The addresses were often very creative. For example, so we have somewhere near 1919.16s - 1929.96s | the North Pole and here was another one that said Hong Kong or Arctic Expedition Pacific and so 1929.96s - 1934.44s | they would kind of send it out and hope that it would be passed from ship to ship and hopefully 1934.44s - 1940.44s | end up with their brother ship. So we know now that there were at least two ways of communication. 1940.44s - 1947.80s | We had the newspaper advertisements from Julia and A.C. and letters from Amelia and Sophia. 1950.98s - 1957.38s | And now let's look at the content or at the plaintext of the ads.


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while we were doing research at the Maritime Library we did find several letters. It's a 1890.60s - 1896.52s | little difficult because they're not entirely in context so there'll be a folder that says 1897.32s - 1903.08s | Collinson letters and just a big stack of letters and so we're kind of going through them and 1903.08s - 1910.44s | we found that some of these were letters from Collinson's other relatives like 1910.44s - 1919.16s | Sophia and Amelia. The addresses were often very creative. For example, so we have somewhere near 1919.16s - 1929.96s | the North Pole and here was another one that said Hong Kong or Arctic Expedition Pacific and so 1929.96s - 1934.44s | they would kind of send it out and hope that it would be passed from ship to ship and hopefully 1934.44s - 1940.44s | end up with their brother ship. So we know now that there were at least two ways of communication. 1940.44s - 1947.80s | We had the newspaper advertisements from Julia and A.C. and letters from Amelia and Sophia. 1950.98s - 1957.38s | And now let's look at the content or at the plaintext of the ads. Many of the ads 1957.94s - 1964.74s | mention places mainly in Great Britain which is not very surprising. Apparently Collinson's family 1964.74s - 1971.86s | or many of the family members lived in the Newcastle area so Newcastle and the surrounding 1971.94s - 1980.26s | is mentioned many times in the messages but they're also relatives apparently in London 1980.26s - 1987.38s | and Portsmouth, Southampton and elsewhere. And no surprise is that places in northern 1987.38s - 1994.74s | Canada were mentioned a couple of times because this was actually the destination of Franklin's 1994.74s - 2000.34s | expedition and of course also of Collinson's expedition. And it's also interesting to look at 2000.34s - 2009.38s | a few events that are mentioned in these ads. Here we have an ad from 1850. It mentions 2010.02s - 2018.66s | windows, a window is in church. We found out that the family of Collinson or of his sister donated 2018.66s - 2027.78s | a couple of windows in churches in Wales and this is here you can see pictures of these and this is 2027.78s - 2037.22s | a drawing we found in the archive. So apparently here on


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Many of the ads 1957.94s - 1964.74s | mention places mainly in Great Britain which is not very surprising. Apparently Collinson's family 1964.74s - 1971.86s | or many of the family members lived in the Newcastle area so Newcastle and the surrounding 1971.94s - 1980.26s | is mentioned many times in the messages but they're also relatives apparently in London 1980.26s - 1987.38s | and Portsmouth, Southampton and elsewhere. And no surprise is that places in northern 1987.38s - 1994.74s | Canada were mentioned a couple of times because this was actually the destination of Franklin's 1994.74s - 2000.34s | expedition and of course also of Collinson's expedition. And it's also interesting to look at 2000.34s - 2009.38s | a few events that are mentioned in these ads. Here we have an ad from 1850. It mentions 2010.02s - 2018.66s | windows, a window is in church. We found out that the family of Collinson or of his sister donated 2018.66s - 2027.78s | a couple of windows in churches in Wales and this is here you can see pictures of these and this is 2027.78s - 2037.22s | a drawing we found in the archive. So apparently here on the left side we see the small gentle 2037.22s - 2045.46s | window as it was and on the right side as it is now so after the renovation. And here we have 2045.46s - 2054.26s | another mentioning of windows, three new windows. Well we found a drawing of these three new windows 2054.26s - 2061.54s | in the archive. In this case the old version is on the right and the new version of the 2061.54s - 2070.58s | windows is on the left. So this is clearly what this message refers to. Here we read 2071.22s - 2078.82s | Queen opening Newcastle station late in August. Well in fact on August 29th 1850 2079.38s - 2084.18s | Queen Victoria opened the train station of Newcastle. 2086.58s - 2095.06s | And here we read Bernard has been made engineer of the Great Exhibition. This refers to the Great 2095.06s - 2105.54s | Exhibition at Crystal Palace which is also known as the World's Fair in 1851. Okay so this is what 2105.54s - 2113.22s | we found in the messages and well let's now draw a conclusion. All right so we know that 2113.22s - 2120.66s | Collinson's


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the left side we see the small gentle 2037.22s - 2045.46s | window as it was and on the right side as it is now so after the renovation. And here we have 2045.46s - 2054.26s | another mentioning of windows, three new windows. Well we found a drawing of these three new windows 2054.26s - 2061.54s | in the archive. In this case the old version is on the right and the new version of the 2061.54s - 2070.58s | windows is on the left. So this is clearly what this message refers to. Here we read 2071.22s - 2078.82s | Queen opening Newcastle station late in August. Well in fact on August 29th 1850 2079.38s - 2084.18s | Queen Victoria opened the train station of Newcastle. 2086.58s - 2095.06s | And here we read Bernard has been made engineer of the Great Exhibition. This refers to the Great 2095.06s - 2105.54s | Exhibition at Crystal Palace which is also known as the World's Fair in 1851. Okay so this is what 2105.54s - 2113.22s | we found in the messages and well let's now draw a conclusion. All right so we know that 2113.22s - 2120.66s | Collinson's family sent messages during his journey and it was via encrypted ads, one per month. They 2120.66s - 2128.50s | also sent letters. We have a project where we are trying to decipher all 50 of these ads and put 2128.50s - 2134.10s | them in the right context. Hopefully we'll be done by the end of the year and then we'll be 2134.10s - 2140.10s | publishing a paper in Cryptologia. If anyone wants to help we're always up for more help. 2140.90s - 2155.29s | And other than that thank you. We have about seven minutes for questions. 2166.50s - 2173.46s | Yes the question was why were these messages encrypted? Well probably to keep these family 2173.46s - 2180.74s | stories private. That's probably the main reason. So I think these messages contain nothing 2180.74s - 2187.30s | absolutely secret but apparently the family members didn't want to read their family gossip 2187.30s - 2194.18s | in the times where everybody could see it. Another reason is that when you're encrypting something you 2194.18s - 2200.82s | can often put more information into it than when it's clear text. For example with telegrams where 2200.82s - 2206.90s


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family sent messages during his journey and it was via encrypted ads, one per month. They 2120.66s - 2128.50s | also sent letters. We have a project where we are trying to decipher all 50 of these ads and put 2128.50s - 2134.10s | them in the right context. Hopefully we'll be done by the end of the year and then we'll be 2134.10s - 2140.10s | publishing a paper in Cryptologia. If anyone wants to help we're always up for more help. 2140.90s - 2155.29s | And other than that thank you. We have about seven minutes for questions. 2166.50s - 2173.46s | Yes the question was why were these messages encrypted? Well probably to keep these family 2173.46s - 2180.74s | stories private. That's probably the main reason. So I think these messages contain nothing 2180.74s - 2187.30s | absolutely secret but apparently the family members didn't want to read their family gossip 2187.30s - 2194.18s | in the times where everybody could see it. Another reason is that when you're encrypting something you 2194.18s - 2200.82s | can often put more information into it than when it's clear text. For example with telegrams where 2200.82s - 2206.90s | people would have to pay by the word and so there were rapidly code books coming up where you could 2206.90s - 2216.15s | put a small amount of text to mean a lot a much larger phrase. How hard is it to source the code 2216.15s - 2222.47s | books? How hard is it to source the code books? I imagine they don't pop up on ebay very often. 2222.47s - 2228.07s | Yeah as a matter of fact if you look in a hacker tracker we have some links to the code books. Oh 2228.07s - 2234.23s | nice. Yeah well I mean like with different code books that you may not have. Oh to find other 2234.23s - 2241.67s | code books? Yeah. It is a constant quest. Uh and anytime someone finds a new code book then 2241.67s - 2249.11s | there's a race to see does this code book help us crack any of the unsolved messages from many 2249.11s - 2255.67s | sources. Uh or sometimes we'll try to derive a code book from what we can read. Like if you heard 2255.67s - 2268.06s | about uh the Mary Queen of Scots


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| people would have to pay by the word and so there were rapidly code books coming up where you could 2206.90s - 2216.15s | put a small amount of text to mean a lot a much larger phrase. How hard is it to source the code 2216.15s - 2222.47s | books? How hard is it to source the code books? I imagine they don't pop up on ebay very often. 2222.47s - 2228.07s | Yeah as a matter of fact if you look in a hacker tracker we have some links to the code books. Oh 2228.07s - 2234.23s | nice. Yeah well I mean like with different code books that you may not have. Oh to find other 2234.23s - 2241.67s | code books? Yeah. It is a constant quest. Uh and anytime someone finds a new code book then 2241.67s - 2249.11s | there's a race to see does this code book help us crack any of the unsolved messages from many 2249.11s - 2255.67s | sources. Uh or sometimes we'll try to derive a code book from what we can read. Like if you heard 2255.67s - 2268.06s | about uh the Mary Queen of Scots uh story they derived things from that. I love it. So was the 2268.06s - 2273.34s | use of this type of system I mean outside of you know military people maybe you know ship captain 2273.34s - 2279.82s | or military folks like you know lovers. Was this really I mean did you come across information 2279.82s - 2285.74s | about people talking about this socially? You know um that that's essentially my question. 2285.82s - 2293.74s | Well um most of the of the ads were clearly published by lovers. There might be more 2293.74s - 2299.18s | business related messages but probably these are the ones that are not broken yet because 2299.18s - 2305.10s | they use the stronger encryption. So apart from this well this story is something special because 2305.10s - 2312.06s | it's not about lovers communicating with each other. Um did you find anything else that's not 2312.06s - 2318.46s | really? Well we know of at least one private detective who would send messages to his clients 2319.02s - 2324.70s | by putting encrypted ads in the newspaper in London. Uh and he may have actually been the 2324.70s - 2329.90s


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uh story they derived things from that. I love it. So was the 2268.06s - 2273.34s | use of this type of system I mean outside of you know military people maybe you know ship captain 2273.34s - 2279.82s | or military folks like you know lovers. Was this really I mean did you come across information 2279.82s - 2285.74s | about people talking about this socially? You know um that that's essentially my question. 2285.82s - 2293.74s | Well um most of the of the ads were clearly published by lovers. There might be more 2293.74s - 2299.18s | business related messages but probably these are the ones that are not broken yet because 2299.18s - 2305.10s | they use the stronger encryption. So apart from this well this story is something special because 2305.10s - 2312.06s | it's not about lovers communicating with each other. Um did you find anything else that's not 2312.06s - 2318.46s | really? Well we know of at least one private detective who would send messages to his clients 2319.02s - 2324.70s | by putting encrypted ads in the newspaper in London. Uh and he may have actually been the 2324.70s - 2329.90s | origin of the Sherlock Holmes story. Was there like discussion of this you know socially in the 2329.90s - 2335.18s | media you know contemporaneously in this you know 1850s to 1890s you know is there any kind of 2335.18s - 2343.90s | mention of yes yes and especially this was a very high status family and we have found many 2343.90s - 2350.46s | mentions that it was the buzz uh when people would get together and like oh there's these 2350.46s - 2358.22s | classified ads in the times and who's making them and why are they making them and I I think uh it 2358.22s - 2365.02s | did come out that Jada W was Julia DeWinton because that was published somewhere but the 2365.02s - 2373.02s | actual system was never published and there's a a short story from about that time period where 2373.02s - 2379.90s | someone is writing about these ads and they made up their own system because they knew no one else 2379.90s - 2384.70s | could solve it so why don't they just make up their own system uh and then they wrote a story 2384.70s - 2393.90s |


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| origin of the Sherlock Holmes story. Was there like discussion of this you know socially in the 2329.90s - 2335.18s | media you know contemporaneously in this you know 1850s to 1890s you know is there any kind of 2335.18s - 2343.90s | mention of yes yes and especially this was a very high status family and we have found many 2343.90s - 2350.46s | mentions that it was the buzz uh when people would get together and like oh there's these 2350.46s - 2358.22s | classified ads in the times and who's making them and why are they making them and I I think uh it 2358.22s - 2365.02s | did come out that Jada W was Julia DeWinton because that was published somewhere but the 2365.02s - 2373.02s | actual system was never published and there's a a short story from about that time period where 2373.02s - 2379.90s | someone is writing about these ads and they made up their own system because they knew no one else 2379.90s - 2384.70s | could solve it so why don't they just make up their own system uh and then they wrote a story 2384.70s - 2393.90s | about it. I'm a long time fan from the AP days so. Thank you. Do you know how often the times was 2393.90s - 2399.26s | published? Was it published daily or or was it published monthly in the 1850s? It was published 2399.26s - 2405.90s | daily but I don't know if there were two uh if there was an edition on Sunday that there might 2405.90s - 2411.02s | have been a Saturday edition that also covered the Sunday but apart from that it was published 2411.02s - 2414.78s | every day. Yeah. Do you have an idea of how expensive it would have been to publish and 2414.78s - 2420.22s | advertise? Um we. I'm sorry you couldn't hear the question. Uh the question was how expensive it was 2421.10s - 2427.98s | I I think we have no information how much it costs in England but in uh France uh we have 2427.98s - 2435.18s | this information of course it's always difficult to say uh how much um 10 francs were in in 1850 2435.18s - 2442.70s | but I think compared to the gold price the the price for um an encrypted or for


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about it. I'm a long time fan from the AP days so. Thank you. Do you know how often the times was 2393.90s - 2399.26s | published? Was it published daily or or was it published monthly in the 1850s? It was published 2399.26s - 2405.90s | daily but I don't know if there were two uh if there was an edition on Sunday that there might 2405.90s - 2411.02s | have been a Saturday edition that also covered the Sunday but apart from that it was published 2411.02s - 2414.78s | every day. Yeah. Do you have an idea of how expensive it would have been to publish and 2414.78s - 2420.22s | advertise? Um we. I'm sorry you couldn't hear the question. Uh the question was how expensive it was 2421.10s - 2427.98s | I I think we have no information how much it costs in England but in uh France uh we have 2427.98s - 2435.18s | this information of course it's always difficult to say uh how much um 10 francs were in in 1850 2435.18s - 2442.70s | but I think compared to the gold price the the price for um an encrypted or for an advertisement 2442.70s - 2457.64s | was roughly 20 dollars or so in today's world. It wasn't cheap. Thank you. Hello uh how much has LLMs 2457.64s - 2462.92s | and OpenAI affected your work in the past three years that you just dump them in there and see 2462.92s - 2470.44s | what comes out? Oh sorry a little closer uh how has LLMs and like OpenAI technology affected your 2470.44s - 2481.00s | work? You mean uh artificial if uh yes artificial artificial intelligence. LGBT yeah. Yes or in 2481.00s - 2488.20s | general um so far artificial intelligence hasn't been used very much in breaking old ciphers but 2488.20s - 2494.68s | it's changing. I I can imagine that it's very helpful especially if you have an encrypted text 2494.68s - 2499.80s | and you you don't know what it is about. So there are certain algorithms where you can tell well 2499.80s - 2505.24s | this might be an encryption of this kind or that kind and it requires some experience and I'm 2505.24s - 2512.36s | pretty sure that artificial intelligence can help a lot uh doing this and I know of research projects 2513.16s


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an advertisement 2442.70s - 2457.64s | was roughly 20 dollars or so in today's world. It wasn't cheap. Thank you. Hello uh how much has LLMs 2457.64s - 2462.92s | and OpenAI affected your work in the past three years that you just dump them in there and see 2462.92s - 2470.44s | what comes out? Oh sorry a little closer uh how has LLMs and like OpenAI technology affected your 2470.44s - 2481.00s | work? You mean uh artificial if uh yes artificial artificial intelligence. LGBT yeah. Yes or in 2481.00s - 2488.20s | general um so far artificial intelligence hasn't been used very much in breaking old ciphers but 2488.20s - 2494.68s | it's changing. I I can imagine that it's very helpful especially if you have an encrypted text 2494.68s - 2499.80s | and you you don't know what it is about. So there are certain algorithms where you can tell well 2499.80s - 2505.24s | this might be an encryption of this kind or that kind and it requires some experience and I'm 2505.24s - 2512.36s | pretty sure that artificial intelligence can help a lot uh doing this and I know of research projects 2513.16s - 2520.76s | that examine this kind of analysis but so far it it hasn't been applied very often. Do you know 2521.16s - 2531.24s | anything else? I've done quite a bit with LLMs involving another code cryptos and no they they 2531.24s - 2538.20s | can translate from one language to another but they can't count. Like if you ask for a sentence 2538.20s - 2561.08s | it's 97 letters long total fail total fail yeah. Did Collinson survive? Yes uh yeah well uh we know 2561.08s - 2567.08s | of four he really received well first of all Collinson survived but I think it was his last 2567.08s - 2573.24s | expedition so as far as I know the government was not very content with the way he led this 2573.24s - 2580.04s | exhibition expedition so it was his last one and I think he retired afterwards and as far as we know 2580.04s - 2585.56s | four of the messages or he received four of the messages in Banyuwangi that was probably 2585.56s - 2591.88s | all so apparently the system worked but not very well. I'm sure he saw the other messages once he


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- 2520.76s | that examine this kind of analysis but so far it it hasn't been applied very often. Do you know 2521.16s - 2531.24s | anything else? I've done quite a bit with LLMs involving another code cryptos and no they they 2531.24s - 2538.20s | can translate from one language to another but they can't count. Like if you ask for a sentence 2538.20s - 2561.08s | it's 97 letters long total fail total fail yeah. Did Collinson survive? Yes uh yeah well uh we know 2561.08s - 2567.08s | of four he really received well first of all Collinson survived but I think it was his last 2567.08s - 2573.24s | expedition so as far as I know the government was not very content with the way he led this 2573.24s - 2580.04s | exhibition expedition so it was his last one and I think he retired afterwards and as far as we know 2580.04s - 2585.56s | four of the messages or he received four of the messages in Banyuwangi that was probably 2585.56s - 2591.88s | all so apparently the system worked but not very well. I'm sure he saw the other messages once he 2591.88s - 2599.08s | got home uh yeah that that his sister had them but but as Klaus said um there was a lot of uh 2599.08s - 2605.72s | unrest on the ship and Collinson was very much blamed for that and uh has nothing to do with 2605.72s - 2611.80s | codes but yeah. You mentioned a couple of the other um family member names do you have a reason 2611.80s - 2617.72s | to believe or do you have a reason why you think uh Amelia is not AC um and given the fact that you 2617.72s - 2621.48s | have other letters and other documents from the family do you think you're going to be able to 2621.48s - 2629.00s | look at? Yes uh Amelia Collinson or AC might be Amelia Collinson that's correct uh would be a good 2629.00s - 2635.48s | hypothesis. They tended to use their married name at that point uh it could well be but we've we've 2635.48s - 2640.76s | just never found any confirmation that it was Amelia with Julia we have written confirmation 2640.76s - 2654.52s | that yes it was Julia but it might be okay


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2591.88s - 2599.08s | got home uh yeah that that his sister had them but but as Klaus said um there was a lot of uh 2599.08s - 2605.72s | unrest on the ship and Collinson was very much blamed for that and uh has nothing to do with 2605.72s - 2611.80s | codes but yeah. You mentioned a couple of the other um family member names do you have a reason 2611.80s - 2617.72s | to believe or do you have a reason why you think uh Amelia is not AC um and given the fact that you 2617.72s - 2621.48s | have other letters and other documents from the family do you think you're going to be able to 2621.48s - 2629.00s | look at? Yes uh Amelia Collinson or AC might be Amelia Collinson that's correct uh would be a good 2629.00s - 2635.48s | hypothesis. They tended to use their married name at that point uh it could well be but we've we've 2635.48s - 2640.76s | just never found any confirmation that it was Amelia with Julia we have written confirmation 2640.76s - 2654.52s | that yes it was Julia but it might be okay all right thank you. Thank you.


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{ "webpage_url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_1DTkkaNqfM", "title": "DEF CON 32 - Clash, Burn, and Exploit Manipulate Filters to Pwn kernelCTF - HexRabbit Chen", "description": "As the successor to the iptables, nftables stands as a crucial network component within the Linux kernel, managing packet filtering and other network-related functionalities. With continuous development and changes, features designed to increase its efficiency, such as batch commit, anonymous chains/sets, and asynchronous garbage collection, have been implemented, which in turn has significantly increased its complexity and made it an attractive target for attackers in recent years.\n\nSince the announcement of the kernelCTF bug bounty, multiple nftables 0-day vulnerabilities have been reported and patched to enhance its security. However, if not careful enough, the security patch may not only mitigate the bug but also introduce new security issues unintentionally. By researching the structural changes in the nftables codebase, we successfully uncover new vulnerabilities despite the intense competition in kernelCTF. Also, we managed to speedrun the exploitation just before Google removed nftables from LTS instance, becoming the last LTS nftables exploitation.\n\nIn this presentation, we will share three nftables vulnerabilities we discovered in a storytelling fashion. We start with a brief introduction on how nftables works under the hood to familiarize attendees with the basics. After that, we dive into nftables internals and dissect three vulnerabilities discovered during our journey, two of which involved utilizing hard-to-exploit race conditions to pwn the flag. Alongside details of the exploitation, we will also share the roller-coaster story of kernelCTF experiences, filled with dramatic highs and lows, making it a tense and exhilarating journey.", "channel_url": "https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC6Om9kAkl32dWlDSNlDS9Iw", "duration": 2260, "channel": "DEFCONConference", "uploader": "DEFCONConference", "upload_date": "20241016" } 0.02s - 8.42s | This text was transcribed using whisper model: large-v2 And with no further ado, please continue. 8.42s - 12.14s | Hello everyone and welcome to my talk, 12.14s - 13.82s | Clash, Burn and Exploit, 13.82s - 16.26s | Manipulate Filters to Pwn Kernel CTF. 17.74s - 19.58s | I'm HexRabbit from Taiwan, 19.58s - 23.14s | currently working as a security researcher at DefCon. 23.14s - 25.22s | I specialize in binary exploit, 25.22s - 27.86s | especially in Linux kernel exploitation. 27.86s - 30.98s | I found some vulnerabilities in Linux kernel component 30.98s - 34.70s | like Error Ring, KSMBD, NSTables and others. 36.46s - 39.66s | Today, I will start from introducing kernel CTF 39.66s - 41.22s | and NSTables. 41.22s - 44.58s |


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with the basics. After that, we dive into nftables internals and dissect three vulnerabilities discovered during our journey, two of which involved utilizing hard-to-exploit race conditions to pwn the flag. Alongside details of the exploitation, we will also share the roller-coaster story of kernelCTF experiences, filled with dramatic highs and lows, making it a tense and exhilarating journey.", "channel_url": "https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC6Om9kAkl32dWlDSNlDS9Iw", "duration": 2260, "channel": "DEFCONConference", "uploader": "DEFCONConference", "upload_date": "20241016" } 0.02s - 8.42s | This text was transcribed using whisper model: large-v2 And with no further ado, please continue. 8.42s - 12.14s | Hello everyone and welcome to my talk, 12.14s - 13.82s | Clash, Burn and Exploit, 13.82s - 16.26s | Manipulate Filters to Pwn Kernel CTF. 17.74s - 19.58s | I'm HexRabbit from Taiwan, 19.58s - 23.14s | currently working as a security researcher at DefCon. 23.14s - 25.22s | I specialize in binary exploit, 25.22s - 27.86s | especially in Linux kernel exploitation. 27.86s - 30.98s | I found some vulnerabilities in Linux kernel component 30.98s - 34.70s | like Error Ring, KSMBD, NSTables and others. 36.46s - 39.66s | Today, I will start from introducing kernel CTF 39.66s - 41.22s | and NSTables. 41.22s - 44.58s | After that, we will dive into the NSTable internals 44.58s - 46.18s | and talk about three vulnerabilities 46.18s - 48.62s | we discovered in NSTables. 49.58s - 52.30s | And in between these three vulnerabilities, 52.30s - 55.46s | I will also share some story behind the scene 55.46s - 58.95s | during my kernel CTF journey. 58.95s - 62.55s | So let's talk about, first talk about the kernel CTF. 62.55s - 64.99s | Kernel CTF is part of Google VRP 64.99s - 68.99s | and the way it works is quite similar to a CTF challenge. 68.99s - 70.55s | For about every two weeks, 70.55s - 72.71s | there'll be new kernel version release 72.71s - 75.95s | and attendee will be given an unprivileged show 75.95s - 78.19s | and you will need to exploit it, 78.19s - 81.15s | exploit the Linux kernel to get flag 81.15s - 84.07s | and submit it to Google to earn the bounty. 84.07s - 86.23s | There are three instances can be pawned. 86.23s - 90.51s | LTS and CLS both use newer and quite similar kernel config 90.51s - 93.91s | while the mitigation one use


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After that, we will dive into the NSTable internals 44.58s - 46.18s | and talk about three vulnerabilities 46.18s - 48.62s | we discovered in NSTables. 49.58s - 52.30s | And in between these three vulnerabilities, 52.30s - 55.46s | I will also share some story behind the scene 55.46s - 58.95s | during my kernel CTF journey. 58.95s - 62.55s | So let's talk about, first talk about the kernel CTF. 62.55s - 64.99s | Kernel CTF is part of Google VRP 64.99s - 68.99s | and the way it works is quite similar to a CTF challenge. 68.99s - 70.55s | For about every two weeks, 70.55s - 72.71s | there'll be new kernel version release 72.71s - 75.95s | and attendee will be given an unprivileged show 75.95s - 78.19s | and you will need to exploit it, 78.19s - 81.15s | exploit the Linux kernel to get flag 81.15s - 84.07s | and submit it to Google to earn the bounty. 84.07s - 86.23s | There are three instances can be pawned. 86.23s - 90.51s | LTS and CLS both use newer and quite similar kernel config 90.51s - 93.91s | while the mitigation one use an older kernel config 93.91s - 98.63s | with custom security patch to accept more one day exploit. 98.63s - 100.95s | But the most important thing is, 100.95s - 103.43s | Google offers pretty big bounty reward. 105.15s - 107.91s | With some simple math calculation, 107.91s - 110.75s | we can quickly find for zero day LTS exploit, 110.75s - 114.19s | the bounty can easily surpass 50,000 US dollar. 114.19s - 115.83s | And with the same vulnerability, 116.63s - 119.31s | you can earn both 21,000 max, 119.31s - 123.47s | maximum in both mitigation and CLS instance, 123.47s - 127.03s | which is quite appealing for the bounty hunter like me. 128.67s - 131.07s | So why am I targeting nftables? 131.07s - 134.87s | First, nftable config is enabled in kernel CTF. 134.87s - 136.39s | And as you can see on the right, 136.39s - 138.51s | there are multiple vulnerabilities discovered 138.51s - 140.67s | just after kernel CTF is announced. 140.67s - 143.51s | So for kernel CTF newbie like me, 143.51s - 145.39s | I think it's the right place to start. 146.83s - 153.34s | Okay, so first we


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an older kernel config 93.91s - 98.63s | with custom security patch to accept more one day exploit. 98.63s - 100.95s | But the most important thing is, 100.95s - 103.43s | Google offers pretty big bounty reward. 105.15s - 107.91s | With some simple math calculation, 107.91s - 110.75s | we can quickly find for zero day LTS exploit, 110.75s - 114.19s | the bounty can easily surpass 50,000 US dollar. 114.19s - 115.83s | And with the same vulnerability, 116.63s - 119.31s | you can earn both 21,000 max, 119.31s - 123.47s | maximum in both mitigation and CLS instance, 123.47s - 127.03s | which is quite appealing for the bounty hunter like me. 128.67s - 131.07s | So why am I targeting nftables? 131.07s - 134.87s | First, nftable config is enabled in kernel CTF. 134.87s - 136.39s | And as you can see on the right, 136.39s - 138.51s | there are multiple vulnerabilities discovered 138.51s - 140.67s | just after kernel CTF is announced. 140.67s - 143.51s | So for kernel CTF newbie like me, 143.51s - 145.39s | I think it's the right place to start. 146.83s - 153.34s | Okay, so first we take a brief intro to nftables. 153.42s - 155.50s | What exactly is nftables? 155.50s - 157.58s | Nftable is a package filtering framework 157.58s - 159.02s | inside Linux kernel. 159.02s - 162.94s | It's used to replace the legacy IP, ARP, EB tables, 162.94s - 165.46s | merge them into a single entry point. 165.46s - 170.46s | It use a simple VM design to implement its functionality 170.78s - 173.58s | and support new syntax for CY interface. 173.58s - 174.82s | As you can see on the right, 174.82s - 176.86s | instead of doing thing one by one, 177.02s - 181.46s | new syntax can now allow config multiple things at once. 181.46s - 184.38s | And this capabilities come from its design, 184.38s - 188.80s | which we will revisit later. 188.80s - 191.88s | Nftable is constructed by a tree-like structure. 191.88s - 193.76s | It contains five core modules, 193.76s - 197.12s | table, chain, rule, expression, and set. 198.68s - 202.08s | Table is the top level container for the below structures. 202.08s - 204.04s | It's used for the measurement purpose. 204.76s - 208.96s | Each table will only belong


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take a brief intro to nftables. 153.42s - 155.50s | What exactly is nftables? 155.50s - 157.58s | Nftable is a package filtering framework 157.58s - 159.02s | inside Linux kernel. 159.02s - 162.94s | It's used to replace the legacy IP, ARP, EB tables, 162.94s - 165.46s | merge them into a single entry point. 165.46s - 170.46s | It use a simple VM design to implement its functionality 170.78s - 173.58s | and support new syntax for CY interface. 173.58s - 174.82s | As you can see on the right, 174.82s - 176.86s | instead of doing thing one by one, 177.02s - 181.46s | new syntax can now allow config multiple things at once. 181.46s - 184.38s | And this capabilities come from its design, 184.38s - 188.80s | which we will revisit later. 188.80s - 191.88s | Nftable is constructed by a tree-like structure. 191.88s - 193.76s | It contains five core modules, 193.76s - 197.12s | table, chain, rule, expression, and set. 198.68s - 202.08s | Table is the top level container for the below structures. 202.08s - 204.04s | It's used for the measurement purpose. 204.76s - 208.96s | Each table will only belong to a specific neural family, 208.96s - 211.40s | and any object contained by the table 211.40s - 212.80s | will follow the same family. 214.36s - 218.28s | Chain in nftables will hook at predefined hooking point 218.28s - 220.88s | provided by net filter infrastructure 220.88s - 223.00s | to do the packet filtering. 223.00s - 226.56s | When any packet flows through the hooking point, 226.56s - 229.00s | the chain will execute the expressions in the row 229.00s - 231.48s | it managed to accept, or to block, 231.48s - 233.32s | or to modify the packets. 234.12s - 236.64s | What is the rule, and what is the expression? 238.73s - 240.61s | As I mentioned earlier, 240.61s - 243.25s | nftable implements its functionality 243.25s - 245.29s | by a simple virtual machine. 245.29s - 248.13s | You can think a rule as a small function. 248.13s - 250.05s | They can contain multiple expressions, 250.05s - 253.73s | and the expression is the instruction for nftables. 254.85s - 257.33s | There are different types of expressions. 257.33s - 260.49s | Some can be used to manipulate VN registers, 260.49s - 262.45s | and


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to a specific neural family, 208.96s - 211.40s | and any object contained by the table 211.40s - 212.80s | will follow the same family. 214.36s - 218.28s | Chain in nftables will hook at predefined hooking point 218.28s - 220.88s | provided by net filter infrastructure 220.88s - 223.00s | to do the packet filtering. 223.00s - 226.56s | When any packet flows through the hooking point, 226.56s - 229.00s | the chain will execute the expressions in the row 229.00s - 231.48s | it managed to accept, or to block, 231.48s - 233.32s | or to modify the packets. 234.12s - 236.64s | What is the rule, and what is the expression? 238.73s - 240.61s | As I mentioned earlier, 240.61s - 243.25s | nftable implements its functionality 243.25s - 245.29s | by a simple virtual machine. 245.29s - 248.13s | You can think a rule as a small function. 248.13s - 250.05s | They can contain multiple expressions, 250.05s - 253.73s | and the expression is the instruction for nftables. 254.85s - 257.33s | There are different types of expressions. 257.33s - 260.49s | Some can be used to manipulate VN registers, 260.49s - 262.45s | and the others can be used to load, 263.09s - 267.28s | to read, or write data within packets. 267.28s - 270.56s | And thus, set is used to store a group of some type, 270.56s - 275.08s | like IP address, or port, or any binary data. 275.08s - 277.24s | It can also be used as a map 277.24s - 280.04s | to map some type A to another type B. 280.04s - 282.12s | And these data stored in the set 282.12s - 287.71s | can be queried by expressions during packet filtering. 287.71s - 291.83s | Okay, so after having some basic understanding of nftables, 291.83s - 294.79s | I will now introduce the first vulnerability I discovered. 296.11s - 299.27s | At the time, I'm not so familiar with nftables. 299.27s - 302.95s | However, I spotted something weird in the code base. 302.95s - 304.47s | These three functions are all used 304.47s - 307.39s | to delete objects in nftables. 307.39s - 309.91s | The nftable.deleteRuleDeactivate 309.91s - 311.71s | will be called during rule deletion, 312.67s - 315.59s | nft.flush will be called during full config flush, 316.99s - 320.07s | and nft.setElementCacheAllDeactivate


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the others can be used to load, 263.09s - 267.28s | to read, or write data within packets. 267.28s - 270.56s | And thus, set is used to store a group of some type, 270.56s - 275.08s | like IP address, or port, or any binary data. 275.08s - 277.24s | It can also be used as a map 277.24s - 280.04s | to map some type A to another type B. 280.04s - 282.12s | And these data stored in the set 282.12s - 287.71s | can be queried by expressions during packet filtering. 287.71s - 291.83s | Okay, so after having some basic understanding of nftables, 291.83s - 294.79s | I will now introduce the first vulnerability I discovered. 296.11s - 299.27s | At the time, I'm not so familiar with nftables. 299.27s - 302.95s | However, I spotted something weird in the code base. 302.95s - 304.47s | These three functions are all used 304.47s - 307.39s | to delete objects in nftables. 307.39s - 309.91s | The nftable.deleteRuleDeactivate 309.91s - 311.71s | will be called during rule deletion, 312.67s - 315.59s | nft.flush will be called during full config flush, 316.99s - 320.07s | and nft.setElementCacheAllDeactivate 320.07s - 322.75s | will be called during set element deletion. 323.75s - 326.23s | However, the pattern here is a bit different. 327.79s - 331.95s | The first two use nft.isActiveNext 331.95s - 334.43s | to check if the object is active. 335.35s - 338.99s | But the last one, nft.setElementCacheAllDeactivate 338.99s - 341.03s | use nft.isActive to check. 341.03s - 343.19s | So, what's the difference? 344.91s - 346.99s | Actually, these two functions 346.99s - 351.67s | is used for object lifetime management in nftables. 352.27s - 354.07s | In order to understand how it works, 354.99s - 356.95s | we will need to first talk 356.95s - 362.43s | about the batch request mechanism. 362.43s - 364.71s | For a query request, 364.71s - 367.23s | for example, the getRule operation above, 367.23s - 370.83s | Netlink API will internally use netlink.receiveXKB 370.83s - 373.43s | to get the raw information loglessly. 374.55s - 377.07s | However, if it's some operation 377.07s - 378.63s | that will modify the control plan, 378.63s - 382.07s | like new table or delete chain, 382.11s - 384.91s | nftables will use nfnetlink.receiveBatch 384.91s - 387.83s | instead of the


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320.07s - 322.75s | will be called during set element deletion. 323.75s - 326.23s | However, the pattern here is a bit different. 327.79s - 331.95s | The first two use nft.isActiveNext 331.95s - 334.43s | to check if the object is active. 335.35s - 338.99s | But the last one, nft.setElementCacheAllDeactivate 338.99s - 341.03s | use nft.isActive to check. 341.03s - 343.19s | So, what's the difference? 344.91s - 346.99s | Actually, these two functions 346.99s - 351.67s | is used for object lifetime management in nftables. 352.27s - 354.07s | In order to understand how it works, 354.99s - 356.95s | we will need to first talk 356.95s - 362.43s | about the batch request mechanism. 362.43s - 364.71s | For a query request, 364.71s - 367.23s | for example, the getRule operation above, 367.23s - 370.83s | Netlink API will internally use netlink.receiveXKB 370.83s - 373.43s | to get the raw information loglessly. 374.55s - 377.07s | However, if it's some operation 377.07s - 378.63s | that will modify the control plan, 378.63s - 382.07s | like new table or delete chain, 382.11s - 384.91s | nftables will use nfnetlink.receiveBatch 384.91s - 387.83s | instead of the logless one to serve the request. 387.83s - 389.19s | The difference between them 389.19s - 392.15s | is that batch one can process a request 392.15s - 394.35s | which contains multiple operations, 394.35s - 396.87s | and they will be processed sequentially. 397.87s - 400.19s | And also because of this design, 400.19s - 403.99s | the COI interface can copy multiple things at once. 405.27s - 407.55s | So, it sounds great, 407.55s - 410.63s | but the thing become more complicated 410.63s - 414.63s | when any operation fail in the middle of a batch request. 415.59s - 419.39s | And what nftables do is to split batch request 419.39s - 423.91s | handling into multiple phases. 423.91s - 425.83s | There are three phases during the handling 425.83s - 427.83s | of the batch request, 427.83s - 431.83s | prepare phase, commit phase, and abort phase. 431.83s - 433.15s | During the prepare phase, 433.15s - 435.59s | if every operation finished successfully 435.59s - 437.03s | in the batch request, 437.03s - 440.15s | it will go to the commit phase and commit the changes. 441.15s - 443.39s | However, if something went wrong,


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logless one to serve the request. 387.83s - 389.19s | The difference between them 389.19s - 392.15s | is that batch one can process a request 392.15s - 394.35s | which contains multiple operations, 394.35s - 396.87s | and they will be processed sequentially. 397.87s - 400.19s | And also because of this design, 400.19s - 403.99s | the COI interface can copy multiple things at once. 405.27s - 407.55s | So, it sounds great, 407.55s - 410.63s | but the thing become more complicated 410.63s - 414.63s | when any operation fail in the middle of a batch request. 415.59s - 419.39s | And what nftables do is to split batch request 419.39s - 423.91s | handling into multiple phases. 423.91s - 425.83s | There are three phases during the handling 425.83s - 427.83s | of the batch request, 427.83s - 431.83s | prepare phase, commit phase, and abort phase. 431.83s - 433.15s | During the prepare phase, 433.15s - 435.59s | if every operation finished successfully 435.59s - 437.03s | in the batch request, 437.03s - 440.15s | it will go to the commit phase and commit the changes. 441.15s - 443.39s | However, if something went wrong, 443.39s - 445.47s | after every operation is processed, 445.47s - 448.35s | it will go to abort phase and revert all the changes. 449.39s - 451.99s | Here's the lifetime management's concern. 451.99s - 457.49s | Any object in nftable has two state variable, 457.49s - 460.45s | current generation and next generation. 460.45s - 463.69s | Only object activated in current generation 463.69s - 466.45s | can affect the runtime behavior. 466.45s - 467.89s | And you can think the next generation 467.89s - 470.57s | as a temporary state for the prepare phase. 472.53s - 474.57s | Every operation modify the control plan, 474.57s - 477.13s | like new or delete operations, 477.13s - 480.05s | will only make changes on the next generation state 480.05s - 481.61s | in the prepare phase. 481.61s - 484.45s | So, without affecting the current generation state. 485.93s - 488.41s | Then, during the commit phase, 488.41s - 490.81s | it will commit the modification. 490.81s - 494.41s | So, the current generation will finally be set 494.41s - 496.25s | as the next generation, 496.25s - 497.77s | and the next generation state 497.77s - 499.53s | will be


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443.39s - 445.47s | after every operation is processed, 445.47s - 448.35s | it will go to abort phase and revert all the changes. 449.39s - 451.99s | Here's the lifetime management's concern. 451.99s - 457.49s | Any object in nftable has two state variable, 457.49s - 460.45s | current generation and next generation. 460.45s - 463.69s | Only object activated in current generation 463.69s - 466.45s | can affect the runtime behavior. 466.45s - 467.89s | And you can think the next generation 467.89s - 470.57s | as a temporary state for the prepare phase. 472.53s - 474.57s | Every operation modify the control plan, 474.57s - 477.13s | like new or delete operations, 477.13s - 480.05s | will only make changes on the next generation state 480.05s - 481.61s | in the prepare phase. 481.61s - 484.45s | So, without affecting the current generation state. 485.93s - 488.41s | Then, during the commit phase, 488.41s - 490.81s | it will commit the modification. 490.81s - 494.41s | So, the current generation will finally be set 494.41s - 496.25s | as the next generation, 496.25s - 497.77s | and the next generation state 497.77s - 499.53s | will be reset to a clean state. 500.49s - 503.01s | But in the case, if something went wrong 503.01s - 504.57s | during the abort phase, 504.57s - 507.77s | it only needs to clean the next generation state. 508.97s - 513.65s | Let's go through some examples to know how it works. 513.65s - 516.01s | After a batch request is received, 516.01s - 517.77s | it goes into the prepare phase. 519.09s - 522.05s | The first operation is delete set C. 522.05s - 525.37s | Okay, so the set C's next generation state 525.37s - 529.27s | will be set to deactivated. 529.47s - 534.19s | Next, it continues to process a set D operation. 535.47s - 537.99s | So, the set D will be added into hash table 537.99s - 543.17s | with next generation in activated state. 543.17s - 546.61s | If nothing went wrong, we'll go to the commit phase. 546.61s - 549.13s | And at this phase, current generation 549.13s - 552.45s | will be set as the next generation. 552.45s - 554.49s | So, the set D will be available 554.49s - 557.29s | in both runtime and query operations. 557.29s - 562.34s


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reset to a clean state. 500.49s - 503.01s | But in the case, if something went wrong 503.01s - 504.57s | during the abort phase, 504.57s - 507.77s | it only needs to clean the next generation state. 508.97s - 513.65s | Let's go through some examples to know how it works. 513.65s - 516.01s | After a batch request is received, 516.01s - 517.77s | it goes into the prepare phase. 519.09s - 522.05s | The first operation is delete set C. 522.05s - 525.37s | Okay, so the set C's next generation state 525.37s - 529.27s | will be set to deactivated. 529.47s - 534.19s | Next, it continues to process a set D operation. 535.47s - 537.99s | So, the set D will be added into hash table 537.99s - 543.17s | with next generation in activated state. 543.17s - 546.61s | If nothing went wrong, we'll go to the commit phase. 546.61s - 549.13s | And at this phase, current generation 549.13s - 552.45s | will be set as the next generation. 552.45s - 554.49s | So, the set D will be available 554.49s - 557.29s | in both runtime and query operations. 557.29s - 562.34s | And also, the set C will be free. 562.34s - 566.38s | If something went wrong, we will enter the abort phase. 566.38s - 569.66s | And at this phase, all operation that's done 569.66s - 573.34s | in the prepare phase will be reverted in a reverse order. 573.34s - 576.54s | So, the add set D will be undue, 576.54s - 582.68s | and also the delete set C will be undue. 582.68s - 584.88s | So, okay, back to the check. 584.88s - 587.12s | So, what's the problem here? 587.12s - 589.60s | As we can see, during the NFT set element 589.60s - 592.96s | catch all deactivate, it used NFT is active 592.96s - 596.08s | to check if the element is still alive. 596.08s - 600.00s | However, NFT is active checks current generation, 600.00s - 603.28s | but the function actually runs in the prepare state, 603.28s - 606.20s | which will only modify the next generation state 606.20s - 608.60s | of an object. 608.60s - 612.72s | So, the check here will always pass. 612.72s - 615.52s | And by request multiple delete operations, 615.52s - 620.64s | we


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| And also, the set C will be free. 562.34s - 566.38s | If something went wrong, we will enter the abort phase. 566.38s - 569.66s | And at this phase, all operation that's done 569.66s - 573.34s | in the prepare phase will be reverted in a reverse order. 573.34s - 576.54s | So, the add set D will be undue, 576.54s - 582.68s | and also the delete set C will be undue. 582.68s - 584.88s | So, okay, back to the check. 584.88s - 587.12s | So, what's the problem here? 587.12s - 589.60s | As we can see, during the NFT set element 589.60s - 592.96s | catch all deactivate, it used NFT is active 592.96s - 596.08s | to check if the element is still alive. 596.08s - 600.00s | However, NFT is active checks current generation, 600.00s - 603.28s | but the function actually runs in the prepare state, 603.28s - 606.20s | which will only modify the next generation state 606.20s - 608.60s | of an object. 608.60s - 612.72s | So, the check here will always pass. 612.72s - 615.52s | And by request multiple delete operations, 615.52s - 620.64s | we can free the element multiple times in the commit phase. 620.64s - 622.60s | So, the batch request to trigger double free 622.60s - 623.80s | will look like this. 623.80s - 626.32s | Since the lifetime check will always pass 626.32s - 629.36s | if the element exists during the prepare phase, 629.36s - 632.04s | two delete set element of operation 632.04s - 634.44s | will both execute successfully. 634.44s - 637.40s | And so, when you get to the commit phase, 637.40s - 639.68s | the send element will be free twice, 639.68s - 644.56s | and we get a set catch all element double free. 644.56s - 649.72s | Great. So, I found my first bug for current CTF. 649.72s - 654.56s | But the next day, I found the maintainer 654.56s - 656.28s | also find the same bug 656.28s - 659.00s | and send a patch to kernel mailing list. 659.00s - 661.00s | I mean, why? 661.00s - 664.00s | So, okay, this means my zero days 664.00s - 666.12s | officially turns into a one day. 666.12s - 669.36s | And according to kernel CTF rules, 669.36s - 673.44s | my bounty


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can free the element multiple times in the commit phase. 620.64s - 622.60s | So, the batch request to trigger double free 622.60s - 623.80s | will look like this. 623.80s - 626.32s | Since the lifetime check will always pass 626.32s - 629.36s | if the element exists during the prepare phase, 629.36s - 632.04s | two delete set element of operation 632.04s - 634.44s | will both execute successfully. 634.44s - 637.40s | And so, when you get to the commit phase, 637.40s - 639.68s | the send element will be free twice, 639.68s - 644.56s | and we get a set catch all element double free. 644.56s - 649.72s | Great. So, I found my first bug for current CTF. 649.72s - 654.56s | But the next day, I found the maintainer 654.56s - 656.28s | also find the same bug 656.28s - 659.00s | and send a patch to kernel mailing list. 659.00s - 661.00s | I mean, why? 661.00s - 664.00s | So, okay, this means my zero days 664.00s - 666.12s | officially turns into a one day. 666.12s - 669.36s | And according to kernel CTF rules, 669.36s - 673.44s | my bounty will decrease by 20,000 US dollar. 673.44s - 676.00s | Ouch. 676.00s - 678.64s | Also, one day vulnerability means 678.64s - 681.44s | that everyone will know how to trigger the vulnerability, 681.44s - 684.48s | and they may also come up with some exploit. 684.48s - 686.56s | So, I definitely need to exploit it 686.56s - 692.44s | before next kernel CTF slot opens. 692.44s - 694.76s | So, after we get the double free primitive, 694.76s - 699.88s | we reuse the exploit method for CVE-2023-4004 699.88s - 702.28s | to overlap the empty table data 702.28s - 706.16s | and empty object to leak address and control IP. 706.16s - 707.76s | Due to a time limit of this talk, 707.76s - 709.52s | I won't expand the detail of it, 709.52s - 713.68s | but kudos to LonelyOnCom who discovered this technique 713.68s - 717.68s | and shared it on kernel CTF repository. 717.68s - 720.68s | So, now we develop the exploits 720.68s - 725.17s | and wait for the slot to reopen. 725.17s - 728.61s | Fast forward to two hours before the competition starts. 728.61s - 731.45s | I nervously check


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will decrease by 20,000 US dollar. 673.44s - 676.00s | Ouch. 676.00s - 678.64s | Also, one day vulnerability means 678.64s - 681.44s | that everyone will know how to trigger the vulnerability, 681.44s - 684.48s | and they may also come up with some exploit. 684.48s - 686.56s | So, I definitely need to exploit it 686.56s - 692.44s | before next kernel CTF slot opens. 692.44s - 694.76s | So, after we get the double free primitive, 694.76s - 699.88s | we reuse the exploit method for CVE-2023-4004 699.88s - 702.28s | to overlap the empty table data 702.28s - 706.16s | and empty object to leak address and control IP. 706.16s - 707.76s | Due to a time limit of this talk, 707.76s - 709.52s | I won't expand the detail of it, 709.52s - 713.68s | but kudos to LonelyOnCom who discovered this technique 713.68s - 717.68s | and shared it on kernel CTF repository. 717.68s - 720.68s | So, now we develop the exploits 720.68s - 725.17s | and wait for the slot to reopen. 725.17s - 728.61s | Fast forward to two hours before the competition starts. 728.61s - 731.45s | I nervously check if there's any kernel updates 731.45s - 734.29s | related to NF tables. 734.29s - 736.81s | And guess what? 736.81s - 739.01s | The patch previously posted on the mailing list 739.05s - 741.33s | has been merged into the kernel. 741.33s - 744.37s | And it added one line on it. 744.37s - 748.09s | It says, reported by LonelyOnCom, 748.09s - 750.73s | which this means is the patch may actually come 750.73s - 753.37s | from a zero-day kernel CTF submission. 753.37s - 755.73s | And since the reporter is LonelyOnCom, 755.73s - 760.29s | whose exploit I just used, this is indeed the case. 760.29s - 763.41s | So, just before I have the chance to exploit 763.41s - 768.13s | an official instance, I found it's a collision. 768.13s - 772.57s | So, yes, I still found the instance and report the flag. 772.57s - 775.57s | But too bad for me, the first bug 775.57s - 780.05s | do collide with an old kernel CTF submission. 780.05s - 785.32s | That's how I look after the competition. 785.32s - 788.08s | Okay, so I take some break. 788.08s - 794.55s | And after


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if there's any kernel updates 731.45s - 734.29s | related to NF tables. 734.29s - 736.81s | And guess what? 736.81s - 739.01s | The patch previously posted on the mailing list 739.05s - 741.33s | has been merged into the kernel. 741.33s - 744.37s | And it added one line on it. 744.37s - 748.09s | It says, reported by LonelyOnCom, 748.09s - 750.73s | which this means is the patch may actually come 750.73s - 753.37s | from a zero-day kernel CTF submission. 753.37s - 755.73s | And since the reporter is LonelyOnCom, 755.73s - 760.29s | whose exploit I just used, this is indeed the case. 760.29s - 763.41s | So, just before I have the chance to exploit 763.41s - 768.13s | an official instance, I found it's a collision. 768.13s - 772.57s | So, yes, I still found the instance and report the flag. 772.57s - 775.57s | But too bad for me, the first bug 775.57s - 780.05s | do collide with an old kernel CTF submission. 780.05s - 785.32s | That's how I look after the competition. 785.32s - 788.08s | Okay, so I take some break. 788.08s - 794.55s | And after three weeks later, I found the second bug. 794.55s - 798.39s | During the research, I came across an interesting commit. 798.39s - 803.55s | NF table validate family when identifying table by handle. 803.55s - 806.51s | The commit is added after the mitigation instance kernel 806.51s - 809.67s | version, so it can be used upon the mitigation instance 809.67s - 811.63s | as a one-day. 811.63s - 816.75s | It added a check on NFT table lookup by handle function, 816.75s - 819.59s | which is used for searching a register table 819.59s - 821.99s | by the provided handle. 821.99s - 824.51s | Without the commit, during the table lookup, 824.51s - 826.71s | we can provide a family different from the one 826.71s - 828.59s | which table belongs to. 828.59s - 834.47s | But what can we do with this inconsistency? 834.47s - 837.83s | Let's trace where the family parameter comes from 837.83s - 839.75s | and where it goes. 839.75s - 842.51s | NF table lookup by handle is only called 842.51s - 844.91s | from NF table delete table. 844.91s - 848.35s | And this function is used to delete user-specified


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three weeks later, I found the second bug. 794.55s - 798.39s | During the research, I came across an interesting commit. 798.39s - 803.55s | NF table validate family when identifying table by handle. 803.55s - 806.51s | The commit is added after the mitigation instance kernel 806.51s - 809.67s | version, so it can be used upon the mitigation instance 809.67s - 811.63s | as a one-day. 811.63s - 816.75s | It added a check on NFT table lookup by handle function, 816.75s - 819.59s | which is used for searching a register table 819.59s - 821.99s | by the provided handle. 821.99s - 824.51s | Without the commit, during the table lookup, 824.51s - 826.71s | we can provide a family different from the one 826.71s - 828.59s | which table belongs to. 828.59s - 834.47s | But what can we do with this inconsistency? 834.47s - 837.83s | Let's trace where the family parameter comes from 837.83s - 839.75s | and where it goes. 839.75s - 842.51s | NF table lookup by handle is only called 842.51s - 844.91s | from NF table delete table. 844.91s - 848.35s | And this function is used to delete user-specified table 848.35s - 850.11s | from NF tables. 850.11s - 856.51s | The family variable is directly get from user-provided input. 856.55s - 858.99s | And it's saved into context family 858.99s - 864.28s | and passed to NFT flush table function. 864.28s - 867.48s | In NFT flush table, context argument 867.48s - 870.88s | is passed into every function handling object deletion. 870.88s - 874.60s | For me, trace which function use the context family 874.60s - 875.92s | is quite annoying. 875.92s - 880.68s | So instead of just tracing into each function, 880.68s - 885.72s | I take the shortcut to trace where it is used. 885.76s - 888.00s | So I just grab the whole code base 888.00s - 892.72s | to find where the context family is used. 892.72s - 896.32s | Grabbing context family gives us a lot of result, 896.32s - 899.28s | most of which comes from the NF table expressions 899.28s - 904.04s | like count limit, net, T proxy, and et cetera. 904.04s - 908.68s | However, most of them cannot be used for the exploit. 908.68s - 912.36s | But I finally found one that can be exploited.


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table 848.35s - 850.11s | from NF tables. 850.11s - 856.51s | The family variable is directly get from user-provided input. 856.55s - 858.99s | And it's saved into context family 858.99s - 864.28s | and passed to NFT flush table function. 864.28s - 867.48s | In NFT flush table, context argument 867.48s - 870.88s | is passed into every function handling object deletion. 870.88s - 874.60s | For me, trace which function use the context family 874.60s - 875.92s | is quite annoying. 875.92s - 880.68s | So instead of just tracing into each function, 880.68s - 885.72s | I take the shortcut to trace where it is used. 885.76s - 888.00s | So I just grab the whole code base 888.00s - 892.72s | to find where the context family is used. 892.72s - 896.32s | Grabbing context family gives us a lot of result, 896.32s - 899.28s | most of which comes from the NF table expressions 899.28s - 904.04s | like count limit, net, T proxy, and et cetera. 904.04s - 908.68s | However, most of them cannot be used for the exploit. 908.68s - 912.36s | But I finally found one that can be exploited. 912.36s - 917.26s | It is in the NFT log expression. 917.26s - 920.78s | The trigger path I found starts from the NFT log destroy. 920.78s - 923.46s | This function takes context family as an argument 923.46s - 927.14s | and call to NF log output. 927.14s - 929.86s | Now it's becoming the PF argument 929.86s - 934.50s | and used as an index to de-reference the loggers array. 934.50s - 937.10s | The value range of our input context family 937.10s - 941.06s | and also the PF here is 0 to 255. 941.06s - 945.54s | But if we check the size of loggers array, 945.54s - 949.46s | we can find it only have 13 elements in the first dimension. 949.46s - 954.54s | So we get the global array out of bound access here. 954.54s - 958.65s | But what can we do with it? 958.65s - 962.21s | After taking the logger out, it de-reference the me field 962.21s - 966.09s | and feed it into the module put. 966.09s - 968.17s | The module put will again de-reference 968.17s - 972.29s | and decrease the refcon value in the module object.


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912.36s - 917.26s | It is in the NFT log expression. 917.26s - 920.78s | The trigger path I found starts from the NFT log destroy. 920.78s - 923.46s | This function takes context family as an argument 923.46s - 927.14s | and call to NF log output. 927.14s - 929.86s | Now it's becoming the PF argument 929.86s - 934.50s | and used as an index to de-reference the loggers array. 934.50s - 937.10s | The value range of our input context family 937.10s - 941.06s | and also the PF here is 0 to 255. 941.06s - 945.54s | But if we check the size of loggers array, 945.54s - 949.46s | we can find it only have 13 elements in the first dimension. 949.46s - 954.54s | So we get the global array out of bound access here. 954.54s - 958.65s | But what can we do with it? 958.65s - 962.21s | After taking the logger out, it de-reference the me field 962.21s - 966.09s | and feed it into the module put. 966.09s - 968.17s | The module put will again de-reference 968.17s - 972.29s | and decrease the refcon value in the module object. 972.29s - 974.05s | With this vulnerability, 974.05s - 978.13s | a logger can be any pointer store adjacent to a loggers array. 978.13s - 980.81s | So we may cause some type of confusion here 980.81s - 983.53s | and decrease some variable by one. 983.53s - 987.73s | However, we are dealing with an awkward situation here. 987.73s - 990.09s | In order to utilize this bug, 990.09s - 992.81s | we have to find a pointer store on global 992.81s - 996.05s | and can be de-referenced twice. 996.05s - 998.69s | The first is to take our logger me 998.69s - 1004.23s | and the second is to take our module refcon. 1004.23s - 1007.15s | To sum up what we have by now, 1007.15s - 1012.79s | first, the maximum value of pfValue we can control is 255. 1012.79s - 1017.39s | And we can trigger an out of bound refcon decrement 1017.39s - 1021.27s | by using a pfValue larger than 12, 1021.27s - 1024.39s | which will execute like the code here. 1024.39s - 1026.99s | To exploit this, the first thing we need to do 1026.99s - 1032.59s | is to find


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972.29s - 974.05s | With this vulnerability, 974.05s - 978.13s | a logger can be any pointer store adjacent to a loggers array. 978.13s - 980.81s | So we may cause some type of confusion here 980.81s - 983.53s | and decrease some variable by one. 983.53s - 987.73s | However, we are dealing with an awkward situation here. 987.73s - 990.09s | In order to utilize this bug, 990.09s - 992.81s | we have to find a pointer store on global 992.81s - 996.05s | and can be de-referenced twice. 996.05s - 998.69s | The first is to take our logger me 998.69s - 1004.23s | and the second is to take our module refcon. 1004.23s - 1007.15s | To sum up what we have by now, 1007.15s - 1012.79s | first, the maximum value of pfValue we can control is 255. 1012.79s - 1017.39s | And we can trigger an out of bound refcon decrement 1017.39s - 1021.27s | by using a pfValue larger than 12, 1021.27s - 1024.39s | which will execute like the code here. 1024.39s - 1026.99s | To exploit this, the first thing we need to do 1026.99s - 1032.59s | is to find a global pointer placed near the loggers array. 1032.59s - 1035.03s | So what do we have on the global? 1035.03s - 1037.51s | By inspect the marrying GDB, 1037.51s - 1040.95s | we quickly find there's an NFCT expect hash 1040.95s - 1044.23s | placed near the loggers array. 1044.23s - 1045.95s | And it's a hash table. 1045.95s - 1049.15s | So in this case, it seems to be a good target 1049.15s - 1053.55s | since the pointer point to an array of pointers. 1053.55s - 1058.66s | Therefore, it can be de-referenced twice. 1058.66s - 1062.86s | So let's check how the code normally works. 1062.86s - 1067.26s | First, it gets the me field at offset 1x 1067.26s - 1073.46s | and then get the refcon at offset 340x. 1073.46s - 1076.42s | Now let's check the out of bound access case. 1076.42s - 1079.22s | First, we set pf to 19 to get a hash table 1079.22s - 1082.50s | pointer NFCT expect hash. 1082.50s - 1085.94s | The first de-reference we got is the index tree entry 1085.94s - 1088.10s | of the hash table. 1088.10s - 1090.58s | The entry points to


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a global pointer placed near the loggers array. 1032.59s - 1035.03s | So what do we have on the global? 1035.03s - 1037.51s | By inspect the marrying GDB, 1037.51s - 1040.95s | we quickly find there's an NFCT expect hash 1040.95s - 1044.23s | placed near the loggers array. 1044.23s - 1045.95s | And it's a hash table. 1045.95s - 1049.15s | So in this case, it seems to be a good target 1049.15s - 1053.55s | since the pointer point to an array of pointers. 1053.55s - 1058.66s | Therefore, it can be de-referenced twice. 1058.66s - 1062.86s | So let's check how the code normally works. 1062.86s - 1067.26s | First, it gets the me field at offset 1x 1067.26s - 1073.46s | and then get the refcon at offset 340x. 1073.46s - 1076.42s | Now let's check the out of bound access case. 1076.42s - 1079.22s | First, we set pf to 19 to get a hash table 1079.22s - 1082.50s | pointer NFCT expect hash. 1082.50s - 1085.94s | The first de-reference we got is the index tree entry 1085.94s - 1088.10s | of the hash table. 1088.10s - 1090.58s | The entry points to the HNO field 1090.58s - 1093.70s | of an NFCT expect object. 1093.70s - 1095.38s | So after one more de-reference, it 1095.38s - 1100.38s | will access offset 340x down below the expect object. 1100.38s - 1104.50s | But since the expect object only have a d at size, 1104.50s - 1107.26s | it will access out of bounds. 1107.26s - 1111.22s | Fortunately, all NFCT expect object 1111.22s - 1114.98s | allocated in a dedicated Cayman cache. 1114.98s - 1117.02s | So the memory space below will also 1117.02s - 1121.42s | contain NFCT expect objects. 1121.42s - 1123.82s | So it will access to an RCU field 1123.82s - 1127.54s | and decrease the next pointer in the structure. 1127.54s - 1132.71s | But what does this next pointer useful? 1132.71s - 1135.75s | As we know, after RCU objects free, 1135.75s - 1138.71s | Linux kernel will not instantly free the object. 1138.71s - 1142.19s | Instead, it will hold the object for a grace period 1142.19s - 1145.55s | to wait for all other RCU readers to finish. 1145.55s - 1148.27s | So the next pointer in the RCU hash structure 1148.27s - 1150.43s |


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the HNO field 1090.58s - 1093.70s | of an NFCT expect object. 1093.70s - 1095.38s | So after one more de-reference, it 1095.38s - 1100.38s | will access offset 340x down below the expect object. 1100.38s - 1104.50s | But since the expect object only have a d at size, 1104.50s - 1107.26s | it will access out of bounds. 1107.26s - 1111.22s | Fortunately, all NFCT expect object 1111.22s - 1114.98s | allocated in a dedicated Cayman cache. 1114.98s - 1117.02s | So the memory space below will also 1117.02s - 1121.42s | contain NFCT expect objects. 1121.42s - 1123.82s | So it will access to an RCU field 1123.82s - 1127.54s | and decrease the next pointer in the structure. 1127.54s - 1132.71s | But what does this next pointer useful? 1132.71s - 1135.75s | As we know, after RCU objects free, 1135.75s - 1138.71s | Linux kernel will not instantly free the object. 1138.71s - 1142.19s | Instead, it will hold the object for a grace period 1142.19s - 1145.55s | to wait for all other RCU readers to finish. 1145.55s - 1148.27s | So the next pointer in the RCU hash structure 1148.27s - 1150.43s | is used for temporary story name 1150.43s - 1156.25s | and waiting for the RCU thread to process to free them. 1156.25s - 1158.89s | So after the contract expect object are free, 1158.89s - 1164.69s | they will be like this, chained by the next pointer. 1164.69s - 1168.09s | And since we can decrease the next pointer in RCU head, 1168.09s - 1169.93s | we can make it point to another field 1169.93s - 1173.33s | inside the contract expect object. 1173.33s - 1175.73s | And to exploit it, we choose to land it 1175.73s - 1177.61s | on a user-controllable field, which 1177.61s - 1181.59s | contains a union of IPv4 and IPv6 address. 1181.59s - 1185.03s | So when RCU callback triggered, it 1185.03s - 1187.27s | will read the fake function pointer we set, 1187.27s - 1190.76s | and we can control the IP. 1190.76s - 1193.68s | However, to actually exploit the vulnerability, 1193.68s - 1195.92s | we came across some roadblocks. 1195.92s - 1199.52s | First, we need the index tree of the hash table 1199.52s - 1201.28s | point to some expect object. 1201.28s - 1204.88s | So we can use it


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is used for temporary story name 1150.43s - 1156.25s | and waiting for the RCU thread to process to free them. 1156.25s - 1158.89s | So after the contract expect object are free, 1158.89s - 1164.69s | they will be like this, chained by the next pointer. 1164.69s - 1168.09s | And since we can decrease the next pointer in RCU head, 1168.09s - 1169.93s | we can make it point to another field 1169.93s - 1173.33s | inside the contract expect object. 1173.33s - 1175.73s | And to exploit it, we choose to land it 1175.73s - 1177.61s | on a user-controllable field, which 1177.61s - 1181.59s | contains a union of IPv4 and IPv6 address. 1181.59s - 1185.03s | So when RCU callback triggered, it 1185.03s - 1187.27s | will read the fake function pointer we set, 1187.27s - 1190.76s | and we can control the IP. 1190.76s - 1193.68s | However, to actually exploit the vulnerability, 1193.68s - 1195.92s | we came across some roadblocks. 1195.92s - 1199.52s | First, we need the index tree of the hash table 1199.52s - 1201.28s | point to some expect object. 1201.28s - 1204.88s | So we can use it to do the out-of-bound write. 1204.88s - 1211.12s | But unfortunately, the hash value is unpredictable. 1211.12s - 1214.76s | Next, the out-of-bound written expect object 1214.76s - 1217.44s | need to be in the grace period, so we 1217.44s - 1220.80s | can decrease its next pointer. 1220.80s - 1223.64s | But the next period is a small time window 1223.64s - 1225.80s | and hard to control when the kernel actually 1225.80s - 1228.64s | frees the object. 1228.64s - 1231.52s | Well, so long story short, we eventually 1231.52s - 1236.60s | found a way to exploit it by brute force and race. 1236.60s - 1239.72s | To exploit this, first, we use a tight loop 1239.72s - 1242.70s | to create a lot of expect objects. 1242.70s - 1245.34s | And at some point, the expect count 1245.34s - 1249.74s | exceeded the value max expected and start 1249.74s - 1254.24s | to evict the oldest expect object. 1254.24s - 1259.16s | So the oldest expect object will be placed into the RCU free list. 1259.16s - 1262.32s | And so on, and so on. 1262.32s - 1266.12s | And at some point, RCU thread gets


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to do the out-of-bound write. 1204.88s - 1211.12s | But unfortunately, the hash value is unpredictable. 1211.12s - 1214.76s | Next, the out-of-bound written expect object 1214.76s - 1217.44s | need to be in the grace period, so we 1217.44s - 1220.80s | can decrease its next pointer. 1220.80s - 1223.64s | But the next period is a small time window 1223.64s - 1225.80s | and hard to control when the kernel actually 1225.80s - 1228.64s | frees the object. 1228.64s - 1231.52s | Well, so long story short, we eventually 1231.52s - 1236.60s | found a way to exploit it by brute force and race. 1236.60s - 1239.72s | To exploit this, first, we use a tight loop 1239.72s - 1242.70s | to create a lot of expect objects. 1242.70s - 1245.34s | And at some point, the expect count 1245.34s - 1249.74s | exceeded the value max expected and start 1249.74s - 1254.24s | to evict the oldest expect object. 1254.24s - 1259.16s | So the oldest expect object will be placed into the RCU free list. 1259.16s - 1262.32s | And so on, and so on. 1262.32s - 1266.12s | And at some point, RCU thread gets scheduled by the kernel 1266.12s - 1271.70s | and starting to process objects. 1271.70s - 1273.62s | At this point, we add another thread 1273.62s - 1277.26s | to trigger out-of-bound decrement in a batch request. 1277.94s - 1283.09s | And keep this system running for a bit. 1283.09s - 1287.97s | So we hope for a race scenario like this to emerge. 1287.97s - 1290.33s | First, the expect object allocated 1290.33s - 1293.05s | into index tree of the hash table. 1293.05s - 1296.13s | And then the expect object you want to out-of-bound write 1296.13s - 1299.45s | is freed into the RCU free list. 1299.45s - 1304.61s | Then it continues to free another expect object. 1304.61s - 1307.89s | After that, we trigger the vulnerability 28 times 1307.89s - 1310.93s | in a batch request to make the next pointer point 1310.93s - 1314.09s | to a user-controllable value. 1314.09s - 1317.89s | And finally, the RCU starts to process these three objects 1317.89s - 1322.28s | and runs our set callback function. 1322.28s - 1323.12s | Great. 1323.12s - 1325.12s | Let's try it on local build. 1325.12s - 1332.78s | And we successfully


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scheduled by the kernel 1266.12s - 1271.70s | and starting to process objects. 1271.70s - 1273.62s | At this point, we add another thread 1273.62s - 1277.26s | to trigger out-of-bound decrement in a batch request. 1277.94s - 1283.09s | And keep this system running for a bit. 1283.09s - 1287.97s | So we hope for a race scenario like this to emerge. 1287.97s - 1290.33s | First, the expect object allocated 1290.33s - 1293.05s | into index tree of the hash table. 1293.05s - 1296.13s | And then the expect object you want to out-of-bound write 1296.13s - 1299.45s | is freed into the RCU free list. 1299.45s - 1304.61s | Then it continues to free another expect object. 1304.61s - 1307.89s | After that, we trigger the vulnerability 28 times 1307.89s - 1310.93s | in a batch request to make the next pointer point 1310.93s - 1314.09s | to a user-controllable value. 1314.09s - 1317.89s | And finally, the RCU starts to process these three objects 1317.89s - 1322.28s | and runs our set callback function. 1322.28s - 1323.12s | Great. 1323.12s - 1325.12s | Let's try it on local build. 1325.12s - 1332.78s | And we successfully control the IP to 414441. 1332.78s - 1337.00s | So what about remote? 1337.00s - 1337.92s | Let's try. 1337.92s - 1340.80s | And we got an error message while trying 1340.80s - 1343.56s | to add the log expression. 1343.56s - 1345.24s | Since I have no idea what happens 1345.24s - 1347.48s | on the remote environment, I decided 1347.48s - 1352.92s | to download the official busy image to debug it locally. 1352.92s - 1357.68s | So I open the GDB and set some breakpoint on the functions. 1357.68s - 1361.36s | But when I set the break on n of t log destroy function, 1361.36s - 1364.76s | GDB complained that it was not defined. 1364.76s - 1368.82s | What's wrong here? 1368.82s - 1372.26s | I later found that it's because the kernel config I used 1372.26s - 1376.94s | is different from the one used in the official environment. 1376.94s - 1380.46s | So the log expression I used to exploit the vulnerability 1380.46s - 1384.02s | not even compiled into the official image. 1384.02s - 1387.70s | But I'm using the official build script 1387.70s - 1389.78s | to view the local test


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control the IP to 414441. 1332.78s - 1337.00s | So what about remote? 1337.00s - 1337.92s | Let's try. 1337.92s - 1340.80s | And we got an error message while trying 1340.80s - 1343.56s | to add the log expression. 1343.56s - 1345.24s | Since I have no idea what happens 1345.24s - 1347.48s | on the remote environment, I decided 1347.48s - 1352.92s | to download the official busy image to debug it locally. 1352.92s - 1357.68s | So I open the GDB and set some breakpoint on the functions. 1357.68s - 1361.36s | But when I set the break on n of t log destroy function, 1361.36s - 1364.76s | GDB complained that it was not defined. 1364.76s - 1368.82s | What's wrong here? 1368.82s - 1372.26s | I later found that it's because the kernel config I used 1372.26s - 1376.94s | is different from the one used in the official environment. 1376.94s - 1380.46s | So the log expression I used to exploit the vulnerability 1380.46s - 1384.02s | not even compiled into the official image. 1384.02s - 1387.70s | But I'm using the official build script 1387.70s - 1389.78s | to view the local test image. 1389.78s - 1394.59s | Why else there can be any difference? 1394.59s - 1395.91s | I mean, why? 1399.91s - 1404.35s | Eventually, I found it is caused by the official build script. 1404.35s - 1408.19s | The mitigation instance is built by CoS kernel config 1408.19s - 1412.67s | plus the Google custom security patch. 1412.67s - 1415.07s | And the official mitigation instance 1415.07s - 1419.75s | used CoS config 6.1.55. 1419.75s - 1424.79s | The NF table expression are enabled in CoS config 1424.79s - 1428.59s | after the version 6.1.64. 1428.59s - 1432.47s | However, the build script will always fetch the latest CoS 1432.47s - 1435.43s | config, so the mitigation kernel I built 1435.43s - 1438.35s | has the NF table expression enabled. 1438.35s - 1443.90s | But in the official image, they're actually disabled. 1443.90s - 1447.78s | So well, I think next time I should definitely 1447.78s - 1454.25s | check out the config first. 1454.25s - 1460.85s | OK, so after my second failure, I revisit some old patch 1460.85s - 1465.50s | and I found a new bug. 1465.50s - 1468.54s | The patch I was looking at is


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image. 1389.78s - 1394.59s | Why else there can be any difference? 1394.59s - 1395.91s | I mean, why? 1399.91s - 1404.35s | Eventually, I found it is caused by the official build script. 1404.35s - 1408.19s | The mitigation instance is built by CoS kernel config 1408.19s - 1412.67s | plus the Google custom security patch. 1412.67s - 1415.07s | And the official mitigation instance 1415.07s - 1419.75s | used CoS config 6.1.55. 1419.75s - 1424.79s | The NF table expression are enabled in CoS config 1424.79s - 1428.59s | after the version 6.1.64. 1428.59s - 1432.47s | However, the build script will always fetch the latest CoS 1432.47s - 1435.43s | config, so the mitigation kernel I built 1435.43s - 1438.35s | has the NF table expression enabled. 1438.35s - 1443.90s | But in the official image, they're actually disabled. 1443.90s - 1447.78s | So well, I think next time I should definitely 1447.78s - 1454.25s | check out the config first. 1454.25s - 1460.85s | OK, so after my second failure, I revisit some old patch 1460.85s - 1465.50s | and I found a new bug. 1465.50s - 1468.54s | The patch I was looking at is the patch 1468.54s - 1470.78s | which introduced the first bug. 1470.78s - 1475.46s | The title says, NF table adapt set backend 1475.46s - 1478.26s | to use GC transaction API. 1478.26s - 1481.62s | So what does the GC mean? 1481.62s - 1485.18s | Here it means the set garbage collection. 1485.18s - 1487.46s | There are some set implementation support user 1487.46s - 1491.94s | to set a timeout on any set element. 1491.94s - 1497.30s | And there are two types of GC to clean the expired element. 1497.30s - 1500.94s | The first one, the synchronous one, 1500.94s - 1503.22s | will be called in the commit phase. 1503.22s - 1506.74s | And a synchronous one will be triggered periodically 1506.74s - 1508.74s | in the background. 1508.74s - 1513.50s | But here, we only focus on the synchronous one. 1513.50s - 1516.58s | So back to the patch. 1516.58s - 1520.74s | In the commit message, it says, use GC transaction API 1520.74s - 1524.86s | to replace the old and buggy GC API and the busy mark 1524.86s - 1526.54s | approach. 1526.54s - 1529.30s | So what is the difference between the


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the patch 1468.54s - 1470.78s | which introduced the first bug. 1470.78s - 1475.46s | The title says, NF table adapt set backend 1475.46s - 1478.26s | to use GC transaction API. 1478.26s - 1481.62s | So what does the GC mean? 1481.62s - 1485.18s | Here it means the set garbage collection. 1485.18s - 1487.46s | There are some set implementation support user 1487.46s - 1491.94s | to set a timeout on any set element. 1491.94s - 1497.30s | And there are two types of GC to clean the expired element. 1497.30s - 1500.94s | The first one, the synchronous one, 1500.94s - 1503.22s | will be called in the commit phase. 1503.22s - 1506.74s | And a synchronous one will be triggered periodically 1506.74s - 1508.74s | in the background. 1508.74s - 1513.50s | But here, we only focus on the synchronous one. 1513.50s - 1516.58s | So back to the patch. 1516.58s - 1520.74s | In the commit message, it says, use GC transaction API 1520.74s - 1524.86s | to replace the old and buggy GC API and the busy mark 1524.86s - 1526.54s | approach. 1526.54s - 1529.30s | So what is the difference between the new and the old 1529.30s - 1530.58s | one? 1530.58s - 1535.70s | Let's take a look of the old GC design. 1535.70s - 1538.14s | In the old design, the synchronous GC 1538.14s - 1542.66s | will run loglessly and can be triggered at any time. 1542.66s - 1544.38s | So in order to protect GC threads 1544.38s - 1547.98s | from raising with the landing API, both of them 1547.98s - 1551.38s | will check against busy mark set on the element 1551.38s - 1556.66s | before delete it to prevent double free. 1556.70s - 1559.66s | But sometimes, the developer might 1559.66s - 1561.90s | forget to check against it. 1561.90s - 1564.50s | In this case, there's a new function 1564.50s - 1569.30s | called nftMapDeactivate forgot to check a busy mark. 1569.30s - 1573.94s | And this leads to a double free vulnerability. 1573.94s - 1576.58s | So in order to avoid this kind of issues, 1576.58s - 1582.86s | nftable developer decided to replace it with a new design. 1582.86s - 1587.14s | In the new GC design, it introduced the GC sequence. 1587.14s - 1589.70s | The GC sequence is a per net


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new and the old 1529.30s - 1530.58s | one? 1530.58s - 1535.70s | Let's take a look of the old GC design. 1535.70s - 1538.14s | In the old design, the synchronous GC 1538.14s - 1542.66s | will run loglessly and can be triggered at any time. 1542.66s - 1544.38s | So in order to protect GC threads 1544.38s - 1547.98s | from raising with the landing API, both of them 1547.98s - 1551.38s | will check against busy mark set on the element 1551.38s - 1556.66s | before delete it to prevent double free. 1556.70s - 1559.66s | But sometimes, the developer might 1559.66s - 1561.90s | forget to check against it. 1561.90s - 1564.50s | In this case, there's a new function 1564.50s - 1569.30s | called nftMapDeactivate forgot to check a busy mark. 1569.30s - 1573.94s | And this leads to a double free vulnerability. 1573.94s - 1576.58s | So in order to avoid this kind of issues, 1576.58s - 1582.86s | nftable developer decided to replace it with a new design. 1582.86s - 1587.14s | In the new GC design, it introduced the GC sequence. 1587.14s - 1589.70s | The GC sequence is a per net variable. 1589.70s - 1594.66s | And it will be increased before and after any modification 1594.66s - 1596.54s | to the control plan. 1596.54s - 1599.02s | So it will increase at the beginning 1599.02s - 1604.94s | and at the end of both the commit and the abort phase. 1604.94s - 1608.34s | During a GC procedure, GC thread will record and check 1608.34s - 1610.34s | it to prevent raise. 1610.34s - 1613.58s | Even though the GC thread still run loglessly, 1613.58s - 1621.34s | during the check, it will now acquire the commit mutex lock. 1621.34s - 1625.26s | The new GC design look like this. 1625.26s - 1628.02s | During batch request handling, GC sequence 1628.02s - 1631.38s | will increase both before and after the commit and abort 1631.38s - 1632.50s | phase. 1632.50s - 1637.14s | And in the GC thread, it will first run loglessly 1637.14s - 1639.42s | to store the GC sequence and collect 1639.42s - 1641.58s | all the expired elements. 1641.58s - 1644.22s | After that, it will acquire the lock 1644.22s - 1648.46s | and check if the current GC sequence match the safe one. 1648.46s -


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variable. 1589.70s - 1594.66s | And it will be increased before and after any modification 1594.66s - 1596.54s | to the control plan. 1596.54s - 1599.02s | So it will increase at the beginning 1599.02s - 1604.94s | and at the end of both the commit and the abort phase. 1604.94s - 1608.34s | During a GC procedure, GC thread will record and check 1608.34s - 1610.34s | it to prevent raise. 1610.34s - 1613.58s | Even though the GC thread still run loglessly, 1613.58s - 1621.34s | during the check, it will now acquire the commit mutex lock. 1621.34s - 1625.26s | The new GC design look like this. 1625.26s - 1628.02s | During batch request handling, GC sequence 1628.02s - 1631.38s | will increase both before and after the commit and abort 1631.38s - 1632.50s | phase. 1632.50s - 1637.14s | And in the GC thread, it will first run loglessly 1637.14s - 1639.42s | to store the GC sequence and collect 1639.42s - 1641.58s | all the expired elements. 1641.58s - 1644.22s | After that, it will acquire the lock 1644.22s - 1648.46s | and check if the current GC sequence match the safe one. 1648.46s - 1653.74s | If they are the same, then the elements will be released. 1653.74s - 1656.62s | For this normal case, since GC thread does not 1656.62s - 1659.38s | raise with the batch request, the GC sequence 1659.38s - 1661.34s | will be the same. 1661.34s - 1668.35s | And the element can be freed by the GC thread. 1668.35s - 1672.39s | Next, we check if it still works in the race case. 1672.39s - 1674.59s | If during the prepare phase, GC thread 1674.59s - 1680.71s | trigger and store the global GC sequence into transfer object, 1680.71s - 1683.23s | it will continue to run loglessly 1683.23s - 1693.04s | to find all the expired element and wait for the mutex lock. 1693.04s - 1694.68s | At the same time, the main thread 1694.68s - 1696.60s | step into the commit phase. 1696.60s - 1699.16s | And some of the elements in the set 1699.16s - 1702.68s | can be released in this phase. 1702.68s - 1706.16s | The GC thread will need to wait until the main thread release 1706.16s - 1710.72s | the mutex lock so it can finally check the safe GC sequence


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1653.74s | If they are the same, then the elements will be released. 1653.74s - 1656.62s | For this normal case, since GC thread does not 1656.62s - 1659.38s | raise with the batch request, the GC sequence 1659.38s - 1661.34s | will be the same. 1661.34s - 1668.35s | And the element can be freed by the GC thread. 1668.35s - 1672.39s | Next, we check if it still works in the race case. 1672.39s - 1674.59s | If during the prepare phase, GC thread 1674.59s - 1680.71s | trigger and store the global GC sequence into transfer object, 1680.71s - 1683.23s | it will continue to run loglessly 1683.23s - 1693.04s | to find all the expired element and wait for the mutex lock. 1693.04s - 1694.68s | At the same time, the main thread 1694.68s - 1696.60s | step into the commit phase. 1696.60s - 1699.16s | And some of the elements in the set 1699.16s - 1702.68s | can be released in this phase. 1702.68s - 1706.16s | The GC thread will need to wait until the main thread release 1706.16s - 1710.72s | the mutex lock so it can finally check the safe GC sequence 1710.72s - 1713.88s | and delete the element. 1713.88s - 1716.48s | But in this case, since GC sequence 1716.48s - 1719.88s | is recorded in the prepare phase and we check it 1719.88s - 1723.20s | after the batch request is done, the GC sequence 1723.20s - 1725.04s | will be different. 1725.04s - 1729.44s | So the element deletion will be skipped to avoid double free. 1729.44s - 1732.28s | Next, let's check the case if GC sequence is 1732.28s - 1736.32s | recorded in the commit phase. 1736.32s - 1738.88s | In this case, since GC sequence increase 1738.88s - 1745.56s | after the commit phase, and the GC thread 1745.56s - 1754.56s | can only check GC sequence after the commit mutex are locked, 1754.56s - 1758.62s | this race will also be detected. 1758.62s - 1764.50s | So to sum up, the new GC design require both the batch request 1764.50s - 1767.78s | and the GC sequence check to hold the lock. 1767.78s - 1770.98s | This ensures that even there's a race while collecting 1770.98s - 1774.14s | the expired element, the check will always 1774.14s - 1780.74s | happen after the GC


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1710.72s - 1713.88s | and delete the element. 1713.88s - 1716.48s | But in this case, since GC sequence 1716.48s - 1719.88s | is recorded in the prepare phase and we check it 1719.88s - 1723.20s | after the batch request is done, the GC sequence 1723.20s - 1725.04s | will be different. 1725.04s - 1729.44s | So the element deletion will be skipped to avoid double free. 1729.44s - 1732.28s | Next, let's check the case if GC sequence is 1732.28s - 1736.32s | recorded in the commit phase. 1736.32s - 1738.88s | In this case, since GC sequence increase 1738.88s - 1745.56s | after the commit phase, and the GC thread 1745.56s - 1754.56s | can only check GC sequence after the commit mutex are locked, 1754.56s - 1758.62s | this race will also be detected. 1758.62s - 1764.50s | So to sum up, the new GC design require both the batch request 1764.50s - 1767.78s | and the GC sequence check to hold the lock. 1767.78s - 1770.98s | This ensures that even there's a race while collecting 1770.98s - 1774.14s | the expired element, the check will always 1774.14s - 1780.74s | happen after the GC sequence has increased. 1780.74s - 1784.50s | But does the batch request always lock 1784.50s - 1786.66s | means there's no race? 1786.66s - 1791.98s | Actually, if you look closely, we will find, 1791.98s - 1798.44s | well, it's not always locked. 1798.44s - 1800.56s | To find where it released the lock, 1800.56s - 1804.16s | let's first talk about the module autoload. 1804.16s - 1805.88s | During the prepare phase, if there 1805.88s - 1808.00s | is some expression type in the request 1808.00s - 1811.88s | is not found during the type resolution, 1811.88s - 1817.00s | it will instantly abort and try to load the correspondent type 1817.00s - 1821.32s | module during the end of the abort phase. 1821.32s - 1828.25s | After that, it will retry the whole batch request again. 1828.25s - 1831.41s | However, maybe there is some efficiency consideration 1831.41s - 1835.37s | or to just only prevent that lock before the function 1835.37s - 1839.21s | try to load the request module. 1839.21s - 1842.69s | The mutex lock will be released. 1842.69s - 1847.50s | But could it cause any problem? 1847.50s - 1848.90s | Back to the


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sequence has increased. 1780.74s - 1784.50s | But does the batch request always lock 1784.50s - 1786.66s | means there's no race? 1786.66s - 1791.98s | Actually, if you look closely, we will find, 1791.98s - 1798.44s | well, it's not always locked. 1798.44s - 1800.56s | To find where it released the lock, 1800.56s - 1804.16s | let's first talk about the module autoload. 1804.16s - 1805.88s | During the prepare phase, if there 1805.88s - 1808.00s | is some expression type in the request 1808.00s - 1811.88s | is not found during the type resolution, 1811.88s - 1817.00s | it will instantly abort and try to load the correspondent type 1817.00s - 1821.32s | module during the end of the abort phase. 1821.32s - 1828.25s | After that, it will retry the whole batch request again. 1828.25s - 1831.41s | However, maybe there is some efficiency consideration 1831.41s - 1835.37s | or to just only prevent that lock before the function 1835.37s - 1839.21s | try to load the request module. 1839.21s - 1842.69s | The mutex lock will be released. 1842.69s - 1847.50s | But could it cause any problem? 1847.50s - 1848.90s | Back to the diagram. 1848.90s - 1852.10s | Now there's a little time window in the abort phase 1852.10s - 1854.94s | that it will not hold the mutex lock. 1854.94s - 1858.58s | So there's a chance during the abort phase 1858.58s - 1862.38s | the GC thread kicks in, records the expired elements, 1862.38s - 1864.90s | and do a GC sequence check. 1864.90s - 1868.78s | In this case, however, the check will be bypassed. 1868.78s - 1876.94s | And the GC thread can delete arbitrary expired elements. 1876.94s - 1880.30s | OK, so now the question is, how do we actually 1880.30s - 1883.62s | exploit the race? 1883.62s - 1887.38s | Our exploit plan is, first, we add a set element 1887.38s - 1889.26s | with a short timeout. 1889.26s - 1891.18s | And then we trigger module autoload 1891.18s - 1893.70s | to force it to revert the commit and free 1893.70s - 1895.94s | the element we just added. 1895.94s - 1904.34s | And at the same time, we trigger GC to collect that element. 1904.34s - 1907.98s | Next, module autoload will release the mutex. 1907.98s - 1911.18s | And we hope that the GC


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diagram. 1848.90s - 1852.10s | Now there's a little time window in the abort phase 1852.10s - 1854.94s | that it will not hold the mutex lock. 1854.94s - 1858.58s | So there's a chance during the abort phase 1858.58s - 1862.38s | the GC thread kicks in, records the expired elements, 1862.38s - 1864.90s | and do a GC sequence check. 1864.90s - 1868.78s | In this case, however, the check will be bypassed. 1868.78s - 1876.94s | And the GC thread can delete arbitrary expired elements. 1876.94s - 1880.30s | OK, so now the question is, how do we actually 1880.30s - 1883.62s | exploit the race? 1883.62s - 1887.38s | Our exploit plan is, first, we add a set element 1887.38s - 1889.26s | with a short timeout. 1889.26s - 1891.18s | And then we trigger module autoload 1891.18s - 1893.70s | to force it to revert the commit and free 1893.70s - 1895.94s | the element we just added. 1895.94s - 1904.34s | And at the same time, we trigger GC to collect that element. 1904.34s - 1907.98s | Next, module autoload will release the mutex. 1907.98s - 1911.18s | And we hope that the GC thread will grab it and bypass 1911.18s - 1913.06s | the check. 1913.06s - 1919.60s | So as a result, the element we just added will be double free. 1919.60s - 1922.44s | But in order to trigger double free, 1922.44s - 1926.60s | there are two time windows we need to enlarge. 1926.60s - 1929.64s | The first time window is from the abort phase start 1929.64s - 1931.92s | to the set element released. 1931.92s - 1934.92s | So the GC thread can recall the expired element 1934.92s - 1939.84s | before they get a link by the revert procedure. 1939.84s - 1944.44s | The second time window is from the load module to its end. 1944.44s - 1952.00s | So the GC thread can grab the lock and bypass the check. 1952.00s - 1954.28s | For the first one, since the abort phase 1954.28s - 1957.22s | will revert the operations in a reverse order, 1957.22s - 1960.54s | we add a bunch of requests after the add set element 1960.54s - 1965.44s | request to delay the unlink operation. 1965.44s - 1968.84s | For the second one, we just request multiple unknown type 1968.84s - 1974.58s


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thread will grab it and bypass 1911.18s - 1913.06s | the check. 1913.06s - 1919.60s | So as a result, the element we just added will be double free. 1919.60s - 1922.44s | But in order to trigger double free, 1922.44s - 1926.60s | there are two time windows we need to enlarge. 1926.60s - 1929.64s | The first time window is from the abort phase start 1929.64s - 1931.92s | to the set element released. 1931.92s - 1934.92s | So the GC thread can recall the expired element 1934.92s - 1939.84s | before they get a link by the revert procedure. 1939.84s - 1944.44s | The second time window is from the load module to its end. 1944.44s - 1952.00s | So the GC thread can grab the lock and bypass the check. 1952.00s - 1954.28s | For the first one, since the abort phase 1954.28s - 1957.22s | will revert the operations in a reverse order, 1957.22s - 1960.54s | we add a bunch of requests after the add set element 1960.54s - 1965.44s | request to delay the unlink operation. 1965.44s - 1968.84s | For the second one, we just request multiple unknown type 1968.84s - 1974.58s | to make module autoload runs longer. 1974.58s - 1978.44s | And here's the demo. 1978.44s - 1984.99s | OK, so first we boot our machine and check 1984.99s - 1986.95s | that URD is a normal user. 1986.95s - 1989.19s | And then we run the exploit. 1989.19s - 1992.35s | So here, we will first measure the execution time 1992.35s - 1996.03s | to set up timing parameter for the race. 1996.03s - 1998.27s | And after that, we set up the environment 1998.27s - 2002.80s | to enlarge the race time windows. 2002.80s - 2009.20s | Then we trigger double free to leak address and control IP. 2009.20s - 2017.77s | And we got the root shell. 2017.77s - 2021.35s | Thank you, guys. 2021.35s - 2022.39s | Great. 2022.39s - 2028.15s | So now I write the exploit and submit it to Kernel CTF. 2028.15s - 2031.35s | And this is my Kernel CTF submission. 2031.35s - 2035.99s | I exploited the LTS instance on Kernel version 6.1.81. 2036.03s - 2040.79s | But as you can see, it is marked with a dupe in that line. 2040.79s - 2042.95s | It is because for every LTS


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| to make module autoload runs longer. 1974.58s - 1978.44s | And here's the demo. 1978.44s - 1984.99s | OK, so first we boot our machine and check 1984.99s - 1986.95s | that URD is a normal user. 1986.95s - 1989.19s | And then we run the exploit. 1989.19s - 1992.35s | So here, we will first measure the execution time 1992.35s - 1996.03s | to set up timing parameter for the race. 1996.03s - 1998.27s | And after that, we set up the environment 1998.27s - 2002.80s | to enlarge the race time windows. 2002.80s - 2009.20s | Then we trigger double free to leak address and control IP. 2009.20s - 2017.77s | And we got the root shell. 2017.77s - 2021.35s | Thank you, guys. 2021.35s - 2022.39s | Great. 2022.39s - 2028.15s | So now I write the exploit and submit it to Kernel CTF. 2028.15s - 2031.35s | And this is my Kernel CTF submission. 2031.35s - 2035.99s | I exploited the LTS instance on Kernel version 6.1.81. 2036.03s - 2040.79s | But as you can see, it is marked with a dupe in that line. 2040.79s - 2042.95s | It is because for every LTS slot, 2042.95s - 2047.03s | only the first zero day or one day exploit will be accepted. 2047.03s - 2049.91s | And there's someone who also submit 2049.91s - 2056.63s | a LTS exploit, which beats me by nine seconds. 2056.63s - 2058.91s | That's too bad. 2058.91s - 2064.17s | So we have to wait for the slot to reopen. 2064.17s - 2067.73s | So yes, just wait for about two weeks, 2067.73s - 2070.45s | and the slot will reopen. 2070.45s - 2073.41s | Right? 2073.41s - 2075.89s | Wait until it starts to reopen? 2075.89s - 2077.13s | Yep. 2077.13s - 2081.89s | But do you know the nftable will be disabled from April 1st? 2081.89s - 2086.35s | What? 2086.35s - 2087.95s | Actually, there's an announcement 2087.95s - 2089.51s | on Kernel CTF Discord. 2089.51s - 2091.95s | It says they are going to disable nftables, 2091.95s - 2095.95s | along with the switch to Kernel version 6.6. 2095.95s - 2099.15s | It starts from March 15th, but actually, they 2099.15s - 2100.39s | delay the switch. 2100.39s - 2103.51s | So it's from April 1st. 2103.51s - 2107.63s | OK, so what's the date


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slot, 2042.95s - 2047.03s | only the first zero day or one day exploit will be accepted. 2047.03s - 2049.91s | And there's someone who also submit 2049.91s - 2056.63s | a LTS exploit, which beats me by nine seconds. 2056.63s - 2058.91s | That's too bad. 2058.91s - 2064.17s | So we have to wait for the slot to reopen. 2064.17s - 2067.73s | So yes, just wait for about two weeks, 2067.73s - 2070.45s | and the slot will reopen. 2070.45s - 2073.41s | Right? 2073.41s - 2075.89s | Wait until it starts to reopen? 2075.89s - 2077.13s | Yep. 2077.13s - 2081.89s | But do you know the nftable will be disabled from April 1st? 2081.89s - 2086.35s | What? 2086.35s - 2087.95s | Actually, there's an announcement 2087.95s - 2089.51s | on Kernel CTF Discord. 2089.51s - 2091.95s | It says they are going to disable nftables, 2091.95s - 2095.95s | along with the switch to Kernel version 6.6. 2095.95s - 2099.15s | It starts from March 15th, but actually, they 2099.15s - 2100.39s | delay the switch. 2100.39s - 2103.51s | So it's from April 1st. 2103.51s - 2107.63s | OK, so what's the date today? 2107.63s - 2109.23s | It's actually March 22nd. 2112.27s - 2115.15s | The Kernel CTF slot opens about every two weeks 2115.15s - 2117.07s | on average, which means I won't be 2117.07s - 2122.35s | able to exploit it before they disable the nftables. 2122.35s - 2125.55s | So on my third Kernel CTF attempt, 2125.63s - 2131.32s | I still could not get a bounty, which is pretty sad. 2131.32s - 2135.40s | To sum up my journey, first, I have hope. 2135.40s - 2139.52s | And then I found bug one, a lifetime issue. 2139.52s - 2142.80s | And it collides with another submission. 2142.80s - 2146.92s | Then I found the bug two, a how-to-use-one-day. 2146.92s - 2151.88s | But I used the wrong config, so it's unusable. 2151.88s - 2156.64s | Then I found the bug three, a locking issue. 2156.66s - 2161.04s | But I lose the submission race, and nftable will be disabled. 2161.04s - 2163.36s | So it's killed. 2163.36s - 2165.80s | However, there's a final plot twist. 2170.84s - 2175.16s | A few days after, I found there are some changes 2175.16s - 2178.28s | in the Kernel CTF


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today? 2107.63s - 2109.23s | It's actually March 22nd. 2112.27s - 2115.15s | The Kernel CTF slot opens about every two weeks 2115.15s - 2117.07s | on average, which means I won't be 2117.07s - 2122.35s | able to exploit it before they disable the nftables. 2122.35s - 2125.55s | So on my third Kernel CTF attempt, 2125.63s - 2131.32s | I still could not get a bounty, which is pretty sad. 2131.32s - 2135.40s | To sum up my journey, first, I have hope. 2135.40s - 2139.52s | And then I found bug one, a lifetime issue. 2139.52s - 2142.80s | And it collides with another submission. 2142.80s - 2146.92s | Then I found the bug two, a how-to-use-one-day. 2146.92s - 2151.88s | But I used the wrong config, so it's unusable. 2151.88s - 2156.64s | Then I found the bug three, a locking issue. 2156.66s - 2161.04s | But I lose the submission race, and nftable will be disabled. 2161.04s - 2163.36s | So it's killed. 2163.36s - 2165.80s | However, there's a final plot twist. 2170.84s - 2175.16s | A few days after, I found there are some changes 2175.16s - 2178.28s | in the Kernel CTF spreadsheet. 2178.28s - 2181.48s | The person who previously got ahead of me 2181.48s - 2186.12s | is disqualified due to a bug collision. 2186.52s - 2189.72s | So this time, I finally take over the slot 2189.72s - 2194.82s | and report it to Google. 2194.82s - 2197.30s | And this month, I got my Kernel CTF bounty 2197.30s - 2201.46s | from Google, which is my first Google VIP bounty. 2201.46s - 2210.84s | I'm so proud of myself. 2210.84s - 2211.88s | Thanks. 2211.88s - 2216.40s | So well, I think this concludes my Kernel CTF journey. 2216.40s - 2225.53s | And thank you, guys. 2225.53s - 2226.91s | Is there any questions? 2226.91s - 2235.80s | Yeah. 2235.80s - 2237.72s | If there's any questions, you can come up here 2237.72s - 2238.60s | to this microphone. 2238.60s - 2257.95s | Thank you. 2257.95s - 2259.79s | Thank you.


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spreadsheet. 2178.28s - 2181.48s | The person who previously got ahead of me 2181.48s - 2186.12s | is disqualified due to a bug collision. 2186.52s - 2189.72s | So this time, I finally take over the slot 2189.72s - 2194.82s | and report it to Google. 2194.82s - 2197.30s | And this month, I got my Kernel CTF bounty 2197.30s - 2201.46s | from Google, which is my first Google VIP bounty. 2201.46s - 2210.84s | I'm so proud of myself. 2210.84s - 2211.88s | Thanks. 2211.88s - 2216.40s | So well, I think this concludes my Kernel CTF journey. 2216.40s - 2225.53s | And thank you, guys. 2225.53s - 2226.91s | Is there any questions? 2226.91s - 2235.80s | Yeah. 2235.80s - 2237.72s | If there's any questions, you can come up here 2237.72s - 2238.60s | to this microphone. 2238.60s - 2257.95s | Thank you. 2257.95s - 2259.79s | Thank you.


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{ "webpage_url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bRj4ipIEmg0", "title": "DEF CON 32 - Prime Cuts from Hacker History :40 Years of 31337 - Cult of the Dead Cow and Friends", "description": "The year is 1984\u2026 Ronald Reagan is President, it is a \u201cNew Mourning in America.\u201d In Texas, a small cabal of malcontents meet in an abandoned slaughterhouse, decorated with heavy metal band posters, satanic iconography, and, most ominously, the skull of a DEAD COW\u2026 As pirated copies of speedmetal and punk music play in the background, these erstwhile revolutionaries speak of their disillusion with The Way Things Are, and their obsession with their new computers. All over America, teens were waking to not just the typical dissatisfaction of adolescence, but the awareness that via these new modes of communication and interaction, they could meet like-minded others, have some illicit fun, and maybe, just maybe, change the goddamn world.\n\n1984 wasn\u2019t the beginning of hacking, but brought perhaps the first real blossoming of the culture. The spread of the personal computer, and the modem, brought the birth of not just cDc, but the Legion of Doom, and 2600 Magazine. 1985 would bring Phrack Magazine, and a true explosion in the written culture, with t-files becoming the currency of the Truly Elite. In this session, members of cDc, 2600, LoD, MoD, and r00t will talk about what made them hackers and phreaks, swap stories, and answer questions posed by Prof. Walter Scheirer of the University of Notre Dame and audience Q&A.", "channel_url": "https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC6Om9kAkl32dWlDSNlDS9Iw", "duration": 6899, "channel": "DEFCONConference", "uploader": "DEFCONConference", "upload_date": "20241016" } 0.27s - 5.43s | This text was transcribed using whisper model: large-v2 Um, so, some of you may know me, some of you might not, uh, my name's Death Veggie, I'm 5.43s - 9.51s | the Minister of Propaganda for the Cult of the Dead Cow, uh, this is my, I don't know 9.51s - 12.55s | how many DEF CONs, but the first one was DEF CON 3, so we've been around for a little bit 12.55s - 20.19s | for that, so, uh, the reason I, I proposed this panel is, uh, 2024 is the 40th anniversary 20.19s - 24.19s | of a lot of sort of like benchmarks in the computer underground and the hacking thing, 24.19s - 28.91s | so it's, it's, 1984 is when Cult of the Dead Cow was founded, it's when 2600 Magazine 28.91s - 34.83s | was


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currency of the Truly Elite. In this session, members of cDc, 2600, LoD, MoD, and r00t will talk about what made them hackers and phreaks, swap stories, and answer questions posed by Prof. Walter Scheirer of the University of Notre Dame and audience Q&A.", "channel_url": "https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC6Om9kAkl32dWlDSNlDS9Iw", "duration": 6899, "channel": "DEFCONConference", "uploader": "DEFCONConference", "upload_date": "20241016" } 0.27s - 5.43s | This text was transcribed using whisper model: large-v2 Um, so, some of you may know me, some of you might not, uh, my name's Death Veggie, I'm 5.43s - 9.51s | the Minister of Propaganda for the Cult of the Dead Cow, uh, this is my, I don't know 9.51s - 12.55s | how many DEF CONs, but the first one was DEF CON 3, so we've been around for a little bit 12.55s - 20.19s | for that, so, uh, the reason I, I proposed this panel is, uh, 2024 is the 40th anniversary 20.19s - 24.19s | of a lot of sort of like benchmarks in the computer underground and the hacking thing, 24.19s - 28.91s | so it's, it's, 1984 is when Cult of the Dead Cow was founded, it's when 2600 Magazine 28.91s - 34.83s | was founded, it's when the Legion of Doom was founded, um, as well as I think, uh, Chaos 34.83s - 40.51s | Computer Club was founded, um, so, you want to do something to kind of talk about that 40.51s - 45.43s | early hacker history, so, you know, this panel is really gonna kind of focus on the 80s and 45.43s - 49.71s | early 90s, cause that's when we are from, and I think it's kind of something that the 49.71s - 55.23s | stories are, are sort of underrepresented in the history just cause, you know, that, 55.23s - 59.71s | this is a time when it really was underground and, and sort of, it's not, you know, at that 59.71s - 65.23s | time sort of, um, hacker was a dirty word, it was, you know, synonymous with, with criminal in 65.23s - 69.55s | the, uh, in, in the press, et cetera. So I've tried to get together, uh, a group of people 69.55s - 74.55s | from, um, various different groups including, uh, CDC and LOD, Eric, uh, Emanuel Goldstein of 77.59s - 84.33s | 2600, um, uh, MOD, which, you know, it's, it's pretty,


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founded, it's when the Legion of Doom was founded, um, as well as I think, uh, Chaos 34.83s - 40.51s | Computer Club was founded, um, so, you want to do something to kind of talk about that 40.51s - 45.43s | early hacker history, so, you know, this panel is really gonna kind of focus on the 80s and 45.43s - 49.71s | early 90s, cause that's when we are from, and I think it's kind of something that the 49.71s - 55.23s | stories are, are sort of underrepresented in the history just cause, you know, that, 55.23s - 59.71s | this is a time when it really was underground and, and sort of, it's not, you know, at that 59.71s - 65.23s | time sort of, um, hacker was a dirty word, it was, you know, synonymous with, with criminal in 65.23s - 69.55s | the, uh, in, in the press, et cetera. So I've tried to get together, uh, a group of people 69.55s - 74.55s | from, um, various different groups including, uh, CDC and LOD, Eric, uh, Emanuel Goldstein of 77.59s - 84.33s | 2600, um, uh, MOD, which, you know, it's, it's pretty, pretty exciting to get, to get, to get 84.33s - 87.73s | John Thread in here, as well as Tommy D. Catt, who's been around, and the panel will be 87.73s - 92.73s | moderated by Professor, uh, Shire from Notre Dame, who, uh, wrote a book, uh, A History of 95.11s - 99.07s | Fake Things on the Internet, available at fine bookstores everywhere, um, that came out in 99.07s - 104.65s | December. Um, so I'm gonna let him take the, take the mic and do the, the proper 104.65s - 105.45s | introductions, I guess. 105.45s - 106.51s | Let's get, let's get everybody on stage. 106.51s - 109.61s | Go get, come up and, take, take your seats. 109.61s - 114.61s | They're hiding in the back, I don't know what's going on here. Woo! Let's give it up for the 116.45s - 117.75s | old school hackers! 117.75s - 128.80s | One more seat here, and we got, there, we got three here and three there, so there's, oh, you 130.24s - 137.38s | have seven people, I was thinking, yeah, I, I can count, counting, math. 137.38s - 143.12s | Alright, let's jump into


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pretty exciting to get, to get, to get 84.33s - 87.73s | John Thread in here, as well as Tommy D. Catt, who's been around, and the panel will be 87.73s - 92.73s | moderated by Professor, uh, Shire from Notre Dame, who, uh, wrote a book, uh, A History of 95.11s - 99.07s | Fake Things on the Internet, available at fine bookstores everywhere, um, that came out in 99.07s - 104.65s | December. Um, so I'm gonna let him take the, take the mic and do the, the proper 104.65s - 105.45s | introductions, I guess. 105.45s - 106.51s | Let's get, let's get everybody on stage. 106.51s - 109.61s | Go get, come up and, take, take your seats. 109.61s - 114.61s | They're hiding in the back, I don't know what's going on here. Woo! Let's give it up for the 116.45s - 117.75s | old school hackers! 117.75s - 128.80s | One more seat here, and we got, there, we got three here and three there, so there's, oh, you 130.24s - 137.38s | have seven people, I was thinking, yeah, I, I can count, counting, math. 137.38s - 143.12s | Alright, let's jump into this. Um, welcome everybody, I think DeathVeggie did a phenomenal 143.14s - 149.78s | job introducing what this panel is all about, uh, I'm sorry to interrupt, so your talk is not 149.78s - 150.48s | on the monitor. 150.48s - 150.92s | Uh oh. 150.92s - 151.62s | Oh no. 151.62s - 152.82s | And we wanna fix that. 152.82s - 153.62s | Okay. 153.62s - 157.06s | The tech, the tech support crew is gonna pause us. 157.06s - 158.26s | Talk amongst yourselves. 158.26s - 159.22s | Yeah. 159.22s - 160.46s | I can give you a topic. 160.46s - 161.80s | Take a break. 161.80s - 166.94s | You know, the, the late Byzantine Empire, how, how much of the, you know, the late Roman 166.94s - 170.10s | Empire did it carry over and how, versus how much of the Greek, so, so please, you know, 170.10s - 176.12s | speak amongst yourselves. 176.14s - 177.58s | It's like a commercial break. 177.58s - 178.74s | A commercial break, yeah. 178.74s - 179.74s | What are we advertising? 179.74s - 181.58s | I don't know, network didn't tell us. 181.58s - 183.28s | Probably ham.


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this. Um, welcome everybody, I think DeathVeggie did a phenomenal 143.14s - 149.78s | job introducing what this panel is all about, uh, I'm sorry to interrupt, so your talk is not 149.78s - 150.48s | on the monitor. 150.48s - 150.92s | Uh oh. 150.92s - 151.62s | Oh no. 151.62s - 152.82s | And we wanna fix that. 152.82s - 153.62s | Okay. 153.62s - 157.06s | The tech, the tech support crew is gonna pause us. 157.06s - 158.26s | Talk amongst yourselves. 158.26s - 159.22s | Yeah. 159.22s - 160.46s | I can give you a topic. 160.46s - 161.80s | Take a break. 161.80s - 166.94s | You know, the, the late Byzantine Empire, how, how much of the, you know, the late Roman 166.94s - 170.10s | Empire did it carry over and how, versus how much of the Greek, so, so please, you know, 170.10s - 176.12s | speak amongst yourselves. 176.14s - 177.58s | It's like a commercial break. 177.58s - 178.74s | A commercial break, yeah. 178.74s - 179.74s | What are we advertising? 179.74s - 181.58s | I don't know, network didn't tell us. 181.58s - 183.28s | Probably ham. 183.28s - 188.29s | Just delicious ham, it's made of pigs. 188.29s - 191.43s | Spam, spam, spam. 191.43s - 194.53s | I'm gonna tell them you, the real AV techs might be on the stage. 194.53s - 196.93s | Uh, we're still, they're still sorting out the AV stuff. 196.93s - 198.43s | What do you mean the real AV techs? 198.43s - 204.57s | Uh, they're antivirus techs, they come from CrowdStrike. 204.65s - 210.53s | A question, um, how vetted are these people? 210.53s - 219.24s | There's a reason that we didn't bring our laptops. 219.24s - 224.28s | I mean, we could do, well, I guess there's, there's, there's, uh, media to go around with 224.28s - 225.28s | our introductions. 225.28s - 226.28s | Um. 226.28s - 228.16s | Is this going to be on the blooper reel or is this going to be on the. 228.16s - 229.16s | I don't know. 229.16s - 231.00s | I mean, maybe we should jump into the other stuff while they're still sorting that out 231.00s - 232.76s | just because we've only got a limited amount of time. 232.76s - 233.76s | Yeah, yeah. 233.76s


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183.28s - 188.29s | Just delicious ham, it's made of pigs. 188.29s - 191.43s | Spam, spam, spam. 191.43s - 194.53s | I'm gonna tell them you, the real AV techs might be on the stage. 194.53s - 196.93s | Uh, we're still, they're still sorting out the AV stuff. 196.93s - 198.43s | What do you mean the real AV techs? 198.43s - 204.57s | Uh, they're antivirus techs, they come from CrowdStrike. 204.65s - 210.53s | A question, um, how vetted are these people? 210.53s - 219.24s | There's a reason that we didn't bring our laptops. 219.24s - 224.28s | I mean, we could do, well, I guess there's, there's, there's, uh, media to go around with 224.28s - 225.28s | our introductions. 225.28s - 226.28s | Um. 226.28s - 228.16s | Is this going to be on the blooper reel or is this going to be on the. 228.16s - 229.16s | I don't know. 229.16s - 231.00s | I mean, maybe we should jump into the other stuff while they're still sorting that out 231.00s - 232.76s | just because we've only got a limited amount of time. 232.76s - 233.76s | Yeah, yeah. 233.76s - 235.40s | We don't want to, yeah, let's, let's get into this. 235.40s - 236.40s | Woo. 236.40s - 237.40s | Let's do it. 237.40s - 238.40s | Okay. 238.60s - 239.60s | Yeah. 239.60s - 240.60s | Yeah. 240.60s - 241.60s | The stimulating conversations about the Byzantine Empire. 241.60s - 242.60s | You can take that. 242.60s - 243.60s | Maybe there's going to be a breakout room afterwards. 243.60s - 244.60s | All right. 244.60s - 245.60s | Hello everybody. 245.60s - 250.44s | I am Walter Shire, a professor at the University of Notre Dame, um, and I have a really fun 250.44s - 254.08s | job because I get to hang out with hackers. 254.08s - 258.96s | I get to study the history of hacking, which is a fascinating topic and I think we're all 258.96s - 261.92s | here because we want to learn something about it. 261.92s - 262.92s | Yes. 262.92s - 263.92s | There we go. 263.92s - 264.92s | Got it. 264.92s - 265.92s | Woo. 265.92s - 266.92s | We got the AV working right here. 266.92s - 267.92s | Yeah. 268.44s - 269.44s | No, no.


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- 235.40s | We don't want to, yeah, let's, let's get into this. 235.40s - 236.40s | Woo. 236.40s - 237.40s | Let's do it. 237.40s - 238.40s | Okay. 238.60s - 239.60s | Yeah. 239.60s - 240.60s | Yeah. 240.60s - 241.60s | The stimulating conversations about the Byzantine Empire. 241.60s - 242.60s | You can take that. 242.60s - 243.60s | Maybe there's going to be a breakout room afterwards. 243.60s - 244.60s | All right. 244.60s - 245.60s | Hello everybody. 245.60s - 250.44s | I am Walter Shire, a professor at the University of Notre Dame, um, and I have a really fun 250.44s - 254.08s | job because I get to hang out with hackers. 254.08s - 258.96s | I get to study the history of hacking, which is a fascinating topic and I think we're all 258.96s - 261.92s | here because we want to learn something about it. 261.92s - 262.92s | Yes. 262.92s - 263.92s | There we go. 263.92s - 264.92s | Got it. 264.92s - 265.92s | Woo. 265.92s - 266.92s | We got the AV working right here. 266.92s - 267.92s | Yeah. 268.44s - 269.44s | No, no. 269.44s - 270.44s | It's just on. 270.44s - 271.44s | I know. 271.44s - 272.44s | It's on his screen. 272.44s - 273.44s | Woo. 273.44s - 274.44s | Okay. 274.44s - 275.44s | Everybody brought their opera glasses, right? 275.44s - 276.44s | All right. 276.44s - 277.44s | Wow. 277.44s - 278.44s | All right. 278.44s - 279.44s | We're just going to keep going because this could take the rest of the panel, uh, to debug. 279.44s - 286.28s | Um, a big part of my life as a technologist has been inspired by the six folks who are 286.28s - 292.16s | up on this stage, uh, and I thought it would be really fun to just be in conversation with 292.16s - 297.20s | them, uh, to try to understand where all this came from, how it has brought us here to this 297.20s - 302.72s | moment at Defcon and probably our private lives, our professional careers, social lives, 302.72s - 303.72s | right? 303.72s - 304.72s | Is, is all wrapped up in hacking, right? 304.72s - 305.84s | We'd love this stuff. 305.84s - 307.20s | And where is it all


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269.44s - 270.44s | It's just on. 270.44s - 271.44s | I know. 271.44s - 272.44s | It's on his screen. 272.44s - 273.44s | Woo. 273.44s - 274.44s | Okay. 274.44s - 275.44s | Everybody brought their opera glasses, right? 275.44s - 276.44s | All right. 276.44s - 277.44s | Wow. 277.44s - 278.44s | All right. 278.44s - 279.44s | We're just going to keep going because this could take the rest of the panel, uh, to debug. 279.44s - 286.28s | Um, a big part of my life as a technologist has been inspired by the six folks who are 286.28s - 292.16s | up on this stage, uh, and I thought it would be really fun to just be in conversation with 292.16s - 297.20s | them, uh, to try to understand where all this came from, how it has brought us here to this 297.20s - 302.72s | moment at Defcon and probably our private lives, our professional careers, social lives, 302.72s - 303.72s | right? 303.72s - 304.72s | Is, is all wrapped up in hacking, right? 304.72s - 305.84s | We'd love this stuff. 305.84s - 307.20s | And where is it all going? 307.20s - 312.76s | Can the past really help us understand where technology is going and perhaps fix a lot 312.76s - 317.56s | of the annoying problems out there on the internet, uh, that we're all sort of concerned 317.56s - 318.56s | about. 318.56s - 322.72s | So I think it's gonna be a really fun panel and to begin, let's just jump in and do our 322.72s - 323.72s | introduction. 323.72s - 326.76s | So I'm going to start all the way here on my left with X. 326.84s - 329.96s | So everybody, just, I want to know your origin story, right? 329.96s - 334.36s | Let the audience know how you got into this, um, and where is it gone in your own life? 334.36s - 336.04s | Is the mic good? 336.04s - 337.04s | Yeah. 337.04s - 338.04s | Alright. 338.04s - 344.00s | Um, so I was from, I'm from Oak Ridge, Tennessee, uh, in East Tennessee that's, there was a 344.00s - 349.36s | city created to basically do the nuclear testing that, to build the atomic bomb. 349.36s - 354.44s | So the city was created, there was


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going? 307.20s - 312.76s | Can the past really help us understand where technology is going and perhaps fix a lot 312.76s - 317.56s | of the annoying problems out there on the internet, uh, that we're all sort of concerned 317.56s - 318.56s | about. 318.56s - 322.72s | So I think it's gonna be a really fun panel and to begin, let's just jump in and do our 322.72s - 323.72s | introduction. 323.72s - 326.76s | So I'm going to start all the way here on my left with X. 326.84s - 329.96s | So everybody, just, I want to know your origin story, right? 329.96s - 334.36s | Let the audience know how you got into this, um, and where is it gone in your own life? 334.36s - 336.04s | Is the mic good? 336.04s - 337.04s | Yeah. 337.04s - 338.04s | Alright. 338.04s - 344.00s | Um, so I was from, I'm from Oak Ridge, Tennessee, uh, in East Tennessee that's, there was a 344.00s - 349.36s | city created to basically do the nuclear testing that, to build the atomic bomb. 349.36s - 354.44s | So the city was created, there was three or four, there's a national lab, uh, three or 354.44s - 361.76s | four other labs and my father was a, uh, computer technician at one of the national 361.76s - 363.72s | security complexes. 363.72s - 369.08s | So most of the city, uh, everybody I grew up with, their, their parents were in, in 369.08s - 370.08s | the government. 370.08s - 371.08s | Got it. 371.08s - 372.08s | Got it. 372.08s - 373.08s | Yes. 373.08s - 374.08s | Excellent. 374.08s - 375.08s | Woo. 375.08s - 376.08s | Thank you. 376.08s - 377.08s | Thank you very much. 377.08s - 378.08s | I don't know what's on the screen. 378.08s - 379.08s | To everybody who's endeavored. 379.08s - 380.08s | Yeah. 380.08s - 383.00s | So everybody I grew up with, their, their parents were working for the national security 383.00s - 385.80s | complexes, um, the national lab. 385.80s - 389.72s | So everybody, there was a lot of smart people that I grew up with in high school. 389.72s - 393.40s | So, um, my dad brought home a computer in 1985. 393.40s - 394.40s | It was a compact luggable.


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three or four, there's a national lab, uh, three or 354.44s - 361.76s | four other labs and my father was a, uh, computer technician at one of the national 361.76s - 363.72s | security complexes. 363.72s - 369.08s | So most of the city, uh, everybody I grew up with, their, their parents were in, in 369.08s - 370.08s | the government. 370.08s - 371.08s | Got it. 371.08s - 372.08s | Got it. 372.08s - 373.08s | Yes. 373.08s - 374.08s | Excellent. 374.08s - 375.08s | Woo. 375.08s - 376.08s | Thank you. 376.08s - 377.08s | Thank you very much. 377.08s - 378.08s | I don't know what's on the screen. 378.08s - 379.08s | To everybody who's endeavored. 379.08s - 380.08s | Yeah. 380.08s - 383.00s | So everybody I grew up with, their, their parents were working for the national security 383.00s - 385.80s | complexes, um, the national lab. 385.80s - 389.72s | So everybody, there was a lot of smart people that I grew up with in high school. 389.72s - 393.40s | So, um, my dad brought home a computer in 1985. 393.40s - 394.40s | It was a compact luggable. 394.40s - 399.16s | It was about 30 pounds with the, the tiny little seven inch screen and the fold out 399.16s - 400.16s | keyboard. 400.16s - 401.16s | I still have it in my attic. 401.16s - 402.16s | Uh, it does not work. 402.16s - 406.96s | It needs a new power supply, um, two floppy disks, no hard drive. 406.96s - 413.36s | Um, so my dad brought it home with a Hayes 1200 bod smart mode and maybe so he could 413.36s - 418.56s | do non non-security work at home, non non-confidential work at home. 418.56s - 421.28s | Um, so he, he did give me access to it. 421.28s - 424.44s | I, I didn't know what to do with the modem. 424.44s - 429.08s | You know, he taught me basic, uh, so I would play games and, you know, control break out 429.08s - 430.52s | of the finest language. 430.52s - 431.52s | Yeah. 431.52s - 435.80s | You can control break out of games to see what the code is doing. 435.80s - 441.48s | Um, that's almost the extent of my programming, uh, ability. 441.48s - 447.48s |


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394.40s - 399.16s | It was about 30 pounds with the, the tiny little seven inch screen and the fold out 399.16s - 400.16s | keyboard. 400.16s - 401.16s | I still have it in my attic. 401.16s - 402.16s | Uh, it does not work. 402.16s - 406.96s | It needs a new power supply, um, two floppy disks, no hard drive. 406.96s - 413.36s | Um, so my dad brought it home with a Hayes 1200 bod smart mode and maybe so he could 413.36s - 418.56s | do non non-security work at home, non non-confidential work at home. 418.56s - 421.28s | Um, so he, he did give me access to it. 421.28s - 424.44s | I, I didn't know what to do with the modem. 424.44s - 429.08s | You know, he taught me basic, uh, so I would play games and, you know, control break out 429.08s - 430.52s | of the finest language. 430.52s - 431.52s | Yeah. 431.52s - 435.80s | You can control break out of games to see what the code is doing. 435.80s - 441.48s | Um, that's almost the extent of my programming, uh, ability. 441.48s - 447.48s | But um, so before I was old enough to drive, I used to ride my bike down to radio shack, 447.48s - 451.84s | which was a couple of blocks away and just hang out at radio shack with a couple of older 451.84s - 456.24s | guys who were computer guys into the bulletin board scene and stuff. 456.24s - 459.36s | And so they finally probably got annoyed with me being there. 459.52s - 461.80s | Um, they gave, they gave me a number to call. 461.80s - 464.80s | I called and got into the bulletin board scene. 464.80s - 468.96s | Um, I was in love with the idea of being a hacker after seeing war games. 468.96s - 472.96s | Um, but I, I had no, no, no way to get there. 472.96s - 476.32s | Um, I'll make it a little bit shorter. 476.32s - 481.40s | I finally found a bulletin board where I was on enough that somebody gave me access to 481.40s - 485.48s | the secret section codes and wares, uh, mostly wares. 485.48s - 488.96s | But um, there were frack magazine copies in there. 488.96s - 493.16s |


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But um, so before I was old enough to drive, I used to ride my bike down to radio shack, 447.48s - 451.84s | which was a couple of blocks away and just hang out at radio shack with a couple of older 451.84s - 456.24s | guys who were computer guys into the bulletin board scene and stuff. 456.24s - 459.36s | And so they finally probably got annoyed with me being there. 459.52s - 461.80s | Um, they gave, they gave me a number to call. 461.80s - 464.80s | I called and got into the bulletin board scene. 464.80s - 468.96s | Um, I was in love with the idea of being a hacker after seeing war games. 468.96s - 472.96s | Um, but I, I had no, no, no way to get there. 472.96s - 476.32s | Um, I'll make it a little bit shorter. 476.32s - 481.40s | I finally found a bulletin board where I was on enough that somebody gave me access to 481.40s - 485.48s | the secret section codes and wares, uh, mostly wares. 485.48s - 488.96s | But um, there were frack magazine copies in there. 488.96s - 493.16s | And once I started reading those, I was, I was in love with the idea of, I wanted to 493.16s - 494.16s | be this. 494.16s - 495.16s | I wanted to be a hacker. 495.16s - 499.60s | I wanted to, uh, to, to learn what they were talking about. 499.60s - 503.60s | Um, how much time are we getting for the introductions? 503.60s - 504.60s | Keep going. 504.60s - 505.60s | Keep going. 505.60s - 506.60s | Okay. 506.60s - 512.20s | So, uh, then, you know, graduated high school, I, uh, started college at the university of 512.20s - 515.96s | Tennessee in Chattanooga where I got my first Unix account. 515.96s - 521.80s | They gave all the students Unix accounts, um, for email. 521.80s - 527.16s | Um, and from reading and seeing what people were doing, I saw that several people were 527.16s - 528.52s | using IRC. 528.52s - 533.84s | I got on IRC, I joined pound wares because I was, I was in, I wanted to play games for 533.84s - 534.84s | free basically. 534.84s - 538.44s | I, Tommy D. Cat was on there. 538.44s - 541.04s


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And once I started reading those, I was, I was in love with the idea of, I wanted to 493.16s - 494.16s | be this. 494.16s - 495.16s | I wanted to be a hacker. 495.16s - 499.60s | I wanted to, uh, to, to learn what they were talking about. 499.60s - 503.60s | Um, how much time are we getting for the introductions? 503.60s - 504.60s | Keep going. 504.60s - 505.60s | Keep going. 505.60s - 506.60s | Okay. 506.60s - 512.20s | So, uh, then, you know, graduated high school, I, uh, started college at the university of 512.20s - 515.96s | Tennessee in Chattanooga where I got my first Unix account. 515.96s - 521.80s | They gave all the students Unix accounts, um, for email. 521.80s - 527.16s | Um, and from reading and seeing what people were doing, I saw that several people were 527.16s - 528.52s | using IRC. 528.52s - 533.84s | I got on IRC, I joined pound wares because I was, I was in, I wanted to play games for 533.84s - 534.84s | free basically. 534.84s - 538.44s | I, Tommy D. Cat was on there. 538.44s - 541.04s | Um, uh, uh, who is of him? 541.04s - 546.44s | He was on pound hack, joined pound hack and met, uh, some of the best friends I've had 546.44s - 547.44s | in my life. 547.44s - 548.44s | Thanks. 548.44s - 557.35s | Before you go, I want to ask, like, uh, I would like to take a picture of the crowd. 557.35s - 558.35s | So I'm going to do that. 558.35s - 563.79s | And anybody who doesn't, you know, who doesn't wear your face, like blur your face just live. 563.79s - 564.79s | So thank you very much. 564.79s - 570.07s | I'm going to take one from this side and one from that side. 570.07s - 571.07s | Thank you. 571.07s - 572.07s | All right. 573.07s - 574.07s | All right. 574.07s - 576.07s | Manuel, you're up next. 576.07s - 584.43s | Hey, um, well, I'm a manual Goldstein, um, a pen name that I coined 40 years ago, 1984, 584.43s - 586.87s | a name that's from the book, 1984. 586.87s - 590.71s | There's a lot of synchronicity here that kind of scares me actually, because I don't


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| Um, uh, uh, who is of him? 541.04s - 546.44s | He was on pound hack, joined pound hack and met, uh, some of the best friends I've had 546.44s - 547.44s | in my life. 547.44s - 548.44s | Thanks. 548.44s - 557.35s | Before you go, I want to ask, like, uh, I would like to take a picture of the crowd. 557.35s - 558.35s | So I'm going to do that. 558.35s - 563.79s | And anybody who doesn't, you know, who doesn't wear your face, like blur your face just live. 563.79s - 564.79s | So thank you very much. 564.79s - 570.07s | I'm going to take one from this side and one from that side. 570.07s - 571.07s | Thank you. 571.07s - 572.07s | All right. 573.07s - 574.07s | All right. 574.07s - 576.07s | Manuel, you're up next. 576.07s - 584.43s | Hey, um, well, I'm a manual Goldstein, um, a pen name that I coined 40 years ago, 1984, 584.43s - 586.87s | a name that's from the book, 1984. 586.87s - 590.71s | There's a lot of synchronicity here that kind of scares me actually, because I don't understand 590.71s - 591.71s | how it all happened. 591.71s - 598.63s | So, so, um, um, in, in tune, um, but yeah, 1984 was when a manual Goldstein technically 598.63s - 600.95s | was born as a handle. 600.95s - 606.07s | Um, but my, um, interest in technology started, I, well, I mean, I've always been interested 606.07s - 611.83s | in technology, however limited I had access to grew up in a one parent household. 611.83s - 616.59s | We never had much, but you know, we had a phone and I would play around with the phone 616.59s - 617.59s | all the time. 617.59s - 619.39s | Rotary dial phone. 619.39s - 620.71s | People know what rotary dial phones are. 620.71s - 621.71s | Okay. 621.71s - 622.71s | Good. 622.71s - 623.71s | Okay. 623.71s - 624.71s | Sometimes I talk to crowds and they have no idea what I'm talking about. 624.71s - 629.31s | Um, if you ever want to have some fun, get some teenagers, tell them to dial a number 629.31s - 630.31s | on a rotary phone. 630.67s - 634.07s | They don't, they don't know how to,


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understand 590.71s - 591.71s | how it all happened. 591.71s - 598.63s | So, so, um, um, in, in tune, um, but yeah, 1984 was when a manual Goldstein technically 598.63s - 600.95s | was born as a handle. 600.95s - 606.07s | Um, but my, um, interest in technology started, I, well, I mean, I've always been interested 606.07s - 611.83s | in technology, however limited I had access to grew up in a one parent household. 611.83s - 616.59s | We never had much, but you know, we had a phone and I would play around with the phone 616.59s - 617.59s | all the time. 617.59s - 619.39s | Rotary dial phone. 619.39s - 620.71s | People know what rotary dial phones are. 620.71s - 621.71s | Okay. 621.71s - 622.71s | Good. 622.71s - 623.71s | Okay. 623.71s - 624.71s | Sometimes I talk to crowds and they have no idea what I'm talking about. 624.71s - 629.31s | Um, if you ever want to have some fun, get some teenagers, tell them to dial a number 629.31s - 630.31s | on a rotary phone. 630.67s - 634.07s | They don't, they don't know how to, how far they supposed to go with their finger. 634.07s - 636.63s | They don't know if they're supposed to push it, they don't know if it's supposed to lift 636.63s - 637.63s | up the receiver. 637.63s - 638.87s | It's, it's a lot of fun. 638.87s - 646.39s | Um, but yeah, so that was my, um, the extent of my, um, uh, access to technology until 646.39s - 652.11s | my senior year of high school, when I heard this, this sound coming from this room, uh, 652.11s - 657.87s | that had computer class in it, um, somebody was strangling a dolphin. 657.95s - 661.27s | Well, it was just a weird, like kind of high pitched noise. 661.27s - 667.67s | Turned out it was, um, uh, deck riders, uh, 300 bar deck riders, high speed deck riders. 667.67s - 673.07s | Um, they were connected to, um, uh, a computer system that the entire school district was 673.07s - 674.59s | connected to far away. 674.59s - 678.23s | Uh, and all these people were typing away and I was fascinated by it, you know, that 678.23s - 680.87s | you could type something


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how far they supposed to go with their finger. 634.07s - 636.63s | They don't know if they're supposed to push it, they don't know if it's supposed to lift 636.63s - 637.63s | up the receiver. 637.63s - 638.87s | It's, it's a lot of fun. 638.87s - 646.39s | Um, but yeah, so that was my, um, the extent of my, um, uh, access to technology until 646.39s - 652.11s | my senior year of high school, when I heard this, this sound coming from this room, uh, 652.11s - 657.87s | that had computer class in it, um, somebody was strangling a dolphin. 657.95s - 661.27s | Well, it was just a weird, like kind of high pitched noise. 661.27s - 667.67s | Turned out it was, um, uh, deck riders, uh, 300 bar deck riders, high speed deck riders. 667.67s - 673.07s | Um, they were connected to, um, uh, a computer system that the entire school district was 673.07s - 674.59s | connected to far away. 674.59s - 678.23s | Uh, and all these people were typing away and I was fascinated by it, you know, that 678.23s - 680.87s | you could type something and something would type back at you. 680.87s - 681.99s | Uh, that was new. 681.99s - 683.99s | That was, that was alien. 683.99s - 689.27s | And, uh, my high school, Ward Melville High School in Setauket, New York, um, we had these 689.27s - 691.27s | deck riders that other school districts didn't have. 691.27s - 694.19s | They had shitty 110 baud connections. 694.19s - 695.83s | We had the 300 baud connection. 695.83s - 699.95s | Um, and so, you know, I just got more and more interested in that and, uh, started playing 699.95s - 700.95s | around and never took a course. 700.95s - 705.47s | To this day, I still have never taken a computer course, um, and which is weird. 705.47s - 710.35s | Um, but, um, basically, uh, I'd stay after school and that's when the games would open 710.35s - 711.35s | up. 711.35s - 714.47s | You know, Star Trek and One Piece and all kinds of fun things like that. 714.47s - 719.15s | Um, and, uh, basically that led to my interest in college. 719.15s - 723.67s | Went to the State University of New York


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and something would type back at you. 680.87s - 681.99s | Uh, that was new. 681.99s - 683.99s | That was, that was alien. 683.99s - 689.27s | And, uh, my high school, Ward Melville High School in Setauket, New York, um, we had these 689.27s - 691.27s | deck riders that other school districts didn't have. 691.27s - 694.19s | They had shitty 110 baud connections. 694.19s - 695.83s | We had the 300 baud connection. 695.83s - 699.95s | Um, and so, you know, I just got more and more interested in that and, uh, started playing 699.95s - 700.95s | around and never took a course. 700.95s - 705.47s | To this day, I still have never taken a computer course, um, and which is weird. 705.47s - 710.35s | Um, but, um, basically, uh, I'd stay after school and that's when the games would open 710.35s - 711.35s | up. 711.35s - 714.47s | You know, Star Trek and One Piece and all kinds of fun things like that. 714.47s - 719.15s | Um, and, uh, basically that led to my interest in college. 719.15s - 723.67s | Went to the State University of New York at Stony Brook, uh, and, um, well, I can tell 723.67s - 727.67s | the story later about how I got the FBI to raid them, but that's, that's, that's gonna 727.67s - 729.39s | take longer than a couple of minutes. 729.39s - 734.19s | But basically, um, uh, Stony Brook was a place where I was able to, um, uh, meet like-minded 734.19s - 739.51s | people, uh, expand, uh, my mind in, in many ways. 739.67s - 744.75s | Uh, but mostly in, in just learning and being exposed to different, uh, perspectives. 744.75s - 749.03s | Um, and I was an English major in a school that's mostly known for engineering. 749.03s - 751.51s | Uh, so that kind of set me apart. 751.51s - 756.63s | I like to write, I like to, um, uh, collate, worked for the, uh, campus, two campus newspapers. 756.63s - 763.35s | Um, but it was the BBS scene, um, when, um, I had access to a modem. 763.35s - 765.91s | Um, well, I should, I should explain. 765.91s - 767.47s | I worked for the campus radio station. 767.47s - 774.15s | Our chief engineer bought an


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at Stony Brook, uh, and, um, well, I can tell 723.67s - 727.67s | the story later about how I got the FBI to raid them, but that's, that's, that's gonna 727.67s - 729.39s | take longer than a couple of minutes. 729.39s - 734.19s | But basically, um, uh, Stony Brook was a place where I was able to, um, uh, meet like-minded 734.19s - 739.51s | people, uh, expand, uh, my mind in, in many ways. 739.67s - 744.75s | Uh, but mostly in, in just learning and being exposed to different, uh, perspectives. 744.75s - 749.03s | Um, and I was an English major in a school that's mostly known for engineering. 749.03s - 751.51s | Uh, so that kind of set me apart. 751.51s - 756.63s | I like to write, I like to, um, uh, collate, worked for the, uh, campus, two campus newspapers. 756.63s - 763.35s | Um, but it was the BBS scene, um, when, um, I had access to a modem. 763.35s - 765.91s | Um, well, I should, I should explain. 765.91s - 767.47s | I worked for the campus radio station. 767.47s - 774.15s | Our chief engineer bought an H89, Heathcote H89, uh, and, um, we used that to connect 774.15s - 775.39s | to BBSs. 775.39s - 780.43s | And I found those to be fascinating, uh, bulletin board systems where these, these methods of 780.43s - 785.87s | just connecting to people all throughout the country, uh, you could only have one person 785.87s - 786.87s | on at a time. 786.87s - 790.95s | So most of the time it was dealing with busy signals and waiting for them to go away so 790.95s - 791.95s | you could connect. 791.95s - 794.35s | And I think we were up to 1,200 bought at that time. 794.35s - 798.43s | Uh, and by connecting to all these different bulletin boards, I was able to make friends 798.43s - 799.67s | all over the place. 799.67s - 804.07s | Um, how I was able to connect to long distance ones is also a different story. 804.07s - 809.47s | Um, but basically I, the, the hacker and, and, and freak, phone freak bulletin boards 809.47s - 812.67s | had these great stories, amazing stories. 812.67s - 814.63s | Um, and I wanted to share those stories. 814.63s


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H89, Heathcote H89, uh, and, um, we used that to connect 774.15s - 775.39s | to BBSs. 775.39s - 780.43s | And I found those to be fascinating, uh, bulletin board systems where these, these methods of 780.43s - 785.87s | just connecting to people all throughout the country, uh, you could only have one person 785.87s - 786.87s | on at a time. 786.87s - 790.95s | So most of the time it was dealing with busy signals and waiting for them to go away so 790.95s - 791.95s | you could connect. 791.95s - 794.35s | And I think we were up to 1,200 bought at that time. 794.35s - 798.43s | Uh, and by connecting to all these different bulletin boards, I was able to make friends 798.43s - 799.67s | all over the place. 799.67s - 804.07s | Um, how I was able to connect to long distance ones is also a different story. 804.07s - 809.47s | Um, but basically I, the, the hacker and, and, and freak, phone freak bulletin boards 809.47s - 812.67s | had these great stories, amazing stories. 812.67s - 814.63s | Um, and I wanted to share those stories. 814.63s - 818.83s | I wanted other people to read them because they were just so amazing about people going 818.83s - 824.11s | to their central office to trash and get printouts and log in to the Cosmos system 824.11s - 830.63s | and, and, and just all kinds of hacker adventures that I just knew the public would appreciate 830.63s - 832.79s | if presented in, in the right manner. 832.79s - 837.51s | Because believe it or not, back then in the early to mid eighties, hackers were being 837.51s - 838.51s | demonized. 838.51s - 839.51s | Yeah. 839.51s - 840.51s | Imagine that. 840.51s - 846.99s | Um, so people had a, a misconception and I figured all they had to do was hear some stories 847.15s - 850.67s | and maybe they would, they would see another, um, uh, aspect to them. 850.67s - 854.87s | Well, obviously that didn't happen, uh, but we did get a whole lot more hackers, a whole 854.87s - 858.39s | lot more people that wanted in on this, on this magical world. 858.39s - 861.99s | Uh, that's basically how the idea for 2600 got started. 861.99s -


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- 818.83s | I wanted other people to read them because they were just so amazing about people going 818.83s - 824.11s | to their central office to trash and get printouts and log in to the Cosmos system 824.11s - 830.63s | and, and, and just all kinds of hacker adventures that I just knew the public would appreciate 830.63s - 832.79s | if presented in, in the right manner. 832.79s - 837.51s | Because believe it or not, back then in the early to mid eighties, hackers were being 837.51s - 838.51s | demonized. 838.51s - 839.51s | Yeah. 839.51s - 840.51s | Imagine that. 840.51s - 846.99s | Um, so people had a, a misconception and I figured all they had to do was hear some stories 847.15s - 850.67s | and maybe they would, they would see another, um, uh, aspect to them. 850.67s - 854.87s | Well, obviously that didn't happen, uh, but we did get a whole lot more hackers, a whole 854.87s - 858.39s | lot more people that wanted in on this, on this magical world. 858.39s - 861.99s | Uh, that's basically how the idea for 2600 got started. 861.99s - 866.19s | Uh, what if we print this out and, and, and mail it to people? 866.19s - 867.59s | Let's see if that works. 867.59s - 875.19s | And basically, uh, we posted some, some, um, um, uh, I guess, uh, files, uh, G files or, 875.39s - 880.39s | um, announcements on bulletin boards, um, send us an envelope and we'll send you an, 880.39s - 883.99s | uh, an issue of a magazine in January of 1984. 883.99s - 888.39s | And that's how the first issue went out to a bunch of people that just sent us an envelope. 888.39s - 901.44s | Uh, and, um, uh, the rest is pretty much history, but that's how it started. 901.44s - 905.88s | I think, uh, you know, I started out, um, kind of similar to, to X in some ways, but 905.88s - 909.24s | although earlier, uh, you know, I had a dad that had worked at the computer industry, 909.44s - 912.72s | uh, and a mom who had been, you know, working in a computer lab in the seventies. 912.72s - 915.92s | And as a kid, I remember, you know, going and


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866.19s | Uh, what if we print this out and, and, and mail it to people? 866.19s - 867.59s | Let's see if that works. 867.59s - 875.19s | And basically, uh, we posted some, some, um, um, uh, I guess, uh, files, uh, G files or, 875.39s - 880.39s | um, announcements on bulletin boards, um, send us an envelope and we'll send you an, 880.39s - 883.99s | uh, an issue of a magazine in January of 1984. 883.99s - 888.39s | And that's how the first issue went out to a bunch of people that just sent us an envelope. 888.39s - 901.44s | Uh, and, um, uh, the rest is pretty much history, but that's how it started. 901.44s - 905.88s | I think, uh, you know, I started out, um, kind of similar to, to X in some ways, but 905.88s - 909.24s | although earlier, uh, you know, I had a dad that had worked at the computer industry, 909.44s - 912.72s | uh, and a mom who had been, you know, working in a computer lab in the seventies. 912.72s - 915.92s | And as a kid, I remember, you know, going and playing at the computer lab and with the, 915.92s - 917.00s | with the punch cards and stuff. 917.00s - 920.88s | But, you know, we got a computer in 1980, like a, uh, my dad built one from a kit, a 920.88s - 926.40s | Sinclair ZX 80 and similar to X, like, you know, I was, uh, working in basic typing and 926.40s - 930.52s | stuff like that anyway, fast forward to like kind of the mid eighties, my dad brought home 930.52s - 933.84s | a modem, you know, I wasn't really doing anything with it at that time. 933.84s - 937.32s | Maybe calling a couple, you know, uh, my friend's local board. 937.80s - 944.72s | Um, in 1986, uh, my family went on a vacation to, uh, California to, I grew up outside of 944.72s - 950.40s | Boston, um, and, uh, to visit my cousins who were in Silicon Valley. 950.68s - 954.00s | And they, they sent me home with a, with a floppy disk that was full of text files. 954.00s - 955.00s | So it's 1986. 955.00s - 958.92s | This, this, uh, disk had cult of the dead


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playing at the computer lab and with the, 915.92s - 917.00s | with the punch cards and stuff. 917.00s - 920.88s | But, you know, we got a computer in 1980, like a, uh, my dad built one from a kit, a 920.88s - 926.40s | Sinclair ZX 80 and similar to X, like, you know, I was, uh, working in basic typing and 926.40s - 930.52s | stuff like that anyway, fast forward to like kind of the mid eighties, my dad brought home 930.52s - 933.84s | a modem, you know, I wasn't really doing anything with it at that time. 933.84s - 937.32s | Maybe calling a couple, you know, uh, my friend's local board. 937.80s - 944.72s | Um, in 1986, uh, my family went on a vacation to, uh, California to, I grew up outside of 944.72s - 950.40s | Boston, um, and, uh, to visit my cousins who were in Silicon Valley. 950.68s - 954.00s | And they, they sent me home with a, with a floppy disk that was full of text files. 954.00s - 955.00s | So it's 1986. 955.00s - 958.92s | This, this, uh, disk had cult of the dead cow files on it. 958.92s - 961.36s | It had frack magazine, number three. 961.60s - 965.24s | It had files from a group called, um, anarchy Inc. 965.32s - 969.68s | It had, um, I think, uh, one of the LOD technical journals, et cetera. 970.08s - 973.52s | And it sort of was like, Oh man, there's this, all this other cool stuff going out 973.52s - 973.64s | there. 973.64s - 975.32s | And I started to call other BBSs. 975.84s - 978.08s | Um, you know, they would have a list of numbers at the bottom. 978.08s - 981.40s | So I'd start calling BBSs in other parts of the country, talking to people. 981.76s - 986.12s | And I realized that, you know, I had, I was growing up in like this, like a relatively 986.12s - 991.12s | small, relatively conservative town in the outskirts of Boston where I was the weird 991.12s - 991.44s | kid. 991.88s - 995.00s | And like, so being on BBS is like, Oh, holy shit. 995.00s - 996.60s | There are other people like me out there. 997.00s - 1000.28s | And it's what, you know, my


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cow files on it. 958.92s - 961.36s | It had frack magazine, number three. 961.60s - 965.24s | It had files from a group called, um, anarchy Inc. 965.32s - 969.68s | It had, um, I think, uh, one of the LOD technical journals, et cetera. 970.08s - 973.52s | And it sort of was like, Oh man, there's this, all this other cool stuff going out 973.52s - 973.64s | there. 973.64s - 975.32s | And I started to call other BBSs. 975.84s - 978.08s | Um, you know, they would have a list of numbers at the bottom. 978.08s - 981.40s | So I'd start calling BBSs in other parts of the country, talking to people. 981.76s - 986.12s | And I realized that, you know, I had, I was growing up in like this, like a relatively 986.12s - 991.12s | small, relatively conservative town in the outskirts of Boston where I was the weird 991.12s - 991.44s | kid. 991.88s - 995.00s | And like, so being on BBS is like, Oh, holy shit. 995.00s - 996.60s | There are other people like me out there. 997.00s - 1000.28s | And it's what, you know, my grandmother used to affectionately refer to as smarty 1000.28s - 1000.80s | weirdos. 1000.84s - 1002.72s | She's like, you and your friends are smarty weirdos. 1003.12s - 1004.92s | It's like, which I think is fair. 1004.92s - 1012.44s | You know, she didn't have the language for neuro atypical, but, um, so, uh, you 1012.44s - 1015.12s | know, I called these things, meeting people all over and learning stuff. 1015.12s - 1018.48s | And then there was the day that my parents got a $600 phone bill. 1019.08s - 1024.00s | And, um, yeah, they sat me down and my dad was like, this will not happen again. 1024.32s - 1027.68s | I was like, okay, well, I'm not going to stop talking to my friends in Sweden. 1028.00s - 1030.08s | So, uh, how do I do this for free? 1030.12s - 1033.12s | And, you know, so that led into like learning how to make, you know, phone, 1033.16s - 1037.20s | phone calls for free, either, you know, uh, war dialing, uh, sorry, codes or 1037.20s - 1038.68s | wardrobe dialing locally. 1039.08s - 1042.80s | And I love to find what we call


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grandmother used to affectionately refer to as smarty 1000.28s - 1000.80s | weirdos. 1000.84s - 1002.72s | She's like, you and your friends are smarty weirdos. 1003.12s - 1004.92s | It's like, which I think is fair. 1004.92s - 1012.44s | You know, she didn't have the language for neuro atypical, but, um, so, uh, you 1012.44s - 1015.12s | know, I called these things, meeting people all over and learning stuff. 1015.12s - 1018.48s | And then there was the day that my parents got a $600 phone bill. 1019.08s - 1024.00s | And, um, yeah, they sat me down and my dad was like, this will not happen again. 1024.32s - 1027.68s | I was like, okay, well, I'm not going to stop talking to my friends in Sweden. 1028.00s - 1030.08s | So, uh, how do I do this for free? 1030.12s - 1033.12s | And, you know, so that led into like learning how to make, you know, phone, 1033.16s - 1037.20s | phone calls for free, either, you know, uh, war dialing, uh, sorry, codes or 1037.20s - 1038.68s | wardrobe dialing locally. 1039.08s - 1042.80s | And I love to find what we call the global out dial modems, which was basically 1042.80s - 1046.24s | businesses for their own people would have like, okay, you dial in a local number. 1046.48s - 1048.52s | Then there's just a modem that will allow you to call anywhere. 1048.76s - 1051.08s | And a lot of times he's had no security on them at all. 1051.08s - 1055.04s | Cause there wasn't really a concept of that at the time, or it was just like a 1055.04s - 1056.32s | default password or something like that. 1056.32s - 1058.96s | So then I could call whatever I want with no, never get a bill. 1059.44s - 1064.28s | Um, In the, you know, I also started working with, uh, you know, talking to 1064.28s - 1067.60s | other people like into the culture that had cow, I was eventually invited in 1067.60s - 1071.88s | cause I was, uh, um, setting up, uh, Alliance teleconferences, which were. 1072.88s - 1077.16s | Just, it was teleconferencing, but at that time teleconferencing cost 1077.16s - 1078.68s | like multiple dollars a minute. 1078.80s - 1081.88s | Like, and so, so I was just setting these up for


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the global out dial modems, which was basically 1042.80s - 1046.24s | businesses for their own people would have like, okay, you dial in a local number. 1046.48s - 1048.52s | Then there's just a modem that will allow you to call anywhere. 1048.76s - 1051.08s | And a lot of times he's had no security on them at all. 1051.08s - 1055.04s | Cause there wasn't really a concept of that at the time, or it was just like a 1055.04s - 1056.32s | default password or something like that. 1056.32s - 1058.96s | So then I could call whatever I want with no, never get a bill. 1059.44s - 1064.28s | Um, In the, you know, I also started working with, uh, you know, talking to 1064.28s - 1067.60s | other people like into the culture that had cow, I was eventually invited in 1067.60s - 1071.88s | cause I was, uh, um, setting up, uh, Alliance teleconferences, which were. 1072.88s - 1077.16s | Just, it was teleconferencing, but at that time teleconferencing cost 1077.16s - 1078.68s | like multiple dollars a minute. 1078.80s - 1081.88s | Like, and so, so I was just setting these up for free on hacked accounts. 1081.96s - 1082.28s | Sorry. 1082.28s - 1085.60s | I mean, allegedly setting these up for free on allegedly hacked 1085.60s - 1086.60s | account in 40 years, man. 1088.32s - 1095.84s | Um, and, uh, eventually they, uh, invited me to join and I guess, you know, somehow 1095.84s - 1097.52s | that was over 30 years ago. 1097.72s - 1099.00s | Time is fucking weird. 1099.56s - 1101.08s | Um, but yeah, I don't know. 1101.20s - 1108.78s | So Patrick, 1111.86s - 1118.46s | my, uh, my, my introduction to computers sort of happened in the late seventies. 1118.46s - 1122.82s | My father was a physicist who was working at the national center for atmospheric 1122.82s - 1127.42s | research, and they had one of the first craze super computers. 1127.42s - 1130.70s | And, uh, back then it was really exciting. 1130.70s - 1133.98s | It had its own room, this cooling system all around it. 1134.74s - 1137.74s | Kind of like an orange hexagon shaped tower. 1137.74s - 1142.70s | And, uh, my, my father, uh, taught me to program this incredible language 1142.70s - 1152.62s | called Fortran


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free on hacked accounts. 1081.96s - 1082.28s | Sorry. 1082.28s - 1085.60s | I mean, allegedly setting these up for free on allegedly hacked 1085.60s - 1086.60s | account in 40 years, man. 1088.32s - 1095.84s | Um, and, uh, eventually they, uh, invited me to join and I guess, you know, somehow 1095.84s - 1097.52s | that was over 30 years ago. 1097.72s - 1099.00s | Time is fucking weird. 1099.56s - 1101.08s | Um, but yeah, I don't know. 1101.20s - 1108.78s | So Patrick, 1111.86s - 1118.46s | my, uh, my, my introduction to computers sort of happened in the late seventies. 1118.46s - 1122.82s | My father was a physicist who was working at the national center for atmospheric 1122.82s - 1127.42s | research, and they had one of the first craze super computers. 1127.42s - 1130.70s | And, uh, back then it was really exciting. 1130.70s - 1133.98s | It had its own room, this cooling system all around it. 1134.74s - 1137.74s | Kind of like an orange hexagon shaped tower. 1137.74s - 1142.70s | And, uh, my, my father, uh, taught me to program this incredible language 1142.70s - 1152.62s | called Fortran 77 that you'd feed it on punch cards and, uh, that, that led 1152.62s - 1158.30s | subsequently to, to me getting an Apple two, no plus, and you could get the 16 1158.30s - 1161.82s | K Ram card and get, you know, solder in a shift key mod. 1161.82s - 1163.46s | So you had lowercase on it. 1163.50s - 1166.82s | And, uh, you know, it was amazing stuff. 1166.82s - 1172.30s | And then, uh, after that was, I think came out with a 5.25 inch disk drive. 1172.30s - 1175.38s | So you didn't have to use cassette tape anymore to sort of things. 1176.18s - 1181.06s | And in the very beginning, uh, there were like these different gatherings 1181.10s - 1190.46s | of Norway, typical individuals who had gathered together to play with computers. 1190.46s - 1196.06s | And, uh, it was in person and that eventually led to, uh, being online and 1196.06s - 1197.94s | coming in contact with more people. 1197.94s - 1203.46s | And there was the piracy scene of getting software because it's like, well, I'm, 1203.50s - 1207.90s | I'm a kid, I don't have like all


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77 that you'd feed it on punch cards and, uh, that, that led 1152.62s - 1158.30s | subsequently to, to me getting an Apple two, no plus, and you could get the 16 1158.30s - 1161.82s | K Ram card and get, you know, solder in a shift key mod. 1161.82s - 1163.46s | So you had lowercase on it. 1163.50s - 1166.82s | And, uh, you know, it was amazing stuff. 1166.82s - 1172.30s | And then, uh, after that was, I think came out with a 5.25 inch disk drive. 1172.30s - 1175.38s | So you didn't have to use cassette tape anymore to sort of things. 1176.18s - 1181.06s | And in the very beginning, uh, there were like these different gatherings 1181.10s - 1190.46s | of Norway, typical individuals who had gathered together to play with computers. 1190.46s - 1196.06s | And, uh, it was in person and that eventually led to, uh, being online and 1196.06s - 1197.94s | coming in contact with more people. 1197.94s - 1203.46s | And there was the piracy scene of getting software because it's like, well, I'm, 1203.50s - 1207.90s | I'm a kid, I don't have like all this crazy money to buy this software. 1207.90s - 1209.10s | I'm not really going to use. 1209.86s - 1216.62s | And what it turned into was the most interesting thing about 99% of all 1216.66s - 1218.90s | software other than collecting it. 1218.90s - 1224.06s | Cause she got them all is very important, especially if they're zero day old wares. 1224.82s - 1228.94s | Um, but it was just like the protection scheme. 1228.98s - 1233.50s | What did you guys do and pour into this to try to prevent people from copying it? 1233.54s - 1239.54s | And then all of that went online with modems at the lightning fast speed of 1239.54s - 1245.38s | like 300 Baud, which, uh, you know, increased exponentially and as has been 1245.38s - 1252.10s | mentioned, I got like, my mom got her first like $2,000 phone bill and it's 1252.10s - 1258.70s | just put the fuck is this like, well, I'm not going to stop calling my 1258.70s - 1260.50s | friends all over the world. 1260.86s - 1264.06s | So how does the phone system work exactly? 1264.06s - 1266.06s | And how are all


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this crazy money to buy this software. 1207.90s - 1209.10s | I'm not really going to use. 1209.86s - 1216.62s | And what it turned into was the most interesting thing about 99% of all 1216.66s - 1218.90s | software other than collecting it. 1218.90s - 1224.06s | Cause she got them all is very important, especially if they're zero day old wares. 1224.82s - 1228.94s | Um, but it was just like the protection scheme. 1228.98s - 1233.50s | What did you guys do and pour into this to try to prevent people from copying it? 1233.54s - 1239.54s | And then all of that went online with modems at the lightning fast speed of 1239.54s - 1245.38s | like 300 Baud, which, uh, you know, increased exponentially and as has been 1245.38s - 1252.10s | mentioned, I got like, my mom got her first like $2,000 phone bill and it's 1252.10s - 1258.70s | just put the fuck is this like, well, I'm not going to stop calling my 1258.70s - 1260.50s | friends all over the world. 1260.86s - 1264.06s | So how does the phone system work exactly? 1264.06s - 1266.06s | And how are all these things connected? 1266.06s - 1269.18s | Which led to an interest in, in freaking. 1269.18s - 1273.62s | And by that time, uh, I was living in New York city, hanging out in the Lower East 1273.62s - 1274.14s | side. 1274.14s - 1278.78s | And, uh, there was this thing called youth international party lines, which was 1278.78s - 1282.58s | actually started by, uh, you know, one of the people was Abby Hoffman. 1282.58s - 1284.90s | It was the whole countercultural movement. 1284.90s - 1286.94s | It was left of the left back then. 1287.42s - 1292.02s | And, uh, it metamorphosed into tap and there were the tap meetings on the Lower 1292.02s - 1292.74s | East side. 1293.26s - 1299.38s | And, uh, we got together and do a lot of interesting things with, uh, the phone 1299.38s - 1303.50s | company computers because they really had a fascinating network. 1303.50s - 1307.58s | I mean, cosmos is, you know, Unix and uppercase, and it has a lot of 1307.58s - 1310.66s | undocumented commands that you're not supposed to know about. 1311.62s - 1317.82s | And, uh, that whole culture of being online


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these things connected? 1266.06s - 1269.18s | Which led to an interest in, in freaking. 1269.18s - 1273.62s | And by that time, uh, I was living in New York city, hanging out in the Lower East 1273.62s - 1274.14s | side. 1274.14s - 1278.78s | And, uh, there was this thing called youth international party lines, which was 1278.78s - 1282.58s | actually started by, uh, you know, one of the people was Abby Hoffman. 1282.58s - 1284.90s | It was the whole countercultural movement. 1284.90s - 1286.94s | It was left of the left back then. 1287.42s - 1292.02s | And, uh, it metamorphosed into tap and there were the tap meetings on the Lower 1292.02s - 1292.74s | East side. 1293.26s - 1299.38s | And, uh, we got together and do a lot of interesting things with, uh, the phone 1299.38s - 1303.50s | company computers because they really had a fascinating network. 1303.50s - 1307.58s | I mean, cosmos is, you know, Unix and uppercase, and it has a lot of 1307.58s - 1310.66s | undocumented commands that you're not supposed to know about. 1311.62s - 1317.82s | And, uh, that whole culture of being online and connecting with people, uh, 1317.82s - 1321.62s | sort of led to the formation of these groups who would work together. 1322.10s - 1327.74s | And that, that was the beginning of, uh, well, LOD, uh, there was a previous 1327.74s - 1333.10s | group called nights of shadow that kind of self-destructed and, uh, there, 1333.10s - 1337.78s | there's this person who may even be here somewhere at this conference. 1337.78s - 1341.22s | I don't know who, who, who's the founder of the legion of doom. 1341.82s - 1351.26s | And, uh, we, we, we basically, we basically, you got together people who 1351.26s - 1353.34s | were good at different skill sets. 1353.34s - 1356.66s | There was the people who were good with the phone systems, people who are good 1356.66s - 1361.42s | at hacking and actual coding and programming and the social engineers. 1361.74s - 1366.66s | And together you would all pull your talents together to cause greater 1366.66s - 1368.62s | chaos than you could buy yourself. 1371.14s - 1379.06s | So that, that was, uh, you know, the eighties into the very early nineties 1379.06s - 1385.18s | where,


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and connecting with people, uh, 1317.82s - 1321.62s | sort of led to the formation of these groups who would work together. 1322.10s - 1327.74s | And that, that was the beginning of, uh, well, LOD, uh, there was a previous 1327.74s - 1333.10s | group called nights of shadow that kind of self-destructed and, uh, there, 1333.10s - 1337.78s | there's this person who may even be here somewhere at this conference. 1337.78s - 1341.22s | I don't know who, who, who's the founder of the legion of doom. 1341.82s - 1351.26s | And, uh, we, we, we basically, we basically, you got together people who 1351.26s - 1353.34s | were good at different skill sets. 1353.34s - 1356.66s | There was the people who were good with the phone systems, people who are good 1356.66s - 1361.42s | at hacking and actual coding and programming and the social engineers. 1361.74s - 1366.66s | And together you would all pull your talents together to cause greater 1366.66s - 1368.62s | chaos than you could buy yourself. 1371.14s - 1379.06s | So that, that was, uh, you know, the eighties into the very early nineties 1379.06s - 1385.18s | where, uh, my, my friend and, uh, another person from LOD, uh, Bruce 1385.18s - 1391.30s | Fancher and I started Mindvox and Mindvox was the first internet 1391.30s - 1393.54s | access provider in New York city. 1394.02s - 1397.62s | This was, uh, we started the company in 1991. 1397.66s - 1403.90s | We went live in 1992 and suddenly everybody on earth had to get on 1403.90s - 1405.46s | this thing called the internet. 1406.70s - 1410.42s | That was, uh, it was a tremendous amount of fun. 1410.46s - 1412.34s | It was complete chaos. 1412.42s - 1418.86s | And I'm very grateful to have, uh, lived through, uh, this timeline that most of 1418.86s - 1420.74s | us sitting here right now share. 1421.14s - 1422.34s | Thank you very much. 1428.62s - 1430.30s | Tommy DeCatt, you are up next. 1430.54s - 1430.90s | Yeah. 1431.14s - 1432.26s | Hello, Defcon. 1432.86s - 1436.26s | Hey, been coming here for a while. 1436.30s - 1438.42s | Uh, let me, uh, give you a little background. 1438.42s - 1442.58s | Does it, uh, it's not too different from a couple of the, the people over


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uh, my, my friend and, uh, another person from LOD, uh, Bruce 1385.18s - 1391.30s | Fancher and I started Mindvox and Mindvox was the first internet 1391.30s - 1393.54s | access provider in New York city. 1394.02s - 1397.62s | This was, uh, we started the company in 1991. 1397.66s - 1403.90s | We went live in 1992 and suddenly everybody on earth had to get on 1403.90s - 1405.46s | this thing called the internet. 1406.70s - 1410.42s | That was, uh, it was a tremendous amount of fun. 1410.46s - 1412.34s | It was complete chaos. 1412.42s - 1418.86s | And I'm very grateful to have, uh, lived through, uh, this timeline that most of 1418.86s - 1420.74s | us sitting here right now share. 1421.14s - 1422.34s | Thank you very much. 1428.62s - 1430.30s | Tommy DeCatt, you are up next. 1430.54s - 1430.90s | Yeah. 1431.14s - 1432.26s | Hello, Defcon. 1432.86s - 1436.26s | Hey, been coming here for a while. 1436.30s - 1438.42s | Uh, let me, uh, give you a little background. 1438.42s - 1442.58s | Does it, uh, it's not too different from a couple of the, the people over there. 1442.58s - 1447.34s | I guess, uh, Walter, he kind of described us as the new wave coming into the scene. 1447.78s - 1455.30s | Um, 1983, I was 13 years old and, uh, I had a Commodore 64 at that time. 1455.30s - 1458.26s | I kind of liked games, uh, and my dad got a modem. 1458.82s - 1462.42s | So the problem was that modem wasn't for a Commodore 64. 1462.46s - 1464.46s | It was for a CPM based system. 1464.46s - 1471.42s | So basically I needed to, to learn how to control that modem in a, in, in, in 1472.18s - 1476.42s | basically on the CDN CPN system, I had to reverse engineer the drivers on 1476.46s - 1478.46s | that to, to write my own bulletin board software. 1478.46s - 1481.42s | So I could get people to call me to get me where it's right. 1481.86s - 1485.74s | Um, eventually I did get, get a modem for that Commodore 64. 1486.02s - 1489.58s | Um, but also, you know, I wanted more games for that. 1489.58s - 1494.98s | So what I found the, the, the currency for getting


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there. 1442.58s - 1447.34s | I guess, uh, Walter, he kind of described us as the new wave coming into the scene. 1447.78s - 1455.30s | Um, 1983, I was 13 years old and, uh, I had a Commodore 64 at that time. 1455.30s - 1458.26s | I kind of liked games, uh, and my dad got a modem. 1458.82s - 1462.42s | So the problem was that modem wasn't for a Commodore 64. 1462.46s - 1464.46s | It was for a CPM based system. 1464.46s - 1471.42s | So basically I needed to, to learn how to control that modem in a, in, in, in 1472.18s - 1476.42s | basically on the CDN CPN system, I had to reverse engineer the drivers on 1476.46s - 1478.46s | that to, to write my own bulletin board software. 1478.46s - 1481.42s | So I could get people to call me to get me where it's right. 1481.86s - 1485.74s | Um, eventually I did get, get a modem for that Commodore 64. 1486.02s - 1489.58s | Um, but also, you know, I wanted more games for that. 1489.58s - 1494.98s | So what I found the, the, the currency for getting games, uh, you could get codes too. 1494.98s - 1498.30s | You could, uh, you could call long distance for free. 1498.30s - 1500.22s | There's all kinds of neat things you could get to. 1500.22s - 1505.66s | So I kind of discovered the world of, uh, freaking, I guess, uh, you could 1505.66s - 1512.78s | call me a co kitty at that point for, uh, whatnot, but, uh, you know, as, as I 1512.78s - 1517.62s | started learning about, uh, access to things, you know, that, that became kind 1517.62s - 1522.98s | of addicting, uh, there were toys out there that I wanted to get into, there 1522.98s - 1527.18s | were games out there, but mostly I started learning about other computers, 1527.18s - 1532.42s | other systems, and it just kind of started, uh, creating a bit of a thirst 1532.42s - 1533.02s | for knowledge. 1533.02s - 1539.66s | So, uh, a lot of the things we did back in the day, I would say is, is, uh, 1539.66s - 1541.78s | Gear Dad getting access to these things. 1541.78s - 1545.02s | I mean, I'm wearing this little thing that, uh,


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games, uh, you could get codes too. 1494.98s - 1498.30s | You could, uh, you could call long distance for free. 1498.30s - 1500.22s | There's all kinds of neat things you could get to. 1500.22s - 1505.66s | So I kind of discovered the world of, uh, freaking, I guess, uh, you could 1505.66s - 1512.78s | call me a co kitty at that point for, uh, whatnot, but, uh, you know, as, as I 1512.78s - 1517.62s | started learning about, uh, access to things, you know, that, that became kind 1517.62s - 1522.98s | of addicting, uh, there were toys out there that I wanted to get into, there 1522.98s - 1527.18s | were games out there, but mostly I started learning about other computers, 1527.18s - 1532.42s | other systems, and it just kind of started, uh, creating a bit of a thirst 1532.42s - 1533.02s | for knowledge. 1533.02s - 1539.66s | So, uh, a lot of the things we did back in the day, I would say is, is, uh, 1539.66s - 1541.78s | Gear Dad getting access to these things. 1541.78s - 1545.02s | I mean, I'm wearing this little thing that, uh, you know, emulates a system 1545.02s - 1549.70s | that came out in 2001 that plays games so much cooler than, you know, all the, 1549.70s - 1553.58s | the hoops I, I jumped through to get the games for the system I had at that time. 1554.02s - 1559.46s | But, uh, as, as, you know, reaching out and, and, uh, finding people out there 1559.50s - 1563.58s | kind of similar to me, I discovered there were communities or, you know, you 1563.58s - 1565.10s | didn't have to go at this alone. 1565.50s - 1570.90s | So, uh, reaching out to the, the bulletin board systems in the area, uh, I 1570.90s - 1575.38s | discovered, I think it was a metal shop, uh, was one of the first metal shop AE. 1575.38s - 1575.58s | Yeah. 1575.58s - 1579.14s | One of the first, uh, big boards I got into and started learning about the scene 1579.14s - 1583.22s | and that's where I learned, uh, a lot of those, uh, kids met up, uh, at this 1583.22s - 1583.62s | place. 1583.62s - 1589.22s | Uh, I, I lived in Midwest at the time and


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you know, emulates a system 1545.02s - 1549.70s | that came out in 2001 that plays games so much cooler than, you know, all the, 1549.70s - 1553.58s | the hoops I, I jumped through to get the games for the system I had at that time. 1554.02s - 1559.46s | But, uh, as, as, you know, reaching out and, and, uh, finding people out there 1559.50s - 1563.58s | kind of similar to me, I discovered there were communities or, you know, you 1563.58s - 1565.10s | didn't have to go at this alone. 1565.50s - 1570.90s | So, uh, reaching out to the, the bulletin board systems in the area, uh, I 1570.90s - 1575.38s | discovered, I think it was a metal shop, uh, was one of the first metal shop AE. 1575.38s - 1575.58s | Yeah. 1575.58s - 1579.14s | One of the first, uh, big boards I got into and started learning about the scene 1579.14s - 1583.22s | and that's where I learned, uh, a lot of those, uh, kids met up, uh, at this 1583.22s - 1583.62s | place. 1583.62s - 1589.22s | Uh, I, I lived in Midwest at the time and there's a, a Galleria mall in St. 1589.22s - 1592.46s | Louis that they had what they call 2,600 meetings. 1592.46s - 1597.10s | So I started showing up there, met some like-minded folks, traded games and 1597.10s - 1600.06s | whatnot, and they started telling me, well, you know, this is actually about 1600.06s - 1600.82s | this magazine. 1601.22s - 1606.54s | So that's kind of where I saw, uh, Emmanuel's work, uh, come in, in there 1606.54s - 1611.30s | and that, that started lighting a path, you know, so it's all about the access. 1611.30s - 1614.78s | And I started reading about other people who did things, you know, maybe it's not 1614.78s - 1620.98s | the most exquisite stuff, uh, or hacks, but people are showing that they're 1621.74s - 1623.02s | curious about things. 1623.54s - 1626.18s | So that really engaged my interest. 1626.22s - 1632.86s | Uh, I started, uh, talking to, uh, there's a, a guy Sigmund, uh, who had, 1632.86s - 1635.30s | uh, Rosetta news was a bookstore. 1635.30s - 1638.22s | And he said, you know, if you like that magazine, maybe you'll want to take a


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there's a, a Galleria mall in St. 1589.22s - 1592.46s | Louis that they had what they call 2,600 meetings. 1592.46s - 1597.10s | So I started showing up there, met some like-minded folks, traded games and 1597.10s - 1600.06s | whatnot, and they started telling me, well, you know, this is actually about 1600.06s - 1600.82s | this magazine. 1601.22s - 1606.54s | So that's kind of where I saw, uh, Emmanuel's work, uh, come in, in there 1606.54s - 1611.30s | and that, that started lighting a path, you know, so it's all about the access. 1611.30s - 1614.78s | And I started reading about other people who did things, you know, maybe it's not 1614.78s - 1620.98s | the most exquisite stuff, uh, or hacks, but people are showing that they're 1621.74s - 1623.02s | curious about things. 1623.54s - 1626.18s | So that really engaged my interest. 1626.22s - 1632.86s | Uh, I started, uh, talking to, uh, there's a, a guy Sigmund, uh, who had, 1632.86s - 1635.30s | uh, Rosetta news was a bookstore. 1635.30s - 1638.22s | And he said, you know, if you like that magazine, maybe you'll want to take a 1638.22s - 1642.38s | look, look at this, uh, 411 blacklisted, take a look at those things. 1642.42s - 1646.38s | And it started, you know, expanding my mind, reaching out to other things. 1646.38s - 1649.02s | And there are other communities out there too. 1649.34s - 1655.34s | Um, where the, the BBS scene is, uh, uh, originally like the, the, the 1655.34s - 1660.18s | wares and, uh, whatnot, people were really private, but there's some other 1660.18s - 1663.82s | groups that really started reaching out socially and connecting. 1664.22s - 1670.26s | Um, I saw, uh, I guess, uh, you know, talking about links you find on a 1670.26s - 1674.50s | bulletin boards to other boards around the system, requiring access to get out 1674.50s - 1678.62s | their codes, uh, figuring out how to freak blue boxing, whatever techniques 1678.62s - 1680.42s | you need to, to, to reach out there. 1680.70s - 1683.70s | But their, their communities are building around that time in the mid 1683.70s - 1685.34s | eighties, uh, early eighties. 1685.62s - 1688.62s | Uh, there's mind mocks there, there's the well and whatnot. 1688.90s - 1692.50s |


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1638.22s - 1642.38s | look, look at this, uh, 411 blacklisted, take a look at those things. 1642.42s - 1646.38s | And it started, you know, expanding my mind, reaching out to other things. 1646.38s - 1649.02s | And there are other communities out there too. 1649.34s - 1655.34s | Um, where the, the BBS scene is, uh, uh, originally like the, the, the 1655.34s - 1660.18s | wares and, uh, whatnot, people were really private, but there's some other 1660.18s - 1663.82s | groups that really started reaching out socially and connecting. 1664.22s - 1670.26s | Um, I saw, uh, I guess, uh, you know, talking about links you find on a 1670.26s - 1674.50s | bulletin boards to other boards around the system, requiring access to get out 1674.50s - 1678.62s | their codes, uh, figuring out how to freak blue boxing, whatever techniques 1678.62s - 1680.42s | you need to, to, to reach out there. 1680.70s - 1683.70s | But their, their communities are building around that time in the mid 1683.70s - 1685.34s | eighties, uh, early eighties. 1685.62s - 1688.62s | Uh, there's mind mocks there, there's the well and whatnot. 1688.90s - 1692.50s | Uh, there's a system called the versatile, uh, where somebody take an 1692.50s - 1695.54s | Apple to computer and just load it up with modems, but those people 1695.54s - 1696.74s | could talk to each other. 1697.18s - 1703.30s | Uh, that started building up into, to other, uh, interconnected systems. 1703.58s - 1709.70s | I think bitnets, uh, was the, the first real major interconnected network, uh, 1709.70s - 1713.42s | other than, you know, like, uh, telling it or whatever that was for a research 1713.42s - 1718.50s | purpose, but they had a, a, a chat program on there where if you had an 1718.50s - 1724.06s | account on a bitnet computer, you could tell relay at like CUNY VM or some 1724.06s - 1728.42s | other, uh, system that had a relay host on it and it would connect you with 1728.42s - 1730.34s | other people that were trying to talk to relay. 1730.38s - 1735.30s | That was the first real chat system I saw on a, on a network system. 1735.86s - 1741.82s | And then in 1989, Yarkel or can there, or, or I can't pronounce the name. 1741.82s


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Uh, there's a system called the versatile, uh, where somebody take an 1692.50s - 1695.54s | Apple to computer and just load it up with modems, but those people 1695.54s - 1696.74s | could talk to each other. 1697.18s - 1703.30s | Uh, that started building up into, to other, uh, interconnected systems. 1703.58s - 1709.70s | I think bitnets, uh, was the, the first real major interconnected network, uh, 1709.70s - 1713.42s | other than, you know, like, uh, telling it or whatever that was for a research 1713.42s - 1718.50s | purpose, but they had a, a, a chat program on there where if you had an 1718.50s - 1724.06s | account on a bitnet computer, you could tell relay at like CUNY VM or some 1724.06s - 1728.42s | other, uh, system that had a relay host on it and it would connect you with 1728.42s - 1730.34s | other people that were trying to talk to relay. 1730.38s - 1735.30s | That was the first real chat system I saw on a, on a network system. 1735.86s - 1741.82s | And then in 1989, Yarkel or can there, or, or I can't pronounce the name. 1741.82s - 1742.26s | I'm sorry. 1742.50s - 1748.26s | Um, invented IRC and that was internet relay chat. 1748.26s - 1752.38s | That was based on the, the bitnet, uh, client that came before that. 1752.38s - 1755.18s | So I, I found that really interesting. 1755.98s - 1762.50s | Um, reaching out, talking to people, uh, first joined up plus wares, I believe, 1762.54s - 1769.10s | uh, in 1989 and, uh, the channels at that time had a plus, not a pound symbol 1769.10s - 1771.62s | in front of them for, you know, whatever reason there, there've been 1771.62s - 1773.38s | iterations over, uh, the years. 1773.82s - 1780.94s | But, uh, yeah, the first person I, I saw on IRC in November, 1989, I think was 1780.94s - 1786.02s | guns, uh, guns was a girl from the university of Illinois, uh, Champaign 1786.02s - 1790.38s | Urbana, and just a, a, a little shout out for that. 1790.66s - 1794.90s | Um, shortly after that, so yeah, I met a girl first thing on it. 1797.90s - 1798.22s | Yeah. 1798.38s - 1802.74s | Shortly after that, you know, look at plus hack, uh,


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- 1742.26s | I'm sorry. 1742.50s - 1748.26s | Um, invented IRC and that was internet relay chat. 1748.26s - 1752.38s | That was based on the, the bitnet, uh, client that came before that. 1752.38s - 1755.18s | So I, I found that really interesting. 1755.98s - 1762.50s | Um, reaching out, talking to people, uh, first joined up plus wares, I believe, 1762.54s - 1769.10s | uh, in 1989 and, uh, the channels at that time had a plus, not a pound symbol 1769.10s - 1771.62s | in front of them for, you know, whatever reason there, there've been 1771.62s - 1773.38s | iterations over, uh, the years. 1773.82s - 1780.94s | But, uh, yeah, the first person I, I saw on IRC in November, 1989, I think was 1780.94s - 1786.02s | guns, uh, guns was a girl from the university of Illinois, uh, Champaign 1786.02s - 1790.38s | Urbana, and just a, a, a little shout out for that. 1790.66s - 1794.90s | Um, shortly after that, so yeah, I met a girl first thing on it. 1797.90s - 1798.22s | Yeah. 1798.38s - 1802.74s | Shortly after that, you know, look at plus hack, uh, saw some people on there, 1802.74s - 1806.46s | but, uh, mostly with IRC, I saw there's a opportunity to kind of 1806.46s - 1808.02s | rebrand myself a little bit too. 1808.50s - 1812.10s | If you put in a nickname, you're limited to nine characters and that didn't 1812.10s - 1815.58s | really fit the, the nicknames that are, you know, still undisclosed to this 1815.58s - 1818.22s | day of, of what I used before that point. 1818.22s - 1820.02s | But, you know, I kind of rebranded myself. 1820.02s - 1822.94s | He was like, I'm not necessarily a wares dude anymore. 1823.14s - 1824.10s | I'm just a script kiddie. 1824.10s - 1824.82s | That's a lot better. 1825.18s - 1831.34s | Um, but what I, I saw is there's a currency, uh, between wares and hack. 1831.66s - 1832.78s | You could take those codes. 1832.78s - 1836.58s | You could take those wares, take those techniques to get into systems and 1836.62s - 1839.54s | you could kind of enable the communities between. 1839.54s - 1844.02s | So, uh, one of the things I did in the early nineties, I guess, is kind


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saw some people on there, 1802.74s - 1806.46s | but, uh, mostly with IRC, I saw there's a opportunity to kind of 1806.46s - 1808.02s | rebrand myself a little bit too. 1808.50s - 1812.10s | If you put in a nickname, you're limited to nine characters and that didn't 1812.10s - 1815.58s | really fit the, the nicknames that are, you know, still undisclosed to this 1815.58s - 1818.22s | day of, of what I used before that point. 1818.22s - 1820.02s | But, you know, I kind of rebranded myself. 1820.02s - 1822.94s | He was like, I'm not necessarily a wares dude anymore. 1823.14s - 1824.10s | I'm just a script kiddie. 1824.10s - 1824.82s | That's a lot better. 1825.18s - 1831.34s | Um, but what I, I saw is there's a currency, uh, between wares and hack. 1831.66s - 1832.78s | You could take those codes. 1832.78s - 1836.58s | You could take those wares, take those techniques to get into systems and 1836.62s - 1839.54s | you could kind of enable the communities between. 1839.54s - 1844.02s | So, uh, one of the things I did in the early nineties, I guess, is kind of 1844.34s - 1847.02s | start creating that bridge between communities. 1847.42s - 1854.54s | Um, and I did that by, uh, creating a couple of bots that set on those channels. 1854.90s - 1856.86s | Uh, there's hat cat and where's cat. 1857.70s - 1861.42s | And basically they maintain the peace through, uh, violence. 1861.70s - 1869.22s | So, um, the, but the, what that did is it set me in a position where, uh, IRC 1869.22s - 1871.50s | was kind of where everybody was popping up. 1871.50s - 1875.50s | Anybody was, anybody would try to pop up in that area and I would see them come up. 1875.50s - 1880.22s | So what was interesting is I saw a lot of people, you know, both on the stage 1880.22s - 1884.46s | and in this room, you know, literally grow up through, through IRC. 1884.46s - 1886.14s | And that was, that was kind of special. 1886.14s - 1890.98s | And this community is really built in a way that back then I didn't really expect. 1894.22s - 1896.78s | It's just, I look out here, it's just amazing. 1898.34s - 1898.86s | All right.


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of 1844.34s - 1847.02s | start creating that bridge between communities. 1847.42s - 1854.54s | Um, and I did that by, uh, creating a couple of bots that set on those channels. 1854.90s - 1856.86s | Uh, there's hat cat and where's cat. 1857.70s - 1861.42s | And basically they maintain the peace through, uh, violence. 1861.70s - 1869.22s | So, um, the, but the, what that did is it set me in a position where, uh, IRC 1869.22s - 1871.50s | was kind of where everybody was popping up. 1871.50s - 1875.50s | Anybody was, anybody would try to pop up in that area and I would see them come up. 1875.50s - 1880.22s | So what was interesting is I saw a lot of people, you know, both on the stage 1880.22s - 1884.46s | and in this room, you know, literally grow up through, through IRC. 1884.46s - 1886.14s | And that was, that was kind of special. 1886.14s - 1890.98s | And this community is really built in a way that back then I didn't really expect. 1894.22s - 1896.78s | It's just, I look out here, it's just amazing. 1898.34s - 1898.86s | All right. 1898.90s - 1902.10s | And last but not least, the one and only John Threat. 1902.50s - 1903.30s | Yo, what's up? 1904.06s - 1904.42s | I am. 1907.14s - 1907.86s | That's kind of you. 1907.90s - 1912.78s | Uh, one question I have is that first of all, just before I get started, uh, yo, 1912.78s - 1916.14s | you guys sure you weren't calling sex lines to run up those bills, man? 1916.58s - 1917.66s | You could tell me, bro. 1919.90s - 1922.06s | So where should I start? 1922.10s - 1922.42s | All right. 1922.82s - 1923.62s | What was the question? 1924.54s - 1925.98s | What is your origin story? 1926.94s - 1928.02s | How did you become a hacker? 1928.90s - 1929.30s | All right. 1929.30s - 1931.02s | So, uh, yeah. 1931.02s - 1932.90s | So I'm from Brooklyn, Brownsville. 1932.90s - 1934.70s | Anybody here from Brooklyn, Brownsville? 1935.98s - 1936.62s | Oh, really? 1936.66s - 1937.54s | It's fucking quiet. 1937.74s - 1938.10s | All right. 1940.10s - 1941.22s | Before we get started. 1941.50s - 1941.82s | All right. 1941.82s - 1942.46s | Raise your hand. 1942.46s - 1947.02s


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1898.90s - 1902.10s | And last but not least, the one and only John Threat. 1902.50s - 1903.30s | Yo, what's up? 1904.06s - 1904.42s | I am. 1907.14s - 1907.86s | That's kind of you. 1907.90s - 1912.78s | Uh, one question I have is that first of all, just before I get started, uh, yo, 1912.78s - 1916.14s | you guys sure you weren't calling sex lines to run up those bills, man? 1916.58s - 1917.66s | You could tell me, bro. 1919.90s - 1922.06s | So where should I start? 1922.10s - 1922.42s | All right. 1922.82s - 1923.62s | What was the question? 1924.54s - 1925.98s | What is your origin story? 1926.94s - 1928.02s | How did you become a hacker? 1928.90s - 1929.30s | All right. 1929.30s - 1931.02s | So, uh, yeah. 1931.02s - 1932.90s | So I'm from Brooklyn, Brownsville. 1932.90s - 1934.70s | Anybody here from Brooklyn, Brownsville? 1935.98s - 1936.62s | Oh, really? 1936.66s - 1937.54s | It's fucking quiet. 1937.74s - 1938.10s | All right. 1940.10s - 1941.22s | Before we get started. 1941.50s - 1941.82s | All right. 1941.82s - 1942.46s | Raise your hand. 1942.46s - 1947.02s | If you, uh, have broken into a computer before, who, yo, what's up? 1947.06s - 1947.78s | Come on, do it. 1948.50s - 1948.94s | Nice. 1948.94s - 1949.62s | This is good. 1949.70s - 1951.06s | That makes me feel at home. 1951.82s - 1952.22s | I'm home. 1952.70s - 1953.02s | All right. 1953.02s - 1954.90s | So for me, I'm from Brownsville, Brooklyn. 1955.50s - 1961.42s | Um, my mother worked at a school, uh, then, uh, yeah, they had computers there 1961.46s - 1963.26s | and it wasn't any games or anything. 1963.26s - 1964.54s | So I was just fucking with it. 1964.54s - 1964.90s | Right. 1965.22s - 1967.38s | There was like a Apple two or something. 1967.98s - 1970.06s | And yeah, so I'll fucking with this thing. 1970.06s - 1974.78s | And then there was a, there was this lovely woman, uh, Sheila. 1975.30s - 1980.02s | Um, um, she lived in park slope and her and her partner, she was very cool. 1980.02s - 1983.26s | She had like a Mohawk and said, and she was like, yo, I want you to 1983.26s - 1984.70s | come to my


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| If you, uh, have broken into a computer before, who, yo, what's up? 1947.06s - 1947.78s | Come on, do it. 1948.50s - 1948.94s | Nice. 1948.94s - 1949.62s | This is good. 1949.70s - 1951.06s | That makes me feel at home. 1951.82s - 1952.22s | I'm home. 1952.70s - 1953.02s | All right. 1953.02s - 1954.90s | So for me, I'm from Brownsville, Brooklyn. 1955.50s - 1961.42s | Um, my mother worked at a school, uh, then, uh, yeah, they had computers there 1961.46s - 1963.26s | and it wasn't any games or anything. 1963.26s - 1964.54s | So I was just fucking with it. 1964.54s - 1964.90s | Right. 1965.22s - 1967.38s | There was like a Apple two or something. 1967.98s - 1970.06s | And yeah, so I'll fucking with this thing. 1970.06s - 1974.78s | And then there was a, there was this lovely woman, uh, Sheila. 1975.30s - 1980.02s | Um, um, she lived in park slope and her and her partner, she was very cool. 1980.02s - 1983.26s | She had like a Mohawk and said, and she was like, yo, I want you to 1983.26s - 1984.70s | come to my house and just cold. 1985.50s - 1988.58s | And then boom, I'd be there and she'd be like, no games, just cold. 1988.90s - 1991.74s | And I just be there and I'd be like, I don't know if this is fun anymore, 1991.74s - 1994.82s | but that's all I can fucking code. 1994.82s - 1995.10s | Right. 1995.58s - 1999.66s | So in a lot of ways, that's like the crucible for me, I was just 1999.66s - 2002.38s | fucking coding and shit, all that shit didn't even matter. 2002.58s - 2007.54s | So then, uh, uh, eventually I did get a computer and then I did get a modem. 2007.66s - 2011.90s | I, you know, I, yeah, I'm not going to say how I got that motor, but yeah, 2011.94s - 2018.46s | trust me, my mom didn't buy that modem for the Commodore 64, but for me, I 2018.46s - 2020.90s | only know breaking into systems. 2020.90s - 2021.78s | That's my shit. 2022.18s - 2024.50s | That's what I do as a hacker. 2024.54s - 2027.42s | That's like the starting point for me. 2027.58s - 2031.74s | So initially, yo, that


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house and just cold. 1985.50s - 1988.58s | And then boom, I'd be there and she'd be like, no games, just cold. 1988.90s - 1991.74s | And I just be there and I'd be like, I don't know if this is fun anymore, 1991.74s - 1994.82s | but that's all I can fucking code. 1994.82s - 1995.10s | Right. 1995.58s - 1999.66s | So in a lot of ways, that's like the crucible for me, I was just 1999.66s - 2002.38s | fucking coding and shit, all that shit didn't even matter. 2002.58s - 2007.54s | So then, uh, uh, eventually I did get a computer and then I did get a modem. 2007.66s - 2011.90s | I, you know, I, yeah, I'm not going to say how I got that motor, but yeah, 2011.94s - 2018.46s | trust me, my mom didn't buy that modem for the Commodore 64, but for me, I 2018.46s - 2020.90s | only know breaking into systems. 2020.90s - 2021.78s | That's my shit. 2022.18s - 2024.50s | That's what I do as a hacker. 2024.54s - 2027.42s | That's like the starting point for me. 2027.58s - 2031.74s | So initially, yo, that was all I did was just breaking computers. 2031.74s - 2034.70s | The time I saw a pound hack, I was already breaking into computers. 2034.70s - 2036.22s | I was like, I don't need this chat shit. 2037.86s - 2038.62s | Just break in. 2047.10s - 2051.46s | Uh, yeah, no, for a long time, actually on, uh, the instructions for IRG, it 2051.46s - 2053.82s | was like how to do a, uh, a band. 2053.82s - 2055.14s | Permaban was Netwiz. 2055.14s - 2057.42s | That was my hacker handle at that time. 2057.46s - 2058.34s | You were the example. 2059.50s - 2060.58s | I mean, I tore that shit up. 2060.58s - 2063.54s | So anyway, the, I mean, I was really bad. 2063.54s - 2068.54s | So, um, but I think that like, for me, that was like the start. 2068.54s - 2073.10s | I feel like I was, uh, uh, in a lot of ways, like hacking is magical. 2073.10s - 2075.82s | One of the reasons I asked you to raise your hands is because if you've ever 2075.82s - 2080.82s | broken into a system there, yo, to be honest, that


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was all I did was just breaking computers. 2031.74s - 2034.70s | The time I saw a pound hack, I was already breaking into computers. 2034.70s - 2036.22s | I was like, I don't need this chat shit. 2037.86s - 2038.62s | Just break in. 2047.10s - 2051.46s | Uh, yeah, no, for a long time, actually on, uh, the instructions for IRG, it 2051.46s - 2053.82s | was like how to do a, uh, a band. 2053.82s - 2055.14s | Permaban was Netwiz. 2055.14s - 2057.42s | That was my hacker handle at that time. 2057.46s - 2058.34s | You were the example. 2059.50s - 2060.58s | I mean, I tore that shit up. 2060.58s - 2063.54s | So anyway, the, I mean, I was really bad. 2063.54s - 2068.54s | So, um, but I think that like, for me, that was like the start. 2068.54s - 2073.10s | I feel like I was, uh, uh, in a lot of ways, like hacking is magical. 2073.10s - 2075.82s | One of the reasons I asked you to raise your hands is because if you've ever 2075.82s - 2080.82s | broken into a system there, yo, to be honest, that shit is like an orgasm. 2081.26s - 2082.98s | It's like a tingle goes up your spine. 2083.66s - 2084.90s | It's unbelievable. 2085.34s - 2090.18s | The feeling it's also such a creative exercise that a lot 2090.18s - 2091.22s | of people don't realize it. 2091.22s - 2093.02s | Now there's different ways to relate to it. 2093.18s - 2096.54s | Some people relate to it in a technical sense and that's fine, but 2096.54s - 2098.06s | there's also like an art to it. 2098.54s - 2102.86s | And a beauty to it, into exploring and using your imagination as ways 2102.86s - 2104.78s | to get around in different systems. 2105.06s - 2107.14s | And a lot of times people don't really think about that. 2107.14s - 2109.50s | Like for me, and maybe I'm going too far. 2109.50s - 2112.26s | We can talk about this later, but it's the idea that actually sometimes 2112.26s - 2116.38s | reflects in security too much where it's like, okay, efficiency, here's 2116.38s - 2121.86s | a checklist, but the beauty of the attacker or the hacker or whatever 2121.86s - 2126.14s | you want to call it


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shit is like an orgasm. 2081.26s - 2082.98s | It's like a tingle goes up your spine. 2083.66s - 2084.90s | It's unbelievable. 2085.34s - 2090.18s | The feeling it's also such a creative exercise that a lot 2090.18s - 2091.22s | of people don't realize it. 2091.22s - 2093.02s | Now there's different ways to relate to it. 2093.18s - 2096.54s | Some people relate to it in a technical sense and that's fine, but 2096.54s - 2098.06s | there's also like an art to it. 2098.54s - 2102.86s | And a beauty to it, into exploring and using your imagination as ways 2102.86s - 2104.78s | to get around in different systems. 2105.06s - 2107.14s | And a lot of times people don't really think about that. 2107.14s - 2109.50s | Like for me, and maybe I'm going too far. 2109.50s - 2112.26s | We can talk about this later, but it's the idea that actually sometimes 2112.26s - 2116.38s | reflects in security too much where it's like, okay, efficiency, here's 2116.38s - 2121.86s | a checklist, but the beauty of the attacker or the hacker or whatever 2121.86s - 2126.14s | you want to call it is using your imagination in a pure form to get 2126.18s - 2129.74s | around and look at data and not let the world restrict you. 2129.74s - 2131.02s | You don't think about that. 2131.30s - 2135.34s | And that was allowing me to have access to computers around the world 2135.54s - 2139.22s | and look at data that I wasn't going to get at the public, at the public 2139.22s - 2141.74s | library or on fucking, I don't know. 2141.74s - 2142.22s | What do you got? 2142.22s - 2144.14s | You guys watch those TV news things. 2144.30s - 2145.06s | Is that what you guys do? 2145.50s - 2146.58s | Anybody watch TV news? 2146.58s - 2147.46s | Yo, don't watch that shit. 2147.46s - 2148.18s | It's terrible. 2149.14s - 2151.82s | So my point is, yo, they're going to just tell you whatever. 2151.82s - 2154.26s | And I don't mean to make a, I could make a long comment on that, but my 2154.26s - 2157.62s | main thing is that that was like part of the freedom of the hackers. 2157.62s - 2162.22s | Like, yo, just pure information, contextualizing


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is using your imagination in a pure form to get 2126.18s - 2129.74s | around and look at data and not let the world restrict you. 2129.74s - 2131.02s | You don't think about that. 2131.30s - 2135.34s | And that was allowing me to have access to computers around the world 2135.54s - 2139.22s | and look at data that I wasn't going to get at the public, at the public 2139.22s - 2141.74s | library or on fucking, I don't know. 2141.74s - 2142.22s | What do you got? 2142.22s - 2144.14s | You guys watch those TV news things. 2144.30s - 2145.06s | Is that what you guys do? 2145.50s - 2146.58s | Anybody watch TV news? 2146.58s - 2147.46s | Yo, don't watch that shit. 2147.46s - 2148.18s | It's terrible. 2149.14s - 2151.82s | So my point is, yo, they're going to just tell you whatever. 2151.82s - 2154.26s | And I don't mean to make a, I could make a long comment on that, but my 2154.26s - 2157.62s | main thing is that that was like part of the freedom of the hackers. 2157.62s - 2162.22s | Like, yo, just pure information, contextualizing it for yourself. 2162.50s - 2165.94s | And that's like also that rebel spirit that really defines 2165.94s - 2168.02s | the mythology of the hacker. 2168.26s - 2169.30s | All right, I'm gonna stop there. 2169.34s - 2169.70s | Peace. 2175.88s - 2176.28s | All right. 2176.92s - 2179.36s | There are a couple of threads that came out of all these origin 2179.36s - 2181.20s | stories that I want to pick up on the first one. 2181.20s - 2186.08s | Let's just take a hook from what John was telling us about hacking. 2186.08s - 2187.44s | What were the early techniques? 2187.44s - 2192.44s | Like, what were you guys doing to make free calls and explore these 2192.44s - 2196.64s | new communications channels or just let your imagination run wild 2196.64s - 2198.36s | all over the information space? 2198.56s - 2200.56s | So I, if I, I'll start out. 2201.80s - 2206.16s | So I assume most people here have seen the movie war games, right? 2206.20s - 2208.76s | You know, raise your hand if you haven't seen war games. 2209.84s - 2211.96s | Oh yeah, there you go. 2211.96s - 2212.88s


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it for yourself. 2162.50s - 2165.94s | And that's like also that rebel spirit that really defines 2165.94s - 2168.02s | the mythology of the hacker. 2168.26s - 2169.30s | All right, I'm gonna stop there. 2169.34s - 2169.70s | Peace. 2175.88s - 2176.28s | All right. 2176.92s - 2179.36s | There are a couple of threads that came out of all these origin 2179.36s - 2181.20s | stories that I want to pick up on the first one. 2181.20s - 2186.08s | Let's just take a hook from what John was telling us about hacking. 2186.08s - 2187.44s | What were the early techniques? 2187.44s - 2192.44s | Like, what were you guys doing to make free calls and explore these 2192.44s - 2196.64s | new communications channels or just let your imagination run wild 2196.64s - 2198.36s | all over the information space? 2198.56s - 2200.56s | So I, if I, I'll start out. 2201.80s - 2206.16s | So I assume most people here have seen the movie war games, right? 2206.20s - 2208.76s | You know, raise your hand if you haven't seen war games. 2209.84s - 2211.96s | Oh yeah, there you go. 2211.96s - 2212.88s | Now you've got some hope. 2212.92s - 2213.84s | You got some homework. 2214.20s - 2221.28s | Um, so most of this, most stuff in war games, you know, was not real, 2221.28s - 2225.20s | but there were some, both kernels of, of actual practice and technology. 2225.40s - 2228.44s | So, you know, there's a, you know, one of the plot points is Matthew 2228.44s - 2232.28s | Broderick's character, um, just sets his computer to call every phone 2232.28s - 2233.56s | number in an entire area code. 2233.56s - 2234.72s | Cause he wants to find a system. 2235.04s - 2236.64s | That is what we would do. 2236.68s - 2240.12s | I mean, we actually called it war dialing after war, after, uh, after war 2240.12s - 2243.40s | games, cause you set your computer call every phone number in, you know, 2243.40s - 2245.72s | six, one, seven overnight, you wake up in the morning and you got a 2245.72s - 2247.12s | list of where a computer answered. 2247.40s - 2250.48s | It doesn't keep a list of how many people you woke up and swore into the phone. 2251.08s - 2254.12s


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| Now you've got some hope. 2212.92s - 2213.84s | You got some homework. 2214.20s - 2221.28s | Um, so most of this, most stuff in war games, you know, was not real, 2221.28s - 2225.20s | but there were some, both kernels of, of actual practice and technology. 2225.40s - 2228.44s | So, you know, there's a, you know, one of the plot points is Matthew 2228.44s - 2232.28s | Broderick's character, um, just sets his computer to call every phone 2232.28s - 2233.56s | number in an entire area code. 2233.56s - 2234.72s | Cause he wants to find a system. 2235.04s - 2236.64s | That is what we would do. 2236.68s - 2240.12s | I mean, we actually called it war dialing after war, after, uh, after war 2240.12s - 2243.40s | games, cause you set your computer call every phone number in, you know, 2243.40s - 2245.72s | six, one, seven overnight, you wake up in the morning and you got a 2245.72s - 2247.12s | list of where a computer answered. 2247.40s - 2250.48s | It doesn't keep a list of how many people you woke up and swore into the phone. 2251.08s - 2254.12s | But, um, and then you just call each one of these things to see 2254.12s - 2255.00s | what answered at the other. 2255.00s - 2256.28s | And some might be fax machines. 2256.28s - 2259.60s | Some might, you know, you don't have nothing kind of really responds, but 2259.60s - 2262.84s | some do, and then you figure out like, what is what, um, so that was like one 2262.84s - 2264.44s | way we found systems before the internet. 2264.84s - 2267.88s | Um, oh, yours is off. 2268.76s - 2272.04s | No, no caller ID. 2272.20s - 2272.80s | No caller ID. 2272.80s - 2275.44s | So we could do this all night long and not worry. 2275.48s - 2275.98s | Yeah. 2276.48s - 2281.04s | And, uh, then also same with like to get, uh, phone codes. 2281.04s - 2283.12s | Cause you know, calling cards, cause long distance calling was 2283.12s - 2284.16s | really fucking expensive. 2284.16s - 2285.44s | You know, dollars a minute kind of thing. 2285.84s - 2290.56s | Um, as our parents found out, but, um, the, uh, so you'd set it, you'd 2290.56s - 2295.28s | like


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| But, um, and then you just call each one of these things to see 2254.12s - 2255.00s | what answered at the other. 2255.00s - 2256.28s | And some might be fax machines. 2256.28s - 2259.60s | Some might, you know, you don't have nothing kind of really responds, but 2259.60s - 2262.84s | some do, and then you figure out like, what is what, um, so that was like one 2262.84s - 2264.44s | way we found systems before the internet. 2264.84s - 2267.88s | Um, oh, yours is off. 2268.76s - 2272.04s | No, no caller ID. 2272.20s - 2272.80s | No caller ID. 2272.80s - 2275.44s | So we could do this all night long and not worry. 2275.48s - 2275.98s | Yeah. 2276.48s - 2281.04s | And, uh, then also same with like to get, uh, phone codes. 2281.04s - 2283.12s | Cause you know, calling cards, cause long distance calling was 2283.12s - 2284.16s | really fucking expensive. 2284.16s - 2285.44s | You know, dollars a minute kind of thing. 2285.84s - 2290.56s | Um, as our parents found out, but, um, the, uh, so you'd set it, you'd 2290.56s - 2295.28s | like find a local, uh, you know, the number for like a, uh, MCI credit 2295.28s - 2297.64s | card or something, and you'd set your computer, just call it and basically 2297.76s - 2301.44s | we were brute forcing and originally like these calling card codes were like 2301.44s - 2306.28s | six digits, um, you know, and so you would, you would get them really quickly. 2306.52s - 2311.04s | And again, like, it's actually like in hindsight, it's kind of surprising 2311.04s - 2314.04s | that more of us didn't get in trouble for that, but like, I guess they just 2314.04s - 2318.72s | weren't, it's so funny because that's what I was always worried I would get 2318.72s - 2321.84s | in trouble for, and that's the one thing the feds didn't care about were free 2321.84s - 2326.84s | phone calls, but the way that we would find things very similar, we just, uh, 2326.88s - 2333.00s | 800 number scan, I would go to pay phones and just dial manually and listen 2333.00s - 2336.96s | for weird things picking up again, no caller ID, uh, you wouldn't 2336.96s - 2338.24s | be traced


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find a local, uh, you know, the number for like a, uh, MCI credit 2295.28s - 2297.64s | card or something, and you'd set your computer, just call it and basically 2297.76s - 2301.44s | we were brute forcing and originally like these calling card codes were like 2301.44s - 2306.28s | six digits, um, you know, and so you would, you would get them really quickly. 2306.52s - 2311.04s | And again, like, it's actually like in hindsight, it's kind of surprising 2311.04s - 2314.04s | that more of us didn't get in trouble for that, but like, I guess they just 2314.04s - 2318.72s | weren't, it's so funny because that's what I was always worried I would get 2318.72s - 2321.84s | in trouble for, and that's the one thing the feds didn't care about were free 2321.84s - 2326.84s | phone calls, but the way that we would find things very similar, we just, uh, 2326.88s - 2333.00s | 800 number scan, I would go to pay phones and just dial manually and listen 2333.00s - 2336.96s | for weird things picking up again, no caller ID, uh, you wouldn't 2336.96s - 2338.24s | be traced on an 800 number. 2338.68s - 2342.88s | Uh, and I remember we found something once called, um, and it'd be wild. 2342.88s - 2346.52s | If anybody remembers this, it was called travel net run by general motors. 2346.64s - 2349.28s | Anybody have any memory of this? 2349.32s - 2349.68s | Okay. 2350.20s - 2351.56s | Uh, one, one person. 2351.56s - 2351.88s | Okay. 2352.20s - 2356.36s | Uh, it was just some weird system that was actually voice activated. 2356.36s - 2362.28s | You would speak the codes and it was, it was two sequences of four numbers. 2362.80s - 2365.76s | Um, and we realized after, after getting a whole bunch of these codes that 2365.76s - 2367.20s | they all added up to the same number. 2367.20s - 2370.44s | I don't know why that was never figured that out, but the way we got our first 2370.44s - 2375.24s | code was by social engineering, by calling general motors asking, uh, yeah, 2375.24s - 2376.52s | you know, I'm over in accounting. 2376.52s - 2378.12s | I need more info on the travel net system. 2378.36s - 2382.48s | They directed us to


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on an 800 number. 2338.68s - 2342.88s | Uh, and I remember we found something once called, um, and it'd be wild. 2342.88s - 2346.52s | If anybody remembers this, it was called travel net run by general motors. 2346.64s - 2349.28s | Anybody have any memory of this? 2349.32s - 2349.68s | Okay. 2350.20s - 2351.56s | Uh, one, one person. 2351.56s - 2351.88s | Okay. 2352.20s - 2356.36s | Uh, it was just some weird system that was actually voice activated. 2356.36s - 2362.28s | You would speak the codes and it was, it was two sequences of four numbers. 2362.80s - 2365.76s | Um, and we realized after, after getting a whole bunch of these codes that 2365.76s - 2367.20s | they all added up to the same number. 2367.20s - 2370.44s | I don't know why that was never figured that out, but the way we got our first 2370.44s - 2375.24s | code was by social engineering, by calling general motors asking, uh, yeah, 2375.24s - 2376.52s | you know, I'm over in accounting. 2376.52s - 2378.12s | I need more info on the travel net system. 2378.36s - 2382.48s | They directed us to a recording that showed people how to use 2382.48s - 2384.68s | it and they used a demo code. 2385.48s - 2387.72s | And I tried to demo code and it fucking worked. 2390.76s - 2391.60s | I couldn't believe it. 2391.92s - 2395.04s | And from there, you know, I just mixed the numbers around 2395.04s - 2396.64s | a little bit and got more codes. 2396.64s - 2400.52s | Before you knew it, we had a hundred codes and we could call all over the 2400.52s - 2404.84s | place with that, without any fear of, of being, um, traced or caught. 2405.16s - 2408.60s | Uh, the only problem was it would have a beep every now and then, uh, every 2408.60s - 2411.52s | couple of minutes it would beep to indicate, I don't know what, uh, time 2411.52s - 2414.64s | passing by, but that's hard if you're on a modem when that happens. 2414.64s - 2418.00s | So that was the only disadvantage, but it sure was a gateway. 2418.16s - 2420.24s | I think you like, you touched on a, on a good thing when you 2420.24s - 2421.24s | mentioned social engineering.


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a recording that showed people how to use 2382.48s - 2384.68s | it and they used a demo code. 2385.48s - 2387.72s | And I tried to demo code and it fucking worked. 2390.76s - 2391.60s | I couldn't believe it. 2391.92s - 2395.04s | And from there, you know, I just mixed the numbers around 2395.04s - 2396.64s | a little bit and got more codes. 2396.64s - 2400.52s | Before you knew it, we had a hundred codes and we could call all over the 2400.52s - 2404.84s | place with that, without any fear of, of being, um, traced or caught. 2405.16s - 2408.60s | Uh, the only problem was it would have a beep every now and then, uh, every 2408.60s - 2411.52s | couple of minutes it would beep to indicate, I don't know what, uh, time 2411.52s - 2414.64s | passing by, but that's hard if you're on a modem when that happens. 2414.64s - 2418.00s | So that was the only disadvantage, but it sure was a gateway. 2418.16s - 2420.24s | I think you like, you touched on a, on a good thing when you 2420.24s - 2421.24s | mentioned social engineering. 2421.24s - 2425.36s | Cause like as, as today back then, like I, the, what I always say is 2425.36s - 2428.40s | that like the weakest link in any security chain is the human one. 2428.40s - 2431.12s | And so, you know, it would be a matter of like, you know, finding people 2431.12s - 2433.64s | and convincing people like, yeah, you know, I'm calling, you know, at the 2433.64s - 2436.56s | time it wasn't it, but it was like, you know, I'm calling from the phone 2436.56s - 2437.88s | company or I'm calling from this. 2437.88s - 2439.24s | I'm calling from that, like that. 2439.24s - 2442.68s | And dumpster diving to find like phone numbers, to find login information, 2442.68s - 2445.64s | to find, you know, all kinds of like manuals, all kinds of stuff. 2445.64s - 2447.36s | I mean, that's how, you know, you would learn stuff. 2447.36s - 2451.04s | And then a lot of times if, if either you would type it up into a text 2451.04s - 2453.32s | file to share with other people, or if you were lucky, other people 2453.32s - 2455.56s |


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2421.24s - 2425.36s | Cause like as, as today back then, like I, the, what I always say is 2425.36s - 2428.40s | that like the weakest link in any security chain is the human one. 2428.40s - 2431.12s | And so, you know, it would be a matter of like, you know, finding people 2431.12s - 2433.64s | and convincing people like, yeah, you know, I'm calling, you know, at the 2433.64s - 2436.56s | time it wasn't it, but it was like, you know, I'm calling from the phone 2436.56s - 2437.88s | company or I'm calling from this. 2437.88s - 2439.24s | I'm calling from that, like that. 2439.24s - 2442.68s | And dumpster diving to find like phone numbers, to find login information, 2442.68s - 2445.64s | to find, you know, all kinds of like manuals, all kinds of stuff. 2445.64s - 2447.36s | I mean, that's how, you know, you would learn stuff. 2447.36s - 2451.04s | And then a lot of times if, if either you would type it up into a text 2451.04s - 2453.32s | file to share with other people, or if you were lucky, other people 2453.32s - 2455.56s | had already found this and that's what you were learning, learned from 2455.56s - 2458.60s | is like, you know, I learned about Cosmos from like manuals that other 2458.60s - 2462.36s | people at Cosmos was like a, a phone, like the phone company, AT&T is 2462.36s - 2464.92s | basically phone database where they would set things up, et cetera. 2465.20s - 2466.92s | And I learned about that from a text file. 2466.92s - 2470.28s | It might've been an LOD technical journal that had like a Cosmos manual, 2470.28s - 2472.72s | but yeah, I mean, that's kind of the way we were learning. 2472.80s - 2476.84s | Just a quick work around though, with the, you know, yeah, all that stuff 2476.84s - 2480.84s | with like caller ID and everything like that, yo, to work around with 2480.84s - 2484.72s | that, when that came out, was it just, yo, you just hack a system and 2484.72s - 2487.28s | he used a modem on a system that global out tile. 2487.76s - 2488.04s | Yeah. 2488.28s - 2491.80s | So a lot of times you would use like a proxy, which of course


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had already found this and that's what you were learning, learned from 2455.56s - 2458.60s | is like, you know, I learned about Cosmos from like manuals that other 2458.60s - 2462.36s | people at Cosmos was like a, a phone, like the phone company, AT&T is 2462.36s - 2464.92s | basically phone database where they would set things up, et cetera. 2465.20s - 2466.92s | And I learned about that from a text file. 2466.92s - 2470.28s | It might've been an LOD technical journal that had like a Cosmos manual, 2470.28s - 2472.72s | but yeah, I mean, that's kind of the way we were learning. 2472.80s - 2476.84s | Just a quick work around though, with the, you know, yeah, all that stuff 2476.84s - 2480.84s | with like caller ID and everything like that, yo, to work around with 2480.84s - 2484.72s | that, when that came out, was it just, yo, you just hack a system and 2484.72s - 2487.28s | he used a modem on a system that global out tile. 2487.76s - 2488.04s | Yeah. 2488.28s - 2491.80s | So a lot of times you would use like a proxy, which of course is nowadays. 2492.60s - 2496.36s | That's the bread and butter of, you know, international hacking attacks 2496.36s - 2499.96s | is to make sure that you have sort of like a proxy, but that was the 2499.96s - 2504.64s | same thing back then, like early use of like proxies and out dials to mask 2504.68s - 2508.72s | where you're making the call from and fuck them up the best is actually 2508.72s - 2510.52s | when you hack from their computer. 2510.52s - 2514.64s | And then it's kind of like a Mobius loop a little bit. 2515.00s - 2518.28s | Another great method we used was something known as extenders. 2518.36s - 2520.08s | You ever use extenders? 2520.36s - 2525.88s | Basically, um, uh, you would call, say a plumber, uh, after hours and the 2525.88s - 2530.72s | phone would, uh, forward, uh, using very crude forwarding method to an 2530.72s - 2534.12s | answering service, the answering service would pick up wanting to take a message 2534.12s - 2535.84s | for, for Joe, the plumber or whatever. 2536.28s - 2538.24s | And you would, uh, wait for them. 2538.28s - 2539.08s | You


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is nowadays. 2492.60s - 2496.36s | That's the bread and butter of, you know, international hacking attacks 2496.36s - 2499.96s | is to make sure that you have sort of like a proxy, but that was the 2499.96s - 2504.64s | same thing back then, like early use of like proxies and out dials to mask 2504.68s - 2508.72s | where you're making the call from and fuck them up the best is actually 2508.72s - 2510.52s | when you hack from their computer. 2510.52s - 2514.64s | And then it's kind of like a Mobius loop a little bit. 2515.00s - 2518.28s | Another great method we used was something known as extenders. 2518.36s - 2520.08s | You ever use extenders? 2520.36s - 2525.88s | Basically, um, uh, you would call, say a plumber, uh, after hours and the 2525.88s - 2530.72s | phone would, uh, forward, uh, using very crude forwarding method to an 2530.72s - 2534.12s | answering service, the answering service would pick up wanting to take a message 2534.12s - 2535.84s | for, for Joe, the plumber or whatever. 2536.28s - 2538.24s | And you would, uh, wait for them. 2538.28s - 2539.08s | You wouldn't say anything. 2539.08s - 2541.96s | They'd eventually hang up and it would trip down to a dial tone, except 2541.96s - 2543.68s | it was his dial tone, not yours. 2544.04s - 2547.80s | So then you could make phone calls from the plumber's phone line. 2548.16s - 2552.04s | I don't know why I'm picking on this plumber, but you know, any say a used 2552.04s - 2555.76s | car dealer, anyone who forwarded their number after hours. 2556.04s - 2558.92s | Oftentimes it would trip down to an unrestricted dial tone. 2559.00s - 2562.44s | And, um, yeah, you would never be traced on that. 2562.56s - 2563.24s | Also time. 2563.24s - 2564.76s | Has it been kind to that term? 2564.76s - 2567.00s | Cause now it sounds like a product at a gas station. 2569.36s - 2572.52s | Another thing that we do is like, you know, um, for at least to make 2572.52s - 2578.32s | free voice phone calls, um, was, uh, you know, you use actual piece of hardware. 2578.32s - 2582.96s | I either you'd make one yourself, like a beige box, or you'd acquire 2582.96s - 2585.04s |


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wouldn't say anything. 2539.08s - 2541.96s | They'd eventually hang up and it would trip down to a dial tone, except 2541.96s - 2543.68s | it was his dial tone, not yours. 2544.04s - 2547.80s | So then you could make phone calls from the plumber's phone line. 2548.16s - 2552.04s | I don't know why I'm picking on this plumber, but you know, any say a used 2552.04s - 2555.76s | car dealer, anyone who forwarded their number after hours. 2556.04s - 2558.92s | Oftentimes it would trip down to an unrestricted dial tone. 2559.00s - 2562.44s | And, um, yeah, you would never be traced on that. 2562.56s - 2563.24s | Also time. 2563.24s - 2564.76s | Has it been kind to that term? 2564.76s - 2567.00s | Cause now it sounds like a product at a gas station. 2569.36s - 2572.52s | Another thing that we do is like, you know, um, for at least to make 2572.52s - 2578.32s | free voice phone calls, um, was, uh, you know, you use actual piece of hardware. 2578.32s - 2582.96s | I either you'd make one yourself, like a beige box, or you'd acquire 2582.96s - 2585.04s | something completely legally. 2585.52s - 2588.64s | Um, and not off of the back of a phone truck called alignment's 2588.64s - 2592.12s | handset or lines, but set, um, which is basically, you know, some people 2592.12s - 2594.64s | are some, actually somebody yesterday came up and gave me one for free, 2594.64s - 2598.32s | which is amazing because my older one, an ex left with her. 2598.48s - 2600.32s | So I was, I'm really excited to have it. 2600.48s - 2603.72s | So it's basically, you know, like a little like phone, phone thing 2603.72s - 2608.24s | with originally a dial and then later tile and just two clips for, uh, 2608.24s - 2609.48s | you know, the two phone lines. 2609.48s - 2613.36s | And you'd go outside a business, or I guess you could do somebody's house 2613.36s - 2617.12s | or even like a big, like foam junction box and just clip on and you'd find 2617.12s - 2619.24s | a live line, a live phone number. 2619.24s - 2620.44s | And then you could just dial for free. 2620.48s - 2623.76s | And so for instance, back at the loft,


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something completely legally. 2585.52s - 2588.64s | Um, and not off of the back of a phone truck called alignment's 2588.64s - 2592.12s | handset or lines, but set, um, which is basically, you know, some people 2592.12s - 2594.64s | are some, actually somebody yesterday came up and gave me one for free, 2594.64s - 2598.32s | which is amazing because my older one, an ex left with her. 2598.48s - 2600.32s | So I was, I'm really excited to have it. 2600.48s - 2603.72s | So it's basically, you know, like a little like phone, phone thing 2603.72s - 2608.24s | with originally a dial and then later tile and just two clips for, uh, 2608.24s - 2609.48s | you know, the two phone lines. 2609.48s - 2613.36s | And you'd go outside a business, or I guess you could do somebody's house 2613.36s - 2617.12s | or even like a big, like foam junction box and just clip on and you'd find 2617.12s - 2619.24s | a live line, a live phone number. 2619.24s - 2620.44s | And then you could just dial for free. 2620.48s - 2623.76s | And so for instance, back at the loft, like the, the original, original 2623.76s - 2627.36s | loft, like, which was a big industrial building, that's how we would make 2627.36s - 2630.16s | free phone calls is we'd go back into like into the phone closet and just 2630.16s - 2633.28s | clip on and just think, call other people, call you, call, you know, our 2633.28s - 2636.72s | friends and other parts and, you know, then whatever business would get the 2636.72s - 2637.00s | bill. 2637.00s - 2639.96s | And, and, you know, we're punk kids. 2639.96s - 2641.24s | We didn't give a shit. 2641.28s - 2644.56s | We would get, we would get on our answering machine, um, an hour 2644.56s - 2650.84s | long, uh, teleconference recording of 40 people just all talking at once. 2650.84s - 2653.16s | And why not call 2,600 answering machine? 2653.16s - 2657.12s | And, and then I, we'd, we'd have to wade through all this. 2657.44s - 2659.72s | Uh, and then a few weeks later, we'd get a call from Alliance 2659.72s - 2662.24s | telecom and said, do you know anybody who might've been calling 2662.24s - 2663.28s | at this particular


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like the, the original, original 2623.76s - 2627.36s | loft, like, which was a big industrial building, that's how we would make 2627.36s - 2630.16s | free phone calls is we'd go back into like into the phone closet and just 2630.16s - 2633.28s | clip on and just think, call other people, call you, call, you know, our 2633.28s - 2636.72s | friends and other parts and, you know, then whatever business would get the 2636.72s - 2637.00s | bill. 2637.00s - 2639.96s | And, and, you know, we're punk kids. 2639.96s - 2641.24s | We didn't give a shit. 2641.28s - 2644.56s | We would get, we would get on our answering machine, um, an hour 2644.56s - 2650.84s | long, uh, teleconference recording of 40 people just all talking at once. 2650.84s - 2653.16s | And why not call 2,600 answering machine? 2653.16s - 2657.12s | And, and then I, we'd, we'd have to wade through all this. 2657.44s - 2659.72s | Uh, and then a few weeks later, we'd get a call from Alliance 2659.72s - 2662.24s | telecom and said, do you know anybody who might've been calling 2662.24s - 2663.28s | at this particular time? 2664.24s - 2669.80s | What was really cool, what Eric was just mentioning, um, was, uh, Alliance 2669.80s - 2672.36s | teleconferences, those are very popular. 2672.36s - 2677.52s | And just, there were like voice chats for groups of, uh, neuro atypical 2677.52s - 2678.92s | individuals who found them. 2679.20s - 2684.24s | Um, but in, in terms of in-person cons, we had in-person conversations. 2684.48s - 2686.40s | Yeah, very much so. 2686.68s - 2691.76s | Um, but, uh, in, in terms of just like making calls, uh, the codes were 2691.76s - 2696.08s | super helpful because you could, you know, set up something to scan them 2696.08s - 2699.72s | and, you know, come back in the morning and you got a thousand of them. 2699.72s - 2701.92s | You could just use them disposably. 2701.92s - 2705.72s | You can call all over planet earth because back then that was 2705.72s - 2708.40s | a significant barrier to entry. 2708.40s - 2710.36s | I mean, now everything's free back then. 2710.36s - 2714.28s | It's, you know, as has been mentioned, it's dollars per minute. 2714.92s - 2719.12s | And, uh, then, then


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time? 2664.24s - 2669.80s | What was really cool, what Eric was just mentioning, um, was, uh, Alliance 2669.80s - 2672.36s | teleconferences, those are very popular. 2672.36s - 2677.52s | And just, there were like voice chats for groups of, uh, neuro atypical 2677.52s - 2678.92s | individuals who found them. 2679.20s - 2684.24s | Um, but in, in terms of in-person cons, we had in-person conversations. 2684.48s - 2686.40s | Yeah, very much so. 2686.68s - 2691.76s | Um, but, uh, in, in terms of just like making calls, uh, the codes were 2691.76s - 2696.08s | super helpful because you could, you know, set up something to scan them 2696.08s - 2699.72s | and, you know, come back in the morning and you got a thousand of them. 2699.72s - 2701.92s | You could just use them disposably. 2701.92s - 2705.72s | You can call all over planet earth because back then that was 2705.72s - 2708.40s | a significant barrier to entry. 2708.40s - 2710.36s | I mean, now everything's free back then. 2710.36s - 2714.28s | It's, you know, as has been mentioned, it's dollars per minute. 2714.92s - 2719.12s | And, uh, then, then you discover, oh, Hey, I can just actually get into 2719.12s - 2722.68s | their computer system and download all of their codes, which is 2722.68s - 2725.04s | a lot more elegant and efficient. 2725.60s - 2731.28s | And the really cool, uh, kind of collision of old and new technology 2731.28s - 2735.16s | happened, uh, for me anyway, in, in New York city, because I had two 2735.16s - 2740.28s | phone lines and one was, uh, an ESS, which is electronic switching. 2740.68s - 2745.00s | That was brand new because they use out of, out of band signaling. 2745.00s - 2746.84s | Everything was digital. 2747.08s - 2751.12s | My other phone line was a crossbar five, which is a mechanical switch. 2751.16s - 2753.12s | Everything is in band. 2753.12s - 2757.32s | So that means you can trunk lines using 2,600 Hertz. 2757.88s - 2761.52s | And, uh, there's software that was available for computers that 2761.52s - 2762.76s | would let you generate that. 2762.76s - 2767.08s | It would pop up a keypad and, uh, uh, it has a couple of extra keys. 2767.08s - 2771.40s | There's like KPST, which


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you discover, oh, Hey, I can just actually get into 2719.12s - 2722.68s | their computer system and download all of their codes, which is 2722.68s - 2725.04s | a lot more elegant and efficient. 2725.60s - 2731.28s | And the really cool, uh, kind of collision of old and new technology 2731.28s - 2735.16s | happened, uh, for me anyway, in, in New York city, because I had two 2735.16s - 2740.28s | phone lines and one was, uh, an ESS, which is electronic switching. 2740.68s - 2745.00s | That was brand new because they use out of, out of band signaling. 2745.00s - 2746.84s | Everything was digital. 2747.08s - 2751.12s | My other phone line was a crossbar five, which is a mechanical switch. 2751.16s - 2753.12s | Everything is in band. 2753.12s - 2757.32s | So that means you can trunk lines using 2,600 Hertz. 2757.88s - 2761.52s | And, uh, there's software that was available for computers that 2761.52s - 2762.76s | would let you generate that. 2762.76s - 2767.08s | It would pop up a keypad and, uh, uh, it has a couple of extra keys. 2767.08s - 2771.40s | There's like KPST, which is key pulse forward start. 2771.96s - 2776.92s | Uh, and you know, essentially you're a TSPS operator, which is transit 2776.92s - 2781.28s | service position switch, if I'm remembering it correctly across decades 2781.28s - 2785.92s | of time, and you're basically an operator and you're invisible and 2785.92s - 2789.64s | you're inside their network and you can do whatever you want, it's like 2789.68s - 2793.52s | John mentioned, uh, it's one hell of a dopamine rush. 2793.52s - 2796.96s | You just killed the final boss on that level. 2797.60s - 2797.84s | Yeah. 2797.84s - 2801.16s | Instead of working in the system of numbers, you're attacking 2801.16s - 2801.80s | the system there. 2801.80s - 2804.48s | You're working around it with the blue boxes and all the 2804.48s - 2806.24s | various colored boxes back then. 2806.84s - 2809.20s | I was going to, you know, when you're talking about codes, like, you 2809.20s - 2811.44s | know, you'd get these things and they were, they're basically like 2811.72s - 2813.36s | currency in the, in the hacker world. 2813.36s - 2814.20s | Like you would trade them. 2814.20s - 2817.16s |


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is key pulse forward start. 2771.96s - 2776.92s | Uh, and you know, essentially you're a TSPS operator, which is transit 2776.92s - 2781.28s | service position switch, if I'm remembering it correctly across decades 2781.28s - 2785.92s | of time, and you're basically an operator and you're invisible and 2785.92s - 2789.64s | you're inside their network and you can do whatever you want, it's like 2789.68s - 2793.52s | John mentioned, uh, it's one hell of a dopamine rush. 2793.52s - 2796.96s | You just killed the final boss on that level. 2797.60s - 2797.84s | Yeah. 2797.84s - 2801.16s | Instead of working in the system of numbers, you're attacking 2801.16s - 2801.80s | the system there. 2801.80s - 2804.48s | You're working around it with the blue boxes and all the 2804.48s - 2806.24s | various colored boxes back then. 2806.84s - 2809.20s | I was going to, you know, when you're talking about codes, like, you 2809.20s - 2811.44s | know, you'd get these things and they were, they're basically like 2811.72s - 2813.36s | currency in the, in the hacker world. 2813.36s - 2814.20s | Like you would trade them. 2814.20s - 2817.16s | You, and so first of all, it was currency in terms of like, okay, I've 2817.16s - 2820.32s | got this, what have you got, but also it was cred, like you would be like, 2820.32s - 2823.32s | Hey, you know, you know, you call this BBS and it has all the, you 2823.32s - 2825.96s | know, all, you know, good codes, you know, basically. 2825.96s - 2828.36s | And this is like, a lot of this is like where the term zero day, 2828.36s - 2829.24s | that's user exploits. 2829.24s - 2832.40s | Now zero day originally was like, where's like freshly cracked 2832.40s - 2833.44s | things and zero day codes. 2833.44s - 2834.60s | Like they had just been cracked. 2834.60s - 2836.00s | So, you know, you know, it's going to be good. 2836.00s - 2838.24s | So somebody would have all the good, the good codes. 2838.24s - 2839.36s | Then they were, you know, elite. 2839.92s - 2840.08s | Yeah. 2840.08s - 2844.88s | Or like a rad, not like anybody would reuse or retrade codes, right? 2844.92s - 2845.32s | Well, no, no. 2845.32s - 2846.96s | I mean, they


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You, and so first of all, it was currency in terms of like, okay, I've 2817.16s - 2820.32s | got this, what have you got, but also it was cred, like you would be like, 2820.32s - 2823.32s | Hey, you know, you know, you call this BBS and it has all the, you 2823.32s - 2825.96s | know, all, you know, good codes, you know, basically. 2825.96s - 2828.36s | And this is like, a lot of this is like where the term zero day, 2828.36s - 2829.24s | that's user exploits. 2829.24s - 2832.40s | Now zero day originally was like, where's like freshly cracked 2832.40s - 2833.44s | things and zero day codes. 2833.44s - 2834.60s | Like they had just been cracked. 2834.60s - 2836.00s | So, you know, you know, it's going to be good. 2836.00s - 2838.24s | So somebody would have all the good, the good codes. 2838.24s - 2839.36s | Then they were, you know, elite. 2839.92s - 2840.08s | Yeah. 2840.08s - 2844.88s | Or like a rad, not like anybody would reuse or retrade codes, right? 2844.92s - 2845.32s | Well, no, no. 2845.32s - 2846.96s | I mean, they would, but that's like, it's currency, you know, 2846.96s - 2848.20s | like it gets passed around. 2848.24s - 2848.40s | Yeah. 2848.40s - 2850.36s | So I'm curious, how did all this evolve? 2850.36s - 2850.52s | Right. 2850.52s - 2853.44s | I mean, if you go back to these old text files, it's like, here's the 2853.44s - 2856.36s | list of the default passwords for unit. 2856.36s - 2859.44s | And like, obviously that, you know, stopped working after a certain point. 2859.84s - 2862.00s | Um, what, what happened next? 2862.00s - 2862.12s | Right. 2862.12s - 2865.20s | You get into the nineties, security starts to become a thing. 2865.32s - 2869.24s | You'd think it would stop working after a certain point, but in actuality, 2869.24s - 2870.96s | it, it kept on for a long, long time. 2871.00s - 2873.40s | How many things do you hear about still that it's like, oh, there's a default 2873.40s - 2874.84s | password that's hard coded somewhere. 2874.84s - 2876.08s | It's just like that still happens. 2876.08s - 2877.64s | Like we have not, hence again. 2877.64s - 2878.12s | There you go. 2878.12s


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would, but that's like, it's currency, you know, 2846.96s - 2848.20s | like it gets passed around. 2848.24s - 2848.40s | Yeah. 2848.40s - 2850.36s | So I'm curious, how did all this evolve? 2850.36s - 2850.52s | Right. 2850.52s - 2853.44s | I mean, if you go back to these old text files, it's like, here's the 2853.44s - 2856.36s | list of the default passwords for unit. 2856.36s - 2859.44s | And like, obviously that, you know, stopped working after a certain point. 2859.84s - 2862.00s | Um, what, what happened next? 2862.00s - 2862.12s | Right. 2862.12s - 2865.20s | You get into the nineties, security starts to become a thing. 2865.32s - 2869.24s | You'd think it would stop working after a certain point, but in actuality, 2869.24s - 2870.96s | it, it kept on for a long, long time. 2871.00s - 2873.40s | How many things do you hear about still that it's like, oh, there's a default 2873.40s - 2874.84s | password that's hard coded somewhere. 2874.84s - 2876.08s | It's just like that still happens. 2876.08s - 2877.64s | Like we have not, hence again. 2877.64s - 2878.12s | There you go. 2878.12s - 2879.96s | The old human file is still useful. 2880.72s - 2881.48s | Admin admin. 2883.78s - 2884.26s | That's true. 2884.26s - 2887.30s | That, uh, default passwords still work today. 2887.46s - 2888.50s | It's very nice. 2889.02s - 2889.78s | Um, thank you. 2890.18s - 2894.82s | I think that, uh, but in addition to that, one thing I think, you know, I, you 2894.82s - 2899.34s | know, that I probably could speak to is that in the evolution of hacking, one of 2899.34s - 2905.14s | the things that, you know, that I particularly practiced, um, is the idea 2905.14s - 2911.34s | that in a way, you know, the password is the first entrance, but that's 2911.34s - 2913.18s | like sucking on a baby bottle. 2913.62s - 2916.10s | You want to graduate to drinking liquor. 2916.34s - 2921.02s | And the way you do that is you say, yo, I don't need just one password. 2921.06s - 2924.74s | I'm going to just take the whole password file and you start there. 2925.18s - 2929.90s | Then that graduates to, yo, I just going to fucking take the whole network. 2930.14s


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- 2879.96s | The old human file is still useful. 2880.72s - 2881.48s | Admin admin. 2883.78s - 2884.26s | That's true. 2884.26s - 2887.30s | That, uh, default passwords still work today. 2887.46s - 2888.50s | It's very nice. 2889.02s - 2889.78s | Um, thank you. 2890.18s - 2894.82s | I think that, uh, but in addition to that, one thing I think, you know, I, you 2894.82s - 2899.34s | know, that I probably could speak to is that in the evolution of hacking, one of 2899.34s - 2905.14s | the things that, you know, that I particularly practiced, um, is the idea 2905.14s - 2911.34s | that in a way, you know, the password is the first entrance, but that's 2911.34s - 2913.18s | like sucking on a baby bottle. 2913.62s - 2916.10s | You want to graduate to drinking liquor. 2916.34s - 2921.02s | And the way you do that is you say, yo, I don't need just one password. 2921.06s - 2924.74s | I'm going to just take the whole password file and you start there. 2925.18s - 2929.90s | Then that graduates to, yo, I just going to fucking take the whole network. 2930.14s - 2936.34s | And that idea of like, sort of like bringing the lens back to like the 2936.34s - 2942.42s | larger picture made it very easy to sort of like scale up the hacking 2942.82s - 2947.50s | because once you see it as this thing, like some people will go like, yo, we 2947.50s - 2949.98s | need ideas out the box, right? 2949.98s - 2952.78s | Then there's some, some other person and they think they're even smarter. 2952.78s - 2954.62s | They're like, but there is no box. 2954.78s - 2959.62s | But to be honest, it's really a rhizomatic. 2959.66s - 2965.30s | Like it's not, it's entire fucking surface of multiple domains. 2965.34s - 2972.02s | And that idea was, that's, you know, what was able to allow, you know, uh, people 2972.02s - 2976.18s | that I, you know, interacted with in the hacking sphere to be able to break into 2976.18s - 2977.38s | so many computers. 2977.74s - 2981.26s | And that once again, is that that's sort of like the evolution. 2981.26s - 2985.38s | It went from those ideas of default passwords, getting in, learning it, but 2985.38s


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- 2936.34s | And that idea of like, sort of like bringing the lens back to like the 2936.34s - 2942.42s | larger picture made it very easy to sort of like scale up the hacking 2942.82s - 2947.50s | because once you see it as this thing, like some people will go like, yo, we 2947.50s - 2949.98s | need ideas out the box, right? 2949.98s - 2952.78s | Then there's some, some other person and they think they're even smarter. 2952.78s - 2954.62s | They're like, but there is no box. 2954.78s - 2959.62s | But to be honest, it's really a rhizomatic. 2959.66s - 2965.30s | Like it's not, it's entire fucking surface of multiple domains. 2965.34s - 2972.02s | And that idea was, that's, you know, what was able to allow, you know, uh, people 2972.02s - 2976.18s | that I, you know, interacted with in the hacking sphere to be able to break into 2976.18s - 2977.38s | so many computers. 2977.74s - 2981.26s | And that once again, is that that's sort of like the evolution. 2981.26s - 2985.38s | It went from those ideas of default passwords, getting in, learning it, but 2985.38s - 2989.70s | then learning to the point where, like I said, it, yo, that the password just 2989.70s - 2990.58s | became invisible. 2990.58s - 2992.98s | That's just an individual user. 2992.98s - 2997.46s | If you could see the whole system and take the system, everything's yours. 3001.88s - 3004.92s | You know, John, you might be able to talk a little bit more about this. 3004.92s - 3009.00s | Cause this is, you know, I think you have more personal experience, uh, than, than 3009.00s - 3012.72s | many of us, you and other people in MOD about like, I mean, you own the phone 3012.72s - 3016.48s | system and you could, you could do things with that, that like are still like kind 3016.48s - 3019.32s | of mythical, like, you know, turning people's home phones into pay phones and 3019.32s - 3019.92s | stuff like that. 3019.96s - 3020.84s | Sorry, allegedly. 3021.20s - 3024.32s | So maybe you can talk a little bit more like owning the system and like what that 3024.32s - 3029.48s | was like and like, you know, both from a, an experiential and like, I don't know,


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- 2989.70s | then learning to the point where, like I said, it, yo, that the password just 2989.70s - 2990.58s | became invisible. 2990.58s - 2992.98s | That's just an individual user. 2992.98s - 2997.46s | If you could see the whole system and take the system, everything's yours. 3001.88s - 3004.92s | You know, John, you might be able to talk a little bit more about this. 3004.92s - 3009.00s | Cause this is, you know, I think you have more personal experience, uh, than, than 3009.00s - 3012.72s | many of us, you and other people in MOD about like, I mean, you own the phone 3012.72s - 3016.48s | system and you could, you could do things with that, that like are still like kind 3016.48s - 3019.32s | of mythical, like, you know, turning people's home phones into pay phones and 3019.32s - 3019.92s | stuff like that. 3019.96s - 3020.84s | Sorry, allegedly. 3021.20s - 3024.32s | So maybe you can talk a little bit more like owning the system and like what that 3024.32s - 3029.48s | was like and like, you know, both from a, an experiential and like, I don't know, 3029.80s - 3030.40s | talk around that. 3031.00s - 3033.36s | I mean, one of the things, thank you, first of all, thank you for that. 3033.64s - 3038.04s | Um, I probably wasn't going to talk about the magic of, of, uh, phone hacking. 3038.04s - 3044.04s | What's interesting is that, that yo, it is like this hidden network that controls 3044.04s - 3044.92s | everything right now. 3044.92s - 3050.04s | A lot of it has shifted to the idea about mobile, but yo, the original phone system 3050.04s - 3053.48s | that still works is, it's amazing. 3053.48s - 3054.64s | And it's complexity. 3054.92s - 3061.04s | So many things came out of those initial, uh, engineers who design a system, but 3061.12s - 3062.16s | how robust it is. 3062.16s - 3065.28s | I mean, like it was literally built to survive nuclear attack. 3065.28s - 3069.44s | Like you, you look around your town of any size and there is going to be like a 3069.44s - 3070.52s | hardened building. 3070.52s - 3072.36s | That's, that's the old phone switching office. 3072.52s - 3073.04s | That's right. 3073.04s - 3078.68s | And


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3029.80s - 3030.40s | talk around that. 3031.00s - 3033.36s | I mean, one of the things, thank you, first of all, thank you for that. 3033.64s - 3038.04s | Um, I probably wasn't going to talk about the magic of, of, uh, phone hacking. 3038.04s - 3044.04s | What's interesting is that, that yo, it is like this hidden network that controls 3044.04s - 3044.92s | everything right now. 3044.92s - 3050.04s | A lot of it has shifted to the idea about mobile, but yo, the original phone system 3050.04s - 3053.48s | that still works is, it's amazing. 3053.48s - 3054.64s | And it's complexity. 3054.92s - 3061.04s | So many things came out of those initial, uh, engineers who design a system, but 3061.12s - 3062.16s | how robust it is. 3062.16s - 3065.28s | I mean, like it was literally built to survive nuclear attack. 3065.28s - 3069.44s | Like you, you look around your town of any size and there is going to be like a 3069.44s - 3070.52s | hardened building. 3070.52s - 3072.36s | That's, that's the old phone switching office. 3072.52s - 3073.04s | That's right. 3073.04s - 3078.68s | And then system, system five actually paved the way for like what everyone uses 3078.68s - 3079.16s | today. 3079.20s - 3083.88s | So that idea about the phone system, yo, you could control everything. 3084.24s - 3086.44s | There was like, you know, you can make service orders. 3086.44s - 3087.36s | You could change things. 3087.36s - 3088.32s | Yes, I did. 3088.40s - 3092.12s | Uh, I love changing people's, uh, uh, you want to, you know, 3092.12s - 3093.64s | yeah, you could turn it into a pay phone. 3093.92s - 3097.68s | You could, uh, remember, I don't even remember if people don't know, maybe don't 3097.68s - 3098.92s | know what a pay phone is, whatever it means. 3098.92s - 3103.72s | Like you, you would pick up your phone at home and try to make a call and it would 3103.72s - 3105.52s | be, please, please insert 25 cents. 3105.52s - 3106.68s | It's like, what? 3107.32s - 3108.76s | Yeah, I missed that. 3108.76s - 3116.28s | So then, um, but yeah, no, I mean, effectively it's amazing that, yo, there's 3116.28s - 3120.68s | so many things that we don't think


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then system, system five actually paved the way for like what everyone uses 3078.68s - 3079.16s | today. 3079.20s - 3083.88s | So that idea about the phone system, yo, you could control everything. 3084.24s - 3086.44s | There was like, you know, you can make service orders. 3086.44s - 3087.36s | You could change things. 3087.36s - 3088.32s | Yes, I did. 3088.40s - 3092.12s | Uh, I love changing people's, uh, uh, you want to, you know, 3092.12s - 3093.64s | yeah, you could turn it into a pay phone. 3093.92s - 3097.68s | You could, uh, remember, I don't even remember if people don't know, maybe don't 3097.68s - 3098.92s | know what a pay phone is, whatever it means. 3098.92s - 3103.72s | Like you, you would pick up your phone at home and try to make a call and it would 3103.72s - 3105.52s | be, please, please insert 25 cents. 3105.52s - 3106.68s | It's like, what? 3107.32s - 3108.76s | Yeah, I missed that. 3108.76s - 3116.28s | So then, um, but yeah, no, I mean, effectively it's amazing that, yo, there's 3116.28s - 3120.68s | so many things that we don't think about is control, you know, data passing through 3120.68s - 3123.04s | these phone systems, both voice and data. 3123.28s - 3126.48s | So yeah, it was unbelievable in that regard. 3126.48s - 3131.00s | And then it was always like the, the, maybe the, that is the part that is maybe 3131.00s - 3135.88s | mythical, but actually already written about is that, uh, you know, the DMS 100 3136.24s - 3142.40s | had the famed, um, remote headset, um, um, which, yeah, you could listen in the 3142.40s - 3145.52s | phone lines, like obviously like cross bar and the older ones, you had to have a 3145.52s - 3150.12s | physical tap on the line, but then they were like, Oh shit, let's put remote 3150.32s - 3153.28s | ability to listen in and yo, that shit. 3153.52s - 3153.92s | Yeah. 3154.00s - 3155.12s | Probably shouldn't touch that. 3155.16s - 3158.28s | But anyway, it never existed, John. 3158.28s - 3160.04s | It was an undocumented feature. 3160.12s - 3160.48s | Yeah. 3160.48s - 3160.76s | Yeah. 3160.80s - 3163.04s | I love undocumented features. 3163.80s - 3164.16s | Yeah. 3164.72s - 3168.84s | To


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about is control, you know, data passing through 3120.68s - 3123.04s | these phone systems, both voice and data. 3123.28s - 3126.48s | So yeah, it was unbelievable in that regard. 3126.48s - 3131.00s | And then it was always like the, the, maybe the, that is the part that is maybe 3131.00s - 3135.88s | mythical, but actually already written about is that, uh, you know, the DMS 100 3136.24s - 3142.40s | had the famed, um, remote headset, um, um, which, yeah, you could listen in the 3142.40s - 3145.52s | phone lines, like obviously like cross bar and the older ones, you had to have a 3145.52s - 3150.12s | physical tap on the line, but then they were like, Oh shit, let's put remote 3150.32s - 3153.28s | ability to listen in and yo, that shit. 3153.52s - 3153.92s | Yeah. 3154.00s - 3155.12s | Probably shouldn't touch that. 3155.16s - 3158.28s | But anyway, it never existed, John. 3158.28s - 3160.04s | It was an undocumented feature. 3160.12s - 3160.48s | Yeah. 3160.48s - 3160.76s | Yeah. 3160.80s - 3163.04s | I love undocumented features. 3163.80s - 3164.16s | Yeah. 3164.72s - 3168.84s | To this day, even something dumb, I see a binary, I'll just hit like string on it 3168.84s - 3171.40s | and just be like, what the fuck's in this motherfucker just in case. 3171.92s - 3176.08s | But yeah, I think, um, you know, but just to, to, to close that out, the phone 3176.12s - 3180.60s | system, I think it's interesting because so many, so many people have forgotten 3180.64s - 3184.92s | about that aspect that, that was like this whole domain that still really does 3184.92s - 3185.40s | exist. 3185.40s - 3190.28s | And that includes like the, the complex, uh, signaling system seven, which 3190.28s - 3195.88s | probably I shouldn't mention, but if you do know about it, whoa, there's multiple 3195.88s - 3198.60s | stratas that control the data in this network. 3198.60s - 3202.96s | And yeah, uh, probably no one's gonna mention it, but me and I'm done with it. 3202.96s - 3203.60s | So, all right. 3204.44s - 3206.08s | They being HLRs. 3206.68s - 3208.48s | Patrick mentioned something really interesting. 3208.48s - 3210.48s | He said a lot of this stuff is free today. 3211.00s - 3215.92s


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this day, even something dumb, I see a binary, I'll just hit like string on it 3168.84s - 3171.40s | and just be like, what the fuck's in this motherfucker just in case. 3171.92s - 3176.08s | But yeah, I think, um, you know, but just to, to, to close that out, the phone 3176.12s - 3180.60s | system, I think it's interesting because so many, so many people have forgotten 3180.64s - 3184.92s | about that aspect that, that was like this whole domain that still really does 3184.92s - 3185.40s | exist. 3185.40s - 3190.28s | And that includes like the, the complex, uh, signaling system seven, which 3190.28s - 3195.88s | probably I shouldn't mention, but if you do know about it, whoa, there's multiple 3195.88s - 3198.60s | stratas that control the data in this network. 3198.60s - 3202.96s | And yeah, uh, probably no one's gonna mention it, but me and I'm done with it. 3202.96s - 3203.60s | So, all right. 3204.44s - 3206.08s | They being HLRs. 3206.68s - 3208.48s | Patrick mentioned something really interesting. 3208.48s - 3210.48s | He said a lot of this stuff is free today. 3211.00s - 3215.92s | And I just want people to realize that that's all we wanted back then was to 3215.92s - 3217.36s | make communications free. 3217.36s - 3224.37s | We fucking won and we don't seem to realize we've, I mean, that was part of 3224.37s - 3224.61s | the thing. 3224.61s - 3226.73s | I said, be like, Oh, how can you steal from the phone company? 3226.73s - 3228.41s | And it's like, you're not fucking stealing. 3228.41s - 3229.89s | Cause you're not taking anything away. 3230.13s - 3230.25s | Yeah. 3230.25s - 3232.09s | If you're building it back to the phone, exactly. 3232.09s - 3232.33s | Yeah. 3232.45s - 3236.33s | And their, and their profits were first of all, untaxed, like my bell and just, 3236.33s - 3237.53s | you know, tens of billions. 3237.85s - 3242.77s | And, um, so, and it, we knew like it costs them nothing for a long distance 3242.77s - 3243.09s | phone call. 3243.09s - 3244.69s | It costs, you know, pennies, pennies, and they were charging. 3244.69s - 3246.09s | And so it's like, you know, fuck you. 3246.09s - 3250.57s | Like we're going to take


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| And I just want people to realize that that's all we wanted back then was to 3215.92s - 3217.36s | make communications free. 3217.36s - 3224.37s | We fucking won and we don't seem to realize we've, I mean, that was part of 3224.37s - 3224.61s | the thing. 3224.61s - 3226.73s | I said, be like, Oh, how can you steal from the phone company? 3226.73s - 3228.41s | And it's like, you're not fucking stealing. 3228.41s - 3229.89s | Cause you're not taking anything away. 3230.13s - 3230.25s | Yeah. 3230.25s - 3232.09s | If you're building it back to the phone, exactly. 3232.09s - 3232.33s | Yeah. 3232.45s - 3236.33s | And their, and their profits were first of all, untaxed, like my bell and just, 3236.33s - 3237.53s | you know, tens of billions. 3237.85s - 3242.77s | And, um, so, and it, we knew like it costs them nothing for a long distance 3242.77s - 3243.09s | phone call. 3243.09s - 3244.69s | It costs, you know, pennies, pennies, and they were charging. 3244.69s - 3246.09s | And so it's like, you know, fuck you. 3246.09s - 3250.57s | Like we're going to take it for free, all the spring codes, MCI codes, uh, 3250.57s - 3251.65s | travel net, whatever. 3251.65s - 3254.65s | It was all so that we could connect and talk to each other. 3254.81s - 3256.49s | Something we all take for granted now. 3257.29s - 3257.49s | Yeah. 3257.49s - 3262.45s | And, and, um, computer access, you know, we all have Linux, you know, on, on our, 3262.45s - 3263.25s | our laptops. 3263.25s - 3267.05s | And back then, the only way you can on our televisions, on our light everywhere, 3267.85s - 3269.81s | everywhere, all have access to something. 3269.81s - 3273.09s | But back then the only way to get access to a Unix system was to either work for 3273.09s - 3276.61s | the phone company or have an accredited account at a university, which many of us 3276.61s - 3277.09s | did not have. 3277.09s - 3279.17s | So breaking in was the only way to learn. 3279.29s - 3279.57s | Yeah. 3279.61s - 3282.45s | That, I mean, for me, that was like, you know, who's going to get a, you know, a 3282.45s - 3287.33s | 13 year old


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it for free, all the spring codes, MCI codes, uh, 3250.57s - 3251.65s | travel net, whatever. 3251.65s - 3254.65s | It was all so that we could connect and talk to each other. 3254.81s - 3256.49s | Something we all take for granted now. 3257.29s - 3257.49s | Yeah. 3257.49s - 3262.45s | And, and, um, computer access, you know, we all have Linux, you know, on, on our, 3262.45s - 3263.25s | our laptops. 3263.25s - 3267.05s | And back then, the only way you can on our televisions, on our light everywhere, 3267.85s - 3269.81s | everywhere, all have access to something. 3269.81s - 3273.09s | But back then the only way to get access to a Unix system was to either work for 3273.09s - 3276.61s | the phone company or have an accredited account at a university, which many of us 3276.61s - 3277.09s | did not have. 3277.09s - 3279.17s | So breaking in was the only way to learn. 3279.29s - 3279.57s | Yeah. 3279.61s - 3282.45s | That, I mean, for me, that was like, you know, who's going to get a, you know, a 3282.45s - 3287.33s | 13 year old kid access to, you know, a Unix system in, in, you know, 1986. 3288.17s - 3289.09s | Hey, you got any wares? 3289.25s - 3289.61s | Sorry? 3290.05s - 3290.89s | You got any wares? 3290.93s - 3291.73s | Oh, you got any wares? 3292.29s - 3292.85s | Hot wares. 3293.13s - 3293.33s | Yeah. 3293.33s - 3296.73s | Like, uh, um, and so it was really, you know, again, I grew up outside of Boston 3296.73s - 3300.61s | where there's a lot of academia, a lot of, a lot of, uh, you know, tech companies 3301.05s - 3304.09s | at the time, a lot of defense, you know, probably still a lot of defense industry 3304.09s - 3304.29s | stuff. 3304.29s - 3308.09s | So I'm kind of lucky I was doing this in the eighties and not, you know, 10 or 20 3308.09s - 3308.57s | years later. 3308.97s - 3314.49s | Um, but, uh, you know, if I wanted to learn about a new computer system, I had 3314.49s - 3317.57s | to, you know, break into it and get access to it to like figure out, you know, to 3317.57s - 3317.93s | learn about


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kid access to, you know, a Unix system in, in, you know, 1986. 3288.17s - 3289.09s | Hey, you got any wares? 3289.25s - 3289.61s | Sorry? 3290.05s - 3290.89s | You got any wares? 3290.93s - 3291.73s | Oh, you got any wares? 3292.29s - 3292.85s | Hot wares. 3293.13s - 3293.33s | Yeah. 3293.33s - 3296.73s | Like, uh, um, and so it was really, you know, again, I grew up outside of Boston 3296.73s - 3300.61s | where there's a lot of academia, a lot of, a lot of, uh, you know, tech companies 3301.05s - 3304.09s | at the time, a lot of defense, you know, probably still a lot of defense industry 3304.09s - 3304.29s | stuff. 3304.29s - 3308.09s | So I'm kind of lucky I was doing this in the eighties and not, you know, 10 or 20 3308.09s - 3308.57s | years later. 3308.97s - 3314.49s | Um, but, uh, you know, if I wanted to learn about a new computer system, I had 3314.49s - 3317.57s | to, you know, break into it and get access to it to like figure out, you know, to 3317.57s - 3317.93s | learn about it. 3317.93s - 3318.77s | And that's what I wanted to do. 3318.81s - 3324.37s | So Emanuel brings up a good point about, you know, illustrating the fact that like 3324.37s - 3326.73s | hacker culture changed so much. 3326.73s - 3331.37s | It's, it spawned a trillion dollar industry, but it's more than that. 3331.37s - 3334.17s | Even as you, I look around here, look at this community. 3334.65s - 3336.17s | There is a special thing. 3336.17s - 3341.45s | Like I still speak to hackers I know around the world from every country. 3341.81s - 3345.69s | Um, sometime they don't like me cause maybe I hacked their country. 3345.93s - 3349.17s | Yo, that's how understanding comes together. 3349.17s - 3351.25s | But the main thing, hacker culture, it's incredible. 3351.25s - 3356.89s | So just, can I just tie it into like the nineties, that eighties and nineties cruxable. 3357.05s - 3359.05s | So now there were hackers that predated us, right? 3359.05s - 3360.01s | Tap, blah, blah, blah. 3360.01s - 3363.65s | I don't know what they listened to Grateful Dead or Arlo Guthrie. 3363.77s - 3365.13s | There's nothing wrong


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it. 3317.93s - 3318.77s | And that's what I wanted to do. 3318.81s - 3324.37s | So Emanuel brings up a good point about, you know, illustrating the fact that like 3324.37s - 3326.73s | hacker culture changed so much. 3326.73s - 3331.37s | It's, it spawned a trillion dollar industry, but it's more than that. 3331.37s - 3334.17s | Even as you, I look around here, look at this community. 3334.65s - 3336.17s | There is a special thing. 3336.17s - 3341.45s | Like I still speak to hackers I know around the world from every country. 3341.81s - 3345.69s | Um, sometime they don't like me cause maybe I hacked their country. 3345.93s - 3349.17s | Yo, that's how understanding comes together. 3349.17s - 3351.25s | But the main thing, hacker culture, it's incredible. 3351.25s - 3356.89s | So just, can I just tie it into like the nineties, that eighties and nineties cruxable. 3357.05s - 3359.05s | So now there were hackers that predated us, right? 3359.05s - 3360.01s | Tap, blah, blah, blah. 3360.01s - 3363.65s | I don't know what they listened to Grateful Dead or Arlo Guthrie. 3363.77s - 3365.13s | There's nothing wrong with that. 3366.21s - 3367.65s | I like a good, you know what I mean? 3367.65s - 3368.85s | Choctaw Ridge or something. 3368.89s - 3374.01s | But my point being that eighties and nineties was super special for the 3374.01s - 3378.01s | acceleration of hacker culture and how much it changed everything. 3378.01s - 3383.33s | And in that, in that is like, yo, there was like skateboarding running parallel to that. 3383.33s - 3388.13s | There was expansion of hip hop that went from street music to like the number one 3388.13s - 3393.21s | music in the entire planet, fucking punk music, fucking, and the overlap between 3393.21s - 3396.61s | punk and hip hop that, that happened in New York. 3396.73s - 3402.21s | All these amazing cultures that are part of the tapestry of our life all coincided 3402.21s - 3407.25s | with the rise of hacking, all these communities, all these people who develop 3407.25s - 3410.05s | like rich digital identities to this day. 3410.05s - 3414.25s | Like I'm sure everybody here, like even the goons, everybody has these alternative 3414.25s - 3415.81s | names that represents that. 3415.81s - 3421.33s


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with that. 3366.21s - 3367.65s | I like a good, you know what I mean? 3367.65s - 3368.85s | Choctaw Ridge or something. 3368.89s - 3374.01s | But my point being that eighties and nineties was super special for the 3374.01s - 3378.01s | acceleration of hacker culture and how much it changed everything. 3378.01s - 3383.33s | And in that, in that is like, yo, there was like skateboarding running parallel to that. 3383.33s - 3388.13s | There was expansion of hip hop that went from street music to like the number one 3388.13s - 3393.21s | music in the entire planet, fucking punk music, fucking, and the overlap between 3393.21s - 3396.61s | punk and hip hop that, that happened in New York. 3396.73s - 3402.21s | All these amazing cultures that are part of the tapestry of our life all coincided 3402.21s - 3407.25s | with the rise of hacking, all these communities, all these people who develop 3407.25s - 3410.05s | like rich digital identities to this day. 3410.05s - 3414.25s | Like I'm sure everybody here, like even the goons, everybody has these alternative 3414.25s - 3415.81s | names that represents that. 3415.81s - 3421.33s | But all of that kind of started with the anonymous names and additional pieces. 3421.33s - 3425.49s | And like I said, the things that Manuel mentioned that, you know, in a lot of ways 3425.49s - 3428.25s | that caused like conversations about free phones. 3428.25s - 3431.37s | If that's what the consumers want, that's what we're going to give them. 3431.37s - 3435.53s | And it's so many examples of how hacker culture has done that. 3435.53s - 3439.97s | And even to today, pushing things like, you know, right of repair or like, you know, 3439.97s - 3444.93s | or even the GitHub, that nature of like, yo, you know, like I, like I have a car 3444.93s - 3446.81s | thing, for instance, you know what I mean? 3446.81s - 3448.93s | And they shut it down, but like, it doesn't matter. 3448.93s - 3451.73s | Yo, the community is going to come together, recode that shit. 3451.73s - 3452.45s | And you know what I mean? 3452.45s - 3455.01s | I'm going to turn it into like a toilet flusher with music. 3455.01s - 3456.33s | But that's not the point. 3456.33s -


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| But all of that kind of started with the anonymous names and additional pieces. 3421.33s - 3425.49s | And like I said, the things that Manuel mentioned that, you know, in a lot of ways 3425.49s - 3428.25s | that caused like conversations about free phones. 3428.25s - 3431.37s | If that's what the consumers want, that's what we're going to give them. 3431.37s - 3435.53s | And it's so many examples of how hacker culture has done that. 3435.53s - 3439.97s | And even to today, pushing things like, you know, right of repair or like, you know, 3439.97s - 3444.93s | or even the GitHub, that nature of like, yo, you know, like I, like I have a car 3444.93s - 3446.81s | thing, for instance, you know what I mean? 3446.81s - 3448.93s | And they shut it down, but like, it doesn't matter. 3448.93s - 3451.73s | Yo, the community is going to come together, recode that shit. 3451.73s - 3452.45s | And you know what I mean? 3452.45s - 3455.01s | I'm going to turn it into like a toilet flusher with music. 3455.01s - 3456.33s | But that's not the point. 3456.33s - 3461.81s | The point is that that is an outgrowth of all that hacker culture that is embodied 3461.81s - 3463.05s | here in this room today. 3463.05s - 3464.13s | So just wanted to mention that. 3464.13s - 3465.41s | I think that's a really good point. 3465.41s - 3471.65s | Like, especially you mentioned GitHub and I never thought about it this way, but it 3471.65s - 3475.21s | is, it is like, you know, the really the embodiment of the old, the hacker ethic of 3475.21s - 3478.13s | like, you know, you, you, you share information, like you, you, you learn 3478.13s - 3481.05s | something new and now you, or you write something new and you share it. 3481.05s - 3484.61s | And that's like what a public repo is to a lot of degree or like, or open source, 3484.61s - 3486.85s | you know, it's this like, Hey, I figured out this cool thing. 3486.85s - 3487.61s | I've made this cool thing. 3487.73s - 3489.13s | Now you can also use it. 3489.13s - 3491.53s | Or, and you can also, you know, change it and make your own thing. 3491.65s -


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3461.81s | The point is that that is an outgrowth of all that hacker culture that is embodied 3461.81s - 3463.05s | here in this room today. 3463.05s - 3464.13s | So just wanted to mention that. 3464.13s - 3465.41s | I think that's a really good point. 3465.41s - 3471.65s | Like, especially you mentioned GitHub and I never thought about it this way, but it 3471.65s - 3475.21s | is, it is like, you know, the really the embodiment of the old, the hacker ethic of 3475.21s - 3478.13s | like, you know, you, you, you share information, like you, you, you learn 3478.13s - 3481.05s | something new and now you, or you write something new and you share it. 3481.05s - 3484.61s | And that's like what a public repo is to a lot of degree or like, or open source, 3484.61s - 3486.85s | you know, it's this like, Hey, I figured out this cool thing. 3486.85s - 3487.61s | I've made this cool thing. 3487.73s - 3489.13s | Now you can also use it. 3489.13s - 3491.53s | Or, and you can also, you know, change it and make your own thing. 3491.65s - 3491.81s | Yeah. 3491.81s - 3493.21s | Let's stay, let's stick with this thread. 3493.21s - 3496.41s | So everyone here is mentioning community, right? 3496.41s - 3497.53s | This is a key thing. 3497.69s - 3501.69s | You know, there's this profound development of this new information network, the phone 3501.69s - 3502.85s | system, it's popular. 3502.85s - 3503.25s | Why? 3503.45s - 3505.09s | We can talk to each other, right? 3505.09s - 3507.65s | And people are finding community, especially hackers. 3507.81s - 3509.61s | So what happens when all this evolves, right? 3509.61s - 3513.81s | How do we end up at this mega conference with what, like 30,000 people? 3514.49s - 3515.77s | How did all, how did all that start? 3515.85s - 3519.53s | Well, I think it probably started at the very, for early, you know, hacker cons, 3519.53s - 3523.49s | which like, like party con summer con, like in the very late eighties. 3523.89s - 3526.81s | Um, I think 90 or something like that. 3526.81s - 3529.65s | Oh, even before that, I think Tommy, you were at like, weren't you at like one 3529.65s - 3530.61s | of


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3491.81s | Yeah. 3491.81s - 3493.21s | Let's stay, let's stick with this thread. 3493.21s - 3496.41s | So everyone here is mentioning community, right? 3496.41s - 3497.53s | This is a key thing. 3497.69s - 3501.69s | You know, there's this profound development of this new information network, the phone 3501.69s - 3502.85s | system, it's popular. 3502.85s - 3503.25s | Why? 3503.45s - 3505.09s | We can talk to each other, right? 3505.09s - 3507.65s | And people are finding community, especially hackers. 3507.81s - 3509.61s | So what happens when all this evolves, right? 3509.61s - 3513.81s | How do we end up at this mega conference with what, like 30,000 people? 3514.49s - 3515.77s | How did all, how did all that start? 3515.85s - 3519.53s | Well, I think it probably started at the very, for early, you know, hacker cons, 3519.53s - 3523.49s | which like, like party con summer con, like in the very late eighties. 3523.89s - 3526.81s | Um, I think 90 or something like that. 3526.81s - 3529.65s | Oh, even before that, I think Tommy, you were at like, weren't you at like one 3529.65s - 3530.61s | of the first summer cons? 3530.61s - 3532.41s | I said 91 to 92. 3532.41s - 3533.81s | I grew up in the area. 3533.81s - 3535.41s | So I had access. 3535.57s - 3538.97s | So like we had summer cons that were put on at that point, it was like, you know, 3538.97s - 3541.53s | maybe people would share a little bit of information, but it was informal. 3541.53s - 3543.65s | It was basically like, you're meeting the face behind the monitor. 3543.65s - 3546.77s | You go and like, you know, you go show up at this like motel in St. 3546.77s - 3549.81s | Louis and there's like 20 other, you know, hacker people. 3549.81s - 3551.61s | And one of them is agents deal. 3551.61s - 3557.49s | Who's a fed, but, um, like, uh, or to be fair, actually not, uh, not actually fed 3557.49s - 3558.37s | just an informant. 3558.85s - 3560.37s | Uh, how did you guys not know that? 3561.09s - 3564.01s | I mean, well, I mean, he did a lot of legitimate stuff. 3564.05s - 3568.13s | It like he, so the agents deal was this guy,


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the first summer cons? 3530.61s - 3532.41s | I said 91 to 92. 3532.41s - 3533.81s | I grew up in the area. 3533.81s - 3535.41s | So I had access. 3535.57s - 3538.97s | So like we had summer cons that were put on at that point, it was like, you know, 3538.97s - 3541.53s | maybe people would share a little bit of information, but it was informal. 3541.53s - 3543.65s | It was basically like, you're meeting the face behind the monitor. 3543.65s - 3546.77s | You go and like, you know, you go show up at this like motel in St. 3546.77s - 3549.81s | Louis and there's like 20 other, you know, hacker people. 3549.81s - 3551.61s | And one of them is agents deal. 3551.61s - 3557.49s | Who's a fed, but, um, like, uh, or to be fair, actually not, uh, not actually fed 3557.49s - 3558.37s | just an informant. 3558.85s - 3560.37s | Uh, how did you guys not know that? 3561.09s - 3564.01s | I mean, well, I mean, he did a lot of legitimate stuff. 3564.05s - 3568.13s | It like he, so the agents deal was this guy, Justin Tanner Peterson, um, who 3568.13s - 3573.93s | basically, uh, he legitimately was a phone freak who had owned, uh, the phone 3573.93s - 3577.81s | company to the extent that he had basically could be caller number, whatever 3577.81s - 3578.69s | for a radio station. 3578.69s - 3580.05s | So he was winning vacations. 3580.05s - 3581.13s | He was winning cars. 3581.13s - 3584.17s | He was winning, you know, he was always like he was over always caller 99 or 3584.17s - 3584.49s | whatever. 3584.85s - 3586.29s | He eventually got busted for that. 3586.29s - 3588.93s | So they turned state evidence, state's evidence, and would show up to these 3588.93s - 3591.61s | cons and be, and ask like leading questions like, Oh yeah. 3591.61s - 3592.89s | So what are you been up to recently? 3592.89s - 3595.01s | Tell me about the new hacks and stuff. 3595.33s - 3599.13s | Unfortunately he also, well, fortunately or unfortunately he couldn't stop, you 3599.13s - 3601.57s | know, uh, fucking with shit himself. 3601.73s - 3602.97s | So he got busted again. 3603.25s - 3607.41s | And, and one of my favorite


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Justin Tanner Peterson, um, who 3568.13s - 3573.93s | basically, uh, he legitimately was a phone freak who had owned, uh, the phone 3573.93s - 3577.81s | company to the extent that he had basically could be caller number, whatever 3577.81s - 3578.69s | for a radio station. 3578.69s - 3580.05s | So he was winning vacations. 3580.05s - 3581.13s | He was winning cars. 3581.13s - 3584.17s | He was winning, you know, he was always like he was over always caller 99 or 3584.17s - 3584.49s | whatever. 3584.85s - 3586.29s | He eventually got busted for that. 3586.29s - 3588.93s | So they turned state evidence, state's evidence, and would show up to these 3588.93s - 3591.61s | cons and be, and ask like leading questions like, Oh yeah. 3591.61s - 3592.89s | So what are you been up to recently? 3592.89s - 3595.01s | Tell me about the new hacks and stuff. 3595.33s - 3599.13s | Unfortunately he also, well, fortunately or unfortunately he couldn't stop, you 3599.13s - 3601.57s | know, uh, fucking with shit himself. 3601.73s - 3602.97s | So he got busted again. 3603.25s - 3607.41s | And, and one of my favorite stories is that, so, so Justin, Justin had, he had 3607.41s - 3607.89s | one leg. 3608.33s - 3612.13s | Um, and when he was, when he was busted, the news, I remember the news article 3612.13s - 3614.33s | was like, Oh, he was apprehended after a brief foot chase. 3614.33s - 3617.65s | And I was like, I would hope it would be brief. 3619.89s - 3621.81s | Well, these days he'd really get away. 3621.93s - 3622.41s | Yeah. 3622.45s - 3623.41s | What technology has done. 3626.01s - 3628.81s | Oh, so I, I got distracted. 3629.41s - 3631.25s | We ended up from cons to a fake leg. 3631.25s - 3631.41s | Yeah. 3632.65s - 3633.25s | Um, yeah. 3633.25s - 3636.65s | So, so I think, you know, we started out with like these, these sort of very 3636.65s - 3639.49s | informal just meeting up and then eventually like a kind of more formal, 3639.49s - 3640.89s | like, okay, we're going to share information. 3641.17s - 3645.09s | Cult of the dead cow in the, in the early nineties had the first, you know, 3645.33s - 3649.41s | founded the first, um,


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stories is that, so, so Justin, Justin had, he had 3607.41s - 3607.89s | one leg. 3608.33s - 3612.13s | Um, and when he was, when he was busted, the news, I remember the news article 3612.13s - 3614.33s | was like, Oh, he was apprehended after a brief foot chase. 3614.33s - 3617.65s | And I was like, I would hope it would be brief. 3619.89s - 3621.81s | Well, these days he'd really get away. 3621.93s - 3622.41s | Yeah. 3622.45s - 3623.41s | What technology has done. 3626.01s - 3628.81s | Oh, so I, I got distracted. 3629.41s - 3631.25s | We ended up from cons to a fake leg. 3631.25s - 3631.41s | Yeah. 3632.65s - 3633.25s | Um, yeah. 3633.25s - 3636.65s | So, so I think, you know, we started out with like these, these sort of very 3636.65s - 3639.49s | informal just meeting up and then eventually like a kind of more formal, 3639.49s - 3640.89s | like, okay, we're going to share information. 3641.17s - 3645.09s | Cult of the dead cow in the, in the early nineties had the first, you know, 3645.33s - 3649.41s | founded the first, um, hacker con where we actually invited journalists and 3649.41s - 3653.17s | invited like even law enforcement to talk and to come and like meet hackers. 3653.53s - 3657.05s | Cause there was this understanding that like, there was like, we saw that there 3657.05s - 3660.73s | was a lack of understanding in law enforcement and judicial communities, 3660.73s - 3664.61s | like as, as sort of Emmanuel alluded to earlier, this demonization of hackers, 3664.81s - 3668.05s | where it's like hacker was synonymous with criminal and not like, not like a 3668.05s - 3671.25s | cool criminal kind of necessarily, but like, you know, they were like, okay, 3671.25s - 3674.81s | you know, you, you are, you know, almost like mobster or kind of, kind of thing. 3675.25s - 3681.45s | Um, but, uh, so, you know, we wanted to, to meet these people and sort of, uh, uh, 3681.45s - 3684.33s | have, be able to have conversations and, and it's, you know, it's harder to 3684.33s - 3687.05s | demonize somebody once you've met them, you know, once you, once you interact 3687.05s - 3692.81s | with them and so, um, you know, and


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hacker con where we actually invited journalists and 3649.41s - 3653.17s | invited like even law enforcement to talk and to come and like meet hackers. 3653.53s - 3657.05s | Cause there was this understanding that like, there was like, we saw that there 3657.05s - 3660.73s | was a lack of understanding in law enforcement and judicial communities, 3660.73s - 3664.61s | like as, as sort of Emmanuel alluded to earlier, this demonization of hackers, 3664.81s - 3668.05s | where it's like hacker was synonymous with criminal and not like, not like a 3668.05s - 3671.25s | cool criminal kind of necessarily, but like, you know, they were like, okay, 3671.25s - 3674.81s | you know, you, you are, you know, almost like mobster or kind of, kind of thing. 3675.25s - 3681.45s | Um, but, uh, so, you know, we wanted to, to meet these people and sort of, uh, uh, 3681.45s - 3684.33s | have, be able to have conversations and, and it's, you know, it's harder to 3684.33s - 3687.05s | demonize somebody once you've met them, you know, once you, once you interact 3687.05s - 3692.81s | with them and so, um, you know, and then that, that DEF CON was founded by Jeff 3692.81s - 3696.41s | Moss and he, he kind of carried on that idea with the whole, like bringing in, 3696.49s - 3699.69s | uh, explicitly like feds to talk and things like that. 3699.69s - 3703.21s | And they had, you know, the spot, the fed contest, et cetera, um, to sort 3703.21s - 3707.01s | of like make it a game, but yeah, I mean, it's, if I can jump in for one 3707.17s - 3711.49s | sec, what you're saying right there was really interesting because Mindvox had, 3711.49s - 3718.13s | uh, a forum that was actually moderated by, uh, Kim Clancy, who at the time was 3718.13s - 3720.21s | a active secret service agent. 3720.77s - 3724.73s | And the participants were many of the people, the secret service had just 3724.73s - 3730.49s | raided an operation Sun Devil, including legion of doom members and a collection 3730.49s - 3732.53s | of other very colorful people. 3733.25s - 3740.33s | So it was a conversation and sometimes it's slightly psychotic and angry and 3740.33s - 3743.77s | stuff, but communication was taking place. 3743.81s


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then that, that DEF CON was founded by Jeff 3692.81s - 3696.41s | Moss and he, he kind of carried on that idea with the whole, like bringing in, 3696.49s - 3699.69s | uh, explicitly like feds to talk and things like that. 3699.69s - 3703.21s | And they had, you know, the spot, the fed contest, et cetera, um, to sort 3703.21s - 3707.01s | of like make it a game, but yeah, I mean, it's, if I can jump in for one 3707.17s - 3711.49s | sec, what you're saying right there was really interesting because Mindvox had, 3711.49s - 3718.13s | uh, a forum that was actually moderated by, uh, Kim Clancy, who at the time was 3718.13s - 3720.21s | a active secret service agent. 3720.77s - 3724.73s | And the participants were many of the people, the secret service had just 3724.73s - 3730.49s | raided an operation Sun Devil, including legion of doom members and a collection 3730.49s - 3732.53s | of other very colorful people. 3733.25s - 3740.33s | So it was a conversation and sometimes it's slightly psychotic and angry and 3740.33s - 3743.77s | stuff, but communication was taking place. 3743.81s - 3751.21s | And the people who had arrested in some cases, prosecuted the individuals were 3751.21s - 3756.09s | able to sit there and interact with them, talk with them after all this was over 3756.09s - 3761.69s | and done with, and try to come to some sort of understanding regarding why this 3761.73s - 3763.05s | occurred, what had happened. 3763.05s - 3766.57s | And it was just like super cool because it's like, Hey, you're a secret service 3766.57s - 3766.93s | agent. 3766.93s - 3770.89s | You want to talk to people and understand the whole culture. 3770.89s - 3771.89s | It was really awesome. 3772.33s - 3774.69s | I wonder, John, do you, do you have like any, any views on this? 3774.69s - 3779.41s | Cause I know like you come out of a much more, you know, you, you guys were in the 3779.41s - 3783.57s | shit and like, you know, and, and, you know, paid the price to some extent for, 3783.61s - 3787.29s | you know, from these feds that we're talking like all like, oh yeah, you know, 3787.29s - 3789.97s | we're meeting, we're, we're getting like,


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- 3751.21s | And the people who had arrested in some cases, prosecuted the individuals were 3751.21s - 3756.09s | able to sit there and interact with them, talk with them after all this was over 3756.09s - 3761.69s | and done with, and try to come to some sort of understanding regarding why this 3761.73s - 3763.05s | occurred, what had happened. 3763.05s - 3766.57s | And it was just like super cool because it's like, Hey, you're a secret service 3766.57s - 3766.93s | agent. 3766.93s - 3770.89s | You want to talk to people and understand the whole culture. 3770.89s - 3771.89s | It was really awesome. 3772.33s - 3774.69s | I wonder, John, do you, do you have like any, any views on this? 3774.69s - 3779.41s | Cause I know like you come out of a much more, you know, you, you guys were in the 3779.41s - 3783.57s | shit and like, you know, and, and, you know, paid the price to some extent for, 3783.61s - 3787.29s | you know, from these feds that we're talking like all like, oh yeah, you know, 3787.29s - 3789.97s | we're meeting, we're, we're getting like, you know, we're being all friendly with 3789.97s - 3793.29s | and, and you had, you know, had a bit of a different friends though. 3793.33s - 3795.17s | I mean, I didn't really go to cons. 3795.21s - 3799.25s | I mean, part of it is like, yeah, you know, I just like breaking a computer that I 3799.25s - 3806.93s | need to go like to a con, but I think, you know, I, yeah, I think, um, I, I, all 3806.93s - 3809.49s | right, could I, I got two things thinking about that though. 3809.81s - 3814.09s | I don't want to take it too far off track, but one thing is interesting in talking 3814.09s - 3819.93s | about that is for instance, um, yo, is there, uh, uh, how many people, 3819.93s - 3822.45s | go to ethical hacker con? 3824.41s - 3825.37s | Like one, right? 3825.37s - 3826.37s | Two, three, no one. 3826.37s - 3827.97s | Oh, I thought you meant just a ethical hacker con. 3827.97s - 3833.57s | So my point being is like, yo, the mythology really lies with the, the idea 3833.61s - 3837.05s | of the


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you know, we're being all friendly with 3789.97s - 3793.29s | and, and you had, you know, had a bit of a different friends though. 3793.33s - 3795.17s | I mean, I didn't really go to cons. 3795.21s - 3799.25s | I mean, part of it is like, yeah, you know, I just like breaking a computer that I 3799.25s - 3806.93s | need to go like to a con, but I think, you know, I, yeah, I think, um, I, I, all 3806.93s - 3809.49s | right, could I, I got two things thinking about that though. 3809.81s - 3814.09s | I don't want to take it too far off track, but one thing is interesting in talking 3814.09s - 3819.93s | about that is for instance, um, yo, is there, uh, uh, how many people, 3819.93s - 3822.45s | go to ethical hacker con? 3824.41s - 3825.37s | Like one, right? 3825.37s - 3826.37s | Two, three, no one. 3826.37s - 3827.97s | Oh, I thought you meant just a ethical hacker con. 3827.97s - 3833.57s | So my point being is like, yo, the mythology really lies with the, the idea 3833.61s - 3837.05s | of the hacker that breaks into stuff and explores things. 3837.05s - 3841.53s | I think it's funny that they have all these terms, ethical hacker, blah, blah, 3841.53s - 3845.29s | blah, the white hat, black hat, divided, god I hate that term, you know what I mean? 3845.29s - 3849.09s | Like, what the fuck that, you know, me, I like non-binary hats. 3849.25s - 3852.21s | I don't, that shit's ridiculous when you put things in a box like that. 3852.57s - 3857.93s | But my point being is that that is, it's, it, it, it goes to like talking about 3857.93s - 3862.25s | how the other thing that I wanted to mention about cons is I also didn't go 3862.25s - 3867.37s | to them because in a lot of ways it represents, like, for instance, and I, 3867.37s - 3868.77s | and I don't mean to cause trouble. 3868.77s - 3870.65s | I just want to have a conversation about it. 3870.85s - 3874.61s | Like, for instance, like a, like a woman didn't wind up on, on this 3874.61s - 3875.85s | panel, for instance, right. 3876.21s - 3878.61s | And I have no problem


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hacker that breaks into stuff and explores things. 3837.05s - 3841.53s | I think it's funny that they have all these terms, ethical hacker, blah, blah, 3841.53s - 3845.29s | blah, the white hat, black hat, divided, god I hate that term, you know what I mean? 3845.29s - 3849.09s | Like, what the fuck that, you know, me, I like non-binary hats. 3849.25s - 3852.21s | I don't, that shit's ridiculous when you put things in a box like that. 3852.57s - 3857.93s | But my point being is that that is, it's, it, it, it goes to like talking about 3857.93s - 3862.25s | how the other thing that I wanted to mention about cons is I also didn't go 3862.25s - 3867.37s | to them because in a lot of ways it represents, like, for instance, and I, 3867.37s - 3868.77s | and I don't mean to cause trouble. 3868.77s - 3870.65s | I just want to have a conversation about it. 3870.85s - 3874.61s | Like, for instance, like a, like a woman didn't wind up on, on this 3874.61s - 3875.85s | panel, for instance, right. 3876.21s - 3878.61s | And I have no problem talking about that. 3878.61s - 3881.09s | I think it's good to have conversations about these things 3881.37s - 3882.97s | because there were women around. 3882.97s - 3887.53s | I think I even mentioned that Sheila Averbach taught me computers. 3887.85s - 3890.05s | So Susan Thunder was also around. 3890.05s - 3893.17s | Susan Thunder, like, I think it was mad people, but like at the same, but 3893.17s - 3894.45s | she wouldn't come to the panel. 3894.45s - 3895.89s | She's not her jam. 3895.93s - 3899.85s | Um, but, but I think it's, I thought, I thought I would just have that just 3899.85s - 3904.17s | as a part of partial part of the dialogue because, you know, women were 3904.17s - 3906.61s | around during all those periods. 3906.61s - 3911.93s | But like, in a lot of ways, you know, them not being represented on a one 3911.97s - 3916.69s | person that out of all the people not represented also reflects a bit, like 3916.69s - 3921.37s | why I didn't go to cons too much because in a lot of ways, like, yeah, sure. 3921.41s - 3925.25s | They're like,


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talking about that. 3878.61s - 3881.09s | I think it's good to have conversations about these things 3881.37s - 3882.97s | because there were women around. 3882.97s - 3887.53s | I think I even mentioned that Sheila Averbach taught me computers. 3887.85s - 3890.05s | So Susan Thunder was also around. 3890.05s - 3893.17s | Susan Thunder, like, I think it was mad people, but like at the same, but 3893.17s - 3894.45s | she wouldn't come to the panel. 3894.45s - 3895.89s | She's not her jam. 3895.93s - 3899.85s | Um, but, but I think it's, I thought, I thought I would just have that just 3899.85s - 3904.17s | as a part of partial part of the dialogue because, you know, women were 3904.17s - 3906.61s | around during all those periods. 3906.61s - 3911.93s | But like, in a lot of ways, you know, them not being represented on a one 3911.97s - 3916.69s | person that out of all the people not represented also reflects a bit, like 3916.69s - 3921.37s | why I didn't go to cons too much because in a lot of ways, like, yeah, sure. 3921.41s - 3925.25s | They're like, John, you got voluminous knowledge, but like, yo, it's still, 3925.25s - 3931.69s | it felt like, like the other, and it's not necessarily ethnicity based. 3931.73s - 3934.69s | It's also could be like class based or whatever. 3934.69s - 3937.81s | It just was a different way to navigate. 3937.81s - 3942.73s | And then, you know, a lot of people would say like, okay, well, um, yeah, 3942.73s - 3946.69s | they don't have a good concept that like, you know, you don't have to have a 3946.69s - 3950.41s | conspiracy to have conspiracy like effects, but when you set up a thing where 3950.41s - 3954.37s | there seems to be like an underlying, like sort of misogyny in certain languages 3954.37s - 3959.21s | that you may take people take for granted is normal, normal for them actually 3959.21s - 3963.53s | puts people off or they say like, you know what, maybe this culture isn't for 3963.53s - 3967.13s | me and they walk away and they, you know, for the person they think, oh shit, 3967.13s - 3968.41s | that was so funny. 3968.41s - 3970.01s | I'm so fucking Chad. 3970.01s


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John, you got voluminous knowledge, but like, yo, it's still, 3925.25s - 3931.69s | it felt like, like the other, and it's not necessarily ethnicity based. 3931.73s - 3934.69s | It's also could be like class based or whatever. 3934.69s - 3937.81s | It just was a different way to navigate. 3937.81s - 3942.73s | And then, you know, a lot of people would say like, okay, well, um, yeah, 3942.73s - 3946.69s | they don't have a good concept that like, you know, you don't have to have a 3946.69s - 3950.41s | conspiracy to have conspiracy like effects, but when you set up a thing where 3950.41s - 3954.37s | there seems to be like an underlying, like sort of misogyny in certain languages 3954.37s - 3959.21s | that you may take people take for granted is normal, normal for them actually 3959.21s - 3963.53s | puts people off or they say like, you know what, maybe this culture isn't for 3963.53s - 3967.13s | me and they walk away and they, you know, for the person they think, oh shit, 3967.13s - 3968.41s | that was so funny. 3968.41s - 3970.01s | I'm so fucking Chad. 3970.01s - 3975.05s | But in reality, yo, they totally made someone's fucking life path curve to 3975.05s - 3976.25s | something they may really want to do. 3976.29s - 3978.13s | I think that that's a valuable point. 3978.13s - 3980.49s | Cause like, you know, we're, we're talking about here and we're, we're like 3980.49s - 3983.57s | talking about like, oh, this, this great community and stuff like that, but you 3983.57s - 3986.73s | know, it's a great community that we were welcomed into and like, I don't, you 3986.73s - 3987.73s | know, we can't sugarcoat it. 3987.73s - 3989.09s | Like there was a lot of misogyny. 3989.09s - 3992.57s | There was a lot of sexism, a fucking hell of a lot of homophobia, like just 3992.57s - 3996.69s | casual, like not, you know, most of it I think wasn't really, you know, vicious. 3996.69s - 4001.61s | However, you know, you're using terms that make people, people feel unwelcome. 4001.61s - 4004.81s | And, and just, you know, just building on that, just a historical point is that 4004.81s - 4008.77s | one, one hacker that I was cool with, anybody remember


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- 3975.05s | But in reality, yo, they totally made someone's fucking life path curve to 3975.05s - 3976.25s | something they may really want to do. 3976.29s - 3978.13s | I think that that's a valuable point. 3978.13s - 3980.49s | Cause like, you know, we're, we're talking about here and we're, we're like 3980.49s - 3983.57s | talking about like, oh, this, this great community and stuff like that, but you 3983.57s - 3986.73s | know, it's a great community that we were welcomed into and like, I don't, you 3986.73s - 3987.73s | know, we can't sugarcoat it. 3987.73s - 3989.09s | Like there was a lot of misogyny. 3989.09s - 3992.57s | There was a lot of sexism, a fucking hell of a lot of homophobia, like just 3992.57s - 3996.69s | casual, like not, you know, most of it I think wasn't really, you know, vicious. 3996.69s - 4001.61s | However, you know, you're using terms that make people, people feel unwelcome. 4001.61s - 4004.81s | And, and just, you know, just building on that, just a historical point is that 4004.81s - 4008.77s | one, one hacker that I was cool with, anybody remember Traxtor? 4008.85s - 4011.85s | Oh, uh, speaking of feds or speaking of narcs. 4011.89s - 4013.61s | Well, he didn't narc on me. 4014.61s - 4021.38s | So if you don't know Traxtor, he was a blind and he also identified as gay and 4021.38s - 4022.82s | like, yo, the kids would make fun of him. 4022.82s - 4025.38s | And I was just like, you're my boy. 4025.54s - 4026.06s | Yeah. 4026.42s - 4027.50s | And he taught me a lot too. 4027.50s - 4033.66s | So one thing I wanted to say is that, um, uh, the scene was, I think, more 4033.66s - 4037.54s | inclusive than a lot of, a lot of things that were going on in the nineties, 4037.78s - 4042.78s | because some of the most successful people from our scene, uh, were gay. 4043.14s - 4046.46s | People from our scene, uh, are women. 4046.86s - 4047.18s | It's true. 4047.18s - 4050.34s | Um, some of the most successful, successful people that I know are, are women. 4050.34s - 4051.14s | Heather Adkins. 4051.14s - 4052.26s | And yeah, yeah. 4052.26s - 4053.58s | Window and window. 4053.58s


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Traxtor? 4008.85s - 4011.85s | Oh, uh, speaking of feds or speaking of narcs. 4011.89s - 4013.61s | Well, he didn't narc on me. 4014.61s - 4021.38s | So if you don't know Traxtor, he was a blind and he also identified as gay and 4021.38s - 4022.82s | like, yo, the kids would make fun of him. 4022.82s - 4025.38s | And I was just like, you're my boy. 4025.54s - 4026.06s | Yeah. 4026.42s - 4027.50s | And he taught me a lot too. 4027.50s - 4033.66s | So one thing I wanted to say is that, um, uh, the scene was, I think, more 4033.66s - 4037.54s | inclusive than a lot of, a lot of things that were going on in the nineties, 4037.78s - 4042.78s | because some of the most successful people from our scene, uh, were gay. 4043.14s - 4046.46s | People from our scene, uh, are women. 4046.86s - 4047.18s | It's true. 4047.18s - 4050.34s | Um, some of the most successful, successful people that I know are, are women. 4050.34s - 4051.14s | Heather Adkins. 4051.14s - 4052.26s | And yeah, yeah. 4052.26s - 4053.58s | Window and window. 4053.58s - 4053.78s | Yeah. 4053.78s - 4054.10s | Windows. 4054.46s - 4055.10s | Lady Ada. 4055.22s - 4055.66s | Lady Ada. 4055.66s - 4056.14s | Lady Ada. 4056.14s - 4062.78s | I mean, yeah, it was, I mean, inclusion, we were, we were, I think we were, we 4062.78s - 4066.58s | were much more inclusive than at least some of the things that were going on there. 4066.66s - 4067.66s | I think that's true. 4067.66s - 4072.14s | But I also think that like, it was to some extent, like, I mean, it's been, 4072.74s - 4077.14s | you know, speaking as, you know, I can only speak as a straight white man. 4077.18s - 4081.34s | Like, um, but like, I think that things are getting better and I think it's, 4081.34s - 4082.78s | it's gotten, gotten better over time. 4082.78s - 4087.38s | It's not only work with women now, so it's, it's, it's, but yeah, I mean, 4087.38s - 4091.94s | like CDC was the first group to the first hacker group to sort of induct 4091.94s - 4094.58s | a woman member, um, lady Carolyn. 4095.18s - 4098.86s | Um, but then, you


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- 4053.78s | Yeah. 4053.78s - 4054.10s | Windows. 4054.46s - 4055.10s | Lady Ada. 4055.22s - 4055.66s | Lady Ada. 4055.66s - 4056.14s | Lady Ada. 4056.14s - 4062.78s | I mean, yeah, it was, I mean, inclusion, we were, we were, I think we were, we 4062.78s - 4066.58s | were much more inclusive than at least some of the things that were going on there. 4066.66s - 4067.66s | I think that's true. 4067.66s - 4072.14s | But I also think that like, it was to some extent, like, I mean, it's been, 4072.74s - 4077.14s | you know, speaking as, you know, I can only speak as a straight white man. 4077.18s - 4081.34s | Like, um, but like, I think that things are getting better and I think it's, 4081.34s - 4082.78s | it's gotten, gotten better over time. 4082.78s - 4087.38s | It's not only work with women now, so it's, it's, it's, but yeah, I mean, 4087.38s - 4091.94s | like CDC was the first group to the first hacker group to sort of induct 4091.94s - 4094.58s | a woman member, um, lady Carolyn. 4095.18s - 4098.86s | Um, but then, you know, and I'm not trying to pat ourselves on our 4098.86s - 4101.38s | back or anything like that because it took us, you know, you know, almost 4101.38s - 4102.82s | 30 years to induct another woman. 4102.82s - 4106.26s | So it's like, what's, what's that that, you know, and, and I'm not, I don't 4106.26s - 4110.10s | mean to suggest that she was any sort of like, you know, a token or anything 4110.10s - 4111.34s | like that, she was fucking awesome. 4111.34s - 4112.66s | So that's why we invited her in. 4113.06s - 4118.66s | But, you know, there was this, yeah, it's, I think there's a, there 4118.66s - 4120.10s | has been something systemic. 4121.06s - 4123.70s | There's no question that it was, it was, um, a different 4123.70s - 4125.90s | environment back in the eighties. 4126.30s - 4130.58s | Um, early summer cons were almost exclusively straight white males. 4130.90s - 4132.50s | Um, who all knew each other. 4132.78s - 4135.46s | It was uncomfortable because if you didn't know them, yeah. 4135.46s - 4137.30s | If you didn't know that these people, if you weren't in


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know, and I'm not trying to pat ourselves on our 4098.86s - 4101.38s | back or anything like that because it took us, you know, you know, almost 4101.38s - 4102.82s | 30 years to induct another woman. 4102.82s - 4106.26s | So it's like, what's, what's that that, you know, and, and I'm not, I don't 4106.26s - 4110.10s | mean to suggest that she was any sort of like, you know, a token or anything 4110.10s - 4111.34s | like that, she was fucking awesome. 4111.34s - 4112.66s | So that's why we invited her in. 4113.06s - 4118.66s | But, you know, there was this, yeah, it's, I think there's a, there 4118.66s - 4120.10s | has been something systemic. 4121.06s - 4123.70s | There's no question that it was, it was, um, a different 4123.70s - 4125.90s | environment back in the eighties. 4126.30s - 4130.58s | Um, early summer cons were almost exclusively straight white males. 4130.90s - 4132.50s | Um, who all knew each other. 4132.78s - 4135.46s | It was uncomfortable because if you didn't know them, yeah. 4135.46s - 4137.30s | If you didn't know that these people, if you weren't in good 4137.30s - 4139.06s | with them, you were ostracized. 4139.54s - 4144.94s | Um, and that's, that's part of our growing pains, uh, that we eventually, 4145.34s - 4149.46s | uh, started to be more inclusive, but it didn't happen right away. 4149.54s - 4150.50s | It didn't happen right away. 4150.94s - 4155.86s | Um, and as soon as the, uh, the kids from the city got involved, all of a 4155.86s - 4160.06s | sudden the media was all over it saying, oh my God, this is a real danger to 4160.06s - 4162.74s | the average American, you know, you saw the difference. 4162.74s - 4165.82s | We saw all kinds of racism, sexism, homophobia. 4166.22s - 4167.14s | We're not immune from that. 4167.14s - 4167.90s | We still aren't. 4168.14s - 4172.78s | But looking around here, looking around, uh, what I see at hope, boy, 4172.78s - 4173.70s | we've come a long way. 4173.70s - 4174.94s | I'm proud of this community. 4174.94s - 4176.70s | I'm proud of what we are trying to do. 4177.10s - 4178.74s | Uh, but let's just not forget. 4178.74s - 4180.66s | It's a work


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good 4137.30s - 4139.06s | with them, you were ostracized. 4139.54s - 4144.94s | Um, and that's, that's part of our growing pains, uh, that we eventually, 4145.34s - 4149.46s | uh, started to be more inclusive, but it didn't happen right away. 4149.54s - 4150.50s | It didn't happen right away. 4150.94s - 4155.86s | Um, and as soon as the, uh, the kids from the city got involved, all of a 4155.86s - 4160.06s | sudden the media was all over it saying, oh my God, this is a real danger to 4160.06s - 4162.74s | the average American, you know, you saw the difference. 4162.74s - 4165.82s | We saw all kinds of racism, sexism, homophobia. 4166.22s - 4167.14s | We're not immune from that. 4167.14s - 4167.90s | We still aren't. 4168.14s - 4172.78s | But looking around here, looking around, uh, what I see at hope, boy, 4172.78s - 4173.70s | we've come a long way. 4173.70s - 4174.94s | I'm proud of this community. 4174.94s - 4176.70s | I'm proud of what we are trying to do. 4177.10s - 4178.74s | Uh, but let's just not forget. 4178.74s - 4180.66s | It's a work in progress and we have to keep trying. 4184.74s - 4186.50s | Okay, let's, let's come back. 4186.54s - 4188.74s | Let's say one thing that like, you know, you're talking about when the 4188.74s - 4190.74s | kids from the city got home, this is something I was speaking to John 4190.74s - 4195.50s | about earlier, like about how, um, you need the New York scene specific. 4195.50s - 4197.74s | Like New York is a very diverse city and stuff. 4197.74s - 4202.58s | So like when you guys, I think we're much more sort of like MOD specifically, 4202.58s - 4206.34s | like much more sort of like a diverse group than, you know, for certainly 4206.34s - 4210.78s | CDC or many, many of the LOD, lots of other groups out there came out of a 4210.78s - 4212.94s | different culture, everybody in there. 4212.94s - 4213.78s | It was really good. 4213.78s - 4216.26s | I mean, I think anybody seen that movie hackers. 4217.90s - 4218.26s | All right. 4218.50s - 4220.66s | I only just saw it for the first time. 4221.14s - 4225.30s | No, the other day they invited


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in progress and we have to keep trying. 4184.74s - 4186.50s | Okay, let's, let's come back. 4186.54s - 4188.74s | Let's say one thing that like, you know, you're talking about when the 4188.74s - 4190.74s | kids from the city got home, this is something I was speaking to John 4190.74s - 4195.50s | about earlier, like about how, um, you need the New York scene specific. 4195.50s - 4197.74s | Like New York is a very diverse city and stuff. 4197.74s - 4202.58s | So like when you guys, I think we're much more sort of like MOD specifically, 4202.58s - 4206.34s | like much more sort of like a diverse group than, you know, for certainly 4206.34s - 4210.78s | CDC or many, many of the LOD, lots of other groups out there came out of a 4210.78s - 4212.94s | different culture, everybody in there. 4212.94s - 4213.78s | It was really good. 4213.78s - 4216.26s | I mean, I think anybody seen that movie hackers. 4217.90s - 4218.26s | All right. 4218.50s - 4220.66s | I only just saw it for the first time. 4221.14s - 4225.30s | No, the other day they invited me to what the Academy to see it. 4225.30s - 4225.74s | Right. 4226.34s - 4227.14s | I never saw it. 4227.74s - 4231.98s | Part of it is that that movie actually kind of steals from it's, it's based 4232.02s - 4238.22s | roughly on, on, uh, on MOD, but whatever conversation about it, you know what I'm 4238.22s - 4238.50s | saying? 4238.50s - 4244.50s | Like I don't touch that film, but I will say I love the diversity and it does 4244.50s - 4249.26s | represent what New York was like, both in terms of like gender identity in the 4249.26s - 4255.26s | film, fucking the different ethnicities, even small twist on a dial, like, you 4255.26s - 4258.94s | know, like different, like, you know, like even like, I just, I'll just say it 4258.94s - 4262.54s | like a, you know, like there was like Afro Latina as well as Latinos. 4262.54s - 4268.02s | Like it doesn't like all these like small pieces that for me was like every day in 4268.02s - 4270.22s | New York city is reflected in that film. 4270.50s - 4273.62s | So obviously that's why I


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me to what the Academy to see it. 4225.30s - 4225.74s | Right. 4226.34s - 4227.14s | I never saw it. 4227.74s - 4231.98s | Part of it is that that movie actually kind of steals from it's, it's based 4232.02s - 4238.22s | roughly on, on, uh, on MOD, but whatever conversation about it, you know what I'm 4238.22s - 4238.50s | saying? 4238.50s - 4244.50s | Like I don't touch that film, but I will say I love the diversity and it does 4244.50s - 4249.26s | represent what New York was like, both in terms of like gender identity in the 4249.26s - 4255.26s | film, fucking the different ethnicities, even small twist on a dial, like, you 4255.26s - 4258.94s | know, like different, like, you know, like even like, I just, I'll just say it 4258.94s - 4262.54s | like a, you know, like there was like Afro Latina as well as Latinos. 4262.54s - 4268.02s | Like it doesn't like all these like small pieces that for me was like every day in 4268.02s - 4270.22s | New York city is reflected in that film. 4270.50s - 4273.62s | So obviously that's why I like, you know, I didn't come to cons cause I was like, 4274.62s - 4276.58s | I don't need to go to the cons, you know what I'm saying? 4276.58s - 4280.86s | And it is just fucking hackers in New York that represent all of that. 4280.86s - 4284.74s | Both, you know, like I said, is it, but it was also really good for me cause it 4284.74s - 4286.70s | really expanded my boundaries. 4286.70s - 4290.50s | But you can see where sometimes that might have come up against other people who 4290.50s - 4294.66s | were like, well, I'm just going to say something out of turn about all these, 4294.90s - 4299.38s | this whole group of people who have feelings and identities and skills, but I'm 4299.38s - 4301.30s | just going to dismiss them with one word. 4301.34s - 4303.06s | And, you know, but you know what? 4303.14s - 4306.26s | Luckily those days over mostly. 4308.06s - 4308.46s | All right. 4308.46s - 4308.70s | Right. 4310.58s - 4314.22s | Let me, let me come back to another really important aspect of the early hacker 4314.22s - 4314.66s | scene.


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like, you know, I didn't come to cons cause I was like, 4274.62s - 4276.58s | I don't need to go to the cons, you know what I'm saying? 4276.58s - 4280.86s | And it is just fucking hackers in New York that represent all of that. 4280.86s - 4284.74s | Both, you know, like I said, is it, but it was also really good for me cause it 4284.74s - 4286.70s | really expanded my boundaries. 4286.70s - 4290.50s | But you can see where sometimes that might have come up against other people who 4290.50s - 4294.66s | were like, well, I'm just going to say something out of turn about all these, 4294.90s - 4299.38s | this whole group of people who have feelings and identities and skills, but I'm 4299.38s - 4301.30s | just going to dismiss them with one word. 4301.34s - 4303.06s | And, you know, but you know what? 4303.14s - 4306.26s | Luckily those days over mostly. 4308.06s - 4308.46s | All right. 4308.46s - 4308.70s | Right. 4310.58s - 4314.22s | Let me, let me come back to another really important aspect of the early hacker 4314.22s - 4314.66s | scene. 4314.94s - 4316.06s | Um, so here's the next question. 4316.06s - 4320.90s | How did text files in zines shape hacking culture and why perhaps do they hold 4320.90s - 4322.42s | relevance for today? 4322.62s - 4326.38s | I think, I think Patrick, you might have, cause you know, you, you were before, 4326.74s - 4329.06s | you're older than us in terms of in the scene and like, 4329.42s - 4330.46s | I'm 300 and 4331.46s - 4331.74s | Oh yeah. 4331.74s - 4335.42s | I mean like LOD, as I said, like one of my introduction was LOD text files. 4335.54s - 4339.06s | So like I, you know, the LOD technical journals, I don't know if you have a, 4339.38s - 4341.62s | anything you want to talk about how you guys started. 4341.70s - 4345.18s | And you've read some pretty mind blowing text files in your day. 4345.18s - 4345.50s | So. 4346.30s - 4350.14s | Yeah, I'm a, I, I, I write out my, my thoughts and stuff. 4350.18s - 4354.58s | It was all of us just kind of began as extended rants that were taking place 4354.58s - 4355.30s |


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4314.94s - 4316.06s | Um, so here's the next question. 4316.06s - 4320.90s | How did text files in zines shape hacking culture and why perhaps do they hold 4320.90s - 4322.42s | relevance for today? 4322.62s - 4326.38s | I think, I think Patrick, you might have, cause you know, you, you were before, 4326.74s - 4329.06s | you're older than us in terms of in the scene and like, 4329.42s - 4330.46s | I'm 300 and 4331.46s - 4331.74s | Oh yeah. 4331.74s - 4335.42s | I mean like LOD, as I said, like one of my introduction was LOD text files. 4335.54s - 4339.06s | So like I, you know, the LOD technical journals, I don't know if you have a, 4339.38s - 4341.62s | anything you want to talk about how you guys started. 4341.70s - 4345.18s | And you've read some pretty mind blowing text files in your day. 4345.18s - 4345.50s | So. 4346.30s - 4350.14s | Yeah, I'm a, I, I, I write out my, my thoughts and stuff. 4350.18s - 4354.58s | It was all of us just kind of began as extended rants that were taking place 4354.58s - 4355.30s | online. 4355.70s - 4360.74s | The, the whole culture of, you know, K rad, the, the, you know, 4360.78s - 4364.70s | instead of using an exclamation point, there's an exclamation point, a one, 4364.74s - 4367.22s | another exclamation point, a two, a string of zeros, 4367.58s - 4371.14s | because people actually did that when they were posting like, Oh, 4371.18s - 4373.30s | they're brand new uploaded cracked software. 4373.30s - 4374.30s | It was very exciting. 4374.30s - 4375.42s | Everything was zero day. 4375.70s - 4378.66s | We were mocking things that were really happening. 4378.66s - 4382.98s | And that sort of like metamorphosed into being culture. 4382.98s - 4387.90s | And we, we wrote about it and we at a certain point in 4387.90s - 4391.30s | time, you just kind of like step back and you start mocking yourself. 4391.30s - 4393.66s | It's like, okay, I'm Lee tweet. 4393.66s - 4395.62s | We have climbed this great mountain. 4395.62s - 4397.78s | We are all together at the top of it. 4397.78s - 4399.66s | And it's, it's all a bunch of bullshit. 4400.38s - 4401.50s | But what is my


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online. 4355.70s - 4360.74s | The, the whole culture of, you know, K rad, the, the, you know, 4360.78s - 4364.70s | instead of using an exclamation point, there's an exclamation point, a one, 4364.74s - 4367.22s | another exclamation point, a two, a string of zeros, 4367.58s - 4371.14s | because people actually did that when they were posting like, Oh, 4371.18s - 4373.30s | they're brand new uploaded cracked software. 4373.30s - 4374.30s | It was very exciting. 4374.30s - 4375.42s | Everything was zero day. 4375.70s - 4378.66s | We were mocking things that were really happening. 4378.66s - 4382.98s | And that sort of like metamorphosed into being culture. 4382.98s - 4387.90s | And we, we wrote about it and we at a certain point in 4387.90s - 4391.30s | time, you just kind of like step back and you start mocking yourself. 4391.30s - 4393.66s | It's like, okay, I'm Lee tweet. 4393.66s - 4395.62s | We have climbed this great mountain. 4395.62s - 4397.78s | We are all together at the top of it. 4397.78s - 4399.66s | And it's, it's all a bunch of bullshit. 4400.38s - 4401.50s | But what is my name? 4401.54s - 4403.38s | I'm I'm fluffy bunny. 4403.42s - 4405.14s | I'm nobody I'm invisible. 4405.18s - 4406.58s | Just don't pay any attention to me. 4406.58s - 4408.10s | And you can tell me how great you are. 4408.54s - 4414.02s | And all of that sort of filtered down and made its way into the text files. 4414.02s - 4420.98s | They sort of were, uh, pieces of culture and time sort of embedded 4420.98s - 4425.98s | in just in a text file that would sort of help you get into the headspace 4426.02s - 4430.18s | of what it was like at that particular intersection point. 4430.58s - 4434.62s | And right now, you know, 35 years after I can't enter that 4434.62s - 4436.34s | headspace like at will. 4436.34s - 4438.86s | I have to sort of coax myself into it. 4438.86s - 4440.74s | Cause I haven't been there in a long time. 4440.74s - 4446.18s | And, uh, that, that, that, that's basically, I'll pass it right back to 4446.18s - 4450.62s | you because that, that group CDC, I, I think it's done a lot of text files. 4451.58s


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name? 4401.54s - 4403.38s | I'm I'm fluffy bunny. 4403.42s - 4405.14s | I'm nobody I'm invisible. 4405.18s - 4406.58s | Just don't pay any attention to me. 4406.58s - 4408.10s | And you can tell me how great you are. 4408.54s - 4414.02s | And all of that sort of filtered down and made its way into the text files. 4414.02s - 4420.98s | They sort of were, uh, pieces of culture and time sort of embedded 4420.98s - 4425.98s | in just in a text file that would sort of help you get into the headspace 4426.02s - 4430.18s | of what it was like at that particular intersection point. 4430.58s - 4434.62s | And right now, you know, 35 years after I can't enter that 4434.62s - 4436.34s | headspace like at will. 4436.34s - 4438.86s | I have to sort of coax myself into it. 4438.86s - 4440.74s | Cause I haven't been there in a long time. 4440.74s - 4446.18s | And, uh, that, that, that, that's basically, I'll pass it right back to 4446.18s - 4450.62s | you because that, that group CDC, I, I think it's done a lot of text files. 4451.58s - 4454.22s | Number 200 was awesome. 4454.26s - 4456.82s | You see 200 is that's, that's the high point for me. 4456.82s - 4459.62s | So if you're not read it, that's, that's the way to go through the good starting 4459.62s - 4459.86s | point. 4460.34s - 4464.98s | Um, yeah, I mean, CDC started out as like, uh, was founded by, by, you know, 4465.06s - 4470.10s | punk kids in Lubbock, Texas who like, uh, uh, you know, were hanging out in 4470.10s - 4475.06s | abandoned slaughterhouse, um, you know, playing heavy metal music and punk and 4475.06s - 4478.26s | skateboarding and like, also just trying to like, you know, they were counter 4478.26s - 4481.50s | culture sort of things like trying to, cause it was, you know, especially back 4481.50s - 4483.86s | then it was very conservative, like socially conservative. 4484.34s - 4487.86s | Um, and so kind of rebelling against that, but like, and then just, we're 4487.86s - 4490.14s | going to write the shit down and there's that. 4490.14s - 4494.74s | And then also certainly CDC was born out of a, like, I think this is a


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- 4454.22s | Number 200 was awesome. 4454.26s - 4456.82s | You see 200 is that's, that's the high point for me. 4456.82s - 4459.62s | So if you're not read it, that's, that's the way to go through the good starting 4459.62s - 4459.86s | point. 4460.34s - 4464.98s | Um, yeah, I mean, CDC started out as like, uh, was founded by, by, you know, 4465.06s - 4470.10s | punk kids in Lubbock, Texas who like, uh, uh, you know, were hanging out in 4470.10s - 4475.06s | abandoned slaughterhouse, um, you know, playing heavy metal music and punk and 4475.06s - 4478.26s | skateboarding and like, also just trying to like, you know, they were counter 4478.26s - 4481.50s | culture sort of things like trying to, cause it was, you know, especially back 4481.50s - 4483.86s | then it was very conservative, like socially conservative. 4484.34s - 4487.86s | Um, and so kind of rebelling against that, but like, and then just, we're 4487.86s - 4490.14s | going to write the shit down and there's that. 4490.14s - 4494.74s | And then also certainly CDC was born out of a, like, I think this is a 4494.74s - 4498.78s | thread that runs through cultivated cow in general is like this sort of, um, not 4498.78s - 4503.10s | just anti-establishment area, like abolition, anti-establishment NIS, but, 4503.14s - 4509.02s | uh, also, um, kind of like wanting to poke holes in anybody or anything that, 4509.02s - 4510.78s | that takes itself too seriously. 4511.10s - 4514.66s | And so we would like write like parodies of hacker files and things like that 4514.66s - 4516.86s | originally and, and publish them. 4517.22s - 4522.98s | But, uh, I think, you know, as your point, like, uh, talking about like K rad and 4522.98s - 4525.54s | putting these numbers, I think that's something that come out of text files and 4525.54s - 4527.38s | come into the hacker community that a lot of people don't understand. 4527.38s - 4531.14s | Like the whole, you know, whether it's elite speak, you know, 3, 1, 3, 3, 7, and 4531.14s - 4533.62s | stuff, that's something that, you know, CDC has said like, Hey, you know, we were 4533.62s - 4535.10s | the ones that first did that or whatever. 4535.54s - 4539.10s | And, uh,


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4494.74s - 4498.78s | thread that runs through cultivated cow in general is like this sort of, um, not 4498.78s - 4503.10s | just anti-establishment area, like abolition, anti-establishment NIS, but, 4503.14s - 4509.02s | uh, also, um, kind of like wanting to poke holes in anybody or anything that, 4509.02s - 4510.78s | that takes itself too seriously. 4511.10s - 4514.66s | And so we would like write like parodies of hacker files and things like that 4514.66s - 4516.86s | originally and, and publish them. 4517.22s - 4522.98s | But, uh, I think, you know, as your point, like, uh, talking about like K rad and 4522.98s - 4525.54s | putting these numbers, I think that's something that come out of text files and 4525.54s - 4527.38s | come into the hacker community that a lot of people don't understand. 4527.38s - 4531.14s | Like the whole, you know, whether it's elite speak, you know, 3, 1, 3, 3, 7, and 4531.14s - 4533.62s | stuff, that's something that, you know, CDC has said like, Hey, you know, we were 4533.62s - 4535.10s | the ones that first did that or whatever. 4535.54s - 4539.10s | And, uh, other things like now, like things that have entered the, the, the. 4539.74s - 4544.14s | Like mainstream consciousness, like owned, like the, as a verb, like, Oh, he owned 4544.14s - 4548.46s | that, or, you know, he owns the system owns pwns shirts at that too, but that is 4548.46s - 4549.50s | directly at a hacking system. 4549.50s - 4551.18s | You owned a system like that. 4551.22s - 4556.14s | And now it's just entered the, like, it was never a verb in that sense before it 4556.14s - 4556.78s | came out of the hacker. 4556.78s - 4560.58s | We're doxxed that you hear that on the, on the news, you hear news commentators 4560.58s - 4561.82s | saying he was doxxed. 4561.86s - 4562.02s | Yeah. 4562.06s - 4563.30s | It's like, what the fuck is happening? 4563.30s - 4563.46s | Right. 4563.46s - 4563.98s | Yeah, yeah, yeah. 4567.82s - 4568.74s | What about the zines? 4568.74s - 4570.78s | Emmanuel, do you want to tell us about like the early days of that? 4571.18s - 4574.94s | Well, it was a beautiful period in the nineties because zines were exploding 4574.94s -


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other things like now, like things that have entered the, the, the. 4539.74s - 4544.14s | Like mainstream consciousness, like owned, like the, as a verb, like, Oh, he owned 4544.14s - 4548.46s | that, or, you know, he owns the system owns pwns shirts at that too, but that is 4548.46s - 4549.50s | directly at a hacking system. 4549.50s - 4551.18s | You owned a system like that. 4551.22s - 4556.14s | And now it's just entered the, like, it was never a verb in that sense before it 4556.14s - 4556.78s | came out of the hacker. 4556.78s - 4560.58s | We're doxxed that you hear that on the, on the news, you hear news commentators 4560.58s - 4561.82s | saying he was doxxed. 4561.86s - 4562.02s | Yeah. 4562.06s - 4563.30s | It's like, what the fuck is happening? 4563.30s - 4563.46s | Right. 4563.46s - 4563.98s | Yeah, yeah, yeah. 4567.82s - 4568.74s | What about the zines? 4568.74s - 4570.78s | Emmanuel, do you want to tell us about like the early days of that? 4571.18s - 4574.94s | Well, it was a beautiful period in the nineties because zines were exploding 4574.94s - 4575.62s | everywhere. 4575.66s - 4577.54s | Uh, how many of you remember tower books? 4578.34s - 4579.14s | What a great place. 4579.14s - 4583.46s | That's what got us started on newsstands was a connection to tower books and then 4583.46s - 4587.42s | all the other bookstores, which were around then independent ones, uh, would 4587.42s - 4591.18s | also want our zine and a hundred other zines. 4591.62s - 4595.82s | Uh, then the chains moved in borders, Barnes and Noble and drove them out of 4595.82s - 4596.30s | business. 4596.46s - 4601.10s | Then the chain started going out of business and with them, um, they kind of 4601.10s - 4605.38s | took a lot of the small independent zines with them because they had no real way to 4605.38s - 4606.06s | survive. 4606.58s - 4610.34s | Um, I remember, uh, my gun Delores fact sheet five, anybody ever read that? 4610.70s - 4615.58s | It was the zine of zines and every issue would be a review of your latest issue. 4615.98s - 4617.22s | Uh, it was the coolest thing. 4617.22s - 4621.06s | It was just this, um, explosion of


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4575.62s | everywhere. 4575.66s - 4577.54s | Uh, how many of you remember tower books? 4578.34s - 4579.14s | What a great place. 4579.14s - 4583.46s | That's what got us started on newsstands was a connection to tower books and then 4583.46s - 4587.42s | all the other bookstores, which were around then independent ones, uh, would 4587.42s - 4591.18s | also want our zine and a hundred other zines. 4591.62s - 4595.82s | Uh, then the chains moved in borders, Barnes and Noble and drove them out of 4595.82s - 4596.30s | business. 4596.46s - 4601.10s | Then the chain started going out of business and with them, um, they kind of 4601.10s - 4605.38s | took a lot of the small independent zines with them because they had no real way to 4605.38s - 4606.06s | survive. 4606.58s - 4610.34s | Um, I remember, uh, my gun Delores fact sheet five, anybody ever read that? 4610.70s - 4615.58s | It was the zine of zines and every issue would be a review of your latest issue. 4615.98s - 4617.22s | Uh, it was the coolest thing. 4617.22s - 4621.06s | It was just this, um, explosion of creativity and some of the zines were 4621.06s - 4625.74s | handwritten, but you could find them in bookstores all over the country. 4626.22s - 4631.18s | Um, yeah, it's replaced by, um, uh, you know, webpages and blogs and things like 4631.18s - 4631.34s | that. 4631.34s - 4632.14s | It's not the same. 4632.42s - 4632.98s | It's not the same. 4632.98s - 4636.94s | People still have collections of their zines from the nineties that they will 4636.94s - 4637.82s | never let go of. 4638.26s - 4641.70s | Um, and I'm, I'm just hoping, you know, I'm seeing more independent bookstores 4641.70s - 4642.90s | opening these days. 4643.18s - 4647.46s | I'm hoping to see more printed zines as well, because you know, that, that is just 4647.46s - 4650.06s | something that you can't replace digitally. 4650.22s - 4652.62s | There are some stores that like, especially like if you ever go to San 4652.62s - 4657.02s | Francisco, silver sprocket in the mission or in Chicago, Quimby's like are basically 4657.02s - 4661.46s | stores that specialize in zines, like both sort of like, you know, comic stuff, but 4661.46s - 4662.62s |


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creativity and some of the zines were 4621.06s - 4625.74s | handwritten, but you could find them in bookstores all over the country. 4626.22s - 4631.18s | Um, yeah, it's replaced by, um, uh, you know, webpages and blogs and things like 4631.18s - 4631.34s | that. 4631.34s - 4632.14s | It's not the same. 4632.42s - 4632.98s | It's not the same. 4632.98s - 4636.94s | People still have collections of their zines from the nineties that they will 4636.94s - 4637.82s | never let go of. 4638.26s - 4641.70s | Um, and I'm, I'm just hoping, you know, I'm seeing more independent bookstores 4641.70s - 4642.90s | opening these days. 4643.18s - 4647.46s | I'm hoping to see more printed zines as well, because you know, that, that is just 4647.46s - 4650.06s | something that you can't replace digitally. 4650.22s - 4652.62s | There are some stores that like, especially like if you ever go to San 4652.62s - 4657.02s | Francisco, silver sprocket in the mission or in Chicago, Quimby's like are basically 4657.02s - 4661.46s | stores that specialize in zines, like both sort of like, you know, comic stuff, but 4661.46s - 4662.62s | also like DIY. 4662.62s - 4664.54s | It's, it's, you know, the same, the same stuff. 4664.74s - 4668.46s | I think one thing you mentioned about like the, the idea of like, uh, the, the 4668.46s - 4672.18s | zine of zines and reviews of things like that ties into text files, because one of 4672.18s - 4675.34s | the other reasons you, you would get text files is that the bottom of every text 4675.34s - 4679.34s | file, a lot of times be a list of other elite BBSs like phone numbers. 4679.34s - 4683.26s | And so you'd find that and like, uh, I, you know, going back to myself in 86 4683.26s - 4687.46s | finding this, this, uh, this disc, like with, with text files at the bottom are 4687.46s - 4688.14s | all these phone numbers. 4688.14s - 4690.58s | And I was like, okay, like I can call these up and some of them are down. 4690.58s - 4693.50s | Cause you know, some of these things were a couple of years up older, but some 4693.50s - 4696.18s | were still up and it's like, and then it sort of builds


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also like DIY. 4662.62s - 4664.54s | It's, it's, you know, the same, the same stuff. 4664.74s - 4668.46s | I think one thing you mentioned about like the, the idea of like, uh, the, the 4668.46s - 4672.18s | zine of zines and reviews of things like that ties into text files, because one of 4672.18s - 4675.34s | the other reasons you, you would get text files is that the bottom of every text 4675.34s - 4679.34s | file, a lot of times be a list of other elite BBSs like phone numbers. 4679.34s - 4683.26s | And so you'd find that and like, uh, I, you know, going back to myself in 86 4683.26s - 4687.46s | finding this, this, uh, this disc, like with, with text files at the bottom are 4687.46s - 4688.14s | all these phone numbers. 4688.14s - 4690.58s | And I was like, okay, like I can call these up and some of them are down. 4690.58s - 4693.50s | Cause you know, some of these things were a couple of years up older, but some 4693.50s - 4696.18s | were still up and it's like, and then it sort of builds and builds and builds and 4696.18s - 4700.90s | you, your network, you know, social network sort of, uh, um, Veggie. 4701.22s - 4701.54s | Yeah. 4701.58s - 4702.98s | I think, I feel like this alternative media, right. 4702.98s - 4703.78s | It's so crucial. 4703.86s - 4704.14s | Yeah. 4704.38s - 4704.54s | Yeah. 4704.78s - 4709.58s | I will say that the very first time that I laughed out loud in front of a computer 4709.58s - 4713.90s | screen from reading something was, was drunk fucks going to McDonald's and trying 4713.90s - 4716.66s | to order a big Mac with four patties, a quadro pounder. 4716.66s - 4716.90s | Yeah. 4717.66s - 4717.98s | Yeah. 4718.34s - 4719.42s | Uh, no veggies. 4719.42s - 4720.10s | Don't wrap it. 4720.10s - 4723.94s | Throw it on the founder and I'll take it like a pounder bitch. 4724.02s - 4724.34s | Yeah. 4724.42s - 4725.74s | This is your homework assignment. 4725.74s - 4728.14s | If you're in the audience, read this text file tonight. 4728.38s - 4729.42s | It will change your life. 4731.30s - 4731.66s | All right. 4731.70s - 4735.62s | I want


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and builds and builds and 4696.18s - 4700.90s | you, your network, you know, social network sort of, uh, um, Veggie. 4701.22s - 4701.54s | Yeah. 4701.58s - 4702.98s | I think, I feel like this alternative media, right. 4702.98s - 4703.78s | It's so crucial. 4703.86s - 4704.14s | Yeah. 4704.38s - 4704.54s | Yeah. 4704.78s - 4709.58s | I will say that the very first time that I laughed out loud in front of a computer 4709.58s - 4713.90s | screen from reading something was, was drunk fucks going to McDonald's and trying 4713.90s - 4716.66s | to order a big Mac with four patties, a quadro pounder. 4716.66s - 4716.90s | Yeah. 4717.66s - 4717.98s | Yeah. 4718.34s - 4719.42s | Uh, no veggies. 4719.42s - 4720.10s | Don't wrap it. 4720.10s - 4723.94s | Throw it on the founder and I'll take it like a pounder bitch. 4724.02s - 4724.34s | Yeah. 4724.42s - 4725.74s | This is your homework assignment. 4725.74s - 4728.14s | If you're in the audience, read this text file tonight. 4728.38s - 4729.42s | It will change your life. 4731.30s - 4731.66s | All right. 4731.70s - 4735.62s | I want to do one more question before we open the floor for questions. 4735.82s - 4737.10s | Where is all this going? 4737.14s - 4740.02s | Where, what is the relevance, especially of these older ideas? 4740.14s - 4742.06s | I mean, think about what the internet is today, right? 4742.06s - 4743.10s | It's very corporate. 4743.34s - 4744.62s | It's centralizing. 4744.86s - 4748.98s | Um, I think there definitely is a need for fresh voices and alternative media, right? 4748.98s - 4751.94s | Zines text files, can this stuff actually come back, right. 4751.94s - 4754.34s | And have this kind of relevance like it did back in the eighties and nineties. 4754.42s - 4758.02s | I mean, I, I think it's important to point out that like the, the tech world 4758.02s - 4762.98s | today is run by, and you know, the founded by people who are, were hackers. 4763.06s - 4763.46s | Exactly. 4763.46s - 4766.78s | I mean, everything from, from Steve Wozniak and Steve jobs, you like the way 4766.78s - 4770.50s | they got the money to, to build the first Apple ones is by selling blue boxes, you 4770.50s - 4774.54s


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to do one more question before we open the floor for questions. 4735.82s - 4737.10s | Where is all this going? 4737.14s - 4740.02s | Where, what is the relevance, especially of these older ideas? 4740.14s - 4742.06s | I mean, think about what the internet is today, right? 4742.06s - 4743.10s | It's very corporate. 4743.34s - 4744.62s | It's centralizing. 4744.86s - 4748.98s | Um, I think there definitely is a need for fresh voices and alternative media, right? 4748.98s - 4751.94s | Zines text files, can this stuff actually come back, right. 4751.94s - 4754.34s | And have this kind of relevance like it did back in the eighties and nineties. 4754.42s - 4758.02s | I mean, I, I think it's important to point out that like the, the tech world 4758.02s - 4762.98s | today is run by, and you know, the founded by people who are, were hackers. 4763.06s - 4763.46s | Exactly. 4763.46s - 4766.78s | I mean, everything from, from Steve Wozniak and Steve jobs, you like the way 4766.78s - 4770.50s | they got the money to, to build the first Apple ones is by selling blue boxes, you 4770.50s - 4774.54s | know, like, and, and it, you look at how many companies are out there, how many 4774.54s - 4777.50s | big businesses like came out of like people from the hacker scene, like it's, 4777.78s - 4778.94s | it's not to be underestimated. 4778.94s - 4780.18s | How did it get so bland then? 4780.46s - 4780.58s | Yeah. 4780.58s - 4781.38s | They all got corrupt. 4781.90s - 4783.30s | People get boring and they want money. 4785.74s - 4785.94s | Yeah. 4785.94s - 4787.26s | That's part of the issue. 4787.26s - 4788.06s | Selling out. 4788.22s - 4788.58s | Yeah. 4788.62s - 4793.38s | Well, no, I think, I think, well, well, first I just want, let me just sideways 4793.38s - 4799.54s | say that like another parallel technical culture that grew up with hacking and 4799.54s - 4802.22s | parallel was EDM, like EDM matured. 4802.22s - 4806.14s | I don't know if you guys know, like the Detroit scene, like, you know, and 4806.14s - 4811.94s | connected, I mean, initially influenced by German, Germany, which also had an 4811.94s - 4814.90s | amazing hackering culture to this day. 4814.98s - 4819.54s |


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| know, like, and, and it, you look at how many companies are out there, how many 4774.54s - 4777.50s | big businesses like came out of like people from the hacker scene, like it's, 4777.78s - 4778.94s | it's not to be underestimated. 4778.94s - 4780.18s | How did it get so bland then? 4780.46s - 4780.58s | Yeah. 4780.58s - 4781.38s | They all got corrupt. 4781.90s - 4783.30s | People get boring and they want money. 4785.74s - 4785.94s | Yeah. 4785.94s - 4787.26s | That's part of the issue. 4787.26s - 4788.06s | Selling out. 4788.22s - 4788.58s | Yeah. 4788.62s - 4793.38s | Well, no, I think, I think, well, well, first I just want, let me just sideways 4793.38s - 4799.54s | say that like another parallel technical culture that grew up with hacking and 4799.54s - 4802.22s | parallel was EDM, like EDM matured. 4802.22s - 4806.14s | I don't know if you guys know, like the Detroit scene, like, you know, and 4806.14s - 4811.94s | connected, I mean, initially influenced by German, Germany, which also had an 4811.94s - 4814.90s | amazing hackering culture to this day. 4814.98s - 4819.54s | Yo, that ran parallel, but in terms of like where, like in terms of what you're 4819.54s - 4825.38s | saying, like there's also been a rapid commodification in terms of like security, 4825.38s - 4830.94s | like in a lot of ways, once again, people think about the mythology of hackers. 4830.94s - 4831.26s | Right. 4831.26s - 4835.18s | But then it's been commoditized so effectively. 4835.18s - 4837.42s | Cause yo, you just get your like a life hacking. 4840.82s - 4846.58s | So you, it's so easy to like, sort of like, um, um, uh, yeah, all the channels 4846.58s - 4851.38s | have been commodified in a way and that in a way suppresses culture because like 4851.38s - 4856.26s | you could just monetize it so fast and that doesn't give a culture breathing room. 4856.30s - 4859.98s | Now I think that culture is still there evolving and stuff. 4859.98s - 4860.58s | I see it. 4860.58s - 4863.22s | But like I said, that is, you know, kind of an end run. 4863.22s - 4866.58s | And a lot of times when that happens, that's when like new shit breaks 4866.58s -


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Yo, that ran parallel, but in terms of like where, like in terms of what you're 4819.54s - 4825.38s | saying, like there's also been a rapid commodification in terms of like security, 4825.38s - 4830.94s | like in a lot of ways, once again, people think about the mythology of hackers. 4830.94s - 4831.26s | Right. 4831.26s - 4835.18s | But then it's been commoditized so effectively. 4835.18s - 4837.42s | Cause yo, you just get your like a life hacking. 4840.82s - 4846.58s | So you, it's so easy to like, sort of like, um, um, uh, yeah, all the channels 4846.58s - 4851.38s | have been commodified in a way and that in a way suppresses culture because like 4851.38s - 4856.26s | you could just monetize it so fast and that doesn't give a culture breathing room. 4856.30s - 4859.98s | Now I think that culture is still there evolving and stuff. 4859.98s - 4860.58s | I see it. 4860.58s - 4863.22s | But like I said, that is, you know, kind of an end run. 4863.22s - 4866.58s | And a lot of times when that happens, that's when like new shit breaks 4866.58s - 4868.38s | out or a new kind of thing. 4868.38s - 4873.26s | Like, you know, that like hip hop and punk and EDM, that's all a turning 4873.26s - 4874.98s | point response to, you know what I mean? 4874.98s - 4876.02s | A change in culture. 4876.30s - 4879.54s | And even now I feel like there's a change in culture afoot and 4879.54s - 4881.58s | we'll see that both in film. 4881.86s - 4883.74s | I watch Skippity Toilet every day. 4883.78s - 4886.46s | Like I don't watch that corny fucking movie shit. 4886.54s - 4891.50s | I think my point being that like you can see the culture turning and in that, 4891.70s - 4895.90s | you know, we'll see like a new evolution of, uh, of that kind of underground 4895.90s - 4899.26s | and what form that'll take will be interesting to me, I'll be watching. 4899.82s - 4899.98s | Yeah. 4899.98s - 4906.34s | You know, it's, um, the way, um, the net is evolving now and the 4906.34s - 4910.30s | concept of creativity, they're not compatible, they're not compatible. 4910.34s - 4915.62s | Amazon, Google, um, all these massive


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4868.38s | out or a new kind of thing. 4868.38s - 4873.26s | Like, you know, that like hip hop and punk and EDM, that's all a turning 4873.26s - 4874.98s | point response to, you know what I mean? 4874.98s - 4876.02s | A change in culture. 4876.30s - 4879.54s | And even now I feel like there's a change in culture afoot and 4879.54s - 4881.58s | we'll see that both in film. 4881.86s - 4883.74s | I watch Skippity Toilet every day. 4883.78s - 4886.46s | Like I don't watch that corny fucking movie shit. 4886.54s - 4891.50s | I think my point being that like you can see the culture turning and in that, 4891.70s - 4895.90s | you know, we'll see like a new evolution of, uh, of that kind of underground 4895.90s - 4899.26s | and what form that'll take will be interesting to me, I'll be watching. 4899.82s - 4899.98s | Yeah. 4899.98s - 4906.34s | You know, it's, um, the way, um, the net is evolving now and the 4906.34s - 4910.30s | concept of creativity, they're not compatible, they're not compatible. 4910.34s - 4915.62s | Amazon, Google, um, all these massive entities that want to control every 4915.62s - 4922.10s | single, um, uh, ingredient in the whole, uh, the whole process, that's 4922.10s - 4924.06s | not what being creative is. 4924.14s - 4926.38s | Um, so something is going to change. 4926.38s - 4927.10s | I don't have the answer. 4927.10s - 4930.46s | I don't know what's going to change, but something major has to change if 4930.46s - 4934.70s | we're going to continue to, um, encourage creative people to express 4934.70s - 4936.98s | themselves using digital technology. 4937.02s - 4938.62s | I see it happening myself. 4938.66s - 4943.18s | I mean, in my practice, you know, one of my practices is, is working as a 4943.18s - 4945.82s | futurist and with young people. 4945.82s - 4948.02s | And I run this space in Los Angeles called R.I.P. 4948.02s - 4954.46s | Space that is like a, it allows like, it's a hacker, hack tech media place. 4954.46s - 4958.30s | And I have like a, a strong, um, community. 4958.30s - 4961.62s | Like I have a bunch of friends in the cyber feminism world 4961.62s - 4964.18s | who, uh, who curate


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entities that want to control every 4915.62s - 4922.10s | single, um, uh, ingredient in the whole, uh, the whole process, that's 4922.10s - 4924.06s | not what being creative is. 4924.14s - 4926.38s | Um, so something is going to change. 4926.38s - 4927.10s | I don't have the answer. 4927.10s - 4930.46s | I don't know what's going to change, but something major has to change if 4930.46s - 4934.70s | we're going to continue to, um, encourage creative people to express 4934.70s - 4936.98s | themselves using digital technology. 4937.02s - 4938.62s | I see it happening myself. 4938.66s - 4943.18s | I mean, in my practice, you know, one of my practices is, is working as a 4943.18s - 4945.82s | futurist and with young people. 4945.82s - 4948.02s | And I run this space in Los Angeles called R.I.P. 4948.02s - 4954.46s | Space that is like a, it allows like, it's a hacker, hack tech media place. 4954.46s - 4958.30s | And I have like a, a strong, um, community. 4958.30s - 4961.62s | Like I have a bunch of friends in the cyber feminism world 4961.62s - 4964.18s | who, uh, who curate with me there. 4964.18s - 4969.30s | And I think like you can see the new emergence happening and stuff. 4969.30s - 4972.42s | And it, and like I said, you can see the parts of the culture falling apart. 4972.42s - 4975.26s | Like you were saying with the corporate thing, there's like the dead internet 4975.30s - 4977.42s | theory, which is not really a theory. 4977.42s - 4981.14s | You see it and media, like what, you know, just as you, you see pieces 4981.14s - 4985.62s | disappearing because once, once it's purchased and locked the rights, they 4985.62s - 4986.82s | could just make it disappear. 4986.82s - 4987.30s | And that's it. 4987.30s - 4988.50s | You don't have any ephemera. 4988.50s - 4990.50s | You don't have any physical media. 4990.50s - 4994.22s | Like you were saying, like with the newsletters, like a blog can just, you 4994.22s - 4997.42s | could turn out the lights, we get to pay the bill or more importantly, yo, 4997.42s - 4999.70s | somebody buys GeoCities and it's just gone. 4999.70s - 5002.50s | And they're like, it's not cost effective to run it anymore.


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with me there. 4964.18s - 4969.30s | And I think like you can see the new emergence happening and stuff. 4969.30s - 4972.42s | And it, and like I said, you can see the parts of the culture falling apart. 4972.42s - 4975.26s | Like you were saying with the corporate thing, there's like the dead internet 4975.30s - 4977.42s | theory, which is not really a theory. 4977.42s - 4981.14s | You see it and media, like what, you know, just as you, you see pieces 4981.14s - 4985.62s | disappearing because once, once it's purchased and locked the rights, they 4985.62s - 4986.82s | could just make it disappear. 4986.82s - 4987.30s | And that's it. 4987.30s - 4988.50s | You don't have any ephemera. 4988.50s - 4990.50s | You don't have any physical media. 4990.50s - 4994.22s | Like you were saying, like with the newsletters, like a blog can just, you 4994.22s - 4997.42s | could turn out the lights, we get to pay the bill or more importantly, yo, 4997.42s - 4999.70s | somebody buys GeoCities and it's just gone. 4999.70s - 5002.50s | And they're like, it's not cost effective to run it anymore. 5002.78s - 5005.58s | And then that saps an entire part of creativity. 5005.58s - 5008.86s | But that being said, everything's a cycle that happens. 5009.02s - 5014.50s | Something else will begin to emerge from, from the detrius that is from that 5014.50s - 5017.22s | particular, you know, in run of corporate mouth. 5017.54s - 5018.90s | You come, you come back to the whole thing. 5018.90s - 5022.34s | Like, you know, the internet interprets censorship as, as, you know, a 5022.34s - 5023.50s | problem and routes around it. 5023.50s - 5025.98s | Like, you know, it's the same sort of, you know, the cultural will interpret 5026.30s - 5031.54s | commodification and, and control as, as an, as a, as a blocker and just route 5031.54s - 5031.94s | around it. 5033.46s - 5034.38s | Culture hacking. 5035.78s - 5038.02s | Remember all, all the protocols are open. 5038.22s - 5039.30s | The code is out there. 5039.42s - 5040.50s | Build an alternative. 5041.54s - 5041.90s | Yeah. 5043.26s - 5044.38s | That's your homework assignment. 5045.46s - 5046.02s | Let's do Q&A. 5046.06s - 5046.30s | Okay. 5046.30s - 5048.74s | I


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5002.78s - 5005.58s | And then that saps an entire part of creativity. 5005.58s - 5008.86s | But that being said, everything's a cycle that happens. 5009.02s - 5014.50s | Something else will begin to emerge from, from the detrius that is from that 5014.50s - 5017.22s | particular, you know, in run of corporate mouth. 5017.54s - 5018.90s | You come, you come back to the whole thing. 5018.90s - 5022.34s | Like, you know, the internet interprets censorship as, as, you know, a 5022.34s - 5023.50s | problem and routes around it. 5023.50s - 5025.98s | Like, you know, it's the same sort of, you know, the cultural will interpret 5026.30s - 5031.54s | commodification and, and control as, as an, as a, as a blocker and just route 5031.54s - 5031.94s | around it. 5033.46s - 5034.38s | Culture hacking. 5035.78s - 5038.02s | Remember all, all the protocols are open. 5038.22s - 5039.30s | The code is out there. 5039.42s - 5040.50s | Build an alternative. 5041.54s - 5041.90s | Yeah. 5043.26s - 5044.38s | That's your homework assignment. 5045.46s - 5046.02s | Let's do Q&A. 5046.06s - 5046.30s | Okay. 5046.30s - 5048.74s | I just want to say first, like we're going to, we're going to do a Q&A, but 5048.74s - 5050.70s | also we have a very limited number. 5050.70s - 5053.30s | I don't know if actually or any are left of the cult of the dead cow book that 5053.30s - 5054.54s | are going to, that we have for sale. 5054.98s - 5058.42s | Autographed by the author and a member of the seat, much of the CDC members. 5058.74s - 5061.98s | Um, money is going, speaking of building a new network, uh, to 5061.98s - 5063.18s | benefit the veil of foundation. 5063.42s - 5068.22s | There's also CDC 40th anniversary challenge coins and various other 5068.22s - 5068.82s | stuff over there. 5068.82s - 5071.78s | If anybody's interested that, that we're selling as well as I think there's 5071.78s - 5074.66s | still some free stickers, but there was a feeding frenzy on the stickers. 5074.66s - 5074.86s | Yeah. 5075.14s - 5078.14s | Oh, and also too, before you do the Q and a, you're not going to show. 5078.14s - 5080.74s | I got, I got a little surprise. 5080.74s - 5082.30s |


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just want to say first, like we're going to, we're going to do a Q&A, but 5048.74s - 5050.70s | also we have a very limited number. 5050.70s - 5053.30s | I don't know if actually or any are left of the cult of the dead cow book that 5053.30s - 5054.54s | are going to, that we have for sale. 5054.98s - 5058.42s | Autographed by the author and a member of the seat, much of the CDC members. 5058.74s - 5061.98s | Um, money is going, speaking of building a new network, uh, to 5061.98s - 5063.18s | benefit the veil of foundation. 5063.42s - 5068.22s | There's also CDC 40th anniversary challenge coins and various other 5068.22s - 5068.82s | stuff over there. 5068.82s - 5071.78s | If anybody's interested that, that we're selling as well as I think there's 5071.78s - 5074.66s | still some free stickers, but there was a feeding frenzy on the stickers. 5074.66s - 5074.86s | Yeah. 5075.14s - 5078.14s | Oh, and also too, before you do the Q and a, you're not going to show. 5078.14s - 5080.74s | I got, I got a little surprise. 5080.74s - 5082.30s | Wait, I got to go to the end of the. 5083.30s - 5084.50s | Is this a surprise job? 5086.62s - 5087.94s | I can't see what's on the screen. 5087.94s - 5091.06s | I'm just flipping through all the weird stuff at the end. 5091.46s - 5092.22s | Yeah, man. 5092.22s - 5094.82s | I mean, we need a little bit of, we talked about text files. 5094.82s - 5096.14s | How about some real hacking? 5097.06s - 5098.50s | A redacted document. 5098.98s - 5100.34s | Yeah. 5100.34s - 5101.82s | Take a look at that. 5101.90s - 5104.58s | So one of the things, Oh, this is, this is elite. 5104.62s - 5105.22s | This is elite. 5105.50s - 5108.46s | So I don't know if it's on the screen, but, uh, it's still on the screen. 5108.50s - 5108.78s | Yeah. 5108.78s - 5110.02s | Well, why don't you read it real quick? 5110.02s - 5111.82s | The unredacted parts, just a little bit. 5111.86s - 5115.06s | Time of meeting place of meeting people involved. 5115.22s - 5118.54s | The purpose of this report is to summarize the meeting that took place 5118.54s - 5123.46s


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Wait, I got to go to the end of the. 5083.30s - 5084.50s | Is this a surprise job? 5086.62s - 5087.94s | I can't see what's on the screen. 5087.94s - 5091.06s | I'm just flipping through all the weird stuff at the end. 5091.46s - 5092.22s | Yeah, man. 5092.22s - 5094.82s | I mean, we need a little bit of, we talked about text files. 5094.82s - 5096.14s | How about some real hacking? 5097.06s - 5098.50s | A redacted document. 5098.98s - 5100.34s | Yeah. 5100.34s - 5101.82s | Take a look at that. 5101.90s - 5104.58s | So one of the things, Oh, this is, this is elite. 5104.62s - 5105.22s | This is elite. 5105.50s - 5108.46s | So I don't know if it's on the screen, but, uh, it's still on the screen. 5108.50s - 5108.78s | Yeah. 5108.78s - 5110.02s | Well, why don't you read it real quick? 5110.02s - 5111.82s | The unredacted parts, just a little bit. 5111.86s - 5115.06s | Time of meeting place of meeting people involved. 5115.22s - 5118.54s | The purpose of this report is to summarize the meeting that took place 5118.54s - 5123.46s | between myself and two individuals from the redacted intelligence redacted. 5123.90s - 5128.18s | The intent of the meeting was for the redacted to provide, am I a 5128.18s - 5132.06s | comprehensive up-to-date training session on the techniques employed 5132.06s - 5135.06s | to gather intelligence in this community? 5135.06s - 5138.78s | The computer underground, Ooh, some of the more specific topics 5139.42s - 5143.70s | included how to effectively create an alias that would produce favorable 5143.70s - 5145.94s | results in gathering intelligence. 5147.18s - 5148.10s | Agent steel. 5148.14s - 5148.42s | Good. 5148.42s - 5148.62s | Good. 5148.90s - 5149.10s | What? 5149.10s - 5150.42s | Not the death vegetable. 5151.70s - 5155.74s | Buzzwords used by hackers when describing particular items like 5155.74s - 5159.82s | where's items to be searching for when gathering intelligence from the 5159.82s - 5164.62s | computer underground boxes, maybe, uh, techniques employed by law enforcement 5164.62s - 5168.34s | to effectively protect their personal professional profile from 5168.38s - 5170.38s | compromised by the hackers. 5171.18s - 5172.66s | That's a little navel gazing there. 5172.66s - 5172.82s | Yeah. 5175.30s - 5178.98s | And then


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| between myself and two individuals from the redacted intelligence redacted. 5123.90s - 5128.18s | The intent of the meeting was for the redacted to provide, am I a 5128.18s - 5132.06s | comprehensive up-to-date training session on the techniques employed 5132.06s - 5135.06s | to gather intelligence in this community? 5135.06s - 5138.78s | The computer underground, Ooh, some of the more specific topics 5139.42s - 5143.70s | included how to effectively create an alias that would produce favorable 5143.70s - 5145.94s | results in gathering intelligence. 5147.18s - 5148.10s | Agent steel. 5148.14s - 5148.42s | Good. 5148.42s - 5148.62s | Good. 5148.90s - 5149.10s | What? 5149.10s - 5150.42s | Not the death vegetable. 5151.70s - 5155.74s | Buzzwords used by hackers when describing particular items like 5155.74s - 5159.82s | where's items to be searching for when gathering intelligence from the 5159.82s - 5164.62s | computer underground boxes, maybe, uh, techniques employed by law enforcement 5164.62s - 5168.34s | to effectively protect their personal professional profile from 5168.38s - 5170.38s | compromised by the hackers. 5171.18s - 5172.66s | That's a little navel gazing there. 5172.66s - 5172.82s | Yeah. 5175.30s - 5178.98s | And then if you just go to the last page, what is this, this letter greetings? 5179.02s - 5179.30s | Yeah. 5179.30s - 5183.10s | It's, uh, it's, uh, from the mail spool at a mind box. 5186.58s - 5187.02s | Wow. 5187.94s - 5190.86s | Hackers, hacking, hacker, law enforcement. 5190.90s - 5197.78s | Um, if, uh, he said he's going to nail the person that hacked the mind box. 5198.62s - 5200.02s | So I don't think that happened. 5200.14s - 5201.10s | Did he ever nail him? 5201.10s - 5204.26s | I'm just curious on, on mind box. 5204.30s - 5207.26s | But the letter from, Oh, Oh, it's Matt. 5208.18s - 5210.62s | Oh, Matt cable system administrator. 5211.46s - 5212.30s | Oh, no, no, no. 5212.34s - 5213.14s | Access technology. 5213.14s - 5214.14s | Probably did not. 5214.14s - 5215.22s | I think he probably did not. 5216.22s - 5218.74s | Of course he didn't nail a consulting pearl. 5219.02s - 5221.30s | It's highly unlikely. 5223.14s - 5225.62s | These are some folks, some very deep cuts. 5225.62s - 5229.70s | For someone who gave you a password and said, welcome, have fun. 5230.90s -


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if you just go to the last page, what is this, this letter greetings? 5179.02s - 5179.30s | Yeah. 5179.30s - 5183.10s | It's, uh, it's, uh, from the mail spool at a mind box. 5186.58s - 5187.02s | Wow. 5187.94s - 5190.86s | Hackers, hacking, hacker, law enforcement. 5190.90s - 5197.78s | Um, if, uh, he said he's going to nail the person that hacked the mind box. 5198.62s - 5200.02s | So I don't think that happened. 5200.14s - 5201.10s | Did he ever nail him? 5201.10s - 5204.26s | I'm just curious on, on mind box. 5204.30s - 5207.26s | But the letter from, Oh, Oh, it's Matt. 5208.18s - 5210.62s | Oh, Matt cable system administrator. 5211.46s - 5212.30s | Oh, no, no, no. 5212.34s - 5213.14s | Access technology. 5213.14s - 5214.14s | Probably did not. 5214.14s - 5215.22s | I think he probably did not. 5216.22s - 5218.74s | Of course he didn't nail a consulting pearl. 5219.02s - 5221.30s | It's highly unlikely. 5223.14s - 5225.62s | These are some folks, some very deep cuts. 5225.62s - 5229.70s | For someone who gave you a password and said, welcome, have fun. 5230.90s - 5234.54s | So, uh, but there are a couple of microphones, if you have a question for 5234.54s - 5238.58s | our panel, come on up on each aisle. 5238.58s - 5241.38s | So if you have a question, if we've got like, I think about as you can tell, 5241.38s - 5243.30s | our panelists love to talk. 5243.30s - 5247.30s | So let's start, let's start over here on the right. 5247.54s - 5248.86s | It's a great text file for anyone. 5249.06s - 5253.70s | Oh, are the mics on the Q and a mics? 5253.74s - 5253.86s | Yeah. 5253.86s - 5255.22s | The Q and a mics need to be on. 5255.82s - 5256.10s | Okay. 5256.10s - 5256.54s | Try again. 5257.10s - 5257.42s | Hello. 5257.98s - 5258.50s | Can you hear me? 5258.82s - 5259.14s | Yes. 5259.46s - 5261.74s | So, um, it's, I mean, it's interesting. 5261.74s - 5263.30s | I've been, I think it needs to be louder. 5263.30s - 5263.54s | Sorry. 5263.54s - 5263.66s | Yeah. 5263.66s - 5264.02s | Louder. 5265.38s - 5265.82s | Hello. 5265.86s - 5266.26s | There we go. 5266.26s - 5266.66s |


