Daily Papers

We give a quantum algorithm for computing an epsilon-approximate Nash equilibrium of a zero-sum game in a m times n payoff matrix with bounded entries. Given a standard quantum oracle for accessing the payoff matrix our algorithm runs in time O(m + ncdot epsilon^{-2.5} + epsilon^{-3}) and outputs a classical representation of the epsilon-approximate Nash equilibrium. This improves upon the best prior quantum runtime of O(m + n cdot epsilon^{-3}) obtained by [vAG19] and the classic O((m + n) cdot epsilon^{-2}) runtime due to [GK95] whenever epsilon = Omega((m +n)^{-1}). We obtain this result by designing new quantum data structures for efficiently sampling from a slowly-changing Gibbs distribution.

In this work, we consider the problem of collaborative multi-user reinforcement learning. In this setting there are multiple users with the same state-action space and transition probabilities but with different rewards. Under the assumption that the reward matrix of the N users has a low-rank structure -- a standard and practically successful assumption in the offline collaborative filtering setting -- the question is can we design algorithms with significantly lower sample complexity compared to the ones that learn the MDP individually for each user. Our main contribution is an algorithm which explores rewards collaboratively with N user-specific MDPs and can learn rewards efficiently in two key settings: tabular MDPs and linear MDPs. When N is large and the rank is constant, the sample complexity per MDP depends logarithmically over the size of the state-space, which represents an exponential reduction (in the state-space size) when compared to the standard ``non-collaborative'' algorithms.

What fundamental properties of reward functions enable efficient sparse-reward reinforcement learning? We address this question through the lens of low-rank structure in reward matrices, showing that such structure induces a sharp transition from exponential to polynomial sample complexity, the first result of this kind for sparse-reward RL. We introduce Policy-Aware Matrix Completion (PAMC), which connects matrix completion theory with reinforcement learning via a new analysis of policy-dependent sampling. Our framework provides: (i) impossibility results for general sparse reward observation, (ii) reward-free representation learning from dynamics, (iii) distribution-free confidence sets via conformal prediction, and (iv) robust completion guarantees that degrade gracefully when low-rank structure is only approximate. Empirically, we conduct a pre-registered evaluation across 100 systematically sampled domains, finding exploitable structure in over half. PAMC improves sample efficiency by factors between 1.6 and 2.1 compared to strong exploration, structured, and representation-learning baselines, while adding only about 20 percent computational overhead.These results establish structural reward learning as a promising new paradigm, with immediate implications for robotics, healthcare, and other safety-critical, sample-expensive applications.

We introduce meta-factorization, a theory that describes matrix decompositions as solutions of linear matrix equations: the projector and the reconstruction equation. Meta-factorization reconstructs known factorizations, reveals their internal structures, and allows for introducing modifications, as illustrated with SVD, QR, and UTV factorizations. The prospect of meta-factorization also provides insights into computational aspects of generalized matrix inverses and randomized linear algebra algorithms. The relations between the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse, generalized Nystr\"{o}m method, and the CUR decomposition are revealed here as an illustration. Finally, meta-factorization offers hints on the structure of new factorizations and provides the potential of creating them.

Counterfactual explanations is one of the post-hoc methods used to provide explainability to machine learning models that have been attracting attention in recent years. Most examples in the literature, address the problem of generating post-hoc explanations for black-box machine learning models after the rejection of a loan application. In contrast, in this work, we investigate mathematical programming formulations for scorecard models, a type of interpretable model predominant within the banking industry for lending. The proposed mixed-integer programming formulations combine objective functions to ensure close, realistic and sparse counterfactuals using multi-objective optimization techniques for a binary, probability or continuous outcome. Moreover, we extend these formulations to generate multiple optimal counterfactuals simultaneously while guaranteeing diversity. Experiments on two real-world datasets confirm that the presented approach can generate optimal diverse counterfactuals addressing desired properties with assumable CPU times for practice use.

We study principal-agent problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme -- called contract -- in order to induce an agent to take a costly, unobservable action leading to favorable outcomes. We consider a generalization of the classical (single-round) version of the problem in which the principal interacts with the agent by committing to contracts over multiple rounds. The principal has no information about the agent, and they have to learn an optimal contract by only observing the outcome realized at each round. We focus on settings in which the size of the agent's action space is small. We design an algorithm that learns an approximately-optimal contract with high probability in a number of rounds polynomial in the size of the outcome space, when the number of actions is constant. Our algorithm solves an open problem by Zhu et al.[2022]. Moreover, it can also be employed to provide a mathcal{O}(T^{4/5}) regret bound in the related online learning setting in which the principal aims at maximizing their cumulative utility, thus considerably improving previously-known regret bounds.

This paper makes a formal connection between two families of widely used matrix factorization algorithms in numerical linear algebra. One family consists of the Jacobi eigenvalue algorithm and its variants for computing the Hermitian eigendecomposition and singular value decomposition. The other consists of Gaussian elimination and the Gram-Schmidt procedure with various pivoting rules for computing the Cholesky decomposition and QR decomposition respectively. Both families are cast as special cases of a more general class of factorization algorithms. We provide a randomized pivoting rule that applies to this general class (which differs substantially from the usual pivoting rules for Gaussian elimination / Gram-Schmidt) which results in the same linear rate of convergence for each algorithm, irrespective of which factorization it computes. A second important consequence of this randomized pivoting rule is a provable, effective bound on the numerical stability of the Jacobi eigenvalue algorithm, which addresses a longstanding open problem of Demmel and Veseli\'c `92.

We consider the problem of estimating (diagonally dominant) M-matrices as precision matrices in Gaussian graphical models. These models exhibit intriguing properties, such as the existence of the maximum likelihood estimator with merely two observations for M-matrices lauritzen2019maximum,slawski2015estimation and even one observation for diagonally dominant M-matrices truell2021maximum. We propose an adaptive multiple-stage estimation method that refines the estimate by solving a weighted ell_1-regularized problem at each stage. Furthermore, we develop a unified framework based on the gradient projection method to solve the regularized problem, incorporating distinct projections to handle the constraints of M-matrices and diagonally dominant M-matrices. A theoretical analysis of the estimation error is provided. Our method outperforms state-of-the-art methods in precision matrix estimation and graph edge identification, as evidenced by synthetic and financial time-series data sets.

In order for agents in multi-agent systems (MAS) to be safe, they need to take into account the risks posed by the actions of other agents. However, the dominant paradigm in game theory (GT) assumes that agents are not affected by risk from other agents and only strive to maximise their expected utility. For example, in hybrid human-AI driving systems, it is necessary to limit large deviations in reward resulting from car crashes. Although there are equilibrium concepts in game theory that take into account risk aversion, they either assume that agents are risk-neutral with respect to the uncertainty caused by the actions of other agents, or they are not guaranteed to exist. We introduce a new GT-based Risk-Averse Equilibrium (RAE) that always produces a solution that minimises the potential variance in reward accounting for the strategy of other agents. Theoretically and empirically, we show RAE shares many properties with a Nash Equilibrium (NE), establishing convergence properties and generalising to risk-dominant NE in certain cases. To tackle large-scale problems, we extend RAE to the PSRO multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) framework. We empirically demonstrate the minimum reward variance benefits of RAE in matrix games with high-risk outcomes. Results on MARL experiments show RAE generalises to risk-dominant NE in a trust dilemma game and that it reduces instances of crashing by 7x in an autonomous driving setting versus the best performing baseline.

Designing an optimum portfolio that allocates weights to its constituent stocks in a way that achieves the best trade-off between the return and the risk is a challenging research problem. The classical mean-variance theory of portfolio proposed by Markowitz is found to perform sub-optimally on the real-world stock market data since the error in estimation for the expected returns adversely affects the performance of the portfolio. This paper presents three approaches to portfolio design, viz, the minimum risk portfolio, the optimum risk portfolio, and the Eigen portfolio, for seven important sectors of the Indian stock market. The daily historical prices of the stocks are scraped from Yahoo Finance website from January 1, 2016, to December 31, 2020. Three portfolios are built for each of the seven sectors chosen for this study, and the portfolios are analyzed on the training data based on several metrics such as annualized return and risk, weights assigned to the constituent stocks, the correlation heatmaps, and the principal components of the Eigen portfolios. Finally, the optimum risk portfolios and the Eigen portfolios for all sectors are tested on their return over a period of a six-month period. The performances of the portfolios are compared and the portfolio yielding the higher return for each sector is identified.

Machine learning models are increasingly used to automate decisions that affect humans - deciding who should receive a loan, a job interview, or a social service. In such applications, a person should have the ability to change the decision of a model. When a person is denied a loan by a credit score, for example, they should be able to alter its input variables in a way that guarantees approval. Otherwise, they will be denied the loan as long as the model is deployed. More importantly, they will lack the ability to influence a decision that affects their livelihood. In this paper, we frame these issues in terms of recourse, which we define as the ability of a person to change the decision of a model by altering actionable input variables (e.g., income vs. age or marital status). We present integer programming tools to ensure recourse in linear classification problems without interfering in model development. We demonstrate how our tools can inform stakeholders through experiments on credit scoring problems. Our results show that recourse can be significantly affected by standard practices in model development, and motivate the need to evaluate recourse in practice.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable progress in reasoning, yet sometimes produce responses that are suboptimal for users in tasks such as writing, information seeking, or providing practical guidance. Conventional alignment practices typically assume that maximizing model reward also maximizes user welfare, but this assumption frequently fails in practice: models may over-clarify or generate overly verbose reasoning when users prefer concise answers. Such behaviors resemble the prisoner's dilemma, where individually rational choices lead to socially suboptimal outcomes. The fundamental challenge is the lack of a principled decision making mechanism that mutually benefits both the LLM and the user. We propose Game-Theoretic Alignment (GTAlign), an alignment framework that integrates game-theoretic decision making into both reasoning and training. During reasoning, the model explicitly treats user-LLM interaction as a strategic game: it constructs payoff matrices within its reasoning chain to estimate welfare for both itself and the user, and then selects actions that are mutually beneficial. During training, we introduce a mutual welfare reward that reinforces cooperative responses, aligning model behavior with socially efficient outcomes. In addition, we introduce an inference technique that leverages game-theoretic reasoning to dynamically adapt LLM's response when pricing policies of LLM service change. Extensive experiments demonstrate that GTAlign substantially improves reasoning efficiency, answer quality, and mutual welfare compared to baselines across diverse tasks. The code is available at https://github.com/ulab-uiuc/GTAlign .

Efficiently training a multi-task neural solver for various combinatorial optimization problems (COPs) has been less studied so far. In this paper, we propose a general and efficient training paradigm based on multi-armed bandits to deliver a unified combinarotial multi-task neural solver. To this end, we resort to the theoretical loss decomposition for multiple tasks under an encoder-decoder framework, which enables more efficient training via proper bandit task-sampling algorithms through an intra-task influence matrix. Our method achieves much higher overall performance with either limited training budgets or the same training epochs, compared to standard training schedules, which can be promising for advising efficient training of other multi-task large models. Additionally, the influence matrix can provide empirical evidence of some common practices in the area of learning to optimize, which in turn supports the validity of our approach.

Given only a few observed entries from a low-rank matrix X, matrix completion is the problem of imputing the missing entries, and it formalizes a wide range of real-world settings that involve estimating missing data. However, when there are too few observed entries to complete the matrix, what other aspects of the underlying matrix can be reliably recovered? We study one such problem setting, that of "one-sided" matrix completion, where our goal is to recover the right singular vectors of X, even in the regime where recovering the left singular vectors is impossible, which arises when there are more rows than columns and very few observations. We propose a natural algorithm that involves imputing the missing values of the matrix X^TX and show that even with only two observations per row in X, we can provably recover X^TX as long as we have at least Omega(r^2 d log d) rows, where r is the rank and d is the number of columns. We evaluate our algorithm on one-sided recovery of synthetic data and low-coverage genome sequencing. In these settings, our algorithm substantially outperforms standard matrix completion and a variety of direct factorization methods.

This paper investigates the rationality of large language models (LLMs) in strategic decision-making contexts, specifically within the framework of game theory. We evaluate several state-of-the-art LLMs across a spectrum of complete-information and incomplete-information games. Our findings reveal that LLMs frequently deviate from rational strategies, particularly as the complexity of the game increases with larger payoff matrices or deeper sequential trees. To address these limitations, we design multiple game-theoretic workflows that guide the reasoning and decision-making processes of LLMs. These workflows aim to enhance the models' ability to compute Nash Equilibria and make rational choices, even under conditions of uncertainty and incomplete information. Experimental results demonstrate that the adoption of these workflows significantly improves the rationality and robustness of LLMs in game-theoretic tasks. Specifically, with the workflow, LLMs exhibit marked improvements in identifying optimal strategies, achieving near-optimal allocations in negotiation scenarios, and reducing susceptibility to exploitation during negotiations. Furthermore, we explore the meta-strategic considerations of whether it is rational for agents to adopt such workflows, recognizing that the decision to use or forgo the workflow constitutes a game-theoretic issue in itself. Our research contributes to a deeper understanding of LLMs' decision-making capabilities in strategic contexts and provides insights into enhancing their rationality through structured workflows. The findings have implications for the development of more robust and strategically sound AI agents capable of navigating complex interactive environments. Code and data supporting this study are available at https://github.com/Wenyueh/game_theory.

Risk parity, also known as equal risk contribution, has recently gained increasing attention as a portfolio allocation method. However, solving portfolio weights must resort to numerical methods as the analytic solution is not available. This study improves two existing iterative methods: the cyclical coordinate descent (CCD) and Newton methods. We enhance the CCD method by simplifying the formulation using a correlation matrix and imposing an additional rescaling step. We also suggest an improved initial guess inspired by the CCD method for the Newton method. Numerical experiments show that the improved CCD method performs the best and is approximately three times faster than the original CCD method, saving more than 40% of the iterations.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

This paper gives three formulas for the pseudoinverse of a matrix product A = CR. The first is sometimes correct, the second is always correct, and the third is almost never correct. But that third randomized pseudoinverse A^+_r may be very useful when A is a very large matrix. 1. A^+ = R^+C^+ when A = CR and C has independent columns and R has independent rows. 2. A^+ = (C^+CR)^+(CRR^+)^+ is always correct. 3. A^+_r = (P^TCR)^+P^TCRQ(CRQ)^+ = A^+ only when rank(P^TA) = rank(AQ) = rank(A) with A = CR.

Implementing quantum game theory on real hardware is challenging due to noise, decoherence, and limited qubit connectivity, yet such demonstrations are essential to validate theoretical predictions. We present one of the first full experimental realizations of the Battle of the Sexes game under the Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein (EWL) framework on IBM Quantum's ibm sherbrooke superconducting processor. Four quantum strategies (I, H, R(pi/4), R(pi)) were evaluated across 31 entanglement values gamma in [0, pi] using 2048 shots per configuration, enabling a direct comparison between analytical predictions and hardware execution. To mitigate noise and variability, we introduce a Guided Circuit Mapping (GCM) method that dynamically selects qubit pairs and optimizes routing based on real-time topology and calibration data. The analytical model forecasts up to 108% payoff improvement over the classical equilibrium, and despite hardware-induced deviations, experimental results with GCM preserve the expected payoff trends within 3.5%-12% relative error. These findings show that quantum advantages in strategic coordination can persist under realistic NISQ conditions, providing a pathway toward practical applications of quantum game theory in multi-agent, economic, and distributed decision-making systems.

In pursuit of participatory budgeting (PB) outcomes with broader fairness guarantees, we initiate the study of lotteries over discrete PB outcomes. As the projects have heterogeneous costs, the amount spent may not be equal ex ante and ex post. To address this, we develop a technique to bound the amount by which the ex-post spend differs from the ex-ante spend -- the property is termed budget balanced up to one project (BB1). With respect to fairness, we take a best-of-both-worlds perspective, seeking outcomes that are both ex-ante and ex-post fair. Towards this goal, we initiate a study of ex-ante fairness properties in PB, including Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS) and their stronger variants, as well as Group Fair Share (GFS). We show several incompatibility results between these ex-ante fairness notions and existing ex-post concepts based on justified representation. One of our main contributions is a randomized algorithm which simultaneously satisfies ex-ante Strong UFS, ex-post full justified representation (FJR) and ex-post BB1 for PB with binary utilities.

In recent years, multiple notions of algorithmic fairness have arisen. One such notion is individual fairness (IF), which requires that individuals who are similar receive similar treatment. In parallel, matrix estimation (ME) has emerged as a natural paradigm for handling noisy data with missing values. In this work, we connect the two concepts. We show that pre-processing data using ME can improve an algorithm's IF without sacrificing performance. Specifically, we show that using a popular ME method known as singular value thresholding (SVT) to pre-process the data provides a strong IF guarantee under appropriate conditions. We then show that, under analogous conditions, SVT pre-processing also yields estimates that are consistent and approximately minimax optimal. As such, the ME pre-processing step does not, under the stated conditions, increase the prediction error of the base algorithm, i.e., does not impose a fairness-performance trade-off. We verify these results on synthetic and real data.