Submitted by shaflow2, also found by Spearmint
https://github.com/code-423n4/2025-01-pump-science/blob/768ef58478724bf6b464c9f0952e3e5a3b2a2613/programs/pump-science/src/instructions/migration/lock_pool.rs#L149
The lock_pool operation requires the creation of a lockEscrow account. However, a malicious actor could preemptively create the lockEscrow account, causing the create_lock_escrow transaction to fail and resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS) for the lock_pool operation.
During the lock_pool process, the create_lock_escrow function is called to create the lock_escrow account.
However, the lock_escrow account is derived using the pool and owner as seeds, and its creation does not require the owners signature. This means that a malicious actor could preemptively create the lock_escrow account to perform a DoS attack on the lock_pool operation.
In the lock_pool process, check if the lock_escrow exists. If it exists, skip the creation process.
Kulture (Pump Science) confirmed
