Submitted by LeoGold, also found by 0x0107, 0xvd, Abysser, air_0x, Bauchibred, Bryan_Conquer, d3e4, francoHacker, Hueber, hyuunn, Infect3d, Kaysoft, KodoSec, komane007, Lamsy, LhoussainePh, MSK, ok567, owanemi, oxchsyston, patitonar, phoenixV110, pindarev, santipu_, SBSecurity, Sherlock__VARM, tourist, unnamed, and vangrim
https://github.com/code-423n4/2025-01-next-generation/blob/499cfa50a56126c0c3c6caa30808d79f82d31e34/contracts/Forwarder.sol#L32-L38
https://github.com/code-423n4/2025-01-next-generation/blob/499cfa50a56126c0c3c6caa30808d79f82d31e34/contracts/Forwarder.sol#L93-L118
Without a deadline parameter, each ForwardRequest is potentially valid indefinitely. This means that once a request is signed, it can be executed at any point in the future, provided that the nonce has not yet been used. If a request remains valid forever without a deadline, allowing it to be executed much later than the signer might have intended. This can lead to situations where the execution context (e.g., market conditions, contract states) has drastically changed from when the request was originally signed. Signers have no mechanism to limit the time window during which their request is valid, reducing their control over their own transactions.
In Token.js add the above it block to the TRANSFER describe block in the FORWARDER describe and run the test.
LOGS:
Adjust the ForwardRequest struct to include a deadline parameter. Consider implementing logic within the contracts execution function to check the current block timestamp against the requests deadline; rejecting any requests that are past their expiration. You can check the standard that was followed in implementing the forwarder in openGSN codebase here.
0xsomeone (judge) commented:
The Trusted forwarder related issues highlighted below are from the report by patitonar, which received the top score from the judge. Note: these were originally submitted as L-01 and L-02.
