The issue is related to how protocol fees are calculated. Specifically, applying fees to the already-paid fees (fee-on-fee logic) can create several risks that affect both the protocols revenue and user interactions. 
The flash() function attempts to collect protocol fees based on the total amount repaid (paid0 and paid1), which includes both the original loan amount and the loan fee. This introduces a compounding fee effect, where the protocol effectively taxes itself by charging fees on both the base amount and the fee amount. Specifically, applying fees to the already-paid fees (fee-on-fee logic) .
https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-10-ramses-exchange/blob/4a40eba36bc47eba8179d4f6203a4b84561a4415/contracts/CL/core/RamsesV3Pool.sol#L707-L716
Reduce the fee0 and fee1 from paid0 and paid1.
