Submitted by Ch_301, also found by Ch_301
https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-09-fenix-finance/blob/main/contracts/core/VoterUpgradeableV2.sol#L485
https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-09-fenix-finance/blob/main/contracts/core/VoterUpgradeableV2.sol#L448
The VoterUpgradeableV2.sol contract has the function attachToManagedNFT(), users use it to delegate their veFNX voting power to a mVeNFT. One of the things this function does after receiving the new voting power is sub-call to _poke() and it will update the last voted timestamp of the mVeNFT.
At this point, the mVeNFT cant trigger the vote function until the next epoch starts due to the _checkVoteDelay(). Even this check inside the vote() doesnt help in this case.
However, to make things worse this protocol is deployed on Blast transactions are too cheap
malicious users can keep creating new locks every epoch with one wei in amount  to bypass the zero check.
Then at the start of every new epoch (after the start of the voting window), just call attachToManagedNFT(). By doing this it keeps forcing the mVeNFT to vote to the same gauges.
DOS attack where mVeNFT cant invoke the vote function to change the weight of gauges; mVeNFT cant reset its votes.
One solution is to not check the vote delay, However, I believe this comes with some trade-offs.
DoS
b-hrytsak (Fenix) confirmed and commented via duplicate Issue #9:
alcueca (judge) decreased severity to Medium
