First, note that the protocol allows borrowers to set a reserve ratio that they must maintain to avoid being charged a delinquency fee.
Now, see https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-08-wildcat/blob/fe746cc0fbedc4447a981a50e6ba4c95f98b9fe1/src/access/MarketConstraintHooks.sol#L44-L45
From here we can see that the maximum acceptable value for this is 10_000.
Now when creating the market, this is called: https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-08-wildcat/blob/fe746cc0fbedc4447a981a50e6ba4c95f98b9fe1/src/access/MarketConstraintHooks.sol#L136-L150
Issue however is that the value of the reserve ratio is allowed to be equal to this maximum, see https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-08-wildcat/blob/fe746cc0fbedc4447a981a50e6ba4c95f98b9fe1/src/access/MarketConstraintHooks.sol#L76-L114
Which calls https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-08-wildcat/blob/fe746cc0fbedc4447a981a50e6ba4c95f98b9fe1/src/access/MarketConstraintHooks.sol#L57-L69
If this happens however, this then means that the entire functionality is now redundant, as borrowers would not be able to withdraw any funds from the market. 
As hinted under Proof of Concept, borrowers would not be able to withdraw any funds from the market. Additionally the market would fall into delinquency immediately after the start.
Consider having a lesser BIP max value for the reserve ratio, or better still introduce a different helper functionality that ensure the value of reserveRatioBips is strictly less than MaximumReserveRatioBips
