https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-07-loopfi/blob/57871f64bdea450c1f04c9a53dc1a78223719164/src/StakingLPEth.sol#L88-L100
This function is used to claim the staking amount after the cooldown has finished or if a cooldown is not set.
Now, the setCooldownDuration() function is used to update the cooldown duration:
https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-07-loopfi/blob/57871f64bdea450c1f04c9a53dc1a78223719164/src/StakingLPEth.sol#L130-L139
This means if there is a decision to set back a duration for cooldown in other to stop any black swan event or whatsoever users should not be allowed to sidestep this. However, the issue is since the setCooldownDuration function and the contract as a whole is not pausable, this allows a user to always watch the mempool after the duration is initially set to 0 for when it would be updated to a real value, allowing them to completely sidestep the duration by frontrunning the call to the setCooldownDuration function and withdraw without any delays.
Likelihood is quite low, but a malicious user can frontrun the call to and sidestep the cooldown duration.
Consider making the contract pausable and then having the whenNotPaused modifier to unstake() this way the function could be first paused and then.
