Submitted by sl1 and also 0xCiphky.
https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-07-karak-findings/issues/55
Before mitigation, when deploying a new NativeVault, the operator could set manager, slashStore and nodeImplementation to anything. This happened because vaultConfig.extraData lacked input validation when calling deployVaults(). The impacts of the original issue were the ability of operator to create a NativeVault that can be silently unslashable and escalate his rights, obtaining a privileged role that will allow him to steal users funds. 
The mitigation removes the slashStore variable altogether and NativeVault burns the slashed ETH directly by itself. The current mitigation does not address all of the impacts of the original issue. As currently operator can still escalate his rights and steal users funds.
As can be seen, when deployVaults() is called with vaultConfigs passed by an operator, the variables is passed to createVault() unvalidated.
CoreLib.sol#L133-L141
After cloning a vault, createVault initializes it with the configuration passed by the operator.
CoreLib.sol#L107
When initialize() is called, the extraData parameter is decoded into manager and nodeImplementation which are only validated to not be address(0).
NativeVault.sol#L59-L62
This allows an operator to set himself as a manager and call restricted functions,  such as changeNodeImplementation() to change the implementation to a malicious one, which would allow him to steal stakers funds.
Preset the NativeNodes implementation and only allow the owner of the NativeVault to change it.
karan-andalusia (Karak) commented:
MiloTruck (judge) commented:
