Submitted by lightoasis, also found by 0xleadwizard, wangxx2026, alexfilippov314, ladboy233, and Tendency
Signatures can be replayed in withdraw() to withdraw more tokens than the user originally intended.
In the TimelockTokenPool.sol contracts, users can provide a signature to allow someone else to withdraw all their withdrawable tokens on their behalf using their signature. TimelockTokenPool.sol#L170)  
As seen from above, the signature provided does not include a nonce and this can lead to signature replay attacks. Due to the lack of a nonce,  withdraw() can be called multiple times with the same signature. Therefore, if a user provides a signature to withdraw all his withdrawable tokens at one particular time, an attacker can repeatedly call withdraw() with the same signature to withdraw more tokens than the user originally intended.
The vulnerability is similar to Arbitrum H-01 where  users signatures could be replayed to use up more votes than a user intended due to a lack of nonce.
Consider using a nonce or other signature replay protection in the TimelockTokenPool contract.
dantaik (Taiko) confirmed and commented:
