Submitted by Bauchibred
Take a look at https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-03-abracadabra-money/blob/1f4693fdbf33e9ad28132643e2d6f7635834c6c6/src/mimswap/periphery/Factory.sol#L81-L90
We can see that this function uses the create() logic and depends on the tx.origin, now Blast is suspicious of a reorg attack and protocol would be deployed on here.
Where as one can assume that the tx.origin should be different for different calls this is not really the case as going to the Blast Explorer for transactions that are currently enqueued we can see that only two addresses are rampant as the tx.origin, i.e 0x4b16E5d33D7ab3864d53aAec93c8301C1FA4a226 and 0x6e5572f31bd9385709ec61305Afc749F0fa8fae1 what this leads is the fact that another user can just wait and due to a re-org take control of the magic lp deployment, since the tx.origin in this case would be the same with original deployers own.
Now, if users rely on the address derivation in advance or try to deploy the magiclp with the same address, any funds/tokens sent to it could potentially be withdrawn by anyone else. All in all, it could lead to the theft of user funds.
Try the deployment using create2 with salt that includes real msg.sender.
0xCalibur (Abracadabra) acknowledged and commented:
cccz (Judge) commented:
Bauchibred (Warden) commented:
cccz (Judge) commented:
