Submitted by Banditx0x, also found by Hajime, oakcobalt, 0xGreyWolf, Tripathi, PENGUN, Krace, 00xSEV (1, 2), 0xmuxyz, b0g0 (1, 2), Jorgect, Kaysoft, and djxploit
https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-01-salty/blob/53516c2cdfdfacb662cdea6417c52f23c94d5b5b/src/dao/DAO.sol#L316 
https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-01-salty/blob/53516c2cdfdfacb662cdea6417c52f23c94d5b5b/src/dao/DAO.sol#L360
formPOL can be vulnerable to a well known liquidity deposit sandwich attack causing loss of funds for the protocol.
In formPOL, there are no slippage parameters when calling depositLiquidityAndIncreaseShare
All liquidity deposits in a Uniswap v2 style pool can be frontrun by this sequence of steps:
Liquidity withdrawals in a x * y = k pool are actually rarely profitable to frontrun attack (it requires certain edge cases), as the same sequence actually loses money if it is a liquidity withdrawals, which is why withdrawPOL wasnt explicitly mentioned. However, this issue also applies to withdrawPOL and adding slippage protection in that function could be an extra safety measure.
formPOL should have some form of slippage protection. This could be based off a maximum deviation off some other price feed such a Uniswap v3 TWAP or Chainlink pricefeed. If the pool reserves deviates too much from the expected ratio from the price feed, formPOL should revert.
othernet-global (Salty.IO) acknowledged and commented:
Picodes (Judge) decreased severity to Medium and commented:
othernet-global (Salty.IO) commented:
Status: Mitigation confirmed. Full details in reports from 0xpiken, zzebra83, and t0x1c.
