Submitted by 0xpiken, also found by hals, trachev, hash, rbserver, evmboi32, bareli, OMEN, Kalyan-Singh, Topmark, kaden, and peter
A malicious user could potentially fulfill all PAY orders that own the same value of zonehash.
The rental process in reNFT can simply be described as follows:
Lets take a look at RentPayload and its referenced structures:
By observing all items in Rentpayload, its obvious that there is no way to verify whether the signature of a payload has been used or not. The signature verification can always be passed as long as it has not expired.
If multiple PAY rental orders own the same metadata, a user could potentially utilize their payload and unexpired signature to fulfill all these rental orders and acquire rental earnings. Since OrderMetadata structure is very simple, the chance that two different orders own same metadata could be high.
Update testcase test_stopRentBatch_payOrders_allDifferentLenders()in StopRentBatch.t.sol with below codes and run forge test --match-test test_stopRentBatch_payOrders_allDifferentLenders:
You may find out that all extraData are same although the rental orders are created by different lenders.
Introduces a field into RentPayload to ensure every payload unique. It is feasible using orderHash of the rental order:
0xean (Judge) decreased severity to Medium
Alec1017 (reNFT) confirmed via duplicate #239
reNFT mitigated:
Status: Mitigation confirmed. Full details in reports from juancito, EV_om and sin1st3r__.
