Submitted by 0x73696d616f
Users can avoid being liquidated if they frontrun liquidation calls with a liquidate call with 1 wei. Or, they may do a partial liquidation and avoid being liquidated before the interest reaches the value of the debt pre liquidation. The total interest stored in __posBorrInfos[_posId].borrExtraInfos[_pool].totalInterest would also be wrong.
The POS_MANAGER stores the total interest in __posBorrInfos[_posId].borrExtraInfos[_pool].totalInterest. Function updatePosDebtShares() assumes that ILendingPool(_pool).debtShareToAmtCurrent(currDebtShares) is always increasing, but this is not the case, as a liquidation may happen that reduces the current debt amount. This leads to calls to updatePosDebtShares() reverting.
The most relevant is when liquidating, such that users could liquidate themselves for small amounts (1) and prevent liqudiations in the same block. This is because the debt accrual happens over time, so if the block.timestamp is the same, no debt accrual will happen. Thus, if a liquidate call with 1 amount frontruns a liquidate call with any amount, the second call will revert.
A user could still stop liquidations for as long as the accrued interest doesnt reach the last debt value before liquidation, if the user liquidated a bigger part of the debt.
Add the following test to TestInitCore.sol:
Vscode, Foundry
Update the users last debt position __posBorrInfos[_posId].borrExtraInfos[_pool].totalInterest on _repay().
fez-init (INIT) confirmed
hansfriese (Judge) commented:
