Note: At the judges request here, this downgraded issue from the same warden has been included in this report for completeness.
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-zetachain/blob/main/repos/node/x/crosschain/keeper/gas_payment.go#L289
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-zetachain/blob/main/repos/node/x/crosschain/keeper/keeper_cross_chain_tx_vote_outbound_tx.go#L169-L172
Normal cost of an ERC20 transfer on Ethereum is around 65000 gas unit. User on Ethereum (or any EVM supported chain) can send their wZETA to another EVM supported chain (thanks to CCTX), which from a user perspective should be similar in terms of cost of a normal ERC20.
Unfortunatelly, this is not the reality, in some case this could imply a huge cost or fund loss for the user which seems to warrant High severity.
High gas fees or fund loss when deposting wZETA to an external chain during the refund flow (see PoC).
Here are two undesired scenario that can occur depending on the inputs:
Lets consider the CCTX flow described in the whitepaper as follow for Cross-Chain Message Passing.
Let say Alice want to send 200 wZETA from Ethereum to BSC using ZetaConnector.eth::send. 
This is where there is an issue in the code. Lets examine more in details VoteOnObservedOutboundTx when the ballot is finalized.
The understanding of a gaslimit is that you can put very high limit to be sure your transaction doesnt lack gas and revert in the middle, as you know the remaining gas will be refunded to you. The problem here is that this is not the case, as Zeta makes the user pay in advance for the gas the TSS will spend to send the refund transaction on the sender chain (Ethereum).
As we can see, gasLimit is assigned to the new OutboundTxParams OutboundTxGasLimit: gasLimit and then PayGasAndUpdateCctx is called.
PayGasInZetaAndUpdateCctx is then called as working with common.CoinTypeZeta, and the function will consume [ALL the gaslimit](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-zetachain/blob/main/repos/node/x/crosschain/keeper/gaspayment.go#L289).
GetRevertGasLimit is called in two places as follow. The comment fallback -- should not happen is actually true for InboundTx, its a dead code path. On the other hand, its an active path for OutboundTx and cause this high severity report.
VoteOnObservedInboundTx
I would recommend to remove the dead code path and have no fallback, the code path is anyway dead, so keeping it there make the code more vulnerable.
VoteOnObservedOutboundTx
 I understand that this will also impact the Inbound flow, but seems a noop as a failure in k.HandleEVMDeposit will always return isContractReverted false which would not reach this code path.
