Submitted by degensec, also found by KmanOfficial, QiuhaoLi, jasonxiale, bart1e, nirlin, pep7siup, qpzm, ubermensch, peanuts, tapir, kutugu, mert_eren, WoolCentaur, peakbolt, ayden, 0xnev, T1MOH, HChang26, Yanchuan, 0x3b, and wintermute
ReLPContract contains logic that removes WETH-RDPX liquidity from Uniswap V2, swaps some amount WETH to RDPX and re-adds the liquidity.
The calculation logic for the amount of tokens to swap is unreliable and sometimes reverts or leaves dust WETH in the reLP contract. WETH cannot be recovered unless another reLP operation is triggered. However, since reLP-ing is accessible to all users in the bonding logic in RdpxV2Core, the contract may be griefed on an ongoing basis, intentional or not.
The presence of excess WETH also means that the total value of the LP decreases abnormally after each reLP operation.
The following Foundry test demonstrates the vulnerability.
Optimal One-sided Supply to Uniswap 
There is an analytic formula to provide one-sided liquidity to Uniswap V2 without leaving dust. This formula can be adapted to ReLPs use-case such that reLPFactor specifies what part of the WETH make-up of the position will be swapped to RDPX according to the formula.
Still, up to 2 wei of dust may be left after the operation, so the remainding RDPX and WETH should be sent to the core contract.
Alex the Entreprenerd (Judge) decreased severity to Medium
