Submitted by peakbolt, also found by carrotsmuggler, Nyx, n1punp, Ack, and rvierdiiev
https://github.com/Tapioca-DAO/tapioca-bar-audit/blob/master/contracts/markets/singularity/SGLLiquidation.sol#L337-L340 
https://github.com/Tapioca-DAO/tapioca-bar-audit/blob/2286f80f928f41c8bc189d0657d74ba83286c668/contracts/markets/bigBang/BigBang.sol#L603-L606
In Singularity and BigBang, the minAssetAmount in _liquidateUser() is provided by the liquidator as a slippage protection to ensure that the swap provides the specified amountOut. However, the same value is utilized even when liquidate() is used to liquidate multiple borrowers.
https://github.com/Tapioca-DAO/tapioca-bar-audit/blob/master/contracts/markets/singularity/SGLLiquidation.sol#L337-L351
Using the same minAssetAmount (minimum amountOut for swap) for the liquidation of multiple borrowers will result in inaccurate slippage protection and transaction failure.
If minAssetAmount is too low, there will be insufficient slippage protection and the the liquidator and protocol could be short changed with a worse than expected swap.
If minAssetAmount is too high, the liquidation will fail as the swap will not be successful.
First scenario
The result is that the liquidator will receive a fraction of the expected reward and the protocol gets repaid at 1/5 of the price, suffering a loss from the swap.
Second scenario
Now the minAssetAmount of 1000 USDO will be higher than the collateral, which is unlikely to be completed as it is higher than market price. That will revert the entire liquidate(), causing the liquidation of Loan X to fail as well.
Update liquidate() to allow liquidator to pass in an array of minAssetAmount values that corresponding to the liquidated borrower.
An alternative, is to pass in the minimum expected price of the collateral and use that to compute the minAssetAmount.
0xRektora (Tapioca) confirmed via duplicate issue 122
