Submitted by ABA, also found by juancito, ToonVH, 0xWaitress, ABA, MiloTruck, rvierdiiev, 8olidity, bughunter007, and bytes032.
In order to withdraw funds from the project a user has to:
Queuing a withdrawal, via queueWithdrawal modifies all internal accounting to reflect this:
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-eigenlayer/blob/main/src/contracts/core/StrategyManager.sol#L345-L346
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-eigenlayer/blob/main/src/contracts/core/StrategyManager.sol#L370
and saves the withdrawal hash in order to be used in completeQueuedWithdrawal(s).
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-eigenlayer/blob/main/src/contracts/core/StrategyManager.sol#L400-L415
In other words, it is final (as there is no cancelWithdrawl mechanism implemented). When executing completeQueuedWithdrawal(s), the withdraw function of the strategy is called (if receiveAsTokens is set to true).
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-eigenlayer/blob/main/src/contracts/core/StrategyManager.sol#L786-L789
In this case, a malicious strategy can always revert, blocking the user from retrieving his tokens. If a user sets receiveAsTokens to false, the other case, then the tokens will be added as shares to the delegation contract
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-eigenlayer/blob/main/src/contracts/core/StrategyManager.sol#L797-L800
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-eigenlayer/blob/main/src/contracts/core/StrategyManager.sol#L646-L647
This still poses a problem because the increaseDelegatedShares functions counterpart, decreaseDelegatedShares, is only callable by the strategy manager (for users to indirectly get their rewards worth back, via this workaround).
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-eigenlayer/blob/main/src/contracts/core/DelegationManager.sol#L168-L179
But in StrategyManager, there are only 3 cases where this is called, none of which is beneficial for the user:
In other words, the workaround (of setting receiveAsTokens to false in completeQueuedWithdrawal(s)) just leaves the funds accounted and stuck in DelegationManager.
In both cases, all shares/tokens associated with other strategies in the pending withdrawal are permanently blocked.
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-eigenlayer/blob/main/src/contracts/core/StrategyManager.sol#L786-L789
Add a cancelQueuedWithdrawl function that will undo the accounting and cancel out any dependency on the malicious strategy. Although this solution may create a front-running opportunity for when their withdrawal will be slashed via slashQueuedWithdrawal, there may exist workarounds to this.
Another possibility is to implement a similar mechanism to how slashQueuedWithdrawal treats malicious strategies: adding a list of strategy indices to skip.
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-eigenlayer/blob/main/src/contracts/core/StrategyManager.sol#L532-L535 https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-eigenlayer/blob/main/src/contracts/core/StrategyManager.sol#L560-L566
DoS
Sidu28 (EigenLayer) disagreed with severity and commented:
Alex the Entreprenerd (judge) commented:
Alex the Entreprenerd (judge) decreased severity to Medium and commented:
ChaoticWalrus (EigenLayer) commented:
ABA (warden) commented: 
ChaoticWalrus (EigenLayer) commented:
ChaoticWalrus (EigenLayer) commented:
Alex the Entreprenerd (judge) commented:
ChaoticWalrus (EigenLayer) commented:
Alex the Entreprenerd (judge) commented:
For this audit, 15 reports were submitted by wardens detailing low risk and non-critical issues. The report highlighted below by volodya received the top score from the judge.
The following wardens also submitted reports: libratus,
Cyfrin,
niser93,
juancito,
btk,
QiuhaoLi,
Aymen0909,
0xnev,
ABA,
RaymondFam,
sashik_eth,
0xWaitress,
ihtishamsudo and
bughunter007.
