Submitted by minhquanym
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-malt/blob/700f9b468f9cf8c9c5cffaa1eba1b8dea40503f9/contracts/StabilityPod/StabilizerNode.sol#L161 
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-malt/blob/700f9b468f9cf8c9c5cffaa1eba1b8dea40503f9/contracts/DataFeed/MaltDataLab.sol#L326
MaltDataLab fetched priceCumulative directly from Uniswap V2 pool to calculate price of Malt token. However, it is noticed that Uniswap V2 pool use Solidity 0.5.16, which does not revert when overflow happen. In addition, it is actually commented in Uniswap code that
https://github.com/Uniswap/v2-core/blob/ee547b17853e71ed4e0101ccfd52e70d5acded58/contracts/UniswapV2Pair.sol#L77-L81
However, MaltDataLab contracts use Solidity 0.8 and will revert when overflow. It will break the stabilize() function and always revert since stabilize() call to MaltDataLab contract to get state.
Please note that, with Solidity 0.5.16, when result of addition bigger than max(uint256), it will overflow without any errors. For example, max(uint256) + 2 = 1.
So when price0CumulativeLast is overflow, the new value of price0CumulativeLast will be smaller than old value. As the result, when MaltDataLab doing a subtraction to calculate current price, it might get revert.
Function stabilize() will call to MaltDataLab.trackPool() first:
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-malt/blob/700f9b468f9cf8c9c5cffaa1eba1b8dea40503f9/contracts/StabilityPod/StabilizerNode.sol#L163
Function trackPool() used a formula that will revert when priceCumulative overflow in Uniswap pool. 
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-malt/blob/700f9b468f9cf8c9c5cffaa1eba1b8dea40503f9/contracts/DataFeed/MaltDataLab.sol#L323-L329
Scenario:
Consider using unchecked block to match handle overflow calculation in Uniswap V2.
0xScotch (Malt) confirmed
