Submitted by RaymondFam, also found by rbserver, nadin, kaden, pavankv, mert_eren, SaeedAlipoor01988, and Rolezn
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-timeswap/blob/main/packages/v2-option/src/TimeswapV2Option.sol#L145-L148 
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-timeswap/blob/main/packages/v2-option/src/TimeswapV2Option.sol#L235
According to Whitepaper 1.1 Permissionless:
In Timeswap, liquidity providers can create pools for any ERC20 pair, without permission. It is designed to be generalized and works
for any pair of tokens, at any time frame, and at any market state 
If fee on transfer token(s) is/are entailed, it will specifically make mint() and swap() revert in TimeswapV2Option.sol when checking if the token0 or token1 balance target is achieved.
File: TimeswapV2Option.sol#L144-L148
File: TimeswapV2Option.sol#L234-L235
File: Error.sol#L148-L153
As can be seen from the code blocks above, checkEnough() is meant to be reverting when token amount has not been received. But in the case of deflationary tokens, the error is going to be thrown even though the token amount has been received due to the fee factor making balance < balanceTarget, i.e the contract balance of token0 and/or token1 always less than currentProcess.balance0Target or currentProcess.balance1Target.
Consider:
vhawk19 (Timeswap) acknowledged and commented:
