Submitted by bin2chen, also found by Ch_301, rvierdiiev, and 0xTraub
Malicious vault owner can use Malicious \_beefyBooster to steal the adapters token.
When creating a BeefyAdapter, the vault owner can specify the \_beefyBooster.
The current implementation does not check if the \_beefyBooster is legitimate or not, and worse, it \_beefyVault.approve to the \_beefyBooster during initialization.
The code is as follows:
As a result, a malicious user can pass a malicious \_beefyBooster contract, and when the user deposits to the vault, the vault is saved to the \_beefyVault.
This malicious \_beefyBooster can execute \_beefyVault.transferFrom(BeefyAdapter), and take all the tokens stored by the adapter to \_beefyVault.
Check \_beefyBooster just like you check \_beefyVault:
RedVeil (Popcorn) confirmed 
