Submitted by Trust
\_constructOrder is called in propose(), OptimisticListingSeaport.sol. It fills the order params stored in proposedListings[_vault].
Importantly, it updates the order hash associated with the vault:
vaultOrderHash[_vault] = _getOrderHash(orderParams, counter);
There is only one other use of vaultOrderHash, in \_verifySale().
This function gets order information from the order hash, and makes sure the order is completely fulfilled.
After NFT sell has completed, cash() is used to distribute income ETH:
As long as sale is not complete, cash() cant be called as highlighted. The issue is that vaultOrderHash[_vault] is not protected during the lifetime of an active proposal. If another proposal is proposed and then the sell using active proposal takes place, cash() will keep reverting. Funds are stuck in listing contract.
We can try to be clever and call propose() again with the same parameters to create an identical orderID, which will make vaultOrderHash[_vault] fine again and allow cash() to go through. But order params contain block.timestamp which will certainly be different which will make the hash different.
Funds are permanently stuck in OptimisticListingSeaport.sol contract if active proposal is executed after new proposal is pending.
Keep the order hash in the Listing structure rather than a single one per vault.
mehtaculous (Tessera) confirmed and commented:
stevennevins (Tessera) mitigated:
