Submitted by stealthyz
https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-12-escher/blob/main/src/Escher.sol#L11
https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts-upgradeable/blob/65420cb9c943c32eb7e8c9da60183a413d90067a/contracts/access/AccessControlUpgradeable.sol#L150
https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-12-escher/blob/main/src/Escher721Factory.sol#L32
(
creator = has a CREATOR_ROLE in Escher.sol
non-creator = doesnt have a CREATOR_ROLE in Escher.sol
)
Currently creating an ERC721 edition via the Escher721Factory.sol contract requires a user to have the CREATOR_ROLE in the main Escher.sol contract.
This requirement would mean that only users with the aforementioned role can be admins of editions. This requirement can be bypassed by having a malicious creator create an edition for someone who doesnt have the  CREATOR_ROLE set by creating the edition and granting the DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE to the non-creator via AccessControl.sols grantRole() function. This way the non-creator can revoke the original creators roles in this edition and gain full ownership. Now this non-creator admin can create sales and operate as if he/she was a creator.
This defeats the point of having a role for creators and makes this function of the protocol not as described == faulty.
A creator can benefit from his role by taking in payments for creating ERC721 editions for other people. This would make sense so that his risk can be covered.
You can edit the Escher721.t.sol file to look like this and then run the test normally, everything should go through without errors:
This kind of attack/abuse is currently hard to track. There is no centralized database of created editions and their admins at the time of creations (i.e. a mapping). This makes it hard to track down malicious creators who create editions for other people. Looping through the emitted events and comparing current admins to the emitted admins is a hassle especially if this protocol gains a lot of traction in the future which I assume is the end goal here.
VS Code, Forge
In EscherERC721.sol implementation contract, it is recommended to override the grantRole() function of AccessControlUpgradeable.sol with something like:
This will disable the granting of roles after initialization. The initialization function already has the required granting of roles done and they cannot be changed after this fix.
Overall it would be recommended to store the created editions in a mapping for example to prevent problems like these.
stevennevins (Escher) confirmed 
For this contest, 34 reports were submitted by wardens detailing low risk and non-critical issues. The report highlighted below by 0xSmartContract received the top score from the judge.
The following wardens also submitted reports: TomJ,
seyni,
joestakey,
ajtra,
slvDev,
carrotsmuggler,
saian,
0xfuje,
nameruse,
immeas,
ladboy233,
adriro,
0xNazgul,
0xA5DF,
_Adam,
0xRobocop,
hansfriese,
0x4non,
zaskoh,
sakshamguruji,
0x1f8b,
yixxas,
HollaDieWaldfee,
cccz,
Lambda,
helios,
RaymondFam,
obront,
gasperpre,
Bnke0x0,
rvierdiiev,
oyc_109, and
danyams.
