Submitted by hansfriese, also found by carrotsmuggler, imare, nalus, 0xRobocop, Englave, Dinesh11G, hihen, danyams, MHKK33, Ruhum, and ahmedov
https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-12-escher/blob/5d8be6aa0e8634fdb2f328b99076b0d05fefab73/src/minters/FixedPriceFactory.sol#L29
https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-12-escher/blob/5d8be6aa0e8634fdb2f328b99076b0d05fefab73/src/minters/LPDAFactory.sol#L29
https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-12-escher/blob/5d8be6aa0e8634fdb2f328b99076b0d05fefab73/src/minters/OpenEditionFactory.sol#L29
For all kinds of sales, the creators create new sales contracts with arbitrary sale data, and the edition is not properly checked.
Malicious creators can create fake contracts that implemented IEscher721 and fake buyers to get free earnings.
Sales contracts can be created by any creator and the sale data is filled with the one provided by the creator.
The protocol does not validate the sale.edition provided by the creator and malicious creators can effectively use their fake contract address that implemented IEscher721.
In the worst case, buyers will not get anything after their payments.
Malicious creators can use a fake contract as an edition to steal funds from users.
Track all the deployed Escher721 contracts in the Escher721Factory.sol and validate the sale.edition before creating sales contracts.
stevennevins (Escher) disagreed with severity and commented:
berndartmueller (judge) decreased severity to Medium
