Submitted by rbserver, also found by 0xPanda, ReyAdmirado, Trust, Josiah, Franfran, pashov, Aymen0909, btk, zgo, Jeiwan, SmartSek, Awesome, shark, RaymondFam, trustindistrust, HE1M, and aphak5010
https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-11-stakehouse/blob/main/contracts/liquid-staking/LiquidStakingManager.sol#L278-L284
https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-11-stakehouse/blob/main/contracts/liquid-staking/LiquidStakingManager.sol#L684-L692
https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-11-stakehouse/blob/main/contracts/liquid-staking/LiquidStakingManager.sol#L426-L492
Calling the updateNodeRunnerWhitelistStatus function by the DAO supposes to allow the trusted node runners to use and interact with the protocol when enableWhitelisting is set to true. However, since calling the updateNodeRunnerWhitelistStatus function executes require(isNodeRunnerWhitelisted[_nodeRunner] != isNodeRunnerWhitelisted[_nodeRunner], "Unnecessary update to same status"), which always reverts, the DAO is unable to whitelist any trusted node runners. Because none of them can be whitelisted, all trusted node runners cannot call functions like registerBLSPublicKeys when the whitelisting mode is enabled. As the major functionalities become unavailable, the protocols usability becomes much limited, and the user experience becomes much degraded.
https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-11-stakehouse/blob/main/contracts/liquid-staking/LiquidStakingManager.sol#L278-L284
https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-11-stakehouse/blob/main/contracts/liquid-staking/LiquidStakingManager.sol#L684-L692
https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-11-stakehouse/blob/main/contracts/liquid-staking/LiquidStakingManager.sol#L426-L492
Please add the following test in test\foundry\LSDNFactory.t.sol. This test will pass to demonstrate the described scenario.
VSCode
https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-11-stakehouse/blob/main/contracts/liquid-staking/LiquidStakingManager.sol#L280 can be updated to the following code.
vince0656 (Stakehouse) confirmed
