Submitted by Jeiwan, also found by Trust, datapunk, immeas, JTJabba, arcoun, bin2chen, imare, wait, unforgiven, satoshipotato, ronnyx2017, Lambda, hihen, bitbopper, fs0c, banky, 9svR6w, c7e7eff, perseverancesuccess, 0xdeadbeef0x, and clems4ever
https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-11-stakehouse/blob/5f853d055d7aa1bebe9e24fd0e863ef58c004339/contracts/liquid-staking/GiantSavETHVaultPool.sol#L50
https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-11-stakehouse/blob/5f853d055d7aa1bebe9e24fd0e863ef58c004339/contracts/liquid-staking/GiantMevAndFeesPool.sol#L44
An attacker can withdraw all ETH staked by users in a Giant pool. Both GiantSavETHVaultPool and GiantMevAndFeesPool are affected.
The batchDepositETHForStaking function in the Giant pools check whether a provided vault is authentic by validating its liquid staking manager contract and sends funds to the vault when the check passes (GiantSavETHVaultPool.sol#L48-L58):
An attacker can pass an exploit contract as a vault. The exploit contract will implement liquidStakingManager that will return a valid staking manager contract address to trick a Giant pool into sending ETH to the exploit contract:
Consider taking a list of LiquidStakingManager addresses instead of vault addresses:
vince0656 (Stakehouse) confirmed
