Submitted by ladboy233, IllIllI, imare, csanuragjain, gzeon, Trust, Trust, Trust, Saintcode_, Josiah, pashov, jadezti, minhquanym, gz627, RaymondFam, fs0c, Mukund, xiaoming90, SmartSek, carlitox477, 9svR6w, wait, wait, unforgiven, hihen, KingNFT, ahmedov, Rolezn, BClabs, Lambda, nicobevi, and nicobevi
Note: per discussion with the judge, instead of highlighting only one submission related to centralization risks, all related findings are being compiled together under M-14 to provide a more complete report.
The _calculateAuctionPriceMultiplierByTicks() function is not properly implemented, it will revert when _maxPriceMultiplier < 1e18 or _minExpPriceMultiplier < 1e18, causes executeLiquidateERC721() not working. If the owner sets either of these numbers incorrectly, auctions will revert and the protocol will lose a lot of money.
The protocol determines whether an asset type can be auctioned purely by checking if the auctionStrategyAddress is configured. If the auctionStrategyAddress of an asset is configured, then it can be auctioned. 
However, upon inspecting the code, it was observed that the initialization function (ReserveLogic.init) and PoolParameters.setReserveAuctionStrategyAddress do not have any mechanism to prevent the admin from configuring the auctionStrategyAddress of the Uniswap v3 LP token. Thus, it is possible that the admin accidentally configures the auctionStrategyAddress of the Uniswap v3 LP token, and this results in Uniswap v3 LP token being auctionable.
Duplicates: 199, 234, 485, 488
each NToken contract holds all the users collaterals for specific underlying asset. poolAdmin is the admin of the pool and have some accesses but he/she shouldnt be able to withdraw and transfer users funds(the underlying asset). in the functions rescueERC721() which is only callable by poolAdmin, there is a check that make sures admin cant transfer underlying asset but in the function executeAirdrop() there is no checks. function executeAirdrop() make a external call with admin specified address, function, parameters. admin can set parameters so the logic would call underlyingAsset.safeTransferFrom(NToken, destAdderss, tokenId) or underlyingAsset.setApprovalForAll(destAddress, true) and then admin could transfer all the underlying assets which belongs to users. this is critical issue because all the protocol collaterals are in danger if poolAdmin private key get compromised.
Duplicates: 248, 272, 437, 477, 521
The owner role has a single point of failure and onlyOwner can use a few critical functions.
owner role in the paraspace project:
Owner is not behind a multisig and changes are not behind a timelock. There is no clear definition of the owner in the paraspace docs.
Even if protocol admins/developers are not malicious there is still a chance for Owner keys to be stolen. In such a case, the attacker can cause serious damage to the project due to important functions. In such a case, users who have invested in project will suffer high financial losses.
Duplicates: 29, 30, 54, 59, 86, 359, 375, 410, 433, 437, 441, 450, 473, 521
Duplicates: 236, 296, 437, 513
The admin can:
Duplicates: 516
The owner can update the implementation of various contracts, allowing theft of assets and general compromise of the protocol.
One example:
The owner of the PoolAddressProvider.sol contract can update the implementation of Pool contract by calling updatePoolImpl function.
The contract provides an easy way to add new functions using IParaProxy.ProxyImplementationAction.Add enum. This way a malicious user can add a malicious function in the Pool contract which can be used to steal tokens from other contracts which rely on the onlyPool modifier for their checks.
The contract owner or single user with a role is not prevented from renouncing the role/ownership while the contract is paused, which would cause any user assets stored in the protocol, to be locked indefinitely
