https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-11-non-fungible/blob/main/scripts/deploy.ts#L18
The scripts/ folder outlines a number of deployment scripts used by the team. Some of the contracts deployed utilise the ERC1967 upgradeable proxy standard. 
This standard involves first deploying an implementation contract and later a proxy contract which uses the implementation contract as its logic. When users make calls to the proxy contract, the proxy contract will delegate call to the underlying implementation contract. 
Exchange.sol implement an initialize() function which aims to replace the role of the constructor() when deploying proxy contracts
Exchange.sol inherits UUPSUpgradeable.sol. It is important that the contract is deployed and initialized in the same transaction to avoid any malicious frontrunning. Exchange.sol may potentially have initialized variable be false, and if this happens, the malicious attacker would take over the control.
it would be worthwhile to ensure the proxy contract is deployed and initialized in the same transaction, or ensure the initialize() function is callable only by the deployer of the proxy contract. This could be set in the proxy contracts constructor()
As a result, a malicious attacker could monitor the Ethereum blockchain for bytecode that matches the  contract and frontrun the initialize() transaction to gain ownership of the contract. This can be repeated as a Denial Of Service (DOS) type of attack, effectively preventing  contract deployment, leading to unrecoverable gas expenses.
Add a control that makes initialize() only call the Deployer Contract;
In another solution; Using the LibRLP library, which makes it possible to pre-calculate Foundrys contract deploy addresses, and deploy simultaneously using the Atomic transaction feature of Foundry and EVM.
https://twitter.com/transmissions11/status/1518507047943245824?s=20&t=-SgkBERLJqFRHn7392GrbA
