Submitted by 0x1f8b, also found by 0x4non, ak1, async, Chom, cryptphi, csanuragjain, datapunk, hyh, JC, Jeiwan, ladboy233, Lambda, leosathya, nalus, pashov, PwnPatrol, Rolezn, scaraven, and unforgiven
https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-09-y2k-finance/blob/ac3e86f07bc2f1f51148d2265cc897e8b494adf7/src/oracles/PegOracle.sol#L63
https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-09-y2k-finance/blob/ac3e86f07bc2f1f51148d2265cc897e8b494adf7/src/Controller.sol#L308
https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-09-y2k-finance/blob/ac3e86f07bc2f1f51148d2265cc897e8b494adf7/src/oracles/PegOracle.sol#L126
Different problems have been found with the use of the oracle that can incur economic losses when the oracle is not consumed in a completely safe way.
The problems found are:
The latestRoundData method of the PegOracle contract calls priceFeed1.latestRoundData(); directly, but does not perform the necessary round or timestamp checks, and delegates them to the caller, but these checks are performed on price2 because it calls getOracle2_Price in this case, this inconsistency between how it take the price1 and price2 behaves favors human errors when consuming the oracle.
For the timestamp issue, it should be checked like this:
MiguelBits (Y2K Finance) confirmed 
HickupHH3 (judge) decreased severity to Medium and commented:
