Migration.settleVault function should only be callable if the buyout initiated by the migration proposal is successful. However, it was observed that it is possible to call Migration.settleVault successfully even though the buyout initiated by the migration proposal has failed.
The following aims to demonstrate the issue:
This attack does not lead to loss of asset. Thus, Im marking this as Low. Even though the migration proposal has settled the vault successfully, when Alice calls Migration.migrateVaultERC[20|721|1155], it will revert because the Buyout.withdrawERC[20|721|1155] will detect that the caller (Migration module) is not the actual auction winner.
However, Migration.settleVault function could still be called successfully in a situation where it should be failing, thus it is something to be raised.
Ensure that the Migration.settleVault can only be called if the buyout initiated by the migration proposal (within Migration.commit) has succeeded.
