Submitted by Czar102, also found by shenwilly
DiamondCutFacet.sol#L16-L29
LibDiamond.sol#L94-L118
LibDiamond.sol#L222-L240
Diamond is to be upgraded after a certain delay to give time to the community to verify changes made by the developers. If the proposition can be falsified, the contract admins can exploit the contract in any way of their choice.
To determine the id of the proposal, only its facet changes are hashed, skipping two critical pieces of data - the _init and _calldata. During a diamond upgrade, devs can choose what code will be executed by the contract using a delegatecall. Thus, they can make the contract perform any actions of their choice.
Add _init and _calldata to the proposition hash.
jakekidd (Connext) confirmed and resolved:
0xleastwood (judge) decreased severity to Medium and commented:
