Submitted by TomFrenchBlockchain, also found by defsec, Dravee, and Jujic
Inability for sNOTE holders to exit the pool in the case of ownership over SNOTE contract being compromised/malicious.
sNOTE works on a stkAAVE model where users have to wait a set cooldown period before being able to reclaim the underlying tokens. This cooldown period can be set to an arbitrary uint32 value in seconds by the owner of the sNOTE contract.
https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-01-notional/blob/d171cad9e86e0d02e0909eb66d4c24ab6ea6b982/contracts/sNOTE.sol#L94-L97
Below in the startCooldown() function, its possible for the owner of the sNOTE contract to choose a value for coolDownTimeInSeconds which always causes this function to revert (_safe32 will always revert if coolDownTimeInSeconds = type(uint32).max).
https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-01-notional/blob/d171cad9e86e0d02e0909eb66d4c24ab6ea6b982/contracts/sNOTE.sol#L217-L226
Should ownership over sNOTE become compromised then all of the users assets may be locked indefinitely.
Provide a sensible upper limit to coolDownTimeInSeconds of, say, a month. This will give plenty of time for NOTE governance to withdraw funds in the event of a shortfall while giving confidence that a users funds cant be locked forever.
pauliax (judge) commented:
