Submitted by WatchPug
https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-01-insure/blob/19d1a7819fe7ce795e6d4814e7ddf8b8e1323df3/contracts/Vault.sol#L485-L496
The owner of the Vault contract can set an arbitrary address as the controller.
https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-01-insure/blob/19d1a7819fe7ce795e6d4814e7ddf8b8e1323df3/contracts/Vault.sol#L342-L352
A malicious controller contract can transfer funds from the Vault to the attacker.
A malicious/compromised can:
Consider disallowing Vault#setController() to set a new address if a controller is existing, which terminates the possibility of migrating funds to a specified address provided by the owner. Or, putting a timelock to this function at least.
oishun1112 (Insure) acknowledged and disagreed with severity:
0xean (judge) commented:
