Submitted by kirk-baird
The proposal to burn a users tokens for a flash governance proposal does not result in the user losing any funds and may in fact unlock their funds sooner.
The function burnFlashGovernanceAsset()  will simply overwrite the users state with pendingFlashDecision[targetContract][user] = flashGovernanceConfig; as seen below.
Since flashGovernanceConfig is not modified in BurnFlashStakeDeposit.execute() the user will have amount set to the current config amount which is likely what they originally transferred in {assertGovernanceApproved()](https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-01-behodler/blob/main/contracts/DAO/FlashGovernanceArbiter.sol#L60).
Furthermore, unlockTime will be set to the config unlock time.  The config unlock time is the length of time in seconds that proposal should lock tokens for not the future timestamp. That is unlock time may be say 7 days rather than now + 7 days. As a result the check in withdrawGovernanceAsset() pendingFlashDecision[targetContract][msg.sender].unlockTime < block.timestamp, will always pass unless there is a significant misconfiguration.
Consider deleting the users data (i.e. delete pendingFlashDecision[targetContract][user]) rather than setting it to the config. This would ensure the user cannot withraw any funds afterwards.
Alternatively, only update pendingFlashDecision[targetContract][user].amount to subtract the amount sent as a function parameter and leave the remaining fields untouched.
gititGoro (Behodler) confirmed
