Submitted by danb
https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-12-vader/blob/main/contracts/dex-v2/pool/VaderPoolV2.sol#L334
on the first deposit, the total liquidity is set to nativeDeposit.
this might be a very low number compared to foreignDeposit.
It can cause a denial of service of the pair.
A pair can enter a denial of service state.
consider the following scenario:
the owner of the pool calls setFungibleTokenSupport for a new token, for example weth.
a malicious actor calls mintFungible,  with nativeDeposit == 1 and foreignDeposit == 10 ether.
totalLiquidityUnits will be 1.
the pool can be arbitraged, even by the attacker, but totalLiquidityUnits will still be 1.
this means that 1 liquidity token is equal to all of the pool reserves, which is a lot of money.
It will cause a very high rounding error for anyone trying to mint liquidity.
then, anyone who will try to mint liquidity will either:
The rounding error losses will increase the pool reserves, which will increase value of liquidity tokens, so the hacker can even profit from this.
after this is realised, no one will want to provide liquidity, and since the pair cannot be removed or replaced, it will cause denial of service for that token forever.
SamSteinGG (Vader) acknowledged
