Submitted by gpersoon.
Suppose a Crowdsale is successful and enough commitments are made before the marketInfo.endTime.
Suppose marketStatus.commitmentsTotal  == marketInfo.totalTokens -1      // note this is an edge case, but can be constructed by an attacker
Then the function auctionEnded() returns true
Assume auctionSuccessful() is also true (might depend on the config of marketPrice.goal and marketInfo.totalTokens)
Then an admin can call finalize() to finalize the Crowdsale.
The function finalize distributes the funds and the unsold tokens and sets status.finalized = true so that finalized cannot be called again.
Now we have marketInfo.totalTokens -1 tokens left in the contract
However commitEth() or commitTokens() can still be called (they give no error message that the auction has ended)
Then functions call calculateCommitment, which luckily prevent from buying too much, however 1 token can still be bought
These functions also call \_addCommitment(), which only checks for marketInfo.endTime, which hasnt passed yet.
Now an extra token is sold and the contract has 1 token short. So the last person to withdraw his tokens cannot withdraw them (because you cannot specify how much you want to withdraw)
Also the revenues for the last token cannot be retrieved as finalize() cannot be called again.
https://github.com/sushiswap/miso/blob/master/contracts/Auctions/Crowdsale.sol#L374
Clearwood (Sushi Miso) confirmed and patched:
