{
    "Function": "slitherConstructorVariables",
    "File": "contracts/upgradeability/UUPSUpgradeable.sol",
    "Parent Contracts": [
        "contracts/upgradeability/ERC1967Upgrade.sol",
        "contracts/upgradeability/draft-IERC1822.sol"
    ],
    "High-Level Calls": [],
    "Internal Calls": [],
    "Library Calls": [],
    "Low-Level Calls": [],
    "Code": "abstract contract UUPSUpgradeable is IERC1822Proxiable, ERC1967Upgrade {\n    /// @custom:oz-upgrades-unsafe-allow state-variable-immutable state-variable-assignment\n    address private immutable __self = address(this);\n\n    /**\n     * @dev Check that the execution is being performed through a delegatecall call and that the execution context is\n     * a proxy contract with an implementation (as defined in ERC1967) pointing to self. This should only be the case\n     * for UUPS and transparent proxies that are using the current contract as their implementation. Execution of a\n     * function through ERC1167 minimal proxies (clones) would not normally pass this test, but is not guaranteed to\n     * fail.\n     */\n    modifier onlyProxy() {\n        require(\n            address(this) != __self,\n            \"Function must be called through delegatecall\"\n        );\n        require(\n            _getImplementation() == __self,\n            \"Function must be called through active proxy\"\n        );\n        _;\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * @dev Check that the execution is not being performed through a delegate call. This allows a function to be\n     * callable on the implementing contract but not through proxies.\n     */\n    modifier notDelegated() {\n        require(\n            address(this) == __self,\n            \"UUPSUpgradeable: must not be called through delegatecall\"\n        );\n        _;\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * @dev Implementation of the ERC1822 {proxiableUUID} function. This returns the storage slot used by the\n     * implementation. It is used to validate that the this implementation remains valid after an upgrade.\n     *\n     * IMPORTANT: A proxy pointing at a proxiable contract should not be considered proxiable itself, because this risks\n     * bricking a proxy that upgrades to it, by delegating to itself until out of gas. Thus it is critical that this\n     * function revert if invoked through a proxy. This is guaranteed by the `notDelegated` modifier.\n     */\n    function proxiableUUID()\n        external\n        view\n        virtual\n        override\n        notDelegated\n        returns (bytes32)\n    {\n        return _IMPLEMENTATION_SLOT;\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * @dev Upgrade the implementation of the proxy to `newImplementation`.\n     *\n     * Calls {_authorizeUpgrade}.\n     *\n     * Emits an {Upgraded} event.\n     */\n    function upgradeTo(address newImplementation) external virtual onlyProxy {\n        _authorizeUpgrade(newImplementation);\n        _upgradeToAndCallUUPS(newImplementation, new bytes(0), false);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * @dev Upgrade the implementation of the proxy to `newImplementation`, and subsequently execute the function call\n     * encoded in `data`.\n     *\n     * Calls {_authorizeUpgrade}.\n     *\n     * Emits an {Upgraded} event.\n     */\n    function upgradeToAndCall(address newImplementation, bytes memory data)\n        external\n        payable\n        virtual\n        onlyProxy\n    {\n        _authorizeUpgrade(newImplementation);\n        _upgradeToAndCallUUPS(newImplementation, data, true);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * @dev Function that should revert when `msg.sender` is not authorized to upgrade the contract. Called by\n     * {upgradeTo} and {upgradeToAndCall}.\n     *\n     * Normally, this function will use an xref:access.adoc[access control] modifier such as {Ownable-onlyOwner}.\n     *\n     * ```solidity\n     * function _authorizeUpgrade(address) internal override onlyOwner {}\n     * ```\n     */\n    function _authorizeUpgrade(address newImplementation) internal virtual;\n\n    uint256[50] private _gap;\n}"
}