Suppose a signature used in the transaction does not include an expiry time. This omission can make it vulnerable to replay attacks where the same transaction (signature) could be submitted repeatedly, potentially leading to unauthorized staking of ETH.
If the signature does not expire, it could be used long after the users intentions have changed. For example, a user might initially authorize a staking transaction but later, due to changing market conditions or personal preferences, wish to retract this authorization.
The repeated staking can cause financial discrepancies, allocate resources improperly, or disrupt the intended distribution and management of staked assets.
The smart contract would still process the transaction based on the old, now potentially unwanted, authorization, leading to mismanagement of user funds or assets against their current wishes.
https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-04-renzo/blob/519e518f2d8dec9acf6482b84a181e403070d22d/contracts/RestakeManager.sol#L618-L643
