title: Niigata Minamata disease

abstract: Niigata Minamata disease is a neurological syndrome caused by severe mercury poisoning. Identical in symptoms to the original outbreak of Minamata disease in Kumamoto Prefecture, the second outbreak in Niigata Prefecture was confirmed with the same name in 1965. The disease was caused by severe mercury poisoning, the source of which was methylmercury released in the wastewater from mercury sulfate-catalysed acetaldehyde production at the Showa Electrical Company's chemical plant in Kanose village. This highly toxic compound was released untreated into the Agano River where it bioaccumulated up the food chain, contaminating fish which when eaten by local people caused symptoms including ataxia, numbness in the hands and feet, general muscle weakness, narrowing of the field of vision and damage to hearing and speech. A total of 690 people from the Agano River basin have been certified as patients of Niigata Minamata disease. Since the Niigata outbreak was the second recorded in Japan and occurred in the Lower Agano River Basin, it is sometimes called Second Minamata disease or Agano River Organic Mercury Poisoning. It is one of the Four Big Pollution Diseases of Japan.

text:
# Niigata Minamata disease

**Niigata Minamata disease (新潟水俣病, *Niigata Minamata-byō*)** is a neurological syndrome caused by severe mercury poisoning. Identical in symptoms to the original outbreak of Minamata disease in Kumamoto Prefecture, the second outbreak in Niigata Prefecture was confirmed with the same name in 1965. The disease was caused by severe mercury poisoning, the source of which was methylmercury released in the wastewater from mercury sulfate-catalysed acetaldehyde production at the Showa Electrical Company's chemical plant in Kanose village. This highly toxic compound was released untreated into the Agano River where it bioaccumulated up the food chain, contaminating fish which when eaten by local people caused symptoms including ataxia, numbness in the hands and feet, general muscle weakness, narrowing of the field of vision and damage to hearing and speech.

A total of 690 people from the Agano River basin have been certified as patients of Niigata Minamata disease.

Since the Niigata outbreak was the second recorded in Japan and occurred in the Lower Agano River Basin, it is sometimes called Second Minamata disease (第二水俣病, *Dai-ni Minamata-byō*) or Agano River Organic Mercury Poisoning (阿賀野川有機水銀中毒, *Agano-gawa Yūki-suigin Chūdoku*). It is one of the Four Big Pollution Diseases of Japan.

## History

### Discovery

The second outbreak of Minamata disease in Niigata Prefecture was discovered in a very similar way to the original outbreak in Kumamoto Prefecture. From the autumn of 1964 to the spring of 1965, cats living along the banks of the Agano River had been seen to go mad and die: "...one cat ran into a small clay cooking stove containing burning charcoal. With the pupils of its eyes dilated, salivating, convulsing and uttering a strange cry, the cat breathed its last breath." These strange symptoms eventually began to appear in people, too. Professor Tadao Tsubaki of Niigata University examined two patients in April and May 1965 and suspected Minamata disease. One patient's hair was found to have a mercury level of 390 ppm. On 31 May, he reported an outbreak of organic mercury poisoning in the Agano River basin to the prefectural government and made his findings public on 12 June.

### Investigation

Throughout 1965 and 1966, researchers from the Kumamoto University Research Group (that had been set up to investigate the original outbreak) and Dr. Hajime Hosokawa (the former Chisso hospital director) brought their significant experience from Minamata and applied it to the Niigata outbreak. Many lessons were learned from Minamata and the investigation into the cause of the outbreak proceeded much more smoothly than it had in Minamata. The prefectural government, Niigata University, citizen's organisations, and local people all worked together to uncover the cause. In March 1966, factory plant wastewater was reported to be suspected as the source of pollution, and in September, the Ministry of Health and Welfare announced it had discovered methylmercury in moss at the outlet of the Showa Denko factory in Kanose village.

### Response of Showa Denko

Showa Denko responded to the outbreak of Niigata Minamata disease in a similar way that Chisso had responded in Minamata: by attempting to discredit the researchers while proposing their own theory. The company issued information leaflets that rejected their wastewater as the cause of the disease and suggested the cause might have been an "agricultural chemical run-off" that entered the river after the 1964 Niigata earthquake.

### Patients' lawsuit

Unlike their counterparts in Minamata, the victims of Showa Denko's pollution lived a considerable distance from the factory and had no particular link to the company. As a result, the local community was much more supportive of patients' groups and a lawsuit was filed against the company in March 1968. The Niigata lawsuit was filed only three years after the outbreak had been made public in 1965. In contrast, the first lawsuit filed in Minamata happened in 1969, 13 years after the original outbreak was discovered.

On 26 September 1968, the government announced its official conclusion as to the cause of Niigata Minamata disease. The report said, although "the circumstances of the poisoning are extremely complex, and they are difficult to reproduce", the mercury had probably been discharged from the Kanose plant over a long period of time. However, the report did not rule out other causes and Showa Denko's president, Masao Yasunishi, insisted the company was not the cause of the outbreak.

The Niigata lawsuit was ultimately successful, and on 29 September 1971, the court found Showa Denko guilty of negligence. Families of deceased and congenital patients received JPY10 million, surviving patients were awarded between JPY1 million and 10 million depending on symptoms, JPY400,000 to those contaminated by mercury, and JPY300,000 were awarded to pregnant women who had been told to have abortions due to the danger posed to their unborn children.

A family member of the deceased patient testified in court, "My father was crazed like a wild beast and then died—agonized, in pain... like a dog."

The events in Niigata catalysed a change in response to the original Minamata incident. The scientific research carried out in Niigata forced a re-examination of that done in Minamata and the decision of Niigata patients to sue the polluting company allowed the same response to be considered in Minamata. Masazumi Harada has said, "It may sound strange, but if this second Minamata disease had not broken out, the medical and social progress achieved by now in Kumamoto... would have been impossible."

### References

## InfoBox

| Minamata disease | |
| --- | --- |
| Specialty | Toxicology, Neurology, Psychiatry |
| Symptoms | Ataxia, numbness and muscle weakness. |
| Complications | Also may affect fetuses. See Minamata disease for more details |
| Duration | Chronic |
| Causes | Severe Mercury poisoning |
| Risk factors | Affected those near the Agano river |
| Diagnostic method | See Mercury poisoning |
| Differential diagnosis | See Mercury poisoning |
| Prevention | Proper handling of industrial waste (After the disease was discovered, a large cleanup project began) |
| Treatment | See Mercury poisoning |
| Medication | See Mercury poisoning |
| Prognosis | For more details see Mercury poisoning |
| Deaths | ? |


abstract: RPM (1964–2000) was the oldest music industry publication in Canada and was considered the country's "music bible". It published Canadian national record charts from June 22, 1964 until its final issue on November 13, 2000. British band the Beatles and American singer Madonna tied for having the most number-one singles in Canada during this period, each with 18. Nevertheless, after the end of RPM, Madonna continued to score an additional four number ones on Nielsen SoundScan's Canadian Singles Chart between 2000 and 2007, and two number ones on Billboard's Canadian Hot 100 since 2007, thus making her the artist with the most number-one singles in the history of Canadian recorded music. Bryan Adams was the Canadian artist with the most Canadian number-one singles during the RPM era, with 10 number-one singles. Nevertheless, after the end of RPM, Canadian singers Justin Bieber and Drake both surpassed his accomplishment, scoring 13 chart-toppers each on Billboard's Canadian Hot 100.

text:
# List of artists by number of Canadian number-one singles (RPM)

The Beatles (*left*) and Madonna each scored 18 Canadian number-one hits during the *RPM* era.

*RPM* (1964–2000) was the oldest music industry publication in Canada and was considered the country's "music bible". It published Canadian national record charts from June 22, 1964 until its final issue on November 13, 2000. British band the Beatles and American singer Madonna tied for having the most number-one singles in Canada during this period, each with 18. Nevertheless, after the end of *RPM*, Madonna continued to score an additional four number ones on Nielsen SoundScan's Canadian Singles Chart between 2000 and 2007, and two number ones on *Billboard*'s Canadian Hot 100 since 2007, thus making her the artist with the most number-one singles in the history of Canadian recorded music.

Bryan Adams was the Canadian artist with the most Canadian number-one singles during the *RPM* era, with 10 number-one singles. Nevertheless, after the end of *RPM*, Canadian singers Justin Bieber and Drake both surpassed his accomplishment, scoring 13 chart-toppers each on *Billboard*'s Canadian Hot 100.

## Artists with 10 number ones or more

| Artist | Total of
no. ones | Singles | Album | First reached
no. one | Total weeks
at no. one | Ref. |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| The Beatles | 18 | "A Hard Day's Night" | *A Hard Day's Night* | 17 August 1964 | 1 |  |
| | "I Feel Fine" | Standalone single | 28 December 1964 | 1 |  |
| | "Eight Days a Week" | Standalone single | 8 March 1965 | 2 |  |
| | "Ticket to Ride" | *Help!* | 24 May 1965 | 2 |  |
| | | "Help!" | 31 August 1965 | 1 |  |
| | "We Can Work It Out" | Standalone single | 24 January 1966 | 1 |  |
| | "Nowhere Man" | Standalone single | 28 March 1966 | 1 |  |
| | "Paperback Writer" | Standalone single | 4 July 1966 | 1 |  |
| | "Yellow Submarine"/"Eleanor Rigby" | Standalone single | 19 September 1966 | 1 |  |
| | "Penny Lane" | Standalone single | 25 March 1967 | 1 |  |
| | "All You Need Is Love" | Standalone single | 26 August 1967 | 2 |  |
| | "Hello, Goodbye" | Standalone single | 23 December 1967 | 3 |  |
| | "Hey Jude" | Standalone single | 30 September 1968 | 3 |  |
| | "Get Back" with (Billy Preston) | *Let It Be* | 19 May 1969 | 6 |  |
| | "Something" | *Abbey Road* | 15 November 1969 | 4 |  |
| | "Let It Be" | *Let It Be* | 11 April 1970 | 3 |  |
| | | "The Long and Winding Road" | 20 June 1970 | 2 |  |
| | "Got to Get You into My Life" | *Rock 'n' Roll Music* | 14 August 1976 | 1 |  |
| Madonna | 18 | "Like a Virgin" | *Like a Virgin* | 19 January 1985 | 1 |  |
| | "Crazy for You" | *Vision Quest* | 25 May 1985 | 1 |  |
| | "Live to Tell" | *True Blue* | 24 May 1986 | 2 |  |
| | | "Papa Don't Preach" | 9 August 1986 | 2 |  |
| | | "True Blue" | 22 November 1986 | 1 |  |
| | | "La Isla Bonita" | 6 June 1987 | 1 |  |
| | "Who's That Girl" | *Who's That Girl* | 29 August 1987 | 1 |  |
| | "Like a Prayer" | *Like a Prayer* | 29 April 1989 | 5 |  |
| | | "Express Yourself" | 29 July 1989 | 2 |  |
| | | "Cherish" | 14 October 1989 | 2 |  |
| | "Vogue" | *I'm Breathless* | 16 June 1990 | 3 |  |
| | "Justify My Love" | *The Immaculate Collection* | 2 February 1991 | 1 |  |
| | "This Used to Be My Playground" | Standalone single | 15 August 1992 | 3 |  |
| | "I'll Remember" | *With Honors* | 16 May 1994 | 5 |  |
| | "Secret" | *Bedtime Stories* | 14 November 1994 | 3 |  |
| | | "Take a Bow" | 6 March 1995 | 2 |  |
| | "Beautiful Stranger" | *Austin Powers: The Spy Who Shagged Me* | 26 July 1999 | 2 |  |
| | "Music" | *Music* | 11 September 2000 | 9 |  |
| Elton John | 17 | "Crocodile Rock" | *Don't Shoot Me I'm Only the Piano Player* | 17 February 1973 | 4 |  |
| | "Daniel" | | 2 June 1973 | 2 |  |
| | "Goodbye Yellow Brick Road" | *Goodbye Yellow Brick Road* | 22 December 1973 | 1 |  |
| | | "Bennie and the Jets" | 13 April 1974 | 2 |  |
| | "Don't Let the Sun Go Down on Me" | *Caribou* | 10 August 1974 | 2 |  |
| | | "The Bitch Is Back" | 2 November 1974 | 1 |  |
| | "Lucy in the Sky with Diamonds" | Standalone single | 11 January 1975 | 4 |  |
| | "Philadelphia Freedom" | Standalone single | 19 April 1975 | 2 |  |
| | "Don't Go Breaking My Heart"
(with Kiki Dee) | Standalone single | 21 August 1976 | 3 |  |
| | "Little Jeannie" | *21 at 33* | 19 July 1980 | 2 |  |
| | "I'm Still Standing" | *Too Low for Zero* | 16 July 1983 | 1 |  |
| | "I Don't Wanna Go on with You Like That" | *Reg Strikes Back* | 13 August 1988 | 3 |  |
| | "You Gotta Love Someone" | *Days of Thunder* | 26 January 1991 | 1 |  |
| | "Don't Let the Sun Go Down on Me"
(with George Michael) | Standalone single | 15 February 1992 | 3 |  |
| | "The One (Elton John song)" | *The One* | 5 September 1992 | 2 |  |
| | "Can You Feel the Love Tonight" | *The Lion King* | 8 August 1994 | 4 |  |
| | "Believe" | *Made in England* | 17 April 1995 | 4 |  |
| Bee Gees | 12 | "Words" | Standalone single | 9 March 1968 | 1 |  |
| | "I Started a Joke" | *Idea* | 20 January 1969 | 2 |  |
| | "Lonely Days" | *2 Years On* | 6 February 1971 | 1 |  |
| | "How Can You Mend a Broken Heart" | *Trafalgar* | 28 August 1971 | 2 |  |
| | "Jive Talkin'" | *Main Course* | 16 August 1975 | 1 |  |
| | "You Should Be Dancing" | *Children of the World* | 11 September 1976 | 1 |  |
| | "How Deep Is Your Love" | *Saturday Night Fever* | 24 December 1977 | 6 |  |
| | | "Stayin' Alive" | 18 February 1978 | 4 |  |
| | | "Night Fever" | 1 April 1978 | 5 |  |
| | "Too Much Heaven" | *Spirits Having Flown* | 20 January 1979 | 3 |  |
| | | "Tragedy" | 24 March 1979 | 4 |  |
| | | "Love You Inside Out" | 23 June 1979 | 1 |  |
| Phil Collins | 10 | "Against All Odds (Take a Look at Me Now)" | *Against All Odds* | 21 April 1984 | 4 |  |
| | "Easy Lover" (with Philip Bailey) | *Chinese Wall* | 9 February 1985 | 2 |  |
| | "One More Night" | *No Jacket Required* | 23 March 1985 | 1 |  |
| | "Separate Lives" (with Marilyn Martin) | *White Nights* | 23 November 1985 | 2 |  |
| | "A Groovy Kind of Love" | *Buster* | 29 October 1988 | 3 |  |
| | | "Two Hearts" | 21 January 1989 | 4 |  |
| | "Another Day in Paradise" | *...But Seriously* | 16 December 1989 | 8 |  |
| | | "I Wish It Would Rain Down" | 24 March 1990 | 6 |  |
| | | "Do You Remember?" | 14 July 1990 | 1 |  |
| | | "Something Happened on the Way to Heaven" | 13 October 1990 | 2 |  |
| Rod Stewart | 10 | "Maggie May" | *Every Picture Tells a Story* | 9 October 1971 | 1 |  |
| | "Tonight's the Night (Gonna Be Alright)" | *A Night on the Town* | 27 November 1976 | 6 |  |
| | "You're in My Heart (The Final Acclaim)" | *Foot Loose & Fancy Free* | 4 February 1978 | 1 |  |
| | "Da Ya Think I'm Sexy?" | *Blondes Have More Fun* | 24 February 1979 | 4 |  |
| | "Downtown Train" | *The Best of Rod Stewart* | 10 February 1990 | 3 |  |
| | "Rhythm of My Heart" | *Vagabond Heart* | 25 May 1991 | 2 |  |
| | | "The Motown Song"
(featuring The Temptations) | 5 October 1991 | 1 |  |
| | "Have I Told You Lately" | *Unplugged...and Seated* | 17 July 1993 | 1 |  |
| | "All for Love" (with Bryan Adams and Sting) | *The Three Musketeers* | 17 January 1994 | 5 |  |
| | "Leave Virginia Alone" | *A Spanner in the Works* | 3 July 1995 | 2 |  |
| Bryan Adams | 10 | "(Everything I Do) I Do It for You" | *Robin Hood: Prince of Thieves* | 3 August 1991 | 9 |  |
| | "Can't Stop This Thing We Started" | *Waking Up the Neighbours* | 26 October 1991 | 4 |  |
| | | "Thought I'd Died and Gone to Heaven" | 25 April 1992 | 1 |  |
| | "Please Forgive Me" | *So Far So Good* | 4 December 1993 | 6 |  |
| | "All for Love" (with Rod Stewart and Sting) | *The Three Musketeers* | 17 January 1994 | 5 |  |
| | "Have You Ever Really Loved a Woman?" | *Don Juan DeMarco* | 29 May 1995 | 5 |  |
| | "The Only Thing That Looks Good on Me Is You" | *18 til I Die* | 15 July 1996 | 1 |  |
| | | "Let's Make a Night to Remember" | 14 October 1996 | 2 |  |
| | "Back to You" | *Unplugged* | 19 January 1998 | 3 |  |
| | "On a Day Like Today" | *On a Day Like Today* | 2 November 1998 | 1 |  |
|


title: 1976–77 Macedonian Republic League

abstract: The 1975–76 Macedonian Republic League was the 33rd since its establishment. FK Rabotnichki won their 9th championship title.

text:
# 1976–77 Macedonian Republic League

The **1975–76 Macedonian Republic League** was the 33rd since its establishment. FK Rabotnichki won their 9th championship title.

## Participating teams

| Club | City |
| --- | --- |
| 11 Oktomvri | Prilep |
| Balkan | Skopje |
| Belasica | Strumica |
| FCU Skopje | Skopje |
| Karaorman | Struga |
| Kozhuf | Gevgelija |
| Kumanovo | Kumanovo |
| Ohrid | Ohrid |
| Osogovo | Kochani |
| Pelister | Bitola |
| Pobeda | Valandovo |
| Rabotnichki | Skopje |
| Rudar | Probishtip |
| Silika | Gostivar |
| Skopje | Skopje |
| Sloga | Skopje |
| Tikvesh | Kavadarci |
| Vardar | Negotino |

## Final table

| Pos | Team | Pld | W | D | L | GF | GA | GD | Pts |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | Rabotnichki | 34 | 18 | 9 | 7 | 62 | 39 | +23 | 45 |
| 2 | Pobeda Valandovo | 34 | 14 | 11 | 9 | 64 | 46 | +18 | 39 |
| 3 | Pelister | 34 | 16 | 6 | 12 | 49 | 31 | +18 | 38 |
| 4 | Belasica | 34 | 13 | 11 | 10 | 49 | 38 | +11 | 37 |
| 5 | Kozhuf | 34 | 11 | 14 | 9 | 33 | 28 | +5 | 36 |
| 6 | Vardar Negotino | 34 | 11 | 13 | 10 | 42 | 36 | +6 | 35 |
| 7 | Tikvesh | 34 | 13 | 9 | 12 | 53 | 48 | +5 | 35 |
| 8 | Kumanovo | 34 | 15 | 4 | 15 | 40 | 40 | 0 | 34 |
| 9 | Karaorman | 34 | 11 | 11 | 12 | 39 | 44 | 5 | 33 |
| 10 | Osogovo | 34 | 11 | 11 | 12 | 35 | 45 | 10 | 33 |
| 11 | Skopje | 34 | 9 | 14 | 11 | 47 | 47 | 0 | 32 |
| 12 | Sloga Skopje | 34 | 12 | 8 | 14 | 35 | 36 | 1 | 32 |
| 13 | Ohrid | 34 | 14 | 4 | 16 | 53 | 59 | 6 | 32 |
| 14 | Balkan | 34 | 9 | 14 | 11 | 34 | 42 | 8 | 32 |
| 15 | 11 Oktomvri | 34 | 13 | 5 | 16 | 39 | 48 | 9 | 31 |
| 16 | Silika Gostivar | 34 | 11 | 9 | 14 | 39 | 54 | 15 | 31 |
| 17 | Rudar Probishtip | 34 | 13 | 4 | 17 | 45 | 56 | 11 | 30 |
| 18 | FCU 55 | 34 | 8 | 11 | 15 | 44 | 61 | 17 | 27 |

Source:


title: Manje Gowda

abstract: Manje Gowda is an Indian educationist and philanthropist based in Bangalore, India. He is the co-founder and chairman of Vidya Soudha Group of Institutions and Managing Trustee of Sri Manjunatha Seva Trust which runs educational institutions in Bangalore, Hassan and Mysore districts in the southern Indian state of Karnataka.

text:
# Manje Gowda

**Manje Gowda** is an Indian educationist and philanthropist based in Bangalore, India. He is the co-founder and chairman of Vidya Soudha Group of Institutions and Managing Trustee of Sri Manjunatha Seva Trust which runs educational institutions in Bangalore, Hassan and Mysore districts in the southern Indian state of Karnataka.

## Early life and education

Gowda was born in Ankanahally village near Gorur in Hassan, Karnataka. He is married to H. S. Sudha, daughter of former minister H. C. Srikantaiah, and they have two sons. He completed his Bachelor of Engineering from Malnad College of Engineering, a Masters Degree in Engineering from Indian Institute of Science and an MBA from Bangalore University. He later went on to complete PhD from Indian Institute of Science at the Faculty of Engineering. He served in Government of Karnataka starting his career in Karnataka Public Works Department and went on to become the General Manager of Karnataka State Financial Corporation until his retirement in 2014.

## Social activities

Gowda is currently involved in several activities in promoting education, sports and business. Apart from serving as chairman of Vidya Soudha Group Of Institutions he is currently serving as the Vice-President of Karnataka Olympic Association, President of Karnataka Amateur Boxing Association and Zonal Secretary of Boxing Federation of India. He had previously served as President, Bengaluru Management Association (BMA), Chairman of Export Promotion Council For EOUs & SEZs (EPCES), Regional Governing Council, Cochin and Director on the board of Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board (BWSSB).

1. "Chairman's Desk - Institutes in Bangalore and Hassan". Retrieved 20 July 2022.
2. "Fun meets Learning at Vidya Soudha Public School". *The New Indian Express*. 16 March 2016. Retrieved 20 July 2022.
3. "Trustees - Vidya Soudha Group of Institutions". Retrieved 20 July 2022.
4. "Indian Institute of Science". Retrieved 26 July 2022.
5. "KOA set to revive State Oly Games". *Deccan Herald*. 18 May 2014. Retrieved 10 August 2022.
6. "Karnataka Olympic Association official website". *karnatakaolympicassociation.com*. Retrieved 20 July 2022.
7. Bureau, EastMojo News (5 February 2021). "Nagaland's Imtisunep AO now Zonal Joint Secretary of Boxing Federation of India". *EastMojo*. Retrieved 10 August 2022. `{{cite web}}`: `|last=` has generic name (help)
8. "BMA-Bangalore". *www.bmabangalore.com*. Retrieved 20 July 2022.
9. "Interactive Session on EOUs & SEZ".

## InfoBox

| Dr. Manje Gowda | |
| --- | --- |
|  | |
| Born | (1953-11-27) 27 November 1953 |
| Nationality | Indian |
| Alma mater | Indian Institute of Science |
| Occupation | Educationist |
| Organization | Vidya Soudha Group of Institutions |


title: Strapping

abstract: Strapping, also known as bundling and banding, is the process of applying a strap to an item to combine, stabilize, hold, reinforce, or fasten it. A strap may also be referred to as strapping. Strapping is most commonly used in the packaging industry.

text:
# Strapping

**Strapping**, also known as **bundling** and **banding**, is the process of applying a strap to an item to combine, stabilize, hold, reinforce, or fasten it. A strap may also be referred to as *strapping*. Strapping is most commonly used in the packaging industry.

## Types of strap

Strap is a flat, flexible material, most commonly made from steel or various types of plastic.

### Steel

Steel is the oldest and highest tensile strength strapping. It is available in a variety of widths and thicknesses as well as variations in the grade of steel. Steel is used for heavy duty holding where high strength and minimal stretch are desired. Surface finishes for steel strap include: paint, paint and wax, bluing, or zinc and wax. The wax is used to better transmit the tension around the bundle and for use with certain types of tensioners. Common applications include steel coils, bundles of metal, baling wire, bricks and other pavers, and roll end-binding.

Steel strapping is sold by weight rather than length due to the natural expansion and contraction of steel in the manufacturing process. A 3/4 x .020 steel strapping coil yields approximately 19.6 feet per pound.

### Polypropylene

Polypropylene strap (oriented or tensilized) is an economical material designed for light to medium duty unitizing, palletizing, and bundling. It is available in various widths, thicknesses, and polymer variations (e.g., copolymers). Most polypropylene is embossed, and some is also printed. This product offers higher elongation at break, but tends to have irrecoverable dead stretch with constant stress. What is not generally known to end users is that polypropylene strapping will lose about 50% of the applied tension within one hour, and that this tension loss is accelerated with increases in ambient temperature. Consequently, although it is suitable for packs due to a degree of stored energy that will take up any relaxation that occurs in the strap, unacceptable strap slackness may occur after time if used on solid product, such as brick or concrete. Furthermore, polypropylene strapping is susceptible to UV degradation and can degrade quickly if left exposed to the elements. UV degradation can be mitigated by specifying the use of black strap or a UV inhibitor.

Polypropylene strapping can be printed. For the highest quality and precision, printing occurs during production (and pre-embossing). Printing can also occur post-production over the embossing, at the cost of reduced quality. Both options offer security and marketing advantages to the strapped product.

### Polyester

Oriented or tensilized polyester and nylon are the strongest plastic strapping products and are used as a viable alternative to steel strapping in some industries. Polyester provides excellent retained tension on rigid loads. Its excellent recovery properties help a load absorb impact without strap breakage.

There are specialized types available for specific applications. For instance, in cold climates a strap bonded in hot melt glue is used because it is weather-proof.

### Nylon

Nylon strap has the greatest specific strength of the three plastics, but it is rarely used due to its high price. Nylon strap used to be very popular, but over time polyester strap has almost completely replaced nylon. Nylon strap is still used in cold room applications, however, because it does not creep as much as the other types of plastic.

### Corded and woven

Corded and woven strapping are available in several constructions, primarily involving polyester and rayon. Some types are reusable. Because this system uses a buckle for a joint, corded and woven strapping can have a larger system strength than steel banding. Corded polyester strapping also has a higher elongation than other strapping systems, which gives it an ideal memory for sea and rail shipments. Because corded and woven polyester straps are light and soft, they are also a safer alternative to steel banding.

### Paper

Paper strap is used to strap paper products between industrial processes. This allows the bundle to be introduced into the process without cutting the straps, which can lead to the product falling apart prematurely.

### Composite

Composite strapping has polyester filaments embedded longitudinally down the length of the strap that provides the tensile strength. These polyester yarn fibers are embedded within a polypropylene coating. The polypropylene provides foam to the strap, but also improves the non-slip characteristic when combined with the wire buckle. In the load securing industry, composite is often referred to as "synthetic steel". It is very abrasion-resistant and has the highest joint efficiency when used with a buckle. Both advantages are not affected by climate.

## Uses of strapping

Examples include:

Strapping is most often used in complete horizontal or vertical bands. *Edge protectors* are used to help distribute the load at corners and reduce damage done to the load by the tensioned strap. Strapping can also be used in loops attached to holding locations on rail cars, skids, etc.

## Joining methods

After the strap is tensioned, the strap is often sealed to itself. Steel strap is sealed with a seal and notch joint, a seal and crimp, seal-less joint, or via welding. Seals come in various shapes depending on the application; some can be put on after the strap is tensioned, while others must be installed before tensioning. To create the seal, the seal and strap are notched on both sides; if one set of notches are created then it is called a *single notch* joint, if two sets of notches are created then it is called a *double notch* joint. Crimp joints also use a seal, but crimp undulations are used instead of formed notches. These crimps form great frictional forces which keep the joint from seeping. Seal-less joints are created by forming interlocking *keys* into the middle of the strap.

Plastic strap is most commonly joined by melting the straps together by adding heat to the joint. For lighter gauge strap, usually 16 mm (0.63 in) and narrower, heat is introduced with a hot knife system. First, the hot knife moves in between the straps. Then a platen comes up and compresses the straps and hot knife against an anvil on the order of tens of milliseconds. The platen then drops and the hot knife is removed. After the hot knife is completely clear of the straps the platen comes back up and compresses the joint so that the melted portions of the strap mix and harden.

For thicker plastic strap, usually 0.73 mm (0.029 in) and thicker, friction is used to create heat within the joint. The process starts with the strap compressed between the platen and the anvil. There is a vibrator built into either the platen or the anvil, which has teeth; there are also teeth on the opposite component, which does not move. The vibrator is quickly vibrated, which creates enough heat to melt the interface between the two strap, because of friction. To complete the weld the vibrator is stopped and the pressure held until the joint has solidified. Polypropylene and Polyester strapping can also be sealed in a similar manner with the heat being produced by sound in the form of Ultrasonic waves passing through the materials and exiting the molecular structure. They are then compressed as in a heat seal. In ultrasonic welding of plastics, high frequency (15 kHz to 40 kHz ) low amplitude vibration is used to create heat by way of friction between the materials to be joined. The interface of the two parts is specially designed to concentrate the energy for the maximum weld strength.

It may also be joined manually by crimping a seal or via a buckle.

The joint is the weakest part of the system, therefore the type of joining method used is very important if strength is an issue. The strength of a joint is defined as the force required to break the strap in uniaxial tension. This is then compared to the uniaxial strength of the strap and recorded as the percent difference (e.g., a sample of steel strap may have a 5,000 lb (2,300 kg) break strength and the seal may fail at 3,000 lb (1,400 kg), so the seal is said to have a 60% strength). Hot knife welds have a minimum break strength of 55%. Friction welds have a minimum break strength of 65%. Well set up strapping machines or friction weld tools will aim for around 80% of break strength. Metal clips/seals are surprisingly low with about 100 – 120 kg slip resistance.

For pallets strapping based on norm ASTM D3953 Standard Specification, the number of the strapping procedure is around 10 times for a minimal.

## Equipment

There are two major types of equipment available for strapping: hand tools, and *strapping machines* or *banding machines*. A dispenser is used with both types of equipment to dispense the strap. Some strapping machines have the dispenser built-in; others (typically those on large arch machines) have a separately powered dispenser, which can automatically load or thread new coils. Non-powered separated dispensers have a pulley which releases and activates a brake to stop the inertia of the coil and keep the strap from over-running onto the floor. Typically, dispensers used on large arch strapping machines have multiple pulleys to act as a way to store strap in a way that can be quickly dispensed. Smaller arch machines, such as tabletop machines, will feed strap into a pool box/accumulator instead. In both cases this is required; otherwise, the strapping machine will draw the strap faster than the dispenser can pay off.

### Hand tools

There are two types of hand tools: manual, and automatic.

Both manual and automatic tools are available as combination tools, which perform the tensioning, sealing and cutting, or as separate tensioners, sealers, and cutters. Manual and automatic hand sealers for steel can use either a seal or a seal-less joint.

Manual tensioners and crimping systems are available for low-volume applications. Manual sealers for plastic strap always use a seal and a compression (serrated seals) or crimp joint (smooth-faced seals).

Automatic hand tools are used for higher-volume applications. Automatic tools can be powered by an electric battery, or by compressed air. Automatic hand tools for plastic strap use a friction weld.

### Strapping machines

Strapping machines, also known as *bundlers* or *banders*, are used for higher-volume applications or special applications. They are available in horizontal and vertical orientations (with the vertical orientation being far more common). They are also available in bottom seal, side seal, and top seal orientations, which define where the joint is located on the bundle.

Strapping machines are available in semi-automatic and automatic varieties. The automatic machines can additionally be used inline with conveyor systems. A photocell is used to detect when the bundle is in the correct location, stop the conveyors, and activate the strapping machine. Most, however, will be found in standalone applications. Semi-automatic and fully automatic strapping machines substantially improve efficiency in a warehouse and also the overall presentation of a packaged product. The saved labor can often easily cover the relatively low cost of the strapping machine.

Both semi- and fully-automatic strapping machines can easily be included in a packing production line where packing tables and strapping machines are positioned at workable heights.

Banding machines like strapping machines allow the unitization and securing of products with a variety of different shapes and sizes.

Banding machines, however, are less damaging to the product being strapped, since the larger widths of bands available (20mm - 100mm) allow greater surface area that minimizes the harm on sensitive products. Banding machines can also run on paper straps for a more eco-friendly alternative to plastic strapping.

Operation is by photo-sensor, foot pedal, or a PLC, allowing these machines to be integrated into production lines or for standalone operation.

Automatic strapping machines allow hands-free securing of parcels with automatically tensioned, sealed, and cut polypropylene strapping.

These machines are operated either by foot pedal or parcel sensor, which makes them ideal for volume throughput.

Semi-automatic strapping machines will allow one operator to automatically tension, seal, and cut polypropylene strapping to give neat and secure fastening on any size box.

Adjustable strap tensioning to suit each package prevents strap damage to softer boxes.

## Further reading

## Standards

* ASTM D3953 Standard Specification for Strapping, Flat Steel and Seals
* ASTM D3950 Standard Specification for Strapping, Nonmetallic (and Joining Methods)
* ASTM D4675 Standard Guide for Selection and Use of Flat Strapping Materials
* BS EN13891:2003 Tensional Strapping - Guide to selection and use of tensional strapping
* BS EN13394:2001 Packaging Specification for non-metallic strapping


title: William A. Kittredge

abstract: William A. Kittredge was a Chicago designer and author on design.

text:
# William A. Kittredge

**William A. Kittredge** (1891 – July 26, 1945) was a Chicago designer and author on design.

## Biography

William A. Kittredge was born in 1891 in Lowell, Massachusetts to printer Albion Kittredge and was apprenticed to Thomas Parkhurst of the Parkhurst Press. After his apprenticeship, he worked at the Riverside Press in Cambridge, art director for a printing house in Philadelphia and various printing houses in New York and Boston as compositor, pressman, layout man, and art director.

Kittredge was Director of Design and Typography for Lakeside Press under R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co.'s of Chicago from 1922 to 1945, supervising all design services for the company. Under Kittredge's direction, Lakeside produced work for Chicago's Caxton Club and the Limited Editions Club. He also produced the "Four American Books" commissioning leading artists for cover designs including Rudolph Ruzicka for *Walden*, Edward A. Wilson for *Two Years Before the Mast*, W.A. Dwiggins, and Rockwell Kent for *Moby Dick*. These books were highly regarded for their printing craftsmanship. He further gained recognition for articles on the craft of printing in *American Printer*, *Inland Printer*, *Publishers Weekly*, and *The Colophon.*

He was an instructor at Northwestern University from 1927 to 1929 and 1931 to 1934. Kittredge was a founding member of the Society of Typographic Arts and the Chicago Art Directors Club. He was awarded the AIGA medal in 1939. Ruzicka wrote for *News-Letter* of his acceptance of the medal saying Kittredge's work was modern due to its "sparsely ornamented simplicity, dignified use of materials, \[and\] fitness to purpose."

Kittredge died July 26, 1945.

1. "INVENTORY OF THE WILLIAM A. KITTREDGE PAPERS, 1907-1952,BULK 1922-1944". Retrieved 2016-12-06.
2. "WILLIAM A. KITTREDGE, A TYPE DESIGNER, 54". Retrieved 2016-12-06.
3. R.R. Donnelley and Sons Company. *William A. Kittredge, his work at the Lakeside press*. Chicago.
4. Hutner, Martin; Kelly, Jerry (2004-01-01). *A Century for the Century: Fine Printed Books from 1900 to 1999*. David R. Godine Publisher. ISBN 9781567922202.
5. "AIGA Medal and Medalists". *AIGA | the professional association for design*. Retrieved 2016-12-06.


title: Thors, Aube

abstract: Thors is a commune in the Aube department in north-central France.

text:
# Thors, Aube

**Thors** is a commune in the Aube department in north-central France.

## Population

Historical population
| Year | Pop. | ±% |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1962 | 100 |  |
| 1968 | 103 | +3.0% |
| 1975 | 81 | −21.4% |
| 1982 | 64 | −21.0% |
| 1990 | 78 | +21.9% |
| 1999 | 98 | +25.6% |
| 2008 | 77 | −21.4% |

## InfoBox

| Thors | |
| --- | --- |
| Commune | |
| Location of Thors | |
| ThorsThors | |
| Coordinates: 48°18′18″N 4°48′43″E / 48.305°N 4.8119°E / 48.305; 4.8119 | |
| Country | France |
| Region | Grand Est |
| Department | Aube |
| Arrondissement | Bar-sur-Aube |
| Canton | Bar-sur-Aube |
| Government | |
| Mayor (20202026) | Jean-Claude Gouvernet |
| Area**1** | 8.33 km2 (3.22 sq mi) |
| Population (2021) | 67 |
| Density | 8.0/km2 (21/sq mi) |
| Time zone | UTC+01:00 (CET) |
| Summer (DST) | UTC+02:00 (CEST) |
| INSEE/Postal code | 10378 /10200 |
| Elevation | 155 m (509 ft) |
| **1** French Land Register data, which excludes lakes, ponds, glaciers \> 1 km2 (0.386 sq mi or 247 acres) and river estuaries. | |


title: Osadía

abstract: Osadía is a street theatre company formed in Barcelona, Spain in 1966 by artist Alex Rendon and featuring hair art.

text:
# Osadía

**Osadía** ("Audacity" in Spanish) is a street theatre company formed in Barcelona, Spain in 1966 by artist Alex Rendon and featuring hair art.

## Style of show

Osadia perform an innovative concept of hair art. Artists actively seek the audience participation - by asking for volunteers to have their hair 'done'. Each volunteer is invited to take a seat and let the artists use their imagination, creating daring and original hairstyles.

They also use various objects which have been made for the event, and these are placed on the heads of the participants. The head sculptures are inspired in the theme of the festival or event. Once finished, the ‘creation’ is a visual reminder of the event.

## Performances

Osadia have performed at many venues, including the 1998 World Expo in Lisbon, the Edinburgh Fringe Festival - as well as venues across England, France, USA, Japan, Germany Spain and Italy.

Tollwood Festival, Munich / Sydney Mardi Gras, Australia / Trafalgar Square Festival, London, UK / Juste pour rire/Just for laughs, Montreal, Canada / The Esplanade Festival, Singapore / NZ International Festival, Wellington, New Zealand / Kleines Fest im Grossen Garten, Hanover / Daidogei World Cup, Shizuoka, Japan / Hogmanay, Edinburgh, Scotland / Festes de la Mercè, Barcelona

## Press articles

"In Wellington, Art has gone to people´s heads." CNN. The Art Club

"OSADIA gathered crowds as they performed free psychedelic hairdos..." *The Times*

"..they are incredibly creative and quick (...) All hairdressers should try and see them -they are stunningly good." *The Scotsman*

"for those brave enough to take a seat in the barber´s chair, artistic duo will create weird, wild and wonderful hair sculptures using creative and innovative concepts of hairdressing. The less brave can simply watch the frantic creations take shape before their eyes." *City of Sydney Times*.

"...recklessly, I add myself to the onlookers who watch the mind-boggling hairdressing performance of Osadia." Mercedes Abad. *El País*

"Bewilderment and amazement (...). The "daring" of a special salon that works live." Santiago Fondevila. *La Vanguardia*

"Osadia´s repertoire includes performance as well as visual art. The show unfolds on a stage with two barber´s chairs and mirrors. The "hair sculptors" play up to the crowd in make up, costumes and theatrical headgear." *The Dominion*. Wellington. New Zealand

"This act, all the way from sunny Spain, were another favourite with the crowds. They create fantastically strange hairdo's on willing and brave audience members using a variety of materials and coloured sprays" BBC


abstract: Niigata Meikun Junior and Senior High School is a private secondary school in the city of Niigata, Niigata Prefecture, Japan.

text:
# Niigata Meikun Junior and Senior High School

**Niigata Meikun Junior and Senior High School** (新潟明訓中学校・高等学校, *Niigata Meikun Chūgakkō Kōtōgakkō*) is a private secondary school in the city of Niigata, Niigata Prefecture, Japan.

## History

The school was established in 1921.

In 2004, the campus moved from Kawagishi-chō in Chūō-ku (near Hakusan Station) to Kitayama in Kōnan-ku (near Kameda Station).

In 2007, the junior high school was founded in addition to the existing senior high school.

## Notable alumni

37°52′53.5″N 139°6′48.5″E / 37.881528°N 139.113472°E / 37.881528; 139.113472

## InfoBox

| Niigata Meikun Junior and Senior High School
新潟明訓中学校・高等学校 | |
| --- | --- |
| The school building | |
| Location | |
|  | |
| Kōnan-ku, Niigata, Niigata Prefecture
Japan | |
| Information | |
| Type | Junior high school
Senior high school |
| Established | 1921 |
| School code | 15501C |
| Grades | Junior high school grades 1-3
Senior high school grades 1-3 |
| Gender | Mixed-sex education |
| Number of students | Approx. 360 (junior, April 2016)
1,194 (senior, April 2016) |
| Website | Official website |


title: United States war plans (1945–1950)

abstract: United States war plans for a conflict with the Soviet Union (USSR) were formulated and revised on a regular basis between 1945 and 1950. Although most were discarded as impractical, they nonetheless would have served as the basis for action had a conflict occurred. At no point was it considered likely that the Soviet Union or United States would resort to war, only that one could potentially occur as a result of a miscalculation. Planning was conducted by agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in collaboration with planners from the United Kingdom and Canada. American intelligence assessments of the Soviet Union's capabilities were that it could mobilize as many as 245 divisions, of which 120 could be deployed in Western Europe, 85 in the Balkans and Middle East, and 40 in the Far East. All war plans assumed that the conflict would open with a massive Soviet offensive. The defense of Western Europe was regarded as impractical, and the Pincher, Broiler and Halfmoon plans called for a withdrawal to the Pyrenees, while a strategic air offensive was mounted from bases in the United Kingdom, Okinawa, and the Cairo-Suez or Karachi areas, with ground operations launched from the Middle East aimed at southern Russia. By 1949, priorities had shifted, and the Offtackle plan called for an attempt to hold Soviet forces on the Rhine, followed, if necessary, by a retreat to the Pyrenees, or mounting an Operation Overlord–style invasion of Soviet-occupied Western Europe from North Africa or the United Kingdom. Despite doubts about its viability and effectiveness, a strategic air offensive was regarded as the only means of striking back in the short term. The air campaign plan, which steadily grew in size, called for the delivery of up to 292 atomic bombs and 246,900 short tons (224,000 t) of conventional bombs. It was estimated that 85 percent of the industrial targets would be completely destroyed. These included electric power, shipbuilding, petroleum production and refining, and other essential war fighting industries. About 6.7 million casualties were anticipated, of whom 2.7 million would be killed. There was conflict between the United States Air Force and the United States Navy over naval participation in the strategic bombing effort, and whether it was a worthwhile use of resources. The concept of nuclear deterrence did not figure in the plans.

text:
# United States war plans (1945–1950)

**United States war plans** for a conflict with the Soviet Union (USSR) were formulated and revised on a regular basis between 1945 and 1950. Although most were discarded as impractical, they nonetheless would have served as the basis for action had a conflict occurred. At no point was it considered likely that the Soviet Union or United States would resort to war, only that one could potentially occur as a result of a miscalculation. Planning was conducted by agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in collaboration with planners from the United Kingdom and Canada.

American intelligence assessments of the Soviet Union's capabilities were that it could mobilize as many as 245 divisions, of which 120 could be deployed in Western Europe, 85 in the Balkans and Middle East, and 40 in the Far East. All war plans assumed that the conflict would open with a massive Soviet offensive. The defense of Western Europe was regarded as impractical, and the **Pincher**, **Broiler** and **Halfmoon** plans called for a withdrawal to the Pyrenees, while a strategic air offensive was mounted from bases in the United Kingdom, Okinawa, and the Cairo-Suez or Karachi areas, with ground operations launched from the Middle East aimed at southern Russia. By 1949, priorities had shifted, and the **Offtackle** plan called for an attempt to hold Soviet forces on the Rhine, followed, if necessary, by a retreat to the Pyrenees, or mounting an Operation Overlord–style invasion of Soviet-occupied Western Europe from North Africa or the United Kingdom.

Despite doubts about its viability and effectiveness, a strategic air offensive was regarded as the only means of striking back in the short term. The air campaign plan, which steadily grew in size, called for the delivery of up to 292 atomic bombs and 246,900 short tons (224,000 t) of conventional bombs. It was estimated that 85 percent of the industrial targets would be completely destroyed. These included electric power, shipbuilding, petroleum production and refining, and other essential war fighting industries. About 6.7 million casualties were anticipated, of whom 2.7 million would be killed. There was conflict between the United States Air Force and the United States Navy over naval participation in the strategic bombing effort, and whether it was a worthwhile use of resources. The concept of nuclear deterrence did not figure in the plans.

## Background

In 1944, at the height of World War II, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) forecast that the war would result in the United States and the Soviet Union becoming the leading world powers. While Britain was still an important power, its position was greatly diminished. On 5 February, the JCS produced an assessment of Soviet post-war intentions. It was expected that the Soviet Union would demobilize most of its forces to facilitate the reconstruction of its economy, which had been devastated by the war, and was not expected to recover before 1952. Until then, the Soviet Union would seek to avoid conflict, but for its own security it would attempt to control border states. Even after demobilization, the capabilities of the Soviet Union would be formidable. American intelligence reports estimated that it would retain over 4,000,000 troops under arms, with 113 divisions. Another 84 divisions would be available from satellite nations.

During World War II, the United States mobilized the largest armed forces in American history. The United States Army, which at the time included the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF), had a strength of 8.3 million, of which 3 million were deployed in the European Theater of Operations, and the United States Navy and United States Marine Corps had a combined strength of 3.8 million. By early 1945, plans called for 21 divisions (about 1,000,000 personnel) to be redeployed from Europe to the Pacific via the United States for the invasion of Japan. About 400,000 personnel were to remain in Europe on military occupation duties, and the Army would release 2 million personnel from active duty under a points system whereby soldiers were awarded points based for length of service, length of overseas service, children and decorations. Those with the highest scores had priority for separation from the Army. By the time of the surrender of Japan in August 1945, 581,000 Army personnel had been separated. Under overwhelming public and political pressure, the demobilization of United States armed forces after World War II proceeded much faster than originally planned. By 30 June 1946, the strength of the Army had declined to 1,434,000, the Navy to 983,000 and the Marine Corps to 155,000; by 30 June 1947, the Army was down to 990,000, the Navy to 477,000 and the Marine Corps to 82,000, and only one division remained in Europe. Meanwhile, the economies of European nations were still recovering from the war, and their ability to maintain forces was constrained.

The Joint Staff Planners (JSP) consulted with Vannevar Bush, the Chairman of the Joint Committee on New Weapons and Equipment, and Major General Leslie R. Groves, the director of the Manhattan Project, on the potential of new weapons then under development, in particular nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. Bush doubted that it was possible to build a missile like the German V-2 rocket of World War II, but with an extended range of 2,000 nautical miles (3,700 km). Even if the rocket was possible, it would still require allied overseas bases to reach the Soviet Union. Groves was more optimistic; while he agreed that long-range missiles were not technologically feasible in 1945, he thought that they might be in the next ten to twenty years. As for atomic bombs, he recommended that a stockpile be built up but warned that the destruction of a nation's industrial capacity would not affect the outcome of a war.

The JCS fashioned a defense posture and war plans oriented toward a single contingency—an all-out global conflict. Mainly they relied on strategic bombardment with nuclear weapons as the country’s principal deterrent and first line of defense. This strategy was found as most practical, effective, and affordable form of defense, and laid foundation for a series of war plans developed over the next few years for dealing with a possible conflict with the Soviet Union.

## Pincher (1946)

On 2 March 1946, the Joint War Plans Committee (JWPC) circulated a discussion paper for an outline war plan codenamed Pincher. The outline, which was revised in April and June, estimated that the Soviets could deploy 270 divisions in Europe, 42 in the Middle East, and 49 in the Far East sixty days after mobilization. The most likely flashpoint for hostilities was the Middle East, where Soviet ambitions might come into conflict with those of Britain. The United States would be neutral in such a conflict, but might eventually be drawn into it, as had occurred in 1917 and 1941. The Soviet Union had the resources to quickly overrun Europe east of the Rhine. The Rhine was a major barrier, but it was anticipated that it could not be held for long, forcing US and British forces to retreat to the Pyrenees. The planners believed that the Italian, Iberian, Danish and Scandinavian peninsulas could be held against superior numbers, but expected that the British and French forces would concentrate on defending their homelands, and would be unwilling to divert the resources required to hold Scandinavia, although they might assist in attempting to hold Spain and Italy. The Soviet drive into Western Europe would likely be accompanied by one into the Middle East. If the Soviets also attacked in the Far East, US forces would fall back to Japan.

The objective of the United States forces would be to hold the British Isles, North Africa, India, China and Japan, from whence strategic air operations could be launched, while the Navy blockaded the Soviet Union's ports. The concept of launching a second Operation Overlord was rejected; it would involve fighting the Soviet forces where they were strongest, and far from their homeland. The possibility of recapturing Scandinavia was considered, but the logistical difficulties were great. The preferred course of action was therefore to attack the Dardanelles and Bosporus, and invade the Soviet Union via the Black Sea. The plan did not specifically call for the use of nuclear weapons, although it noted that bases within Boeing B-29 Superfortress range of key targets were lacking. At the time the B-29 was the USAAF's most advanced long-range bomber. There was no concept for operations beyond the initial counter-offensive, and the logistical implications of deploying a large force in the Middle East were not explored. Nonetheless, on 8 July 1946 the Joint Strategic Planners accepted Pincher as the basis for planning.

The JWPC and the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) then produced a series of regional studies based upon Pincher. The first was Broadview, which was issued on 5 August, and revised on 24 October 1946. It dealt with the defense of North America. Long-range weapons meant that the heartland could no longer be considered invulnerable. In the immediate future, the Soviet Union was capable of conducting one-way air strikes and commando raids, and submarines could attack shipping and lay mines in American waters. The major threat, though, was seen as sabotage and subversion by Soviet agents. After 1950, there was a possibility the Soviet Union would develop nuclear weapons, and the long range aircraft or missiles to deliver them against cities in the United States. The possibility of an invasion of Alaska was also considered. To counter these threats, the United States would need mobile ground forces to counter raids, an air warning system, and antisubmarine forces.

Plan Griddle, which was issued on 15 August 1946, dealt with the defense of Turkey. The Turkish Army was large, with 48 divisions, but it lacked modern equipment. The study estimated that the Soviet Union could deploy up to 110 divisions against Turkey without compromising operations elsewhere. A two-pronged advance was envisaged, with an attack on Eastern Thrace from Soviet-aligned Bulgaria, coupled with one into Anatolia from Soviet Transcaucasia. Airborne and amphibious forces could strike at both sides of the Dardanelles and Bosporus. From Turkey, Soviet forces could advance into Iraq and Iran. It was estimated that Turkey could hold out for at most 120 days before Turkish forces had to fall back to the western Anatolian coast. Nonetheless, Turkey figured large in American strategy as a potential base for air attacks on the Soviet Union, and blunting the Soviet drive into the Middle East. The study therefore called for increased military aid to Turkey, and development of Turkish airbases and ports.

This led to the next study, which was issued on 2 November 1946. It was codenamed Caldron, and dealt with the Middle East. While the Soviet Union produced ample oil for its own peacetime needs, the planners felt that it had insufficient reserves for a major conflict, and therefore that seizing the oil resources of the Middle East would be a Soviet priority. Conversely, this would deny them to the Allies. The region was also considered as an important staging area for an attack on the Soviet Union, so it was expected that the Soviets would move to preclude that. Up to 85 Soviet divisions would be available for operations in the Middle East, where the British would have five divisions to stop them. Soviet forces were expected to reach Palestine within 60 days. About 14 Allied divisions could be concentrated in Egypt.

Cockspur, a study of the threat to Italy, was dated 20 December 1946. It envisaged an attack on Italy by Yugoslav forces while Soviet forces concentrated on overrunning Germany, although once this was accomplished Soviet forces could then invade Italy from the north. The Allies had the option of trying to defend northern Italy, which was regarded as impractical, or conducting a fighting retreat. This raised the prospect of Allied forces there being overrun or destroyed, leaving nothing for the defense of Sicily. The study therefore recommended that the best course of action was to immediately withdraw to Sicily.

Since the Pincher plan called for a withdrawal to the Pyrenees, the Iberian Peninsula assumed considerable importance. Accordingly, Drumbeat, which was issued on 4 August 1947, dealt with its defense. It was estimated that Spain could mobilize 22 divisions in sixty days, but the quality of the Spanish Army was regarded as only fair. Portugal could mobilize another two divisions, and there were 5,000 British troops in Gibraltar. The JWPC did not believe that the Soviet Union would attack Spain, but the possibility was considered. It was estimated that as many as 20 Soviet divisions could reach the Pyrenees by D plus 45, and 50 by D plus 90. Nonetheless, the planners assessed that there was a chance that the Allies could hold Spain.

The Far East was considered a theater of secondary importance. Plan Moonrise, which covered it, was presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 29 August 1947. It was estimated that the Soviet Union could deploy about 45 divisions in the region. Given the limitations of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, the Soviet Union's main target would be China. The Nationalist Chinese Army was large, but also largely ineffective, and the Soviet forces would be augmented by 1.115 million Chinese Red Army troops and 2 million militia, and perhaps three divisions from Mongolia, a Soviet satellite state. The first phase of a Soviet attack was expected to target the Port Arthur area. Manchuria would soon be overrun and Beijing would fall in about ten days. The planners estimated that Soviet forces could reach the Yellow River by D plus 90, and Nanjing and Hankou in another three weeks. An advance to the Yangtze River was not anticipated. At the time, US forces still garrisoned Korea, but the plan called for the American forces there to be withdrawn to Japan.

## Broiler (1947)

Although the Pincher studies were not accepted as a war plan by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 16 July 1947 the JWPC informed the Joint Staff Planners that sufficient progress had been made to formulate one. On 29 August, the Joint Strategic Plans Committee (JSPC), which had replaced the JSP with the enactment of the National Security Act of 1947, instructed the Joint Strategic Plans Group (JSPG) to develop one based on Pincher, with the assumptions that a war would occur in 1948, that the United States would be allied with Britain and Canada, and that atomic weapons would be used. The increased emphasis on atomic weapons represented an important change in emphasis.

The resultant war plan was codenamed Broiler. Its starting point was estimates of the available strength of the US forces furnished by the three services; assessments of deficiencies would be based upon the plan at a later stage. The JSPG also drafted a longer-range war plan based on Broiler called Bushwacker, for a war starting on 1 January 1952, and one codenamed Charioteer, for one in 1955 that assumed that Western Europe had already been overrun and a strategic air campaign was called for. The planners had no political guidance as to what the ultimate objective of the war would be, so it was assumed that it would be to drive the Soviet Union back to its 1939 borders.

The same scenario as Pincher was envisaged, and the Joint Intelligence Staff's assessment of Soviet Union's capabilities remained substantial: it could mobilize as many as 245 divisions. Of these, 120 could be deployed in Western Europe, 85 in the Balkans and Middle East, and 40 in the Far East. This gave it the capability of overrunning most of Europe in 45 days. In the longer term, the Soviet Union was expected to possess not just numerical superiority but technological equality as well. It was anticipated that the Soviet Union would have developed nuclear weapons by 1952, and long range bombers to deliver them to targets in the United States by 1956.

To secure the United States, Greenland and Iceland would be occupied. The development of aerial refuelling capability would permit B-29 and the Boeing B-50 Superfortress, an improved version of the B-29, aircraft to attack twenty major urban areas in the Soviet Union. B-29s were converted to Boeing KB-29 Superfortress aerial tankers, but the first planes were not delivered until late 1948; 77 would be in service by May 1950. Major overseas bases would be established in the United Kingdom, Okinawa and Karachi; the Cairo-Suez and Basra areas were rejected as indefensible. The JSPG admitted that Karachi was far from ideal as a base, but at least it was defensible.

The American mobilization plan, JCS 1725/1, submitted on 13 February 1947, was based on the assumption that nuclear weapons would not be used. It called for an Army of 13 divisions at the outbreak of hostilities, which would be increased to 45 divisions in a year, and 80 divisions in two years. This was similar to what had been achieved in World War II. In July the JWPC submitted a plan based on the use of nuclear weapons. On the assumption that between 100 and 200 nuclear weapons would be available, it called for 34 atomic bombs to be dropped on 24 Soviet cities; seven would be dropped on Moscow, three on Leningrad and two each on Kharkov and Stalingrad. It was reckoned that this would do massive damage to the Soviet Union's industries, and would kill or injure about one million of its citizens. The damage might well cause the Soviet Union to sue for peace.

The assumption that a hundred atomic bombs were available was not correct. The number of bombs in the stockpile was a closely-guarded secret in 1947. President Harry S. Truman was shocked when he was informed how small the stockpile really was. By June 1948, components for about fifty Fat Man and two Little Boy bombs were on hand. These were not whole and complete bombs, but components that had to be assembled by specially trained Armed Forces Special Weapons Project assembly teams known as special weapons units. A well-trained team could assemble a bomb in two days, but the teams that had assembled the bombs during the war had returned to civilian life. The first United States Army unit was formed in August 1947, followed by a second in December, and a third in March 1948. Bomb components would have to be delivered to the assembly teams at forward bases by transport aircraft.

In 1948, training of a United States Navy special weapons unit began, as the Navy foresaw the delivering of Little Boy nuclear weapons from its *Midway*-class aircraft carriers with Lockheed P2V Neptune and North American AJ Savage bombers. An additional Army unit was created in May 1948, and two United States Air Force units in September and December 1948. The Air Force gradually became the agency most concerned with the delivery of nuclear weapons, and by the end of 1949 it had twelve special weapons units, with another three in training, while the Army had four, and the Navy three, one for each of the three *Midway*-class carriers. The Navy's claim to a role in strategic bombing caused friction with the Air Force.

Only Silverplate B-29 bombers were capable of delivering Fat Man nuclear weapons, and of the 65 Silverplate B-29s that had been made, only 32 were still operational at the start of 1948, all of which were assigned to the 509th Bombardment Group, which was based at Roswell Army Airfield in New Mexico. Trained crews were also in short supply; at the beginning of 1948 only six crews were qualified to fly atomic bombing missions, although enough personnel had been trained to assemble an additional fourteen crews in an emergency. Up to 20 percent of the target cities were beyond the 3,000-nautical-mile (5,600 km) range of the B-29, requiring a one-way mission, which would expend the crew, bomb and aircraft. The Convair B-36 Peacemaker, with a range of 4,000 nautical miles (7,400 km), was in the process of being introduced to service in 1948, but was not atomic capable. There were also doubts about the ability of the B-29 to penetrate Soviet air space; as a propeller-driven bomber it was no match for Soviet jet fighters, even at night.

The forced reliance on nuclear weapons represented an important doctrinal change. During World War II, the USAAF had devastated Axis cities, but had clung to the doctrine of precision bombing even as it had drifted away in practice to area bombing; the latter had now become doctrine. One reason for this was the paucity of intelligence on the precise location of the Soviet Union's industrial facilities. It was hoped that with the power of atomic bombs, just finding the right cities would be good enough.

However, this was far from certain. In January 1949, Lieutenant General Curtis LeMay, who assumed command of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) in October 1948, ordered a practice attack on the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base as an exercise. A similar exercise had been conducted in May 1947, when 101 B-29s were ordered to attack New York; 30 had not left the ground due to mechanical problems. This time, the crews were ordered to attack at combat altitude of 30,000 feet (9,100 m) rather than the customary 10,000 to 15,000 feet (3,000 to 4,600 m), which was warmer and did not require cabin pressurization or the use of oxygen masks, and at night, using radar bombing techniques. They were given 1938 maps of Dayton, Ohio, which while old, were better than the ones they had of the Soviet Union. The high altitude and cold temperatures took their toll on aircraft and crews alike. Many sorties were cancelled due to freezing rain, and the radar had difficulty locating targets due to ground clutter and thunderstorm activity. Of the 303 simulated attacks on the target, two-thirds were more than 7,000 feet (2,100 m) from the target, and the average error was 10,000 feet (3,000 m). The atomic bombs of the era would have left the target unscathed. LeMay said, "Not one airplane finished that mission as briefed. *Not one.*"

When the Joint Logistics Committee (JLC) studied the plan, it assessed that the Mediterranean line of communications to the Cairo-Suez area would require 912 ships after six months. If the Mediterranean were closed, the longer route around the Cape of Good Hope and the Red Sea would call for 1,042 ships. Over two years the need would rise to 2,252 and 3,848 ships respectively. On 2 September 1947, after a more detailed examination of requirements, the figure for support via the Red Sea after six months was raised from 1,042 to 1,788 ships. The JLC calculated that it would take 16 months to reactivate so many mothballed cargo ships. Allied forces would require 32,360 short tons (29,360 t) of supplies per day, but the combined capacity of the Red Sea ports was only 26,400 short tons (23,900 t).

A 14 October 1947 assessment of aircraft requirements for the first twelve months came to 91,332 aircraft of all types, but a month later the Munitions Board (the successor to the Army-Navy Munitions Board under the National Security Act of 1947) reported that this was unrealistic. The JLC assessed the mobilization requirements as unrealistic too, as they would require 300,000 men per month to be inducted, which would put enormous strain on the training and logistical infrastructure. On 23 January 1948, the Munitions Board reported that Broiler and Charioteer called for resources that were not available. It was estimated that the stockpiling of equipment and activation of standby munitions plants would require $139.6 million in fiscal year 1949 (equivalent to $1417 million in 2023), but only $37.6 million (equivalent to $382 million in 2023) was available. It recommended that a more realistic war plan be drafted.

The JSPC presented Broiler to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 10 March 1948. A slightly modified version, codenamed Frolic, was forwarded to the Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal. Although Broiler was accepted as an emergency war plan, all the Joint Chiefs had reservations about it. The Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, did not like the reliance on the use of nuclear weapons when it was uncertain that their use would be authorized. The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Louis E. Denfeld, did not agree with the concept of abandoning Western Europe, which he argued was contrary to the foreign policy and national objectives of the United States. He contended that a better strategy would be to build up US forces in Europe to the point that a stand could be made on the Rhine.

## Halfmoon (1948)

By 1948, the United States had become enmeshed in great power politics. At the same time, severe limitations on defense spending created an ever-widening gap between capabilities and obligations. Western Europe remained weak and divided, and China was wracked with the Chinese Civil War. Planners from the United States, Britain and Canada met in Washington, D.C., from 12 to 21 April 1948, and they drew up an outline emergency war plan based on Broiler.

This resulted in a new plan called Halfmoon (renamed Fleetwood in August 1948). The number of countries assumed to be on the Allied side was increased. It was assumed that the British Commonwealth, the Western Union countries (France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg), and the entire Western Hemisphere would be allies of the United States, and that Turkey, Spain, Norway, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen would become allies if attacked by the Soviet Union. At the insistence of the British that it was feasible to hold the Cairo-Suez area, a base there was substituted for the one in Karachi, although the Americans retained the latter as a back up. A strategic air offensive would be launched with B-36 bombers from the United States and B-29 and B-50 bombers based in the United Kingdom, Cairo-Suez and Okinawa.

Halfmoon assumed that atomic bombs would be used from the outset by the United States, and by the Soviet Union too once it had developed them. US intelligence (incorrectly) assessed that this would not be in 1949. In the absence of adequate conventional forces, the planners felt that they had no alternative. The President, Harry S. Truman, was briefed on Halfmoon on 6 May 1948, and he expressed misgivings. He asked Leahy to prepare an alternative plan to "resist a Russian attack without using atomic bombs for the reason that we might not have them available either because they might at that time be outlawed or because the people of the United States might not at the time permit their use for aggressive purposes."

The Secretary of the Army, Kenneth C. Royall, was particularly disturbed by Truman's objection, and circulated a memo on 19 May calling for a review of national policy regarding the use of nuclear weapons. He raised the matter at a National Security Council (NSC) meeting the next day chaired by the Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, who considered Truman's policy of resisting the Soviet Union without the means to do so was "playing with fire while we have nothing with which to put it out." In July Forrestal told the Joint Chiefs to ignore the President's request for an alternative plan. The policy that Royall called for was drafted by the Air Force in July, updated with minor revisions in early September, and adopted by the NSC as NSC 30 on 16 September. It stated that:

> 12. It is recognized that, in the event of hostilities, the National Military Establishment must be ready to utilize, promptly and effectively all appropriate means available, including atomic weapons, in the interests of national security and must therefore plan accordingly.
>
> 13. The decision as to the employment of atomic weapons in the event of war is to be made by the Chief Executive when he considers such decision to be required.

Thus, after three years, the inclusion of nuclear weapons in war plans was officially authorized. While the president remained the sole authority on their use, the selection of targets and the circumstances in which they would be used was in the hands of the planners. An updated version of Halfmoon was issued on 28 January 1949 called Trojan. This contained an annex detailing the strategic air offensive. This would target 70 Soviet cities with 133 nuclear weapons, of which eight would be dropped on Moscow and seven on Leningrad. The main change from Fleetwood was the addition of Greece, Italy, Iceland, Ireland, the Philippines and Switzerland to the list of allies, but at the same time dropping the assumption that Arab countries would be on the Allied side, due to the deterioration of relations with the United States in the wake of the 1948 Arab–Israeli War and the creation of the state of Israel.

The JLC used Halfmoon as the basis for a new mobilization plan called Cogwheel in response to a request from the Secretary of Defense to provide details that could be used by the Munitions Board as a basis for industrial mobilization. Cogwheel detailed the requirements of the war plan for the first two years, assuming a start of hostilities on 1 July 1949. The only point of disagreement among the three services concerned the construction of additional aircraft carriers; the Army and Air Force believed that the Navy had sufficient on hand or in mothballs, and the additional carriers could not be completed in two years, by which time the Army and Air Force would have completely mobilized. This was submitted on 1 September 1948. On 6 December the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered the three services to prepare revised mobilization plans. Before this could occur, the Munitions Board submitted its assessment of Cogwheel. It concluded that aircraft production would be 60 percent of requirements by the end of the first year. Further, it was assessed that demand for raw materials such as copper and aluminum would exceed supply, that those for munitions exceeded the capacity to produce them, and that the call for manpower exceeded the ability of the Selective Service System to process them. The Munitions Board therefore decided to base its planning on 50 percent of the requirements of Cogwheel.

Projected force levels under the Cogwheel plan
| Force | At start | After one year | After two years |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Army divisions | 20 | 40 | 80 |
| Air Force groups | 66 | 103 | 186 |
| Navy warships | 510 | 1,785 | 2,976 |
| Navy aircraft carriers | 11 | 16 | 25 |

On 4 October 1948, Denfeld told the Senate Armed Services Committee:

> The unpleasant fact remains that the Navy has honest and sincere misgivings as to the ability of the Air Force successfully to deliver the \[atomic\] weapon by means of unescorted missions flown by present-day bombers, deep into enemy territory in the face of strong Soviet air defenses, and to drop it on targets whose locations are not accurately known.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved Trojan on 28 January 1949, but recognized that it fell short of a war plan that could be implemented. General Omar N. Bradley, the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, admitted that the Army had serious deficiencies of both personnel and equipment that it was unable to correct due to budget limitations. Similarly, Denfeld reported that the Navy did not have the resources to carry out its part, and the Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force, General Hoyt Vandenberg stated that the Air Force did not have the means to conduct Trojan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff estimated that $29 billion (equivalent to $291 billion in 2023) was required for fiscal year 1950, but the administration would only support $17 to $18 billion (equivalent to $171 billion to $181 billion in 2023).

## Offtackle (1949)

On 25 February 1949, the acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower issued a directive providing more guidance for the strategic planners. He accepted that the Rhine could not be held with the available forces, but wanted a return to Western Europe at the earliest possible date. Over the next seven months, a new plan called Offtackle was drawn up. This was followed by a second round of planning conferences with British and Canadian representatives from 26 September to 4 October. For the first time, some political guidance was available from the National Security Council in the form of NSC 20/4. It stated that the policy of the United States would not initiate war with the Soviet Union, but a conflict could result from a miscalculation on the part of the Soviet Union, such as an underestimation of American resolve. In this, it affirmed an assumption that had already been built into the war plans from Pincher on. It also informed the Joint Chiefs that in the event of war with the Soviet Union, it would not be required to force an unconditional surrender or to conduct an occupation. Like previous war plans, Offtackle only dealt with the opening stages of the war and not with the concluding stages or post-conflict issues.

The strategic air campaign outlined in Offtackle was even more ambitious than Trojan. The campaign called for the delivery of 292 atomic bombs and 246,900 short tons (224,000 t) of conventional bombs. It was estimated that 85 percent of the industrial targets would be completely destroyed. These included electric power, shipbuilding, petroleum production and refining, and other essential war fighting industries. Moreover, it was hoped that the campaign would not just cripple Soviet industry, but loosen the control of the government over the people, undermine the determination to prosecute the war, disrupt mobilization, and retard the advance of Soviet ground forces into Western Europe. However, SAC lacked the resources to implement the plan. With its available aircraft, it could carry out only 2,000 sorties in the first two months, far short of the 6,000 called for in the plan. Supporting them would require 360 Douglas C-54 Skymaster sorties or their equivalent, but only 260 were allocated to SAC. Spare parts for the B-50s were in short supply, and the amount of avgas in the war reserve was insufficient.

The first steps towards developing an alliance of western countries for an organized and coordinated defense came with the formation of the Western Union on 17 March 1948. This was a mutual defensive alliance consisting of the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. It was followed by the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on 4 April 1949. On 6 October 1949, Truman signed into law the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, which provided $1 billion (equivalent to $10 billion in 2023) for NATO allies to purchase weapons and equipment. The American ground forces consisted of one division and three regiments in Europe, and five divisions in the United States. The whole NATO alliance could field ten divisions in West Germany, but it was estimated that at least eighteen were required to halt a Soviet advance on the Rhine. Despite misgivings, in December 1949 the twelve NATO allies accepted a common defense plan.

To fulfil Eisenhower's directive, the planners considered other options. The main ones were to fall back to the Pyrenees and hold there, or to mount an Operation Overlord–style invasion of Soviet-occupied Western Europe from North Africa or the United Kingdom. The forces for the former were lacking, so the latter strategy was adopted. Field Marshal Lord Montgomery, the Chairman of the Commanders-in-Chief Committee of the Western European Union, reported on 15 June 1950 that "as things stand today and in the foreseeable future, there would be scenes of appalling and indescribable confusion in Western Europe if we were ever attacked by the Russians." He felt that NATO forces were incapable of holding the Rhine, and sought a new directive; in the end the Western European Union ordered him to hold the Rhine.

Forrestal expressed doubts about the plan, which he thought relied too much on the Soviets doing what they were expected to do. He questioned whether strategic bombardment could win a war. Before he committed to the purchase of millions of dollars worth of aircraft, he wanted some assurances. An interservice committee chaired by Lieutenant General Hubert R. Harmon, USAF, was formed to investigate. The report reiterated that in the absence of adequate conventional forces, the strategic air campaign was all that there was. It estimated that it would result in a 30 to 40 percent decrease in Soviet industrial capacity. About 6.7 million casualties were anticipated, of whom 2.7 million would be killed. The survivors would face life without electric power or fuel. Nonetheless, the Harmon committee doubted that it would destroy civilian morale; based on World War II experience, the opposite would be more likely. A separate question, left unanswered, was whether it could be successfully conducted, given the poor state of intelligence regarding the Soviet Union. Denfeld, for one, doubted that it could, and proposed that instead a tactical air campaign be conducted to retard the Soviet advance into Western Europe. The Air Force pressed ahead with procurement of the long-range B-36 bomber, which led to a confrontation between the Navy and the Air Force known as the Revolt of the Admirals, and to the relief of Denfeld, who was replaced by Admiral Forrest Sherman.

## Outcome

Interservice conflict was relieved by the outbreak of the Korean War and the consequent increase in the defense budget from $14.258 billion in fiscal year 1950 (equivalent to $143 billion in 2023) to $53.208 billion in fiscal year 1951 (equivalent to $501 billion in 2023) and $65.992 billion in fiscal year 1952 (equivalent to $608 billion in 2023). This allowed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to contemplate a 21-division Army, 143-wing Air Force and 402-ship Navy. The Soviet Union's detonation of its first atomic bomb in August 1949—a year before the earliest date that the Joint Intelligence Committee had assessed as possible and four years earlier than the date it regarded as most probable on 22 March 1948—led to a revision of estimates of the Soviet nuclear stockpile. It was now expected to have 10 to 20 bombs by mid-1950, 45 to 90 by mid-1952, and 120 to 200 by mid-1954. This was immediately incorporated into the next draft of the Offtackle war plan dated 25 October. Both sides were assumed to use nuclear weapons from the commencement of hostilities. The United States now had to contemplate the air defense of North America. On 30 March 1949, Truman signed into law legislation authorizing the establishment of 75 radar stations at a cost of $85.5 million (equivalent to $859 million in 2023). No money was appropriated, so only some site selection had been carried out by January 1950.

The Operation Sandstone nuclear tests in April and May 1948 had demonstrated improved designs, with the X-Ray and Yoke tests having yields of 37 kilotons of TNT (150 TJ) and 41 kilotons of TNT (170 TJ) respectively—nearly twice that of the older Mark 3 Fat Man devices in the inventory. The new Mark 4 nuclear bomb, which entered service in March 1949, was a more practical piece of ordnance than its predecessor, and its composite uranium-plutonium core made more economical use of the available fissile material. In May 1948, the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory commenced work on the design of the Mark 5 nuclear bomb, a smaller and lighter weapon. The development of Soviet atomic bombs provided the impetus for the development of even more destructive thermonuclear weapons. On 31 December 1949, the Strategic Air Command had 521 B-29s, B-36s and B-50s capable of delivering atomic bombs. It was estimated that SAC bombers would suffer 35 percent casualties at night, and fifty percent if missions had to be conducted in daylight. The delivery of the 292 atomic bombs called for by the Offtackle plan was regarded as practical, but there would be no ability to launch follow-up raids. A jet bomber, the Boeing B-47 Stratojet was under development, but would not become operational until 1953. The concept of nuclear deterrence did not figure in the war plans; nuclear weapons were seen purely as weapons of war.

In 1947 the United States European Command (EUCOM) ordered the sole American division stationed in Europe, the 1st Infantry Division, which was scattered about the US Occupation Zone in West Germany, to reassemble to constitute a theater reserve. It was relieved of its occupation duties and its commander, Major General Frank W. Milburn, was ordered to resume its tactical training. By 1950, it was still scattered, while EUCOM looked for suitable locations for its consolidation. To build up the US ground forces, the Joint Chiefs decided to deploy four more divisions to Europe in 1951. Plans for the defense of the Rhine were still regarded as unsound as NATO was short 8,000 tanks, 9,200 half-tracks and 3,200 artillery pieces. Equipment that had been purchased during World War II was increasingly becoming obsolescent or unserviceable. The commander of the Army's Logistics Division, Major General Henry S. Aurand, reported in September 1948 that the Army had 15,526 tanks, but only 1,762 were serviceable. By June 1950, four hundred M26 Pershing tanks had been rebuilt as the new M46 Patton.

The war plans of the late 1940s were never put to the test. It is not known whether the Soviet Union would have overrun Western Europe, whether the strategic air offensive would have succeeded, or even who would have won such a war. The disparity between military means and political commitments weighed heavily on the planners. They concentrated on Soviet capabilities rather than intentions. The assessment of the intent of the Soviet Union was that it did not want to risk a war due to the devastated state of its economy. A calculated risk was taken on that basis. "As long as we can outproduce the world, can control the sea and strike inland with the atomic bomb," Forrestal noted in December 1947, "we can assume certain risks otherwise unacceptable in an effort to restore world trade, to restore the balance of power-military power and to eliminate some of the conditions that breed war."


title: Widows Creek Fossil Plant

abstract:
Widows Creek Fossil Plant was a 1.6-gigawatt coal power plant, 4.8 miles (7.7 km) east of Stevenson, Alabama, USA. The plant, operated by the Tennessee Valley Authority, generated about nine billion kilowatt-hours of electricity a year. It had one of the tallest chimneys in the world at 305 metres (1,001 ft), which was built in 1977, and was removed December 3, 2020 in a controlled demolition.
Along with the Chimney of the Harllee Branch Power Plant, it is the tallest chimney to be demolished in the United States.

text:
# Widows Creek Fossil Plant

**Widows Creek Fossil Plant** (also known as the **Widows Creek Power Plant**) was a 1.6-gigawatt (1,600 MW) coal power plant, 4.8 miles (7.7 km) east of Stevenson, Alabama, USA. The plant, operated by the Tennessee Valley Authority, generated about nine billion kilowatt-hours of electricity a year. It had one of the tallest chimneys in the world at 305 metres (1,001 ft), which was built in 1977, and was removed December 3, 2020 in a controlled demolition. Along with the Chimney of the Harllee Branch Power Plant, it is the tallest chimney to be demolished in the United States.

## History

Initially, six identical 140-MWe units were built between 1952 and 1954. Two more units (575 and 550 MWe name-plate capacity) were added in 1961 and 1965.

The last load of coal was delivered to the plant on September 18, 2015, with only one of its eight generation units working. The coal was enough to power Unit 7 until September 23, 2015.

## Accidents and incidents

On January 9, 2009, the plant experienced a dam break on a gypsum slurry pond, and spilled up to 10,000 US gallons (38 m3) of waste (possibly including boron, cadmium, molybdenum and selenium) into the creek of the same name on the property, inundating it with an ashlike substance.

## EPA compliance agreement

On April 14, 2011, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) announced a settlement with the Tennessee Valley Authority to resolve alleged Clean Air Act violations at 11 of its coal-fired plants in Alabama, Kentucky, and Tennessee. Under the terms of the agreement, the entire Widows Creek plant was affected:

* Units 16 were retired in stages of two units per year, beginning by July 31, 2013 and ending by July 31, 2015
* Units 7 & 8 were to be fitted with selective catalytic reduction (SCR) devices to reduce their emissions of nitrogen oxide (NO*x*)
* In December, 2020, the towering smokestack at the Widows Creek Fossil Plant, standing at an height of 1,001 feet, was brought down in a controlled demolition using explosives. This operation, completed in a mere 90 seconds, effectively removed the largest remaining structure at the 8-unit coal-fired power plant situated along the Tennessee River.

## Future

On June 24, 2015, Google, a multinational technology company, announced it would invest $600 million to install a data center on land made available by the retirement of Units 1-6. A renewable power capacity equivalent to the data center's needs will be added somewhere on the TVA system, so the data center will run on renewable energy. The project broke ground in April 2018.

## InfoBox

| Widows Creek Fossil Plant | |
| --- | --- |
| Widows Creek Fossil Plant | |
|  | |
| Country | United States |
| Location | Jackson County, near Stevenson, Alabama |
| Coordinates | 34°53′03″N 85°45′18″W / 34.88417°N 85.75500°W / 34.88417; -85.75500 |
| Status | Being decommissioned |
| Commission date | Unit 1: July, 1952
Unit 2: October, 1952
Unit 3: November, 1952
Unit 4: January, 1953
Unit 5: June, 1954
Unit 6: July, 1954
Unit 7: February, 1961
Unit 8: February, 1965 |
| Decommission date | Unit 7: September, 2015 |
| Owners | Tennessee Valley Authority |
| Thermal power station | |
| Primary fuel | Bituminous coal |
| Cooling source | Tennessee River |
| Power generation | |
|  | |
|  | |
| Units decommissioned | 8 |
| Nameplate capacity | 1,600 MW |
| Annual net output | 9,000 GWh |
| External links | |
| Commons | Related media on Commons |
| \[edit on Wikidata\] | |


title: Thomas Winnington (1696–1746)

abstract: Thomas Winnington, of Stanford Court, Stanford on Teme. Worcestershire, was an English Whig politician who sat in the House of Commons from 1726 to 1746.

text:
# Thomas Winnington (1696–1746)

**Thomas Winnington** PC (31 December 1696  23 April 1746), of Stanford Court, Stanford on Teme. Worcestershire, was an English Whig politician who sat in the House of Commons from 1726 to 1746.

## Biography

Winnington was the second, but eldest surviving, son of Salwey Winnington of Stanford Court, Member of Parliament for Bewdley, and his wife Anne Foley, daughter of Thomas Foley, MP, of Witley Court, Worcestershire. He was grandson of Sir Francis Winnington, who had been Solicitor General in the 1670s. He was educated at Westminster School and matriculated at Christ Church, Oxford in 1713. He was admitted to Middle Temple in 1714.

Winnington entered Parliament at a by-election on 31 January 1726 as a Tory Member of Parliament for Droitwich, but very soon after became a Whig and supported the Administration. He was returned unopposed again in 1727 and 1734. At the 1741 returned for Droitwich and also elected in a contest for Worcester (a more prestigious constituency), and he chose to sit for Worcester in what turned out to be his last Parliament.

A supporter of the Prime Minister Robert Walpole, Winnington was made a Lord of the Admiralty in 1730, and served as a Lord of the Treasury from 1736 to 1742; in 1741 he was made a Privy Counsellor and became Cofferer of the Household. When Henry Pelham became Prime Minister in 1743, he appointed Winnington Paymaster General of the Forces, the post he himself had held in the previous administration (although unlike Pelham, Winnington was not accorded a seat in the Cabinet); he held this post for the remaining two-and-a-half years of his life.

Winnington purchased the shares of the elder sisters in the family estate of Stanford (which his grandfather Sir Francis had acquired for the family through his second marriage), and in 1674 he bought the leasehold interest under the crown of the manor of Bewdley.

## Family

In 1719, Winnington married Love Reade, daughter of Sir James Reade, Bt. of Brocket Hall, Hertfordshire. They had no children. Winnington became the lover of Etheldreda Townshend in 1742 and it was said that she was the one in charge. The affair provoked a duel but eventually ended shortly before he died after a quarrel related to the Jacobite cause. The Stanford Court estate subsequently passed to his cousin who became Sir Edward Winnington, 1st Baronet. The Elizabethan mansion of Stanford Court was burnt on 5 December 1882, and the valuable books and manuscripts in the old library were destroyed. Stanford Court was rebuilt and remained the family seat until sold by Sir Francis Winnington, 6th Baronet in 1949.